No More Learning

Head Quarters, Morristown, April 5th, 1777.
Gentlemen:
Since my last I have had the pleasure of receiving your
reply to my two favours of 29th ultimo and 2d current. I
am happy enough to be able to inform you, that my indis-
position, which was the occasion of my brevity when I last
wrote, is now removed.
The opinion I advanced respecting the enemy's not mov-
ing before the beginning of May, seems to be shaken, though
not entirely overthrown, by some present appearances. We
have received information, that they are embarking about
three thousand men on board of transports, which are lying
at the Hook, by way of Staten Island. This, it is conjec-
tured, is with a view to the Delaware; and the supposition
is confirmed, by the circumstance of a confederacy lately
detected at Philadelphia, who, among other things, were
endeavouring, by the temptation of fifty pounds, to engage
persons as pilots up that river. The extreme difficulties
they must labour under for want of forage, and the infinite
hazard they must run by moving with a small body of about
five thousand men, with an enemy in the rear, incapable of
sparing any considerable body of troops to form a post be-
hind, and be an asylum to them in case of accident, -- these
circumstances will hardly allow me to think they will be
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? 72 THE LIFE OF
daring enough to make the attempt at this time. But on
the other hand, as they know we are in a progressive state
as to numbers, and other matters of importance, and as they
have no prospect of early reinforcement, and are in a state
of uncertainty as to any, from the bustling aspect of Euro-
pean affairs, it is probable they may conceive a necessity of
making a push at all risks. Perhaps, however, this embar-
kation is intended for some other purpose; to make a di-
version, or execute some partizan exploit elsewhere. On
the whole, I find it difficult to believe they are yet ready
for any capital operation.
As to your apprehensions of an attempt up the North
river, I imagine you may discard any uneasiness on that
score, although it will be at all times advisable to be on the
watch against such a contingency, it is al most reduced to a cer-
tainty, that the principal views of the enemy in the ensuing
campaign will be directed towards the southward, and to
Philadelphia more immediately; of which idea, the disco-
very before mentioned, with respect to pilots, is no incon-
siderable confirmation. Philadelphia is an object calcu-
lated to strike and attract their attention. It has all along
been the main source of supplies towards the war, and the
getting it into their possession would deprive us of a wheel
we could very badly spare, in the great political and mili-
tary machine. They are sensible of this, and are equally
sensible, that it contains in itself, and is surrounded by a
prodigious number of persons attached to them, and inimi-
cal to us, who would lend them all the assistance they could
in the further prosecution of their designs. It is also a
common and well-grounded rule in war, to strike first and
principally at the capital towns and cities, in order to the
conquest of a country.
I must confess I do not see any object equally interesting
to draw their efforts to the northward. Operations merely
for plundering and devastation can never answer their end;
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? HAMILTON. 73
and if they could, one part of the continent would do nearly
as well as another. And as to the notion of forming a
junction with the northern army, and cutting off the com-
munication between the northern and southern states, I
apprehend it will do better in speculation than in practice.
Unless the geography of the country is far different from
any thing I can conceive, to effect this would require a
chain of posts, and such a number of men at each, as would
never be practicable or maintainable, but to an immense
army. In their progress, by hanging upon their rear, and
seizing every opportunity of skirmishing, their situation
might be rendered insupportably uneasy.
But for fear of mistake, the general has determined to .
collect a considerable body of troops at or about Peekskill,
which will not be drawn off till the intentions of the enemy
have acquired a decisive complexion. These will be rea-
dy, according to conjunctures, either to proceed northerly or
southerly, as'may be requisite. Every precaution should
be taken to prevent the boats from being destroyed, by col-
lecting them at the first movement of the enemy under
cover of one of the forts, or into some inlet, difficult of ac-
cess and easily defensible with a small number of men.
The loss of them would be an irreparable disadvantage.
The enemy's attempt upon Peekskill is a demonstration
of the folly of having any quantity of stores at places so
near the water, and so much exposed to a sudden inroad.
There should never be more there than sufficient to answer
present demands. We have lost a good deal in this way at
different times, and I hope experience will at last make
us wiser.
His excellency lately had a visit from the Oneida chief
and five others. He managed them with a good deal of
address, and sent them away perfectly satisfied. He per-
suaded them to go to Philadelphia, but they declined it,
alleging their impatience to return, and remove the errone-
vot. i. 10
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? 74 THE LIFE OF
ous opinions of their countrymen, from the misrepresenta-
tions of British emissaries, which they were apprehensive
might draw them into some rash proceedings. They part-
ed, after having made the most solemn protestations of
friendship and good will. His excellency has been very
busy all day in despatching the southern post, which has
prevented me giving him your resolve. It will, no doubt,
be very acceptable; and it is with pleasure I inform you,
that the zeal and abilities of the New-York Convention hold
the first rank in his estimation.
No news from France, save that the congress have ob-
tained a credit there, for which they can draw bills to the
amount of ? 100,000 sterling. This will be extremely ser-
viceable in carrying on a trade with the French. The new
troops begin to come in. If we can shortly get any con-
siderable accession of strength, we may be able to strike
some brilliant stroke.
I am, Gentlemen, with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient servant,
A. Hamilton.
P. S. We have been some time endeavouring to nego-
tiate a regular cartel; but it has been lately broken off
principally on account of Major General Lee. General
Howe will not allow him to be comprehended under the
general idea of American prisoners.
On the 17th of the same month, he again wrote to the
committee, giving a particular account of the attack of the
enemy on the American troops commanded by General
Lincoln, at Boundbrook, and informing them that three of
the enemy's vessels had entered the Delaware, and that a
vessel from France had been attacked in the river, and, to
prevent her falling into their hands, was blown up.
To aid in counteracting any sudden movement of the
enemy, Washington extended his army from Morristown
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? HAMILTON. 75
to the high ground of Middlebrook, a strong position within
a few miles of New-Brunswick, where the English had col-
lected their principal stores, which enabled him, at the same
time, to keep up his communication with Philadelphia,
which he was confirmed in his belief was the enemy's
ultimate destination.
The state of the public mind in that city, at this expect-
ed invasion, is strongly shown in the following letter from
Mr. Duer, a very able and eloquent delegate in congress
from New-York, whose conduct from the commencement
of the revolution had been marked with boldness and in-
telligence.
WILLIAM DUER TO ABRAHAM TEN BROECK.
Philadelphia, April 17, 1777.
"I am extremely sorry to inform you, that notwithstand-
ing the invasion which threatens this city, a languor pre-
vails amongst the inhabitants of almost all ranks. The
disputes about their constitution, and a want of vigilance
and vigour in detecting and defeating the designs of the
disaffected, have given the malignants a dangerous ascend-
ency. The depreciation of the continental money is aston-
ishingly rapid, and I see, with concern, that no attempts
are made to check so fatal a measure. You will see by
the enclosed resolutions of congress of the 14th and 15th
of April, that they have been under the necessity of supply-
ing an executive authority in this state.
"By the recess of the Supreme Executive Council, there
was an absolute interregnum, and if congress had not in-
terposed, this state would have fallen an easy prey to a very
small body of the enemy's army. -- Only six hundred and
eighty-five men at Ticonderoga fit for duty, including one
hundred and twenty artificers. --I have the pleasure to as-
sure the convention, that the state of New-York stands in
a very high point of light in the eyes of the continent, and
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? 76 tSe life of
that General Washington, in his public letters to congress,
gives the most honourable testimonials in its favour. These,
sir, are the happy effects of our unanimity and vigour. "
It is also stated, "the disputes in Pennsylvania grew out
of no want of attachment to the cause, but from disputes
about the constitution. I wish the establishment of new
forms of government had been deferred. The union, vi-
gour, and security derived from conventions and committees,
are not to be found in any state under its new constitution. "
The severe campaign of the preceding year, though one
of continued successes until the affair of Trenton, had been
productive of little service to the British cause, excepting
the capture of New-York; for the enemy could boast no-
thing more than the ground which their armies occupied.
Sir William Howe now judged that the honour of the Bri-
tish arms required some new enterprise worthy of the force
under his command.
None seemed more imposing than that of Philadelphia.
It was regarded as the capital of the country. It was the
seat of government of Pennsylvania, and the most important
city of the colonies; and although, as a military post, its
possession would yield few advantages, its occupation by an
enemy would weaken the cause of America in Europe,
strengthen the hands of the British ministry, and produce,
he hoped, such a depressing effect on the minds of the Ame-
ricans, as might predispose them to yield more readily to
conciliatory propositions. Having in vain essayed every art
to bring on a general engagement, and not daring to ven-
ture on the bold experiment of crossing the Delaware with
an enemy in his rear, the English general decided upon a
new plan of operations. His whole force now exceeded
forty thousand men; from these, leaving a sufficient strength
to protect New-York, he selected eighteen thousand of his
choicest soldiers, and about the middle of July embarked at
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? HAMILTON. 77
Amboy. During this interval of inactivity, the attention of
the Americans was principally directed to the operations on
the northern frontier; and the advance of one army towards
Albany, and the embarkation, at the same time, of another
for an apparently remote expedition, baffled speculation.
The following letter from Colonel Hamilton, to a friend,
written at this time, marks the state of opinion.
Head Quarters, Smith's Clove, July 22d, 1777.
Your favour of the eighteenth, from Saratoga, reached
me yesterday Your pronouncing Fort Edward among
the other forts, indefensible, surprises me a little, as it is
entirely contrary to the representations of several gentle-
men of judgment, who have had an opportunity of seeing
and considering its situation, by whom we have been taught
to believe that it would be an excellent post, at least for
checking and retarding Burgoyne's progress. I agree with
you that our principal strength in the quarter you are, will
be in the forests and natural strength of the country, and in
the want of forage, provisions, carriages, &c. in which the
enemy may easily be thrown, by taking away what there
are of those articles which you observe have never been in
great abundance.
I am doubtful whether Burgoyne will attempt to pene-
trate far, and whether he will not content himself with ha-
rassing our back settlements by parties, assisted by the sa-
vages, who, it is to be feared, will pretty generally be
tempted by the enemy's late successes, to confederate in
hostilities against us.
This doubt arises from some appearances that indicate a
southern movement of General Howe's army, which if it
should really happen, will certainly be a barrier against
any further impressions of Burgoyne; for it cannot be sup-
posed he would be rash enough to plunge into the bosom of
the country without an expectation of being met by Ge-
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? 78 THE LIFE OF
neral Howe. Things must prove very adverse to us in-
deed, should he make such an attempt and not be ruined
by it. I confess, however, that the appearances I allude
to do not carry a full evidence in my mind; because they
are opposed by others of a contradictory kind, and because
I cannot conceive upon what principle of common sense or
military propriety Howe can be running away from Bur-
goyne to the southward.
It is much to be wished he may, even though it should
give him the possession of Philadelphia, which, by our re-
moteness from it may very well happen. In this case we
may not only, if we think proper, retaliate, by aiming a
stroke at New-York; but we may come upon him with the
greatest part of our collective force, to act against that
part which is under him. We shall then be certain that
Burgoyne cannot proceed, and that a small force of conti-
nental troops will be sufficient for that partizan war which
he must carry on the rest of the campaign.
A small force will also be sufficient to garrison the posts
in the Highlands, and prevent any danger there; so that
we shall be able to bring nearly the whole of the continen-
tal army against Mr. Howe. The advantages of this are
obvious. Should he be satisfied with the splendour of his
acquisition, and shut himself up in Philadelphia, we can
ruin him by confinement. Should he leave a garrison
there, and go forward, we can either fall upon that or his
main body, diminished as it will be by such a measure,
with our whole force There will, however, be many dis-
agreeable consequences attending such an event; amongst
which, the foremost is, the depreciation of our currency,
which, from the importance in which Philadelphia is held,
cannot fail to ensue.
I am, dear sir,
Your most obedient servant,
Alex. Hamilton.
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? HAMILTON. 79
A fragment of a letter written by him about this time
to his venerable friend Doctor Knox, who warmly espou-
sed the American cause, will be read with interest, as ex-
hibiting more at large the prospects and views of policy
which he entertained.
"This event [the evacuation of Ticonderoga*] redounds
very little to our credit. For, if the post was untenable,
or required a larger number of troops to defend it than
could be spared for the purpose, it ought long ago to have
been foreseen and given up. Instead of that, we have kept
a large quantity of cannon in it, and have been heaping up
very valuable magazines of stores and provisions, that in
the critical moment of defence are abandoned and lost.
This affair will be attended with several evil consequences;
for, besides the loss of our stores, which we cannot well
afford,it opens a new and easy door by which to penetrate the
northern states. It will fix the hitherto fluctuating disposi-
tion of the Indians in that quarter, in their favour, and ex-
pose the frontiers of the adjacent country to their depreda-
tions. But, though it is a misfortune we have reason to la-
ment, I dare say it will be regarded with you as much
more important than it really is, and as materially endanger-
ing the success of our cause, which is by no means the case.
Our opposition is at this time too well matured, and has too
great stability to be shaken by an accident of that kind.
While we have a respectable army in the field, and resources
to feed, clothe, and arm them, we are safe We have had
a force sufficient for the foregoing part of the campaign, to
maintain such a superiority over the main army of the enemy
as effectually to hinder them from attaining any of their pur-
poses. And, to the northward, with the reinforcements
sent up to succour the retreating garrison of Ticonderoga,
and the militia flocking in from New-England, I think there
is little doubt we have by this time a force adequate to give
* July 5th, 1777.
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? 80 THELIFEOF
Mr. Burgoyne a seasonable check. One good effect will
result from the misfortune, which is, that it will stimulate
the eastern states to greater exertions than they might other-
wise make.
"By our last advices, the enemy were in possession of all
the country between Ticonderoga and Fort George, and
our army, nearly equal in number to them, were about to
take post somewhere between Fort Edward and Saratoga.
"The consequences of this northern affair will depend
much upon the part that Howe acts. If he were to co-ope-
rate with Burgoyne, it would demand our utmost efforts to
counteract them. But, if he should go towards the south-
ward, all, or most of the advantages of Burgoyne's success
will be lost. He will either be obliged to content himself
with the possession of Ticonderoga, and the dependent for-
tresses, and with carrying on a partizan war the rest of the
campaign, or he must precipitate himself into certain ruin>
by attempting to advance in the country with a very in-
competent force.
"Appearances lead us to suppose that Howe is fool enough
to meditate a southern expedition; for he has now altered
his station at Staten Island, mentioned above, and has fallen
down to the Hook. Judging it morally certain that there
would be a co-operation of the two armies, we thought it
expedient to march northerly, and had accordingly reached
within fourteen miles of New-Windsor, the place where we
could cross the North river without danger of interruption.
But this new movement of the enemy's fleet has induced us
to return a few miles, and make a disposition for marching
southerly. We shall, however, be cautious how we pro-
ceed on that course, lest nothing more than a feint is intend-
ed to divert us from the real object.
"If they go to the southward in earnest, they must have
the capture of Philadelphia in view, for there is no other
sufficient inducement. We shall endeavour to get there in
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? HAMILTON. 81
time to oppose them, and shall have the principal part of
the continental force, and a large body of spirited militia,
many of them from their services during the last campaign
pretty well inured to arms to make the opposition with.
Yet I would not have you to be much surprised if Philadel-
phia should fall; for the enemy will doubtless go there with
a determination to succeed at all hazard, and we shall not
be able to prevent them without risking a general action, the
expediency of which will depend upon circumstances. If
the militia turn out with that zeal we have a right to expect
from their conduct when the enemy made their last experi-
ment in the Jersies, and were supposed to be going to Phi-
ladelphia, we may do it without much inconvenience. If
they fall materially short of it, we shall be obliged to confine
ourselves to a skirmishing opposition, which we cannot ex-
pect will be effectual. It may be asked, if to avoid a gene-
ral engagement we give up objects of the first importance,
what is to hinder the enemy from carrying every important
point, and ruining us 1 My answer is, that our hopes are not
placed in any particular city or spot of ground, but in the
preserving a good army, furnished with proper necessaries
to take advantage of favourable opportunities, and waste
and defeat the enemy by piecemeal. Every new post they
take requires a new division of their forces, and enables us
to strike with our united force against a part of theirs; and
such is their present situation, that another Trenton affair
will amount to a complete victory on our part, for they are
at too low an ebb to bear another stroke of the kind. Per-
haps before I may have an opportunity of ending this, facts
will unfold what I am now endeavouring to anticipate by
conjecture.
"You will expect some animadversions on the temper
and views of the French nation. I presume you are nearly
as well acquainted with the assistance they are giving us, as
vol. i. 11
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? 84 THE LIFE OF
ed for his gallantry and enterprise,) with a small party
of horse. The approach to the mills was by a road de-
scending a long hill to a bridge over the Schuylkill. On
the summit of this hill two videttes were posted, to give
intelligence of the enemy's advance. Soon after the party
readied the mills, Hamilton secured a flat bottomed boat,
by which he could effect his escape should the enemy over-
take them ;-- a few moments showed the necessity of this
precaution. While thus occupied, the videttes gave the
alarm; four. of the dragoons, with Hamilton, jumped into
the boat, and the enemy's horse came clattering down the
hill, just in the rear of the flying videttes. Lee, hoping to
regain the bridge, trusted to his horse. This diverted the
pursuing party for a moment, and Hamilton, struggling
against the furious current of the river, swoln by the recent
tempest, gained the shore in safety, though vollies, which
were returned at intervals, were poured into the boat, by
which three of the party were wounded. Lee, equally for-
tunate, owed his escape to the fleetness of his horse.
The British continued to advance towards the capital,
which it was impossible to save. During their slow pro-
gress, Hamilton was despatched to Philadelphia by Wash-
ington; on his approach to which, as appears from the
following letter, he was a second time exposed to a surprise.
TO THE HONOURABLE JOHN HANCOCK, PRESIDENT
OF CONGRESS.
September 18th, 1777, 9 o'clock at night.
SIB,
I did myself the honour to write you a hasty line this even-
ing, giving it as my opinion that the city was no longer a place
of safety for you. I write you again lest that letter should
not get to hand. The enemy are on the road to Swedes
Ford, the main body about four miles from it. They sent a
party this evening to Daviser's ferry, which fired upon me and
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? HAMILTON. 85
some others in crossing it, killed one man, wounded another,
and disabled my horse.
They came on so suddenly, that one boat was left adrift
on the other side, which will of course fall into their hands,
and by the help of that, they will get possession of another,
which was abandoned by those who had the direction of it,
and left afloat, in spite of every thing that I could do to the
contrary. These two boats will convey fifty men across at
a time, so that in a few hours they may throw over a large
party, perhaps sufficient to overmatch the militia who may be
between them and the city. This renders the situation of
congress extremely precarious, if they are not on their guard:
my apprehensions for them are great, though it is not impro-
bable they may not be realized.
The most cogent reasons oblige me to join the army this
night, or I should have waited upon you myself. I am in
hopes our army will be up with the enemy before they pass
Schuylkill; if they are, something serious will ensue.
I have the honour to be,
With much respect,
Sir, your most obedient,
A. Hamilton.
Soon after his return to camp, he was again directed to re-
turn to Philadelphia, to concert future measures with some of
the members of congress, to execute the unpleasant task of
impressing the property of the citizens, and to superintend
the collection of stores, and its embarkation in the shipping.
This duty was performed in a manner highly satisfactory
to the commander-in-chief, in whose name Colonel Hamilton
addressed a letter to the ladies of that city, enforcing upon
them the claims of their country, of which he spoke as the
most successful of his youthful productions.
On his arrival at Philadelphia, he addressed a letter, dated
the 22d September, to the President of Congress, stating, --
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? 86 THE LIFE Of
"I left camp last evening, and came to this city to superintend
the collection of blankets and clothing for the army. Mr.
Lovell sends to inform me there is an express going off to con-
gress, and I do myself the honour to communicate a brief state
of things when I left camp. The enemy moved yesterday
from where they lay opposite to Valley Forge, &c. higher up
the river, on their old scheme of gaining our right. I don't
know precisely where they halted, but our army was prepa-
ring to move up also to counteract them.
"I am this morning told they marched about twelve o'clock
at night for that purpose. The general opinion was, that the
enemy would attempt crossing this day, -- every appearance
justified the supposition.
"We had intelligence that the enemy had the night before
last surprised Generals Smallwood and Wayne, and conse-
quently dispersed them, after a small opposition. The loss, it
is said, was not great, and our troops were re-assembling fast
at the Red Lion. This seems to have been a bad look out,
and is somewhat disconcerting.
"By a letter from General McDougal, received this morn-
ing, it appears he was on the 20th, in the morning, at Second
river, just settingout on his march towards Woodbridge. He
is pressing forward with all possible expedition. The troops
were pretty well refreshed, and in good spirits. "
Finding all resistance vain, the Americans took post sixteen
miles from Philadelphia, in a strong situation, on the eastern
side of the Schuylkill, covered by a stream known as the
Skippach creek.
Sir William Howe meanwhile crossed that river with his
army, and having ordered Cornwallis to take possession of
the city, encamped at Germantown.
Each position was taken with reference to the fortifications
which had been erected on the Delaware, with immense la-
bour, under the eye of Du Portail,who was soon after appoint-
ed a general of brigade.
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? HAMILTON. 87
Howe, considering the removal of these obstructions essen-
tial to his security, weakened his army by detachments for
that purpose. Washington, strengthened by a reinforcement
from Maryland, and by McDougal's brigade from New-York,
regarded this as a favourable moment to surprise the enemy.
The battle of Germantown ensued. The surprise was less
complete than had been hoped, and after a-vigorous onset, in
which the divisions under Wayne and Sullivan displayed the
greatest gallantry, the Americans were compelled to retreat.
The object was not, however, wholly unattained. The army
had felt the importance of an action; an impression was made
on their adversary, that even in a close engagement, without
the advantage of ground, the gallantry and discipline of this
inferior force was a just object of vigilance. The common
sentiment of the country called for the attempt, and such was
its influence on the mind of General Howe, that within two
days after the attack, he drew in his lines, and retreating to
Philadelphia, permitted the Americans to remain within his
reach, without any serious molestation.
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? CHAPTER VI.
[1777. ]
While the main army was thus employed in resisting the
attempts on Philadelphia, events of the utmost importance had
occurred on the northern frontier. On the day of Hamilton's
appointment to the staff, he addressed, in the name of Gene-
ral Washington, an urgent letter to the committee of New-
York, incidentally mentioning the difficulty of supplying the
troops with arms, from the practice which had prevailed
among the militia of taking them with them when their terms
of service expired; and endeavouring to impress upon the
state the necessity of the most unwearied activity in arming
their quotas, he then replies to an application for reinforce-
ments at the north, "that the advanced season of the year
renders an attack upon Ticonderoga over the ice not so much
to be feared as to induce him to provide against a possible in-
convenience there, at the expense of not guarding effectually
against a certain one here, wherefore I have determined to
send no more battalions to that place, having ordered a suffi-
cient force from the east. "
This unavoidable decision of the commander-in-chief, ex-
cited the greatest alarm among the inhabitants of New-York,
and led them to wait, with the most eager anxiety, the march
of the eastern troops.
The hostile feelings which had been nourished among the
Dutch population towards their eastern neighbours, were now
carried to the highest point.
Engaged in a common conflict, the people of New-York
regarded the tardy measures of New-England as proceeding
from a fixed determination to surrender them an easy prey
to the enemy,--relying on their dense population for their
own security, and shunning a warfare so remote, and attend-
ed with so many hardships. Hence proceeded the most
vol. . i. 12
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? 90 THE LIFE OF
gloomy alarms, followed by embittered rancour. In a letter
from Governor Clinton, it is stated, "that Connecticut and
Massachusetts have not furnished a man for the southern de-
partment; nay, scarcely answered the letters sent to them.
General Gates is ordered to take the command of the north-
ern army, and General Schuyler to join General Washing-
ton. The New-England men will now be gratified, and
ought to turn out, but I fear they will not behave better un-
der any command.
"The New-York militia have turned out with the greatest
alacrity and spirit, leaving their harvests in the fields. "
In a letter from the Albany committee, it is mentioned," our
affairs grow more gloomy every day. The New-England
states are still indifferent to all entreaty. All the militia of
Albany are sent to the army. The people in Schoharie say
they must lay down their arms if Albany falls. Only two
hundred savages have driven in the inhabitants within fifty
miles. What would be the case if a thousand are let loose 1
Trumbull writes that no aid is to be expected from Connecti-
cut. " In another communication, the delegates from New-
York write, " General Gates is far from partial to our state;
you cannot be at a loss for the reason. Our revolters* seem
to possess his esteem here, and he has left a most extraordi-
nary recommendation in their favour. "
About the same time, the council of Albany prepared a
declaration, (stating "the pain it gave them to find that a mea-
sure so absurd and probably chimerical as the surrender of
Ticonderoga, should be imputed to the directions of General
Schuyler" inwhosezeal,vigilance,and integrity, they express
the highest confidence,) which they addressed to General
Putnam, enclosing an extract from a letter of General Schuy-
ler, from Fort Edward, of the ninth of July, expressing his
astonishment at the conduct of the officers who had evacuated
that post.
* The people of Vermont.
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? HAMILTON. 91
These contemporary monuments of history evince, in a
strong light, the alarming condition of affairs in New-York,
where the people were unable to stifle their deep-rooted hos-
tility to their New-England neighbours, and where state pride
looked with indignation at the decision which had supplanted
their most popular chief, who, perhaps, entered too warmly
into the local feelings of his state, to make room for an indi-
vidual, whose capacity was distrusted by men of discernment,
and whose title to command was deemed the more invidious,
as being founded on his popularity with a community with
whom they had long been engaged in territorial disputes.
This scene of discord produced deep dismay at head quar-
ters, where the necessity of silencing all local differences had
been among the most important, as it was the most difficult
of duties.
While the imminent danger which menaced the army un-
der his immediate command, would seem to have required
all his care, Washington failed in none of the great trusts of
his high station, but with that presiding superiority and high
tone of mind which distinguished him, he is seen stemming
the tide of discontent around him, -- cheering the faltering
spirits of congress, stimulating the then sluggish councils of
New-England, and, at the same time, soothing the alarms of
the unhappy sufferers of New-York. The following letter,
written by Hamilton at his instance, and addressed to the
committee of that state, is a highly interesting exhibition of
the temper of his patriotic mind.
Head Quarters, Philadelphia, August 4th, 1777.
I have been duly honoured by your several favours of the
25th, 27th, and 30th of July. The misfortune at Ticonde-
roga, has produced a very disagreeable alteration in our af-
fairs, and has thrown a gloom upon the favourable prospect
which the campaign previous to that event afforded. But I
am in great hopes, the ill consequences of it will not continue
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? 02 THE LIFE Of
to operate long, and that the jealousies and alarms which so
sudden and unexpected an accident has occasioned in the
minds of the people both of your state and to the eastward,
will shortly subside, and give way to the more rational dic-
tates of self-preservation and regard to the common good.
In fact, the worst effect of that disaster is, that it has served
to create those distrusts and apprehensions; for if the mat-
ter were coolly and dispassionately considered, there would
be found nothing so formidable in Mr. Burgoyne, and the
force under him, with all his successes, as to countenance
the least languor or despondency, and experience would
show that a tolerable degree of vigour in the states more
immediately interested, would be sufficient to check his
career, and perhaps convert the advantages he has gained
into his ruin. But while people continue to view what has
happened through the medium of supineness or fear, there is
no saying to what length an enterprising genius may push
his good fortune. I have the fullest confidence that no en-
deavours of the council will be omitted to bring your state
(with the distresses of which I am sensibly affected,) to every
effort it is capable of making in its present mutilated condi-
tion, and they may rely upon it no means in my power will
be unemployed to co-operate with them in repelling the dan-
ger that threatens the state, and through it the continent.
If I do not give as essential aid as might be wished to the
northern army, it is not from want of inclination, nor from
being too little impressed with the importance of doing it.
It would be the height of impolicy to weaken ourselves too
much here, in order to increase our strength there, and it must
certainly be more difficult, as well as of greater moment, to
control the main army of the enemy, than an inferior, and, I
may say, dependent one; for it is pretty obvious, if General
Howe can be completely kept at bay, and prevented effect-
ing any capital purposes, the successes of General Burgoyne,
whatever they may be, must be partial and temporary.
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? HAMILTON. 93
Nothing that I can do shall be wanting to rouse the east-
ern states, and excite them to those exertions which the exi-
gency of our affairs so urgently demands. I lament that they
have not yet done more, that so few of their militia have
come into the field, and that those few have been so precipi-
tate in returning home at this critical period; but I have,
nevertheless, great reliance upon those states. I know they
are capable of powerful efforts, and that their attachment to
the cause, notwithstanding they may be a little tardy, will not
allow them long to withhold their aid, at a time when their
own safety, and that of a sister state, and, in a great measure,
the safety of the continent, calls for their greatest zeal and
activity.
I flatter myself the presence of General Arnold and Ge-
neral Lincoln in the Northern Department will have a happy
effect upon them. Those gentlemen possess much of their
confidence, particularly the latter, than whom there is, per-
haps, no man from the state of Massachusetts, who enjoys
more universal esteem and popularity. And in addition to
that, they are both to be considered as very valuable officers.
You intimate a wish that some assistance could be drawn
from the southern states at this time. But while things re-
main in their present posture, and appearances, however
illusory they may prove in the issue, afford the strongest rea-
son to keep their force at home, to counteract the seeming
intentions of General Howe, I could neither ask nor expect
them to detach succours to the northern states, who are so
well able to defend themselves against the force they now
have to oppose.
I hope an exaggerated idea of the enemy's numbers may
have no injurious influence on our measures. There is no
circumstance I am acquainted with that induces me to be-
lieve General Burgoyne can have more than five or six
thousand men; and if the force left in Canada is so consi-
derable as the information you send me makes it, he can-
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? 94 THE IIFE OF
not have even so many. The representations of prisoners
and deserters in this respect are of little validity; their
knowledge is always very limited, and their intentions, par-
ticularly the former, very often bad.