No More Learning

596 (#636) ############################################

596
THE REFORMS OF 1919
>
by the Government of India, and "provincial”, while the other
divided provincial subjects into “transferred”, which were placed in
the control of the governor acting with his ministers, and “reserved”,
which were to be disposed of by the governor in council. In the
reports both of Mr Montagu and Lord Chelmsford (para. 221) and
of the joint select committee (clause 6) the greatest possible stress was
laid on the necessity for joint deliberation by the two parts of a
provincial government. However careful the separation of trans-
ferred and reserved subjects may be, some overlapping is inevitable.
Thus a restrictive policy of excise (transferred) may raise serious
questions of law and order (reserved). Even where there is no such
intimate contact, free discussion between experienced officials and
ministers in close relation with the elected members of the legislative
council was likely to lead to accommodation. Where it was doubtful
into which category a topic fell the decision was to be made in
accordance with rules. After discussion, however, the order issued
was to bear on its face a clear indication showing that it was the
decision of the governor in council or of the governor acting with
his ministers. So far as public action in the debates of the legislative
council was concerned, the select committee advised that members
of the executive council should act together, and similarly ministers
should act together. Where both sections of the government were in
agreement members and ministers should be free to speak and vote
for each other's proposals. There should, however, be no compulsion
on a member or minister to support by speech or vote a proposal
made by the section to which he did not belong, if he disagreed
with it.
Important changes were made in the matter of supply and legisla-
tion. As explained elsewhere,1 an Indian budget at this period did not
require an annual finance bill as in England, because rates of taxation
were altered, especially so far as they affected provincial revenues,
only at comparatively long intervals. Discussion in the legislative
council was thus chiefly concerned with a proper allocation of
existing revenues. From the enlargement of the popular element in
these provircial bodies, larger demands for expenditure, especially on
the transferred subjects, were inevitable, and two problems arose for
decision. The first was the question whether provincial revenues
should be definitely allocated between the reserved and transferred
sides, forming what was called in the later discussions “the separate
purse”, or whether the purse should remain joint, and the needs of
each side of the government decided annually. Mr Montagu and
Lord Chelmsford favoured the latter method (para. 256) while the
Government of India were strongly in favour of a separate purse, such
as had been familiar in India as between the central and provincial
governments. Indian non-official witnesses, before the joint select
· P. 572, supra.
Cd. 123, p. 28.


## p. 597 (#637) ############################################

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
597
committee, preferred the joint purse and it was suggested 1 that this
was because they hoped that through it the ministers could exercise
more influence over the reserved subjects. Briefly the question was
whether greater acerbity would be caused by a public division of
funds for a term of years, or by an annual discussion within the
government. Faced by this difficulty the committee recommended a
joint purse, holding that ordinarily common sense and reasonableness
would bring about agreement. If the governor at any time found
serious disagreement between his executive council and the ministers,
he was to have power to make an allocation. This, however, was to
be made, not by a division of sources of revenue, but by apportioning
definite fractions of the total receipts and the balance. The committee
emphasised a warning that the budget should not be capable of being
used by ministers or a majority in the legislative council to direct the
policy on reserved subjects. The decision in favour of a joint purse
was unfortunate. Indian popular opinion has always regarded the
treasury as containing unlimited funds, which would be made
available if the jealousy of its guardians permitted, and the sense of
responsibility would have been quickened by a definite provision of
sources of income, with the knowledge that, if they did not suffice,
fresh taxation would be necessary.
The second problem was that of the responsibility for new taxation.
In the report (para. 257) it was suggested that after any contribution
payable to the Government of India had been set aside, and full
provision made for the reserved subjects, the balance should be at the
disposal of the ministers. If it were not sufficient, the onus would lie
on ministers to suggest new taxation. The Government of India
showed that this might bring about the impossible situation that
ministers would have to propose taxation which was really required
for expenditure on reserved subjects although they did not approve
of it, the alternative being that the transferred subjects in which they
were deeply interested would not receive the funds they needed. This
was, in fact, one of the chief arguments in favour of the separate purse.
The matter was not discussed by the select. committee which appears
to have covered it by expressing general confidence in good will, and
the recommendation that power should be taken to make a division
of funds in case of need.
There remains the question, how the executive government of a
province was to secure the passing of legislation or the voting of
supplies which it considered necessary for thc, reserved services.
Various alternatives are discussed in the joint report (paras. 247-53),
such as the passing by the Indian legislature of bills rejected by a
provincial legislature, or the making of ordinances by the governor-
general, alone or in council, or by the provincial governor. All these
were rejected as savouring too much of the autocratic methods which
1 Question 7002.
2. Clause 1.


## p. 598 (#638) ############################################

598
THE REFORMS OF 1919
were being superseded. Where a governor had doubts of his ability
to get through the council a bill dealing with a reserved subject which
was of importance, he was to certify that it was a measure “essential
to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of
the province or any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsi-
bility for the reserved subjects". Such a bill after introduction and
discussion would be automatically referred to a grand committee
numbering 40 to 50 per cent. of the council and partly elected by the
elected members of the council. The governor would have power to
Dominate a bare majority, exclusive of himself, but not more than
two-thirds of the nominated members could be officials. Although
most of the governments in India approved of this scheme, it was
strongly opposed by the government of Madras which pointed out
that the non-official nominees of the governor would be subject to
strong pressure by opponents of a measure and would be in a most
difficult and invidious position. It suggested that where a bill of
vital importance was rejected or modified, the government should
have power to return it to the legislative council for reconsideration,
and subsequently the governor might set aside amendments which
were not acceptable to him and declare the bill to have passed. The
late Lord Carmichael, who had been governor of Victoria, and of two
presidencies in India, strongly supported this method of fixing re-
sponsibility on the governor personally, instead of using the obnoxious
official bloc with additional nominees of uncertain stability, and the
joint committee accepted the change (clause 13). Similarly it sug-
gested that the governor should have power to restore a provision for
a reserved subject in the budget which the council had reduceu and
which the governor considered essential for proper administration
(clause 11). And it recommended that the governor, if so advised
by his ministers, would be justified in asking the council to review
an alteration in the provision for a transferred subject.
In the Government of India no measure of responsibility was
introduced. The executive council consisted of six ordinary members
and the commander-in-chief. Of the ordinary members three must
have had ten years' service under the crown in India and one must
be a barrister of five years' standing. The joint report suggested the
abolition of these statutory limitations, to secure elasticity, and also
the early appointment of a second Indian as member, which was
possible without legislation. The joint committee removed the limit
on the total numbers, retained the official qualifications for at least
three members, and widened the legal qualification by making it
include lawyers who were pleaders of a High Court in India. It
also thought that not less than three members of council should be
Indians.
In addition to their proposals for admitting Indians more freely to
i Cd. 123, p. 163.
· Questions 5689-95.
.
a
1


## p. 599 (#639) ############################################

COUNCIL OF STATE
599
the executive government, the authors of the joint report desired to
provide greater opportunities for discussion in a popular assembly.
They attached considerable importance to this as paving the way for
social legislation which might impinge on religious matters, and in
the past had always been undertaken with reluctance by the alien
government. With this object they suggested an enlargement of the
legislative council (now called the legislative assembly) and the addi-
tion of a new chamber called the Council of State. As two-thirds of
the former body was to be elected, it was necessary in the Government
of India also to provide for the case where vital government measures
or supply had been denied. It was proposed to do this through the
council of state, which was to include only twenty-one elected members
out of fifty, with officials up to twenty-five and four non-official
nominated members. Government bills were ordinarily to be intro-
duced and passed in the assembly and then go to the council of state.
Amendments made by the latter which were not accepted by the
assembly were to be discussed by a joint session of both houses. If
the assembly refused leave to the introduction of a bill, or rejected
one, the governor-general in council might certify. that the bill was
essential to the interests of peace, order or good government. It vould
then be introduced in the council of state, and, when passed there,
become law without further reference to the assembly. Lastly to save
time in an emergency a certified bill might be passed into law in the
council of state alone, and merely reported to the assembly.
While provincial councils were to pass budgets, subject to the
power of the governor to restore grants for reserved subjects, the
imperial legislature was to be empowered only to pass resolutions
which were not binding, though they would have enhanced significance
from the wider representation in the assembly compared with the
former legislative council.
These devices appeared to the joint committee as objectionable
as the similar' methods proposed in the provinces. It increased
popular representation in the council of state and proposed that it
should be a real second chamber (clause 18), while reserving powers
of certification, for both finance and legislation, to the governor-
general in council where necessary for the discharge of his responsi-
bility (clauses 25 and 26).
The legislative councils as framed by the act contained more than
twice as many members as those of the old councils, the number
ranging from 11 to 125 in the four larger provinces and from fifty.
three to ninety-eight in four others. These numbers might be enlarged
by rules, subject to the provision that not more than 20 per cent
should be official members and at least 70 per cent should be elected.
The council of state contained sixty members of whom not more than
a third might be officials, while the legislative assembly had 140, of
whom 100 were elected and twenty-six officials, and, if the number


## p. 600 (#640) ############################################

600
THE REFORMS OF 1919
was increased, the same proportions should be maintained. With
these increases in numbers and responsibilities, it was decided that
the governor-general or head of a province should no longer preside
over his legislature. The governor-general appointed a president of
the council of state from among its members. Presidents of the
legislative assembly and the provincial councils were first appointed
by the governor-general or governor for a term of four years, but
were afterwards to be elected by the members. The recommendation
of the joint committee that the first president of the legislative assembly
should be a person “qualified by experience of the House of Commons
and a knowledge of parliamentary procedure, precedents and con-
ventions" (clause 20) was accepted, and a similar appointment was
made in the legislative council of Bengal.
Most of the proposals of the franchise committee were accepted by
the joint committee. It demurred, however, to the suggestion that
non-officials members of both the council of state and legislative
assembly should be elected by the same group of persons and it
preferred direct election to the latter instead of indirect (clauses 18
and 19). Separate (communal) representation was condemned in the
joint report as contrary to the principles of responsible government,
without precedent except in a few minor states, and bad because it
encouraged members of a state to think of themselves primarily as
citizens of any smaller unit than itself, and tended to stereotype
existing relations (paras. 227–9). Reluctantly the authors acquiesced
in the principle so far as Muslims were concerned, because of the
arrangements made in 1909 (which they regretted), the agreement
between political leaders in the Lucknow Congress of 1916, and
because they knew that Muslims were anxious about their position
under a system of popular government (para. 231). Though history
affords few precedents for such a system, it has many to show that
minorities not so protected have remained for long periods with no
representation. Besides the Muslims other communities urged their
claims. In Madras it was shown that Brahmans, who numbered only
3 per cent. of the population, had almost monopolised representation
and occupied three times as many of the higher posts in the services
as other Hindus and more than all other communities together. The
select committee recommended that seats should be reserved for the
non-Brahman Hindus in Madras and for the Marathas in the Bombay
Presidency who had also failed to secure representation. They also
suggested that rural areas and the depressed classes should receive a
larger share than was allotted by Lord Southborough's committee.
Female suffrage, which they rightly pointed out went deep into the
social system and susceptibilities of India, was left to be decided by
the legislative councils when they were constituted. 2 Disqualifications
1 The rules drawn up in the Panjab also reserved seats for Sikhs in that province.
: Female suffrage was gradually voted by the councils.


## p. 601 (#641) ############################################

POSITION OF SECRETARY OF STATE
601
(as has been shown in chapter XXXI) had been a source of much
discussion, and their application to individuals had caused much
soreness, while exemption had been an invidious task. It was now
proposed that dismissal from government service should no longer be
a bar, but that a criminal conviction entailing a sentence of more than
six months' imprisonment should disqualify for five years from the
date of the expiration of the sentence. As suggested by the franchise
committee, a residential qualification for a candidate in his con-
stituency was imposed only in the provinces of Bombay, the Panjab
and the Central Provinces.
These organic changes in the governments in India involved
altering their relations with the secretary of state in council. It was
pointed out in the joint report (para. 291) that delegation to re-
sponsible ministers implied that parliament must set certain bounds
to its own responsibility for the internal administration of the country,
so far as transferred subjects were concerned, and might reasonably
sanction delegation in regard to reserved subjects. A committee,
presided over by Lord Crewe, examined these questions. Indian
politicians had often criticised the secretary of state's council on the
ground, that the retired officials were usually opposed to reforms.
Lord Crewe's committee suggested that this body should become
purely advisory, and that one-third of its members should be chosen
by the secretary of state from persons domiciled in India, whose
names had been placed on a panel by the votes of non-official members
of the Indian legislative council. The secretary of state, no longer
bound as in the past by the votes of the council in questions of finance,
would refer to it what matters he pleased. While hitherto his previous
sanction had been required in all important new departures and in
certain specified cases, a principle of previous consultation should be
substituted. Joint approval by the Government of India and a
majority of the non-official members of the legislative assembly should
ordinarily carry with it, in either legislative or administrative action,
the assent of the secretary of state unless he felt that
his responsibility to parliament for the peace, good order and good government
of India, or paramount considerations of imperial policy, required him to secure
reconsideration of the matter at issue by the legislative Assembly.
The select committee (clause 31) held that no statutory change
should be made so long as the governor-general remained responsible
to parliament, but it was in favour of a growing convention that
the secretary of state might “reasonably consider that only in ex-
ceptional circumstances should he be called upon to intervene in
matters of purely Indian interest where the government and the
legislature of India are in agreement”. Protective tariffs had long
been asked for in India, and, in the dislocation of finance caused by
the late war, changes of a protective character had been made in the


## p. 602 (#642) ############################################

602
THE REFORMS OF 1919
customs-duties. The committee recommended this case specially as
one for relaxation of control, to remove the suspicion, sometimes
justified in the past, that India's fiscal policy was subjected to the
interests of British trade. The only remedy was to grant liberty to
devise tariff arrangements which seemed best fitted to the needs of
the inhabitants of India, both consumers and manufacturers, as an
integral part of the British Empire. Control over transferred subjects
was to be restricted to the narrowest possible limits, and the con-
vention of deference to combined agreement between the government
and legislature was ordinarily to be extended to reserved matters in
the provinces.
So far as the Council of India was concerned the committee did not
favour abolition (clause 3). Advice would still be needed, and a
formal council was preferable to an informal one. It was, however,
suggested that the Indian element should be increased and the term
of office shortened to ensure a constant flow of fresh experience from
India and to relieve Indian members from long exile. In accordance
with these recommendations the number of members now varies
between eight and twelve, half of whom must have served or resided
in India for at least ten years, and have not left India more than five
years before the date of their appointment. Their tenure of office is
five years, though reappointment for a similar term is possible, the
special reasons of public advantage which justify this being recorded
and laid before parliament. A member who at the time of his appoint-
ment is domiciled in India receives a special allowance of £600 a year
in addition to the ordinary salary of £1200. Slight changes were made
in the powers of the secretary of state to arrange the conduct of
business in his council, but the drastic alterations proposed in 1914
(see chapter XI) to enable the secretary of state to withdraw many
classes of questions from his council were not pursued.
Lord Crewe's committee had, however, recommended that those
functions performed by the secretary of state in council which were
akin to the duties of high commissioners of the self-governing do-
minions, should be arranged for separately, and a high commissioner
was appointed for India in October, 1920. The debit to India of the
salary of the secretary of state had long been a grievance, and the act
laid down that it should now be paid out of moneys provided by
parliament, while the salaries of his under-secretaries and
any
other
expenses of his department might also be met in the same way.
It was clearly impossible for parliament to legislate in full detail
for all the numerous matters which required legislation. The act
therefore provided that many of these should be governed by rules.
Although these were to be made by the secretary of state, or by the
governor-general in council with the former's sanction, they were
to be brought to the formal notice of parliament. The most important
class of rules, by which the powers of superintendence, direction and
control over the Government of India, vested in the secretary of state


## p. 603 (#643) ############################################

IMPORTANCE OF THE REFORMS
603
(with or without his council), might be regulated or restricted, re-
quired the previous sanction of both houses of parliament, if they
affected subjects which had not been transferred to popular control
in the provinces. Rules for the classification of subjects as central or
provincial, for fixing the size of legislative bodies and governing the
qualifications of members, franchise and elections, or for the conduct
of business in these bodies, must be laid on the table in both houses,
and if an adverse address is passed by either house His Majesty in
council may annul them. Other rules that must be laid for informa-
tion include those for admission to the Indian Civil Service, and for
appointment to that service of persons domiciled in India, or for
laying down the qualifications of persons domiciled in British India
and born of parents habitually resident there who may be appointed
to fill posts ordinarily reserved for the Indian Civil Service.
None of the constitutional changes made in other parts of the
British Empire had, in Lord Selborne's opinion, been more. important
than these reforms in India. The size of the country, its vast popula-
tion with complexities due to divisions of caste and religion, the rule
by foreigners who made no attempt at assimilation, and the absence
of indigenous representative institutions, were factors which combined
to suggest caution and the need of full control over the experiment.
It was therefore provided that at the expiration of ten years a com-
mission should be appointed to enquire into the working of the
system of government, the growth of education, and the development
of representative institutions in British India, and to report whether
and to what extent it was desirable to establish the principle of re-
sponsible government; or to extend, modify or restrict whatever
degree then existed. An attempt to ensure more concentrated atten.
tion on Indian topics coming before parliament was made by ap-
pointing Indian standing committees. The royal proclamation issued
on the passing of the act contained a recognition of the magnitude
of the experiment, fortified by reliance on the good will and honest
purpose of all who would have to deal with it.
The path will not be easy and in the march towards the goal there will be need
of perseverance and of mutual forbearance between all sections and races of my
people in India. I am confident that these high qualities will be forthcoming.
I rely on the new popular assemblies to interpret wisely the wishes of those whom
they represent and not to forget the interests of the masses who cannot yet be
admitted to franchise. I rely on the leaders of people, the ministers of the future,
to face responsibility, and endure misrepresentations, to sacrifice much for the
common interest of the state, remembering that true patriotism transcends party
and communal boundaries, and, while retaining the confidence of the legislatures,
to co-operate with my officers for the common good in sinking unessential differences
and in maintaining the essential standards of a just and generous government.
Equally do I rely upon my officers to respect their new colleagues and to work
with them in harmony and kindliness; to assist the people and their representatives
in an orderly advance towards free institutions; and to find in these new tasks
a fresh opportunity to fulfil, as in the past, their highest purpose of service to my
people.
1 Questions 4077-83, Cd. 97 (1919).


## p. 604 (#644) ############################################

CHAPTER XXXIV
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 to 1969
GOVERNMENT of India Act, 1919: It was on 8 February 1921
that the Duke of Connaught opened the new central Indian legis-
lature and read the following message from King Emperor George
V: “For years, patriotic and loyal Indians have dreamed of Swaraj
(Home Rule) for their motherland. To-day you have the begin-
ning of Swaraj within my empire and the widest scope and ample
opportunity for progress to the liberty which my other Dominions
enjoy. ” This central legislature was provided in the Government
of India Act, 1919 whose preamble was in these words:
“Whereas it is the declared policy of the Parliament to provide
for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian
administration, and for gradual development of self-governing insti-
tutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible
government in British India as an integral part of the Empire;
“And whereas progress, in giving effect to this policy, can only
be achieved by successive stages, and it is expedient that substan-
rial steps in this direction should now be taken;
“And whereas the time and manner of each advance can be
determined only by Parliament upon whom responsibility lies for
the welfare and advancement of the Indian people;
“And whereas the action of Parliament in such matters should
be guided by the cooperation received from those on whom new
opportunities of service will be conferred, and by the extent to
which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of
responsibility;
“And whereas concurrently with the development of self-govern-
ing institutions in the Provinces of India, it is expedient to give to
those provinces in provincial matters the highest measure of inde-
pendence of the Government of India, which is compatible with
the due discharge by the latter of its own responsibilities. ”
Formerly the Secretary of State for India used to be paid out
of the Indian revenues. The new Act provided that in future he
was to be paid out of the British revenues. Some of his functions
were taken away from him and given to the High Commissioner
for India who was to be appointed by the Government of India
and paid by the Government of India. He was to act as the agent
of the Governor-General-in-Council. He was to be incharge of
the Stores Department, the Indian Students Department, etc. The


## p. 605 (#645) ############################################

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1919
605
control of the Secretary of State was reduced in the provincial sphere
in so far as the Transferred Departments were concerned, but it
remained as complete as before in so far as the Reserved Depart-
ments were concerned. The Secretary of State was to possess and
exercise the power of superintendence, direction and control over
the affairs of India and it was the duty of the Government of India
to carry out his orders.
The Act set up a bicameral legislature at the Centre in place of
the Imperial Legislative Council. The names of the two Houses
were the Council of State and Central Legislative Assembly. The
Council of State consisted of 60 members out of which 33 were
elected and 27 nominated by the Governor-General. The Assembly
consisted of 145 members out of which 103 were elected and the
rest were nominated. Out of the nominated members, 25 were
officials and the rest non-officials. Out of the 103 elected members.
51 were elected by the general constituencies, 32 by communal
constituencies (30 by the Muslims and 2 by the Sikhs) and 20 by
special constituencies (7 by landholders, 9 by Europeans and 4 by
Indian Commerce). The life of the Central Assembly was 3 years
and that of the Council of Siate 5 years. However, the same could
be extended by the Governor-General. As a matter of fact, the
last Assembly sat for 11 years. The first Speaker of the Assembly
was nominated by the Government but the subsequent Speakers
were elected by the members of the Assembly. The Governor-
General was given the power to summon, prorogue and dissolve
both Houses of the Legislature. He was given the authority io
address the members of both Houses of the Central Legislature.
The Franchise Committee recommended a system of indirect
elections to the Central Assembly on the ground that direct elec-
tions, though preferable, were impracticable on account of the
unwieldy character of the constituencies. However, the Govern-
ment of India decided in favour of direct elections for both Houses
of the Central Legislature. The franchise was very much restrict-
ed. In 1920, the total number of voters for the Council of State
was 17,364 and for the Central Assembly 9,09,874.
The Central Legislature was given very wide powers. It could
make laws for the whole of British India, for the subjects of His
Majesty and Services of the Crown in other parts of India, for
the Indian subjects of His Majesty wherever they may happen to
be and for all persons employed in His Majesty's defence forces. It
could also repeal or amend laws for the time being in force in British
India or applicable to persons mentioned in the preceding sentence.
However, the previous sanction of the Secretary of State-n-Council
was required to pass any legislation abolishing any high Court.


## p. 606 (#646) ############################################

606 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
9
The Central Legislature had no power to amend or repeal any
Parliamentary statute relating to British India or to do anything
affecting the authority of Parliament or the written laws or Consti-
tution of the United Kingdom. The previous sanction of the
Governor-General was also required to introduce bills concerning
the public debt . or public revenues of India, religion or religious
rites and usages of the British subjects in India, discipline or main-
tenance of His Majesty's military, naval and air forces, relations of
the Government of India with foreign states or Indian states and
any measure which repealed or amended any Act of a Legislature
or any ordinance made by the Governor-General, etc. The Gover-
nor-General was also given the power of preventing the considera-
tion, at any stage, of a bill or a part of a bill in either Chamber
of the Central Legislature if in his opinion it "affects the safety or
tranquillity of British India or any part thereof. " The Governor-
General was given the power to enact laws which were considered
essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India or
any part thereof if either Chamber refused or failed to pass them.
Every Act so passed required the assent of His Majesty. The
Governor-General was given the power of making and promulgat-
ing ordinances for the peace and quiet Government of British India
in case of emergency. An ordinance issued by the Governor-
General was to have the same force of law as a law passed by the
Central Legislature and was to last for 6 months. The Governor-
General was given the power of returning any measure passed by
the two Houses of Central Legislature for reconsideration before
signifying his assent or dissent. The assent of the Governor-General
was essential before a bill passed by the Legislature could become
law.
He was given the power to give his assent or reserve a Bill
for approval by His Majesty. The Crown was given the power of
disallowing any Act made by the Central Legislature or the Gover-
nor-General. This power of veto was not only in theory but was
actually exercised by the Governor-General on many occasions.
The members of both houses of the Central Legislature were
given the right of putting interpellations and supplementary ques-
tions and moving resolutions and motions of adjournment accord-
ing to rules. They were also given the right of freedom of speech.
The Government was to submit proposals for appropriations, in
the form of demands, for the vote of the Central Assembly. How-
ever, there were certain non-votable items in the budget which
were not open to discussion in either Chamber "unless the Gover-
nor-General otherwise directs”. All other items of expenditure
were to be submitted to the vote of the Assembly which "may assent
or refuse its assent to any demand or may reduce the amount


## p. 607 (#647) ############################################

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA -ACT, 1919
607
referred to in any demand by a reduction of the whole grant. ” If
the Governor-General was satisfied that any demand which had
been refused by the Assembly was essential for the discharge of
his responsibilities, he could restore the grant even if it was rejected
by the Assembly. In cases of emergency, the Governor-General
was given the power “to authorise such expenditure as may; in his
opinion, be necessary for the safety and tranquillity of British India
or any part thereof. " It is obvious that the Central Legislature
was helpless before the Governor-General who was not only inde-
pendent of the Legislature, but was also given the power of over-
riding it in almost all respects.
It is rightly pointed out that the Government of India Act, 1919
introduced responsive and not responsible Government at the Centre.
The members of the Executive Council of the Governor-General
were nominated members and the people had neither any hand in
their appointment nor in their removal. No vote of no-confidence
by Legislature could turn them out. However, as a matter of fact,
the members of the Executive Council did respond to the wishes
of the members of the Central Legislature and through them to the
people of the country. Some of the members of the Central Legisla-
ture were members of the Standing Committees such as Finance
Committee, Committee on Public Accounts, etc. , and in that capa-
city they had an opportunity to influence the Government. The
members could expose the Government by putting them. questions,
supplementary questions and moving motions of adjournment.
They could reject the budget and move and pass resolutions
against the Government. It is these factors which made the Gov-
ernment respond to the wishes of the members of the Legislature.
Even the most irresponsible Executive Councillors could not afford
to ignore the wishes of the members of the Legislature. Thus it
was that although the Executive was independent of the Legisla-
ture, the latter could influence its decisions to a certain extent.
The large majority given to the elected members of the Central
Assembly made things hot for the Government and the only way
to improve matters was to carry on the administration according
to the wishes of the people.
The Government of India Act, 1919 provided for two lists of
subjects: Central List and Provincial List. The principle underly-
ing this division of subjects was that matters in regard to which
uniformity in legislation was necessary or desirable for the whole
of India or in more than one province were given to the centre and
matters in which the provinces in general were interested were
given to Provinces. The items included in the Central List were
defence, foreign and political relations, public debt, tariffs and


## p. 608 (#648) ############################################

608 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
customs, posts and telegraphs, patents and copyright, currency and
coinage, communications, commerce and shipping, civil and crimi-
nal law and procedure, major ports, etc. The Provincial subjects
were local self-government, public health and sanitation and medi-
cal administration, education, public works, water supply and irri-
gation, land revenue administration, famine relief, agriculture,
forests, cooperative societies, law and order, etc. The residuary
subjects were divided between the centre and the provinces on the
same principle on which the Lists were drawn. The division was
not clear-cut or definite. There was a lot of over-lapping. While
subjects like commerce and law regarding property were placed in
the Central List, important subjects like excise and laws regarding
land revenue were given to the provinces. Although all subjects
in the Provincial List were provincial for purposes of administra-
tion, that was not the case in legislation. Certain parts of them
in regard to which uniformity in legislation was considered desir-
able, were made “subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature”.
Those were borrowing and tasing powers of local self-governing
bodies, infectious and contagious diseases of men, animals and
plants, water supply and irrigation, industrial matters including
factories, electricity, settlement of labour disputes, control of news-
papers, printing presses, etc.
The size of the provincial Legislative Councils was considerably
enlarged. While about 70% of the members of the provincial
Legislatures were elected, about 30% were nominated by the Gover-
nor. Some of the nominated members were officials and the others
were non-officials. The life of the Council was fixed at 3 years,
but the same could be extended. The members were given the
right of asking questions and supplementary questions. They were
also given the power of rejecting the budget although the Gover-
nor was given the power of restoring the same.
DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
Dyarchy was introduced in the provinces. The subjects given
in the Provincial List were divided into two parts, reserved and
transferred subjects. The reserved subjects were to be adminis-
iered by the Governor as before with the help of the Executive
Council. The change now made was that the transferred sub-
jects were to be dealt with by the Governor in future with the help
of his ministers. While the members of the Executive Council were
nominated by the Governor, the ministers were chosen by him from
the members of the Legislature. The reserved subjects were the
administration of justice, police, irrigation and canals, drainage


## p. 609 (#649) ############################################

DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
609
and embankments, water storage and water power, land revenue
administration, land improvement and agricultural loans, famine
relief, control of newspapers, books and printing presses, prisons
and reformatories, borrowing money on the credit of the province,
forests except in Bombay and Burma, factory inspection, settlement
of industrial disputes, industrial insurance and housing. The trans-
ferred subjects were local self-government including matters relat-
ing to municipal corporations and district boards, public health,
sanitation and medical administration including hospitals and
asylums and provision for medical education, education of Indians
with some exceptions, public works including roads, bridges and
municipal tramways, but excluding irrigation, agriculture and
fisheries, cooperative societies, excise, forests in Bombay anad Burma
only, development of industries including industrial research and
technical education. The Governor was not to act as a constitu-
tional head. He was given special responsibilities. He was given
the authority to over-rule his ministers and the members of the
Executive Council if that was considered necessary for the discharge
of his responsibilities. The Governor was expected to encourage
joint deliberations between the ministers and the members of the
Executive Council. Provision was made for the temporary admin-
istration of transferred subjects in case of an emergency. If no
minister was incharge of a transferred subject, the Governor him-
self assumed temporary charge of it till a minister was appointed.
The Governor-General-in-Council, with the previous sanction of
the Secretary of State in Council, could revoke or suspend the
transfer of all or any subjects in a province and in that case those
were to be administered by the Governor-in-Council.
The system of dyarchy was worked in the provinces from 1921
to 1937, but it did not work satisfactorily. The very principle of
dyarchy was faulty. Any division of administration into two parts,
each independent of the other, is opposed to political theory and
practice of Government. The state is like an organism and the two
parts cannot be separated completely. However, the actual divi-
sion of subjects was the most defective. There could not be a
worse division than the one actually attempted. Sir K. V. Reddy,
a Minister of Madras, says: “I was a minister for development with-
out forests. I was the minister for agriculture without irrigation.
As minister of agriculture, I have nothing to do with the adminis-
tration of the Madras Agriculturists' Loans Act or the Madras Land
Improvement Loans Act. . . . . . Famine relief, of course, could not
be touched by the minister for agriculture; efficacy and efficiency
of a minister for agriculture without anything to do with irriga-
tion, agricultural loans, land improvement loans and famine relief


## p. 610 (#650) ############################################

610 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
>
is better imagined than described. Then again, I was a minister
for industries without factories, boilers, electricity and water power,
mines or labour, all of which were reserved subjects. ” While edu-
cation was a transferred subject, the education of Europeans and
the Anglo-Indians was made a reserved subject. Sir C. Y.
Chintamani, a minister of U. P. , has given some examples of the
manner in which dyarchy was actually worked. In 1921, an
enquiry was started in the Department of Agriculture on the ques-
tion of the fragmentation of lands. When the report was submitted
in 1922, it was felt that the question should have been dealt with
by the Revenue Department and the case was transferred to that
Department. In 1924, it was decided that the case should be sent
to the Cooperative Department to which it related. Similar
examples could be multiplied.
There was no harmony between the two halves of the provin-
cial Government. While the ministers were the representatives of
the people, the members of the Executive Council belonged to the
bureaucracy. Ordinarily, they did not pull together. There was
constant friction. Occasionally, the ministers and the Executive
Councillors condemned each other openly in public. The result
was that the work of the administration suffered. As a rule, the
Governor backed the members of the Executive Council because
he himself belonged to the service to which they belonged.
The position of the ministers was very weak. They had to serve
two masters, viz. , the Governor and the Legislative Council. A
minister could be appointed by the Governor and dismissed at his
will. He was responsible to the Legislature for the administration
of his Department. He could be turned out by the Legislature by
a vote of no-confidence. However, from the point of view of practi-
cal politics, the ministers cared more for the Governor than for the
Legislature. There were no strong political parties in the provin-
cial legislatures on whom the ministers could rely upon for their
support. No minister had a majority in the Legislature to back
him in office. He had always to depend upon the support of the
official bloc in the Legislature. While the elected members of the
Provincial Legislature were divided into many groups on the basis
of various religions, the support of the official bloc which always
voted under instructions from the Governor, was always available
to a minister who cared for the goodwill and support of the Gover-
No wonder, the ministers always looked up to the Governor
and were dependent upon him. The Raja of Panagal openly used
to say in the Madras Legislative Council that he was responsible
only to the Governor and none else. In certain cases, the ministers
hoped to become Executive Councillors after the expiry of their
nor.


## p. 611 (#651) ############################################

DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
611
term of office as ministers. The result of all this was that the min-
isters sank to the position of glorified secretaries. C. Y. Chintamani
rightly says that the ministers had no power. “The power is with
the Governor and not with the ministers”. The Governor could
interfere in any matter under any minister. Kelkar says that he
was allowed to have his way in matters of policy but was constantly
over-ruled in matters of detail. To quote him, “For instance, I
could not picture myself how a Governor could support my policy
of non-interference with a Municipal Committee who wanted to
hoist national flag on the municipal office and how the same Gover-
nor could ask me to uphold an order of a Deputy Commissioner
who had suspended a Committee's resolution to the effect that its
servants should put on Khaddar dress. ”
The Governors did not care to encourage the principle of joint
responsibility among the ministers. The ministers never worked as
a team. They were always quarrelling among themselves. In the
case of the Calcutta Municipal Bill, the Nawab Sahib and Sir
Surendranath Banerjee openly canvassed against each other in the
Legislative Council. In 1928, Sir Feroz Khan Noon publicly criti-
cized and condemned the action of his Hindu colleague. It is to
be noted that the dismissal or resignation of a minister did not
affect his colleagues. The Governor dealt with every minister
individually
The position of the permanent services created many difficulties.
The appointment, salary, suspension, dismissal and transfer of the
members of the All-India services were under the control of the
Secretary of State for India. Those persons continued to be under
the control of the Secretary of State for India even if they worked
in the Transferred Departments. No wonder, they did not care
for the ministers. The ministers had no power to choose their
own subordinates. Vacancies occurred in their Departments. Most
of the important jobs were reserved for the members of the All-India
services. In the case of Madras, when the post of the Surgeon-
General fell vacant, the minister concerned could not get his
nominee appointed. An I. M. S. officer was sent to fill the post.
Although the minister desired to encourage the Indian system of
medicine, the Surgeon-General did not care for his views. Even
if there were certain superfluous jobs, the minister concerned had
no power to abolish them. In the case of U. P. , a District Officer
refused to apply for appeal in an excise case as required by the
minister and he was supported by a member of the Executive Coun-
cil. As a general rule, the Governors could be expected to support
the members of the civil services against the ministers.
According to the rules of executive business, if a minister differed


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612 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
from the opinion of the Permanent Secretary or the Head of the
Department or the Commissioner of a Division, the matter had to
be submitted to the Governor for final orders. Both the Permanent
Secretary and the Head of the Department had direct access to the
Governor. The Secretary had a weekly interview with the Gover-
nor and he could discuss everything about his Department with the
Governor. That must have weakened the position of the ministers.
Sometimes, the Governor knew more things about a Department
than the minister who was incharge of it.
Another cause of the failure of dyarchy was the reservation of
the Finance Department in the hands of a member of the Execu-
tive Council. While all the nation-building Departments were
given to the ministers, they were given no money for the same.
The result was that the ministers had to depend upon the sweet-will
of the Finance Secretary. As a member of the Indian Civil Service,
the Finance Secretary had no sympathy with the aspirations of the
Indians as represented by the ministers. He cared more for the
needs of the Reserved Departments than for the Transferred Depart-
ments. C. Y. Chintamani says: "A Finance Member was certain-
ly more anxious to see that his Reserved Departments got all the
money they required before other Departments got what they
wanted. ” In certain cases, the Finance Department refused even
to examine any scheme on the ground that no money was likely to
be available. In the case of U. P. , the Finance Department issued
a circular to all the Heads of the Departments directing them not
to send proposals involving expenditure. When actually money
was found available, it was contended by the Finance Department
that no money could be granted as proposals had not been put up
for examination at the right time. Many a time, the reply of the
Finance Department was that the proposals were not "worth spend-
ing money on”. Even when schemes were approved, ways and
means were found to defeat them or delay them till the end of the
financial year which compelled the minister concerned to start from
the very beginning once again. C. Y. Chintamani says: "I am
prepared to state this without any exaggeration that it was the
general experience of both the ministers in the United Provinces
that they had to contend with great difficulties when they went to
the Finance Department, that pretty frequently they had to go
before the Governor, pretty frequently the Governor did not side
with them and pretty frequently they could only gain their point
in the end by placing their offices at the disposal of the Governor. "
There was another hindrance in the way of the successful work-
ing of dyarchy. It was born under an unlucky star. The political
atmosphere in the country was surcharged with suspicion and dis-


## p. 613 (#653) ############################################

DYARCHY IN THE PROVINCES
613
trust in account of the happenings in the Punjab and the attitude
of the British Government towards Turkey. The monsoons failed
in 1920 and added to the misery of the people. Slump also came
in the market. The result was that the finances of both the Cen-
tral and Provincial Governments were upset. The favourable bal-
ance of trade of India was upset. Under the Meston Award, the
Provincial Government were required to make certain annual
contributions to the Government of India. On account of the fin-
ancial crisis, the Government of India demanded full contributions
from the provincial governments which themselves were in a very
bad condition. Dyarchy could not be expected to work without
finances.
The man in the street knew that the reforms of 1919 were in
the nature of a half-way house. It was known that ihe Indians
were going to get more in the future and no wonder, they were
not in a mood to give a fair trial to what they had already got.
The situation has been beautifully put in the following words:-
“The Indian intelligentsia exhibit the mentality of a traveller
who is consumed with the desire to arrive at the end of a long and
difficult journey. Every stage, no matter how essential, is a fresh
grievance; any obstacle, no matter how inevitable, an intolerable
outrage; every advance, no matter how note-worthy, is ignored
and forgotten in comparison with the distance which has yet to be
painfully traversed. "
Regarding the working of dyarchy, Sir Harcourt Butler says:
"In India, it has almost become a term of abuse. I have heard
one man shouting to another: 'You are a dyarchy'. 'I will beat
you with a dyarchy', said one Indian boy to another and when
questioned as to what dyarchy was, replied, “a new kind of tennis
racket. ' I have been received in a Burma village by 'a dyarchy
band' braying against a Home Rule band with all the vigour of
village faction neither having the least idea of what Home Rule or
dyarchy meant. ”
Dr. Appadorai in “Dyarchy in Practice” observes: “Dyarchy
was introduced with high hopes and it must be said that, on a
theoretical analysis and if worked under ideal conditions, it is not
without merits. It is the strictly logical solution of a situation in
which it is desired to base the authority of Government in different
matters on two different sources- a situation in which a complete
transfer of responsibility is considered impossible by a ruling power.
It is thus a bridge between autocracy and responsibility. It is
educative in the sense that it gives men an opportunity to show
what they can do, as it proceeds on the basis of proved results; it
would put everybody on their mettle, . . . . . In practice, largely


## p. 614 (#654) ############################################

614 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
because, I think, the conditions it postulates are too difficult to
obtain, its achievements are much more modest. It is a trite re-
mark that where it succeeded it succeeded only because the princi-
ple of dyarchy was largely ignored. But this much may be said:
under dyarchy many persons have been brought in touch with
problems of administration, and with the difficulties of a responsible
form of government. This is a valuable asset, especially if the same
people have an opportunity of working later under a system of full
responsible government. And another good result is that the ideas
of 'transferred subjects' and 'popular control have brought about
a concentration of public interest on certain beneficial activities of
government—the nation building departments. "
The view of Prof. Palande was: “Dyarchy was never intended to
be an ideal in itself but as a stepping stone to a nobler consumma-
tion, namely, a fully self-governing India.