No More Learning

The battle took place
under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on
the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean.
Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of
the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence
of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops,
which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly,
the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs
were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,[284] when, to
remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy
with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in
492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks
(_falces_) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses
(_non absimili forma muralium falcium_). [285] The _falx_ was an iron
with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which,
suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that
of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon
as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes
which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all
their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the
disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded
it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was
completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of
courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated
one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The
Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved
their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This
unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility
of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a
very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the
night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till
sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime
peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all
their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without
the means of defending any longer their _oppida_, they surrendered
themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in
future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be
put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this
great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the
vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives
to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it
was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the
Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the
mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its
revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii
slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the
insurrection. [286]


[Sidenote: Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli. ]

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this
nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined,
a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A
multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of
Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops.
Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his
three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for
his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He
established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which
separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now
find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier. [287] (_See Plate
13. _) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north,
the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000
paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a
position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the
heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his
troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up
in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own
soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the
latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in
face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a
lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle,
without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But,
not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he
determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and
cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a
deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following
night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of
Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the
favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them
escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for
arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with
branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the
retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble
and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But
Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order
to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while
they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality,
the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the
Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the
cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately
submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the
victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against
the Veneti. [288]


[Sidenote: Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus. ]

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with
twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which,
according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul. [289] He
believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country
where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had
lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced
a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries,
and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he
led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and
strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during
its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but,
suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (_in
convalle_), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the
battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour
to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show
what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general
and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans.
Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the _oppidum_ of
the Sotiates (the town of _Sos_), attempted to carry it by assault; but
the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to
covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to
sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they
went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the
Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all
their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they
made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the
Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation,
Adiatunnus,[290] supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty
men of the class called _soldures_, attempted a sally from another side
of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and,
after a severe struggle, drove him back into the _oppidum_;
nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the
countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far
from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an _oppidum_ fortified
by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour
and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon
Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs
enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in
their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had
too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out
detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he
saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was
danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the
same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two
lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited
the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections
of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the
weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the
victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions
they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack
with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained
shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer
battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of
fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with
loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to
their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others
drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the
rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for
action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones
and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the
enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry
brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate,
the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more
easy. [291] He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the
ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take
the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in
the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to
be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the
principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the
clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus,
redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose
courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight.
The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians
or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp
very late in the night.

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of
Aquitaine[292] submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him
hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the
advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission. [293]


[Sidenote: March against the Morini and the Menapii. ]

VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the
end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who
alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had
not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in
caverns[294] or under the tent. [295] Taught by the example of their
neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into
the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their
country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to
fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without
experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest
which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the
enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he
formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This
work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible
celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini
and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of
the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they
were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer
permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to
retire. [296] He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew
his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the
Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently
vanquished. [297]


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on
the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time,
entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain,
for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought
against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or
by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the
mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the
barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what
facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest
to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of
Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we
must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the
world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among
these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations,
named _præfecti fabrorum_. They rendered him the most signal services.
Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,[298] who prepared the material
of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,[299] who, in spite of the
bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his
genius during the wars in Gaul.




CHAPTER VII.

(Year of Rome 699. )

(BOOK IV OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)

INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE
MENAPII.


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s March against the Usipetes and the Tencteri. ]

I. The Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples driven out of their
place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different
countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they
resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii
(established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed
the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves[300] and Xanten) (_see
Plate 14_), and, after taking possession of the whole country, lived
the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.

Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression
which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to
be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the
Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.

To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual
(_maturius quam consuerat_), and joined the army in the countries of the
Aulerci and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had
wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples
of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and
penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal,
the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some
of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi,
the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar
called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned
ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained
cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march
against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war,
for the number of the Tencteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than
430,000 individuals--men, women, and children. If we admit that among
these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing
arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is,
one-fourth of the total population, we see that the Romans had to
combat more than 100,000 enemies. [301]

Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he
promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards
the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had
sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road
which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht,
where he crossed the Meuse. (_See Plate 14. _) He was only a few days’
march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty
language, an arrangement:--“Driven from their country, they have not
taken the initiative in the war; but they will not seek to avoid it.
The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the
aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be
useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are
allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the
exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they
know no people capable of resisting them. ” Cæsar imposed upon them, as a
first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, “Those who have not been able
to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;”
and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his
support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to
this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his
march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain
time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to
collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,[302] beyond the
Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.

At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo
now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the
deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and
earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could
not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the
vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a
delay of three days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the
latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept
Cæsar’s conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem,
yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for
the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more
numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to
provoke a combat, but to confine itself in case of being attacked, to
remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.

When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the
Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the
confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country
of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in
the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne
to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north
of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other
water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that
river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen,
the German deputation.

The vanguard, consisting of 5,000 cavalry, marched without distrust,
reckoning on the truce which had been concluded. Suddenly, 800 horsemen
(all at the disposal of the Germans, since the greater part of their
cavalry had passed the Meuse) appeared bearing down upon Cæsar’s cavalry
from the greatest distance at which they could be seen. In an instant
the ranks of the latter are thrown into disorder. They have succeeded in
forming again, when the German horsemen, according to their custom,
spring to the ground, stab the horses in the bellies, and overthrow
their riders, who fly in terror till they come in sight of the legions.
Seventy-four of the cavalry perished, among whom was the Aquitanian
Piso, a man of high birth and great courage, whose grandfather had
wielded the sovereign power in his country, and had obtained from the
Senate the title of “Friend. ” His brother, in the attempt to save him,
shared his fate.

This attack was a flagrant violation of the truce, and Cæsar resolved to
enter into no further negotiation with so faithless an enemy. Struck
with the impression produced by this single combat on the fickle minds
of the Gauls, he was unwilling to leave them time for reflection, but
decided on delaying battle no longer; besides, it would have been folly
to give the Germans leisure to wait the return of their cavalry. Next
morning their chiefs came to the camp in great numbers, to offer their
justification for the previous day’s attack in defiance of the
convention, but their real object was to obtain by deception a
prolongation of the truce. Cæsar, satisfied at seeing them deliver
themselves into his power of their own accord, judged right to make use
of reprisals, and ordered them to be arrested. The Roman army, then
encamped on the Niers, was only eight miles distant from the
Germans. [303]


[Sidenote: Rout of the Usipetes and the Tencteri. ]

II. Cæsar drew all the troops out of his camp, formed the infantry in
three lines,[304] and placed the cavalry, still intimidated by the late
combat, in the rear guard. After marching rapidly over the short
distance which separated him from the Germans, he came upon them totally
unexpected. Struck with terror at the sudden appearance of the army, and
disconcerted by the absence of their chiefs, they had the time neither
to deliberate nor to take their arms, and hesitated for a moment between
flight and resistance. [305] While their cries and disorder announce
their terror, the Romans, provoked by their perfidious conduct on the
previous day, rush upon the camp. As many of the Germans as are quick
enough to gain their arms attempt to defend themselves, and combat among
the baggage and wagons. But the women and children fly on every side.
Cæsar sends the cavalry to pursue them. As soon as the barbarians, who
still resisted, hear behind them the cries of the fugitives, and see the
massacre of their companions, they throw down their arms, abandon their
ensigns, and rush headlong out of the camp. They only cease their flight
when they reach the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, where some
are massacred and others are swallowed up in the river. [306] This
victory, which did not cost the Romans a single man, delivered them
from a formidable war. Cæsar restored their liberty to the chiefs he had
retained; but they, fearing the vengeance of the Gauls, whose lands they
had ravaged, preferred remaining with him. [307]


[Sidenote: First Passage of the Rhine. ]

III. After so brilliant a success, Cæsar, to secure the results,
considered it a measure of importance to cross the Rhine, and so seek
the Germans in their homes. For this purpose, he must choose the point
of passage where the right bank was inhabited by a friendly people, the
Ubii. The study of this and the following campaigns leads us to believe
that this was Bonn. [308] From the field of battle, then, he proceeded
up the valley of the Rhine; he followed a direction indicated by the
following localities: Gueldres, Crefeld, Neuss, Cologne, and Bonn. (_See
Plate 14. _) Above all, it was Cæsar’s intention to put a stop to the
rage of the Germans for invading Gaul, to inspire them with fears for
their own safety, and to prove to them that the Roman army dared and
could cross a great river. He had, moreover, a plausible motive for
penetrating into Germany--the refusal of the Sicambri to deliver up to
him the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among
them after the battle. The Sicambri had replied to his demand, that the
empire of the Roman people ended with the Rhine, and that beyond it
Cæsar had no further claims. At the same time, the Ubii, who alone of
the peoples beyond the Rhine had sought his alliance, claimed his
protection against the Suevi, who were threatening them more seriously
than ever. It would be a sufficient guarantee for their safety, they
said, to show himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so great was the
renown of the Roman army among even the most remote of the German
nations, since the defeat of Ariovistus and the recent victory; and they
offered him boats for passing the river. Cæsar declined this offer. It
did not appear to him worthy of the dignity of himself or of the Roman
people to have recourse to barbarians, and he judged it unsafe to
transport the army in boats. Therefore, in spite of the obstacles
presented by a wide, deep, and rapid river, he decided on throwing a
bridge across it.

It was the first time that a regular army attempted to cross the Rhine.
The bridge was constructed in the following manner. (_See Plate 15. _)
Two trees (probably in their rough state), a foot and a half in
thickness, cut to a point at one of their extremities, and of a length
proportionate to the depth of the river, were bound together with
cross-beams at intervals of two feet from each other; let down into the
water, and stuck into the ground by means of machines placed in boats
coupled together, they were driven in by blows of a rammer, not
vertically, like ordinary piles, but obliquely, giving them an
inclination in the direction of the current. Opposite them, and at a
distance of forty feet below, another couple of piles were placed,
arranged in the same manner, but inclined in a contrary direction, in
order to resist the violence of the river. In the interval left between
the two piles of each couple, a great beam was lodged, called the
_head-piece_, of two feet square; these two couples (_hæc utraque_) were
bound together on each side, beginning from the upper extremity, by two
wooden ties (_fibulæ_), so that they could neither draw from nor towards
each other, and presented, according to the “Commentaries,” a whole of a
solidity so great, that the force of the water, so far from injuring it,
bound all its parts tighter together. [309] This system formed one row of
piles of the bridge; and as many of them were established as were
required by the breadth of the river. The Rhine at Bonn being about 430
mètres wide, the bridge must have been composed of fifty-six arches,
supposing each of these to have been twenty-six Roman feet in length
(7·70 mètres). Consequently, there were fifty-four rows of piles. The
floor was formed of planks reaching from one head-piece to the other, on
which were placed transversely smaller planks, which were covered with
hurdles. Besides this, they drove in obliquely, below each row of piles,
a pile which, placed in form of a buttress (_quæ pro ariete subjectæ_),
and bound in with it, increased the resistance to the current. Other
piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above the rows of
piles, so as to form stockades, intended to stop trunks of trees and
boats which the barbarians might have thrown down in order to break the
bridge.

These works were completed in ten days, including the time employed for
the transport of the materials. Cæsar crossed the river with his army,
left a strong guard at each extremity of the bridge, and marched towards
the territory of the Sicambri, proceeding, no doubt, up the valley of
the Sieg and the Agger, (_See Plate 14. _) During his march, deputies
from different peoples came to solicit his alliance. He gave them a
friendly reception, and exacted hostages. As to the Sicambri, at the
beginning of the erection of the bridge, they had fled to the deserts
and forests, terrified by the reports of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who
had taken refuge among them.

Cæsar remained only eighteen days beyond the Rhine. During this time he
ravaged the territory of the Sicambri, returned to that of the Ubii, and
promised them succour if they were attacked by the Suevi. The latter
having withdrawn to the centre of their country, he renounced the
prospect of combating them, and considered that he had thus accomplished
his design.

It is evident, from what precedes, that Cæsar’s aim was not to make the
conquest of Germany, but to strike a great blow which should disgust the
barbarians with their frequent excursions across the Rhine. No doubt he
hoped to meet with the Suevi, and give them battle; but learning that
they had assembled at a great distance from the Rhine, he thought it
more prudent not to venture into an unknown country covered with
forests, but returned into Gaul, and caused the bridge to be broken.

It was not enough for Cæsar to have intimidated the Germans; he formed a
still bolder project, that of crossing the sea, to go and demand a
reckoning of the Britons for the succour which, in almost all his wars,
and particularly in that of the Veneti, they had sent to the Gauls.
[310]


[Sidenote: Description of Britain in the time of Cæsar. ]

IV. The Romans had but imperfect information relating to Britain, which
they owed to certain Greek writers, such as Pytheas of Marseilles, who
had visited the Northern Sea in the fourth century before our era, and
Timæus of Tauromenium. The Gauls who visited Britain for the sake of
traffic, knew hardly more than the southern and south-eastern coasts.
Nevertheless, a short time before the arrival of the Romans, one of the
populations of Belgic Gaul, the Suessiones, then governed by Divitiacus,
had extended their domination into this island. [311]

It was only after having landed in Britain that Cæsar was able to form a
tolerably exact idea of its form and extent. “Britain,” he says, “has
the form of a triangle, the base of which, about 500 miles in extent,
faces Gaul. The side which faces Spain, that is, the west, presents a
length of about 700 miles. In this direction the island is separated
from Hibernia (_Ireland_) by an arm of the sea, the breadth of which is
apparently the same as the arm of the sea which separates Britain from
Gaul;” and he adds that “the surface of Hibernia represents about one
half the surface of Britain. The third part of the triangle formed by
this latter island is eastward turned to the north, and 800 miles long;
it faces no land; only one of the angles of this side looks towards
Germany. ”[312] These imperfect estimates, which were to give place in
the following century to others less inaccurate,[313] led the great
captain to ascribe to the whole of Britain twenty times 100,000 paces in
circuit. He further gathered some information still more vague on the
small islands in the vicinity of Britain. “One of them,” he writes, “is
called Mona (_the Isle of Man_), and is situated in the middle of the
strait which separates Britain from Hibernia. ” The Hebrides, the
Shetland islands (_Acmodæ_ of the ancients), and the Orcades, which were
only known to the Romans at the commencement of our era,[314] were
confounded, in the minds of Cæsar and his contemporaries, with the
archipelago of the Feroe isles and Scandinavia. Caledonia (_Scotland_)
appeared only in an obscure distance.

Cæsar represents the climate of Britain as less cold and more temperate
than that of Gaul. With the exception of the beech (_fagus_) and the fir
(_abies_), the same timbers were found in the forests of this island as
on the neighbouring continent. [315] They grew wheat there, and bred
numerous herds of cattle. [316] “The soil, if it is not favourable to
the culture of the olive, the vine, and other products of warm
climates,” writes Tacitus,[317] “produces in their place grain and
fruits in abundance. Although they grow quickly, they are slow in
ripening. ”

Britain contained a numerous population. The interior was inhabited by
peoples who believed themselves to be _autochthones_, and the southern
and eastern coasts by a race who had emigrated from Belgic Gaul, and
crossed the Channel and the Northern Sea, attracted by the prospect of
plunder. After having made war on the natives, they had established
themselves in the island, and became agriculturalists. [318] Cæsar adds
that nearly all these tribes which had come from the continent had
preserved the names of the _civitates_ from whence they had issued. And,
in fact, among the peoples of Britain named by geographers in the ages
subsequent to the conquest of Gaul, we meet, on the banks of the Thames
and the Severn, with the names of Belgæ and Atrebates.

The most powerful of the populations of Belgic origin were found in
Cantium (_Kent_), which was placed, by its commercial relations, in more
habitual intercourse with Gaul. [319] The “Commentaries” mention only a
small number of British nations. These are the Trinobantes (the people
of _Essex_ and _Middlesex_), who proved the most faithful to the
Romans,[320] and whose principal _oppidum_ was probably already, in the
time of Cæsar, Londinium (_London_), mentioned by Tacitus;[321] the
Cenimagni[322] (_Suffolk_, to the north of the Trinobantes); the
Segontiaci (the greater part of _Hampshire_ and _Berkshire_, southern
counties); the Bibroci (inhabiting a region then thickly wooded, over
which extended the celebrated forest of Anderida);[323] their territory
comprised a small part of _Hampshire_ and _Berkshire_, and embraced the
counties of _Surrey_ and _Sussex_ and the most western part of _Kent_;
the Ancalites (a more uncertain position, in the north of _Berkshire_
and the western part of _Middlesex_); the Cassii (_Hertfordshire_ and
_Bedfordshire_, central counties). Each of these little nations was
governed by a chieftain or king. [324]

The Belgæ of Britain possessed the same manners as the Gauls, but their
social condition was less advanced. Strabo[325] gives this proof, that,
having milk in abundance, the Britons did not know how to make cheese,
an art, on the contrary, carried to great perfection in certain parts of
Gaul. The national character of the two populations, British and
Gaulish, presented a great analogy:--“The same boldness in seeking
danger, the same eagerness to fly from it when it is before them,”
writes Tacitus; “although the courage of the Britons has more of pride
in it. ”[326] This resemblance of the two races showed itself also in
their exterior forms. Yet, according to Strabo, the stature of the
Britons was taller than that of the Gauls, and their hair was less red.
Their dwellings were but wretched huts made of stubble and wood;[327]
they stored up their wheat in subterranean repositories; their _oppida_
were situated in the middle of forests, defended by a rampart and a
fosse, and served for places of refuge in case of attack. [328]

The tribes of the interior of the island lived in a state of greater
barbarism than those of the maritime districts. Clothed in the skins of
animals, they fed upon milk and flesh. [329] Strabo even represents them
as cannibals; and assures us that the custom existed among them of
eating the bodies of their dead relatives. [330] The men wore their hair
very long, and a moustache; they rubbed their skin with woad, which gave
them a blue colour, and rendered their aspect as combatants singularly
hideous. [331] The women also coloured themselves in the same manner for
certain religious ceremonies, in which they appeared naked. [332] Such
was the barbarism of the Britons of the interior, that the women were
sometimes common to ten or twelve men, a promiscuousness which was
especially customary amongst the nearest relatives. As to the children
who were born of these incestuous unions, they were considered to belong
to the first who had received into his house the mother while still a
girl. [333] The Britons of the Cape Belerium (_Cornwall_) were very
hospitable, and the trade they carried on with foreign merchants had
softened their manners. [334]

The abundance of metals in Britain, especially of tin, or _plumbum
album_, which the Phœnicians went to seek there from a very remote
antiquity,[335] furnished the inhabitants with numerous means of
exchange. At all events, they were not acquainted with money, and only
made use of pieces of copper, gold, or iron, the value of which was
determined by weighing. They did not know how to make bronze, but
received it from abroad. [336]

The religion of the Britons, on which Cæsar gives us no information,
must have differed little from that of the Gauls, since Druidism passed
for having been imported from Britain into Gaul. [337] Tacitus, in fact,
tells us that the same worship and the same superstitions were found in
Britain as among the Gauls. [338] Strabo speaks, on the authority of
Artemidorus, of an island neighbouring to Britain, where they
celebrated, in honour of two divinities, assimilated by the latter to
Ceres and Proserpine, rites which resembled those of the mysteries of
Samothrace. [339] Under the influence of certain superstitious ideas, the
Britons abstained from the flesh of several animals, such as the hare,
the hen, and the goose, which, nevertheless, they domesticated as
ornamental objects. [340]

The Britons, though living in an island, appear to have possessed no
shipping in the time of Cæsar. They were foreign ships which came to
the neighbourhood of Cape Belerium to fetch the tin, which the
inhabitants worked with as much skill as profit. [341] About a century
after Cæsar, the boats of the Britons were still only frames of
wicker-work covered with leather. [342] The inhabitants of Britain were
less ignorant in the art of war than in that of navigation. Protected by
small bucklers,[343] and armed with long swords, which they handled with
skill, but which became useless in close combat, they never combated in
masses: they advanced in small detachments, which supported each other
reciprocally. [344] Their principal force was in their infantry;[345] yet
they employed a great number of war-chariots armed with scythes. [346]
They began by driving about rapidly on all sides, and hurling darts,
seeking thus to spread disorder in the enemy’s ranks by the mere terror
caused by the impetuosity of the horses and the noise of the wheels;
then they returned into the intervals of their cavalry, leaped to the
ground, and fought on foot mixed with the horsemen. During this time the
drivers withdrew themselves with the chariots so as to be ready in case
of need to receive the combatants. [347] The Britons thus united the
movableness of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; daily exercise
had made them so dexterous that they maintained their horses at full
speed on steep slopes, drew them in or turned them at will, ran upon the
shaft, held under the yoke, and thence threw themselves rapidly into
their chariots. [348] In war they used their dogs as auxiliaries, which
the Gauls procured from Britain for the same purpose. These dogs were
excellent for the chase. [349]

In short, the Britons were less civilised than the Gauls. If we except
the art of working certain metals, their manufactures were limited to
the fabrication of the coarsest and most indispensable objects; and it
was from Gaul they obtained collars, vessels of amber and glass, and
ornaments of ivory for the bridles of their horses. [350]

It was known also that pearls were in the Scottish sea, and people
easily believed that it concealed immense treasures.

These details relating to Britain were not collected until after the
Roman expeditions, for that country was previously the subject of the
most mysterious tales; and when Cæsar resolved on its conquest, this
bold enterprise excited people’s minds to the highest degree by the
ever-powerful charm of the unknown. As to him, in crossing the Channel,
he obeyed the same thought which had carried him across the Rhine: he
wished to give the barbarians a high notion of Roman greatness, and
prevent them from lending support to the insurrections in Gaul.


[Sidenote: First Expedition to Britain. ]

V. Although the summer approached its end, the difficulties of a
descent upon Britain did not stop him. Even supposing, indeed, that the
season should not permit him to obtain any decisive result by the
expedition, he looked upon it as an advantage to gain a footing in that
island, and to make himself acquainted with the locality, and with the
ports and points for disembarking. None of the persons whom he examined
could or would give him any information, either on the extent of the
country, or on the number and manners of its inhabitants, or on their
manner of making war, or on the ports capable of receiving a large
fleet.

Desirous of obtaining some light on these different points before
attempting the expedition, Cæsar sent C. Volusenus, in a galley, with
orders to explore everything, and return as quickly as possible with the
result of his observations. He proceeded in person with his army into
the country of the Morini, from whence the passage into Britain was
shortest. There was on that coast a port favourably situated for fitting
out an expedition against this island, the _Portius Itius_, or, as we
shall endeavour to prove farther on, the port of Boulogne. The ships of
all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous
year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.

The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the
merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with
offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their
return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of
the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he
appreciated, enjoyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to
visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good
feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.

While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the
preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in
the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past
conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave
enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow
of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of
sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain:
he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus
returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission:
as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.

The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th
and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a
detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450
horses.

Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of
the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii
and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The
lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port
with a sufficient force.

They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable
of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage,
and a certain number of galleys, which were distributed among the
quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels,
destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little
port (that of _Ambleteuse_) situated eight miles to the north of
Boulogne. [351] (_See Plate 16. _)

Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable
wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall
endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after
giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above
(_Ambleteuse_); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of
the day (ten o’clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The
cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.

From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this
spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the
heights could reach the beach. [352] The place appeared to him in no
respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which
Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of “coasts surmounted by immense
rocks. ”[353] (_See Plate 17. _) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain
until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours,
_Appendix B_), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the
interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the
soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information
brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of
his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the
manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that
Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.

When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o’clock, the wind
and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal
for raising their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to
the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according
to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory,[354] the point of the South
Foreland (_see Plate 16_), he stopped before the open and level shore
which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.

From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the
movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where
the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and
their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They
arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the
most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude,
could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown
coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight
of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a
footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of
their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the
water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with
confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses
into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this
concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of
combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.

In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the
galleys--lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the
barbarians--and directed them by force of rowing upon the enemy’s
uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from
his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the
machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons,
struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the
novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the
Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of
the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the
gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle,
leaps into the sea and induces them to follow. [355] This example is
imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the
combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their
ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the
confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the
land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the
shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy,
taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On
seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys’ boats and the small vessels which
served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them
wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in
establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon
the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for
want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had not
been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.

In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained
unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by
Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner.
Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a
rock,[356] whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the
enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land
fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions
took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence,
and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh
transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his
helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted
himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions.
When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought
his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a
disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded
him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.

The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near
the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of
Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships
left at anchor not far from the shore.

The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They
joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini,
with whom they lived on friendly terms,[357] and Commius, the King of
the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The
barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him
with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask
pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar
reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of
their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of
peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of
these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a
few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the
chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.

Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain,
and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper
port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view
of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out
of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had
started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island,
where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in
the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.

This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full
moon; the Romans were ignorant of the fact that this was the period of
the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys
which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which
had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the
coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in
want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials
for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not
intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.

At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again
assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed
of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of
the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the
more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage[358] they
determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable
for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in
the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them
off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into
Britain.

A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another
from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away.
Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering
the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet,
soon led him to anticipate what would happen. He therefore took his
measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired
in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber
and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of
which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to
the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again,
with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight
vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.

During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards
to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities;
but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded
to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard
before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust
arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some
attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two
others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him
without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had
happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair
to the only spot which remained to reap (_pars una erat reliqua_), had
concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting
till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun
to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the
legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with
their cavalry and chariots.

This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th
legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty
under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when
Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored
confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did
not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain
length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had
experienced considerable loss. [359] Continual rains, during some days,
rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians,
believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty,
assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.

Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with
this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed,
would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal
thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could
use them with advantage;[360] he drew up his legions in battle at the
head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not
sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as
quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp,
after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a
vast circuit.

The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask for peace. Cæsar
doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them
to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only
obeyed this order.

As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill
repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable
weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all
his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable
to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little
lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once
landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by
the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing
to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed
in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they
would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than
four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to
their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and
were nearly all massacred. [361]

[Sidenote: Chastisement of the Morini and Menapii. ]

VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus
received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from
Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer
heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year
before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Cotta rejoined
Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who
had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was
established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it
received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of
thanksgiving. [362]

[Sidenote: Order for Rebuilding the Fleet. Departure for Illyria. ]

VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair
the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of
which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load
them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little
lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented
no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose
to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed
wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired
also to have greater breadth in the vessels on account of the baggage
and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be
arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was
facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio
Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the
Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls. [363] He procured from Spain
all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.

Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the
assembly of Citerior Gaul, and afterwards started for Illyria, on the
news that the Pirustes (_peoples of the Carnic Alps_) were laying the
frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic
measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established
tranquillity. [364]


[Sidenote: Points of Embarking and Landing. Date of the Arrival in
Britain. ]

VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at
which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain.
Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in
this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which
will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the
first place, the terms used in the “Commentaries” lead us to suppose it;
next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne;
and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both
occasions at the same spot. [365] It is, then, convenient to treat here
the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to
certain facts.

Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant,
others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I, in
his _Précis des Guerres de César_, has not hesitated in preferring
Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of
Boulogne is the _Portus Itius_, which alone answers the necessities of
the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a
considerable expedition. [366]

To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data.
The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the
place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by
historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered
famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in
preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of
Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons
to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani,[367]
and was to end at Gesoriacum (_Boulogne_), since the Itinerary of
Antoninus traces it thus.