No More Learning

Nevertheless, Hamilton's work
in this respect is important. He overcame the provincialism of
English thought and he brought it into connection with the
greatest of the new German philosophers. It may have been an
imperfect Kant that he revealed; Fichte, Schelling and Hegel
were brought forward as objects of criticisms only. But the
traditional circle of English thought was broken, and new ideas
were brought within it.
Hamilton came forward as a reconciler of Scottish and German
thought of Reid with Kant. It was only an imperfect synthesis
-
that he worked out, but the enterprise was notable. His logical
work, indeed, stands to some extent apart. He followed Kant in
his strictly formal treatment, and he devoted a large amount of
time, and no little ingenuity, to the elaboration of a modification of
the formal doctrine of the traditional logic. This modified doctrine
made a great stir for many years, and was even hailed as the
greatest logical discovery since the time of Aristotle? It is known
as 'the Quantification of the Predicate. ' Hamilton's own exposi-
tions of it are incomplete and are contained in appendixes to his
Discussions and to his Lectures. The clearest accounts of his
views have to be sought in An Essay on the New Analytic of
Logical Forms (1850), by his pupil, Thomas Spencer Baynes, and
in An Outline of the Laws of Thought (the first edition of which
was published in 1842), by William Thomson, afterwards arch-
bishop of York. But the gist of the matter can be put very
shortly. According to the traditional view, in a judgment or
proposition, an assertion is made about something ; that is to say,
the subject is said to possess or not to possess the quality signified
by the predicate. When made not about an individual thing, but
about a group or class, then the assertion may be meant to apply
to every member of the class or only to some of them ; it is, there-
fore, necessary to indicate this, or to express the quantity of the
subject. The predicate is not similarly quantified. But a quality
is always potentially a class—the class of things which possess that
quality. The most elementary of logical operations implies that
it can be treated as such and assigned a quantity as the subject
of a new proposition. Hamilton's ‘new analytic' depends upon
1 Baynes, T. S. , Essay on the New Analytic (1850), p. 80.


## p. 11 (#40) ##############################################

IO
Philosophers
[ch.
6
the contention that the quantity thus implied should be always
explicitly stated, and consists in following out the changes in
formal procedure which seem to him to result from this being
done. But Hamilton was not thorough enough in the elaboration
of his theory. He did not see that it implied a change from the
predication view' to the class view of the proposition and that
this would lead to a very different classification of propositions
from his, and, in general, to a much more radical revision of logical
forms than he contemplated. Two contemporary mathematicians
-Augustus de Morgan and George Boole—went further than he
did; and the latter's treatise entitled The Laws of Thought (1854)
laid the foundations of the modern logical calculus.
Hamilton's article on the Philosophy of Perception' is both a
defence of Reid and, at the same time, a relentless attack npon
Thomas Brown. It is also an attempt to formulate and justify the
doctrine of natural realism' or natural dualism' in a form less
ambiguous than that in which it had been stated by Reid. 'In
the simplest act of perception,' says Hamilton, 'I am conscious
of myself as the perceiving subject and of an external reality as
the object perceived. ' As regards the latter factor what we
have is said to be an immediate knowledge of the external
reality. This clear view almost disappears, however, in the
process of discussion and elaboration which it underwent in
Hamilton's later thought. In the course of his psychological
analysis, he distinguished sharply and properly between the sub-
jective and the objective factors in the act of cognising external
reality; the former he called sensation proper and the latter
perception proper; and he even formulated a “law' of their inverse
ratio. He elaborated, also, the old distinction of primary and
secondary qualities of matter, to which, more suo, he added an
intermediate class of secundo-primary qualities. As a result of
these distinctions the doctrine of 'immediate knowledge of the
external reality' is transformed. The object of perception proper,
it is said, is either a primary quality or a certain phase of a
secundo-primary. But we do not perceive the primary qualities
of things external to our organism. These are not immediately
known but only inferred; the primary qualities which we do
perceive ‘are perceived as in our organism. ' That is to say, when
,
we perceive a table, we do not perceive the shape or size of the
table; knowledge of these is got by inference; the shape and size
which we perceive are in our own bodies. The existence of an
extra-organic world is apprehended through consciousness of


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1]
а
The Philosophy of the Conditioned II
resistance to our muscular energy, which Hamilton calls a 'quasi-
primary phasis of the secundo-primary' qualities? From this
view it follows that no immediate knowledge of external reality is
given by sight; and yet it would be hard to show that the
'testimony of consciousness,' to which Hamilton constantly and
confidently appeals, makes any such distinction between things
seen and things touched.
The value of Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned,' as he
called it, is not easy to estimate, chiefly owing to the difficulty of
stating the exact sense in which he held his favourite doctrine of
the relativity of human knowledge. His most striking production
is the first article he published—that on the Philosophy of the
Unconditioned. ' It is a review not directly of Schelling or Hegel,
but of the eclectic system of his French contemporary, Victor
Cousin. The unconditioned, in his use of the term, is a genus of
which the infinite (or unconditionally unlimited) and the absolute
(or unconditionally limited) are the species ; and his contention is
that it is not an object of thought at all, but ‘merely a common
name for what transcends the laws of thought. ' His argument
follows lines similar to those used by Kant in exhibiting the
antinomies of rational cosmology, though it is applied to the con-
clusions of post-Kantian speculation. According to him, there
cannot be any knowledge of that which is without conditions,
whether it is called infinite or absolute; knowledge lies between two
contradictory inconceivables, one of which must be true though
neither can be conceived; all true philosophy is a philosophy of
the conditioned. "To think,' he says, “is to condition. This state-
ment, however, involves two positions which he does not take care
to keep distinct. It implies that we cannot know the infinite or
whole, which in its nature must be without any conditions ; and it
may also be taken as implying that our knowledge of the finite parts
is not a knowledge of them as they truly exist, but only as they are
modified by our way of knowing. This latter position, though very
definitely stated by Hamilton, is not clearly carried out. He follows
Kant by laying chief stress on space and time as the forms under
which we know objects ; but he departs from Kant in holding that
these forms are also modes of things as actually existing. It would
therefore appear that the fact of their being (as Hamilton calls
them) à priori 'forms of thought' does not interfere with the
objective truth of our spatio-temporal knowledge ; it is a know-
ledge, under the forms of space and time, of things which really
1 Reid's Works, ed. Hamilton, Note D*, pp. 881, 882.


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I 2
[CH.
Philosophers
exist in space and time. Hamilton's doctrine of immediate per-
ception necessitates some such view. He saw, moreover, that some
kind of reconciliation was required; but a parenthetical paragraph
in his article on the Philosophy of Perception’exhausts what he
has to say on this important problem. "To obviate misappre-
hension,' he asserts that all that we know is 'those phases of being
which stand in analogy to our faculties of knowledge. ' This vague
phrase may mean little more than that we cannot know what we
are incapable of knowing. Because the nature of a thing is 'in
a
analogy to our faculties' may be the reason why we are able to
know it; it cannot show that we do not know it as it is or in its
actual nature. But Hamilton's mind seemed to work in two
distinct compartments belonging respectively to the philosophy of
perception and to the philosophy of the conditioned. The two
lines of thought seldom met, and when they did meet the result
was sometimes curious. Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet is the
taunt he flings at Brown and the representationists; but when he
poses as the philosopher of the conditioned, he takes the same tag
as his own motto—rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet.
As regards our supposed knowledge of the absolute or of the
infinite, that, he holds, is merely a negative conception. On this
topic he can hardly be said to have set forth anything substantially
new, though his arguments were novel and striking to the English
reader of the day. Nor, even here, on this fundamental point,
can his view be said to be free from ambiguity. His doctrine
seems to lead logically to a form of positivism; he will not even
allow that the moral consciousness or practical reason' has the
significance assigned to it by Kant; but yet he asserts emphatically
that what cannot be known can be and ought to be believed.
What then is belief? By classifying it as a form or 'faculty' of
cognition, Hamilton strikes at the root of his doctrine that thought
excludes the notion of the absolute or infinite. When on the
war-path against the unconditioned, the ‘imbecility' of human
knowledge is asserted to the fullest extent; when religious belief
is in question, the unknown God’ is represented as somehow the
object of consciousness; and sometimes it would even appear as if
his view were simply that knowledge of the highest object which
consciousness can apprehend, cannot, like our knowledge of par-
ticular things, imply a reference to some higher concept.
The theological results of the philosophy of the conditioned
were worked out thoroughly and with effective logic by Henry


## p. 13 (#43) ##############################################

I]
John Stuart Mill
13
Longueville Mansel, an Oxford professor who was dean of St Paul's
for the three years preceding his death in 1871. Mansel was a
scholar of less miscellaneous learning than Hamilton, and his
thinking was less original; but his thought was not obscured by his
learning. In the notes and appendixes to his edition of Aldrich's
Artis Logicæ Rudimenta (1849), and in his Prolegomena Logica
(1851), he defined and defended a formal view of the science
similar to Hamilton's. His Metaphysics (1860), originally con-
tributed to The Encyclopaedia Britannica, is the best connected
exposition of the philosophy that may be called Hamiltonian;
and, in his Philosophy of the Conditioned (1866), the doctrine was
defended against the criticisms of Mill. He was also the author
of a brilliant brochure, in the form of an Aristophanic comedy,
entitled Phrontisterion (republished in Letters, Lectures and
Reviews, 1873), in which academic reformers and German philo-
sophers are satirised. But his wider fame came from his Bampton
lectures, The Limits of Religious Thought (1858). This work is
a Christian apologetic founded on the doctrine of agnosticism
(to use the modern term) which he shared with Hamilton.
Since knowledge of God, in His absolute existence, is self-con-
tradictory, since 'absolute morality' is equally beyond human
knowledge and since our moral conceptions can only be relative
and phenomenal,' he seeks to disallow any criticisms of theological
doctrine which are based upon human conceptions of good and
evil. The indignation with which this doctrine was repudiated by
John Stuart Mill formed one of the most striking, but not one of
the most important, features of his criticism of the philosophy of
Hamilton.
IV. JOHN STUART MILL AND OTHERS
John Stuart Mill is, on the whole, the most interesting and
characteristic figure in English philosophy in the nineteenth
century. He was successively the hope and the leader, sometimes,
also, the despair, of the school of thought which was regarded as
representative of English traditions. He was born in London on
20 May 1806, and was the eldest son of James Mill. He was
educated entirely by his father and was deliberately shielded from
association with other boys of his age. From his earliest years he
was subjected to a rigid system of intellectual discipline. As a
result of this system, knowledge of what are considered the higher
branches of education was acquired by him in childhood, and he


## p. 14 (#44) ##############################################

14
[ch.
Philosophers
started on his career, according to his own account, with an advan-
tage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries. This
is probably an overstatement of a very remarkable intellectual
precocity; and John Mill recognised, in later life, that his father's
system had the fault of appealing to the intellect only and that
the culture of his practical and emotional life had been neglected,
while his physical health was probably undermined by the strenu-
ous labour exacted from him. James Mill's method seems to
have been designed to make his son's mind a first-rate thinking
machine, so that the boy might become a prophet of the utilitarian
gospel. In this he succeeded. But the interest—one may almost
say, the tragedy—of the son’s life arose from the fact that he
possessed a much finer and subtler nature than his father's—a
mind which could not be entirely satisfied by the hereditary creed.
He remained more or less orthodox, according to the standards of
his school ; but he welcomed light from other quarters, and there
were times when Grote and others feared that he might become
a castaway. 'A new mystic' was Carlyle's judgment upon some
of his early articles. Mill never became a mystic; but he kept an
open mind, and he saw elements of truth in ideas in which the
stricter utilitarians could see nothing at all.
He had no doubts at the outset of his career. On reading
Bentham (this was when he was fifteen or sixteen) the feeling
rushed upon him that all previous moralists were superseded. '
The principle of utility, he says, understood and applied as it was
by Bentham,
gave unity to my conception of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a
doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion;
the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward
purpose of a life.
Soon afterwards he formed a small ‘Utilitarian Society,' and, for
some few years, he was one of 'a little knot of young men who
adopted his father's philosophical and political views 'with youth-
ful fanaticism. ' A position under his father in the India office
had secured him against the misfortune of having to depend on
literary work for his livelihood; and he found that office-work left
him ample leisure for the pursuit of his wider interests.
He was already coming to be looked upon as a leader of
thought when, in his twenty-first year, the mental crisis occurred
which is described in his Autobiography. This crisis was a result
of the severe strain, physical and mental, to which he had been
subjected from his earliest years. He was in a dull state of
6


## p. 15 (#45) ##############################################

1]
Mill's Early Writings
15
nerves'; the objects in life for which he had been trained and for
which he had worked lost their charm; he had ‘no delight in
virtue, or the general good, but also just as little in anything
else'; a constant habit of analysis had dried up the fountains of
feeling within him. After many months of despair, he found,
accidentally, that the capacity for emotion was not dead, and “the
cloud gradually drew off. ' But the experience he had undergone
modified his theory of life and his character. Happiness was still
to be the end of life, but it should not be taken as its direct end;
' ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The
only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to
it, as the purpose of life. Further, he ceased to attach almost
exclusive importance to the ordering of outward circumstances,
and, 'for the first time, gave its proper place, among the prime
necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the
individual. ' In this state of mind, he found, in the poems of
Wordsworth— the poet of unpoetical natures,' as he calls him,
that very culture of the feelings which he was seeking. From him
he learned 'what would be the perennial sources of happiness,
when all the greater evils of life shall have been removed. '
Mill's widened intellectual sympathies were shown by his
reviews of Tennyson's poems and of Carlyle's French Revolution
in 1835 and 1837. The articles on Bentham and on Coleridge,
published in 1838 and 1840 respectively, disclose his modified
philosophical outlook and the exact measure of his new mental
independence. From the position now occupied he did not
seriously depart throughout the strenuous literary work of his
mature years. The influence of the new spirit, which he identified
with the thinking of Coleridge, did not noticeably develop further;
if anything, perhaps, his later writings adhered more nearly to the
traditional views than might have been anticipated from some
indications in his early articles.
These two articles provide the key for understanding Mill's
own thought. He looks upon Bentham as a great constructive
genius who had first brought light and system into regions for-
merly chaotic. No finer or juster appreciation of Bentham's work
has ever been written. Mill agrees with Bentham's fundamental
principle and approves his method. Bentham made morals and poli-
tics scientific; but his knowledge of life was limited. “It is wholly
empirical and the empiricism of one who has had little experience. '
The deeper things of life did not touch him; all the subtler work-
ings of mind and its environment were hidden from his view. It


## p. 16 (#46) ##############################################

16
Philosophers
[CH.
is significant that Mill assumes that, for light on these deeper and
subtler aspects of life, we must go not to other writers of the
empirical tradition but to thinkers of an entirely different school.
He disagrees with the latter fundamentally in the systematic
presentation of their views—whether these be defended by the
easy appeal to intuition or by the more elaborate methods of
Schelling or Hegel. What we really get from them are half-lights-
glimpses, often fitful and always imperfect, into aspects of truth
not seen at all by their opponents. Coleridge represented this
type of thought. He had not Bentham's great constructive
faculties; but he had insight in regions where Bentham's vision
failed, and he appreciated, what Bentham almost entirely over-
looked, the significance of historical tradition.
The ideas which Mill derived from the writings of Coleridge, or
from his association with younger men who had been influenced
by Coleridge, did not bring about any fundamental change in his
philosophical standpoint, but they widened his horizon. And in
nearly all his books we can trace their effect. He seems conscious
that the analysis which satisfied other followers of Bentham is
imperfect, and that difficulties remain which they are unable to
solve and cannot even see.
Mill's System of Logic was published in 1843, and ran through
many editions, some of which—especially the third (1850) and the
eighth (1872)—were thoroughly revised and supplemented by the
incorporation of new, mainly controversial, matter. It is probably
the greatest of his books. In spite of Hobbes's treatise, and of
the suggestive discussions in the third book of Locke's Essay, the
greater English philosophers almost seem to have conspired to
neglect the theory of logic. It had kept its place as an academic
study, but on traditional lines; Aristotle was supposed to have
said the last word on it, and that last word to be enshrined in
scholastic manuals. English thought, however, was beginning to
emerge from this stage. Richard Whately had written a text-
book, Elements of Logic (1826), which, by its practical method and
modern illustrations, gave a considerable impetus to the study,
and Hamilton's more comprehensive researches had begun. From
them Mill did not learn much or anything. What he set bimself
to work out was a theory of evidence in harmony with the first
principles of the empirical philosophy; and this was an almost
untouched problem. He may have obtained help from Locke; he
.
acknowledges the value for his thinking of Dugald Stewart's
analysis of the process of reasoning; he was still more indebted to


## p. 17 (#47) ##############################################

E
3
1] Mill's System of Logic 17
his discussions with a society of friends. Thus he worked out his
theory of terms, propositions and the syllogism; and then the book
was laid aside for five years. When he returned to it, and pro-
ceeded to analyse the inductive process, he found rich material
to hand not only in Sir John Herschel's Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy (1830), but, also, in William Whewell's History
of the Inductive Sciences (1837). After his theory of induction
was substantially complete, he became acquainted with, and derived
stimulus and assistance from, the first two volumes of Comte's
Cours de philosophie positive (1830). These were the chief in-
fluences upon his work, and their enumeration serves to bring out
the originality of his performance. His work marks an epoch
in logical enquiry, not for English philosophy only but in modern
thought.
The reputation of Mill's Logic was largely due to his analysis
of inductive proof. He provided the empirical sciences with a set
of formulae and criteria which might serve the same purpose for
them as the time-worn formulae of the syllogism had served for
arguments that proceeded from general principles. In this part
of his work he derived important material from Whewell, much as
he differed from him in general point of view, and he found his
own methods implicitly recognised in Herschel's Discourse. The
importance and originality of Mill's contribution, however, cannot
be denied. His analysis is much more precise and complete than
any that had been carried out by his immediate predecessors. He
seeks to trace the steps by which we pass from statements about
particular facts to general truths, and also to justify the transition:
though he is more convincing in his psychological account of the
process than in his logical justification of its validity. When he is
brought face to face with the fundamental problem of knowledge,
as Hume had been before him, he does not show Hume's clearness
of thought.
Mill's work is not merely a logic in the limited sense of that
term which had become customary in England. It is a theory of
knowledge such as Locke and Hume attempted. The whole is
rendered more precise by its definite reference to the question of
proof or evidence; but the problem is Hume's problem over again.
The ultimate elements of knowledge are subjective entities-
'feelings or states of consciousness'—but knowledge bas objective
validity. The elements are distinct, though the laws of association
bind them into groups and may even fuse them into inseparable
wholes—but knowledge unites and distinguishes in an order which
2
E. L. XIV.
CH. I.


## p. 18 (#48) ##############################################

18
[CH.
Philosophers
is not that of laws of association. The theory of knowledge,
accordingly, has to explain how our thinking, especially in the
transition from assertion to assertion which we call “proof,' has
validity for objective reality, and, in doing so, it has to give a
tenable account of the universal principles postulated in these
transitions. In Mill's case, as in Hume's, this has to be done on
the assumption that the immediate object in experience is some-
thing itself mental, and that there are no à priori principles
determining the connections of objects. In his doctrine of terms
and propositions, Mill emphasises the objective reference in
knowledge, although he cannot be said to meet, or even fully to
recognise, the difficulty of reconciling this view with his psycho-
logical analysis. He faces much more directly the problem of
the universal element in knowledge. He contends that, ultimately,
proof is always from particulars to particulars. The general
proposition which stands as major premiss in a syllogism is only
a shorthand record of a number of particular observations, which
facilitates and tests the transition to the conclusion. All the
general principles involved in thinking, even the mathematical
axioms, are interpreted as arrived at in this way from experience:
so that the assertion of their universal validity stands in need of
justification.
In induction the essential inference is to new particulars, not
to the general statement or law. And here he faces the crucial
point for his theory. Induction, as he expounds it, is based upon
the causal principle. Mill followed Hume in his analysis of cause.
Now the sting of Hume's doctrine lay in its' subjectivity—the
reduction of the causal relation to a mental habit. Mill did not
succeed in extracting the sting; he could only ignore it. Through-
out, the relation of cause and effect is treated by him as something
objective: not, indeed, as implying anything in the nature of
power, but as signifying a certain constancy (which he, unwarrant-
ably, describes as invariable) in the succession of phenomena. He
never hesitates to speak of it as an objective characteristic of
events, but without ever enquiring into its objective grounds.
According to Mill, it is only when we are able to discover a causal
connection among phenomena that strict inductive inference is
possible either to a general law or to new empirical particulars.
But the law of universal causation, on his view, is itself an inference
from a number of particular cases. Thus it is established by
inductive inference and yet, at the same time, all inductive
inference depends upon it. Mill seeks to resolve the contradiction


## p. 19 (#49) ##############################################

1] Mind and the External World
19
by maintaining that this general truth, that is to say, the law
of causation, is indeed itself arrived at by induction, but by
a weaker form of induction, called per enumerationem simplicem,
in which the causal law is not itself assumed. Such a bare
catalogue of facts, not penetrating to the principle of their
connection, would not, in ordinary cases, justify an inference that
can be relied on. But Mill thinks that the variety of experience
that supports it in this case, its constant verification by new
experience and the probability that, had there been any exception
to it, that exception would have come to light, justify our confidence
in it as the ground of all the laws of nature. He does not
recognise that these grounds for belief-whatever their value
may be—all assume the postulate of uniformity which he is
endeavouring to justify.
A later and more comprehensive discussion of his philosophical
views, especially in a psychological regard, is given in his Exami-
nation of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy and of the principal
philosophical questions discussed in his writings. This work was
published in 1865; and, as his habit was, the author amplified it
greatly in subsequent editions by replies to his critics. In this
case the criticisms were exceptionally numerous.
The book focused
the whole controversial energy of the period belonging to the two
opposed schools, the intuitional and the empirical; and, in spite of
its controversial character, it became the leading text-book of that
psychological philosophy which had been adumbrated by Hume.
It is a work which shows Mill's powers at their most mature stage.
He criticises with severity the theory which he sets out to examine;
but he is alive to the awkward places in his own position. Among
the numerous doctrines on which he left the impress of his work-
manship, none excited more attention at the time of the book's
publication, or are of greater permanent importance, than his
doctrines of the external world and of the self. There is nothing
fundamentally original about his views on these topics; but
his discussion of both illustrates his ability to see further into the
facts than his predecessors, and his candour in recording what he
sees, along, however, with a certain disinclination to pursue an
enquiry which might land him definitely on the other side of
the traditional lines. Mill's doctrine is essentially Humean, though,
as regards the external world, he prefers to call it Berkeleyan; and
here he is the inventor of a phrase: matter is 'permanent possi-
bility of sensation. ' The phrase is striking and useful; but a
possibility of sensation is not sensation, and the permanence which
2-2


## p. 20 (#50) ##############################################

20
Philosophers
[CH.
he attributes to the possibility of sensation implies an objective
order: so that the reduction of matter to sensation is implicitly
relinquished when it appears to be affirmed in words. Mind, in
somewhat similar fashion, is reduced to a succession of feelings or
states of consciousness. But the fact of memory proves a stumbling-
block in his way; he cannot explain how a succession of feelings
should be conscious of itself as a succession; and he implicitly
admits the need of a principle of unity. Thus, he almost relin-
quishes his own theory and only avoids doing so explicitly by
falling back on the assertion that here we are in presence of the
final inexplicability in which ultimate questions always merge.
In spite of the prominence of the ethical interest in his mind
and in spite, also, of numerous ethical discussions in his other
writings, Mill's sole contribution to the fundamental problem of
ethical theory was his small volume Utilitarianism, which first
appeared in Fraser's Magazine in 1861 and wa reprinted in book-
form in 1863. Perhaps, he regarded the fundamental positions of
Benthamism as too secure to need much elaboration. What he offers
is a finely conceived and finely written defence of utilitarian ethics,
into which his own modifications of Bentham's doctrine of life are
worked. He holds that the sanctions of this doctrine are not weaker
than those of any other doctrine, and that, in its own nature, it is
neither a selfish nor a sensual theory. It is not selfish, because it
regards the pleasures of all men as of equal moment; it is not
sensual, because it recognises the superior value of intellectual,
artistic and social pleasures as compared with those of the senses.
But Mill fails in trying to establish a logical connection between
the universal reference of the ethical doctrine and the egoistic
analysis of individual action to which his psychology committed him.
And he is so determined to emphasise the superiority of the pleasures
commonly called 'higher,' that he maintains that, merely as
pleasures, they are superior in kind to the pleasures of the senses,
irrespective of any excess of the latter in respect of quantity. In
so doing he strikes at the root of hedonism, for he makes the
ultimate criterion of value reside not in pleasure itself but in that
characteristic—whatever it may turn out to be—which makes one
kind of pleasure superior to another.
Mill's social and political writings, in addition to occasional
articles, consist of the short treatise Considerations on Repre-
sentative Government (1860), Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform
(1859), the essays On Liberty (1859) and on the Subjection of
Women (1869), Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political


## p. 21 (#51) ##############################################

1]
Political and Economic Theory
21
Economy (1831, 1844) and Principles of Political Economy (1848).
The method appropriate to these topics had been already discussed
in the chapters on 'the Logic of the Moral Sciences' included in
his Logic. He sought a via media between the purely empirical
method and the deductive method. The latter, as employed by his
father, was modelled on the reasonings of geometry, which is not a
science of causation. The method of politics, if it is to be deductive,
must belong to a different type, and will (he holds) be the same
as that used in mathematical physics. Dynamics is a deductive
science because the law of the composition of forces holds ;
similarly, politics is a deductive science because the causes with
which it deals follow this law: the effects of these causes, when
conjoined, are the same as the sum of the effects which the same
causes produce when acting separately. Like his predecessors,
Mill postulated certain forces as determining human conduct:
especially, self-interest and mental association. From their working
he deduced political and social consequences. He did not diverge
from the principles agreed upon by those with whom he was
associated. Perhaps, he did not add very much to them. But he
saw their limitations more clearly than others did: the hypo-
thetical nature of economic theory, and the danger that democratic
government might prove antagonistic to the causes of individual
freedom and of the common welfare. To guard against these
dangers he proposed certain modifications of the representative
system. But his contemporaries, and even his successors of the
same way of thinking in general, for long looked upon the dangers
as imaginary, and his proposals for their removal were ignored.
The essay On Liberty—the most popular of all his works—is an
eloquent defence of the thesis that the sole end for which
mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering
with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection,'
but, as an argument, it meets everywhere with the difficulty of
determining the precise point at which the distinction between
self-regarding and social (even directly social) activity is to be
drawn. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, accepting Mill's utilitarian
criterion, raked his positions with a fire of brilliant and incisive, if
unsympathetic, criticism in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873).
Mill's Political Economy has been variously regarded as an
improved Adam Smith and as a popularised Ricardo. Perhaps
the latter description is nearer the mark. Its essential doctrines
differ little, if at all, from those of Ricardo; the theory of the
'wages fund, for example, is formulated quite in the spirit of
a


## p. 22 (#52) ##############################################

22
[CH.
Philosophers
Ricardo, though this theory was afterwards relinquished or modi-
fied by Mill in consequence of the criticisms of William Thomas
Thornton. But the work has a breadth of treatment which
sometimes reminds one of Adam Smith: the hypothetical nature
of economic theory was not overlooked, and the applications to
social philosophy' were kept in view. In spite of his adherence
to the maxim of laissez faire, Mill recognised the possibility of
modifying the system of distribution, and, with regard to that
system, he displayed a leaning to the socialist ideal, which grew
stronger as his life advanced. His methodical and thorough
treatment of economics made his work a text-book for more than
a generation, and largely determined the scope of most of th
treatises of his own and the succeeding period, even of those
written by independent thinkers.
Mill died at Avignon in 1873. After his death, were published
his Autobiography (1873) and Three Essays on Religion: Nature
the Utility of Religion and Theism (1874). These essays were
written between 1850 and 1870 and include the author's latest
thoughts on ultimate questions. He had been educated in the
belief that speculation on ultimate questions is futile; in his works
he had always maintained the attitude afterwards called agnosticism,
for which he was willing to adopt Comte's term positivism; he
accepted, also, in general, Comte's doctrine on this point, though
always dissociating himself from the latter's political and social
theories. But, even while, in his book Auguste Comte and
Positivism (1865), accepting the view that the essential nature
and ultimate causes of things are inscrutable, he holds that this
'positive mode of thought is not necessarily a denial of the super-
natural,' but only throws it back beyond the limits of science. His
posthumous essays show a further development. In that on nature
(the earliest of the series), he dwells upon the imperfections of the
cosmic order as showing that it cannot have been the creation of a
being of infinite goodness and power; in the last essay of the
volume, he approaches a tentative and limited form of theism
the doctrine of a finite God.
a
For more than a generation Mill's influence was dominant in
all departments of philosophical and political thought; he had
the initiative, and set the problems for his opponents as well as
for his adherents ; and his works became university text-books.
This holds of politics, economics, ethics, psychology and logic.
A striking reaction against his influence is shown in the work of


## p. 23 (#53) ##############################################

1]
Alexander Bain
23
William Stanley Jevons, professor at Manchester and afterwards
in London, whose economic and logical writings are distinguished
by important original ideas. In his Theory of Political Economy
(1871), he introduced the conception of final (or marginal) utility,
which, subsequently, has been greatly developed in the analytic
and mathematical treatment of the subject. In logic, also, he laid
the foundations for a mathematical treatment in his Pure Logic
(1864) and Substitution of Similars (1869); and, in his Principles
of Science (1874), he fully elaborated his theory of scientific infer-
ence, a theory which diverged widely from the theory of induction
expounded by Mill. As time went on, Jevons became more and
more critical of the foundations of Mill's empirical philosophy,
which he attacked unsparingly in discussions contributed to Mind.
George Grote, the historian of Greece, an older contemporary
and early associate of Mill, deserves mention here not only for his
works on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, but, also, for some
independent contributions to ethics, published together under
the title Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876). He had little
sympathy with Mill’s approximations to types of thought opposed
to the traditional utilitarianism. In this respect he agreed with
Alexander Bain, professor at Aberdeen, a writer of far greater
importance in a philosophical regard. Bain was younger than
Mill and long outlived him; he assisted him in some of his works,
especially the Logic; he wrote numerous works himself; but his
pre-eminence was in psychology, to which his chief contributions
were two elaborate books, The Senses and the Intellect (1855) and
The Emotions and the Will (1859). The psychology of James Mill
and of J. S. Mill was, in the main, derived from Hartley; but
it was Hartley as expurgated by Priestley, Hartley with the
physiology left out? Bain reinstated the physiological factor, not
in Hartley's rather speculative manner, but by introducing facts of
nerve and muscle whenever they could serve to elucidate mental
process. That came to be, as a rule, whenever the mental
process itself was obscure or difficult. The result is sometimes
confusing, because it mixes two different orders of scientific con-
ceptions. But Bain's work is wonderfully complete as a treatment
of the principle of the association of ideas; and, perhaps, he has
said the last word that can be said in favour of this principle as
the ultimate explanation of mind. His range of vision may have
been narrow, but he had a keen eye for everything within that
range. He was persistent in his search for facts and shrewd in
i Cf. ante, p. 5.


## p. 24 (#54) ##############################################

24
[CH.
Philosophers
6
examining them; and he had no illusions-except the great
illusion that mind is a bundle of sensations tied together by laws
of association. It is interesting to note how this clear-sighted and
unimaginative writer made observations which suggest doctrines,
different from his own, which have gained prominence later. His
observations on spontaneous movement and his teaching as to fixed
ideas strike at the roots of the analysis of volition to which he
adhered, and might lead naturally to a view of mind as essentially
active and no mere grouping of sensations or feelings. He offered,
also, a new analysis of belief (though he subsequently withdrew it)
which resolved it into a preparedness to act; and, here, the latent
'activism’ in his thinking might have led, if developed, to
something of the nature of pragmatism.
George Croom Robertson, professor in University college,
London, was in general sympathy with Mill's school of thought,
tempered, however, by wide knowledge and appreciation of other
developments, including those of recent philosophy. Circumstances
prevented his producing much literary work beyond a few articles
and an admirable monograph on Hobbes (1886). He is remembered
not only for these, and for his lectures, some of which have been
published (1896), but, also, for his skilful and successful work as
editor of Mind during the first sixteen years of its existence.
Mind was the first English journal devoted to psychology and
philosophy, and its origin in 1876 is a landmark in the history of
British philosophy.
a
In Mill's day and afterwards there was an active, though not
very widespread, propaganda of the positive philosophy of Comte.
The study of Comte's system was greatly facilitated by the admirable
condensed translation of his Positive Philosophy issued by Harriet
Martineau in 1853. The chief teachers of positivist doctrine in
England were a group of writers who had been contemporaries at
Oxford; but a serious disagreement arose amongst them regarding
the prominence to be given to the inculcation of Comte’s ‘religion
of humanity. ' Their activity was shown in lectures and addresses
and in many translations of Comte's works. The Catechism of
positive religion was translated by Richard Congreve in 1858;
Comte's General View of Positivism by John Henry Bridges in
1865; and System of Positive Polity by Bridges and Frederick
Harrison in 1875. Their independent writings were inspired by
the positivist spirit, even when they did not add much to its
defence on philosophical grounds. In The Unity of Comte's Life


## p. 25 (#55) ##############################################

1]
John Grote
25
and Doctrine (1866), Bridges replied to the criticisms of J. S. Mill.
He published, also, Five Discourses on Positive Religion in 1882;
and his Essays and Addresses (1907) were collected and edited
after his death.
V. RATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHERS
Although Mill's fame overshadowed the other philosophers of
his day, there were a number of contemporary writers who were
not merely his followers or critics, but independent thinkers.
Of note among these was John Grote, younger brother of the
historian, who held the chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge
from 1855 to 1866. Grote himself issued only one volume on
philosophy-Exploratio Philosophica, Part 1 (1865). After his
death three volumes were compiled from his manuscripts: An
Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy in 1870, A Treatise on
the Moral Ideals in 1876 and the second part of Exploratio in
1900. They are all 'rough notes'-as the author himself describes
the first on its title-page. They have no place in literature. Grote
thought and wrote simply to get at the truth of things and without
any view of impressing the public. A ‘belief in thought' upheld
him: 'a feeling that things were worth thinking about, that
thought was worth effort. ' He did not seek reputation as a
philosophical writer, and he has not gained it. His direct
influence has been restricted to a limited number of other
thinkers, through whom it has passed to wider circles without any
definite trace of its origin. His books are largely filled with
criticism of contemporary writers. But none of the criticism is
merely destructive: it aims always at elucidating the core of
truth in other men's opinions, with a view to a comprehensive
synthesis. Often it leads to bringing out important doctrines
which, if not altogether new, are set in a new light. An instance
of this is his whole doctrine of the scale of sensation or know-
ledge,' and, in particular, the elaboration and application of the
distinction of two kinds of knowledge or, rather, the twofold
process of knowledge, which he formulated as the distinction
between acquaintance with a thing and knowing about it. He
sought to assign its due value to phenomenalism or positivism, at
the same time as he contended for the more complete view-
‘rationary' or idealist—which recognised in positivism ‘an ab-
straction from the complete view of knowledge. ' Similarly, in
moral philosophy, there was a science of virtue, or 'aretaics,


## p. 26 (#56) ##############################################

26
[CH.
Philosophers
existing side by side with 'eudaemonics,' or the science of happi-
ness. Fundamentally, his theory is a doctrine of thought: 'the
fact that we know is prior to, and logically more comprehensive
than, the fact that what we know is. ' To be known, things must
be knowable, or fitted for knowledge. “Knowledge is the sym-
pathy of intelligence with intelligence, through the medium of
qualified or particular existence. '
Religious philosophy in England was stimulated and advanced
by the work of three men all born in the year 1805. These were
Maurice, Newman and Martineau. Frederick Denison Maurice?
had already an ecclesiastical career behind him when, in 1866, he
succeeded Grote as professor at Cambridge. Of his numerous
works only a few deal with philosophy; the most important of
these, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, originally appeared
in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana in 1847 and is a historical
sketch which is chiefly devoted to ancient thought. Maurice's
influence was due to his personality more than to his books; and
he was a social reformer and religious teacher rather than a philo-
sopher. But his work, both in social reform and in religion, derived
stimulus and direction from philosophical ideas. John Henry
Newman’ was still less of a philosopher, though his Grammar of
Assent propounds a theory of the nature and grounds of belief.
More significant, however, is the appearance in Newman's work of
the idea of development, which was beginning to transform all
departments of thought: for the quasi-mechanical view with which
he started of a fixed norm of belief existing in the past, he
substituted the view of the church as an organism whose life
and doctrine were in process of growth. The only philosopher
among those who joined the Roman church about the same time
as Newman was William George Ward, who, in various articles,
carried on a controversy with Mill concerning free-will and
necessary truth. These and other articles were collected after
his death and published as Essays on the Philosophy of Theism
(1884).
Of much greater importance than these, in a philosophical
regard, was James Martineau. His philosophy, also, was essen-
tially religious philosophy; individual freedom and the being and
presence of God were his fundamental certainties, and these he
defended in many writings during his long life. His earlier works
were mainly religious rather than philosophical, though, in a series
1 See, ante, vol. xn, chap. Xm.
; Ibid. chap. XII.


## p. 27 (#57) ##############################################

1]
Herbert Spencer
27
of essays, he showed his power as a critic of materialism and
naturalism, and gave an outline of the ethical views which he
afterwards worked out in detail. He was eighty years old, or
upwards, when his chief books appeared— Types of Ethical Theory
(1885), A Study of Religion (1888), and The Seat of Authority in
Religion (1890). The first of these is the most notable, and works
out the original view of the moral criterion which had been
previously indicated by him. It suffers from faulty arrangement,
from the undue prominence given to the psychological factor in
moral judgment and from the incompleteness of the psychological
analysis. As a whole it does not impress the reader. But, taken
in detail, it is seen to be full of penetrating criticism, and to be
inspired by insight into the spiritual meaning of life. Traces of
age are to be found only in its defective order and, perhaps, in its
diffuseness; its style shows no marks of weariness: it is brilliant,
pellucid, eloquent, rhetorical sometimes and coloured by emotion,
but never falls below the dignity of his theme. Martineau did
not make any important advance in speculative construction; he
was not in sympathy with the idealist metaphysic that had risen
to the ascendant in England even before his books were published;
the ideas which he elucidated and defended were those which had
been distinctive of spiritual thought for many centuries. In his
criticisms, on the other hand, he did not restrict himself to the
older forms of materialist and sensationalist doctrine; he was
prompt to recognise the difference made by more recent scientific
views, and he showed no lack of power or effectiveness in dealing
with the claims of the philosophy of evolution.
VI. HERBERT SPENCER AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EVOLUTION
a
.
The publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859 marks
a turning-point in the history of thought. It had a revolutionary
effect upon the view of the world held by educated men similar
to that which had been produced, more slowly, three centuries
before, by the work of Copernicus ; on philosophical ideas its
influence may, perhaps, be better compared with that of the
theory of mechanics chiefly due to Galileo. The latter contributed
to philosophy the conception of nature as a mechanical system ;
Darwin contributed the conception of evolution and, owing largely
to his influence, biological ideas gained greater prominence than
mathematical in philosophical construction.


## p. 28 (#58) ##############################################

28
[CH.
Philosophers
1
The acknowledged leader of the new movement in philosophy
was Herbert Spencer. He was born at Derby on 27 April 1820,
and his early training was as an engineer. This profession he
relinquished at the age of twenty-five. He had previously, in
1842, contributed a series of letters on the Proper Sphere of
Government' to The Nonconformist, and, from 1848 to 1853
he acted as sub-editor of The Economist. In these years he
wrote his book Social Statics (1850) and began the publication
of longer essays in reviews, among which mention should be
made of the essays "The Development Hypothesis' (1852), “The
Genesis of Science' (1854) and Progress : its law and cause
(1857). He also published Principles of Psychology, in one
volume, in 1855. His essays show, even by their titles, that he
was working towards a theory of evolution before he had any
knowledge of Darwin's researches, the results of which were
still unpublished. Then, in 1860, he issued his ‘Programme
of a System of Synthetic Philosophy,' on which he had been
at work for some time, and to the elaboration of which he
devoted his life. It is impossible to speak too highly of the
single-minded purpose with which he carried out this task, in spite
of inherent and extraneous difficulties. He continued to work,
without haste and without rest, publishing First Principles in
1862, Principles of Biology (two volumes) in 1864—7, Prin-
ciples of Psychology (two volumes) in 1870—2, Principles of
Sociology (three volumes) in 1876—96 and Principles of Ethics
(two volumes) in 1879–92. Besides these he designed a series
of charts of Descriptive Sociology, which were compiled by his
assistants, until the work had to be suspended from lack of funds ;
and he also produced smaller works on Education (1861), The
Classification of the Sciences (1864), The Study of Sociology
(1872), The Man versus The State (1884) and Factors of Organic
Evolution (1887). Thus, his perseverance enabled him to complete
his scheme : except, indeed, that he omitted the detailed treat-
ment of inorganic evolution, and thus gained the incidental
advantage of avoiding the awkward problem of the origin of life.
And he produced a considerable amount of subsidiary writing,
including an Autobiography (published in 1904, the year after his
death), which contains a minute and elaborate account of his life,
character and work.
Spencer's idea of philosophy is a system of completely
coordinated knowledge—the sciences consisting of knowledge
partially coordinated. In this sense his system is synthetic. It


## p. 29 (#59) ##############################################

1]
The Unknowable
29
is a scheme in which everything is to find its place, and is to
be seen as a resultant of a single principle. His elaboration of
this scheme approaches completeness, and, in this respect, his
system stands by itself: no other English thinker since Bacon
and Hobbes had even attempted anything so vast. The system
itself fitted in admirably, also, with the scientific conceptions of the
early Darwinians, and thus obtained wide currency in all English-
speaking countries and, to a less extent, on the continent of
Europe. Darwin hailed him as 'our great philosopher,' for he
made evolution a universal solvent and not merely a means for
explaining the different forms of plants and animals. At the same
time, the support which it received from modern science seemed
to give Spencer's philosophy a more secure position than that
of those speculative systems of which the English mind tended
to be suspicious.
The view of philosophy as science further coordinated brings
Spencer's doctrine into line with positivism. He did not, however,
entirely ignore the question of the nature of ultimate reality.
Perhaps, he was not much interested in questions of the kind, and
he had certainly small acquaintance with previous speculation
regarding them. But he had great skill in adapting current
doctrines to his uses; and he found what he needed in the doctrine
of the relativity of knowledge set forth by Hamilton and Mansel.
On this he based his doctrine of the limits of knowledge. But
he found, as others have found, that it was necessary to recognise
something which lay beyond the sphere of exact knowledge.
Hamilton had called this the sphere of belief; Spencer says that
we have an indefinite consciousness of what he nevertheless calls
the unknowable. The nature of this indefinite consciousness is
not explained by him; yet, its object is not treated by him, as one
would expect it to be, as a mere blank; it is said to be “growing
clearer'; the unknowable is constantly referred to as a power,
and it is even asserted that it makes for the happiness of
mankind. These inconsistencies soften his paradox that religion
and science can be reconciled by assigning to the latter the
region of the knowable and restricting the former to the un-
knowable. On his view, all that we know consists of mani-
festations of the inscrutable power behind phenomena ; and
these manifestations depend ultimately upon a single first prin-
ciple—the persistence of force. Spencer's interpretation of this
principle is somewhat flexible and has been attacked by mathe-
maticians and physicists as loose and unscientific. Nevertheless,


## p. 30 (#60) ##############################################

30
Philosophers
[ch.
Spencer holds that from it every other scientific principle must be
deduced-even the law of evolution itself. He has provided a
'formula,' or, rather, definition, of evolution. He defines it as
an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during
which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a
definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion
undergoes a parallel transformation.
All phenomena of whatever kind are subject to this law. It is
throughout conceived as a law of progress, which will issue in
a highest state establishing the extremest multiformity and most
complete moving equilibrium. ' But this stage, also, cannot be
permanent; and Spencer contemplates the history of the universe
as a succession of cycles—'alternate eras of evolution and dis-
solution. '
Spencer displayed much ingenuity in fitting organic, mental
and social facts into this mechanical framework.
His early
training as an engineer seems to have influenced his ideas. He
built a system as he might have built a bridge. It was a problem
of strains and of the adaptation of material. Regarded thus, the
whole problem was mechanical and had to be solved in terms
of matter and motion. His purpose was, as he says, 'to interpret
the phenomena of life, mind, and society in terms of matter,
motion, and force. ' Hence, life, mind and society are treated as
stages of increasing complexity in phenomena of the same kind,
and-80 far as this treatment is adhered to—the characteristic
functions of each stage are left unexplained. But the method
of treatment is supplemented by another in which the facts are
dealt with more directly. This is seen especially in psychology,
where the subjective aspect' is recognised with only a suggestion
of an attempt to deduce it from the objective aspect.