No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: Although a cause is more potent than its effect,
it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause
as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is
found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is
not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under
the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal effective causes.
Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger than the union of
the wife with her husband's kindred, and yet it ought not to be named
affinity, but matrimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is
identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.

Reply to Objection 2: Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a
way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a
person who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with
all of them. But on account of their separation and distance from one
another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in
one way is connected with another in another way, either as to the kind
of connection or as to the degree.

Reply to Objection 3: Further, a relation results sometimes from a
movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a
relation of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results
from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one way
when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any
movement previous or concomitant of the other extreme; as in the
Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the
knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in
the other logically only. In another way when the relation results from
the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not
without a previous movement of the other; thus there results equality
between two men by the increase of one, without the other either
increasing or decreasing then, although previously he reached his
actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is
founded really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and
affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results in a grown
child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the
former's at the time, but by virtue of that previous movement of his
wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there
results in him the aforesaid relation through the movement of another.
Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same
stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's
wife, without any new change in him.
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Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity does not remain after the
death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and
wife or "vice versa. " Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now
the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the
husband's death, since then "the woman . . . is loosed from the law of
the husband" (Rom. 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.

Objection 2: Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the
consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at his
death. Therefore, the wife's affinity with them ceases also.

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity
binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore
affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons)
is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of a third person.

I answer that, A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the
corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause;
thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the
quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there are certain
relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or
movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused by movement,
through something being moved actually; such is the relation between
mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being
adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the motive
power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them
result from something, having been moved previously, such as the
relation between father and son, for the relation between them is
caused not by (the con) being begotten now, but by his having been
begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory;
whereas the fact of having been moved is everlasting, since what has
been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are
never dissolved through the removal of the cause, but only through the
corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same
applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been
joined together not by their being actually joined. Wherefore it is not
done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been
contracted survive, although the person die through whom it was
contracted.

Reply to Objection 1: The marriage tie causes affinity not only by
reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been
effected in the past.

Reply to Objection 2: Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity,
but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now,
but because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause
affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things do
not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot
be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.

Objection 2: Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be
affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results
from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship.
Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would
sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his
blood-relations and with himself: for instance when a man is guilty of
incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by
unlawful intercourse.

Objection 3: Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or
against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful
intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3).
Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse according to
nature.

On the contrary, He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (1 Cor.
6:16). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore
unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.

Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the
definition of affinity, which definition is as follows: Affinity is the
relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is
altogether void of blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation
even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes
affinity.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union
of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of the
procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of
works: the former of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal
copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership
directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found in every
carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union may
be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently
since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling,
it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far
as it has something of natural copulation.

Reply to Objection 1: In an unlawful intercourse there is something
natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this
respect it causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate
whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause
affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a
way dishonorable.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why diverse relations should
not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently
there can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only
on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for
instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father's side marries a
blood-relation of mine on my mother's side. Hence in the above
definition the words "which is altogether void of blood-relationship"
apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having
intercourse with his blood-relation contracts affinity with himself,
since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as
likeness does.

Reply to Objection 3: In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of
seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does
not cause affinity.
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Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal.
For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes broken
off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.

Objection 2: Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being
consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more akin to
carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause
affinity.

Objection 3: Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future
marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without
affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age
of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of impotence
promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between
persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other
way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity.

On the contrary, Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et
matrim. ) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she
had been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case
unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect
marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes not
affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called
"the justice of public honesty," which is an impediment to marriage
even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same
degrees, and is defined thus: "The justice of public honesty is a
relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from
ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty. " This indicates
the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that this
relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.

Reply to Objection 1: Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end
to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as "the
justice of public honesty": wherefore just as marriage is a lasting
tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.

Reply to Objection 2: In carnal intercourse man and woman become one
flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or
penetration of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but
only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes
affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason
of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also marriage is
according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the marriage
contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its
consummation, and in like manner there results from betrothal, which is
a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely
the justice of public honesty.

Reply to Objection 3: All those impediments which void a betrothal
prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence
whether he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be
under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity
nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If
however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, having a
perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and after
the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a
contract there results the impediment called "justice of public
honesty," because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at
that age the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of
the act in question.
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Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity.
For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): "No man may
marry his wife's surviving blood-relation": and it is said in the next
chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that "the wives of two cousins are
forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband. " But this is
only on account of affinity being contracted through union with a
person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of affinity.

Objection 2: Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as
carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity are
reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity
does also.

Objection 3: Further, things that are the same with one and the same
are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same
relations with all her husband's kindred. Therefore all her husband's
kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the wife,
and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.

Objection 4: On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man
who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because
then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is
false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.

Objection 5: Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by
marrying another man's widow would contract affinity with all her first
husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this
cannot be the case because he would become especially related by
affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.

Objection 6: Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity.
But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations of
the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause
affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from
another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of
species, as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing
proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process is
always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents.
The first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the same
species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an
act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be
begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession, just as in the
first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species
as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point there
proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a
line; and from a line moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a
surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can
go no further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds
whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and this
always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the
marriage union, and this produces a different kind of relationship from
the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her
husband's blood-relations not by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if
this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but
another kind of relationship; and consequently a married party
contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of
affinity but of some other kind which is called affinity of the second
kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship
with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the
second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted
above [4977](A[1]). Formerly these two kinds were included in the
prohibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty rather
than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true
affinity, in the same way as the relationship arising out of betrothal.
Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which
now refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity
consists.

Reply to Objection 1: A husband contracts affinity of the first kind
with his wife's male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind
with the latter's wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former
cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again
if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being
connected with B by the first kind of affinity, contracts affinity of
the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this relation C
being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man's
wife contracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And since
the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account
of a certain honesty more than by reason of affinity, the canon (cap.
Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: "The justice of public honesty forbids
the wives of two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after
the other. " But this prohibition is done away with.

Reply to Objection 2: Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people
being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of
connection.

Reply to Objection 3: The wife contracts the same connection with her
husband's relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of
connection.

Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show
that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to them lest the
time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, a woman does not contract
affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the
flesh, wherefore she does not contract affinity of the second kind with
a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one of
these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind
with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid the same man
to marry successively two women known by one man.

Reply to Objection 5: As a man is not connected with his wife by
affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the
second kind with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the
argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 6: One person is not connected with me through
another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who
is affine to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is
connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal
procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and
according to the olden legislation, I contracted some kind of
connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another
husband becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree
of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again her second
husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her
other blood-relations are not connected with him, but she is connected
with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends
from them, or, as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same
principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become
affine to me in any kind of affinity.
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Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to
marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is
contrary thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is
caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the
husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after his
death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine
to them, as shown above [4978](A[5]). Therefore affinity is not an
impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 18:8): "Thou shalt not uncover the
nakedness of thy father's wife. " Now she is only affine. Therefore
affinity is an impediment to marriage.

I answer that, Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being
contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as
consanguinity. For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations
to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity:
and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is
there between those who are affine to one another. If, however,
affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated
above (Q[50], A[7]).

Reply to Objection 1: Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which
causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far
as the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing
of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.

Reply to Objection 2: The husband's possessions do not become one with
him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as
consanguinity is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband
according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's
wife.
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Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees.
For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees. Now
affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself
apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that
the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within the
degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the
case unless the son of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity
like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the
degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and so
it has no degrees of itself.

I answer that, A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except
in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus: thus
animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and
black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation to consanguinity,
because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it;
whereas it has no relation to affinity except through consanguinity
which is the latter's cause. Wherefore since the degrees of
relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the
distinction of degrees is directly and immediately referable to
consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general
rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever degree of
consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of
affinity I am related to the wife.

Reply to Objection 1: The degrees in propinquity of relationship can
only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to
which affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore
affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the
degrees of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 2: Formerly it used to be said that the son of my
affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but
accidentally as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account
of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for this
reason this prohibition is now revoked.
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Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of
consanguinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend
in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of
affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity
arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as from an equivocal
cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie
of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as
consanguinity.

Objection 2: Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now
according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were
forbidden, in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage:
as instanced in a brother's wife whom a man could marry although he
could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of
affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same degrees.

On the contrary, A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very
fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in
whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to
me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity
should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.

I answer that, Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to
the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs be the
same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being
a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a dispensation
is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in
the remote degrees of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 1: The fact that the tie of affinity is less than
the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of
relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the
point.

Reply to Objection 2: A man could not take his deceased brother's wife
except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to
raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when
religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the
flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not
marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying the place of
his brother.
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Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or
consanguinity should always be annulled?

Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within
the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be
annulled by divorce.
For "what God hath joined together let no man put
asunder" (Mat. 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church
does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins
such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to
knowledge they ought not to be separated.

Objection 2: Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie
of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription
the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by
length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not so
before.

Objection 3: Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage
ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when two
brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of
consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and
yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled
on account of affinity or consanguinity.

On the contrary, Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a
marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity
be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have
actually contracted marriage.

I answer that, Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a
mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it
belongs to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid
marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot
without incest be united in the flesh.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the Church is upheld by God's gift and
authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in
her acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a
union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an
impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought
about contrary to Divine authority through man's error, which being an
error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence when the
impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the
aforesaid union.

Reply to Objection 2: That which cannot be done without sin is not
ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later.
iv, can. 50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit. ), "length of time
does not diminish sin but increases it": nor can it in any way
legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful
persons.

Reply to Objection 3: In contentious suits between two persons the
verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one
brother's marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of
consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage
against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience
the other brother ought not on this account always to be bound to put
away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from
ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to
form his conscience on what has been done about the other marriage: but
seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has
certain knowledge of the impediment of his marriage, or he has an
opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither
seek nor pay the debt, in the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the
third he can both pay and ask.
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Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of
a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or
consanguinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of
accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons
related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by
inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of
retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was
bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation;
Cf. [4979]SS, Q[33], A[7]]. But this is not required when a matrimonial
separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.

Objection 2: Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are
heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even
strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the
process is not by way of accusation.

Objection 3: Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should
be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now
this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not
the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take
place at any other time.

Objection 4: Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact
that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if
he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he
cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to
suspicion. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the
marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful.
Therefore it can be denounced.

I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as
though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of
fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through
ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful
whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused,
so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that
a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is
deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.

Reply to Objection 1: The punishment of retaliation takes place when a
person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may
be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not
for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is
unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself
to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words
or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage
denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.

Reply to Objection 2: Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except
from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence
when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting
from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives
who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the
other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not
debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a
perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage
and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a
denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be
debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of
the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is
inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.

Reply to Objection 3: If the marriage is not yet contracted and there
is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not,
cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the
marriage be contracted.

Reply to Objection 4: He who is silent at first is sometimes heard
afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is
repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his
qui matrim. accus. possunt. ) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did
not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published
in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his
accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made,
so that if he who lodges information against persons already married
was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication,
or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for
instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not
in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too
young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other
lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt
he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the
information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that
he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation. "
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Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in
the same way as in other suits?

Objection 1: It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed
by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any
witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here
strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or
love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other.
Therefore their evidence should not be taken.

Objection 3: Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those
others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore
can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is
not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.

On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the
judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be
afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not
pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in
other lawsuits witnesses should be called.

I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be
unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and
witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,' since it is a
quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that
the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the
denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant
may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is
admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the
names of the witnesses. " All this is in order to prevent the sin that
may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test.
et attest. ; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn. ).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

(2) From what cause is it contracted?

(3) Between whom?

(4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?

(5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?
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Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an
impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not
contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to
marriage.

Objection 2: Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand
together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as
when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he
contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage
is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment
to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh.
But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment
to marriage.

Objection 4: Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now
spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of
a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]:
whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as
stated above ([4980]Q[50], A[1]). Since then disparity of worship is an
impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has
not this effect.

On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded.
Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of
bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual
relationship should also be an impediment.

Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of
bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a
spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.

I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural
being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is
contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as
carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a
distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it
precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the
contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does
not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction
in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship
is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his
child who is at the point of death---and then it is not an obstacle to
the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any
necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose
action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely
and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has
occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but
is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not
be prejudicial to the other.

Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual relationship does not hinder
any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods,
namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is
by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and
friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.

Reply to Objection 2: Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no
supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that
marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the
impediment precedes.

Reply to Objection 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a
spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an
impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a
bodily relationship.

Reply to Objection 4: There is nothing unreasonable in two things that
are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great
and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and
spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the
distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage.
Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.
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Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by
Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual
kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual
birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even
as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.

Objection 2: Further, a character is imprinted in order as in
Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from
Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals.
Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for
instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from
catechizing, as some maintain.

Objection 4: Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism
besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
from catechism any more than from the others.

Objection 5: Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of
catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not
result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.

Objection 6: Further, the instruction given to the baptized by
preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not
yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching.
Neither therefore does it result from catechism.

Objection 7: On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. 4:15): "In Christ
Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you. " Now spiritual birth causes
spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from
the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.

Objection 8: Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is
actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.

Objection 9: Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is
called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching,
pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual
relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
Confirmation.

I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that
as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the
Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the
first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the
bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each
of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal
relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation.
Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds,
from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now
spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore
it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted
otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual
relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely
catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know
the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a
sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two
sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more
common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak
impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not
void the contract.

Reply to Objection 1: Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the
womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth
without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened;
wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in
the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when
that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can
without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive
tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being
strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence
spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these
sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the sacrament of order is not
regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not
conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can
arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.

Reply to Objection 3: In catechism one makes a profession of future
Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future
marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity
is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered
at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: There is not made a profession of faith in the
other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the
comparison fails.

The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.

Reply to Objection 7: The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a
kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to
their spiritual birth.

Reply to Objection 8: Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not
contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son
can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the
whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it
matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind
of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind
of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a
resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal
intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his
spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between
priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to
remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and
seqq. , Caus. xxx] was made.

Reply to Objection 9: A spiritual father is so called from his likeness
to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a
carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and
instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so called
from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being
his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is
like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This
solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and
the person who raises him from the sacred font?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not
contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him
from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is
contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is
born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after
birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between
the receiver and the received at the sacred font.

Objection 2: Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is
called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his
office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause
of spiritual relationship, as stated above [4981](A[2]). Therefore no
relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises
from the sacred font.