No More Learning

? ? ? ? or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME.
146
I mast therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjec tive sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter mined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the phsenomenou itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I caunot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.
In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne cessarily ; but 1 cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by npprehension) that which antecedes it.
For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the event.
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc
cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same Ij
? ? ? ? 146 TBAJJSCENDENTAl DOCTR1NE.
tort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phsenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, --not even in the phenomenal world.
Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phsenomena are determined in their sequence, that as they happen, the preceding state, can make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event possible.
No doubt appears as this were in thorough contradic
? tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained
in regard to the procedure rf the human understanding. Ac
cording to these opinions, means of the perception and
comparison of similar consequences following upon certain
antecedent phsenomena, that the understanding led to the
discovery of rule, according to which certain events always
follow certain phsenomena, and only by this process thnt we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such basis,
clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which furnishes us with -- " Everything that happens must have cause" --would be just as contingent as expe rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as would not in this case be priori, but founded on deduction. Bat the same the case with this law as with other pure priori representations g. space and time), which we can
draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experier. ce, only because we had already placed them therein, and thnt
means, nnd by that alone, had rendered
experience possible.
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? Or THK 8UCCESSIOK OF TIMI.
147
Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori.
It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc cession or effect (of an event--that the happening of some thing that did not exist before), and distinguish from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when rule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed,
this necessity which first renders possible the representation of succession in the object.
We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre sentations are still nothing more than representations, that internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how happens that to these representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to them certain unknown objective reality clear that ob jective significancy cannot consist in relation to nnother re presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again arises " How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi cancy over and above the subjective, which proper to as
? determination of state of mind ? " If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our
and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our
representations in certain manner, and of subjecting them to rule and that conversely, only because certain order
necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significancy ascribed to them.
In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our repre sentations always successive. Now hereby not repre sented an object, for by means of this succession, which
subjective representations,
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common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive or assume, that in thia succession there ia a relation to a state antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule, so soon do
I represent something as an event, or as a thing that happens ; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign a certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because of the preceding state in the object. When, there fore, I perceive that something happens, there is contained in this representation, in the first place, the fact, that something antecedes ; because it is only in relation to this, that the phe nomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists after an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can receive ita determined place in time, only by the presupposition that something existed in the foregoing state, upon which it foUows inevitably and always, that in conformity with rule. From all this evident that, in the first place, cannot reverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede that upon which follows and that, in the second place, the antecedent state be posited,
? certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily follows. Hence follows that there exists certain order in our repre sentations, whereby the present gives sure indication of some previously existing state, as correlate, though still undetermined, of the existing event which given, -- cor relate which itself relates to the event as its consequence, conditions and connects necessarily with itself in the series of time.
If then be admitted as necessary iaw of sensibility, and consequently formal condition of all perception, that the preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inas much as cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding), must likewise be an indispensable law of empi rical representation of the series of time, that the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot take place, except in so far as the former determine their existence in time, that to say, establish according to rule. For of course only in phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity
the connection of times.
For all experience and for the possibility of experience, uu>>
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derstanding is indispensable, and the first step . which it takes in
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,*
but to render the representation of an object in general, pos sible. It does this by applying the order of time to pheno mena, and their existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a consequence, a place in relation to preceding phenomena, determined & priori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time itself, which deter mines a place & priori to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception) ; but, on the contrary, phenomena must reciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of time. In other words, whatever follows or
must follow in conformity with an universal rule upon that which was contained in the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of phenomena, which, by means of the under standing, produces and renders necessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible perceptions, as is found & priori in the form of internal intui tion (time), in which all our perceptions must have place.
That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a possible experience, which becomes real, only because I look upon the phenomenon as determined in regard to iCa place in time, consequently as an object, which can always be found by means of a rule in the connected series of my per ceptions. But this rule of the determination of a thing ac cording to succession in time is as follows : " In what pre cedes may be found the condition, under which an event always (that necessarily) follows. " From all this obvious that the principle of cause and effect the principle of possible experience, that of objective cognition of phe- nomena, in regard to their relations in the succession of time.
The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the following momenta of argument. To all empirical cog nition belongs the synthesis of the manifold the imagiration,
synthesis which always successive, that in which the representations therein always follow one another. But the order of succession in imagination not determined, and the series of successive representations may be taken retrogres<<
Tliit <vaj the opinion of Wolf and Leibnits. -- 2K
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lively 88 well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a syc thesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phe nomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or, to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of succes sive synthesis which determines an object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when this is po sited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my per ception is to contain the cognition of an event, that of something which really happens, must be an empirical judgment, wherein we think that the succession determined that presupposes another phenomenon, upon which this event follows necessarily, or in conformity with rule. If, on the contrary, when posited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, should be obliged to con sider merely as subjective play of my imagination, and
in this represented to myself anything as objective, must look upon as mere dream. Thus, the relation of pheno mena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something which antecedes, in conformity with rule, --in other words, the relation of cause and effect-- the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. The principle of the re lation of causality in the succession of phenomena there fore valid for all objects of experience, because itself the ground of the possibility of experience.
Here, however, difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The principle of the connection of causality among pheno mena limited in our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For example, there heat in room, which does not exist in the open air.
look about for the cause, and find to be the fire. Now the fire as the cause, simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room. In this case, then, there no succession as
regards time, between cause and effect, but they are simul taneous and still the law holds good. The greater part operating causes nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the latter produced only be
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? 0? THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 151
HUM the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality ofits cause, because if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remem bered, that we must consider the order of time, and not the lapte thereof. The relation remains, even though no time has
The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according to time. If, for ex ample, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in as cause, then simultaneous with the effect. But distinguish the two through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface but supposing the cushion has, from some cause or another, hollow, there does not thereupon follow leaden ball.
Thus, the law of succession of time in all instances the only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause. The glass the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface, although the two phse- nomena are contemporaneous. For, as soon as draw some water with the glass from larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into concave, which assumes in the glass.
This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action that of action, to the conception of force and through to the conception of substance. As do not wish this
critical essay, the sole purpose of which to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition priori, to be crowded with
analyses which merely explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, reserve the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for future system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this subject. But cannot at present refrain from making few remarks on the empirical criterion of substance, in so far as seems to be more evi dent and more easily recognised through the conception of
elapsed.
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? 152 TIUTJSCEWDENTAL DOCTRINE.
action, than througn that of the permanence of a pheno menon
Where action (consequently activity aud force) exists, sub stance also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately from the action to the -permanence of that whicli acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of sub stance (phenomenon) ? But after what has been said above, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of procedure --merely analysing our conceptions --it would be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, ""the last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that
changes, that substance. For according to the prin ciple of causality, actions are always the first ground of all
change in phenomena, and consequently cannot be pro perty of subject which itself changes, because this were the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From all this results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance
? Besides, this mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all
origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenom ena) arise and pass away, sound and safe conclusion, con clusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in existence, and consequently to the concep tion of substance as phenomenon.
When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that which occurs, an object requiring vestigation. The transition from the non-being of state into the existence of supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed the phenomenon, fart of itscll
comparison.
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demanding inquiry. Such an event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is therefore . only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be re garded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, be cause the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in themselves, and objects of understanding alone, they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as objects of possible ex
? perience.
How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon
one state existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in another point of time--of this we have not the smallest conception ^priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which can only be given empirically ; for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, Df certain successive phsenomena (as movements) which in dicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place ns
the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that the state which changed, what may), and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can very well be considered priori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of time. *
When substance passes from one state, a, into another state,
the point of time in which the latter exists different from, and subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as from sero. That to say, the state, differs from the state, a, only in respect to quantity, the change coming into existence of -- a, which in the former state did not exist,
=
must be remarked, that do not speak of the change of certain relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when bod) moves in an uniform manner, does not change its staU (of motion) but only Chea Ha ro? tion increases or decreases.
and in relation to which that state
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Now the question arises, haw a thing passes from one state =o, into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states existing in these moments, there is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quan
Consequently, every transition from one state into another, is always effected in a time contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing leaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the intermediate state be tween both, and as such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which the change takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at 4, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (6--a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in
bo far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.
Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state of thing passes in the process of
change through all these parts, as elements, to its second state. There no smallest degree of reality in phenomenon, just as there no smallest degree in the quantity of time and so the new state of the reality grows up out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the difference between and a.
not our business to enquire here into the utility of this principle in the investigation of nature. But how such pro position, which appears bo greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, possible completely priori, indeed question which
deserves investigation, although the first view seems to de monstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the quo*
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tion, how it is possible, may be considered superfluous. For there are so many groundless pretensions to the eulareement of our knowledge by pure reason, that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thorough-going and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence.
Everyadditiou toour empirical knowledge, and every advance made in the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression in time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof, and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every transition in perception to anything which follows upon an other in time, is a determination of time by means of the pro
? duction of this perception. always and in all its parts,
duced to be considered as
all its degrees --no one of which
zero up to its determined degree.
possibility of cognizing priori
ever, which concerns their form merely. We merely antici pate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as m itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized priori.
Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the possibility of continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows the understanding, virtue of the unity of apperception, contains the condition priori of the possibility of continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render universally and for all time,
and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical cognition of the relations of time.
And as this determination of time
quantity, the perception pro quantity which proceeds through
the smallest possible --from From this we perceive the
law of changes -- law, how
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TJUNgCENDENrAX DOCnUFH
C.
THIRD ANALOGY.
PB15CIPLB OF CO EXISTENCE, ACCOHDING TO THE LAW Of
BECIPBOCITY OB COMMUNITY.
All substancet, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.
Proof.
Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the per ception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versd -- which cannot occur in the succession of phsenomena, as we have shown in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive the moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the moon ; and for the reason that my perception of these objects can reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contempo
Now co-existence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But time itself is not an object of percep tion ; and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact thst things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the perceptions of these things can follow each other reciprocally.
The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the other is not present, and contrariwise ; but would not show that the objects are co-existent, that is to say, that, if the one exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of following each other reciprocally. ItfoIlows thataconception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phsenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite
to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of per ceptions has its foundation iu the object, and to enable us to represent co-existence as objective. But that relation of sub- stnnces in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the co-existence of substances iu space cannot be cognized in experience other
? raneously.
? ? ? PRINCIPLE OF CO-EX . STE5CB. 167
wide than under the precondition of their reciprocal action.
This is therefore the condition of the possibility of things
themselves as objects of experience.
Things are co-existent, in so far as they exist in one and the
same time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time ? Only by observing that the order in the syn thesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from A, through B,. C, D, to E, or contrariwise from ? to A. For if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time, and therefore cannot be an object of apprehension.
Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is completely isolated, that that no one ants upon another. Then say that the co-existence of these cannot be an object of possible perception, and that the existence of one cannot, any mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another. For we imagine them in this case to be separated by completely void space, and thus percep tion, which proceeds from the one to the other in time, would indeed determine their existence means of a following per
? but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phsenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or co-existent with it.
Besides the mere fact of existence then, there must be
something by means of which determines the position of
in time, and conversely, the position of because only under this condition can substances be empirically represented
as existing contemporaneously. Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time, which the cause of or of its determinations. Consequently every substance (inas much as can have succession predicated of only respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself. That to say
substances mmst stand (mediately or immediately) in dyna mical community with each other, co-existence to be cog-
nixed any possible experience. But, in regard to object* of experience, that absolutely necessary, without which the
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experience of three objects would itself be impossible. Con* sequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phsenomena, in so far as they are co-existent, stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.
The word community has in our language* two meanings, and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio, and commercium. We employit in this place in the latter sense -- that of a dynamical community, without which even the com munity of place (communio spatii) could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to observe, that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can conduct our senses from one object to another ; that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies pro duces a mediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their co-existence with us ; that we cannot empirically change our position (perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout the whole of space ren dered possible the perception of the positions we occupy ; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous ex istence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and thereby also the co-existence of even the most remote ob jects -- although in this case the proof is only mediate. With out community, every perception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other and isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that of experience, must, with the appearance of new object, begin entirely denovo, without the least connexion with preceding representations, and without standing towards these even in the relation of time. My intention here no means to combat the notion of empty space for may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, there fore, no empirical perception of co-existence takes place. But in this case not an object of possible experience.
The following remarks may be useful in the way of explana tion. In the mind, all phamomena, as contents of possible
experience, must exist in community (communio) of apper ception or consciousness, and in so far as requisite that objects be represented as co-existent and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position time of each
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? FRINCIPLE CW CO-EXISTENCE. 159
Other, and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For otherwise succession, which is always found in percep tions as apprehensions, would be predicated of external objects, and their representation of their co-existence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is to say, a real community (commercium) of substances, without wIhcIi therefore the empirical relation of co-existence would be a notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this com mercium, phenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and nevertheless in connection with each other, constitute a com- positum reale. Such comporita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all others spring, are those of Inherence, Consequence, and Com position.
? *****
These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time, according to the three modi of this determination ; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that duration), the re lation in time as series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination in regard to time thoroughly dynamical that to say, time not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its position for this impossible, inasmuch as absolute time not an object of perception, by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other. On the contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence of phenomena can receive syuthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines for every phe nomenon its position in time, and consequently priori, and with validity for all and every time.
By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we under stand the totality of phsenomena connected, in respect of theii existence, according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore certain laws (which are moreover priori) which
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? 160 TBAHSCENDEKTAIi DOCTKIKIS.
make nature possible ; and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes possible. The par- pose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity of nnturc in the connection of all phenomena under certain ex ponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the
unity of apperception, which can exist iu synthesis only ac cording to rules. The combined expression of all is this : All phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this & priori unity, no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience, is pos sible.
As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these transcendental laws of nature, and the pecu liar character of we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important as guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthe tical propositions priori. Had we endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that from conceptions that
to say, had we employed this method in attempting to show that every thing which exists, exists only in that which per manent, --that every thingor event presupposes the existence ot something in preceding state, upon which follows in con formity with rule --lastly, that in the manifold, which co existent, the states co-exist in connection with each other according to rule, --all our labour would have been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the existence of another. What other course was left for us to pursue This only, to demonstrate the possibility of experience as cognition in which at last all objects must be curable of beiug presented to us, the representation of them
to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating term, the essential form of which consists in the
synthetical unity of the apperception of all plisenomena, we found priori conditions of the universal and necessary de termination as to time of all existences in the world of pha> nomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity priori, by means of wluch we could
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? TrtE POSTULATES Ot EMP1MCAL TUOrGHT. 101
For <<ant of this method, and from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof
of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the em pirical employment of the understanding, has it happened, that a proof of the principle of sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain. The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have always been silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread famished by the categories was wanting, the guide which alone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system
of conceptions and of principles.
IV.
The Postulates of Empirical Thought.
1 . That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition
and conception) of experience, is possible.
2. Tlmt which coheres with the material conditions of ex
perience (sensation), is real.
3. That whose coherence with the real is determined ac
cording to universal conditions of experience is (exists) ne cessary.
Explanation.
The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the con ception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only ex press its relation to the faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the hitter, whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more definitely determined
* The unity of tlie universe, in which all phenomena must be con nected, is evidently a mere consequence of the tacitly admitted principle of the community of all substances which are co-existent. For wer? sub stances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not necessary from the very fact of co-existence, we could not conclude from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former as a real one. We have, however shown in its place, that community is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of co-existence, and that wc may therefore pro perly reason from the latter to the former as its condition.
M
anticipate experience.
? ? ? ? 162
THANSC? KDJ5KTAL
DOCTRHTE.
in thought, out the question is only in what relation in cluding all its determinations, stands to the understanding and its employment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgment, and to the reason in its application to expe
rience. of modality are For this very reason, too, the categories
nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possi bility, reality, and necessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time, restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For they are to have something more than merely logical significance, and to be something more than mere analytical expression of the form of thought, and to have relation to things and their possibility, reality or necessity,
The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our experience in general. But this, that to say, the ob jective form of experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for the cognition of objects. concep tion which contains synthesis must be regarded as empty and without reference to an object, its synthesis does not belong to experience -- either as borrowed from and in this case called an empirical conception, or such as the ground and a priori condition of experience (its form), and in this case pure conception, conception which neverthe
less belongs to experience, inasmuch as its object can be
found in this alone. For where shall we find the criterion or
character of the possibility of an object which cogitated by
means of an priori synthetical conception, not in the syn thesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of ob
jects That in such conception no contradiction exists indeed necessary logical condition, but very far from being
sufficient to establish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the possibility of such an object as thought in the conception. Thus, in" the conception of figure which contained within two straight lines, there no contradiction, for the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction
contain no negation of figure. The impossibility such case does not rest upon the conception itself, but upon the
? they must concern possible experience
unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.
and its synthetical
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? THE POSTULATES Of EMMRIOAL THOU8HT. 163
construction of it in space, that is to say, upon the conditions of space and its determinations. But these have themselves objective reality, that is, they apply to possible things, because they contain o priori the form of experience in genernl.
And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and influence of this postulate of possibility. When I repre sent to myself a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something which is so constituted that, when it is posited, something else follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no self- contradiction ; but whether such a property as causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different things (substances) which are so constituted, that the state or
condition of one causes a change in the state of the other,
and reciprocally ; but whether such a relation is a property of
things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which con
tain a merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, there
fore, that these conceptions express a priori the relations of
perceptions in every experience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth ; and that inde
pendent of experience, though not independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized.
But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of sub stances, forces, action and reaction, from the material pre sented to us by perception, without following the example of experience in their connexion, we create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion, because we have not taken experience for our instructress, though we have borrowed tko conceptions from her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like the categories, d priori, as conceptions on which all experience de pends, but only, & posteriori, as conceptions given by means of experience itself, and their possibility must either be cog
nized & posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all. A substance, which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce into
X2
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metaphysics), or a peculiar fundamental power of the mlnJ of intuiting the future by anticipation (instead of merely infer ring from past and present events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may be -- these are conceptions, the pos sibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based upon experience and its known laws ; and with out experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in these concep tions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility in concrete without the aid of experience ; because reality is concerned only with sensa tion, as the matter of experience, and not with the form of thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies.
But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general.
It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly
of experience) ; for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely h priori, that is to say, we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must remain a mere product of the ima gination, and the possibility of the existence of an object cor responding to it must remain doubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of ex perience rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition
& priori of external experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we coustruct a triangle in imagination, is the very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a phensmenou for the purpose of making an empirical conception of are what alone connect the notion of the possibility of such thing with the conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility ol continuous quantities, indeed of quantities in general, for the
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? THE POBTULATZS OF EMPIBICAX THOUGHT. 166
conceptions of them are without exception synthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but only when they are considered as the formal conditions of the determina tion of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we look for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in experience, by which aione objects arc presented to us ? It
however, true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of things, relatively to the formal conditions, under which something determined in experience as an object, consequently completely priori. But still this possible only in relation to experience and within its limits.
The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed immediately, that of the object itself, whose existence to be cognized, but still that the object have some connection with real perception, in accordance with the ana logies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connec
tion in experience.
From the mere conception of thing impossible to con
clude its existence. For, let the conception be ever so com plete, and containing statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of -- has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether such thing given, so that the perception of can in every case precede the concep tion. For the fact that the conception of precedes the per ception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence perception, which presents matter to the conception, that the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however, and therefore comparatively priori, we are able to cognize its existence, provided, stands in connection with some perceptions according to the principles of the em pirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of perception. For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing connected with our perceptions in possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the series of possible perception* from thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do 'iot perceive. Thus, we cognize the existence of magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the at tract ion of the steel- filin<<v hv the magnet, although the con
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? 166 TRANSCENDENTAL DOOTRHnt.
stitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute, --but this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not pro ceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately. This therefore, the proper place for its refutation.
REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
Idealism-- mean material* idealism -- the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and im
The first the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical as sertion (atsertio), to wit, am. The second the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which the inseparable condition, thing which in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism unavoidable, we regard space as property of things in themselves for in that case
? possible.
with all to which serves as condition,
But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental esthetic. Problematical ideal ism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our in capacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves
means of immediate experience, theory rational and evi dencing thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for observes the rule, not to form decisive judgment before
In opposition to formal or critical idealism -- the theory of Kant-- which denies to us knowledge of things as things in themselves, and maintains that we can know only phenomena. -- 7V.
nonentity.
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? B6F0TATION O! IDHALI8M. 167
sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Des Cartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only uuder the previous assumption of external ex perience.
Theorem.
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space.
Pboof.
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard to time presupposes the exist ence of something permanent in perception. But this perma nent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me, and not through the mere representation of a thing with out me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things ex ternal to me. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily con nected with the consciousness of the possibility of this deter mination in time. Hence it follows, that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That is to say, the con sciousness of my own existence is at the same time an im mediate consciousness of the existence of other things with out me.
Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays-, is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed, that the only immediate experience is internal, and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is pro
? ? ? ? 168 TRAJTSCENDENTiL DOCTRIXE.
perly immediate,* that only by virtue of it -- not, indeed, tlif consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the deter mination of our existence in time, that internal experi ence-- possible.