No More Learning

Such was the Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter
kill me else, as I kill this Beast. " So is our Forme, "I shall do thus,
and thus, so help me God. " And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies,
which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking
faith might be the greater.




No Oath, But By God

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or
Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no
Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men
have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet
they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine
honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his
name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is
not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of
talking.




An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath,
as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be
confirmed with an Oath.



CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE




The Third Law Of Nature, Justice

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to
another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind,
there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their
Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty
words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still
in the condition of Warre.




Justice And Injustice What

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently,
no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it
is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not
Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,)
are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants;
yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare
be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre,
cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have
place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to
the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment,
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant;
and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire,
in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there
is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be
gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For
they say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his
own. " And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there
is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is,
where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having
Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there
nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping
of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with
the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep
them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.




Justice Not Contrary To Reason

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;
and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep
Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may
be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he
questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the
same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes
stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and
particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a
man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings,
but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by
violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it
against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by
it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or else
Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that
in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have
allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen
that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed
neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat
like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he
sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the
Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From
which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire
apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his
father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet
it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of
men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is
nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But
either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there
is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be
against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe,
or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation
whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which
notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to
his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect,
arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it
reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre,
wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them
all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength,
or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help
of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the
Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares
he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect
no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single
Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received
into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but
by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be
retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours
a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and
therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he
live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not
foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction,
forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of
Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably
be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so,
others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof
is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of
Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing
destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature,
to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on
earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to
which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently
be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit
to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted
over them by their own consent. ) But because there is no naturall
knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is
then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon
other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know
those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally;
Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.




Covenants Not Discharged By The Vice Of The Person To Whom Made

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do
neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and
such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is
against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge
our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to
have hindred the making of it.




Justice Of Men, And Justice Of Actions What

The names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie
one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they
are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or Inconformity of
Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they
signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or
manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he
that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and
an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often
in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then
Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous
man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that
proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does
an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does,
of forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the
Justice, but by the apparant benefit of what he is to do. That which
gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse
or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to
be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of
promise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where
Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guiltlesse;
and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them
but the name of Guilty.




Justice Of Manners, And Justice Of Actions

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to
do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without
supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an
Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person
Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many
times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth
to another. As when The Master commandeth his servant to give mony to a
stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom
he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the
stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure
him. And so also in Common-wealths, private men may remit to one another
their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are
endammaged; because the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves;
but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the
Common-wealth.




Nothing Done To A Man, By His Own Consent Can Be Injury

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signified to
the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed
away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent
Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done
him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a
release of that Covenant; and so again there is no Injury done him.




Justice Commutative, And Distributive

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and
Distributive; and the former they say consisteth in proportion
Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative
therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted
for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of
equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to
give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted
for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides
that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth
the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative,
not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace
onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to
be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice,
is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant,
in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and
Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say,
the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that
make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute
to every man his own: and his is indeed Just Distribution, and may
be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly
Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.




The Fourth Law Of Nature, Gratitude

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does Gratitude depend
on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and is the
fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, "That a man
which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he
which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good
will. " For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe;
because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to
every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated,
there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of
mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore
they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to
the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth men to Seek
Peace. The breach of this Law, is called Ingratitude; and hath the same
relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.




The Fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, "That every
man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest. " For the understanding
whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society;
a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affections; not
unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an
Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of
Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for
the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the
building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome:
so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those
things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and
for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be
left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every
man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is supposed
to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his
conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things
superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and
therefore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of
Nature, which commandeth To Seek Peace. The observers of this Law,
may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary,
Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.




The Sixth, Facility To Pardon

A sixth Law of Nature is this, "That upon caution of the Future time,
a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire
it. " For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted
to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet
not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an
aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.




The Seventh, That In Revenges, Men Respect Onely The Future Good

A seventh is, " That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of evil for
evil,) Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the
greatnesse of the good to follow. " Whereby we are forbidden to inflict
punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender,
or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before
it, that commandeth Pardon, upon security of the Future Time. Besides,
Revenge without respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a
triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the
End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory,
and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the
introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is
commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.




The Eighth, Against Contumely

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;
insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be
revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature set down this
Precept, "That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare
Hatred, or Contempt of another. " The breach of which Law, is commonly
called Contumely.




The Ninth, Against Pride

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of
meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The
inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. I know
that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of
his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning
the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;)
others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not
Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by
consent of men, but by difference of Wit; which is not only against
reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish,
that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others:
Nor when the wise in their own conceit, contend by force, with them who
distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any
time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that
equalitie is to be acknowledged; or if Nature have made men unequall;
yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into
conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be
admitted. And therefore for the ninth Law of Nature, I put this, "That
every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature. " The breach of
this Precept is Pride.




The Tenth Against Arrogance

On this law, dependeth another, "That at the entrance into conditions of
Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not
content should be reserved to every one of the rest. " As it is necessary
for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; that
is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it necessarie
for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies;
enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all
things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in
this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that
which they would not have to be granted to others, they do contrary
to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgement of naturall
equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers
of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant Men.
The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia; that is, a desire
of more than their share.




The Eleventh Equity

Also "If a man be trusted to judge between man and man," it is a precept
of the Law of Nature, "that he deale Equally between them. " For without
that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre.
He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to
deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently,
(against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of
that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have
sayd before) distributive justice: the violation, Acception Of Persons,
Prosopolepsia.




The Twelfth, Equall Use Of Things Common

And from this followeth another law, "That such things as cannot be
divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the
thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of
them that have Right. " For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and
contrary to Equitie.




The Thirteenth, Of Lot

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in
common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth,
"That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First
Possession, be determined by Lot. " For equall distribution, is of
the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be
imagined.




The Fourteenth, Of Primogeniture, And First Seising

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is
that which is agreed on by the Competitors; Naturall, is either
Primogeniture, (which the Greek calls Kleronomia, which signifies, Given
by Lot;) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor
divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and is some cases
to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.




The Fifteenth, Of Mediators

It is also a Law of Nature, "That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed
safe Conduct. " For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth
Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe
Conduct.




The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,
there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First,
whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against
the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a
question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unlesse the
parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence
of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose
Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of
the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversie, submit their
Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator. "




The Seventeenth, No Man Is His Own Judge

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own
benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were
never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one
be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the
controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of
Nature.




The Eighteenth, No Man To Be Judge, That Has In Him Cause Of Partiality

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for
Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently
ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for he hath
taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be
obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition
of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.




The Nineteenth, Of Witnesse

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more credit
to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give
credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the
question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the
conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine
of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destruction of
particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of Intemperance;
which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law
of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are
pertinent enough to this place.




A Rule, By Which The Laws Of Nature May Easily Be Examined

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature,
to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in
getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave
all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum,
intelligible even to the meanest capacity; and that is, "Do not that to
another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe;" which sheweth
him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Nature, but,
when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too
heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into
their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to
the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will
not appear unto him very reasonable.




The Lawes Of Nature Oblige In Conscience Alwayes,

But In Effect Then Onely When There Is Security The Lawes of Nature
oblige In Foro Interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they
should take place: but In Foro Externo; that is, to the putting them
in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and
performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els
should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his
own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which
tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that shall observe the same
Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but
War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind In Foro Interno, may be broken, not onely by
a fact contrary to the Law but also by a fact according to it, in case a
man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according
to the Law; which where the Obligation is In Foro Interno, is a breach.




The Laws Of Nature Are Eternal;

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall, For Injustice,
Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the
rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall
preserve life, and Peace destroy it.




And Yet Easie

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I
mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For
in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their
performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just.




The Science Of These Lawes, Is The True Morall Philosophy

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For
Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and
Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill,
are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different
tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men,
differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant,
and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also
of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of
common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe;
and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time
he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise Disputes,
Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the
condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private
Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all men
agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or
means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude,
Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that
is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the
science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true
Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the
Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues
and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that
they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and
comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not
the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause,
but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but
improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what
conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; whereas Law,
properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But
yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of
God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called
Lawes.



CHAPTER XVI. OF PERSONS, AUTHORS, AND THINGS PERSONATED



A Person What

A PERSON, is he "whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any
other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. "




Person Naturall, And Artificiall

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall
Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and
actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.




The Word Person, Whence

The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise,
or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes
more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask
or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer
of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a
Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common
Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an
other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or
act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus
Sustineo Tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three
Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;") and is called in
diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a
Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and
the like.




Actor, Author; Authority

Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and he that
owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the
Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and
possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke
Kurios; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of
possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is
called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right
of doing any act: and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence
from him whose right it is.




Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by
Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made
it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the
same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the
nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity,
is true also when they are made by their Actors, Representers, or
Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their
Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man
is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by
a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.




But Not The Actor

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command of
the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him, not he, but
the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against
the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily; to refuse to do
it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.




The Authority Is To Be Shewne

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of the
Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word;
in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is
no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Author, is not valid,
without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew
before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word;
then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh
himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident,
the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority
is feigned, it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but
himselfe.




Things Personated, Inanimate

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by
Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may
be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate,
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the
Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by
those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore,
such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill
Government.




Irrational

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may
be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during
that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall
recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give
Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State
Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.




False Gods

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were
Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men
from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot
be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the
State: and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods
of the Heathen could not be Personated.




The True God

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses; who governed
the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own
name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc Dicit Dominus.
Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son our Blessed Saviour Jesus
Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the
Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father.
And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working
in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of
himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.




A Multitude Of Men, How One Person

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or
one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of
every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the
Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person
One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one
Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.




Every One Is Author

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot
be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their
Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their
common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning
all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre
he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him
commission to Act.




An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater
number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser
number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in
the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to destroy
the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing
uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.




Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable

And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is
not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is
therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases
contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in
condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne
not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve
not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve; but on
the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The
like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring
till another time; For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing
Execution, is a decree of Dilation.




Negative Voyce

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the
effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no
Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of
men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a
mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else, so for the government of
a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have
before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply.
The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another
conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the
other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors
conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and
Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appearance before
a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.





PART II. OF COMMON-WEALTH



CHAPTER XVII. OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A
COMMON-WEALTH




The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security

The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon
themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable
condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn)
to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep
them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of
their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature set down in
the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.




Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves, without
the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and
the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of
Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep
them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not
great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on
his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all
places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one
another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the
Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was
their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of
Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives,
and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now
do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own
security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and
fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour
as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open
force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are
rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.




Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them
this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side
or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient
to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion.
The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not
determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we
feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so
visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of warre, as to
move him to attempt.




Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed By One Judgement

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be
directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither
against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application
of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce
their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are
easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also
when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for
their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of
men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature,
without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose
all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be nor need to
be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would
be Peace without subjection.




And That Continually

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all
the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one
judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For
though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a
forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy,
or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for
a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve,
and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.




Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,




Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without Any Coercive Power

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live
sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred
amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than
their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of
them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common
benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind
cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst
these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they
procure thereby the common benefit.
But man, whose Joy consisteth
in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason,
do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of their
common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke
themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the
rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another
that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in
making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet
they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others,
that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the
likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of
Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their
pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and
Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended
with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is
most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, and
controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is
by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder
if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their
Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.




The Generation Of A Common-wealth

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and
thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie,
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one
Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills,
by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to
appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every
one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he
that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those
things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to
submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his
Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of
them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with
every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, "I
Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to
this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right
to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. " This done, the
Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine
CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to
speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the
Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him
by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so
much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is
inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall
ayd against their enemies abroad.




The Definition Of A Common-wealth

And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to
define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,
to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. "




Soveraigne, And Subject, What

And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have
Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by
Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves,
and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if
they refuse, or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them
their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst
themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be
called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and
the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of
a Common-wealth by Institution.



CHAPTER XVIII. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION




The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do
Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man,
or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right
to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their
Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that
Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of
that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his
own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.




The Consequences To Such Institution, Are




I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government




From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and
Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by
the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not
obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And
Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being
thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one,
cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient
to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And
therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave
cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude;
nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man,
or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man,
to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their
Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man
dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty
to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him,
they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.
Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment,
as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And
because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be
punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their
Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also
is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some
body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with
God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that
it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly
disposition.




2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given
to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and
not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the
part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any
pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which
is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects beforehand, is
manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as
one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with
every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as
yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants
as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd,
because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach
thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of
his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns
therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of
Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they
had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by
way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his
Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want
of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and
breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man,
but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose
actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them
all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then
no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for
no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made
a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such
conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the
Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and
in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that
are kinder to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to
participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.




3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The

Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part. Thirdly,
because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne;
he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented
to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the
rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that
were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and
therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore
unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his
consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or
be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might
without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.




4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly Accused By The Subject

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the
Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that
whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor
ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose
authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every
particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently
he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that
whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones
selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne
power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper
signification.




5. What Soever The Soveraigne Doth, Is Unpunishable By The Subject

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath
Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner
by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is author of the
actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.




6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace

And Defence Of His Subjects

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of
them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the
Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do
whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the
preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and
Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the
recovery of the same. And therefore,




And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently,
on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall,
in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines
of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth
the well governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded
but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally
received; the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most
sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never
breake the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace,
but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live
as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belongeth
therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or
constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to
Peace, thereby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.




7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May

Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject

Can Without Injustice Take It From Him

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may
enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of
his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety. For before
constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had
right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this
Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power,
is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of
Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull and Unlawfull
in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the
lawes of each Commonwealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law
be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which
being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were
in these parts the Civill Law.




8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature

And Decision Of Controversies:

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that
is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise
concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall, or concerning Fact. For
without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one
Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and
Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and
necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting
himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and
contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.




9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre, and
Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of
Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to
be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the
Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power by which the
people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength
of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which
Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command
of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it
Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that
hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.




10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,

Both Of Peace, And Warre:

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all
Councellours, Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and
War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the
common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such
Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.




11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No

Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe he hath
formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge
most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or
deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.




12. And Of Honour And Order

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon
themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they
value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them, Emulation,
Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one
another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It
is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the
worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the
Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to
put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shown, that not
onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the
Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the
Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to
appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to
one another.




These Rights Are Indivisible

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which
are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly
of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are
incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of
the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in
Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the
Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subject be retained. But if
he transferre the Militia, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want
of execution of the Lawes; Or if he grant away the Power of raising
Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of
doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of
Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall
presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no
effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all
Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is
said, "A kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this
division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If
there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of
England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and
fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed
in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of
Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right,
that there be few now (in England,) that do not see, that these Rights
are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and
no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto
been.




And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct

Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be granted
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably
annexed thereunto.




The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The Presence

Of The Power Soveraign

This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of
Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than
every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of lesse
power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not
the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One,
signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together,
they understand them as one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,)
then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power;
and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough,
when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch
they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in
whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and
Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master, the Servants
are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the
presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse,
when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more
than the Starres in presence of the Sun.




Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,

And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not

Submitting Readily, To A Lesse

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very
miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passions
of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And
commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy;
and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other
Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of
Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect
enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate
of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the
greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and
horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute
condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a
coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge: nor
considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the
dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth
their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence,
make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can
in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent occasion, or
sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men
are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their
Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a
great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely
Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.



CHAPTER XIX. OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,

AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER




The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three

The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the
Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the
Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in an
Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath
right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the
rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For
the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it
is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One
man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that
will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth:
when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY.
Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or
More, or All must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be
indivisible) entire.




Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy, And Aristocracy

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of
Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are
displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which
signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that
want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when
they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the
Governours.




Subordinate Representatives Dangerous

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they
please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one; as
well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch,
as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is
already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative
of the same people, but onely to certain particular ends, by the
Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every
man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one
another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of
Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And
therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting
the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power
to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such
Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of
the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And
I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little
observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent
of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from
every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them
for their King; was notwithstanding never considered as their
Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title
of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry
their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which
may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that
Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall
Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge
the truth committed to them.




Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth
not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or
Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the people; for which end
they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may
observe; First, that whosoever beareth the Person of the people, or
is one of that Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall
Person. And though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure
the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the
private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the
most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he
preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent
than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and
private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the
publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from
the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can
be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or
contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a
war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the
publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one
that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a
treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he
pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the
matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, and
as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will.
But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted
but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the
most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition
of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long
discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but
not governe them in it. For the Understanding is by the flame of the
Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time,
wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of
their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other
Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that
of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence
of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme,
(which may happen by security, negligence, or private impediments,) or
the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day,
all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or
interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce
a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the
Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power is the same; and
they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as
a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers, serve
one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the
Favorites of an Assembly, are many; and the Kindred much more numerous,
than of any Monarch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which
cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators,
that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have
great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse
Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than
absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and
Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power, must be in the
hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by
his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person,
and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of
the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is
to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and
Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must
arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great
honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that
this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call
Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed
who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely
by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that
case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be
attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of
the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are
not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is
the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for
such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient
rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most
interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom
least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every
man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant
into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction,
or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision
being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a
Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition
of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is
no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly,
which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of
Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For
as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and
is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he
is committed: So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the
counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also
(in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers
and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis; that is of Dictators, or
Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs;
to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power;
and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than
Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three;
that is to say, Monarchie, where one Man has it; or Democracie, where
the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristocracie, where it is
in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished
from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes
that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce
them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other
Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective
Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands
for a time; of Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which
Governments, are nevertheless by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise
if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies
Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or
other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a
Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For
Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne;
nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the
Soveraigne Power: nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a
Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or
Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to
certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans;
If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but
Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there
is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect
a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and
returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power
to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the
Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which
they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think
good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the
decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor,
to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing
into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was,
when elected, a Soveraign absolute.

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or
them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is
not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore
was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Limit him; and
by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or
Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge
to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea
(for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy;
because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any of
them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were
not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their
Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the
people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to
the people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the
government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed
by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the
government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are
governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not
of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.




Of The Right Of Succession

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so that not
onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary for the
conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for
an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall
Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly,
should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they
that are governed by One man, as soon as their Governour dyeth. This
Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the
Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other
particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may
be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right
is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new
choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him
that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did institute
the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude
that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of
Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of
another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Soveraign, to
whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that
which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth,
as Author. And though the Soveraign assembly, may give Power to others,
to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their
Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the
publique shall require it) be recalled.

The Present Monarch Hath Right To Dispose Of The Succession The greatest
difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: And the
difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest
who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he
hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact
ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question,
who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign
Authority; that is to say, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the
Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that
either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession,
or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death
of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude
without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in
whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at
all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch;
every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks
best able to protect him, or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne
sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of
every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had
its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution
of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the
Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the
Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheritance
of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Testament; or
by other tacite signes sufficient.




Succession Passeth By Expresse Words;

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in his life
time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared
who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe
imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man
shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate.
If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his
Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediately after the
decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.




Or, By Not Controlling A Custome;

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall
signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And
therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession;
for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise,
he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise
where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth,
there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male,
for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the
Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does
not, it is a naturall signe he would have that Custome stand.




Or, By Presumption Of Naturall Affection

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it is
to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the government
remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government in
himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be
preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined
by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other
men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are
naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly,
where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so
still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote, because it is
alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and
'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour
from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.




To Dispose Of The Succession, Though To A King Of Another Nation,

Not Unlawfull

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by words
of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience:
for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which,
because strangers (that is, men not used to live under the same
government, not speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue one
another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed
a great inconvenience; but it proceedeth not necessarily from the
subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the
Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore
the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government
digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they
thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes
to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the
Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the
Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it
our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of
his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained,
had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those
Kingdomes at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to
the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though
by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient.
Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.



CHAPTER XX. OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL


A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is
acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or
many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do
authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their
lives and liberty in his Power.




Wherein Different From A Common-wealth By Institution

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by
Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it
for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this
case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases
they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such
Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if
it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged
to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or
acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no
Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the
Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because
he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he
may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of
the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign.
Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh:
But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is
acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such
absolution.




The Rights Of Soveraignty The Same In Both

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both.
His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He
cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of
Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary
for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme
Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre,
and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours,
Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of
Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are
the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same
Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.




Dominion Paternall How Attained Not By Generation, But By Contract

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The
right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over
his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the
Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child
because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or
by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God
hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally
Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to
both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man
can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it.
For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between
the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War.