No More Learning

And in this, not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation.
? ? it is
a
is,
a
? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223
For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, man the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse
which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas ; whi'e instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony
with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a
perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, --and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea.
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature --probably also the disposition of the whole universe -- give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea.
Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings ot this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode* of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that
experience,
? ? ? is,
? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest
to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from what is done.
We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar
duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of mora, science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its con fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart --and their number is but small, -- if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow
ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, -- that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu ated list of them. The genus is representation in general
degree reprehensible
? Under it stands representation with consci ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the
subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition {cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus)
(representatio).
? ? ? OtT IDEAS IN (3EHE&AL. 225
The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the
of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK I.
Sect. II. -- Of Transcendental Idea*.
representation
? Tkanscendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure con ceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects ante cedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments -- converted into a conception
of the synthesis of intuitions -- produced the categories, which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure con ceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex perience according to principles.
The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined a prion in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition. "Caius is mDrtal," is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone ; but my wish is to find a
conception,
which contains the condition under which the
? All mathematical figures, for example. -- Tr.
Q
? ? ? 226
TBAJT8CENDJSNTAti DIALECTIC.
predicate of this judgment is given --in this case, the con ception of man -- and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say, "Cains is mortal. "
Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a pre dicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas). To this corresponds totality (univerrltas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of con ditions is itself always unconditioned ; a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the
? of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basi* for the synthesis of the conditioned.
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject ; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the mem bers of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, euch of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the uncon ditioned -- one to the subject which cannot be employed as a predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the mem bers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of con ditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason --at least as modes of elevating the unity of the under standing to the unconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in amcrelo, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as widely ni
possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perf1ct consistence and harmony.
conception
? ? ? Ctf 'fRiN8CEKDENTAL IDSAS.
227
But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we again light upon an expression, which we find it impossible to dispense with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one of the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey --a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss -- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment -- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The werd absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsi cally. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself {interne) --which fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On the other hand,
sometimes employed to indicate that thing valid in
? all respects- -for example, absolute sovereignty.
vossible would in this sense signify that which
all relations 9X1. x ill every respect and this
can be predicated of the possibility of thing. Now these significations do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which intrinsically impossible, also impossible in all relations, that absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other toto caelo, and can no means conclude tnat, because thing itself possible, is also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. Nay, more, shall in the sequel show, that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that therefore must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an opposite which intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that in all respects impossible, and that con sequently the thing itself, of which this the opposite,
but cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which absolutely necessary intrinsi
absolutely necessary
that that the absolute necessity of things an interna/- necessity. For this internal necessity
cally impossible,
certain cases mere empty word with which the least con
Absolutely
possible in the most that
? ? a
it it
is
is
Q2 is
I is it by
is
; is,
is is,
is is
is
in is
it
I
is
is, is is in
is
I
a
is in
a
a
;
? 228 fRASSCENDENTAL DIAtECTIC\
ception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him.
In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some par ticular respect ; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction whatever.
Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that in all respects and relations, uncon ditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding every thing that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis imagination. The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the con ceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity* of phsenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding. * Reason, therefore, haa an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the
ground of possible experience (for the conception of the ab solute totality of conditions not conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience uncon
ditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing to certain inity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the >>im of which to collect into an absolute whole all acts of
the understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason always transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are
limited to possible experience.
understand idea necessary conception of reason, to
which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental ideas. They
? Vernunfteinheit, Yerstandeseinhcit.
? ? ? I
is
by
a
is
is
is, in
it
a is
is a
? OF TRANSCr. HDF. NTAL IDEAS.
229
are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have kence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand ing. And finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a tran scendental idea. When we use the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly little, be cause the idea, as the conception of maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter
? properly the sole aim, and as in this case the approxi mation to conception, which never attained in practice,
the same thing as the conception were non-existent, -- commonly said of conception of this kind, only
an idea. So we might very well say, the absolute totality of all phenomena only an idea, for as we never can pre
sent an adequate representation of remains for us problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, the indispensable condition of all practical employ ment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeter-
itly always under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea always in the highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the idea,
pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of wisdom, in disparaging way, it only an idea. For, for the very reason that the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, must be for all practical exertions and en deavours the primitive condition and rule-- rule which, not constitutive, at least limitative.
Now, although we must say of the transcendent. il concep-
? ? it is
it is
a
a
is
a
is
is
if is a
it is
it, it
a
is,
is
a if
it is is
is
it is
? 230 TRANSCENDENTAL T>1ALEOT:C.
bona of reason, they are oiuy ideas, we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise --a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to apeak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the sequel.
But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to con template reason in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use ; and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically h priori, in relation to one or other of the func tions of reason.
Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that of mediate judgment -- by means of the subsumption of the condition of
possible judgment under the condition of given judgment. The given judgment the general rule (major). The sub- sumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule the minor. The actual judgment, which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, the conclusion (eoneluno). The rule predicates something generally under certain condition. The con dition of the rule satisfied in some particular case. follows, that what was valid in general under that condi tion must also be considered as valid the
? particular case which satisfies this condition. very plain that
reason attains to cognition, means of acts of the un derstanding which constitute series of conditions. Wheu
arrive at the proposition, "All bodies are changeable,"
? ? Ia is
by
It
a
by
a
a
is
is is
It
is in
a
is,
? Or TttANSCEXDENTAti IDEAS. 281
beginning with the more remote cognition, (in which the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), " All [that com pound changeable," by proceeding from this to less remote cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, " Bodies are compound," and hence to third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, *' Consequently, bodies are change able," -- have arrived at cognition (conclusion) through series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) given, can be continued consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which
series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per prosy llogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an indefinite extent.
But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of pro- syllogisms, that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms must have very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) given only as con ditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the pre-supposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because only under this supposition the judgment we may be considering possible priori; while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not pre-supposed or given series, consequently only
? Hence, when cognition as conditioned, reason compelled to con sider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed
potential progression, cogitated. contemplated
and given in their totality. But the very same cognition considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences
descending line, reason may preserve perfect indifference, as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series possible, because stands in no need of such series for the purpose of arriving
at tlu>> conclusion before inasmuch as this conclusion
? ? is
a
is
is
is
in a
is
is a
isit is a
isa
a
a
I
is
is
it,a a a a
if
a
;
a
a isj
? 232 CEUraCXKDEKTXL DIAXICTIO.
? ufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a part* priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the con ditions the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited ; but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we never could succeed in completely appre
hending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting from to be held as true. This requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as determined priori and as necessary, either in itself -- and in this case needs no grounds to rest upon -- or, deduced, as member of
of grounds, which itself unconditionally true.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK
Sect. III. --System Transcendental Ideas.
Ws are not at present engaged with logical dialectic which
makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition, and
aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form syllogisms. Our subject transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced con ceptions, the object of which cannot be given empirically, and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of under standing. We have observed, from the natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, syllogisms as well as in judgments, most have to the logical, that there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three
modes of conclusion, which reason attains to cognitions on principles and that in all the business of reason, to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach.
Now the most general relations which can exist in our
representations are, 1st, the relation to the subject 2nd, the
relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with tha main division, all the relations of our representations, of which we can form either conception or an idea, are threefold
? series
? ? a
d
is if it is
i
of
;
;
it is
I. a
is a
by
is
of
in
a it
a
a
it, is
? SYSTEM 0T TRAN8CENDXHTAL IDEAS.
233
1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the mani fold of the object as a phsenomenon ; 3. The relation to all things in general.
Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of representations: conceptions of pure reason,
(transcendental ideas) on the other hand, with the uncondi tional synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of ihe thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the seriet of the conditions of a phsenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.
The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total of nll phsenomena (the world) is the object- matter of Cosmology; and ihe thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul ( psy- chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use of reason, that all cogitable syllogisms --for the purpose of proceeding from one
? to all others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure
and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.
What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these trans
cendental ideas are, will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thrend of the categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In like manner, will be made manifest in the detailed explana tion of these ideas, --how reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which employs in categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, --how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of -the ab solutely unconditioned m a series of given conditions, and finally, -- how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism in volves the highest conception of bring ofall brings thought which at first sight seems the highest degree paradoxical.
object (phsenomenon)
? ? in
a
: a
a
it
it
is,
? 234 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in
the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these trans cendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any
object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in the present chapter.
It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason
the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the condi tions, and that does not concern itself with the absolute com pleteness on the part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them to the understand ing priori. But we once have completely (and uncon ditionally) given condition, there no further necessity, pro ceeding with the series, for conception of reason for the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles.
As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that there widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the understanding, but that transcendental use thereof impossible and, that when wc form an idea of the absolute totality of such synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this idea mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not neces sary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the con ditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception not trans cendental idea -- and with these alone that we are at present occupied.
Finally, obvious, that there exists among the trans cendental ideas certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one
? From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being, the progres sion so natural, that seems to resemble the logical march uf reason from the premisses to the conclusion. * Now whether
The science of Metaphysics lias for the proper ohject of its inquiries os! t three grand ideas God, Freedom, and Immortality, and aim
system.
? ? *
is
a
:
it
; a
if
it a is
it
it is
is
aais ;
it a in
i9 is a
a
a
is
a
is,
? SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
235
tliere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
OF THE DIALECTICAL PBOCEDURF. OF PURE REASON.
It may be said that the object, of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that ia adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which
at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethict, and, through the conjunction of both. Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange ment -- the tyitt helical one -- would be the most suitable ; but in the in vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w< should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to Bs>-- psychology, to cosmology, and thenre to theology.
? ? ? ? 23fi THAS9CE! TDENTAri DIALECTIC.
perfectly corresponds to an idea, althongh we may possess a problematical conception thereof.
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre misses, and by means of which we conclude from some thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheVess, by an un avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are rery well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory
of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the.
absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that from things which do not know in their mere transcendental conception, conclude being of all beings which know still less means of transcenderr
? conception
? ? 1
by
I
aI a
is,
? at THi PAllALOOISMS OJr PURE fiEiSON. ft?
tid conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I ? hall call the Ideal of pure reason.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II.
Chap. I. -- Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason,
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism Las a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid able, though not insoluble, mental illusion.
We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This iIs the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.
At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin guish two different kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine o(
of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con ception J, in so far as it appears in all thought.
Now, the ratiotal doctrine of the soul is really an undo*.
? the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing
? ? ? 238 NUftSOm)E>TAIi DIALECttO.
taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of
thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before Ius a pretended science,
presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception nothing more than the mere apperception, think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof empirically given, cannot be re garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general representation of self-con sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.
think therefore the oiily text of rational psychology, from which must develope its whole system. manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof be cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience.
But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the cate
raised upon the single proposition,
or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which ex
gories, --only, as in the present case thing, as thinking
we shall -- not indeed change the order stauds the table, -- but begin at the
which thing in itself represented, and proceed backwards through the series. The topic of the
rational doctrine of the soul, from which every thing else may contain must be deduced, accordingly as follows
being, of the
at first given,
category
categories as of substance,
think, whose foundation
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2.
As regards its quality, it is simple.
3.
As regards the different
times in which it exists,
it is numerically iden- tical, that is toitt, not
Plurality. 4.
1.
The soul is Substance.
It is in relation to possible objects in space. *
From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality ; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility ; its identity, as in tellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality ; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
? (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the
principle of life in matter, that as soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality and this, limited and determined
the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of trans cendental psychology, which falsely held to be science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly coutentless representation which cannot even be called conception, but merely con sciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more represented than transcendental subject of thought = x, which cognized only means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of
The reader, who m>>y not so easily perceive the psychological tense of these expressions -- taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of eMitlence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms wh'ch have been employed, instead of their German synonymes, contrary to lha rules of correct writing. But judged baUer to sacrifice elegance language to perspicuity of exposition.
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? 240 TraNbcbndeStjo, dialectic.
which, opart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a per petual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ in order 10 frame any judgment respecting it. And this inconvenience we find impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness in itself not so much representation distinguishing par ticular object, as form of representation in general, in so far as may be termed cognition for in and cognition alone do think anything.
must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the
condition, under which think, and which
property of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid foi every existence which thinks, and that we can pre umc to bass upon seemingly empirical proposition judgment which apoiieictic and universal, to wit, that every thing which thinks
constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares to lie, that is, as self-conscious being. The cause of this belief to be found in the fact, that we necessarily attribute to things
priori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now cannot obtain the least representation of thinking being means of externa! experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such ob jects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, think,
? in the present case, understood problematical sense, not in so far as contains perception of an existence (like the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum), but in regard to its mere possibility -- for the purpose of discovering, what properties may be inferred from so simple proposition and predicated of the subject of it.
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of think ing beings there lay more than the mere Cogito, -- we could likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology which would be kind physiology of the internal sense, and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense. But could never be available for discovering those properties which do not be long to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity),
nor could m^ke any apodeictic enunciation on the nature
consequently
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of thinking beings : -- it would therefore not be a rational
Now, as the proposition Ithink (in the problematical sense) contains the form of every judgment in general, and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories ; it is manifest, that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of the under standing excludes all empirical elements ; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable conception before hand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology ; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this exami nation to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.
Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, bat only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-conscious ness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (concep tions of the understanding --categories) ; they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable self, that of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), the object.
In all judgments am the determining subject of that rela tion which constitutes judgment. But that the which thinks, must be considered as in thought always subject, and as thing which cannot be predicate to thought, an apodeictic and identical proposition. But this proposition does not sig nify that as an object, am, for myself, self-subsist ent bsing or substance. This latter statement --an ambitious one--re quires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered in thought and are perhaps (in so far as consider the think
ing self merely as surh) not to be discovered the thinking self at all.
241
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? 242 TRANXCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
2. That the / or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is lingular or simple, and cannot be readied into a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject, --this is self-evidentfrom the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance -- for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which conse quently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought : but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be sur prising, if the conception of substance, which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition -- so much trouble too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter), should be presented immediately to me, as if by reve lation, in the poorest mental representation of all.
3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is conse quently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which 1 am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the iden tity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition.
4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me --among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical propo sition, for other things are exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself. But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external to me ; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man), -- cannot be known or inferred from this proposition.
Thus we have gained nothing as regards *he cognition, of myself as object, by the analysis of the consrinnsnc*s of
? ? ? ? OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUKE BEASON. 241
my Self in thought. The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the
object.
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous,
if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of per sonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have pene trated into the sphere of noumena ; and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it. For the proposition, " Every thinking being, as snch, is simple sub stance," is an h priori synthetical proposition ; because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of and adds to the mere notion of thinking being the mode its existence, and in the second place annexes predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter conception -- pre dicate which could not have discovered in the sphere of
? would follow that priori synthetical propo sitions are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have
experience.
maintained, in relation to objects of possible
and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are applicable to things as things in themselves --an inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical
But indeed the danger not so great, we look little closer into the question.
There lurks the procedure of rational psychology para logism, which represented in the following syllogism
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject,
procedure.
does not exist otherwise than as subject, and substance.
therefore
thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogi tated otherwise than as subject.
exists also as such, that as substance.
In the major we speak of being that can be cogitated gene
rally and in every relation, consequently as may be given in intuition. But in the minor we speak of the same being only so far as regards itself aa subject, relatively to thought
There/ore
experience,
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and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intui tion, by which it is presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sojphisma figures dictionis. *
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be
plain to any one who will consider the general remark which
precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure under standing, and the section on noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality ; that is to say, we can never know, whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception ; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition ; we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If, then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance --that of subject existing per se -- to the subject as thinking being. And thus the con ception of the simple nature of substance, which connected with the objective reality of this conception, shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought whilst we remain perfectly ignorant, whether the subject composite or not.
Thought taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. In the major considered as relating and applying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand
as relating merely lo self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of thingi, but of thought, (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego always the subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, " cannot exist otherwise than as subject but only "
in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judg ment. " But this an identical proposition, and throws no lijht on \\ts mode of my existence.
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