However, that
invitation
was refused by the Nizam.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Jinnah on the other.
When the Nawab and the Dewan
ran away from the state, many letters fell into the hands of the
Government of India and in one of those letters, it was stated that
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had written to Mr. Jinnah about the in-
terview he granted him on 16 July, 1947 in which Mr. Jinnah had
advised the Nawab to keep out under any circumstances until 15
August. There was also a reference to the assurances of Mr.
Jinnah that he would not allow Junagadh to starve as “Veraval is
not far from Karachi. ” There was also the following passage in
one of those letters: “Junagadh stands all alone surrounded by
Hindu rulers' territories and British Indian Congress provinces.
We are of course connected by sea with Pakistan. If geographical
position by land was fairly considered, Kutch, Jamnagar and other
territories adjoining Junagadh geographically should be considered
connected with Pakistan as they once in the past actually formed
part of Sind. Though the Muslim population of Junagadh is
nearly 20% and non-Muslims form 80 per cent, 7 lakh Muslims
of Kathiawar survived because of Junagadh. I consider that no
sacrifice is too great to preserve the prestige, honour and rule of
His Highness and to protect Islam and the Muslims of Kathiawar. "
The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was condemned by the
rulers of the other states of Kathiawar. Jam Saheb of Nawanagar
and the rulers of Bhavnagar, Dhrangadhra, Morvi, Porbandar,
Gondal and Wankaner sent their protests. The reply of the Nawab
was in these words: “The Indian Independence Act did not and
does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on
accession. I think we are making an unnecessary fetish of the argu-
ment of geographical contiguity. Even then, this is sufficiently
## p. 919 (#963) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
919
provided by Junagadh's sea coast with several ports which can keep
connection with Pakistan. "
The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar told the Government of India
that if the latter did not take immediate and effective steps to
protect the other Kathiawar states, the people would lose all faith
in the Government of India. There were also rumours that
Pakistan had offered to give military assistance to Junagadh. On
17 September, 1947, the Government of India decided to disperse
around Junagadh troops of the acceding states. However, there
were strict orders that the State of Junagadh was not to be occupied.
On 24 September 1947, the Government of India decided that a
brigade should be suitably dispersed in Kathiawar to protect the
states which had acceded to the Indian Union. It was also de-
cided to send troops to the states of Mangrol and Babariawad. On
September 25, 1947, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a tele-
gram to the Government of India in which it was asserted that the
Nawab of Junagadh had every right to accede to Pakistan regard-
less of the territorial location of his state.
The situation in Junagadh was deteriorating day by day. More
than a lac of Hindus ran away from the state of Junagadh. Law
and order in the whole of Kathiawar practically collapsed. It was
at this stage that the Congress leaders of Kathiawar announced in
Bombay on 25 September, 1947, the establishment of a provisional
Government (Arzi Hakumat) of Junagadh. The provisional Gov-
ernment consisted of 6 members with Samaldas Gandhi as Presi-
dent "with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested
in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15 September
1947. ” When Samaldas Gandhi and his colleague journeyed from
Bombay to Rajkot, they were greeted by large crowds at the way-
side railway stations. They set up their headquarters at Rajkot
and enrolled a large number of volunteers. Junagadh troops entered
the State of Mangrol which had acceded to the Dominion of India.
It was then decided to send Indian troops to occupy the State of
Mangrol. It was found that the Khan of Manavadar was arrest-
ing local leaders and harassing the people. In order to prevent a
flare up in the state, that state was also taken over on 22 October,
1947.
When the Nawab of Junagadh found that help from Pakistan
was not enough to keep him on the throne, he ran away from the
state towards the end of October, 1947. He took with him to
Karachi not only the members of his family but also all his jewellery
and all the available cash in the state treasury. Although the
Nawab ran away, Sir Shah Nawaz continued as Dewan of the state
of Junagadh. On 27 October, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz wrote the
## p. 920 (#964) ############################################
920
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
following letter to Mr. Jinnah: “Our principal sources of revenue,
railways and customs, have gone to the bottom. Food situation is
terribly embarrassing though Pakistan has come to our rescue with
a generous allotment of foodgrains. There has been a harsh treat-
ment of Muslims travelling on Kathiawar railway lines who have
been subjected to several kinds of hardships and humiliations.
Added to this, His Highness and the royal family have had to leave
because our secret service gave us information in advance of seri-
ous consequences to their presence and safety. Though immedi-
ately after accession, His Highness and myself received hundreds of
messages chiefly from Muslims congratulating us on the decision,
today our brethren are indifferent and cold. Muslims of Kathia-
war seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan. ” Again, “No
doubt Your Excellency's Government offered us seven companies
of Crown Police but we felt that if they were to come and be con-
fronted by the vast enemy forces arrayed against us it would be
sheer wastage of human material and equipment. The situation
has therefore so worsened that responsible Muslims and others have
come to press me to seek a solution of the impasse. I do not wish
to say much more. My Senior Member of Council, Capt. Harvey
Jones, must have apprised you of the serious state of things. The
question is delicate but I feel it must be settled honourably to the
satisfaction of all. It is impossible for me to court any further
bloodshed, hardship and persecution of loyal people. Myself I
do not mind what suffering is imposed on me but I do not wish to
take the responsibility any further if it can be avoided for thousands
of His Highness' subjects. I should therefore suggest that you
immediately arrange for a conference of the representatives of the
two Dominions to decide the Junagadh issue. ”
Finding his position precarious, Sir Shah Nawaz opened negotia-
tions with Samaldas Gandhi on 7 November, 1947 through Cap-
tain Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council,
requesting Samaldas Gandhi to take over the reins of Government
and restore law and order in the State. However, the Muslims of
Junagadh prevailed upon Shah Nawaz to hand over the Govern-
ment not to Samaldas Gandhi but to Mr. Buch who at that time
was the Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States.
It was under these circumstances that Mr. Buch took over the
administration of Junagadhon 9 November, 1947. Sir Shah
Nawaz had already left for Karachi a day earlier.
As soon as normal conditions were restored, the Government of
India arranged a referendum of the people of Junagadh with regard
to the question of accession. Shri C. B. Nagarkar, I. C. S. , super-
vised the referendum which took place on 20 February, 1948. Out
## p. 921 (#965) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
921
of a total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their right
of vote. Only 91 voters voted for accession to Pakistan. A refe-
rendum was also held in the States of Mangrol, Manavadar, Baba-
riawad, Bantwa, and Sardargarh. Out of 31,434 votes cast for all
these states, only 39 voted for accession to Pakistan. It was in this
way that the problem of Junagadh was solved.
HYDERABAD
Geographically, Hyderabad occupied a pivotal position in the
heart of India. This State was surrounded by the Central Provin-
ces in the North, Bombay in the West and Madras on the East and
South. Its population was nearly 60 million and the annual reve-
nue was Rs. 26 crores. Its area was more than 82,000 sq. miles.
It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. Although the
Hindus formed more than 85% of the total population of Hyder-
abad, their representation in the Civil Services and the army was
practically nil and the Government machinery was a monopoly of
the Muslims. ' Although it was a very important State, it was not
given any privileged position by the British Government. The lat-
ter asserted its right to intervene in its affairs whenever it consider-
ed to be necessary. After the announcement of 3rd June, 1947
plan by the British Government, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a
firman declaring his intention not to send his representatives to the
Constituent Assembly of either India or Pakistan. He made it
clear that after 15 August, 1947, he would be a completely inde-
pendent sovereign ruler. The intention of the Nizam was to make
Hyderabad a Dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations.
On July 11, 1947, the Nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to meet
Lord Mountbatten. One of the members of the delegation was
Sir Valter Monckton. The discussions centred round three points:
the retrocession of Berar to the Nizam, the grant of Dominion
Status to Hyderabad and the accession of the State of Hyderabad
to the Indian Union. The delegation was told that it was not pos-
sible to hand over Berar to the Nizam. The delegation was also
told that it was not possible to grant Dominion Status to Hyder-
abad. The members of the delegation went to the extent of saying
that if the Nizam was pressed hard, he might join Pakistan. The
delegation was told that the Government would not enter into a
Stand-still agreement without the State of Hyderabad acceding to
India. The Nizam asked for two months to consider his position
and that time was allowed to him. Lord Mountbatten was hope-
ful that ultimately Hyderabad would accede to India.
On 8 August, 1947, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten that
## p. 922 (#966) ############################################
922
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
he could not think of bringing Hyderabad into an organic Union
with either India or Pakistan. He was, however, prepared to enter into
a treaty with India which would conform to all-India standards so
far as railway communications were concerned. Hyderabad would
also contribute an agreed number of troops for the defence of
India. He was prepared to conduct the foreign policy of his State
in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. All this
was to be done on the condition that in the event of a war between
India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral. Hyder-
abad was also to have the right to appoint Agents-General wher-
ever it thought fit. There was also to be a provision in the treaty
that if India seceded from the British Commonwealth, Hyderabad
was free to review the situation de novo. Sir Walter Monckton
resigned as Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam as there was a vio-
lent attack upon him in the Hyderabad press but he was persuaded
to continue by Lord Mountbatten.
The suggestion of Sir Walter Monckton was that the Nizam
could be persuaded to enter into a treaty provided the term “Instru-
ment of Accession” was substituted by the term “Articles of Asso-
ciation. ” However, this was not acceptable to Sardar Patel who
insisted on the Nizam acceding to the Dominion of India. His
view was that if the Nizam was given a special treatment, that
would be mis-interpreted by the rulers of the Indian States who had
already acceded to the Dominion of India. The view of Sardar
Patel was that the Nizam must refer the question of accession to
the people of his State and act according to their decision. Lord
Mountbatten offered to the Nizam to have the referendum under
the supervision of British Officers. However, that offer was reject-
ed by the Nizam. On 18 September, 1947, the Nizam wrote that
short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into
a treaty of association with India. At the same time, the Nizam
contacted Mr. M. A. Jinnah with a view to secure the services of
Sir Zafrullah Khan as the President of his Executive Council.
However, he was not successful in that. The Nizam pointed out
to the Government of India that if Hyderabad acceded to the
Dominion of India, the Muslims who formed about half the popula-
tion of Hyderabad city would not tolerate it and they would create
such a trouble as would not be possible to control. Sir Walter
Monckton wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the attitude of the
Nizam had stiffened and he was not prepared to reconsider the
question of accession. He would prefer the negotiations to break
down rather than accept accession. That was due to the influence
of Pakistan on the Nizam and the latter wanted him to go to
Karachi to have an interview with Mr. Jinnah.
## p. 923 (#967) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
923
There were protracted negotiations in which Sir Walter Monck-
ton and Sir Sultan Ahmed, besides others, participated. Ultimate-
ly, drafts were prepared which were acceptable to the Government
of India and the delegation sent by the Nizam. Those drafts were
taken by the delegation to Hyderabad on 22 October, 1947, for the
approval of the Nizam with the promise that they would come
back on 26 October, 1947. The Nizam referred the matter to his
Executive Council for advice and the Executive Council advised
the Nizam to accept those drafts. The Nizam approved the deci-
sion of the Executive Council but postponed the signing of the
agreement till 26 October, 1947. At about 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing of 26 October, 1947, a crowd estimated at about 25,000 to
30,000 surrounded the houses of Sir Walter Monckton, Nawab of
Chhattari and Sir Sultan Ahmed. They shouted that the delega-
tion would not go to Delhi. The result was that the Nizam order-
ed that the delegation should not go to Delhi. The advice of
Qasim Razvi to the Nizam was that as the hands of the Indian
Union were full with other problems, they would not be able to
take action against Hyderabad and the Nizam could afford not to
accede to the Indian Union. Although Sir Walter Monckton, Sir
Sultan Ahmed and the Nawab of Chhattari suggested to the Nizam
that the advice of Qasim Razvi was likely to lead to disaster, the
Nizam was inclined to listen to Qasim Razvi and hence all of
them tendered their resignations. The Nizam sent a letter to Lord
Mountbatten in which he said that if negotiations with the Govern-
ment of India broke down, he would immediately negotiate and
conclude an agreement with Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the
Nizam had already sent two persons to Karachi and they had come
back with a reply from Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten was very
unhappy about the change in the attitude of the Nizam. He did
not like the replacement of the old delegation by a new one. He
told the members of the new delegation that it was not wise on
the part of the Nizam to threaten to conclude a Stand-still Agree-
ment with Pakistan if he failed to sign one with India. He ex-
pressed the view that the time had come for the Nizam to take a
final decision one way or the other. India would be put to some
inconvenience if no Stand-still Agreement was signed but that would
ultimately prove to be disastrous for the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten tried to remove the impression that India was weak and
hence could not give full attention to the problem of Hyderabad.
Kasim Razvi also visited Delhi and met Sardar Patel. In his
interviews, he declared that Hyderabad would never surrender
her independence and if the Government of India insisted on a
plebiscite, the sword would be the final arbiter.
a
## p. 924 (#968) ############################################
924
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In spite of the difficulties in the way, a Stand-still Agreement
was signed between the Government of India and the Nizam on
29 November, 1947. It was provided that until new arrangements
were made, all the agreements and administrative arrangements
on matters of common concern, including defence, external affairs
and communications which had existed between the Crown Repre-
sentative and the Nizam before the transfer of power, would be
continued as between the Government of India and the Nizam.
The Government of India and the Nizam also agreed to appoint
their agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively and give them
every facility for the discharge of their functions. The Govern-
ment of India was not to exercise any paramountcy function in
their relations with Hyderabad. Nothing in the Agreement was
to create, in favour of either party, any right continuing after its
termination, or derogate from any right which, but for the Agree-
ment, would have been exercisable by either party after the date
of its termination. Any dispute arising out of the Agreement was
to be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of
the parties and an umpire to be selected by those arbitrators. The
Agreement was to come into force immediately and was to remain
in force for a period of one year.
The Stand-still Agreement was taken in different lights. Lord
Mountbatten hoped that the Agreement would provide a basis for
a satisfactory long term solution. He hoped that before the Stand-
still Agreement expired, it would be possible for Hyderabad to
accede to India. The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the
Agreement would purchase communal peace in the south for at
least one year. Sardar Patel was doubtful about the bona fides of
the Government of Hyderabad. The Nizam and his advisers took
the Agreement as something which gave them breathing space in
which they were to secure the withdrawal of the Indian troops from
Hyderabad and ultimately become independent.
Shri K. M. Munshi was appointed as India's Agent-General in
Hyderabad. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Nizam Govern-
ment towards him was positively hostile from the very beginning.
He was not given even a building for his residence or office. Ulti-
mately, two of the buildings belonging to the Indian army were
put at his disposal.
The Nizam began to press for the speedy withdrawal of the
Indian troops and the supply of arms and ammunitions for the
Hyderabad army and police. The Nizam also issued two Ordi-
nances by which he put restrictions on the export of all precious
metals from Hyderabad to India and also made Indian currency
as not legal tender in the Hyderabad State. The Government of
## p. 925 (#969) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
925
SO
Hyderabad also advanced a loan of Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan in the
form of Government of India's Securities. The Government of
India protested against these developments but nothing was done to
remove the objection. At this time, the activities of the Razakars
increased tremendously. Kasim Razvi and his followers made all
kinds of objectionable speeches with the object of inflaming com-
munal passions inside and outside of Hyderabad. Razvi declared
that the Razakars were the liberators of the Muslims of India. The
Razakars began to attack the neighbouring provinces like Madras,
Bombay, and the Central Provinces. The situation became
serious that the common saying was that the Razakars ruled by
day and the Communists ruled by night. The Government of
Madras asked for military help to save its people from the raids
of Razakars. This state of affairs continued for many months.
Shri K. M. Munshi was practically a prisoner in his house in
Hyderabad. El Edroos, the Commander-in-Chief for the Hydera-
bad forces, called upon the people in a radio talk to be ready for
any emergency. In his speech delivered on 31 March, 1948 on the
occasion of the inauguration of the Hyderabad Weapons Week,
Kasim Razvi urged the Muslims of Hyderabad not to sheathe their
swords until their objective for Islamic supremacy was achieved.
He asked them to march forward with the Koran in one hand and
the swor in the er to hound out the enemy.
He also declared
that "the forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be
columnists in
any
showdown. ” On 12 April, 1948,
Kasim Razvi declared, “The day is not far off when the waves of
the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our Sovereign. " He
went to the extent of saying that he would plant the Asaf Jahi Flag
on the Red Fort in Delhi. When Laik Ali, the new Prime Minister
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
To quote Sardar Patel, “You know as well as I do where power
resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie
in Hyderabad. The gentleman (Kasim Razvi) who seems to
dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically
stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it will find
nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crores of Hindus.
If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future
of the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly be-
cause I do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The
Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the
case of other States. No other way is possible.
No other way is possible. We cannot agree
to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the
very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At
our fifth
## p. 926 (#970) ############################################
926
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek
a friendly solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to
Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an inde-
pendent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail. ”
The view of Lord Mountbatten was that if he could persuade the
Nizam to visit Delhi, it would be possible to bring him round and
with that object in view, he sent him an invitation to visit Delhi.
However, that invitation was refused by the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten sent his Press Attache to Hyderabad to meet the Nizam,
study the situation and make a report to him. The report sub-
mitted by the Press Attache was that the Nizam was the keyman
in the situation and nothing was being done without his approval.
He also reported that the Nizam was in a mood of aggressive
fatalism.
The situation on the border began to worsen. On the evening
of 22 May, 1948, the mail train from Madras to Bombay was
attacked at Gangapur Station inside the Hyderabad State. The
attack was made by a party of men equipped with daggers, hockey
sticks and lathis. The Government of India took a very serious
view of the matter.
Lord Mountbatten made very serious efforts to settle the matter
before his departure in June, 1948. He put personal pressure on
Sardar Patel to agree to the four changes suggested by the Hydera-
bad delegation. In spite of that, the Nizam put forward other
demands which were not acceptable to the Government of India
and the result was that in spite of his best efforts, Lord Mountbatten
left India on 21 June, 1948 without solving the Hyderabad problem.
After the departure of Lord Mountbatten, the relations between
India and Hyderabad began to worsen. Charges of border raids
and breaches of the Stand-still Agreement were made on both sides.
Sidney Cotton, an Australian, was employed by the Hyderabad
Government to smuggle arms and ammunitions into Hyderabad.
The Government of Pakistan began to cash a portion of the Rs. 20
crores of the Government of India Securities which the Govern-
ment of Hyderabad had offered to the Government of Pakistan as
a loan. There was a reign of terror. People were being killed and
their eyes were being taken out. Women were being raped and
houses were being burnt down in large numbers. The situation
was becoming intolerable. Both the press and the public opinion
in India accused the Government of India of inaction in the face
of repeated violations of Indian territory. The stories brought by
the evacuees from Hyderabad made the people indignant. Attacks
on the through trains created panic. It was under these circum-
stances that the Government of India decided to take action.
## p. 927 (#971) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
927
In the early hours of 13 September, 1948, Indian forces com-
manded by Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri under the direction of
Lt. General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji who was then the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, entered the
Hyderabad State. There was some stiff resistance on the first
and second day and after that the same collapsed. On the evening
of 17 September, 1948, the Hyderabad Army surrendered. On
18 September, 1948, the Indian troops entered Hyderabad city.
The police action lasted for 108 hours. It was learnt that if action
had not been taken on 13 September, 1948, Lt. T. T. Moore who
was captured with his jeep full of explosives, would have destroyed
all the important bridges in the State and it would have been very
difficult for the Indian army to move forward.
On 18 September, 1948, Major-General Chaudhuri took charge
as Military Governor. On 19 September, Kasim Razvi
arrested. The Razakars were disbanded and many of them were
detained under the Public Safety Regulations. Strong action was
taken against the Communists and their resistance was crushed.
The administration under Major-General Chauduri lasted up to
December, 1949 when Shri M. K. Vellodi, I. C. S. , took over as
Chief Minister. In 1950, four representatives of the Hyderabad
State Congress were appoined as Ministers. In March, 1952,
general elections were held and a Congress Ministry was installed
with the Nizam as a constitutional head. In 1956 was passed the
States Reorganisation Act by which the State of Hyderabad was
split up and it ceased to exist. Most of its territories went to the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
was
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had strategic importance on
account of its international boundaries. To the East was Tibet,
to the North-East was the Sinkiang province of China and to the
North-West was Afghanistan. Gilgit was a part of the territory
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The majority of the popu-
lation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of Muslims
although the Buddhists were in majority in Ladakh. At the be-
ginning of 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh was the ruler of the State
and Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was its Prime Minister.
After the announcement of June 3 Plan, Lord Mountbatten
visited Kashmir and for four days discussed the question of acces-
sion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Maharaja Hari
Singh. He told him that independence was not practicable and
the State would not be recognised as a Dominion by the British
## p. 928 (#972) ############################################
928
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Government. He gave an assurance to the Maharaja that up to
15 August, 1947, he could join any Dominion and there would be
no difficulty. Even if he acceded to Pakistan, India would not
raise any objection. However, it was desirable to ascertain the
wishes of the people before acceding to any Dominion as the
majority of its people were Muslims. Lord Mountbatten failed in
his mission as the Maharaja refused to commit himself. After 15
August, 1947, Lord Ismay went to Srinagar and tried to persuade
the Maharaja to join one Dominion or the other but his mission
also failed.
It cannot be denied that it was not easy for the Maharaja to
make a decision. He was himself a Hindu and he would not like
to join Pakistan at once. Moreover, he was not sure of the fate
of his Hindu subjects in the event of his joining Pakistan. There
was also the possibility of the opposition from the National Con-
ference which was the most powerful and vocal organisation in the
State. If he acceded to India, there was also the possibility of ad-
verse reactions in Gilgit and certain other areas which were contigu-
ous to Pakistan. Moreover, the road communications were with
Pakistan. Till the declaration of the Radcliffe Award, there was
no land communication between India and the State of Jammu
and Kashmir. Moreover, Maharaja Hari Singh was thinking in
terms of becoming an independent ruler.
Shortly before 15 August, 1947, Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was re-
placed by Major-General Janak Singh as Prime Minister. The
Government of Jammu and Kashmir announced its intention of
entering into Stand-still Agreements both with India and Pakistan.
India was not enthusiastic about it even after the announcement of
the Radcliffe Award which connected India with the State by road.
Pakistan signed a Stand-still Agreement but with an ulterior motive.
In spite of the Agreement, the Pakistan authorities cut off the sup-
ply of food, petrol and other essential commodities. Restrictions
were put on the transit of travel between Kashmir and Pakistan.
Goods belonging to the State lying in the towns of Pakistan were
not allowed to be transported to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The State had practically no petrol for its transport organisation.
Military pressure was put on Jammu and Kashmir to accede to
Pakistan. Mr. M. A. Jinnah sent his British Military Secre-
tary thrice to Srinagar to bring about Kashmir's accession to
Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah also wrote to Maharaja to allow him to
spend the summer in Kashmir on account of his bad health and
offered to make his own arrangements. Major Shah was sent to
Kashmir to arouse the people in favour of Pakistan and also to
intimidate the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. There were hit
## p. 929 (#973) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
929
o
ē
)
th
a
ער
in
and run border raids on the State. It was under these circum-
stances that Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as the
Prime Minister of the State.
On 15 October, 1947, the new Prime Minister complained to the
British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken
the Stand-still Agreement by discontinuing the supply of essential
articles and by stopping, without any reason, the railway service
from Sialkot to Jammu. He also pointed out that the whole of
the State border from Gurdaspur to Gilgit was threatened with
invasion and the same had already started in Poonch. He request-
ed the British Prime Minister to advise the Government of Pakistan
to deal fairly with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However,
he got no reply. On 18 October, 1947, a protest was sent to the
Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan against the
breaches of the Stand-still Agreement and the raids on the State.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, sent a reply on
20 October, 1947 in which he protested against the tone and langu-
age of the communication.
The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October, 1947.
The raiders included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis and the
soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave. They were led by regular
officers who knew Kashmir well. They advanced from Abbottabad
in North-Western Frontier Province along the Jhelum Valley Road.
They captured Garhi and Domel and arrived at the gates of
Muzaffarabad. All the Muslims in the State Battalion at Muzaffara-
bad deserted and acted as advance guard to the raiders' column.
They marched towards Baramula, along the road leading to Srinagar.
All the Muslims in the State Forces deserted and joined the raiders.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the State Forces, gather-
ed together about 150 men and proceeded towards Uri. He en-
gaged the raiders for two days and in the rear-guard action destroy-
ed the Uri Bridge. Not only the Brigadier himself but all his men
were cut to pieces in the battle. On 24 October, 1947, the raiders
captured the Mahura Power House which supplied electricity to
Srinagar, and that plunged Srinagar in darkness. The raiders de-
clared that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October, 1947 and
celebrate the Id celebrations in the Srinagar mosque.
Such was the critical situation when the Government of India
received an appeal for help from the Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir on 24 October, 1947. Even earlier than that, Field
Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, had received a
message from Pakistan Army Headquarters giving information
about the advance of the raiders and their probable destination.
Although the information was passed on to the Government of
b
di
ci
C.
に
12
1
## p. 930 (#974) ############################################
930
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
India, no action was taken on it. Even when the appeal came
from the Maharja on 24 October, no immediate action was taken.
On the morning of 25 October, 1947, a meeting of the Defence
Committee was held under the presidentship of Lord Mountbatten.
It was decided that no immediate action be taken by the Govern-
ment of India and Shri V. P. Menon be sent to Srinagar immediate-
ly to study the situation on the spot and report to the Government
of India. Shri V. P. Menon immediately left by plane and reached
Srinagar. From the aerodrome, he went straight to the residence
of Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan. The latter put all the
facts before Shri V. P. Menon about the situation at that time. It
was decided to send immediately the Maharaja from Srinagar to
Jammu. There were rumours at night that the raiders had infiltrat-
ed into Srinagar and hence it was not considered safe to remain in
the city for the night and hence, Shri V. P. Menon and Prime
Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan immediately went to the aerodrome
and early in the morning of 26 October the plane left Srinagar
and reached Delhi. Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan met
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister
Sardar Patel and apprised them of the serious and dangerous situ-
ation in the State. He solicited army help and made it clear that
the army must be flown at once, otherwise the whole town of
Srinagar would be completely destroyed. He was told that it was
not possible to send the army at a moment's notice but that did
not impress him. Prime Minister Mahajan put his case in these
words to the Indian leaders: “Give army, take accession and give
whatever powers you want to the popular party, but the army
must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate
terms with Mr. Jinnah, as the city must be saved”. On this Prime
Minister Nehru flew into a rage and asked Prime Minister Mahajan
to go away. It was at this moment that Sheikh Abdullah who
was staying in the Prime Minister's house and was over-hearing
the talks, sent a slip of paper to Prime Minister Nehru. Prime
Minister Nehru read that slip of paper and his attitude was com-
pletely changed. Sheikh Abdullah was against the accession of
Kashmir to Pakistan and there was no love last between him and
Mr. Jinnah. He wanted, as desired by his party, the accession of
the State to India, but he was also keen that power should go in
his hands and the Maharaja should become a constitutional head.
The result of the negotiations on the morning of 26 October, 1947
was that at the persistent request of Prime Minister Mahajan, the
Indian Cabinet agreed to accept the accession of the State and send
its army to Srinagar on the morning of 27 October, 1947 to defend
the State. Shri V. P. Menon again went to Jammu accompanied
## p. 931 (#975) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
931
by Prime Minister Mahajan and after getting the Instrument of
Accession from the Maharaja, he flew back to Delhi. Sardar Patel
was waiting at the aerodrome and both of them went straight to a
meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that
evening. There was a long discussion and ultimately it was decided
that the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted,
subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State
when the law and order situation allowed. It was also decided
that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.
This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah. It must
be pointed out that Lord Mountbatten and the 3 British Chiefs of
Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks
involved in the operation for which there was hardly any pre-
paration.
In the early hours of the morning of 27 October, 1947, more
than 100 civilian aircraft and Royal Indian Air Force planes were
mobilised to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. It
must be admitted that it was the heroism and enthusiasm shown
by the civilian and Royal Indian Air Force pilots and the ground
ciews that made the air-lift a success. Some of the pilots did
several sorties in the course of the day. It was in this way that the
timely arrival of the Indian forces in the morning of 27 October,
1947 saved Srinagar.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was impatient with what was happening in
Kashmir. His Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was already
in Srinagar but after the arrival of the Indian troops, he was arrest-
ed and sent back to Pakistan. When Mr. M. A. Jinnah heard
about the acceptance of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by
India and the arrival of the Indian troops in Srinagar, he gave
orders to General Gracey, the Acting Commanding-in-Chief of the
Pakistan Army, to send Pak troops to Kashmir but the General re-
fused to do so without the approval of Field Marshal Auchinleck.
The Field Marshal also flew to Lahore on the morning of 28
October, 1947 and explained to Mr. Jinnah that the State of Jammu
and Kashmir had acceded to India and if Pak troops entered
Kashmir, there was every likelihood of a war between the two
countries and if that happened, all British Officers serving in the
Pakistan Army would be automatically and immediately with-
drawn. It was under these circumstances that Mr. Jinnah can-
celled his previous order for Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir.
On 30 October, 1947, a statement was issued by the Govern-
ment of Pakistan in which it was stated that the accession of
Kashmir to India was "based on fraud and violence and as such
cannot be recognised”. It was also stated therein that the State
## p. 932 (#976) ############################################
932
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
troops were the first to attack the Muslims in the State and the
Muslim villages on the Pakistan border and that provoked the
raiders to attack the State. It was also at this time that Pakistan
established her control over Gilgit which was a part of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir.
On 1st November, 1947, Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay
flew to Lahore and had a long conference with Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
The latter contended that the accession of Kashmir to India was
brought about by violence and the reply of Lord Mountbatten was
that the violence had come from the tribal raiders. Lord Mount-
batten suggested a plebiscite under the auspices of the United
Nations but Mr. Jinnah pressed for a plebiscite under the joint con-
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan. Many other things were discussed at the meeting but nothing
came out of it and Lord Mountbatten came back to Delhi. On
4 November, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan broadcast from
Lahore in which he said that the accession of Kashmir to India
was a fraud perpetrated on its people by its cowardly ruler with
the aggressive help of the Government of India.
Major-General Kalwant Singh was put in charge of the Military
operations in Kashmir. On 8 November, 1947, his forces occupied
Baramula. When the Indian troops entered the city, it was found
that the tribesmen had taken away all its wealth and women. Out
of the female population of 14,000, only about 1,000 were left.
The destruction of Baramula could be compared with the sacking
of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. By 11 November, 1947, Indian
troops reached the heights of Uri and the tribesmen were in so great
hurry that they gave up Tangmarg and Gulmarg without firing a
shot. One cannot help admiring the courage with which Air
Commodore Mehr Singh flew Major-General Thimmayya over an
unchartered mountainous route more than 23,000 feet above the
sea level and landed him safely at Leh on an improvised air strip.
It was in this way that Leh and Ladakh valleys were cleared from
the raiders by Major-General Thimmayya. The credit of recover-
ing Poonch goes to Major-General Atma Singh.
It was on the persuasion of Lord Mountbatten that the Govern-
ment of India took their complaint to the United Nations against
the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire was order-
ed with effect from 1st January, 1949. Many efforts were made
by the United Nations to resolve the dispute between India and
Pakistan but they have not succeeded.
In 1965, Pakistan sent her infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley
and then attacked the Chhamb area.
ran away from the state, many letters fell into the hands of the
Government of India and in one of those letters, it was stated that
Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto had written to Mr. Jinnah about the in-
terview he granted him on 16 July, 1947 in which Mr. Jinnah had
advised the Nawab to keep out under any circumstances until 15
August. There was also a reference to the assurances of Mr.
Jinnah that he would not allow Junagadh to starve as “Veraval is
not far from Karachi. ” There was also the following passage in
one of those letters: “Junagadh stands all alone surrounded by
Hindu rulers' territories and British Indian Congress provinces.
We are of course connected by sea with Pakistan. If geographical
position by land was fairly considered, Kutch, Jamnagar and other
territories adjoining Junagadh geographically should be considered
connected with Pakistan as they once in the past actually formed
part of Sind. Though the Muslim population of Junagadh is
nearly 20% and non-Muslims form 80 per cent, 7 lakh Muslims
of Kathiawar survived because of Junagadh. I consider that no
sacrifice is too great to preserve the prestige, honour and rule of
His Highness and to protect Islam and the Muslims of Kathiawar. "
The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was condemned by the
rulers of the other states of Kathiawar. Jam Saheb of Nawanagar
and the rulers of Bhavnagar, Dhrangadhra, Morvi, Porbandar,
Gondal and Wankaner sent their protests. The reply of the Nawab
was in these words: “The Indian Independence Act did not and
does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on
accession. I think we are making an unnecessary fetish of the argu-
ment of geographical contiguity. Even then, this is sufficiently
## p. 919 (#963) ############################################
STATE OF JUNAGADH
919
provided by Junagadh's sea coast with several ports which can keep
connection with Pakistan. "
The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar told the Government of India
that if the latter did not take immediate and effective steps to
protect the other Kathiawar states, the people would lose all faith
in the Government of India. There were also rumours that
Pakistan had offered to give military assistance to Junagadh. On
17 September, 1947, the Government of India decided to disperse
around Junagadh troops of the acceding states. However, there
were strict orders that the State of Junagadh was not to be occupied.
On 24 September 1947, the Government of India decided that a
brigade should be suitably dispersed in Kathiawar to protect the
states which had acceded to the Indian Union. It was also de-
cided to send troops to the states of Mangrol and Babariawad. On
September 25, 1947, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent a tele-
gram to the Government of India in which it was asserted that the
Nawab of Junagadh had every right to accede to Pakistan regard-
less of the territorial location of his state.
The situation in Junagadh was deteriorating day by day. More
than a lac of Hindus ran away from the state of Junagadh. Law
and order in the whole of Kathiawar practically collapsed. It was
at this stage that the Congress leaders of Kathiawar announced in
Bombay on 25 September, 1947, the establishment of a provisional
Government (Arzi Hakumat) of Junagadh. The provisional Gov-
ernment consisted of 6 members with Samaldas Gandhi as Presi-
dent "with all power, authority and jurisdiction heretofore vested
in and exercised by the Nawab of Junagadh prior to 15 September
1947. ” When Samaldas Gandhi and his colleague journeyed from
Bombay to Rajkot, they were greeted by large crowds at the way-
side railway stations. They set up their headquarters at Rajkot
and enrolled a large number of volunteers. Junagadh troops entered
the State of Mangrol which had acceded to the Dominion of India.
It was then decided to send Indian troops to occupy the State of
Mangrol. It was found that the Khan of Manavadar was arrest-
ing local leaders and harassing the people. In order to prevent a
flare up in the state, that state was also taken over on 22 October,
1947.
When the Nawab of Junagadh found that help from Pakistan
was not enough to keep him on the throne, he ran away from the
state towards the end of October, 1947. He took with him to
Karachi not only the members of his family but also all his jewellery
and all the available cash in the state treasury. Although the
Nawab ran away, Sir Shah Nawaz continued as Dewan of the state
of Junagadh. On 27 October, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz wrote the
## p. 920 (#964) ############################################
920
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
following letter to Mr. Jinnah: “Our principal sources of revenue,
railways and customs, have gone to the bottom. Food situation is
terribly embarrassing though Pakistan has come to our rescue with
a generous allotment of foodgrains. There has been a harsh treat-
ment of Muslims travelling on Kathiawar railway lines who have
been subjected to several kinds of hardships and humiliations.
Added to this, His Highness and the royal family have had to leave
because our secret service gave us information in advance of seri-
ous consequences to their presence and safety. Though immedi-
ately after accession, His Highness and myself received hundreds of
messages chiefly from Muslims congratulating us on the decision,
today our brethren are indifferent and cold. Muslims of Kathia-
war seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan. ” Again, “No
doubt Your Excellency's Government offered us seven companies
of Crown Police but we felt that if they were to come and be con-
fronted by the vast enemy forces arrayed against us it would be
sheer wastage of human material and equipment. The situation
has therefore so worsened that responsible Muslims and others have
come to press me to seek a solution of the impasse. I do not wish
to say much more. My Senior Member of Council, Capt. Harvey
Jones, must have apprised you of the serious state of things. The
question is delicate but I feel it must be settled honourably to the
satisfaction of all. It is impossible for me to court any further
bloodshed, hardship and persecution of loyal people. Myself I
do not mind what suffering is imposed on me but I do not wish to
take the responsibility any further if it can be avoided for thousands
of His Highness' subjects. I should therefore suggest that you
immediately arrange for a conference of the representatives of the
two Dominions to decide the Junagadh issue. ”
Finding his position precarious, Sir Shah Nawaz opened negotia-
tions with Samaldas Gandhi on 7 November, 1947 through Cap-
tain Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council,
requesting Samaldas Gandhi to take over the reins of Government
and restore law and order in the State. However, the Muslims of
Junagadh prevailed upon Shah Nawaz to hand over the Govern-
ment not to Samaldas Gandhi but to Mr. Buch who at that time
was the Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States.
It was under these circumstances that Mr. Buch took over the
administration of Junagadhon 9 November, 1947. Sir Shah
Nawaz had already left for Karachi a day earlier.
As soon as normal conditions were restored, the Government of
India arranged a referendum of the people of Junagadh with regard
to the question of accession. Shri C. B. Nagarkar, I. C. S. , super-
vised the referendum which took place on 20 February, 1948. Out
## p. 921 (#965) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
921
of a total of 2,01,457 registered voters, 1,90,870 exercised their right
of vote. Only 91 voters voted for accession to Pakistan. A refe-
rendum was also held in the States of Mangrol, Manavadar, Baba-
riawad, Bantwa, and Sardargarh. Out of 31,434 votes cast for all
these states, only 39 voted for accession to Pakistan. It was in this
way that the problem of Junagadh was solved.
HYDERABAD
Geographically, Hyderabad occupied a pivotal position in the
heart of India. This State was surrounded by the Central Provin-
ces in the North, Bombay in the West and Madras on the East and
South. Its population was nearly 60 million and the annual reve-
nue was Rs. 26 crores. Its area was more than 82,000 sq. miles.
It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. Although the
Hindus formed more than 85% of the total population of Hyder-
abad, their representation in the Civil Services and the army was
practically nil and the Government machinery was a monopoly of
the Muslims. ' Although it was a very important State, it was not
given any privileged position by the British Government. The lat-
ter asserted its right to intervene in its affairs whenever it consider-
ed to be necessary. After the announcement of 3rd June, 1947
plan by the British Government, the Nizam of Hyderabad issued a
firman declaring his intention not to send his representatives to the
Constituent Assembly of either India or Pakistan. He made it
clear that after 15 August, 1947, he would be a completely inde-
pendent sovereign ruler. The intention of the Nizam was to make
Hyderabad a Dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations.
On July 11, 1947, the Nizam sent a delegation to Delhi to meet
Lord Mountbatten. One of the members of the delegation was
Sir Valter Monckton. The discussions centred round three points:
the retrocession of Berar to the Nizam, the grant of Dominion
Status to Hyderabad and the accession of the State of Hyderabad
to the Indian Union. The delegation was told that it was not pos-
sible to hand over Berar to the Nizam. The delegation was also
told that it was not possible to grant Dominion Status to Hyder-
abad. The members of the delegation went to the extent of saying
that if the Nizam was pressed hard, he might join Pakistan. The
delegation was told that the Government would not enter into a
Stand-still agreement without the State of Hyderabad acceding to
India. The Nizam asked for two months to consider his position
and that time was allowed to him. Lord Mountbatten was hope-
ful that ultimately Hyderabad would accede to India.
On 8 August, 1947, the Nizam wrote to Lord Mountbatten that
## p. 922 (#966) ############################################
922
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
he could not think of bringing Hyderabad into an organic Union
with either India or Pakistan. He was, however, prepared to enter into
a treaty with India which would conform to all-India standards so
far as railway communications were concerned. Hyderabad would
also contribute an agreed number of troops for the defence of
India. He was prepared to conduct the foreign policy of his State
in general conformity with the foreign policy of India. All this
was to be done on the condition that in the event of a war between
India and Pakistan, Hyderabad would remain neutral. Hyder-
abad was also to have the right to appoint Agents-General wher-
ever it thought fit. There was also to be a provision in the treaty
that if India seceded from the British Commonwealth, Hyderabad
was free to review the situation de novo. Sir Walter Monckton
resigned as Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam as there was a vio-
lent attack upon him in the Hyderabad press but he was persuaded
to continue by Lord Mountbatten.
The suggestion of Sir Walter Monckton was that the Nizam
could be persuaded to enter into a treaty provided the term “Instru-
ment of Accession” was substituted by the term “Articles of Asso-
ciation. ” However, this was not acceptable to Sardar Patel who
insisted on the Nizam acceding to the Dominion of India. His
view was that if the Nizam was given a special treatment, that
would be mis-interpreted by the rulers of the Indian States who had
already acceded to the Dominion of India. The view of Sardar
Patel was that the Nizam must refer the question of accession to
the people of his State and act according to their decision. Lord
Mountbatten offered to the Nizam to have the referendum under
the supervision of British Officers. However, that offer was reject-
ed by the Nizam. On 18 September, 1947, the Nizam wrote that
short of accession, Hyderabad was ready and willing to enter into
a treaty of association with India. At the same time, the Nizam
contacted Mr. M. A. Jinnah with a view to secure the services of
Sir Zafrullah Khan as the President of his Executive Council.
However, he was not successful in that. The Nizam pointed out
to the Government of India that if Hyderabad acceded to the
Dominion of India, the Muslims who formed about half the popula-
tion of Hyderabad city would not tolerate it and they would create
such a trouble as would not be possible to control. Sir Walter
Monckton wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the attitude of the
Nizam had stiffened and he was not prepared to reconsider the
question of accession. He would prefer the negotiations to break
down rather than accept accession. That was due to the influence
of Pakistan on the Nizam and the latter wanted him to go to
Karachi to have an interview with Mr. Jinnah.
## p. 923 (#967) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
923
There were protracted negotiations in which Sir Walter Monck-
ton and Sir Sultan Ahmed, besides others, participated. Ultimate-
ly, drafts were prepared which were acceptable to the Government
of India and the delegation sent by the Nizam. Those drafts were
taken by the delegation to Hyderabad on 22 October, 1947, for the
approval of the Nizam with the promise that they would come
back on 26 October, 1947. The Nizam referred the matter to his
Executive Council for advice and the Executive Council advised
the Nizam to accept those drafts. The Nizam approved the deci-
sion of the Executive Council but postponed the signing of the
agreement till 26 October, 1947. At about 3 o'clock in the morn-
ing of 26 October, 1947, a crowd estimated at about 25,000 to
30,000 surrounded the houses of Sir Walter Monckton, Nawab of
Chhattari and Sir Sultan Ahmed. They shouted that the delega-
tion would not go to Delhi. The result was that the Nizam order-
ed that the delegation should not go to Delhi. The advice of
Qasim Razvi to the Nizam was that as the hands of the Indian
Union were full with other problems, they would not be able to
take action against Hyderabad and the Nizam could afford not to
accede to the Indian Union. Although Sir Walter Monckton, Sir
Sultan Ahmed and the Nawab of Chhattari suggested to the Nizam
that the advice of Qasim Razvi was likely to lead to disaster, the
Nizam was inclined to listen to Qasim Razvi and hence all of
them tendered their resignations. The Nizam sent a letter to Lord
Mountbatten in which he said that if negotiations with the Govern-
ment of India broke down, he would immediately negotiate and
conclude an agreement with Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the
Nizam had already sent two persons to Karachi and they had come
back with a reply from Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten was very
unhappy about the change in the attitude of the Nizam. He did
not like the replacement of the old delegation by a new one. He
told the members of the new delegation that it was not wise on
the part of the Nizam to threaten to conclude a Stand-still Agree-
ment with Pakistan if he failed to sign one with India. He ex-
pressed the view that the time had come for the Nizam to take a
final decision one way or the other. India would be put to some
inconvenience if no Stand-still Agreement was signed but that would
ultimately prove to be disastrous for the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten tried to remove the impression that India was weak and
hence could not give full attention to the problem of Hyderabad.
Kasim Razvi also visited Delhi and met Sardar Patel. In his
interviews, he declared that Hyderabad would never surrender
her independence and if the Government of India insisted on a
plebiscite, the sword would be the final arbiter.
a
## p. 924 (#968) ############################################
924
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
In spite of the difficulties in the way, a Stand-still Agreement
was signed between the Government of India and the Nizam on
29 November, 1947. It was provided that until new arrangements
were made, all the agreements and administrative arrangements
on matters of common concern, including defence, external affairs
and communications which had existed between the Crown Repre-
sentative and the Nizam before the transfer of power, would be
continued as between the Government of India and the Nizam.
The Government of India and the Nizam also agreed to appoint
their agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively and give them
every facility for the discharge of their functions. The Govern-
ment of India was not to exercise any paramountcy function in
their relations with Hyderabad. Nothing in the Agreement was
to create, in favour of either party, any right continuing after its
termination, or derogate from any right which, but for the Agree-
ment, would have been exercisable by either party after the date
of its termination. Any dispute arising out of the Agreement was
to be referred to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of
the parties and an umpire to be selected by those arbitrators. The
Agreement was to come into force immediately and was to remain
in force for a period of one year.
The Stand-still Agreement was taken in different lights. Lord
Mountbatten hoped that the Agreement would provide a basis for
a satisfactory long term solution. He hoped that before the Stand-
still Agreement expired, it would be possible for Hyderabad to
accede to India. The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the
Agreement would purchase communal peace in the south for at
least one year. Sardar Patel was doubtful about the bona fides of
the Government of Hyderabad. The Nizam and his advisers took
the Agreement as something which gave them breathing space in
which they were to secure the withdrawal of the Indian troops from
Hyderabad and ultimately become independent.
Shri K. M. Munshi was appointed as India's Agent-General in
Hyderabad. Unfortunately, the attitude of the Nizam Govern-
ment towards him was positively hostile from the very beginning.
He was not given even a building for his residence or office. Ulti-
mately, two of the buildings belonging to the Indian army were
put at his disposal.
The Nizam began to press for the speedy withdrawal of the
Indian troops and the supply of arms and ammunitions for the
Hyderabad army and police. The Nizam also issued two Ordi-
nances by which he put restrictions on the export of all precious
metals from Hyderabad to India and also made Indian currency
as not legal tender in the Hyderabad State. The Government of
## p. 925 (#969) ############################################
STATE OF HYDERABAD
925
SO
Hyderabad also advanced a loan of Rs. 20 crores to Pakistan in the
form of Government of India's Securities. The Government of
India protested against these developments but nothing was done to
remove the objection. At this time, the activities of the Razakars
increased tremendously. Kasim Razvi and his followers made all
kinds of objectionable speeches with the object of inflaming com-
munal passions inside and outside of Hyderabad. Razvi declared
that the Razakars were the liberators of the Muslims of India. The
Razakars began to attack the neighbouring provinces like Madras,
Bombay, and the Central Provinces. The situation became
serious that the common saying was that the Razakars ruled by
day and the Communists ruled by night. The Government of
Madras asked for military help to save its people from the raids
of Razakars. This state of affairs continued for many months.
Shri K. M. Munshi was practically a prisoner in his house in
Hyderabad. El Edroos, the Commander-in-Chief for the Hydera-
bad forces, called upon the people in a radio talk to be ready for
any emergency. In his speech delivered on 31 March, 1948 on the
occasion of the inauguration of the Hyderabad Weapons Week,
Kasim Razvi urged the Muslims of Hyderabad not to sheathe their
swords until their objective for Islamic supremacy was achieved.
He asked them to march forward with the Koran in one hand and
the swor in the er to hound out the enemy.
He also declared
that "the forty-five million Muslims in the Indian Union would be
columnists in
any
showdown. ” On 12 April, 1948,
Kasim Razvi declared, “The day is not far off when the waves of
the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our Sovereign. " He
went to the extent of saying that he would plant the Asaf Jahi Flag
on the Red Fort in Delhi. When Laik Ali, the new Prime Minister
of Hyderabad, met Sardar Patel, the latter referred to the speech
of Kasim Razvi and asserted that such things could not be tolerated.
To quote Sardar Patel, “You know as well as I do where power
resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie
in Hyderabad. The gentleman (Kasim Razvi) who seems to
dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically
stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad it will find
nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crores of Hindus.
If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future
of the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly be-
cause I do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The
Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the
case of other States. No other way is possible.
No other way is possible. We cannot agree
to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the
very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At
our fifth
## p. 926 (#970) ############################################
926
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek
a friendly solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to
Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an inde-
pendent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail. ”
The view of Lord Mountbatten was that if he could persuade the
Nizam to visit Delhi, it would be possible to bring him round and
with that object in view, he sent him an invitation to visit Delhi.
However, that invitation was refused by the Nizam. Lord Mount-
batten sent his Press Attache to Hyderabad to meet the Nizam,
study the situation and make a report to him. The report sub-
mitted by the Press Attache was that the Nizam was the keyman
in the situation and nothing was being done without his approval.
He also reported that the Nizam was in a mood of aggressive
fatalism.
The situation on the border began to worsen. On the evening
of 22 May, 1948, the mail train from Madras to Bombay was
attacked at Gangapur Station inside the Hyderabad State. The
attack was made by a party of men equipped with daggers, hockey
sticks and lathis. The Government of India took a very serious
view of the matter.
Lord Mountbatten made very serious efforts to settle the matter
before his departure in June, 1948. He put personal pressure on
Sardar Patel to agree to the four changes suggested by the Hydera-
bad delegation. In spite of that, the Nizam put forward other
demands which were not acceptable to the Government of India
and the result was that in spite of his best efforts, Lord Mountbatten
left India on 21 June, 1948 without solving the Hyderabad problem.
After the departure of Lord Mountbatten, the relations between
India and Hyderabad began to worsen. Charges of border raids
and breaches of the Stand-still Agreement were made on both sides.
Sidney Cotton, an Australian, was employed by the Hyderabad
Government to smuggle arms and ammunitions into Hyderabad.
The Government of Pakistan began to cash a portion of the Rs. 20
crores of the Government of India Securities which the Govern-
ment of Hyderabad had offered to the Government of Pakistan as
a loan. There was a reign of terror. People were being killed and
their eyes were being taken out. Women were being raped and
houses were being burnt down in large numbers. The situation
was becoming intolerable. Both the press and the public opinion
in India accused the Government of India of inaction in the face
of repeated violations of Indian territory. The stories brought by
the evacuees from Hyderabad made the people indignant. Attacks
on the through trains created panic. It was under these circum-
stances that the Government of India decided to take action.
## p. 927 (#971) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
927
In the early hours of 13 September, 1948, Indian forces com-
manded by Major-General J. N. Chaudhuri under the direction of
Lt. General Maharaj Shri Rajendrasinhji who was then the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, entered the
Hyderabad State. There was some stiff resistance on the first
and second day and after that the same collapsed. On the evening
of 17 September, 1948, the Hyderabad Army surrendered. On
18 September, 1948, the Indian troops entered Hyderabad city.
The police action lasted for 108 hours. It was learnt that if action
had not been taken on 13 September, 1948, Lt. T. T. Moore who
was captured with his jeep full of explosives, would have destroyed
all the important bridges in the State and it would have been very
difficult for the Indian army to move forward.
On 18 September, 1948, Major-General Chaudhuri took charge
as Military Governor. On 19 September, Kasim Razvi
arrested. The Razakars were disbanded and many of them were
detained under the Public Safety Regulations. Strong action was
taken against the Communists and their resistance was crushed.
The administration under Major-General Chauduri lasted up to
December, 1949 when Shri M. K. Vellodi, I. C. S. , took over as
Chief Minister. In 1950, four representatives of the Hyderabad
State Congress were appoined as Ministers. In March, 1952,
general elections were held and a Congress Ministry was installed
with the Nizam as a constitutional head. In 1956 was passed the
States Reorganisation Act by which the State of Hyderabad was
split up and it ceased to exist. Most of its territories went to the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
was
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had strategic importance on
account of its international boundaries. To the East was Tibet,
to the North-East was the Sinkiang province of China and to the
North-West was Afghanistan. Gilgit was a part of the territory
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The majority of the popu-
lation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir consisted of Muslims
although the Buddhists were in majority in Ladakh. At the be-
ginning of 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh was the ruler of the State
and Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was its Prime Minister.
After the announcement of June 3 Plan, Lord Mountbatten
visited Kashmir and for four days discussed the question of acces-
sion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Maharaja Hari
Singh. He told him that independence was not practicable and
the State would not be recognised as a Dominion by the British
## p. 928 (#972) ############################################
928
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
Government. He gave an assurance to the Maharaja that up to
15 August, 1947, he could join any Dominion and there would be
no difficulty. Even if he acceded to Pakistan, India would not
raise any objection. However, it was desirable to ascertain the
wishes of the people before acceding to any Dominion as the
majority of its people were Muslims. Lord Mountbatten failed in
his mission as the Maharaja refused to commit himself. After 15
August, 1947, Lord Ismay went to Srinagar and tried to persuade
the Maharaja to join one Dominion or the other but his mission
also failed.
It cannot be denied that it was not easy for the Maharaja to
make a decision. He was himself a Hindu and he would not like
to join Pakistan at once. Moreover, he was not sure of the fate
of his Hindu subjects in the event of his joining Pakistan. There
was also the possibility of the opposition from the National Con-
ference which was the most powerful and vocal organisation in the
State. If he acceded to India, there was also the possibility of ad-
verse reactions in Gilgit and certain other areas which were contigu-
ous to Pakistan. Moreover, the road communications were with
Pakistan. Till the declaration of the Radcliffe Award, there was
no land communication between India and the State of Jammu
and Kashmir. Moreover, Maharaja Hari Singh was thinking in
terms of becoming an independent ruler.
Shortly before 15 August, 1947, Pt. Ram Chandra Kak was re-
placed by Major-General Janak Singh as Prime Minister. The
Government of Jammu and Kashmir announced its intention of
entering into Stand-still Agreements both with India and Pakistan.
India was not enthusiastic about it even after the announcement of
the Radcliffe Award which connected India with the State by road.
Pakistan signed a Stand-still Agreement but with an ulterior motive.
In spite of the Agreement, the Pakistan authorities cut off the sup-
ply of food, petrol and other essential commodities. Restrictions
were put on the transit of travel between Kashmir and Pakistan.
Goods belonging to the State lying in the towns of Pakistan were
not allowed to be transported to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The State had practically no petrol for its transport organisation.
Military pressure was put on Jammu and Kashmir to accede to
Pakistan. Mr. M. A. Jinnah sent his British Military Secre-
tary thrice to Srinagar to bring about Kashmir's accession to
Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah also wrote to Maharaja to allow him to
spend the summer in Kashmir on account of his bad health and
offered to make his own arrangements. Major Shah was sent to
Kashmir to arouse the people in favour of Pakistan and also to
intimidate the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. There were hit
## p. 929 (#973) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
929
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in
and run border raids on the State. It was under these circum-
stances that Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan took over as the
Prime Minister of the State.
On 15 October, 1947, the new Prime Minister complained to the
British Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan had broken
the Stand-still Agreement by discontinuing the supply of essential
articles and by stopping, without any reason, the railway service
from Sialkot to Jammu. He also pointed out that the whole of
the State border from Gurdaspur to Gilgit was threatened with
invasion and the same had already started in Poonch. He request-
ed the British Prime Minister to advise the Government of Pakistan
to deal fairly with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However,
he got no reply. On 18 October, 1947, a protest was sent to the
Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Pakistan against the
breaches of the Stand-still Agreement and the raids on the State.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan, sent a reply on
20 October, 1947 in which he protested against the tone and langu-
age of the communication.
The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October, 1947.
The raiders included Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis and the
soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave. They were led by regular
officers who knew Kashmir well. They advanced from Abbottabad
in North-Western Frontier Province along the Jhelum Valley Road.
They captured Garhi and Domel and arrived at the gates of
Muzaffarabad. All the Muslims in the State Battalion at Muzaffara-
bad deserted and acted as advance guard to the raiders' column.
They marched towards Baramula, along the road leading to Srinagar.
All the Muslims in the State Forces deserted and joined the raiders.
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the State Forces, gather-
ed together about 150 men and proceeded towards Uri. He en-
gaged the raiders for two days and in the rear-guard action destroy-
ed the Uri Bridge. Not only the Brigadier himself but all his men
were cut to pieces in the battle. On 24 October, 1947, the raiders
captured the Mahura Power House which supplied electricity to
Srinagar, and that plunged Srinagar in darkness. The raiders de-
clared that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October, 1947 and
celebrate the Id celebrations in the Srinagar mosque.
Such was the critical situation when the Government of India
received an appeal for help from the Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir on 24 October, 1947. Even earlier than that, Field
Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, had received a
message from Pakistan Army Headquarters giving information
about the advance of the raiders and their probable destination.
Although the information was passed on to the Government of
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## p. 930 (#974) ############################################
930
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
India, no action was taken on it. Even when the appeal came
from the Maharja on 24 October, no immediate action was taken.
On the morning of 25 October, 1947, a meeting of the Defence
Committee was held under the presidentship of Lord Mountbatten.
It was decided that no immediate action be taken by the Govern-
ment of India and Shri V. P. Menon be sent to Srinagar immediate-
ly to study the situation on the spot and report to the Government
of India. Shri V. P. Menon immediately left by plane and reached
Srinagar. From the aerodrome, he went straight to the residence
of Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan. The latter put all the
facts before Shri V. P. Menon about the situation at that time. It
was decided to send immediately the Maharaja from Srinagar to
Jammu. There were rumours at night that the raiders had infiltrat-
ed into Srinagar and hence it was not considered safe to remain in
the city for the night and hence, Shri V. P. Menon and Prime
Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan immediately went to the aerodrome
and early in the morning of 26 October the plane left Srinagar
and reached Delhi. Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan met
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister
Sardar Patel and apprised them of the serious and dangerous situ-
ation in the State. He solicited army help and made it clear that
the army must be flown at once, otherwise the whole town of
Srinagar would be completely destroyed. He was told that it was
not possible to send the army at a moment's notice but that did
not impress him. Prime Minister Mahajan put his case in these
words to the Indian leaders: “Give army, take accession and give
whatever powers you want to the popular party, but the army
must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate
terms with Mr. Jinnah, as the city must be saved”. On this Prime
Minister Nehru flew into a rage and asked Prime Minister Mahajan
to go away. It was at this moment that Sheikh Abdullah who
was staying in the Prime Minister's house and was over-hearing
the talks, sent a slip of paper to Prime Minister Nehru. Prime
Minister Nehru read that slip of paper and his attitude was com-
pletely changed. Sheikh Abdullah was against the accession of
Kashmir to Pakistan and there was no love last between him and
Mr. Jinnah. He wanted, as desired by his party, the accession of
the State to India, but he was also keen that power should go in
his hands and the Maharaja should become a constitutional head.
The result of the negotiations on the morning of 26 October, 1947
was that at the persistent request of Prime Minister Mahajan, the
Indian Cabinet agreed to accept the accession of the State and send
its army to Srinagar on the morning of 27 October, 1947 to defend
the State. Shri V. P. Menon again went to Jammu accompanied
## p. 931 (#975) ############################################
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
931
by Prime Minister Mahajan and after getting the Instrument of
Accession from the Maharaja, he flew back to Delhi. Sardar Patel
was waiting at the aerodrome and both of them went straight to a
meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that
evening. There was a long discussion and ultimately it was decided
that the Accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted,
subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the State
when the law and order situation allowed. It was also decided
that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day.
This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah. It must
be pointed out that Lord Mountbatten and the 3 British Chiefs of
Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks
involved in the operation for which there was hardly any pre-
paration.
In the early hours of the morning of 27 October, 1947, more
than 100 civilian aircraft and Royal Indian Air Force planes were
mobilised to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. It
must be admitted that it was the heroism and enthusiasm shown
by the civilian and Royal Indian Air Force pilots and the ground
ciews that made the air-lift a success. Some of the pilots did
several sorties in the course of the day. It was in this way that the
timely arrival of the Indian forces in the morning of 27 October,
1947 saved Srinagar.
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was impatient with what was happening in
Kashmir. His Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was already
in Srinagar but after the arrival of the Indian troops, he was arrest-
ed and sent back to Pakistan. When Mr. M. A. Jinnah heard
about the acceptance of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by
India and the arrival of the Indian troops in Srinagar, he gave
orders to General Gracey, the Acting Commanding-in-Chief of the
Pakistan Army, to send Pak troops to Kashmir but the General re-
fused to do so without the approval of Field Marshal Auchinleck.
The Field Marshal also flew to Lahore on the morning of 28
October, 1947 and explained to Mr. Jinnah that the State of Jammu
and Kashmir had acceded to India and if Pak troops entered
Kashmir, there was every likelihood of a war between the two
countries and if that happened, all British Officers serving in the
Pakistan Army would be automatically and immediately with-
drawn. It was under these circumstances that Mr. Jinnah can-
celled his previous order for Pakistan troops to march into Kashmir.
On 30 October, 1947, a statement was issued by the Govern-
ment of Pakistan in which it was stated that the accession of
Kashmir to India was "based on fraud and violence and as such
cannot be recognised”. It was also stated therein that the State
## p. 932 (#976) ############################################
932
THE INDIAN STATES SINCE 1919
troops were the first to attack the Muslims in the State and the
Muslim villages on the Pakistan border and that provoked the
raiders to attack the State. It was also at this time that Pakistan
established her control over Gilgit which was a part of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir.
On 1st November, 1947, Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay
flew to Lahore and had a long conference with Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
The latter contended that the accession of Kashmir to India was
brought about by violence and the reply of Lord Mountbatten was
that the violence had come from the tribal raiders. Lord Mount-
batten suggested a plebiscite under the auspices of the United
Nations but Mr. Jinnah pressed for a plebiscite under the joint con-
trol and supervision of the Governors-General of India and Pakis-
tan. Many other things were discussed at the meeting but nothing
came out of it and Lord Mountbatten came back to Delhi. On
4 November, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan broadcast from
Lahore in which he said that the accession of Kashmir to India
was a fraud perpetrated on its people by its cowardly ruler with
the aggressive help of the Government of India.
Major-General Kalwant Singh was put in charge of the Military
operations in Kashmir. On 8 November, 1947, his forces occupied
Baramula. When the Indian troops entered the city, it was found
that the tribesmen had taken away all its wealth and women. Out
of the female population of 14,000, only about 1,000 were left.
The destruction of Baramula could be compared with the sacking
of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739. By 11 November, 1947, Indian
troops reached the heights of Uri and the tribesmen were in so great
hurry that they gave up Tangmarg and Gulmarg without firing a
shot. One cannot help admiring the courage with which Air
Commodore Mehr Singh flew Major-General Thimmayya over an
unchartered mountainous route more than 23,000 feet above the
sea level and landed him safely at Leh on an improvised air strip.
It was in this way that Leh and Ladakh valleys were cleared from
the raiders by Major-General Thimmayya. The credit of recover-
ing Poonch goes to Major-General Atma Singh.
It was on the persuasion of Lord Mountbatten that the Govern-
ment of India took their complaint to the United Nations against
the Pak invasion of Jammu and Kashmir. A cease-fire was order-
ed with effect from 1st January, 1949. Many efforts were made
by the United Nations to resolve the dispute between India and
Pakistan but they have not succeeded.
In 1965, Pakistan sent her infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley
and then attacked the Chhamb area.
