Mahadji Sindhia and
Nana Farnavis were among the few fugitives who escaped almost
miraculously from the field; the former received a wound in the leg
from a gigantic Afghan which lamed him for life.
Nana Farnavis were among the few fugitives who escaped almost
miraculously from the field; the former received a wound in the leg
from a gigantic Afghan which lamed him for life.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Mugul Period
1 The taunt deeply wounded the pride
of the Maratha generals, and the old jealousy of the rule of the
Chitpavan broke out afresh. “If this Brahman wins", they said, "he
will send his couriers to collect the revenues of Hindustan, and we
shall have to wash his loin-cloths. It is better that he should meet
with a defeat, or else what consideration shall we be allowed? ” Suraj
Mal determined to slip away from the doomed force at the first
suitable opportunity.
The Marathas were outside Delhi by the end of July, and the fort
was captured without much difficulty on 2 August. Here also the
Bhao Sahib's conduct gave great offence. In order to pay his troops,
he stripped off the silver from the ceiling of the great hall of audience,
and plundered tombs and shrines which Persian and Afghan had
respected. A rumour was even spread abroad that he intended to
place Vishvas Rao on the Mughul throne. Dismayed at this behaviour,
Suraj Mal and his Jats quietly decamped: the loss of these seasoned
troops was a serious matter, but the Bhao Sahib affected to make
light of it, saying that nothing better could be expected of mere
landholders. The Marathas spent the rainy season encamped in and
around Delhi, while the Abdali was in quarters at Anupshahr in the
Bulandshahr district; both parties being busily engaged in intriguing,
through their agents, for the support of Shuja'-ud-daula, the Nawab
Vazir, who had succeeded his uncle Safdar Jang in 1754 and at first
remained neutral. Proposals were also made by the Bhao Sahib that
1 Sarkar, op. cit. pp. 258 sqq. , doubts the arrogance of the Bhao Sahib. But
Nana Farnavis, who was present, says: "His Highness had latterly become
proud and arrogant, and had lost his usual wisdom”, to which he mainly attri-
butes the disaster.
3 Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, ITI, 385.
## p. 419 (#457) ############################################
START OF THE CAMPAIGN
419
the Abdali should be given large territories north of the Sutlej on
condition that he withdrew, but they fell through, chiefly on account
of the opposition of Najib Khan the Rohilla, who had good cause to
hate the Marathas for ravaging Rohilkhand and wanted them to
retire for good and all behind the line of the Chambal. Shuja'-ud-
daula reluctantly decided to join his co-religionists.
The rains were now over; the Dasahra festival was at hand, and
both sides prepared to take the field. The Bhao Sahib moved up-
stream, leaving Naro Shankar with about 7000 Marathas to garrison
Delhi. The Abdali was on the other side of the river: his army was
slightly superior in numbers to that of his opponents, and the
Durranis were men of great bodily strength, mounted on swift
Turki horses. ? About seventy-eight miles north of Delhi lay the
fortified post of Kunjpura, well-stocked with money and provisions,
of which the Marathas were in sore need, and commanding an
important ford over the Jumna. It was held by Nijabat Khan with
10,000 picked Rohillas, and on 17 October the Bhao Sahib determined
to attack it. It was taken by storm after a fierce bombardment by
Ibrahim Khan's heavy guns, and the garrison was put to the sword
on the pretext that Nijabat Khan had been responsible for the death
of Dattaji Sindia at Badaun Ghat. The Jumna was still in full flood
and impassable, and Ahmad Shah was forced to look on helplessly
while his troops were cut to pieces. The bad discipline and the
notorious love of plunder of the Marathas now proved their undoing.
While they were engaged in ransacking Kunjpura for treasure and
celebrating the Dasahra feast, they failed to keep the enemy on the
further bank under observation. Ahmad Shah cleverly slipped away
and marched down stream. With the help of Shuja'-ud-daula, he
-
found a ford at Baghpat, about twenty-five miles north of Delhi, and
in spite of the flood, in two days he pushed his whole army across
at all costs, losing numbers of men in the process. By this masterly
stroke he placed himself between his opponents and their base. This
was on 25 October. The Marathas came up soon after and were
repulsed with loss: had they arrived a little while earlier, they would
have had the Afghans at their mercy. Now that it was too late, the
Marathas attacked, but were driven off with loss, and fell back
fighting on the little town of Panipat, about sixty miles north of
Delhi. Holkar once more begged the Bhao Sahib to resume the old
guerrilla tactics of the Marathas, but Ibrahim Khan Gardi threatened
to turn his guns upon his own side if they deserted him. The Bhao
1 In 1760 it fell on October 19th.
2 Sarkar, op. cit. , II, 289, gives the forces actually engaged as Afghans, 60,000;
Marathas, 45,000, exlcuding irregular troops and followers. Kasi Raj gives the
numbers as follows: Afghans, 41,800 cavalry, 38,000 infantry: total 79,800.
Marathas, 55,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, 15,000 Pindaris : total 85,000. Both
sides had immense numbers of camp-followers,
## p. 420 (#458) ############################################
420 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
Sahib therefore threw himself into Panipat, where with the help of
Ibrahim Khan he proceeded to "dig himself in " in approved European
fashion, throwing up a broad rampart with a ditch in front of it and
mounting his cannon at regular intervals. He hoped to provoke the
Durrani to attack him, by means of raids upon his lines of commu-
nications, but the Afghan artillery was inferior to that of the Marathas,
and Ahmad Shah was too old a soldier to be drawn into a conflict
except on his own terms. He therefore proceeded to entrench him-
self also in a fortified camp with an abattis of felled trees, about eight
miles away, between the enemy and the Jumna. By this fatal move,
the Marathas permanently lost the initiative, sacrificing also their
mobility, which was their most valuable asset. But the Bhao Sahib
made a still graver blunder. He had taken into the field his own
wife and the wives of his officers, instead of leaving them behind at
Delhi. The vast crowd of retainers and camp followers were bound
to eat up the provisions of Panipat in a short time. Meanwhile,
negotiations were proceeding behind the scenes. Shuja'-ud-daula was
still inclined towards peace, but Najib Khan, the sworn enemy of the
Marathas, again dissuaded Ahmad Shah. "The Marathas", he said,
“are the thorn of Hindustan: if they were out of the way, this empire
might be Your Majesty's whenever you should please. " The Bhao
Sahib would not have been averse from an arrangement by which
he should fall back behind the Chambal leaving northern India in
the hands of the Abdali. But such an idea met strong opposition
in Poona from Raghunath Rao, who was not unnaturally reluctant
to see the fruits of his conquests abandoned.
The space between the lines was now the scene of almost daily
skirmishes : horsemen rode out challenging their foes to single combat,
and a number of fierce actions developed from chance encounters.
Raids by the Gardi infantry on 19 November and by Sindia on
the 22nd were repulsed with loss, after some initial successes; and
on 7 December a Rohilla attack was defeated in a spirited manner
by Balvant Rao Mehendale, who drove off the Afghans with great
slaughter, but was unfortunately killed in the hour of victory, when
his men fled. The Afghans pursued them and nearly stormed the
Maratha camp, which was only saved by the approach of night.
The death of Mehendale, his brother-in-law and most trusted coun-
sellor, was a serious loss to the Bhao Sahib, but about the same time
he managed to get into touch with Govind Pant, the Peshwa's col-
lector in Bundelkhand and the Duab. Govind Pant advanced rapidly
with a swarm of light horsemen, and skirmishing in the traditional
Maratha manner, began to cut off the enemy's supplies and harass
his foraging parties.
The tables were now turned. The Afghan camp was in a state of
1 His despatches are translated in the Appendix to Kasi Raj, Account of
the Last Battle of Panipat (Oxford, 1926).
## p. 421 (#459) ############################################
THE MARATHA CAMP BLOCKADED
421
siege, and there was a serious shortage of food. Many of the Afghan
generals became seriously alarmed, and urged the Abdali either to
attack the Marathas or to break camp and retreat. But here Ahmad
Shah showed himself a great captain. “This”, he answered, “is a
matter of war with which you are not acquainted. Military opera-
tions must not be precipitated. You shall see how I will manage
this affair, and bring it to a successful conclusion. ” He then proceeded
to tighten the blockade. He established an advanced post of 5000
men half-way between the lines; and there he pitched a little red
tent, which he made his head-quarters from sunrise to nightfall, riding
fifty or sixty miles a day to visit his outposts. After dark, the advanced
post was pushed up to the very walls of the enemy's camp, and re-
mained under arms all night, while other bodies went the rounds.
“Ahmad Shah's orders were obeyed like destiny," says Kasi Raj,
"no man daring to hesitate or delay one moment in executing
them. ”
The effect of this pressure soon began to tell. On 17 December
a body of horse under 'Ata Khan, riding fifty miles in a day,
surprised Govind Pant and his raiders and cut them to pieces. A few
nights later, some twenty thousand camp followers, who had left
the Maratha camp to go foraging, were caught by the advanced post
and all slaughtered; and to crown everything, on 6 January a convoy
bringing specie from Delhi to pay the troops, together with its escort,
was similarly cut up.
The state of things in the Maratha camp was now indescribable.
Grief and terror prevailed. Hundreds died every day of famine, and
an epidemic, the result of starvation and absence of sanitation, broke
out in the vast host cooped up in this narrow area. “We were sur-
rounded," says Nana Farnavis in his autobiography, "and the
enemy's shots fell thickly among our tents daily. . . . There we re-
mained in a state of siege for two months, during which most of the
cattle of the army died, and the stench was dreadful. ” Attempts to
open negotiations with the enemy were once more foiled by the
implacable hatred of Najib Khan.
On 13 January the Maratha chiefs approached their leader. "It
is now two days since we have had anything to eat”, they said.
“Do not let us perish in this misery : let us make one spirited effort
against the enemy, and whatever is our destiny that will happen. ”
Holkar and Sindia urged once more that
more that the cavalry should
abandon the camp, leaving the infantry and non-combatants to their
fate, and cut their way through to Delhi. Ibrahim Khan not un-
naturally refused to be sacrificed, and the Bhao Sahib rightly
declined to abandon the women to the mercy of the Afghans. It
was determined to deliver a general assault on the enemy's lines on
the following day. Whatever were the Bhao's feelings, he was too
brave a man to show them; and at the close of the council, he
## p. 422 (#460) ############################################
422 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
2
distributed pan and supari to his officers with all the dignified cere-
mony of a darbar.
Shortly before dawn, Shuja'-ud-daula received a last despairing
letter from the Bhao Sahib. “The cup is now full to the brim, and
cannot hold another drop. If anything can be done, do it or else
inform me plainly at once: hereafter there will be no time for writing
nor speaking. ” It was plain from this that the Marathas were
coming out. The Nawab at once told his men to fall in, and galloped
off to warn Ahmad Shah. Ahmad Shah, who was sleeping, was
aroused, and was soon up and seated on his charger outside the little
red tent, calmly smoking his hookah, and listening to the commotion
in the enemy's camp. It was as yet uncertain whether the Marathas
were preparing to attack or to slip away, but at length the long lines
of troops were seen deploying in the dim light. "Your servant's
news is very true”, said Ahmad Shah, and at once issued the neces-
sary instructions to his officers. The Marathas advanced slowly, the
ends of their turbans loose and their faces anointed with saffron-a
sign that they had come out to conquer or to die on the field. On the
left of the line was Ibrahim Khan with his regular battalions, with
Damaji Gaikwar on his immediate right. On the right flank were
Malhar Rao Holkar and Jankoji Sindia. The centre was com-
posed of the household cavalry. The Bhao himself, seated besid?
Vishvas Rao on a magnificent war-elephant, took station beneath
a black mango-tree, and over him floated the famous Bhagwa
Jhanda, the national standard of the Marathas. Three Jari Phatkas,
or grand ensigns of the Peshwas, were in the field. The Afghan
centre was commanded by the chief minister, Shah Wali Khan, with
the pick of the Durrani troops on their great Turki mounts. On the
left flank were Shah Pasand Khan and Najib-ud-daula, the latter
facing his old enemies, Sindia and Holkar. Between these and the
centre was Shuja'-ud-daula with the Oudh troops. On the right
flank were Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg with Rohilla and Mughul
contingents.
The two lines advanced obliquely on a front of about 742 miles,
the Maratha left under Ibrahim Khan making contact first. The
battle began with a fierce discharge of artillery and rockets all along
the line, but the Maratha gunners, deceived probably by the light,
fired high, and the shots flew harmlessly overhead. Thus the weapon
on which the Bhao Sahib chiefly relied failed him at the critical
1 Another version is "the flood has risen above my head" (Sarkar, op. cit.
p. 320).
2 The Maratha order of the battle from the left was : Ibrahim Khan;
Damaji Gaikwar; Vithal Shivdeo; Sadashiv Rao and Vishvas Rao (centre);
Jaswant Rao Powar; Shamsher Bahadur; Malhar Rao Holkar; Jankoji Sindia.
The Durrani order, facing the Marathas, was : Barkhurdar Khan; Amir Beg;
Dunde Khan; Hafiz Rahmat Khan; Ahmad Khan Bangash; Grand Vazir (cen-
tre); Shuja'-ud-daula; Najib-ud-daula; Shah Pasand Khan.
## p. 423 (#461) ############################################
THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT
423
moment. Ibrahim Khan, who had promised Sadashiv Rao that on
this day he would justify the trust placed in him, thereupon ordered
the guns to cease firing, and closed his opponents with the bayonet.
After a fierce struggle, during which their commander was wounded,
the regular sepoys pressed back the Rohillas. This exposed the Afghan
centre under the chief minister, and at once the Bhao Sahib, seeing
his opportunity, charged into the gap with the whole of the house-
hold cavalry at full gallop. The impact was incredibly violent; the
Afghans were surprised and met their enemies at the trot, and the
Marathas broke through three lines of their opponents. It was now
impossible to see anything for the clouds of dust, and nothing could
be heard but the opposing cries of Har, Har Mahadeo! and Din, Din!
as the troopers, locked in a death grip, stabbed and struck with lance
and battle-axe, and even with daggers. The Shah Wali Khan, who
commanded the centre, dismounted and in full armour, in a paroxysm
of rage, was trying to rally his men in vain. "Our country is far
off, my friends," he was crying, "whither do you fly? " But none
heeded his orders or his exhortations.
It now looked as if the battle was going against the Afghans. Their
right flank was turned and their centre was broken: only on their
left were they holding their own. Here Najib-ud-daula was facing
his old enemy, Jankoji Sindia. Anticipating modern methods, he
advanced by short rushes, his men halting to "dig themselves in",
and the sappers throwing up field-breastworks, while the Maratha
formations were broken up by salvos of rockets. From dawn to
midday the engagement raged with the utmost fury, and at any
moment the line might give way. But the Abdali knew that the
commander who throws in his reserves last wins. The psychological
moment had now come. He brought up his fresh reserves, and at
the same time sent military police to whip up, on pain of death, the
stragglers who were dribbling away to the rear, and to call up the
troops left to guard the camp. He then posted 4000 men to cover
his right, sent 10,000 to Shah Wali Khan, with orders for him to
charge with the sword in close order at full gallop, and issued direc-
tions to Pasand Khan and Najib-ud-daula to take the Maratha
centre in flank, as soon as as he saw the minister's troops on the move.
Meanwhile, the mounted infantry galloped along the enemy's line,
firing from their saddles into the close ranks of the enemy.
The simultaneous counter-attack was launched all along the line
early in the afternoon. It was excellently timed, and its effect upon
the exhausted Marathas was terrible. Men and horses had been
starved for weeks, and had had no food at all since dawn. Still,
1 Sarkar points out that Hindu armies, for caste-reasons, took no food into
the field, and were accustomed to break off action in order to prepare a meal
about noon. Clive at Plassey, and General Harris at Seringapatam, took advan-
tage of this fact.
## p. 424 (#462) ############################################
424 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
" 2
however, they contested the ground, inch by inch. “A furious engage-
ment ensued,” says the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, "and
for full two hours there arose such a cloud of dust that none of the
combatants could distinguish the earth from the heavens. From mid-
day to four o'clock, nothing could be heard or seen, but a furious
slaughter which was going on at an incredible rate. ” To the fire
of the mounted infantry was added that of the camel-guns (shutarnal),
which caused many casualties. About 2. 15 p. m. , Vishvas Rao was
wounded and had to be taken to his elephant, but the Bhao still
fought on at the head of his men for an hour longer. Then with
dramatic suddenness, resistance collapsed. “All at once, as if by
enchantment, the whole Maratha army turned their backs and fled
at full speed, leaving the field of battle covered with heaps of dead. "'1
In the dramatic words of an eyewitness, the Hindu host suddenly
melted away "like camphor". The victors pursued them to their
camp, giving no quarter, and the ditch was soon choked with bodies,
“The field of battle looked like a tract sown with tulips, and as far
as the sight could extend, nothing could be discovered but bodies
stretched at the foot of bodies, as if they had been asleep, or mar-
shalled by art. " 2 It was a moonlight night, and the slaughter of
fugitives went on till dawn. Next morning the camp was stormed,
and a further massacre took place. Surrender availed nothing. The
unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched
grain and a drink of water, and beheaded. Every Afghan tent had
heads piled before its doors. The plunder of the camp was prodigious,
and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves. 3
The body of Vishvas Rao was brought to the Shah, and every one
gazed in admiration of the beauty of the lad, who seemed to be only
sleeping. The Durranis cried out: “This is the body of the king of
the unbelievers: we will have it dried and stuffed to carry back to
Kabul. ” But Shuja'-ud-daula, who did all he could to help the
vanquished army, arranged to have him cremated according to Hindu
rites. He was, however, unable to protect Jankoji Sindia or Ibrahim
Khan, who were both taken prisoners and sacrificed to the conqueror's
rage. Ibrahim Khan was a renegade, who had fought on the side
of the infidel against true believers : Jankoji was hated by the
Rohillas. The Bhao Sahib, when he saw that all was lost, had
mounted his charger, and collecting a few men, galloped into the
thick of the battle to find a soldier's death. When last seen, he was
surrounded by Afghans and fighting desperately. A headless corpse,
identified as his, was recovered and cremated along with that of his
nephew. 4
1 Kasi Raja, pp. 39-40.
2 Siyar-ul-Mutakhkhirin, loc. cit.
3 Twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land,
says the Siyar-ul-Mutakhkhirin.
4 There is no doubt about his fate, though two impostors, claiming to be
the Bhao, appeared in Poona and Benares and were thrown into prison.
## p. 425 (#463) ############################################
DEFEEAT OF THE MARATHAS
425
Meanwhile, the Peshwa had been planning an expedition to
northern India to extricate the Bhao Sahib, and he had, without
success, endeavoured to enlist the co-operation of the Nizam. Balaji
was now in failing health, and incapable of acting with promptness.
He was distracted by family dissensions, and haunted by the spectre
of bankruptcy, the result of his far-flung ambitions in the north.
But in any case, the Bhao and his heroic comrades were beyond the
reach of earthly help. On 24 January, at Bhilsa, a banker's letter
was intercepted, which announced in enigmatic language the tragedy
of ten days previously. "Two pearls have been dissolved,” it said,
"twenty-seven gold mohurs have been lost, and of the silver and
copper, the total cannot be cast up. ” Balaji pressed on, hoping that
some of his family might have survived, but fugitives now began to
come in, who confirmed the completeness of the tragedy. Balaji
slowly fell back on Poona, which he reached in June. Here, on the
23rd, he passed away in the palace which he had erected on the
Parvati hill, calling for his lost son. It is easy to be wise after the
event, and innumerable criticisms have been passed upon the Bhao
for his arrogance and refusal to take advice from his captains. But
Sadashiv Rao, with all his faults, atoned by death for any errors of
which he may be adjudged guilty. Defeat is sometimes as honourable
as victory, and at Panipat the Marathas went down fighting.
Holkar and Damaji Gaikwar withdrew when they saw that all
was lost. But there does not appear to be sufficient reason for
accusing the former of deliberate treachery. According to his owi?
account, the Bhao Sahib sent him a message, telling him to "do as
he had directed”—perhaps to rescue the women and children in
the camp, who had been committed to his charge, and escort them
to Delhi. In this he was unsuccessful. Naro Shankar and part of
the Delhi garrison managed to get away.
Mahadji Sindhia and
Nana Farnavis were among the few fugitives who escaped almost
miraculously from the field; the former received a wound in the leg
from a gigantic Afghan which lamed him for life. About 100,000
Marathas must have perished: and only one-fourth of the fighting
men ever saw the Deccan again. Many fugitives were murdered by
the peasants, who were only too eager to turn the tables upon their
former oppressors. Those who straggled into Dig were, however,
hospitably entertained by Suraj Mal, and in this way about four
thousand men reached home. Shamsher Bahadur and Antaji Man-
keshwar died of wounds at Dig.
"Never was a defeat more complete", says Elphinstone, "and
never was there a calamity that diffused so much consternation.
Grief and despondency spread over the whole Maratha people: most
had to mourn relations, and all felt the destruction of the army as
a death-blow to their national greatness. ” Most disastrous of all,
1 Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, DI, 392.
## p. 426 (#464) ############################################
426
RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
perhaps, was the fact that it dealt a fatal blow to the one unifying
influence in the Deccan, the prestige of the Peshwas. It is, of course,
true that the Marathas, with characteristic resiliency, recovered from
what would have been a crushing disaster to a less hardy nation.
In August, 1763, they won a brilliant victory over the Nizam at
Rakshasbhavan. But their armies were never again the same. The
Arab and Hindustani mercenary to an increasing degree replaced
the free Maratha trooper, and most important of all, the weakened
power of the Peshwa paved the way to English interference in
Maratha affairs. Panipat, in other words, was the prelude to Assaye
and Kirkee. To Ahmad Shah also, the victory was a Pyrrhic one:
on 22 March, after ransacking Delhi, he withdrew his army. His
men, who hated the Indian hot weather, were on the verge of mutiny,
and insisted on returning home with their plunder. Ahmad Shah,
accordingly, after having left Najib Khan as regent of Delhi, retreated
beyond the passes, and did not again invade India.
A NOTE ON MARATHI LITERATURE
The Marathas are typical hil en, independent and freedom-loving, and their
language and literature reflect these characteristics. Marathi is a rugged ton-
gue, with none of the courtly refinements of northern India, and the early poetic
literature is the simple, natural expression of religious emotion. The earliest
Marathi poetry is an offshoot of the Bhakti movement which swept over India
from the twelfth century A. D. , and gave such an impetus to the development of
vernaculars. Its essential doctrine is that salvation may be attained, independent-
ly of priests, ritual and caste, by devotion to the Divine Name. The Deity, whe-
ther manifested as Shiva, or Vishnu in his various incarnations, is Bhagavan, the
Adorable, and his devotees are the Bhagavatas. It has been not inaptly com-
pared to the Protestant Reformation in Europe.
In Maharashtra, the central object of devotion was Vithoba, a local form of
Vishnu, who dwells at the famous shrine of Pandharpur. It was upon him that
the worship of the poet-sainis of the Deccan was focused. The earliest writers
in Marathi (as opposed to the Maharashtri Prakrit) belong to the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, and flourished under the Yadavas, the last Hindu
dynasty of the Deccan. They are Mukundraj, Namdev (A. D. 1270-1350) and
Jnaneshvar. Their object was to bring the learning of the pundits down to the
level of the common people. Jnaneshvar, who lived at Alandi near Poona, is
commonly believed to have made a buffalo recite the Veda! He wrote a para-
phrase of the Bhagavad Gita. Namdev, a devotee of Vithoba, was a tailor by
caste. He wrote in Hindi as well as Marathi; some of his poems found their way
to northern India, and were incorporated in the Adi Granth of the Sikhs.
For the next three centuries, with the Deccan under the heel of the Muham-
madans, no writer of note appeared. Then in the seventeenth century, the
national renaissance which culminated in Shivaji began to gather force. The
earliest poet of this period was Eknath of Paithan, who, though a Brahman,
denounced the caste-system, and went so far as to dine with a Mahar, an almost
unbeard-of action. He died in 1608. His grandson Mukteshvar, together with
Tukaram and Ramdas, was a contemporary of Shivaji. Shivaji, though formally
illiterate, was a fervent admirer of his country's songs and legends, and it is said
that more than once he risked capture when going to Poona in disguise to hear
## p. 427 (#465) ############################################
MARATHI LITERATURE
427
a religious recitation. He tried to persuade Tukaram to come to his court. But
Tukaram, absorbed in his intense love of Vithoba, cared for none of these things:
He was a poor trader by profession, knowing no Sanskrit, and his artless verses
are sung in countless village homes all over the Deccan to-day. Ramdas, on
the cther hand, was a Brahman, and was Shivaji's guru or spiritual preceptor.
It is said that Shivaji surrendered his kingdom to him, and received it back
"in trust from God”, and for this reason, the national standard of the Mara-
thas, the Bhagwa Jhanda, was the orange robe of the ascetic. The verses of
Ramdas, full of wise saws, remind us of the Proverbs of King Solomon, and
his teaching undoubtedly had a formative effect upon Shivaji. He died in 1681.
The most interesting products of the period, however, are the pawadas or
ballads. Their most singular characteristic is that they are unwritten, being
handed down from generation to generation by the gondhalis, a tribe or caste
of wandering bards who composed and recited them. The gondhalis are devo-
tees of the goddess Amba Bhavani, and the recitations are accompanied by an
elaborate ritual, in which the goddess herself is supposed to descend upon the
reciter. The ballads deal with the deeds of the Maratha heroes in their strug-
gles against the Muhammadans, such as the slaying of Afzal Khan, the taking
of Sinhgarh by Tanaji Malusre, the battle of Kharda, and the tragedy of
Panipat. These ballads were intensely popular with the unlettered peasantıy,
and played a great part in arousing them against their Muhammadan rulers. i
The period after the death of Shivaji witnessed a great outburst of Marathi
poetry, and it will here be possible only to mention a few leading names. Shri-
dhar was the most beloved of the writers of this time, and shares with Tukaram
the palm of popularity in the Deccan to-day. His mission was to make the heroic
legends of Hinduism accessible to women and others who knew no Sanskrit.
The titles of his works, the Tri of Rama ma Vijay and the Exploits
of the Pandavas, speak for themselves. He was born at Pandharpur in 1670
and died in 1728. "In every town and village in the Deccan and Konkan,
especially during the rains, the pious Maratha will be found enjoying with his
family and friends the Pothi of Shridhar. ” Moropant, admired by connoisseurs
for his verbal ingenuity, does not appeal to western taste. Another writer of
great interest is Mahipati, whose Bhakta Vijaya and Santa Vijaya, Triumphs
of the Devotees and Saints, are a mine of information about the picturesque
legends which have grown up round the poet-saints of the Deccan.
During the eighteenth century, the Maratha character started to change.
Poona was filled with loot from Hindustan, and the manners and ceremonial
of the Mughul Court were introduced. Contact with the western nations, espe-
cially the English at Bombay and Surat, was beginning to have its effect. Erotic
poetry became popular, and Ram Joshi (1762-1812) was the most celebrated of
the writers of Lavanis or Love Songs. The conquest of an empire, and the
appearance of state-papers and despatches, led to the development of Marathi
prose. Bakhars or historical chronicles were compiled, but their barbarous
idiom, three-quarters Persian, bears little relation to the elegant, highly sanskri-
tised prose style which arose in the nineteenth century, as a result of contact
with western literature.
1 About sixty were taken down by Acworth and Shaligram, and ten have been
translated into verse by H. A. Acworth, Ballads of the Marathas, Longmans, 1894.
## p. 428 (#466) ############################################
CHAPTER XV
AHMAD SHAH ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
THE new emperor was a young man of twenty-one, vicious, dissi-
pated, perfidious, pusillanimous, and utterly worthless. The weak-
ness of his character left him, throughout his short reign, a tool in the
hands of others, and his natural instinct led him to prefer, as advisers,
those least worthy of being associated in the administration of such
territories as were left to him. The great nobles were entirely selfish,
devoid of patriotism and honour, and interested only in dividing
among themselves the remnant of the dominions of the House of
Timur. In this ignoble competition they employed intrigue, assassina-
tion, and open violence.
After returning from the inglorious though successful campaign
against Ahmad Shah, they were employed in a redistribution of the
great offices at the capital and in the provinces. Mu'in-ul-Mulk, a
son of the late minister, had already secured the Punjab and had
been permitted to leave Sirhind for Lahore after promising to remit
large sums to Delhi as tribute, a promise which he was never able
to redeem. The vacant place of minister was filled by Safdar Jang,
the viceroy of Oudh, who governed his province by deputy. Nizam-
ul-Mulk, now an old man in a very feeble state of health, had at
once marched northward, but had not passed Burhanpur when he
heard first of the defeat of the invader at Sirhind and immediately
afterwards of the death of Muhammad and the accession of Ahmad
Shah. Turning back, he died on 1 June 1748 close to Burhanpur. His
eldest son being at court, he was succeeded in the Deccan, as a matter
of course, by his second son, Nasir Jang. His title of Amir-ul-Umara,
with its privileges, was bestowed by Ahmad Shah on Sadat Khan,
entitled Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang, who had already held high office as governor
of the capital.
These offices of state were apportioned by the great nobles without
reference to the personal wishes of the emperor, who tried to retaliate
by forming a court faction of personal adherents. His attempt to
assert authority may be traced to his mother, a woman of humble
origin but pernicious activity. At the head of the party was the chief
eunuch, Javid Khan, who received high titles and in return for these
unmerited honours taught his master to destroy a naturally feeble
intellect by drinking to excess. The court party was, in fact, nothing
but a cabal of women and eunuchs who pitted themselves against
the great officers of state and their armed forces.
1 See chap. XIII, p. 386.
## p. 429 (#467) ############################################
THE BANGASH PATHANS ATTACK THE ROHILLAS 429
'Ali Muhammad Khan, the chief of the Rohillas of Katehr, had
been a political prisoner, and in the confusion which ensued on
Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion returned to Moradabad, where he
completely re-established his authority. Safdar Jang, a Persian Shiah,
detested all Afghans and viewed with alarm the establishment of
an Afghan state on the north-western border of his province. 'Ali
Muhammad Khan died shortly after his return, but Hafiz Rahmat
Khan, the father-in-law of his elder son, Sa'd-ullah Khan, became
regent of his territories. An officer appointed from Delhi as governor
of Moradabad, but ill supplied with troops and munitions, ventured
to cross the Ganges with a small force. The Rohillas whom he first
attacked feigned flight, and pursuing them with triumphant shouts,
he and his men were drawn into an ambush, where nearly all were
slain.
Safdar Jang now thought of a new device. During the reigns of
Farrukh-siyar and Muhammad Shah the Afghan soldier of fortune,
Muhammad Khan Bangash, had gradually acquired the greater part
of the southern portion of the Gangetic Duab, from Kol, the modern
'Aligarh, nearly to the south-eastern boundary of the present district
of Cawnpore. In Farrukhabad, the capital which he built for him-
self, he commemorated the name of his first patron. In this area
he was virtually independent and the viceroys of Oudh resented the
growth of this Afghan principality on their western border as much
as that of the more recently established Rohilla state. Muhammad
Khan had died in 1743, but his territories were now governed by
his son Qaim Khan, who bore the title of Qaim Jang, and Safdar
Jang issued in the emperor's name an order directing him to attack
the rebels in Katehr. Qaim Jang crossed the Ganges and besieged
the Rohillas in Budaun, where the impetuous Sa'd-ullah Khan, elder
son of 'Ali Muhammad Khan, sallied forth to meet him. Qaim Jang's
superior numbers forced the enemy to give way, but by a stratagem
Qaim Jang was enticed into an ambush and slain, and his troops fled.
The defeat of the Bangash Afghans and the death of their leader
left them a safe object of attack and on 10 December 1748 Safdar
Jang, carrying the emperor with him, marched from Delhi for
Farrukhabad with 40,000 horse, having also directed Raja Naval Rai,
his deputy in Oudh, to join him from that direction. The Afghans
were too broken to offer any resistance. Six million rupees were
extorted from the mother of Qaim Jang and five of Muhammad Khan's
younger sons were carried off and imprisoned by Naval Rai in the
fortress of Allahabad.
In 1749 Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded India for the second time.
but did not advance beyond Lahore, where the governor bought
him off by the cession of the revenue of four sub-districts.
Safdar Jang had left to the Bangash Afghans only those districts
which Farrukh-siyar had assigned to Muhammad Khan, and the
## p. 430 (#468) ############################################
430 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
remainder were administered by Raja Naval Rai, Ahmad Khan, the
brother of Qaim Jang, who had succeeded at the instigation of his
mother, began to assemble troops in preparation for an attack on
Naval Rai, who warned his master of the preparations and, advancing
from Kanauj, entrenched himself at Khudaganj about half-way
between Kanauj and Farrukhabad. Safdar Jang left Delhi on 3 August
with a large army and sent troops in advance to meet Naval Rai. The
Afghans, however, on 13 August penetrated the camp of Naval Rai
by surprise, put him to death in his tent, and captured his artillery
and the whole of his equipage.
Safdar Jang had reached Marahra, about sixty-seven miles north-
west of Farrukhabad, when he received the news. His difficulties were
increased by the turbulence of his troops who, in consequence of
a dispute between a camel driver and one of the leading inhabitants,
sacked the town of Marahra while he halted there. Ahmad Khan
turned north. The armies met on 24 September between Sahawar
and Patiali, and Safdar Jang was completely defeated and he was
himself wounded by a musket ball. He retired with his beaten army
to Delhi, where he learnt with indignation that his defeat had been
received by the court party with joy. His death had been reported
and the emperor and Javid Khan had prepared to confiscate his
property, as was usual, but had waited until the rumour should be
confirmed. His wife had assembled such of his troops as remained
in Delhi to defend his property. On his return the emperor and
Javid Khan attempted to excuse themselves but failed to satisfy
Safdar Jang, who warned the queen-mother, as the prime mover in
the plot, that he was still alive and that it would go ill with any
who attempted to molest him.
Ahmad Khan, after his victory over the minister, sent his young
son Muhammad Khan into Oudh to plunder the country and marched
in person on Allahabad, where his younger brothers were confined,
and besieged the fort. Failing to take it, and learning that the
minister had taken the field, he plundered and burnt the city and
retired to Farrukhabad carrying with him 400 women captured at
Allahabad.
Meanwhile Mahmud Khan had crossed the Ganges into Oudh
and attacked Bilgram, but the determined attitude of the Sayyids
of that town, of the same stock as the Sayyids of Barha, saved it.
He sent detachments to occupy the parganas of Shahabad and Khaira-
bad and marched to Phaphamau, on the Ganges, near Allahabad,
whence he despatched a force to capture Lucknow. The Afghans
entered Lucknow, but one of Safdar Jang's officers raised the
citizens and drove them out of the city, while other troops from
Oudh moved towards Phaphamau and Mahmud Khan fled. The
expulsion of the Afghans from Oudh was now a simple matter, but
they still remained dangerous. Safdar Jang now decided to summon
## p. 431 (#469) ############################################
SAFDAR JANG CALLS IN THE MARATHAS
431
to his aid Malhar Rao Holkar from Malwa, Jayappa Sindia from
Narnaul, and Suraj Mal the Jat. He did this, intent only on his
own ends and negligent of the danger of bringing Marathas into
disputes in the neighbourhood of the capital. The Maratha horse
were first sent against Ahmad Khan's governor of Kol and Jalesar,
who was suddenly attacked and completely defeated, and fled to
Farrukhabad. Ahmad Khan, on hearing of this, withdrew at once
from Allahabad, which he had been again besieging. His army largely
composed of adventurers, deserted him, and he reached Farrukhabad
with but a few followers. Safdar Jang and the Marathas and Jats
marched on Farrukhabad and on their approach Ahmad Khan with-
drew from the city to a fort now called Fatehgarh, which he had built
on the bank of the Ganges, and appealed to the Rohillas for aid.
There was some hesitation on their part in responding. The elders
had been on good terms with the minister, since they had defeated
Qaim Jang, and even the impetuous Sa'd-ullah Khan hesitated to join
Ahmad Khan, who had not yet avenged his brother's blood. Ahmad
Khan assured him that help at such a time would be ample atonement
and Sa'd-ullah Khan marched, too late, to his aid.
The Marathas sacked Farrukhabad and had for some time been
endeavouring to throw a bridge of boats across the Ganges, hoping
to surround the position held by Ahmad Khan, which was open in
all directions on the east of the Ganges. Mahmud Khan was unsuc-
cessful in preventing this, and on 28 April the Ganges was bridged
under cover of the Maratha guns. Sa'd-ullah Khan joined Ahmad
Khan two days later, and the latter, unwilling to stand a siege in
his camp, came forth, and gave battle. The Afghans were defeated,
with heavy loss, and the remnant fled by way of Aonla and Morada-
bad to Chilkia, at the foot of the Kumaun hills. The Marathas
occupied Rohilkhand throughout the rainy season of 1751 and were
rewarded for their services in this campaign with half the Bangash
territory. The power of the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad was
now finally broken. Early in the reign Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang had held
the provinces of Allahabad and Agra, but the minister, Safdar Jang,
coveted the former, which adjoined Oudh, and transferred to Zu-'l-
Fiqar Jang Ajmer, which adjoined Agra, and took Allahabad. The
Emperor was obliged to sanction this arrangement, though it was
detrimental to his interests. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang was foolish, irresolute,
and a poltroon, but events in Rajputana gave him an opportunity.
Bakht Singh of Jodhpur was in rebellion against his nephew, Ram
Singh, who had succeeded his father, Abhay Singh, and he appealed
for imperial support against his nephew, making specious promises
which offered a prospect of the re-establishment of the emperor's
authority. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang promised him aid and set out for Ajmer.
The Jats meanwhile had extended their dominion northwards and
had occupied Nimrana, which lay in Zu-'l-Fiqar's way. Though they
## p. 432 (#470) ############################################
432 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
were not hostile to the emperor, the fortress was weakly held and a
cheap victory appealed strongly to Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang. The garrison
was expelled without difficulty, but the simple victor had but em-
broiled himself disastrously with the Jats. His illusory success turned
his head, and after some hesitation he recalled his advanced guard
and marched southward into the Jat country. Here an advanced
guard found the Jats in force, under Suraj Mal. At a moment when
a little resolution might have ensured the success of a mistaken enter-
prise his heart failed, and instead of advancing in person to the
support of his advanced guard, he ordered it to retire. Its retreat
demoralised the rest of his army, which was attacked and defeated
by the Jats. He then thought of fieeing to Delhi and leaving his
army, but his officers would not permit this. Suraj Mal, though
prepared to defend his own possessions, was loth to detain the impe-
rial officer, and he offered Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang easy terms and undertook
to fulfil his obligations to Bakht Singh and to send tribute from
Rajputana. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang continued his march to Narnaul, where
Bakht Singh resided, accompanied by his Jat ally. Bakht Singh did
not conceal his contempt for an ally of the Jats and would not permit
them to join in the settlement of disputes between Rajputs; and
ordered Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang to proceed to Ajmer. Suraj Mal returned
home in disgust and the submissive Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang was joined by
Bakht Singh at Ajmer and they marched towards Jodhpur. The
combined troops of Ram Singh and Khande Rao, son of Malhar Rao
Holkar, met them at Pipar. Bakht Singh warned Zu-l-Fiqar Jang
to beware of the Jodhpur artillery concealed in the centre of the
army, but the latter disregarded the warning. Fire was reserved
until his army, in close formation, was almost on the guns and was
then delivered with terrible effect, causing the whole mass to recoil.
The battle was not decided and Bakht Singh's troops were fresh,
but Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang had had enough of fighting and announced his
intention of coming to terms. Bakht Singh vainly urged the impor-
tance of establishing the imperial authority in Jodhpur, but Zu-'l-
Fiqar Jang persisted in his resolve. On the one side Bakht Singh and
on the other Khande Rao Holkar withdrew, leaving Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang
and Ram Singh to arrange their own terms. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang accepted
300,000 rupees in ready money and a promise of supplies to be
delivered at various stages of his retreat and set out at once for
Delhi. The reason for his haste was the news of Safdar Jang's defeat
by Ahmad Khan. He assumed that the minister would at once be
dismissed and his folly and conceit encouraged him to hope that he
might secure the place, but Safdar Jang had already recovered his
position. After Zu-'l-Fiqar's return to Delhi his failure preyed upon
his mind. He begged the emperor to help him to discharge his debt
to his troops and, when his request was rejected, began to talk treason
1 26° 23' N. , 73° 33' E.
## p. 433 (#471) ############################################
DISPUTED SUCCESSION TO NIZAM-UL-MULK 433
among his companions. Finally, he attempted to enter the hall of
audience fully armed, to intimidate the emperor. Forbidden to
appear at court, he appeared no more in public. His property was
confiscated and he was deprived of his rank and of the title of Amir-
ul-Umara, which was conferred upon Ghazi-ud-din Khan, the eldest
son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk.
In the Deccan, Nizam-ul-Mulk had been succeeded in 1748 by his
second son, Nasir Jang. Ahmad Shah and Javid Khan had from the
first disliked Safdar Jang and had intended to confer the post of mini-
ster on Nizam-ul-Mulk. They sought to attach the powerful viceroy of
the Deccan to the court party and thus escape the domination of
Safdar Jang, and accordingly wrote private letters to Nasir Jang beg-
ging him to come to Delhi. He set out with a large army and arrived
at Burhanpur in April, 1749, but received another order cancelling
the summons. Safdar Jang had probably discovered the design of
the court party and had compelled the emperor to abandon it.
Nazir Jang was content to return, for his sister's son Muzaffar
Jang, who enjoyed the support of the French, had taken advantage
of his departure to rise in rebellion and at the instigation of Husain
Dost Khan the Navait, known as Chanda Sahib, and with the help
of a force of French troops supplied by M. Dupleix, had invaded the
lower Carnatic. Nasir Jang's campaign in the Carnatic and his
murder in December, 1750, have been described elsewhere. 2 A few
months later Muzaffar Jang, who was proclaimed by the French
viceroy of the Deccan, shared the same fate, and Bussy recognised as
his successor Salabat Jang, the third son of Nizam-ul-Mulk.
Nazir Jang, Muzaffar Jang, and Salabat Jang, as well as their
foreign supporters, had all assumed that Ghazi-ud-din Khan, eldest
son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk, had foregone his claim. Ghazi-ud-din,
though he had hitherto taken no steps to dispute Nasir Jang's acces-
sion, early in 1751 demanded of the emperor a commission as viceroy
of the Deccan in succession to his father. The issue of orders was
delayed by the courtiers' claim that he should purchase his office
with the customary large payment in which they hoped to share and
by Ghazi-ud-din's demand that it should be free of cost.
This dispute was interrupted by the third 3 invasion of India by
Ahmad Shah Abdali, who crossed the frontier at the end of 1751,
and at the same time sent an envoy to Delhi, demanding the cession
of the Punjab and Multan. Muʻin-ul-Mulk the governor withstood
the invader for four months and would probably have compelled
1 His other titles were Firuz Jang and 'Imad-ul-Mulk.
2 See chap, XIII, p. 386, and vol. V, pp. 127 sqq.
3 The author of the Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin misnumbers all Ahmad Shah
Abdali's invasions, making the first the second, and so on. Ahmad Shah, as one of
Nadir Shah's officers, accompanied him on his expedition to India and Sayyid
Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai apparently reckons this as the Abdali's first
invasion
28
## p. 434 (#472) ############################################
434 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH 'ALAM
him to retire had it not been for the treachery of Adina Beg Khan,
who suggested an ill-timed sortie, of which notice was given to the
invaders, and which failed.
As usual the emperor and his courtiers were overcome with terror.
Safdar Jang, who had not returned to the capital since his successes
against the Bangash Afghans and the Rohillas, received pressing
messages asking him to bring to court Malhar Rao Holkar and other
allies.
of the Maratha generals, and the old jealousy of the rule of the
Chitpavan broke out afresh. “If this Brahman wins", they said, "he
will send his couriers to collect the revenues of Hindustan, and we
shall have to wash his loin-cloths. It is better that he should meet
with a defeat, or else what consideration shall we be allowed? ” Suraj
Mal determined to slip away from the doomed force at the first
suitable opportunity.
The Marathas were outside Delhi by the end of July, and the fort
was captured without much difficulty on 2 August. Here also the
Bhao Sahib's conduct gave great offence. In order to pay his troops,
he stripped off the silver from the ceiling of the great hall of audience,
and plundered tombs and shrines which Persian and Afghan had
respected. A rumour was even spread abroad that he intended to
place Vishvas Rao on the Mughul throne. Dismayed at this behaviour,
Suraj Mal and his Jats quietly decamped: the loss of these seasoned
troops was a serious matter, but the Bhao Sahib affected to make
light of it, saying that nothing better could be expected of mere
landholders. The Marathas spent the rainy season encamped in and
around Delhi, while the Abdali was in quarters at Anupshahr in the
Bulandshahr district; both parties being busily engaged in intriguing,
through their agents, for the support of Shuja'-ud-daula, the Nawab
Vazir, who had succeeded his uncle Safdar Jang in 1754 and at first
remained neutral. Proposals were also made by the Bhao Sahib that
1 Sarkar, op. cit. pp. 258 sqq. , doubts the arrogance of the Bhao Sahib. But
Nana Farnavis, who was present, says: "His Highness had latterly become
proud and arrogant, and had lost his usual wisdom”, to which he mainly attri-
butes the disaster.
3 Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, ITI, 385.
## p. 419 (#457) ############################################
START OF THE CAMPAIGN
419
the Abdali should be given large territories north of the Sutlej on
condition that he withdrew, but they fell through, chiefly on account
of the opposition of Najib Khan the Rohilla, who had good cause to
hate the Marathas for ravaging Rohilkhand and wanted them to
retire for good and all behind the line of the Chambal. Shuja'-ud-
daula reluctantly decided to join his co-religionists.
The rains were now over; the Dasahra festival was at hand, and
both sides prepared to take the field. The Bhao Sahib moved up-
stream, leaving Naro Shankar with about 7000 Marathas to garrison
Delhi. The Abdali was on the other side of the river: his army was
slightly superior in numbers to that of his opponents, and the
Durranis were men of great bodily strength, mounted on swift
Turki horses. ? About seventy-eight miles north of Delhi lay the
fortified post of Kunjpura, well-stocked with money and provisions,
of which the Marathas were in sore need, and commanding an
important ford over the Jumna. It was held by Nijabat Khan with
10,000 picked Rohillas, and on 17 October the Bhao Sahib determined
to attack it. It was taken by storm after a fierce bombardment by
Ibrahim Khan's heavy guns, and the garrison was put to the sword
on the pretext that Nijabat Khan had been responsible for the death
of Dattaji Sindia at Badaun Ghat. The Jumna was still in full flood
and impassable, and Ahmad Shah was forced to look on helplessly
while his troops were cut to pieces. The bad discipline and the
notorious love of plunder of the Marathas now proved their undoing.
While they were engaged in ransacking Kunjpura for treasure and
celebrating the Dasahra feast, they failed to keep the enemy on the
further bank under observation. Ahmad Shah cleverly slipped away
and marched down stream. With the help of Shuja'-ud-daula, he
-
found a ford at Baghpat, about twenty-five miles north of Delhi, and
in spite of the flood, in two days he pushed his whole army across
at all costs, losing numbers of men in the process. By this masterly
stroke he placed himself between his opponents and their base. This
was on 25 October. The Marathas came up soon after and were
repulsed with loss: had they arrived a little while earlier, they would
have had the Afghans at their mercy. Now that it was too late, the
Marathas attacked, but were driven off with loss, and fell back
fighting on the little town of Panipat, about sixty miles north of
Delhi. Holkar once more begged the Bhao Sahib to resume the old
guerrilla tactics of the Marathas, but Ibrahim Khan Gardi threatened
to turn his guns upon his own side if they deserted him. The Bhao
1 In 1760 it fell on October 19th.
2 Sarkar, op. cit. , II, 289, gives the forces actually engaged as Afghans, 60,000;
Marathas, 45,000, exlcuding irregular troops and followers. Kasi Raj gives the
numbers as follows: Afghans, 41,800 cavalry, 38,000 infantry: total 79,800.
Marathas, 55,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, 15,000 Pindaris : total 85,000. Both
sides had immense numbers of camp-followers,
## p. 420 (#458) ############################################
420 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
Sahib therefore threw himself into Panipat, where with the help of
Ibrahim Khan he proceeded to "dig himself in " in approved European
fashion, throwing up a broad rampart with a ditch in front of it and
mounting his cannon at regular intervals. He hoped to provoke the
Durrani to attack him, by means of raids upon his lines of commu-
nications, but the Afghan artillery was inferior to that of the Marathas,
and Ahmad Shah was too old a soldier to be drawn into a conflict
except on his own terms. He therefore proceeded to entrench him-
self also in a fortified camp with an abattis of felled trees, about eight
miles away, between the enemy and the Jumna. By this fatal move,
the Marathas permanently lost the initiative, sacrificing also their
mobility, which was their most valuable asset. But the Bhao Sahib
made a still graver blunder. He had taken into the field his own
wife and the wives of his officers, instead of leaving them behind at
Delhi. The vast crowd of retainers and camp followers were bound
to eat up the provisions of Panipat in a short time. Meanwhile,
negotiations were proceeding behind the scenes. Shuja'-ud-daula was
still inclined towards peace, but Najib Khan, the sworn enemy of the
Marathas, again dissuaded Ahmad Shah. "The Marathas", he said,
“are the thorn of Hindustan: if they were out of the way, this empire
might be Your Majesty's whenever you should please. " The Bhao
Sahib would not have been averse from an arrangement by which
he should fall back behind the Chambal leaving northern India in
the hands of the Abdali. But such an idea met strong opposition
in Poona from Raghunath Rao, who was not unnaturally reluctant
to see the fruits of his conquests abandoned.
The space between the lines was now the scene of almost daily
skirmishes : horsemen rode out challenging their foes to single combat,
and a number of fierce actions developed from chance encounters.
Raids by the Gardi infantry on 19 November and by Sindia on
the 22nd were repulsed with loss, after some initial successes; and
on 7 December a Rohilla attack was defeated in a spirited manner
by Balvant Rao Mehendale, who drove off the Afghans with great
slaughter, but was unfortunately killed in the hour of victory, when
his men fled. The Afghans pursued them and nearly stormed the
Maratha camp, which was only saved by the approach of night.
The death of Mehendale, his brother-in-law and most trusted coun-
sellor, was a serious loss to the Bhao Sahib, but about the same time
he managed to get into touch with Govind Pant, the Peshwa's col-
lector in Bundelkhand and the Duab. Govind Pant advanced rapidly
with a swarm of light horsemen, and skirmishing in the traditional
Maratha manner, began to cut off the enemy's supplies and harass
his foraging parties.
The tables were now turned. The Afghan camp was in a state of
1 His despatches are translated in the Appendix to Kasi Raj, Account of
the Last Battle of Panipat (Oxford, 1926).
## p. 421 (#459) ############################################
THE MARATHA CAMP BLOCKADED
421
siege, and there was a serious shortage of food. Many of the Afghan
generals became seriously alarmed, and urged the Abdali either to
attack the Marathas or to break camp and retreat. But here Ahmad
Shah showed himself a great captain. “This”, he answered, “is a
matter of war with which you are not acquainted. Military opera-
tions must not be precipitated. You shall see how I will manage
this affair, and bring it to a successful conclusion. ” He then proceeded
to tighten the blockade. He established an advanced post of 5000
men half-way between the lines; and there he pitched a little red
tent, which he made his head-quarters from sunrise to nightfall, riding
fifty or sixty miles a day to visit his outposts. After dark, the advanced
post was pushed up to the very walls of the enemy's camp, and re-
mained under arms all night, while other bodies went the rounds.
“Ahmad Shah's orders were obeyed like destiny," says Kasi Raj,
"no man daring to hesitate or delay one moment in executing
them. ”
The effect of this pressure soon began to tell. On 17 December
a body of horse under 'Ata Khan, riding fifty miles in a day,
surprised Govind Pant and his raiders and cut them to pieces. A few
nights later, some twenty thousand camp followers, who had left
the Maratha camp to go foraging, were caught by the advanced post
and all slaughtered; and to crown everything, on 6 January a convoy
bringing specie from Delhi to pay the troops, together with its escort,
was similarly cut up.
The state of things in the Maratha camp was now indescribable.
Grief and terror prevailed. Hundreds died every day of famine, and
an epidemic, the result of starvation and absence of sanitation, broke
out in the vast host cooped up in this narrow area. “We were sur-
rounded," says Nana Farnavis in his autobiography, "and the
enemy's shots fell thickly among our tents daily. . . . There we re-
mained in a state of siege for two months, during which most of the
cattle of the army died, and the stench was dreadful. ” Attempts to
open negotiations with the enemy were once more foiled by the
implacable hatred of Najib Khan.
On 13 January the Maratha chiefs approached their leader. "It
is now two days since we have had anything to eat”, they said.
“Do not let us perish in this misery : let us make one spirited effort
against the enemy, and whatever is our destiny that will happen. ”
Holkar and Sindia urged once more that
more that the cavalry should
abandon the camp, leaving the infantry and non-combatants to their
fate, and cut their way through to Delhi. Ibrahim Khan not un-
naturally refused to be sacrificed, and the Bhao Sahib rightly
declined to abandon the women to the mercy of the Afghans. It
was determined to deliver a general assault on the enemy's lines on
the following day. Whatever were the Bhao's feelings, he was too
brave a man to show them; and at the close of the council, he
## p. 422 (#460) ############################################
422 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
2
distributed pan and supari to his officers with all the dignified cere-
mony of a darbar.
Shortly before dawn, Shuja'-ud-daula received a last despairing
letter from the Bhao Sahib. “The cup is now full to the brim, and
cannot hold another drop. If anything can be done, do it or else
inform me plainly at once: hereafter there will be no time for writing
nor speaking. ” It was plain from this that the Marathas were
coming out. The Nawab at once told his men to fall in, and galloped
off to warn Ahmad Shah. Ahmad Shah, who was sleeping, was
aroused, and was soon up and seated on his charger outside the little
red tent, calmly smoking his hookah, and listening to the commotion
in the enemy's camp. It was as yet uncertain whether the Marathas
were preparing to attack or to slip away, but at length the long lines
of troops were seen deploying in the dim light. "Your servant's
news is very true”, said Ahmad Shah, and at once issued the neces-
sary instructions to his officers. The Marathas advanced slowly, the
ends of their turbans loose and their faces anointed with saffron-a
sign that they had come out to conquer or to die on the field. On the
left of the line was Ibrahim Khan with his regular battalions, with
Damaji Gaikwar on his immediate right. On the right flank were
Malhar Rao Holkar and Jankoji Sindia. The centre was com-
posed of the household cavalry. The Bhao himself, seated besid?
Vishvas Rao on a magnificent war-elephant, took station beneath
a black mango-tree, and over him floated the famous Bhagwa
Jhanda, the national standard of the Marathas. Three Jari Phatkas,
or grand ensigns of the Peshwas, were in the field. The Afghan
centre was commanded by the chief minister, Shah Wali Khan, with
the pick of the Durrani troops on their great Turki mounts. On the
left flank were Shah Pasand Khan and Najib-ud-daula, the latter
facing his old enemies, Sindia and Holkar. Between these and the
centre was Shuja'-ud-daula with the Oudh troops. On the right
flank were Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg with Rohilla and Mughul
contingents.
The two lines advanced obliquely on a front of about 742 miles,
the Maratha left under Ibrahim Khan making contact first. The
battle began with a fierce discharge of artillery and rockets all along
the line, but the Maratha gunners, deceived probably by the light,
fired high, and the shots flew harmlessly overhead. Thus the weapon
on which the Bhao Sahib chiefly relied failed him at the critical
1 Another version is "the flood has risen above my head" (Sarkar, op. cit.
p. 320).
2 The Maratha order of the battle from the left was : Ibrahim Khan;
Damaji Gaikwar; Vithal Shivdeo; Sadashiv Rao and Vishvas Rao (centre);
Jaswant Rao Powar; Shamsher Bahadur; Malhar Rao Holkar; Jankoji Sindia.
The Durrani order, facing the Marathas, was : Barkhurdar Khan; Amir Beg;
Dunde Khan; Hafiz Rahmat Khan; Ahmad Khan Bangash; Grand Vazir (cen-
tre); Shuja'-ud-daula; Najib-ud-daula; Shah Pasand Khan.
## p. 423 (#461) ############################################
THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT
423
moment. Ibrahim Khan, who had promised Sadashiv Rao that on
this day he would justify the trust placed in him, thereupon ordered
the guns to cease firing, and closed his opponents with the bayonet.
After a fierce struggle, during which their commander was wounded,
the regular sepoys pressed back the Rohillas. This exposed the Afghan
centre under the chief minister, and at once the Bhao Sahib, seeing
his opportunity, charged into the gap with the whole of the house-
hold cavalry at full gallop. The impact was incredibly violent; the
Afghans were surprised and met their enemies at the trot, and the
Marathas broke through three lines of their opponents. It was now
impossible to see anything for the clouds of dust, and nothing could
be heard but the opposing cries of Har, Har Mahadeo! and Din, Din!
as the troopers, locked in a death grip, stabbed and struck with lance
and battle-axe, and even with daggers. The Shah Wali Khan, who
commanded the centre, dismounted and in full armour, in a paroxysm
of rage, was trying to rally his men in vain. "Our country is far
off, my friends," he was crying, "whither do you fly? " But none
heeded his orders or his exhortations.
It now looked as if the battle was going against the Afghans. Their
right flank was turned and their centre was broken: only on their
left were they holding their own. Here Najib-ud-daula was facing
his old enemy, Jankoji Sindia. Anticipating modern methods, he
advanced by short rushes, his men halting to "dig themselves in",
and the sappers throwing up field-breastworks, while the Maratha
formations were broken up by salvos of rockets. From dawn to
midday the engagement raged with the utmost fury, and at any
moment the line might give way. But the Abdali knew that the
commander who throws in his reserves last wins. The psychological
moment had now come. He brought up his fresh reserves, and at
the same time sent military police to whip up, on pain of death, the
stragglers who were dribbling away to the rear, and to call up the
troops left to guard the camp. He then posted 4000 men to cover
his right, sent 10,000 to Shah Wali Khan, with orders for him to
charge with the sword in close order at full gallop, and issued direc-
tions to Pasand Khan and Najib-ud-daula to take the Maratha
centre in flank, as soon as as he saw the minister's troops on the move.
Meanwhile, the mounted infantry galloped along the enemy's line,
firing from their saddles into the close ranks of the enemy.
The simultaneous counter-attack was launched all along the line
early in the afternoon. It was excellently timed, and its effect upon
the exhausted Marathas was terrible. Men and horses had been
starved for weeks, and had had no food at all since dawn. Still,
1 Sarkar points out that Hindu armies, for caste-reasons, took no food into
the field, and were accustomed to break off action in order to prepare a meal
about noon. Clive at Plassey, and General Harris at Seringapatam, took advan-
tage of this fact.
## p. 424 (#462) ############################################
424 RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
" 2
however, they contested the ground, inch by inch. “A furious engage-
ment ensued,” says the author of the Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, "and
for full two hours there arose such a cloud of dust that none of the
combatants could distinguish the earth from the heavens. From mid-
day to four o'clock, nothing could be heard or seen, but a furious
slaughter which was going on at an incredible rate. ” To the fire
of the mounted infantry was added that of the camel-guns (shutarnal),
which caused many casualties. About 2. 15 p. m. , Vishvas Rao was
wounded and had to be taken to his elephant, but the Bhao still
fought on at the head of his men for an hour longer. Then with
dramatic suddenness, resistance collapsed. “All at once, as if by
enchantment, the whole Maratha army turned their backs and fled
at full speed, leaving the field of battle covered with heaps of dead. "'1
In the dramatic words of an eyewitness, the Hindu host suddenly
melted away "like camphor". The victors pursued them to their
camp, giving no quarter, and the ditch was soon choked with bodies,
“The field of battle looked like a tract sown with tulips, and as far
as the sight could extend, nothing could be discovered but bodies
stretched at the foot of bodies, as if they had been asleep, or mar-
shalled by art. " 2 It was a moonlight night, and the slaughter of
fugitives went on till dawn. Next morning the camp was stormed,
and a further massacre took place. Surrender availed nothing. The
unhappy prisoners were paraded in long lines, given a little parched
grain and a drink of water, and beheaded. Every Afghan tent had
heads piled before its doors. The plunder of the camp was prodigious,
and the women and children who survived were driven off as slaves. 3
The body of Vishvas Rao was brought to the Shah, and every one
gazed in admiration of the beauty of the lad, who seemed to be only
sleeping. The Durranis cried out: “This is the body of the king of
the unbelievers: we will have it dried and stuffed to carry back to
Kabul. ” But Shuja'-ud-daula, who did all he could to help the
vanquished army, arranged to have him cremated according to Hindu
rites. He was, however, unable to protect Jankoji Sindia or Ibrahim
Khan, who were both taken prisoners and sacrificed to the conqueror's
rage. Ibrahim Khan was a renegade, who had fought on the side
of the infidel against true believers : Jankoji was hated by the
Rohillas. The Bhao Sahib, when he saw that all was lost, had
mounted his charger, and collecting a few men, galloped into the
thick of the battle to find a soldier's death. When last seen, he was
surrounded by Afghans and fighting desperately. A headless corpse,
identified as his, was recovered and cremated along with that of his
nephew. 4
1 Kasi Raja, pp. 39-40.
2 Siyar-ul-Mutakhkhirin, loc. cit.
3 Twenty-two thousand, many of them of the highest rank in the land,
says the Siyar-ul-Mutakhkhirin.
4 There is no doubt about his fate, though two impostors, claiming to be
the Bhao, appeared in Poona and Benares and were thrown into prison.
## p. 425 (#463) ############################################
DEFEEAT OF THE MARATHAS
425
Meanwhile, the Peshwa had been planning an expedition to
northern India to extricate the Bhao Sahib, and he had, without
success, endeavoured to enlist the co-operation of the Nizam. Balaji
was now in failing health, and incapable of acting with promptness.
He was distracted by family dissensions, and haunted by the spectre
of bankruptcy, the result of his far-flung ambitions in the north.
But in any case, the Bhao and his heroic comrades were beyond the
reach of earthly help. On 24 January, at Bhilsa, a banker's letter
was intercepted, which announced in enigmatic language the tragedy
of ten days previously. "Two pearls have been dissolved,” it said,
"twenty-seven gold mohurs have been lost, and of the silver and
copper, the total cannot be cast up. ” Balaji pressed on, hoping that
some of his family might have survived, but fugitives now began to
come in, who confirmed the completeness of the tragedy. Balaji
slowly fell back on Poona, which he reached in June. Here, on the
23rd, he passed away in the palace which he had erected on the
Parvati hill, calling for his lost son. It is easy to be wise after the
event, and innumerable criticisms have been passed upon the Bhao
for his arrogance and refusal to take advice from his captains. But
Sadashiv Rao, with all his faults, atoned by death for any errors of
which he may be adjudged guilty. Defeat is sometimes as honourable
as victory, and at Panipat the Marathas went down fighting.
Holkar and Damaji Gaikwar withdrew when they saw that all
was lost. But there does not appear to be sufficient reason for
accusing the former of deliberate treachery. According to his owi?
account, the Bhao Sahib sent him a message, telling him to "do as
he had directed”—perhaps to rescue the women and children in
the camp, who had been committed to his charge, and escort them
to Delhi. In this he was unsuccessful. Naro Shankar and part of
the Delhi garrison managed to get away.
Mahadji Sindhia and
Nana Farnavis were among the few fugitives who escaped almost
miraculously from the field; the former received a wound in the leg
from a gigantic Afghan which lamed him for life. About 100,000
Marathas must have perished: and only one-fourth of the fighting
men ever saw the Deccan again. Many fugitives were murdered by
the peasants, who were only too eager to turn the tables upon their
former oppressors. Those who straggled into Dig were, however,
hospitably entertained by Suraj Mal, and in this way about four
thousand men reached home. Shamsher Bahadur and Antaji Man-
keshwar died of wounds at Dig.
"Never was a defeat more complete", says Elphinstone, "and
never was there a calamity that diffused so much consternation.
Grief and despondency spread over the whole Maratha people: most
had to mourn relations, and all felt the destruction of the army as
a death-blow to their national greatness. ” Most disastrous of all,
1 Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin, DI, 392.
## p. 426 (#464) ############################################
426
RISE OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE (1707-1761)
perhaps, was the fact that it dealt a fatal blow to the one unifying
influence in the Deccan, the prestige of the Peshwas. It is, of course,
true that the Marathas, with characteristic resiliency, recovered from
what would have been a crushing disaster to a less hardy nation.
In August, 1763, they won a brilliant victory over the Nizam at
Rakshasbhavan. But their armies were never again the same. The
Arab and Hindustani mercenary to an increasing degree replaced
the free Maratha trooper, and most important of all, the weakened
power of the Peshwa paved the way to English interference in
Maratha affairs. Panipat, in other words, was the prelude to Assaye
and Kirkee. To Ahmad Shah also, the victory was a Pyrrhic one:
on 22 March, after ransacking Delhi, he withdrew his army. His
men, who hated the Indian hot weather, were on the verge of mutiny,
and insisted on returning home with their plunder. Ahmad Shah,
accordingly, after having left Najib Khan as regent of Delhi, retreated
beyond the passes, and did not again invade India.
A NOTE ON MARATHI LITERATURE
The Marathas are typical hil en, independent and freedom-loving, and their
language and literature reflect these characteristics. Marathi is a rugged ton-
gue, with none of the courtly refinements of northern India, and the early poetic
literature is the simple, natural expression of religious emotion. The earliest
Marathi poetry is an offshoot of the Bhakti movement which swept over India
from the twelfth century A. D. , and gave such an impetus to the development of
vernaculars. Its essential doctrine is that salvation may be attained, independent-
ly of priests, ritual and caste, by devotion to the Divine Name. The Deity, whe-
ther manifested as Shiva, or Vishnu in his various incarnations, is Bhagavan, the
Adorable, and his devotees are the Bhagavatas. It has been not inaptly com-
pared to the Protestant Reformation in Europe.
In Maharashtra, the central object of devotion was Vithoba, a local form of
Vishnu, who dwells at the famous shrine of Pandharpur. It was upon him that
the worship of the poet-sainis of the Deccan was focused. The earliest writers
in Marathi (as opposed to the Maharashtri Prakrit) belong to the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, and flourished under the Yadavas, the last Hindu
dynasty of the Deccan. They are Mukundraj, Namdev (A. D. 1270-1350) and
Jnaneshvar. Their object was to bring the learning of the pundits down to the
level of the common people. Jnaneshvar, who lived at Alandi near Poona, is
commonly believed to have made a buffalo recite the Veda! He wrote a para-
phrase of the Bhagavad Gita. Namdev, a devotee of Vithoba, was a tailor by
caste. He wrote in Hindi as well as Marathi; some of his poems found their way
to northern India, and were incorporated in the Adi Granth of the Sikhs.
For the next three centuries, with the Deccan under the heel of the Muham-
madans, no writer of note appeared. Then in the seventeenth century, the
national renaissance which culminated in Shivaji began to gather force. The
earliest poet of this period was Eknath of Paithan, who, though a Brahman,
denounced the caste-system, and went so far as to dine with a Mahar, an almost
unbeard-of action. He died in 1608. His grandson Mukteshvar, together with
Tukaram and Ramdas, was a contemporary of Shivaji. Shivaji, though formally
illiterate, was a fervent admirer of his country's songs and legends, and it is said
that more than once he risked capture when going to Poona in disguise to hear
## p. 427 (#465) ############################################
MARATHI LITERATURE
427
a religious recitation. He tried to persuade Tukaram to come to his court. But
Tukaram, absorbed in his intense love of Vithoba, cared for none of these things:
He was a poor trader by profession, knowing no Sanskrit, and his artless verses
are sung in countless village homes all over the Deccan to-day. Ramdas, on
the cther hand, was a Brahman, and was Shivaji's guru or spiritual preceptor.
It is said that Shivaji surrendered his kingdom to him, and received it back
"in trust from God”, and for this reason, the national standard of the Mara-
thas, the Bhagwa Jhanda, was the orange robe of the ascetic. The verses of
Ramdas, full of wise saws, remind us of the Proverbs of King Solomon, and
his teaching undoubtedly had a formative effect upon Shivaji. He died in 1681.
The most interesting products of the period, however, are the pawadas or
ballads. Their most singular characteristic is that they are unwritten, being
handed down from generation to generation by the gondhalis, a tribe or caste
of wandering bards who composed and recited them. The gondhalis are devo-
tees of the goddess Amba Bhavani, and the recitations are accompanied by an
elaborate ritual, in which the goddess herself is supposed to descend upon the
reciter. The ballads deal with the deeds of the Maratha heroes in their strug-
gles against the Muhammadans, such as the slaying of Afzal Khan, the taking
of Sinhgarh by Tanaji Malusre, the battle of Kharda, and the tragedy of
Panipat. These ballads were intensely popular with the unlettered peasantıy,
and played a great part in arousing them against their Muhammadan rulers. i
The period after the death of Shivaji witnessed a great outburst of Marathi
poetry, and it will here be possible only to mention a few leading names. Shri-
dhar was the most beloved of the writers of this time, and shares with Tukaram
the palm of popularity in the Deccan to-day. His mission was to make the heroic
legends of Hinduism accessible to women and others who knew no Sanskrit.
The titles of his works, the Tri of Rama ma Vijay and the Exploits
of the Pandavas, speak for themselves. He was born at Pandharpur in 1670
and died in 1728. "In every town and village in the Deccan and Konkan,
especially during the rains, the pious Maratha will be found enjoying with his
family and friends the Pothi of Shridhar. ” Moropant, admired by connoisseurs
for his verbal ingenuity, does not appeal to western taste. Another writer of
great interest is Mahipati, whose Bhakta Vijaya and Santa Vijaya, Triumphs
of the Devotees and Saints, are a mine of information about the picturesque
legends which have grown up round the poet-saints of the Deccan.
During the eighteenth century, the Maratha character started to change.
Poona was filled with loot from Hindustan, and the manners and ceremonial
of the Mughul Court were introduced. Contact with the western nations, espe-
cially the English at Bombay and Surat, was beginning to have its effect. Erotic
poetry became popular, and Ram Joshi (1762-1812) was the most celebrated of
the writers of Lavanis or Love Songs. The conquest of an empire, and the
appearance of state-papers and despatches, led to the development of Marathi
prose. Bakhars or historical chronicles were compiled, but their barbarous
idiom, three-quarters Persian, bears little relation to the elegant, highly sanskri-
tised prose style which arose in the nineteenth century, as a result of contact
with western literature.
1 About sixty were taken down by Acworth and Shaligram, and ten have been
translated into verse by H. A. Acworth, Ballads of the Marathas, Longmans, 1894.
## p. 428 (#466) ############################################
CHAPTER XV
AHMAD SHAH ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
THE new emperor was a young man of twenty-one, vicious, dissi-
pated, perfidious, pusillanimous, and utterly worthless. The weak-
ness of his character left him, throughout his short reign, a tool in the
hands of others, and his natural instinct led him to prefer, as advisers,
those least worthy of being associated in the administration of such
territories as were left to him. The great nobles were entirely selfish,
devoid of patriotism and honour, and interested only in dividing
among themselves the remnant of the dominions of the House of
Timur. In this ignoble competition they employed intrigue, assassina-
tion, and open violence.
After returning from the inglorious though successful campaign
against Ahmad Shah, they were employed in a redistribution of the
great offices at the capital and in the provinces. Mu'in-ul-Mulk, a
son of the late minister, had already secured the Punjab and had
been permitted to leave Sirhind for Lahore after promising to remit
large sums to Delhi as tribute, a promise which he was never able
to redeem. The vacant place of minister was filled by Safdar Jang,
the viceroy of Oudh, who governed his province by deputy. Nizam-
ul-Mulk, now an old man in a very feeble state of health, had at
once marched northward, but had not passed Burhanpur when he
heard first of the defeat of the invader at Sirhind and immediately
afterwards of the death of Muhammad and the accession of Ahmad
Shah. Turning back, he died on 1 June 1748 close to Burhanpur. His
eldest son being at court, he was succeeded in the Deccan, as a matter
of course, by his second son, Nasir Jang. His title of Amir-ul-Umara,
with its privileges, was bestowed by Ahmad Shah on Sadat Khan,
entitled Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang, who had already held high office as governor
of the capital.
These offices of state were apportioned by the great nobles without
reference to the personal wishes of the emperor, who tried to retaliate
by forming a court faction of personal adherents. His attempt to
assert authority may be traced to his mother, a woman of humble
origin but pernicious activity. At the head of the party was the chief
eunuch, Javid Khan, who received high titles and in return for these
unmerited honours taught his master to destroy a naturally feeble
intellect by drinking to excess. The court party was, in fact, nothing
but a cabal of women and eunuchs who pitted themselves against
the great officers of state and their armed forces.
1 See chap. XIII, p. 386.
## p. 429 (#467) ############################################
THE BANGASH PATHANS ATTACK THE ROHILLAS 429
'Ali Muhammad Khan, the chief of the Rohillas of Katehr, had
been a political prisoner, and in the confusion which ensued on
Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion returned to Moradabad, where he
completely re-established his authority. Safdar Jang, a Persian Shiah,
detested all Afghans and viewed with alarm the establishment of
an Afghan state on the north-western border of his province. 'Ali
Muhammad Khan died shortly after his return, but Hafiz Rahmat
Khan, the father-in-law of his elder son, Sa'd-ullah Khan, became
regent of his territories. An officer appointed from Delhi as governor
of Moradabad, but ill supplied with troops and munitions, ventured
to cross the Ganges with a small force. The Rohillas whom he first
attacked feigned flight, and pursuing them with triumphant shouts,
he and his men were drawn into an ambush, where nearly all were
slain.
Safdar Jang now thought of a new device. During the reigns of
Farrukh-siyar and Muhammad Shah the Afghan soldier of fortune,
Muhammad Khan Bangash, had gradually acquired the greater part
of the southern portion of the Gangetic Duab, from Kol, the modern
'Aligarh, nearly to the south-eastern boundary of the present district
of Cawnpore. In Farrukhabad, the capital which he built for him-
self, he commemorated the name of his first patron. In this area
he was virtually independent and the viceroys of Oudh resented the
growth of this Afghan principality on their western border as much
as that of the more recently established Rohilla state. Muhammad
Khan had died in 1743, but his territories were now governed by
his son Qaim Khan, who bore the title of Qaim Jang, and Safdar
Jang issued in the emperor's name an order directing him to attack
the rebels in Katehr. Qaim Jang crossed the Ganges and besieged
the Rohillas in Budaun, where the impetuous Sa'd-ullah Khan, elder
son of 'Ali Muhammad Khan, sallied forth to meet him. Qaim Jang's
superior numbers forced the enemy to give way, but by a stratagem
Qaim Jang was enticed into an ambush and slain, and his troops fled.
The defeat of the Bangash Afghans and the death of their leader
left them a safe object of attack and on 10 December 1748 Safdar
Jang, carrying the emperor with him, marched from Delhi for
Farrukhabad with 40,000 horse, having also directed Raja Naval Rai,
his deputy in Oudh, to join him from that direction. The Afghans
were too broken to offer any resistance. Six million rupees were
extorted from the mother of Qaim Jang and five of Muhammad Khan's
younger sons were carried off and imprisoned by Naval Rai in the
fortress of Allahabad.
In 1749 Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded India for the second time.
but did not advance beyond Lahore, where the governor bought
him off by the cession of the revenue of four sub-districts.
Safdar Jang had left to the Bangash Afghans only those districts
which Farrukh-siyar had assigned to Muhammad Khan, and the
## p. 430 (#468) ############################################
430 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
remainder were administered by Raja Naval Rai, Ahmad Khan, the
brother of Qaim Jang, who had succeeded at the instigation of his
mother, began to assemble troops in preparation for an attack on
Naval Rai, who warned his master of the preparations and, advancing
from Kanauj, entrenched himself at Khudaganj about half-way
between Kanauj and Farrukhabad. Safdar Jang left Delhi on 3 August
with a large army and sent troops in advance to meet Naval Rai. The
Afghans, however, on 13 August penetrated the camp of Naval Rai
by surprise, put him to death in his tent, and captured his artillery
and the whole of his equipage.
Safdar Jang had reached Marahra, about sixty-seven miles north-
west of Farrukhabad, when he received the news. His difficulties were
increased by the turbulence of his troops who, in consequence of
a dispute between a camel driver and one of the leading inhabitants,
sacked the town of Marahra while he halted there. Ahmad Khan
turned north. The armies met on 24 September between Sahawar
and Patiali, and Safdar Jang was completely defeated and he was
himself wounded by a musket ball. He retired with his beaten army
to Delhi, where he learnt with indignation that his defeat had been
received by the court party with joy. His death had been reported
and the emperor and Javid Khan had prepared to confiscate his
property, as was usual, but had waited until the rumour should be
confirmed. His wife had assembled such of his troops as remained
in Delhi to defend his property. On his return the emperor and
Javid Khan attempted to excuse themselves but failed to satisfy
Safdar Jang, who warned the queen-mother, as the prime mover in
the plot, that he was still alive and that it would go ill with any
who attempted to molest him.
Ahmad Khan, after his victory over the minister, sent his young
son Muhammad Khan into Oudh to plunder the country and marched
in person on Allahabad, where his younger brothers were confined,
and besieged the fort. Failing to take it, and learning that the
minister had taken the field, he plundered and burnt the city and
retired to Farrukhabad carrying with him 400 women captured at
Allahabad.
Meanwhile Mahmud Khan had crossed the Ganges into Oudh
and attacked Bilgram, but the determined attitude of the Sayyids
of that town, of the same stock as the Sayyids of Barha, saved it.
He sent detachments to occupy the parganas of Shahabad and Khaira-
bad and marched to Phaphamau, on the Ganges, near Allahabad,
whence he despatched a force to capture Lucknow. The Afghans
entered Lucknow, but one of Safdar Jang's officers raised the
citizens and drove them out of the city, while other troops from
Oudh moved towards Phaphamau and Mahmud Khan fled. The
expulsion of the Afghans from Oudh was now a simple matter, but
they still remained dangerous. Safdar Jang now decided to summon
## p. 431 (#469) ############################################
SAFDAR JANG CALLS IN THE MARATHAS
431
to his aid Malhar Rao Holkar from Malwa, Jayappa Sindia from
Narnaul, and Suraj Mal the Jat. He did this, intent only on his
own ends and negligent of the danger of bringing Marathas into
disputes in the neighbourhood of the capital. The Maratha horse
were first sent against Ahmad Khan's governor of Kol and Jalesar,
who was suddenly attacked and completely defeated, and fled to
Farrukhabad. Ahmad Khan, on hearing of this, withdrew at once
from Allahabad, which he had been again besieging. His army largely
composed of adventurers, deserted him, and he reached Farrukhabad
with but a few followers. Safdar Jang and the Marathas and Jats
marched on Farrukhabad and on their approach Ahmad Khan with-
drew from the city to a fort now called Fatehgarh, which he had built
on the bank of the Ganges, and appealed to the Rohillas for aid.
There was some hesitation on their part in responding. The elders
had been on good terms with the minister, since they had defeated
Qaim Jang, and even the impetuous Sa'd-ullah Khan hesitated to join
Ahmad Khan, who had not yet avenged his brother's blood. Ahmad
Khan assured him that help at such a time would be ample atonement
and Sa'd-ullah Khan marched, too late, to his aid.
The Marathas sacked Farrukhabad and had for some time been
endeavouring to throw a bridge of boats across the Ganges, hoping
to surround the position held by Ahmad Khan, which was open in
all directions on the east of the Ganges. Mahmud Khan was unsuc-
cessful in preventing this, and on 28 April the Ganges was bridged
under cover of the Maratha guns. Sa'd-ullah Khan joined Ahmad
Khan two days later, and the latter, unwilling to stand a siege in
his camp, came forth, and gave battle. The Afghans were defeated,
with heavy loss, and the remnant fled by way of Aonla and Morada-
bad to Chilkia, at the foot of the Kumaun hills. The Marathas
occupied Rohilkhand throughout the rainy season of 1751 and were
rewarded for their services in this campaign with half the Bangash
territory. The power of the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad was
now finally broken. Early in the reign Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang had held
the provinces of Allahabad and Agra, but the minister, Safdar Jang,
coveted the former, which adjoined Oudh, and transferred to Zu-'l-
Fiqar Jang Ajmer, which adjoined Agra, and took Allahabad. The
Emperor was obliged to sanction this arrangement, though it was
detrimental to his interests. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang was foolish, irresolute,
and a poltroon, but events in Rajputana gave him an opportunity.
Bakht Singh of Jodhpur was in rebellion against his nephew, Ram
Singh, who had succeeded his father, Abhay Singh, and he appealed
for imperial support against his nephew, making specious promises
which offered a prospect of the re-establishment of the emperor's
authority. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang promised him aid and set out for Ajmer.
The Jats meanwhile had extended their dominion northwards and
had occupied Nimrana, which lay in Zu-'l-Fiqar's way. Though they
## p. 432 (#470) ############################################
432 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
were not hostile to the emperor, the fortress was weakly held and a
cheap victory appealed strongly to Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang. The garrison
was expelled without difficulty, but the simple victor had but em-
broiled himself disastrously with the Jats. His illusory success turned
his head, and after some hesitation he recalled his advanced guard
and marched southward into the Jat country. Here an advanced
guard found the Jats in force, under Suraj Mal. At a moment when
a little resolution might have ensured the success of a mistaken enter-
prise his heart failed, and instead of advancing in person to the
support of his advanced guard, he ordered it to retire. Its retreat
demoralised the rest of his army, which was attacked and defeated
by the Jats. He then thought of fieeing to Delhi and leaving his
army, but his officers would not permit this. Suraj Mal, though
prepared to defend his own possessions, was loth to detain the impe-
rial officer, and he offered Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang easy terms and undertook
to fulfil his obligations to Bakht Singh and to send tribute from
Rajputana. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang continued his march to Narnaul, where
Bakht Singh resided, accompanied by his Jat ally. Bakht Singh did
not conceal his contempt for an ally of the Jats and would not permit
them to join in the settlement of disputes between Rajputs; and
ordered Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang to proceed to Ajmer. Suraj Mal returned
home in disgust and the submissive Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang was joined by
Bakht Singh at Ajmer and they marched towards Jodhpur. The
combined troops of Ram Singh and Khande Rao, son of Malhar Rao
Holkar, met them at Pipar. Bakht Singh warned Zu-l-Fiqar Jang
to beware of the Jodhpur artillery concealed in the centre of the
army, but the latter disregarded the warning. Fire was reserved
until his army, in close formation, was almost on the guns and was
then delivered with terrible effect, causing the whole mass to recoil.
The battle was not decided and Bakht Singh's troops were fresh,
but Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang had had enough of fighting and announced his
intention of coming to terms. Bakht Singh vainly urged the impor-
tance of establishing the imperial authority in Jodhpur, but Zu-'l-
Fiqar Jang persisted in his resolve. On the one side Bakht Singh and
on the other Khande Rao Holkar withdrew, leaving Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang
and Ram Singh to arrange their own terms. Zu-'l-Fiqar Jang accepted
300,000 rupees in ready money and a promise of supplies to be
delivered at various stages of his retreat and set out at once for
Delhi. The reason for his haste was the news of Safdar Jang's defeat
by Ahmad Khan. He assumed that the minister would at once be
dismissed and his folly and conceit encouraged him to hope that he
might secure the place, but Safdar Jang had already recovered his
position. After Zu-'l-Fiqar's return to Delhi his failure preyed upon
his mind. He begged the emperor to help him to discharge his debt
to his troops and, when his request was rejected, began to talk treason
1 26° 23' N. , 73° 33' E.
## p. 433 (#471) ############################################
DISPUTED SUCCESSION TO NIZAM-UL-MULK 433
among his companions. Finally, he attempted to enter the hall of
audience fully armed, to intimidate the emperor. Forbidden to
appear at court, he appeared no more in public. His property was
confiscated and he was deprived of his rank and of the title of Amir-
ul-Umara, which was conferred upon Ghazi-ud-din Khan, the eldest
son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk.
In the Deccan, Nizam-ul-Mulk had been succeeded in 1748 by his
second son, Nasir Jang. Ahmad Shah and Javid Khan had from the
first disliked Safdar Jang and had intended to confer the post of mini-
ster on Nizam-ul-Mulk. They sought to attach the powerful viceroy of
the Deccan to the court party and thus escape the domination of
Safdar Jang, and accordingly wrote private letters to Nasir Jang beg-
ging him to come to Delhi. He set out with a large army and arrived
at Burhanpur in April, 1749, but received another order cancelling
the summons. Safdar Jang had probably discovered the design of
the court party and had compelled the emperor to abandon it.
Nazir Jang was content to return, for his sister's son Muzaffar
Jang, who enjoyed the support of the French, had taken advantage
of his departure to rise in rebellion and at the instigation of Husain
Dost Khan the Navait, known as Chanda Sahib, and with the help
of a force of French troops supplied by M. Dupleix, had invaded the
lower Carnatic. Nasir Jang's campaign in the Carnatic and his
murder in December, 1750, have been described elsewhere. 2 A few
months later Muzaffar Jang, who was proclaimed by the French
viceroy of the Deccan, shared the same fate, and Bussy recognised as
his successor Salabat Jang, the third son of Nizam-ul-Mulk.
Nazir Jang, Muzaffar Jang, and Salabat Jang, as well as their
foreign supporters, had all assumed that Ghazi-ud-din Khan, eldest
son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk, had foregone his claim. Ghazi-ud-din,
though he had hitherto taken no steps to dispute Nasir Jang's acces-
sion, early in 1751 demanded of the emperor a commission as viceroy
of the Deccan in succession to his father. The issue of orders was
delayed by the courtiers' claim that he should purchase his office
with the customary large payment in which they hoped to share and
by Ghazi-ud-din's demand that it should be free of cost.
This dispute was interrupted by the third 3 invasion of India by
Ahmad Shah Abdali, who crossed the frontier at the end of 1751,
and at the same time sent an envoy to Delhi, demanding the cession
of the Punjab and Multan. Muʻin-ul-Mulk the governor withstood
the invader for four months and would probably have compelled
1 His other titles were Firuz Jang and 'Imad-ul-Mulk.
2 See chap, XIII, p. 386, and vol. V, pp. 127 sqq.
3 The author of the Siyar-ul-Mutaakhkhirin misnumbers all Ahmad Shah
Abdali's invasions, making the first the second, and so on. Ahmad Shah, as one of
Nadir Shah's officers, accompanied him on his expedition to India and Sayyid
Ghulam Husain Khan Tabatabai apparently reckons this as the Abdali's first
invasion
28
## p. 434 (#472) ############################################
434 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH 'ALAM
him to retire had it not been for the treachery of Adina Beg Khan,
who suggested an ill-timed sortie, of which notice was given to the
invaders, and which failed.
As usual the emperor and his courtiers were overcome with terror.
Safdar Jang, who had not returned to the capital since his successes
against the Bangash Afghans and the Rohillas, received pressing
messages asking him to bring to court Malhar Rao Holkar and other
allies.
