Without this last
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use.
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use.
William Smith - 1844 - Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities - a
The definition must be clear and dis-
preinises. Thereupon, in the second book of the rinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavour-
Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion ing first to define the particular, in order to become
according to its peculiar determining principles acquainted with the import of it in every species.
(Anal. ii
. 1—15), points out errors and deficiencies The use of definition is especially important in
in concluding (cc. 16–21), and teaches how to proposing problenis. (Anal. post. ii. 14. )
refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete argu- Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Meta-
ments, which have for their object subjective con- physics, or in the particular sciences, proceed ac-
viction only. (cc. 22–27. )
cording to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he
We do not arrive at that conclusion which is develops them in the Organon; but the definition
the foundation of knowledge til we arrive at (ógiouós) forms the central point in the further
proof, i. e, a conclusion conveying a distinct prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He
meaning (συλλογισμός επιστημονικός, απόδειξις), forms his conception of the idea of a thing (το τι
which proceeds from the essential definitions of tv elva) in the identity of its existence and essence,
the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead and so continually points out the universal in the
to objective truth, necessarily presupposes prin particular.
ciples. Without an acquaintance with princi-
VII. METAPHYSICS.
ples. we cannot attain to knowledge by means of
proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the na- The first philosophy (for such is the name Aris-
ture of principles. They are the Universal, which totle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the
serves as a medium through which alone we can science of the first principles and causes of things.
attain to knowledge; they have their certainty in (Meh. ii. 3, 4. ) li' is theoretic science, and the
themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional most excellent, but at the same time the most
separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle difficult of all sciences, because its object, the uni-
compares them with the immediate certainty of versal, is removed as far as possible from the per-
sensuous perceptions. The reason (voûs) and the ceptions of the senses. (Met. i. 2. ) It is, however,
exertion of the reason (vonois), which is itself the at the same time the most accurate science, because
Universal, develops these principles (apxás) out of its subject matter is most knowable; and the most
itself.
free, because it is sought solely for the sake of
In proof we may distinguish three things : knowledge.
1. That which is proved (Anal. post. i. 7), i. e. There are four first causes or principles of things:
that which is to pertain to some definite object a. The substance and the idea (ni ovoia kai 70 tí
(yével Tivi) considered in itself. 2. The principles v elval); 6. The subject and the matter (ý in
from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the Kal TÒ ÚTokeluevov); C. The principle of motion
attributes of which are to be exhibited. According (80ev apxo) Tas Kuhoews); d. The purpose and
to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer the good (TÒ éveka kal tò ayabów). The earlier
relation to the particular sciences. Here the im- philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book
portant point is, to know what science is more
of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these
accurate, and may be presupposed as the ground classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connex-
work of another (Trpotépa &oti). The knowledge ion. With full consciousness he declares, after
to which proof conducts by means of principles having developed the history of metaphysics froin
(ÉMIOTÝMT) has for its object necessary existence; the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and mas-
conception (86ļa), on the other hand, bas for its terly outlines, that this science of the first philoso-
object that which may be otherwise constituted: phy had up to his time resembled a lisping child
After Aristotle, in the first book of the second(vernicovévm, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk. ).
Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we The consciousness of the opposition between
may receive a knowledge that something is, and truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition
why it is so, he considers that which we cannot get of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philo-
at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the sophizing. This consciousness, which has come out
complete development of our ideas, viz. the defini- in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the
tion of that which is substantial, by means of which most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But
we have stated what an object is. This is effected he has it in the form of doubts (åtopiai), which
by definition (ópiouós). The definition states what rise against science itself and its definitions. These
the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on
universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following
any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by result:-
i
## p. 337 (#357) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
337
ARISTOTELES.
We
Ced
The
de a
des:
be
136
Ans
1. There is a science which considers existence 3. The third kind of substance is that in which
as such, and the definitions pertaining to it as dúvapus, évépzela, and évtedexeca are united ; the
such. 2. It is not the same with any one of the absolute substance; the eternal, unmoved; but which
particular sciences, for all these consider only a is at the same time motive, is pure activity (actus
part of what exists and its attributes. 3. The purus, Met. xii. 6, ix. 8, xii. 7), is God himself.
principies and highest causes of things must have a
This substance is without matter, and so also is
nature appropriate only to them.
not a magnitude.
Existence is indeed defined in various ways, and The chief momentum in the Aristotelian philo-
denotes at one time the What and the idea, at sophy is, that thought and the subject of thought
another time the condition or constitution, magni- are one; that what is objective and thought (the
tude, &c. , of a thing ; of all the definitions, how- évépyera) are one and the sune. God himself is
ever, the What, which denotes the substance, is eternal thought, and his thought is operation, life,
the first. (Met. vii. 1. p. 1028, Bekk. ) All other action,-it is the thought of thought. Objects
definitions only state attributes or qualities of this exist in their truth only in so far as they are the
first definition, and are not in their nature inde subjects of thought, are thoughts. That is their
pendent, or capable of being separated from the essence (ovola). In nature, indeed, the idea
substance. On the other hand, the idea of sub- exists not as a thought, but as a body; it has,
stance (ovola) lies at the foundation of our ideas of however, a soul, and this is its idea. In saying
everything, and we do not arrive at the cognition this, Aristotle stands upon the highest point of
of anything when we know how great, or where, speculation : God, as a living God, is the universe.
&c. , it is, but when we know what it The In the course of the investigation, Aristotle, with
question, therefore, is, What is the substance ? careful regard to, and examination of, the views of
(ris o ovola ;) which has ever been the object earlier philosophers, points out that neither ab-
of philosophical investigation. (Met. vii. 1. p. stractly universal, nor particular, sensuously per-
1028. ) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of ceptible essences can be looked upon as principles
substances: 1. Substance perceptible by the senses of existence. Neither the universal apart from the
(Met. xii. 1, 2, vii. 7), which is finite and pe particular, nor the particular by itself, can be a
rishable, like single sensible objects. The mo principle of the natural and spiritual world; but
menta of this sensible substance are, - a. the the absolute principle is God, -the highest reason,
matter, that which is fundamental, constant; b. the object of whose thought is himself. Thus the
particular things, the negative in relation to each dominion of the Anaxagorean vous was declared in
other ; c. the motive principle, the pure form or a profounder manner by Aristotle. In the divine
cidos. 2. The second higher kind of substance is thought, existence is at the same time implied.
that which may be perceived by the senses, but is Thought is the sum and substance of the universe,
imperishable, such as the heavenly bodies. Here and realizes itself in the eternal immutable furni-
the active principle (évépyela, actus) steps in, ative principles which, as the essences indwelling
which, in so far as it contains that which is to be (immanent) in the material, fashion themselves so
produced, is understanding (vous). That which it as to assume an individual existence. In man, the
contains is the purpose, which is realized by means thought of the divine reason completes itself so as
of the evėpyera. The two extremes are here po- to become the self-conscious activity of thinking
tentiality and agency (matter and thought), the reason. By it he recognizes in the objective world
passive universal and the active universal. These his own nature again, and so attains to the cogni-
iwo are not subject to change. That which is tion of truth. With these slight intimations, we
changed is the particular thing, and passes from must here leave the subject.
one into the other by means of something else by VIII. THE PARTICULAR SCIENCES.
which it is moved. The purpose, in so far as it Respecting the Essence of the Particular Sciences,
is the motive principle, is called the cause ( ápxý), and the division of them into Theoretical and Prac-
but, in so far as it is the purpose, it is the reason, tical Sciences. The science of the particular can
aitla. (Mel. v. 1, 2. ) The active principle gives
reality to that wbich it contains in itself: this re thing, the potentiality must pass into actuality.
mains the same: it is still, however, matter, which the principle of the transition from the potential
is different from the active principle, though both to the actual in a thing Aristotle calls entelecheia
are combined. That which combines them is the ! (Td erteles é xov), because it unites both the
form, the union of both. The relation of the potentiality and the actuality. Every union of
newly coined idea of évteléxeia, or the purpose potentiality and actuality is a motion, and accord-
realized by the formative principle, to the idea of ingly the entelecheia is the principle of motion (o
ενέργεια, is this : εντελέχεια signifies in the dif-του δυνάμει όντος εντελέχεια, ή τοιούτον, κίνησις
ferent grades of existence the completion which is doti). The potentiality (Súvauis) can never be-
in conformity with each single existing thing ; come actuality (évéoyela) without entelecheia ; but
and évépyeta denotes the actuality which is in the entelecheia also cannot dispense with the poten-
conformity with this completion. (Metaph. ix. 3, tiality. If the entelecheia does not manifest itself
p. 179. 8, Brand. ) Thus the soul is essentially in a thing, it is merely a thing kata duvapiv ;
εντελέχεια. *
if it does manifest itself, it becomes a thing kat'
évéprerav. The same thing is often both together,
The actuality of each thing presupposes an the former in reference to qualities which it has
original internal potentiality, which is in itself not yet, but can obtain; the latter in reference to
only conceivable, not perceptible. The potenti attributes already actually present in it. (Buhle,
ality of a thing is followed by its actuality in in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie. )
reference either to mere existence or to action. • Met. xii. p. 1074, Bekk. , autóv åpa voci ennep
This actuality is ενέργεια, αctus, and is perceptible. έστι το κράτιστον και έστιν η νύησις, νοήσεως
Lut, that the potential thing may become a real vómois.
ke at
294
a
a. net
21
2
## p. 338 (#358) ############################################
338
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
1
1
1
exist only when the essence of the particular, the vows fa&ntikus the sensible, finite world is a ne
vontov, i, e. the conceivable, the reasonable, is cessary production of cognition. It attains to the
perceived. (Met. vii. 6. ) It presupposes the cognition of nothing without sensuous perception.
principles of the intellectual and real, and has But it is only the vous #OINTIKOS which attains to
reference to that which is demonstrable from them. the cognition of the complete truth of the sensible
The individual sciences deduce from principles the world, and here rice versá the proposition holds
truth of the particular by means of proof, which is good: nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in in-
the foundation of knowledge. Their limit consists tellectu.
in this : that the individual science sets out from Reason is either theoretical or practical reason
something presupposed, which is recognized, and (de Anim. iii. 10). The object of the first is the
deduces the rest from this by means of conclusion cognition of truth (of the universal, the unchange
(syllogism). That operation of the mind which able); the object of the other is the realisation, by
refers the particular to the universal, is the reflect- means of action, of the truth, the cognition of
ing understanding (Orávoia), which is opposed as which has been attained. (Metaph. ii. 1. ) Prac-
well to sensuous perception as to the higher opera- tical reason, therefore, is directed to the particular
tion of the reason. With it the difference between and individual, which is determined and regulated
existence and thought, between truth and false by the universal. (Eth. Nic. vi. 12. ) The scientific
hood, becomes a matter of consciousness.
treatment of the moral (ethics and politics) has,
Every single science has reference to a definite ob- therefore, to investigate not so much what virtue
ject (γένος, Αnal. post. 1. 28, Met. xi. 7), and seeks is ( ου γαρ ίν' είδωμεν τι εστιν η αρετή σκεπτομεθα,
certain principles and causes of it. The particular Eth. Nic. ii. 2), as rather how we may becomie vir-
object therefore determines the science, and every tuous (axx' iv dyatol yevuueda).
Without this last
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use. The difference be-
liar to it, i. e. out of the essential definitions of the tween action and the exercise of the creative power
particular object. Three things are presupposed (apátter and foreiv) in the province of practical
for every particular science : a. That its object, reason, is the foundation of the difference between
and the essential definitions of that object (i. e, the morality and art. What is common to both is,
principles peculiar to it), exist. 1. The common that the commencing point of the activity lies
principles (axioms), and c. The signification of the here in the subject (Met. xi. 7), and that the ob-
essential attributes of the object. According to ject of the activity has reference to that which
their common principles, all sciences are mutually admits of different modes of existence. (Eth. Nic.
connected. Such common principles are, for ex- vi. 4. ) The difference, thererefore, between the
ample, the law of contradiction.
two is this: that in action (Tpártev) the pur-
The accuracy (dxpibera) of the single sciences pose lies in the activity itself in the mpaktov),
depends on the nature of their objects. The less whereby the will of the actor manifests itself, while
this is an object of sense, the more accurate is the in the exercise of the creative power (Foreiv) it
science of it. (Met. xiii. 3; Anal. post. i. 27; lies in the work produced. (Metaph. vi. l;
Met. iv. 1, i. 2. ) Therefore metaphysics is the Mam. Mor. i. 35. )
most accurate, but also the most difficult science. The theoretical sciences have to do with that
A knowledge of the kind of scientific treatment which exists in accordance with the idea, and can
which the subject in hand requires must be ac- be deduced from it. Their object is either, a, the
quired by intellectual cultivation. To wish to universal, as it is the object of cognition to the
apply in all cases the method and schematism of abstracting understanding, which, however, is still
a philosophy, which in constructing its theories restricted to one side of the material, to the quan-
begins from the fundamental idea (dxpibus), is titative (Mlet. xiii. 2),— accordingly td áxiunta
pedantic (aven eúðepov, Met. i. 1, p. 29, Brand). all'où xwplotá; or, b. the universal, as by
Natural science, for example, does not admit of the means of the formative principles, which give it
application of a mere abstract definition of the some definitive shape, it attains to existence in the
idea, for it has to take into consideration as well essences of natural things (τα αχώριστα άλλ' ουκ
the manifold, as also the accidental. The same asívnta); c. or lastiy, their object is the universal,
may be said of the province of practical science, as it exhibits itself as necessary existence (Tò aidov
where, in ethics and politics, universal, thorough kal drivntov kal xwplotóv). Out of these the
definitions are not always possible, but the true theoretic sciences of mathematics, physics, and
can often be exhibited only in outline (év TÚTY, theology develop themselves, as well as the prac-
Eth. Nic. i. 1, ii. 2, ix. 2). For the practical has tical sciences, which have for their object action,
also to do with the individual, and therefore acci- morality in the individual and in the state (ethics,
dental. For that reason, experience and what is oeconomics, politics), or the exercise of the creative
matter of fact, have a high value as the proper faculty, and art (poetics, rhetoric).
basis of cognition. For the individual existence
A.
(TÓBE T1) with its formative principle, is the really
the
substantial; and
THE THEORETICAL SCIENCES.
sensuously perceptible
essences and those which are universal are almost
1. Natural Sciences.
the same natures (Met. xiii. 9, p. 1086, 2 Bekk. ) The science of Physics (ή φυσική, ή περί
It is only in the individual that the universal attains púoews & TIOThun) considers that existence which
reality.
is susceptible of motion. Its object is not the
The particular sciences have for their object the idea in its spiritual existence (TÓ Tí hv elvas),
cognition of the world of appearances in its essen- but the idea in its real existence in the material
tial characteristics. For this purpose the co-opera- (TÒ 71! 0T1). Natural existence has the origin of
tion of the senses is necessary. Therefore here motion in itself originally. Motion is change from
the proposition, nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit what exists to what exists. Nature, therefore, is
in sensu, holds good. (De Anim. iii. 8. ) In the no lifeless substratum, but an organization pose
## p. 339 (#359) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
339
ARISTOTELES.
ressed of life, a process of becoming and being | imitate the imperishablo (as e. g. earth and fire,
produced, in which the moving power, consisting in Met. ix. 8). "Things possessed of life produce
the formative principle, is that which gives it its in the process of generation an object of like kind
shape. In natural existence matter (tan), depri- with themselves (de Anim. ii. 4. 2), and so parti-
vation (otépnois), and the formative principle, are cipate in eternity as far as they can, since in their
in inseparable union. Matter is the foundation individual existence, as one according to number
of the manifold, for everything, according to the (év áp:0pą), they are not etemal. A constant
formative principle, which in itself is perfect, strives dynamical connexion exhibits itself in the process
to advance from it to that which is more perfect, of development of natural life, it aims at more and
till it attains to actuality. The internal formative more perfect formations, and makes the lower and
principle, on the other hand, is the basis of what less perfect forms a preliminary condition of the
is unchangeable in that which is manifold. For higher, so that the higher sphere comprehends also
the formative principle is in itself eternal and im- the lower. (De Caclo, iv. 3. ) Thus in the grada-
perishable, and is perishable only in so far as it tions of the elements between earth and heaven,
engenders itself in the material. Natural science the several elements are separated by no definite
considers the formative principles which in motion | limit, but pass insensibly from one to the other
and change continually reengender themselves. The (Phys. iv. 5; De Caclo, iv. 1, 4), and also in
formative principle and the purpose are the same, organisms possessed of life the same gradation,
only conceived of in a different relation :- the from the lower to the more and more perfect forms,
formative principle in relation to that which ac- shews itself. (De Anima, ii. 2, 3. ) Natural science
tually exists ; purpose, in relation to the why? of then must follow this process of development, for it
it. The identity of the two is the operative cause. is only in this way that it attains to a lively ap-
The relation of purpose is the highest cause, in prehension of nature.
which all physical causes concentrate themselves. To develop how Aristotle, according to these
(Phys. ii. 7-9. ) Wherever there is purpose there leading outlines, treats the particular natural
is activity (apátretai, Phys. ii. 8) in relation to sciences, how he first develops the gradations of
this purpose, and according to the activity of each the elements, the motion of the heavenly bodies,
thing, so is its natural constitution. Nature now and the unmoved moving principle, and then points
has a purpose, but it is independent of all reflection out the process of formation in inorganic and
and consideration. (Phys. I. c. ) It creates accord- organic nature, and lastly arrives at man, as the
ing to an unconscious impulse, and its activity is a end and centre of the entire creation, of which he
daemonical, but not a divine activity (vi gdp pois is the most complete organization (Polit. i. 8; Hist.
daluovia ai oủ Geichde Div. per Somn. c. 2). Anim. ix. l; De Partib. Anim. iv. 10), would
Sometimes it does not attain its object, because in lead us farther than our present limits allow. We
its formative process it cannot overpower the can only again direct attention to the excellent
material ; and then, through this partial frustration delineation, a perfect model of its kind, in the
of the purpose, abortions are produced. (Phys. l. c. , work of Biese above referred to, vol. ii. pp. 59–
de Gener. Anim. iv. 4. ) Nature therefore has the 216.
foundation of its development and existence in 2. Mathematics and the Mathematical Sciences.
itself,—is its own purpose ; it is an organic whole, Mathematics and Physics have the same objects
in which everything is in a state of vigorous reci- in common, but not in the same manner;
for
procal action, and exhibits a series of gradations mathematics abstract from the concrete attributes
from the less perfect to the more perfect. The of sensible things, and consider, only the quantitative.
fashioning active principle is the cloos, and this (Met. xiii
. 3. ) This is the only side of that which
when perfected is εντελέχεια and ενέργεια, in con- is material on which the understanding (διάνοια)
trast with which the material, as the merely po- dwells, where it considers the universal in the
tential, is the lower principle. The connecting way in which it is presented by the abstractive
link between the two is motion, the process of be power of the understanding. This mode of pro-
coming ; accordingly motion is a condition in all cedure, however, does not admit of being applied
nature, and he who has not arrived at the cogni- in all cases (Phys. ii. 2); and mathematics, from
tion of motion does not understand nature. (Phys. their very nature, cannot rise above the material
iii. 1. ) Motion is the means by which everything and reach real existence as such. The investi-
strives to advance from potentiality (matter) to that gations of this science are restricted to one part of
actuality, of which, according to its nature, it is material existence (nepi 71 mépos tñs oikelas üans
capable, i. e. to the form appropriate to it, which is TOLE Tai tiiv Jewplav, Met. xi. 4).
its purpose. The eloos is thus what is true in the The relation between the three theoretical sci-
visible object, but not apart from the process of be- ences, therefore, is this : the science of physics
coming; but it is the basis of this process of becom- busies itself indeed with the internal formative
ing itself, inasmuch as it is the active, fashioning principle, with that which has an absolute exist-
principle. The true principle of natural science, ence, but only in so far as this has passed into the
Therefore, lies in the dynamico-genetical method, material, and is accordingly not immoveable. (Met.
which looks upon nature as something continually vi. 1, xii. 7. )
becoming, as it strives to advance froin potentiality The science of mathematics, on the other hand,
to actuality. Motion itself is eternal and unpro- occupies itself indeed with that which is immove-
duced ; it is the life (olov {uni tis oùoa) in all able and at rest, as its definitions are fixed and
natural things. (Phys. viii. 1. ) Through this unalterable; but not with that which is absolutely
striving of all natural existences after the imper- immoveable, but immoveable in so far as it is con-
ishable, everything is in some sort filled with soul. nected with matter.
(De Gener. Anim. iii. 11. ) The elementary bodies, The science of metaphysics, lastly, occupies itsell
considered in themselves, have motion in them with that which exists really and absolutely, with
selves reciprocally produce each other, and so that which is cternal and immoveable.
3
z 2
## p. 340 (#360) ############################################
340
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
i
Mathematics, therefore, stand half-way between good circumstances as means of virtue. Virtnes
physics and metaphysics. (Met. i. 6, p. 20, 23, are of two kinds, either intellectual virtues (dia-
i. 9, p. 33, 23, xi. 1. p. 212, 22.
preinises. Thereupon, in the second book of the rinct. This distinctness is attained by endeavour-
Analytics, he treats of the complete conclusion ing first to define the particular, in order to become
according to its peculiar determining principles acquainted with the import of it in every species.
(Anal. ii
. 1—15), points out errors and deficiencies The use of definition is especially important in
in concluding (cc. 16–21), and teaches how to proposing problenis. (Anal. post. ii. 14. )
refer to the syllogistic figures incomplete argu- Aristotle, however, does not, either in his Meta-
ments, which have for their object subjective con- physics, or in the particular sciences, proceed ac-
viction only. (cc. 22–27. )
cording to the abstract forms of conclusion, as he
We do not arrive at that conclusion which is develops them in the Organon; but the definition
the foundation of knowledge til we arrive at (ógiouós) forms the central point in the further
proof, i. e, a conclusion conveying a distinct prosecution of his philosophical investigations. He
meaning (συλλογισμός επιστημονικός, απόδειξις), forms his conception of the idea of a thing (το τι
which proceeds from the essential definitions of tv elva) in the identity of its existence and essence,
the matter in question. Proof, in order to lead and so continually points out the universal in the
to objective truth, necessarily presupposes prin particular.
ciples. Without an acquaintance with princi-
VII. METAPHYSICS.
ples. we cannot attain to knowledge by means of
proof. Aristotle, therefore, treats first of the na- The first philosophy (for such is the name Aris-
ture of principles. They are the Universal, which totle gives to what we call Metaphysics) is the
serves as a medium through which alone we can science of the first principles and causes of things.
attain to knowledge; they have their certainty in (Meh. ii. 3, 4. ) li' is theoretic science, and the
themselves, and are not susceptible of any additional most excellent, but at the same time the most
separate proof. In this point of view Aristotle difficult of all sciences, because its object, the uni-
compares them with the immediate certainty of versal, is removed as far as possible from the per-
sensuous perceptions. The reason (voûs) and the ceptions of the senses. (Met. i. 2. ) It is, however,
exertion of the reason (vonois), which is itself the at the same time the most accurate science, because
Universal, develops these principles (apxás) out of its subject matter is most knowable; and the most
itself.
free, because it is sought solely for the sake of
In proof we may distinguish three things : knowledge.
1. That which is proved (Anal. post. i. 7), i. e. There are four first causes or principles of things:
that which is to pertain to some definite object a. The substance and the idea (ni ovoia kai 70 tí
(yével Tivi) considered in itself. 2. The principles v elval); 6. The subject and the matter (ý in
from which this is deduced. 3. The object, the Kal TÒ ÚTokeluevov); C. The principle of motion
attributes of which are to be exhibited. According (80ev apxo) Tas Kuhoews); d. The purpose and
to their subject-matter, proofs come into closer the good (TÒ éveka kal tò ayabów). The earlier
relation to the particular sciences. Here the im- philosophers (this Aristotle shews in the first book
portant point is, to know what science is more
of the Metaphysics) recognized indeed all these
accurate, and may be presupposed as the ground classes singly, but neither distinctly nor in connex-
work of another (Trpotépa &oti). The knowledge ion. With full consciousness he declares, after
to which proof conducts by means of principles having developed the history of metaphysics froin
(ÉMIOTÝMT) has for its object necessary existence; the Ionian philosophers to Plato in bold and mas-
conception (86ļa), on the other hand, bas for its terly outlines, that this science of the first philoso-
object that which may be otherwise constituted: phy had up to his time resembled a lisping child
After Aristotle, in the first book of the second(vernicovévm, Met. i. 10, p. 993, Bekk. ).
Analytics, has shewn how by means of proof we The consciousness of the opposition between
may receive a knowledge that something is, and truth existing in and for itself, and the cognition
why it is so, he considers that which we cannot get of it, must necessarily be presupposed in all philo-
at by means of proof, but which is necessary for the sophizing. This consciousness, which has come out
complete development of our ideas, viz. the defini- in all its distinctness only in the philosophy of the
tion of that which is substantial, by means of which most recent times, Aristotle also possesses. But
we have stated what an object is. This is effected he has it in the form of doubts (åtopiai), which
by definition (ópiouós). The definition states what rise against science itself and its definitions. These
the essence of a thing is, and is therefore always doubts and questions, then, Aristotle considers on
universal and affirmative. It cannot be proved by all sides, and therefrom arrives at the following
any conclusion, nor even be demonstrated by result:-
i
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ARISTOTELES.
337
ARISTOTELES.
We
Ced
The
de a
des:
be
136
Ans
1. There is a science which considers existence 3. The third kind of substance is that in which
as such, and the definitions pertaining to it as dúvapus, évépzela, and évtedexeca are united ; the
such. 2. It is not the same with any one of the absolute substance; the eternal, unmoved; but which
particular sciences, for all these consider only a is at the same time motive, is pure activity (actus
part of what exists and its attributes. 3. The purus, Met. xii. 6, ix. 8, xii. 7), is God himself.
principies and highest causes of things must have a
This substance is without matter, and so also is
nature appropriate only to them.
not a magnitude.
Existence is indeed defined in various ways, and The chief momentum in the Aristotelian philo-
denotes at one time the What and the idea, at sophy is, that thought and the subject of thought
another time the condition or constitution, magni- are one; that what is objective and thought (the
tude, &c. , of a thing ; of all the definitions, how- évépyera) are one and the sune. God himself is
ever, the What, which denotes the substance, is eternal thought, and his thought is operation, life,
the first. (Met. vii. 1. p. 1028, Bekk. ) All other action,-it is the thought of thought. Objects
definitions only state attributes or qualities of this exist in their truth only in so far as they are the
first definition, and are not in their nature inde subjects of thought, are thoughts. That is their
pendent, or capable of being separated from the essence (ovola). In nature, indeed, the idea
substance. On the other hand, the idea of sub- exists not as a thought, but as a body; it has,
stance (ovola) lies at the foundation of our ideas of however, a soul, and this is its idea. In saying
everything, and we do not arrive at the cognition this, Aristotle stands upon the highest point of
of anything when we know how great, or where, speculation : God, as a living God, is the universe.
&c. , it is, but when we know what it The In the course of the investigation, Aristotle, with
question, therefore, is, What is the substance ? careful regard to, and examination of, the views of
(ris o ovola ;) which has ever been the object earlier philosophers, points out that neither ab-
of philosophical investigation. (Met. vii. 1. p. stractly universal, nor particular, sensuously per-
1028. ) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of ceptible essences can be looked upon as principles
substances: 1. Substance perceptible by the senses of existence. Neither the universal apart from the
(Met. xii. 1, 2, vii. 7), which is finite and pe particular, nor the particular by itself, can be a
rishable, like single sensible objects. The mo principle of the natural and spiritual world; but
menta of this sensible substance are, - a. the the absolute principle is God, -the highest reason,
matter, that which is fundamental, constant; b. the object of whose thought is himself. Thus the
particular things, the negative in relation to each dominion of the Anaxagorean vous was declared in
other ; c. the motive principle, the pure form or a profounder manner by Aristotle. In the divine
cidos. 2. The second higher kind of substance is thought, existence is at the same time implied.
that which may be perceived by the senses, but is Thought is the sum and substance of the universe,
imperishable, such as the heavenly bodies. Here and realizes itself in the eternal immutable furni-
the active principle (évépyela, actus) steps in, ative principles which, as the essences indwelling
which, in so far as it contains that which is to be (immanent) in the material, fashion themselves so
produced, is understanding (vous). That which it as to assume an individual existence. In man, the
contains is the purpose, which is realized by means thought of the divine reason completes itself so as
of the evėpyera. The two extremes are here po- to become the self-conscious activity of thinking
tentiality and agency (matter and thought), the reason. By it he recognizes in the objective world
passive universal and the active universal. These his own nature again, and so attains to the cogni-
iwo are not subject to change. That which is tion of truth. With these slight intimations, we
changed is the particular thing, and passes from must here leave the subject.
one into the other by means of something else by VIII. THE PARTICULAR SCIENCES.
which it is moved. The purpose, in so far as it Respecting the Essence of the Particular Sciences,
is the motive principle, is called the cause ( ápxý), and the division of them into Theoretical and Prac-
but, in so far as it is the purpose, it is the reason, tical Sciences. The science of the particular can
aitla. (Mel. v. 1, 2. ) The active principle gives
reality to that wbich it contains in itself: this re thing, the potentiality must pass into actuality.
mains the same: it is still, however, matter, which the principle of the transition from the potential
is different from the active principle, though both to the actual in a thing Aristotle calls entelecheia
are combined. That which combines them is the ! (Td erteles é xov), because it unites both the
form, the union of both. The relation of the potentiality and the actuality. Every union of
newly coined idea of évteléxeia, or the purpose potentiality and actuality is a motion, and accord-
realized by the formative principle, to the idea of ingly the entelecheia is the principle of motion (o
ενέργεια, is this : εντελέχεια signifies in the dif-του δυνάμει όντος εντελέχεια, ή τοιούτον, κίνησις
ferent grades of existence the completion which is doti). The potentiality (Súvauis) can never be-
in conformity with each single existing thing ; come actuality (évéoyela) without entelecheia ; but
and évépyeta denotes the actuality which is in the entelecheia also cannot dispense with the poten-
conformity with this completion. (Metaph. ix. 3, tiality. If the entelecheia does not manifest itself
p. 179. 8, Brand. ) Thus the soul is essentially in a thing, it is merely a thing kata duvapiv ;
εντελέχεια. *
if it does manifest itself, it becomes a thing kat'
évéprerav. The same thing is often both together,
The actuality of each thing presupposes an the former in reference to qualities which it has
original internal potentiality, which is in itself not yet, but can obtain; the latter in reference to
only conceivable, not perceptible. The potenti attributes already actually present in it. (Buhle,
ality of a thing is followed by its actuality in in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopädie. )
reference either to mere existence or to action. • Met. xii. p. 1074, Bekk. , autóv åpa voci ennep
This actuality is ενέργεια, αctus, and is perceptible. έστι το κράτιστον και έστιν η νύησις, νοήσεως
Lut, that the potential thing may become a real vómois.
ke at
294
a
a. net
21
2
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338
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
1
1
1
exist only when the essence of the particular, the vows fa&ntikus the sensible, finite world is a ne
vontov, i, e. the conceivable, the reasonable, is cessary production of cognition. It attains to the
perceived. (Met. vii. 6. ) It presupposes the cognition of nothing without sensuous perception.
principles of the intellectual and real, and has But it is only the vous #OINTIKOS which attains to
reference to that which is demonstrable from them. the cognition of the complete truth of the sensible
The individual sciences deduce from principles the world, and here rice versá the proposition holds
truth of the particular by means of proof, which is good: nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in in-
the foundation of knowledge. Their limit consists tellectu.
in this : that the individual science sets out from Reason is either theoretical or practical reason
something presupposed, which is recognized, and (de Anim. iii. 10). The object of the first is the
deduces the rest from this by means of conclusion cognition of truth (of the universal, the unchange
(syllogism). That operation of the mind which able); the object of the other is the realisation, by
refers the particular to the universal, is the reflect- means of action, of the truth, the cognition of
ing understanding (Orávoia), which is opposed as which has been attained. (Metaph. ii. 1. ) Prac-
well to sensuous perception as to the higher opera- tical reason, therefore, is directed to the particular
tion of the reason. With it the difference between and individual, which is determined and regulated
existence and thought, between truth and false by the universal. (Eth. Nic. vi. 12. ) The scientific
hood, becomes a matter of consciousness.
treatment of the moral (ethics and politics) has,
Every single science has reference to a definite ob- therefore, to investigate not so much what virtue
ject (γένος, Αnal. post. 1. 28, Met. xi. 7), and seeks is ( ου γαρ ίν' είδωμεν τι εστιν η αρετή σκεπτομεθα,
certain principles and causes of it. The particular Eth. Nic. ii. 2), as rather how we may becomie vir-
object therefore determines the science, and every tuous (axx' iv dyatol yevuueda).
Without this last
science deduces the proof out of the principles pecu- object it would be of no use. The difference be-
liar to it, i. e. out of the essential definitions of the tween action and the exercise of the creative power
particular object. Three things are presupposed (apátter and foreiv) in the province of practical
for every particular science : a. That its object, reason, is the foundation of the difference between
and the essential definitions of that object (i. e, the morality and art. What is common to both is,
principles peculiar to it), exist. 1. The common that the commencing point of the activity lies
principles (axioms), and c. The signification of the here in the subject (Met. xi. 7), and that the ob-
essential attributes of the object. According to ject of the activity has reference to that which
their common principles, all sciences are mutually admits of different modes of existence. (Eth. Nic.
connected. Such common principles are, for ex- vi. 4. ) The difference, thererefore, between the
ample, the law of contradiction.
two is this: that in action (Tpártev) the pur-
The accuracy (dxpibera) of the single sciences pose lies in the activity itself in the mpaktov),
depends on the nature of their objects. The less whereby the will of the actor manifests itself, while
this is an object of sense, the more accurate is the in the exercise of the creative power (Foreiv) it
science of it. (Met. xiii. 3; Anal. post. i. 27; lies in the work produced. (Metaph. vi. l;
Met. iv. 1, i. 2. ) Therefore metaphysics is the Mam. Mor. i. 35. )
most accurate, but also the most difficult science. The theoretical sciences have to do with that
A knowledge of the kind of scientific treatment which exists in accordance with the idea, and can
which the subject in hand requires must be ac- be deduced from it. Their object is either, a, the
quired by intellectual cultivation. To wish to universal, as it is the object of cognition to the
apply in all cases the method and schematism of abstracting understanding, which, however, is still
a philosophy, which in constructing its theories restricted to one side of the material, to the quan-
begins from the fundamental idea (dxpibus), is titative (Mlet. xiii. 2),— accordingly td áxiunta
pedantic (aven eúðepov, Met. i. 1, p. 29, Brand). all'où xwplotá; or, b. the universal, as by
Natural science, for example, does not admit of the means of the formative principles, which give it
application of a mere abstract definition of the some definitive shape, it attains to existence in the
idea, for it has to take into consideration as well essences of natural things (τα αχώριστα άλλ' ουκ
the manifold, as also the accidental. The same asívnta); c. or lastiy, their object is the universal,
may be said of the province of practical science, as it exhibits itself as necessary existence (Tò aidov
where, in ethics and politics, universal, thorough kal drivntov kal xwplotóv). Out of these the
definitions are not always possible, but the true theoretic sciences of mathematics, physics, and
can often be exhibited only in outline (év TÚTY, theology develop themselves, as well as the prac-
Eth. Nic. i. 1, ii. 2, ix. 2). For the practical has tical sciences, which have for their object action,
also to do with the individual, and therefore acci- morality in the individual and in the state (ethics,
dental. For that reason, experience and what is oeconomics, politics), or the exercise of the creative
matter of fact, have a high value as the proper faculty, and art (poetics, rhetoric).
basis of cognition. For the individual existence
A.
(TÓBE T1) with its formative principle, is the really
the
substantial; and
THE THEORETICAL SCIENCES.
sensuously perceptible
essences and those which are universal are almost
1. Natural Sciences.
the same natures (Met. xiii. 9, p. 1086, 2 Bekk. ) The science of Physics (ή φυσική, ή περί
It is only in the individual that the universal attains púoews & TIOThun) considers that existence which
reality.
is susceptible of motion. Its object is not the
The particular sciences have for their object the idea in its spiritual existence (TÓ Tí hv elvas),
cognition of the world of appearances in its essen- but the idea in its real existence in the material
tial characteristics. For this purpose the co-opera- (TÒ 71! 0T1). Natural existence has the origin of
tion of the senses is necessary. Therefore here motion in itself originally. Motion is change from
the proposition, nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit what exists to what exists. Nature, therefore, is
in sensu, holds good. (De Anim. iii. 8. ) In the no lifeless substratum, but an organization pose
## p. 339 (#359) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
339
ARISTOTELES.
ressed of life, a process of becoming and being | imitate the imperishablo (as e. g. earth and fire,
produced, in which the moving power, consisting in Met. ix. 8). "Things possessed of life produce
the formative principle, is that which gives it its in the process of generation an object of like kind
shape. In natural existence matter (tan), depri- with themselves (de Anim. ii. 4. 2), and so parti-
vation (otépnois), and the formative principle, are cipate in eternity as far as they can, since in their
in inseparable union. Matter is the foundation individual existence, as one according to number
of the manifold, for everything, according to the (év áp:0pą), they are not etemal. A constant
formative principle, which in itself is perfect, strives dynamical connexion exhibits itself in the process
to advance from it to that which is more perfect, of development of natural life, it aims at more and
till it attains to actuality. The internal formative more perfect formations, and makes the lower and
principle, on the other hand, is the basis of what less perfect forms a preliminary condition of the
is unchangeable in that which is manifold. For higher, so that the higher sphere comprehends also
the formative principle is in itself eternal and im- the lower. (De Caclo, iv. 3. ) Thus in the grada-
perishable, and is perishable only in so far as it tions of the elements between earth and heaven,
engenders itself in the material. Natural science the several elements are separated by no definite
considers the formative principles which in motion | limit, but pass insensibly from one to the other
and change continually reengender themselves. The (Phys. iv. 5; De Caclo, iv. 1, 4), and also in
formative principle and the purpose are the same, organisms possessed of life the same gradation,
only conceived of in a different relation :- the from the lower to the more and more perfect forms,
formative principle in relation to that which ac- shews itself. (De Anima, ii. 2, 3. ) Natural science
tually exists ; purpose, in relation to the why? of then must follow this process of development, for it
it. The identity of the two is the operative cause. is only in this way that it attains to a lively ap-
The relation of purpose is the highest cause, in prehension of nature.
which all physical causes concentrate themselves. To develop how Aristotle, according to these
(Phys. ii. 7-9. ) Wherever there is purpose there leading outlines, treats the particular natural
is activity (apátretai, Phys. ii. 8) in relation to sciences, how he first develops the gradations of
this purpose, and according to the activity of each the elements, the motion of the heavenly bodies,
thing, so is its natural constitution. Nature now and the unmoved moving principle, and then points
has a purpose, but it is independent of all reflection out the process of formation in inorganic and
and consideration. (Phys. I. c. ) It creates accord- organic nature, and lastly arrives at man, as the
ing to an unconscious impulse, and its activity is a end and centre of the entire creation, of which he
daemonical, but not a divine activity (vi gdp pois is the most complete organization (Polit. i. 8; Hist.
daluovia ai oủ Geichde Div. per Somn. c. 2). Anim. ix. l; De Partib. Anim. iv. 10), would
Sometimes it does not attain its object, because in lead us farther than our present limits allow. We
its formative process it cannot overpower the can only again direct attention to the excellent
material ; and then, through this partial frustration delineation, a perfect model of its kind, in the
of the purpose, abortions are produced. (Phys. l. c. , work of Biese above referred to, vol. ii. pp. 59–
de Gener. Anim. iv. 4. ) Nature therefore has the 216.
foundation of its development and existence in 2. Mathematics and the Mathematical Sciences.
itself,—is its own purpose ; it is an organic whole, Mathematics and Physics have the same objects
in which everything is in a state of vigorous reci- in common, but not in the same manner;
for
procal action, and exhibits a series of gradations mathematics abstract from the concrete attributes
from the less perfect to the more perfect. The of sensible things, and consider, only the quantitative.
fashioning active principle is the cloos, and this (Met. xiii
. 3. ) This is the only side of that which
when perfected is εντελέχεια and ενέργεια, in con- is material on which the understanding (διάνοια)
trast with which the material, as the merely po- dwells, where it considers the universal in the
tential, is the lower principle. The connecting way in which it is presented by the abstractive
link between the two is motion, the process of be power of the understanding. This mode of pro-
coming ; accordingly motion is a condition in all cedure, however, does not admit of being applied
nature, and he who has not arrived at the cogni- in all cases (Phys. ii. 2); and mathematics, from
tion of motion does not understand nature. (Phys. their very nature, cannot rise above the material
iii. 1. ) Motion is the means by which everything and reach real existence as such. The investi-
strives to advance from potentiality (matter) to that gations of this science are restricted to one part of
actuality, of which, according to its nature, it is material existence (nepi 71 mépos tñs oikelas üans
capable, i. e. to the form appropriate to it, which is TOLE Tai tiiv Jewplav, Met. xi. 4).
its purpose. The eloos is thus what is true in the The relation between the three theoretical sci-
visible object, but not apart from the process of be- ences, therefore, is this : the science of physics
coming; but it is the basis of this process of becom- busies itself indeed with the internal formative
ing itself, inasmuch as it is the active, fashioning principle, with that which has an absolute exist-
principle. The true principle of natural science, ence, but only in so far as this has passed into the
Therefore, lies in the dynamico-genetical method, material, and is accordingly not immoveable. (Met.
which looks upon nature as something continually vi. 1, xii. 7. )
becoming, as it strives to advance froin potentiality The science of mathematics, on the other hand,
to actuality. Motion itself is eternal and unpro- occupies itself indeed with that which is immove-
duced ; it is the life (olov {uni tis oùoa) in all able and at rest, as its definitions are fixed and
natural things. (Phys. viii. 1. ) Through this unalterable; but not with that which is absolutely
striving of all natural existences after the imper- immoveable, but immoveable in so far as it is con-
ishable, everything is in some sort filled with soul. nected with matter.
(De Gener. Anim. iii. 11. ) The elementary bodies, The science of metaphysics, lastly, occupies itsell
considered in themselves, have motion in them with that which exists really and absolutely, with
selves reciprocally produce each other, and so that which is cternal and immoveable.
3
z 2
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340
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
i
Mathematics, therefore, stand half-way between good circumstances as means of virtue. Virtnes
physics and metaphysics. (Met. i. 6, p. 20, 23, are of two kinds, either intellectual virtues (dia-
i. 9, p. 33, 23, xi. 1. p. 212, 22.
