No More Learning

The
next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success.
Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as
well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and
took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived
on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the
assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the
bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in
order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their
presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience,
and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the
cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their
perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would
hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished
to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself
to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their
country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had
drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and
then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (_Nevers_). This
town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable
position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public
treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and,
lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt
of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of
Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as
of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of
Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre
the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share
amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the
hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away,
and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the
neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry
everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of
provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the
Narbonnese--a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire,
swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier
towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering
under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more
than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on
all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated
with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges,
irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute
the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or
retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter
course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the
passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt
the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted
to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order
to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before
the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that
river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at
Bourbon-Lancy. [500] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity
made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above
water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry
was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army
passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his
first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and
with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched
towards the land of the Senones. [501]


[Sidenote: Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii. ]

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus
had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an
island in the Seine, the _oppidum_ of the Parisii. After leaving his
baggage at Agedincum (_Sens_)[502] under the guard of the troops
recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left
bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important
streams and considerable towns. [503] At the news of his approach, the
enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The
command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this
honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in
the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh
sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of
the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops
along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (_See
Plate 23. _)

When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries
to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to
establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many
difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the
Seine at Melodunum (_Melun_), and, when once on the right bank, of
advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He
therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and,
retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an _oppidum_ of the Senones,
situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty
boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into
the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the
inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of
Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the
bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored
it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where
Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who
had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to
Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes
his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the _oppidum_, that
is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.

It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the
news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the
insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated
incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been
compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province.
The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the
revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for
war.

At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the
difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he
was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the
Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a
well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he
had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts
and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it
advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and
resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring.
Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should
not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not
have re-mounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising
the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left
bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he
convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of
his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the
Roman knights, with orders to descend the river at the end of the first
watch (ten o’clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles
(six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of
Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least
experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the
same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river
in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their
tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same
direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little
after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding
down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for
him.

When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise
the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank. The legions and cavalry
had soon passed the Seine with the assistance of the knights. Day began
to appear, when the enemy learnt, almost at the same instant, first,
that an unusual agitation prevailed in the Roman camp, that a
considerable column of troops was ascending the river, and that in the
same direction a great noise of oars was heard; lastly, that lower down
the stream the troops were crossing the Seine in boats. This news made
the Gauls believe that the legions intended to cross it on three points,
and that, perplexed by the defection of the Ædui, they had decided on
forcing the road by the left bank. [504] Camulogenus divided also his
forces into three corps: he left one opposite the Roman camp; sent the
second, less numerous, in the direction of Melodunum,[505] with
instructions to regulate its march according to the progress of the
enemy’s boats which re-ascended the Seine; and, at the head of the
third, went to meet Labienus.

At sunrise the Roman troops had crossed the river, and the enemy’s army
appeared drawn up in order of battle. Labienus exhorts his soldiers to
recall to mind their ancient valour, and so many glorious exploits, and,
as they marched to the combat, to consider themselves under the eye of
Cæsar, who had led them so often to victory: he then gives the signal.
At the first shock the 7th legion, placed on the right wing, routs the
enemy; but on the left wing, although the 12th legion had transpierced
the first ranks with their _pila_, the Gauls defend themselves
obstinately, and not one dreams of flight. Camulogenus, in the midst of
them, excites their ardour. The victory was still doubtful, when the
tribunes of the 7th legion, informed of the critical position of the
left wing, lead their soldiers to the back of the enemies, and take them
in the rear. The barbarians are surrounded, yet not one yields a step;
all die fighting, and Camulogenus perishes with the rest. The Gaulish
troops left opposite the camp of Labienus had hurried forward at the
first news of the combat, and had taken possession of a hill (probably
that of Vaugirard); but they did not sustain the attack of the
victorious Romans, and were hurried along in the general rout; all who
would not find refuge in the woods and on the heights were cut to pieces
by the cavalry.

After this battle Labienus returned to Agedincum; thence he marched with
all his troops, and went to join Cæsar. [506]


[Sidenote: The Gauls assume the offensive. ]

X. The desertion of the Ædui gave the war a greater development.
Deputies are sent in all directions: credit, authority, money,
everything is put in activity to excite the other states to revolt.
Masters of the hostages whom Cæsar had entrusted to them, the Ædui
threaten to put to death those who belong to the nations which hesitate.
In a general assembly of Gaul, convoked at Bibracte, at which the Remi,
the Lingones, and the Treviri only were absent, the supreme command is
conferred on Vercingetorix, in spite of the opposition of the Ædui, who
claim it, and who, seeing themselves rejected, begin to regret the
favours they had received from Cæsar. But they had pronounced for the
war, and no longer dare to separate themselves from the common cause.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of great promise, obey
Vercingetorix unwillingly. The latter begins by exacting from the other
states hostages to be delivered on a fixed day; orders that the cavalry,
amounting to 15,000 men, shall be gathered round his person; declares he
has infantry enough at Bibracte, for his intention is not to offer a
pitched battle to the Romans, but, with a numerous cavalry, to intercept
their convoys of grain and forage. He exhorts the Gauls to set fire
with a common accord to their habitations and crops, which are only
small sacrifices in comparison to their liberty. These measures having
been decided, he demands from the Ædui and the Segusiavi, who bordered
upon the Roman province, 10,000 foot soldiers, sends them 800 horse, and
gives the command of these troops to the brother of Eporedorix, with
orders to carry the war into the country of the Allobroges. On another
side, he orders the Gabali and the neighbouring cantons of the Arverni
to march against the Helvii, and sends the Ruteni and the Cadurci to lay
waste the country of the Volcæ Arecomici. At the same time, he labours
secretly to gain the Allobroges, in the hope that the remembrance of
their ancient struggles against the Romans is not yet effaced. He
promises money to their chiefs, and to their country the sovereignty
over the whole Narbonnese.

To meet these dangers, twenty-two cohorts, raised in the province, and
commanded by the lieutenant Lucius Cæsar,[507] had to face the enemy on
every side. The Helvii, faithful to the Romans, by their own impulse,
attacked their neighbours in the open field; but repulsed with loss, and
having to deplore the death of their chiefs, among others that of C.
Valerius Donnotaurus, they ventured no more outside their walls. As to
the Allobroges, they defended their territory with energy, by placing a
great number of posts along the Rhone. The superiority of the enemy in
cavalry, the interruption of the communications, the impossibility of
drawing succour from Italy or the province, decided Cæsar on demanding
from the German peoples on the other side of the Rhine, subdued the year
before, cavalry and light infantry accustomed to fight intermingled. On
their arrival, finding that the cavalry were not sufficiently well
mounted, he distributed amongst them the horses of the tribunes, and
even those of the Roman knights and the volunteers (_evocati_). [508]


[Sidenote: Junction of Cæsar and Labienus. Battle of the Vingeanne. ]

XI. The line of march followed by Cæsar after he had crossed the Loire
has been the subject of numerous controversies. Yet the “Commentaries”
appear to us to furnish sufficient data to determine it with precision.
On leaving Gergovia, Cæsar’s object was, as he tells us himself, to
effect a junction with Labienus; with this view, he marched towards the
land of the Senones, after having crossed the Loire at Bourbon-Lancy. On
his part, Labienus, after returning to Sens, having advanced to meet
Cæsar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of
the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point, in our opinion, is
Joigny. (_See Plate 19. _) Encamped not far from the confluence of the
Armançon and the Yonne, Cæsar could easily receive the contingent which
he expected from Germany.

The Roman army was composed of eleven legions: the 1st, lent by Pompey,
and the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th. [509]
The effective force of each of them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 men;
for, if we see (lib. V. 49) that on the return from Britain two legions
reckoned together only 7,000 men, their effective force was soon
increased by considerable re-enforcements which came to the army of Gaul
in 702;[510] the legion lent by Pompey was of 6,000 men;[511] and the
13th, at the breaking out of the civil war, had in its ranks 5,000
soldiers. [512] Cæsar had then at his disposal, during the campaigns
which ended with the taking of Alesia, 50,000 legionaries, and perhaps
20,000 Numidian or Cretan archers, and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, a
thousand of whom were Germans, making a total of about 75,000 men,
without counting the valets, who were always very numerous.

When the junction of the troops had been effected, Cæsar sought above
all to approach the Roman province, in order to carry succour to it with
more ease; he could not think of taking the most direct road, which
would have led him into the country of the Ædui, one of the centres of
the insurrection; he was, therefore, obliged to pass through the
territory of the Lingones, who had remained faithful to him, and to
proceed into Sequania, where Besançon offered an important place of
arms. (_See Plate 19. _) He started from Joigny, following the road which
he had taken when he marched to meet Ariovistus (696),[513] and the
winter before, when he moved from Vienne to Sens. After reaching the
Aube at Dancevoir, he proceeded towards the little river Vingeanne,
crossing, as the “Commentaries” say, the extreme part of the territory
of the Lingones (_per extremos Lingonum fines_). [514] His intention was,
no doubt, to cross the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler.

Whilst the Romans abandoned that part of Gaul which had revolted, in
order to approach nearer to the province, Vercingetorix had assembled
his army, amounting to more than 80,000 men, at Bibracte; it had come in
great part from the country of the Arverni, and counted in its ranks the
cavalry furnished by all the states. Having been informed of Cæsar’s
march, he started at the head of his troops, to bar the road through
Sequania. Passing, as we believe, by Arnay-le-Duc, Sombernon, Dijon, and
Thil-Châtel, he arrived at the heights of Occey, Sacquenay, and
Montormentier, where he formed three camps, at a distance of 10,000
paces (fifteen kilomètres) from the Roman army. (_See Plate 24. _) In
this position Vercingetorix intercepted the three roads which Cæsar
could have taken towards the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler, or
at Chalon. [515] Resolved on risking a battle, he convoked the chiefs of
the cavalry. “The moment of victory,” he told them, “has arrived; the
Romans fly into their province, and abandon Gaul. If this retreat
delivers us for the present, it ensures neither peace nor rest for the
future; they will return with greater forces, and the war will be
endless. We must attack them, therefore, in the disorder of their march;
for if the legions stop to defend their long convoy, they will not be
able to continue their road; or if, which is more probable, they abandon
their baggage in order to secure their own safety, they will lose what
is indispensable to them, and, at the same time, their prestige. As to
their cavalry, they will surely not dare to move away from the column;
that of the Gauls must show so much the more ardour, as the infantry,
ranged before the camp, will be there to intimidate the enemy. ” Then,
the cavalry exclaimed, “Let every one swear, by a solemn oath, never to
return to the home of his forefathers, his wife, or his children, if he
has not ridden twice through the ranks of the enemy! ” This proposition
was received with enthusiasm, and all took the oath.

The day on which Vercingetorix arrived on the heights of Sacquenay,[516]
Cæsar, as we have seen, encamped on the Vingeanne, near Longeau.
Ignorant of the presence of the Gauls, he started next day, in marching
column, the legions at a great distance from each other, separated by
their baggage. When his vanguard arrived near Dommarien, it could
perceive the hostile army. Vercingetorix was watching the moment they
(the Romans) debouched, to attack. He had divided his cavalry in three
bodies, and his infantry had descended from the heights of Sacquenay in
order to take a position along the Vingeanne and the Badin. (_See Plate
24. _) As soon as the vanguard of the enemy appears, Vercingetorix bars
its way with one of the bodies of cavalry, while the two others show
themselves in order of battle on the two wings of the Romans. Taken
unexpectedly, Cæsar divides his cavalry also into three bodies, and
opposes them to the enemy. The combat engages on all sides; the column
of the Roman army halts; the legions are brought into line, and the
baggage placed in the intervals. This order, in which the legions were,
no doubt, in column of three deep, was easy to execute, and presented
the advantages of a square. Wherever the cavalry gives way or is too
hotly pressed, Cæsar sends to its support the cohorts, which he draws
from the main body to range them in order of battle. [517] By this
manœuvre he renders the attacks less vigorous, and increases the
confidence of the Romans, who are assured of support. Finally, the
German auxiliaries, having gained, to the right of the Roman army, the
summit of a height (the hill of Montsaugeon), drive the enemies from it,
and pursue the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix stood
with his infantry. At the sight of this rout, the rest of the Gaulish
cavalry fear to be surrounded, and take to flight. From this time the
battle became a mere carnage. Three Ædui of distinction are taken and
brought to Cæsar: Cotus, chief of the cavalry, who, at the last
election, had contended with Convictolitavis for the sovereign
magistracy; Cavarillus, who, since the defection of Litavicus, commanded
the infantry; and Eporedorix, whom the Ædui had for chief in their war
against the Sequani, before the arrival of Cæsar in Gaul. [518]


[Sidenote: Blockade of Alesia. ]

XII. Vercingetorix, after the defeat of his cavalry, decided on a
retreat; taking his infantry with him, without returning to his camp, he
marched immediately towards Alesia, the _oppidum_ of the Mandubii. The
baggage, withdrawn from the camp, followed him without delay. [519] Cæsar
ordered his baggage to be carried to a neighbouring hill, under the
guard of two legions, pursued the enemies as long as daylight permitted,
killed about 3,000 men of their rear-guard, and established his camp,
two days afterwards, before Alesia. [520] After having reconnoitred the
position of the town, and taking advantage of the disorder of the enemy,
who had placed his principal confidence in his cavalry, which was thrown
into consternation by its defeat, he resolved to invest Alesia, and
exhorted his soldiers to support the labours and fatigues of a siege
with constancy.

Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of the Côte-d’Or, is, undoubtedly,
the Alesia of the “Commentaries. ” The examination of the strategic
reasons which determined the march of Cæsar, the correct interpretation
of the text, and, lastly, the excavations lately made, all combine to
prove it. [521]

Ancient Alesia occupied the summit of the mountain now called Mont
Auxois; on the western slope is built the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine.
(_See Plates 25 and 26_. ) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which
rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (_erat oppidum
Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco . . . _). Two rivers bathe the
foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the
Oserain (_cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina
subluebant_). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends,
the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that
of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (_ante oppidum planities
circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat_). On all other
sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of
hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (_reliquis ex
omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis
fastigio oppidum cingebant_).

The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in
length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the
first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a
superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the
upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (_See Plate
25_. ) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which
was protected by scarped rocks against all attack. [522]

This _oppidum_ could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete
investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the
slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by
a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established
his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the
cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or
blockhouses,[523] formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen
kilomètres). [524] The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts,
to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in
them.

The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the
plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were
giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged
the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the
enemy’s infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the
cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they
were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became
embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the
wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued
with fury by the Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and
others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb
over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before
his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder
into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and
the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw
themselves into the _oppidum_; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the
gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans
retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a
great number of horses.

Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the
Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their
departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to
carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think
of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who
has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would
entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation,
he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he
may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes
his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o’clock). It
is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and
the Oserain. Then he orders, on pain of death, all the corn to be
brought to him. He divides among the soldiers individually the numerous
cattle which had been collected by the Mandubii; but as to the grain,
he reserves the power of distributing it gradually and in small
quantities. All the troops encamped outside withdraw into the _oppidum_.
By these dispositions he prepares to wait for the succour of Gaul, and
to sustain the war.

As soon as Cæsar was informed of these measures by the prisoners and
deserters, he resolved to form lines of countervallation and
circumvallation, and adopted the following system of fortifications: he
ordered first of all to be dug, in the plain of Laumes, a fosse twenty
feet wide, with vertical walls, that is, as wide at the bottom as at the
level of the ground (_see Plates 25 and 28_), so as to prevent lines so
extensive, and so difficult to guard with soldiers along their whole
extent, from being attacked suddenly by night, and also to protect the
workmen from the darts of the enemy during the day. Four hundred feet
behind this fosse, he formed the countervallation. He then made two
fosses of fifteen feet wide, of equal depth,[525] and filled the
interior fosse--that is, the one nearest to the town--with water derived
from the river Oserain. Behind these fosses he raised a rampart and a
palisade (_aggerem ac vallum_), having together a height of twelve feet.
Against this was placed a fence of hurdles with battlements (_loricam
pinnasque_); strong forked branches were placed horizontally at the
junction of the hurdle-fence and the rampart, so as to render them more
difficult to scale. (_See Plate 27. _) Lastly, he established towers on
all this part of the countervallation, with a distance of eighty feet
between them.

It was necessary at the same time to work at widely extended
fortifications, and to fetch in wood and provisions, so that these
distant and toilsome expeditions diminished incessantly the effective
force of the combatants; and the Gauls, too, often attempted to harass
the workmen, and even made vigorous sallies, through several gates at a
time. Cæsar judged it necessary to increase the strength of the works,
so that they might be defended with a smaller number of men. He ordered
trees or large branches to be taken, the extremities of which were
sharpened and cut to a point;[526] they were placed in a fosse five feet
deep; and, that they might not be torn up, they were tied together at
the lower part; the other part, furnished with branches, rose above
ground. There were five rows of these, contiguous and interlaced;
whoever ventured amongst them would be wounded by their sharp points;
they were called _cippi_. In front of these sorts of _abatis_ were dug
wolves’ pits (_scrobes_), trunconic fosses, of three feet deep, disposed
in the form of a quincunx. In the centre of each hole was planted a
round stake, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, hardened in the fire,
and pointed at the top; it only rose about four inches above ground. In
order to render these stakes firmer, they were surrounded at the base
with earth well stamped down; the rest of the excavation was covered
with thorns and brushwood, so as to conceal the trap. There were eight
rows of holes, three feet distant from each other: they were called
_lilies_ (_lilia_), on account of their resemblance to the flower of
that name. Lastly, in front of these defences were fixed, level with
the ground, stakes of a foot long, to which were fixed irons in the
shape of hooks. These kind of caltrops, to which they gave the name of
_stimuli_,[527] were placed everywhere, and very near each other.

When this work was finished, Cæsar ordered retrenchments to be dug,
almost similar, but on the opposite side, in order to resist attacks
from the exterior. This line of circumvallation, of fourteen miles in
circuit (twenty-one kilomètres), had been formed on the most favourable
ground, in conforming to the nature of the locality. If the Gaulish
cavalry brought back an army of succour, he sought by these means to
prevent it, however numerous it might be, from surrounding the posts
established along the circumvallation. In order to avoid the danger
which the soldiers would have run in quitting the camps, he ordered that
every man should provide himself with provisions and forage for thirty
days. Notwithstanding this precaution, the Roman army suffered from
want. [528]

Whilst Cæsar adopted these measures, the Gauls, having convoked an
assembly of their principal chiefs, probably at Bibracte, decided not to
collect all their men able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix wished, but to
demand from each people a certain contingent, for they dreaded the
difficulty of providing for so large and so confused a multitude, and of
maintaining order and discipline. The different states were required to
send contingents, the total of which was to amount to 283,000 men; but,
in reality, it did not exceed 240,000. The cavalry amounted to
8,000. [529]

The Bellovaci refused their contingent, declaring that they intended to
make war on their own account, at their own will, without submitting to
anybody’s orders. Nevertheless, at the instance of Commius, their host,
they sent 2,000 men.

This same Commius, we have seen, had in previous years rendered signal
service to Cæsar in Britain.
In return for which, his land, that of the
Atrebates, freed from all tribute, had recovered its privileges, and
obtained the supremacy over the Morini. But such was then the eagerness
of the Gauls to re-conquer their liberty and their ancient glory, that
all feelings of gratitude and friendship had vanished from their memory,
and all devoted themselves body and soul to the war.

The numbering and the review of the troops took place on the territory
of the Ædui. The chiefs were named; the general command was given to the
Atrebatan Commius; to the Æduans Viridomarus and Eporedorix, and to the
Arvernan Vercasivellaunus, cousin of Vercingetorix. With them were
joined delegates from each country, who formed a council of direction
for the war. They began their march towards Alesia, full of ardour and
confidence: each was convinced that the Romans would retreat at the mere
sight of such imposing forces, especially when they found themselves
threatened at the same time by the sallies of the besieged, and by an
exterior army powerful in infantry and in cavalry.

Meanwhile, the day on which the besieged expected succour was past, and
their provisions were exhausted; ignorant, moreover, of what was taking
place among the Ædui, they assembled to deliberate on a final
resolution. The opinions were divided: some proposed to surrender,
others to make a sally, without waiting till their vigour would be
exhausted. But Critognatus, an Arvernan distinguished by his birth and
credit, in a discourse of singular and frightful atrocity, proposed to
follow the example of their ancestors, who, in the time of the war of
the Cimbri, being shut up in their fortresses, and a prey to want, ate
the men who were unable to bear arms, rather than surrender. When the
opinions were gathered, it was decided that that of Critognatus should
only be adopted at the last extremity, and that for the present they
would confine themselves to sending out of the place all useless mouths.
The Mandubii, who had received the Gaulish army within their walls,
were compelled to leave with their wives and children. They approached
the Roman lines, begged to be taken for slaves and supplied with bread.
Cæsar placed guards along the _vallum_, with orders not to admit them.

At length Commius and the other chiefs, followed by their troops, appear
before Alesia; they halt upon a neighbouring hill, scarcely 1,000 paces
from the circumvallation (the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse). The following day
they draw their cavalry out of their camp; it covered the whole plain of
Laumes. Their infantry establishes itself at a short distance on the
heights. The plateau of Alesia commanded the plain. At the sight of the
army of succour, the besieged meet together, congratulate each other,
yield to excess of joy, and then they rush out of the town, fill the
first fosse with fascines and earth, and all prepare for a general and
decisive sally.

Cæsar, obliged to face the enemy on two sides at once, disposed his army
on the two opposite lines of the retrenchments, and assigned to each his
post; he then ordered the cavalry to leave its camps, and to give
battle. From all the camps placed on the top of the surrounding hills,
the view extended over the plain, and the soldiers, in suspense, waited
for the issue of the event. The Gauls had mixed with their cavalry a
small number of archers and light-armed soldiers, to support them if
they gave way, and arrest the attack of the cavalry of the enemy. A good
number of the latter, wounded by these foot-soldiers, whom they had not
perceived until then, were obliged to retire from the battle. Then the
Gauls, confident in their numerical superiority, and in the valour of
their cavalry, believed themselves sure of victory; and from all sides,
from the besieged, as well as from the army of succour, there arose an
immense cry to encourage the combatants. The engagement was in view of
them all; no trait of courage or of cowardice remained unknown; on both
sides, all were excited by the desire of glory and the fear of
dishonour. From noon till sunset the victory remained uncertain, when
the Germans in Cæsar’s pay, formed in close squadrons, charged the
enemy, and put them to the rout; in their flight they abandoned the
archers, who were surrounded; then, from all parts of the plain, the
cavalry pursued the Gauls up to their camp without giving them time to
rally. The besieged, who had sallied out of Alesia, returned in
consternation, and almost despairing of safety.

After a day employed in making a great number of hurdles, ladders, and
hooks, the Gauls of the army of succour left their camp in silence
towards the middle of the night, and approached the works in the plain.
Then, suddenly uttering loud cries, in order to warn the besieged, they
throw their fascines, to fill up the fosse, attack the defenders of the
_vallum_ with a shower of sling-balls, arrows, and stones, and prepare
everything for an assault. At the same time, Vercingetorix, hearing the
cries from without, gives the signal with the trumpet, and leads his
troops out of the place. The Romans take in the retrenchments the places
assigned to them beforehand, and they spread disorder among the Gauls by
throwing leaden balls, stones of a pound weight, and employing the
stakes placed in the works beforehand; the machines rain down upon the
enemy a shower of darts. As they fought in the dark (the shields being
useless), there were in both armies many wounded. The lieutenants M.
Antony and C. Trebonius, to whom was entrusted the defence of the
threatened points, supported the troops that were too hardly pressed by
means of reserves drawn from the neighbouring redoubts. So long as the
Gauls kept far from the circumvallation, the multitude of their missiles
gave them the advantage; but when they approached, some became suddenly
entangled in the _stimuli_; others fell bruised into the _scrobes_;
others again were transpierced by the heavy _pila_ used in sieges, which
were thrown from the tops of the _vallum_ and the towers. They had many
disabled, and nowhere succeeded in forcing the Roman lines. When day
began to break, the army of succour retired, fearing to be taken in
their uncovered flank (the right side) by a sally from the camps
established on the mountain of Flavigny. On their side, the besieged,
after losing much valuable time in transporting the material for the
attack, and in making efforts to fill up the first fosse (the one which
was twenty feet wide), learnt the retreat of the army of succour before
they had reached the real retrenchment. This attempt having failed, like
the other, they returned into the town.

Thus twice repulsed with great loss, the Gauls of the army of succour
deliberated on what was to be done. They interrogate the inhabitants of
the country, who inform them of the position and the sort of defences
of the Roman camps placed on the heights.

To the north of Alesia there was a hill (Mont Réa) which had not been
enclosed in the lines, because it would have given them too great an
extent; the camp necessary on that side had, for this reason, to be
established on a slope, and in a disadvantageous position (_see Plate
25, camp D_); the lieutenants C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius
Rebilus occupied it with two legions. The enemy’s chiefs resolved to
attack this camp with one part of their troops, whilst the other should
assail the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes. Having decided on
this plan, they send their scouts to reconnoitre the localities,
secretly arrange among themselves the plan and the means of execution,
and decide that the attack shall take place at noon. They choose 60,000
men amongst the nations most renowned for their valour.
Vercasivellaunus, one of the four chiefs, is placed at their head. They
sally at the first watch, towards nightfall, proceed by the heights of
Grignon and by Fain towards Mont Réa, arrive there at break of day,
conceal themselves in the depressions of the ground to the north of that
hill, and repose from the fatigues of the night. At the hour appointed,
Vercasivellaunus descends the slopes and rushes upon the camp of Reginus
and Rebilus; at the same moment, the cavalry of the army of succour
approaches the retrenchments in the plain, and the other troops,
sallying from their camps, move forwards.

When, from the top of the citadel of Alesia, Vercingetorix saw these
movements, he left the town, carrying with him the poles, the small
covered galleries (_musculos_), the iron hooks (_falces_),[530] and
everything which had been prepared for a sally, and proceeded towards
the plain. An obstinate struggle follows;, everywhere the greatest
efforts are made, and wherever the defence appears weakest, the Gauls
rush to the attack. Scattered over extensive lines, the Romans defend
only with difficulty several points at the same time, and are obliged to
face two attacks from opposite sides. Fighting, as it were, back to
back, everybody is agitated by the cries he hears, and by the thought
that his safety depends upon those that are behind him; “it lies in
human nature,” says Cæsar, “to be struck more deeply with the danger one
cannot see. ”[531]

On the northern slopes of the mountain of Flavigny (at the point marked
_J C_, _Plate 25_), Cæsar had chosen the most convenient spot for
observing each incident of the action, and for sending assistance to the
places which were most threatened. Both sides were convinced that the
moment of the decisive struggle had arrived. If the Gauls do not force
the lines, they have no further hope of safety; if the Romans obtain the
advantage, they have reached the end of their labours. It is especially
at the retrenchments on the slopes of Mont Réa that the Romans run the
greatest danger, for the commanding position of the enemy gives them an
immense disadvantage (_iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum
habet momentum_). One part of the assailants throw darts; another
advances, forming the tortoise; fresh troops incessantly relieve the
soldiers who are weary. All strive desperately to fill the fosses, to
render useless the accessory defences by covering them with earth, and
to scale the rampart. Already the Romans begin to feel the want of arms
and strength. Cæsar, informed of this state of things, sends Labienus to
their succour with six cohorts, and orders him, if the troops cannot
maintain themselves behind the retrenchments, to withdraw them and make
a sally, but only at the last extremity. Labienus, encamped on the
mountain of Bussy, descends from the heights to proceed to the place of
combat. Cæsar, passing between the two lines, repairs to the plain,
where he encourages the soldiers to persevere, for this day, this hour
will decide whether they are to gather the fruit of their former
victories.

Meanwhile the besieged, having abandoned the hope of forcing the
formidable retrenchments of the plain, direct their attack against the
works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of
Flavigny, and transport thither all their materials of attack; with a
shower of arrows they drive away the Roman soldiers who fight from the
top of the towers; they fill the fosses with earth and fascines, clear a
passage for themselves, and, by means of iron hooks, tear down the
wattling of the parapet and the palisade. Young Brutus is first sent
thither with several cohorts, and after him the lieutenant C. Fabius
with seven more; at last, as the action becomes still hotter, Cæsar
himself hurries to them with new reserves.

After the fortune of the fight has been restored, and the enemies driven
back, he proceeds towards the place where he had sent Labienus, draws
four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, orders a part of the cavalry to
follow him, and the other part to go round by the exterior lines, to
take the enemy in the rear by issuing from the camp of Grésigny. On his
side, Labienus, seeing that neither the fosses nor the ramparts can
arrest the efforts of the Gauls, rallies thirty-nine cohorts which have
arrived from the neighbouring redoubts, and which chance offers to him,
and informs Cæsar that, according to what had been agreed, he is going
to make a sally. [532] Cæsar hastens his march in order to share in the
combat. As soon as, from the heights on which they stood, the
legionaries recognise their general by the colour of the garment which
he was in the habit of wearing in battle (the purple-coloured
_paludamentum_),[533] and see him followed by cohorts and detachments of
cavalry, they sally from the retrenchments and begin the attack. Shouts
arise on both sides, and are repeated from the _vallum_ to the other
works. When Cæsar arrives, he sees the lines abandoned, and the battle
raging in the plain of Grésigny, on the banks of the Ose. The Roman
soldiers throw away the _pilum_, and draw their swords. At the same
time, the cavalry of the camp of Grésigny appears in the rear of the
enemy; other cohorts approach. The Gauls are put to the rout, and in
their flight encounter the cavalry, who make great slaughter among them.
Sedulius, chief and prince of the Lemovices, is slain; the Arvernan
Vercasivellaunus is taken prisoner. Seventy-four ensigns are brought to
Cæsar. Of all this army, so numerous as it was, few combatants return to
their camp safe and sound.

Witnesses, from the top of their walls, of this sanguinary defeat, the
besieged despaired of their safety, and called in the troops who were
attacking the countervallation. [534] As the result of these reverses,
the Gauls of the army of succour fly from their camp; and if the Romans,
compelled to defend so many points at one time, and to assist each other
mutually, had not been worn out by the labours of a whole day, the
entire mass of the enemies might have been annihilated. Towards the
middle of the night the cavalry sent in pursuit came up with their
rear-guard; a great part of them were taken prisoners or killed; the
others dispersed, to return to their countries.

Next day, Vercingetorix convokes a council. He declares that he has not
undertaken this war out of personal interest, but for the cause of the
liberty of all. “Since they must yield to fate, he places himself at the
discretion of his fellow-citizens, and offers them, in order to appease
the Romans, to be delivered up, dead or alive. ” A deputation is at once
sent to Cæsar, who requires that the arms and the chiefs be delivered to
him. He places himself in front of his camp, inside the retrenchments;
the chiefs are brought, the arms are laid down, and Vercingetorix
surrenders to the conqueror. This valiant defender of Gaul arrives on
horseback, clad in his finest arms, makes the circuit of Cæsar’s
tribunal, dismounts, and laying down his sword and his military ensigns,
exclaims: “Thou hast vanquished a brave man, thou, the bravest of
all! ”[535] The prisoners were distributed by head to each soldier, by
way of booty, except the 20,000 who belonged to the Ædui and Arverni,
and whom Cæsar restored in the hope of bringing back those people to his
cause.

Dio Cassius relates the surrender of the Gaulish chief as follows:
“After this defeat, Vercingetorix, who had neither been taken nor
wounded, might have fled; but, hoping that the friendship which had
formerly bound him to Cæsar would procure his pardon, he repaired to the
proconsul, without having sent a herald to ask for peace, and appeared
suddenly in his presence, at the moment he was sitting on his tribunal.
His appearance inspired some fear, for he was of tall stature, and had a
very imposing aspect under arms. There was a deep silence: the Gaulish
chief fell at Cæsar’s knees, and implored him by pressing his hands,
without uttering a word. This scene excited the pity of the by-standers,
by the remembrance of Vercingetorix’s former fortune compared to his
present misfortune. Cæsar, on the contrary, upbraided him with the
recollections on which he had hoped for his safety. He compared his
recent struggle with the friendship of which he reminded him, and by
that means pointed out more vividly the odiousness of his conduct. And
thus, far from being touched with his misfortune at that moment, he
threw him at once in fetters, and afterwards ordered him to be put to
death, after having exhibited him in his triumph. ” By acting thus, Cæsar
believed that he was obeying state policy and the cruel customs of the
time. It is to be regretted for his glory that he did not use, towards
Vercingetorix, the illustrious Gaulish chief, the same clemency which,
during the Civil War, he showed towards the vanquished who were his
fellow-citizens.

When these events were accomplished, Cæsar proceeded towards the Ædui,
and received their submission. There he met the envoys of the Arverni,
who promised to pay deference to his orders: he required from them a
great number of hostages. Afterwards, he placed his legions in winter
quarters. T. Labienus, with two legions and some cavalry, among the
Sequani (Sempronius Rutilius was given him as a colleague); C. Fabius
and L. Minucius Basilius, with two legions, among the Remi, in order to
protect them against the Bellovaci, their neighbours; C. Antistius
Reginus amongst the Ambluareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; C.
Caninius Rebilus among the Ruteni, each with one legion. Q. Tullius
Cicero and P. Sulpicius were established at Cabillonum (_Chalon_) and
Matisco (_Mâcon_), in the land of the Ædui, on the Saône, to ensure the
supply of provisions. Cæsar resolved to pass the winter at
Bibracte. [536] He announced those events at Rome, where twenty days of
public thanksgivings were decreed.


[Sidenote: Details of the Excavations at Mont Auxois. ]

XIII. The excavations earned on round Mont Auxois, from 1862 to 1863,
have brought to light, in nearly all points, the fosses of the Roman
retrenchments. The following is the result:--

CAMPS. --Cæsar debouched upon Alesia by the mountain of Bussy (_see Plate
25_), and distributed his army round Mont Auxois: the legions encamped
on the heights, and the cavalry was established on the lower grounds,
near the streams.

There were four camps of infantry, two of them, _A_ and _B_, on the
mountain of Flavigny. Their form depends on that of the ground: they
were shaped in such a manner that the retrenchments should, as far as
possible, command the ground situated before them. On the side where it
could have been attacked, that is, to the south, the camp _A_ presented
formidable defences, to judge from the triple line of fosses which
surround this part. (_See Plates 25 and 28. _) We must, perhaps, suppose
that it was occupied by Cæsar in person. The camp _B_ is more extensive.
The vestiges of its _remblai_ are still visible at the present day, in
the greatest part of its circuit, in consequence of this land having
never been touched by the plough. It is the only known example of
visible traces of a camp made by Cæsar. None of the camps of the
mountain of Flavigny having been attacked, the excavations have only
brought to light in the fosses a small number of objects. The entrances
to the camps are at the places marked by arrows on _Plate 25_. A third
camp of infantry was situated on the mountain of Bussy, at _C_.

The fourth infantry camp was established on the lower slopes of Mont
Réa, at _D_. It is the one occupied by the two legions of Reginus and
Rebilus, and which Vercasivellaunus attacked with 60,000 men. Indeed, it
will be observed that the spur situated to the north of Mont Auxois,
between the Rabutin and the Brenne, is much farther from Alesia than the
other mountains which surround it, and Mont Réa, which is the nearest
part of it, is still more than 2,000 mètres distant from it. Hence it
follows that Cæsar could not have included Mont Réa in his lines without
giving them an excessive development. Consequently, he was obliged to
establish one of his camps on the southern slope of that hill. This
camp was on the point of being forced, and an obstinate battle was
fought there. The excavations have led to the discovery in the fosses of
a multitude of interesting objects, and, among them, more than 600 Roman
and Gaulish coins. (See the list in _Appendix C_. )[537] The extremity of
the upper fosse, represented by dots on _Plates 25_ and _28_, has not
been discovered, because earthfalls have taken place on that part of
Mont Réa, which would have obliged the excavators to dig too deep to
arrive at the bottom of the fosse. The strength of the retrenchments of
the infantry camps was very variable, as may be seen by inspecting the
various profiles of the fosses. (_See Plate 28. _) For each camp, they
have larger dimensions on the side which is not defended by the
escarpments, as may easily be conceived.

There were four cavalry camps, _G H I K_, placed near the different
streams: three in the plain of Laumes, and one in the valley of the
Rabutin. The fosses of these camps took greatly varied shapes. (_See
Plate 28. _) In general, their dimensions were decidedly less than those
of the fosses of the infantry camps. Camp _G_, however, had rather deep
fosses; no doubt because it was farthest from the lines. The fosse which
enclosed camp _I_ towards the side of the Brenne has disappeared by the
inundations of the river.

REDOUBTS, OR CASTELLA. --Of the twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses
(_castella_), five only have been discovered; they were the most
considerable; they are represented on _Plate 25_, by the numbers 10, 11,
15, 18, 22. The others, built of wood, and forming blockhouses, would
not have left any trace; they are marked by circles on the most
convenient places.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINE OF INVESTMENT. --We
know, from the “Commentaries,” that camp _D_, on the slopes of Mont Réa,
contained two legions. By comparing its superficies with that of the
other camps, we may admit that these were occupied in the following
manner: in camp _A_, one legion; in camp _B_, two legions; in camp _C_,
three legions; total, eight legions. The three remaining legions would
have been distributed in the twenty-three redoubts. As we have said, the
number of 11,000 paces can evidently only apply to the line of
investment formed by the eight camps and the twenty-three redoubts
established round Alesia immediately after the arrival of the army, and
not, as has been believed, to the countervallation properly so called,
which was only constructed subsequently (VII. 72). This number is
rigorously exact, for the circuit of ground surrounded by the camps
measures a little more than sixteen kilomètres, which represents 11,000
Roman paces.

THE FOSSE OF TWENTY FEET. --This fosse has been discovered in its whole
extent: it barred the plain of Laumes, following a direction
perpendicular to the course of the Ose and the Oserain, and did not go
round Mont Auxois. _Plate 28_ represents two of its most remarkable
sections. It was not exactly twenty feet in width, as stated in the
“Commentaries;” neither was it everywhere 400 paces distant from the
countervallation. This measurement is only exact towards the extremities
of the fosse, near the two rivers.

COUNTERVALLATION. --Vercingetorix, having retired to the plateau of
Alesia, could only have escaped by the plain of Laumes, and, at the
worst, by the valley of the Rabutin; for the spurs situated to the
south, the east, and the north of Mont Auxois are surmounted by a belt
of perpendicular rocks, which form insurmountable barriers, and the
valleys of the Oserain and the Ose, which divide them, constitute
veritable defiles. It became important, therefore, to bar the plain of
Laumes with impregnable works. Hence Cæsar accumulated there the means
of defence; but he simplified them everywhere else, as the excavations
have shown.

These are the works, peculiar to the plain of Laumes, which Cæsar
describes in chapters 72 and 73. The traces of the two fosses exist
over the whole extent of the plain, from one river to the other. They
had not the same form: the one nearest to Mont Auxois is
square-bottomed; the other is triangular. (_See Plates 27 and 28. _) The
width of the first is fifteen feet, as stated in the text; that of the
triangular fosse is fifteen feet at certain points, but more frequently
a little less. The two fosses have the same depth; but it does not reach
fifteen feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it. To dig a
fosse of fifteen feet deep is so considerable a work, on account of the
two stages of workmen which it requires, that it has, perhaps, never
been executed for a temporary fortification. Moreover, the result of the
excavations leaves no doubt on this subject: the two fosses of the
countervallation have both only a depth of from eight to nine feet.

The fosse which is nearest Mont Auxois was filled with water. The Romans
had naturally introduced the water into that of the two fosses which,
owing to its square bottom, could contain the most considerable volume.
A careful level made in the plain of Laumes has proved that this water
was derived from the Oserain. During the excavations, the gravel has
been found which the water of this river had carried with it, at the
time of the investment of Alesia, almost to the middle of the length of
the fosse.

To the left of the Oserain, the countervallation cut the first slopes of
the hill of Flavigny for a length of 800 mètres; thence it continued,
having but one fosse, the various sections of which are indicated on
_Plate 28_. It ran at first along the left bank of the river, at a mean
distance of fifty mètres, as far as the mill of Chantrier, then cut the
western extremity of Mont Penneville, between the Oserain and the Ose,
followed the right bank of the latter river, along the slopes of the
mountain of Bussy, and, after having crossed the small plain of
Grésigny, joined the camp established at the foot of Mont Réa. Nearly
everywhere the Romans had the advantage of a commanding position to
defend the countervallation. The excavations have proved that in the
plain of Grésigny the fosse of the countervallation had been filled with
water from the Rabutin. They have led to the discovery in the ancient
bed of this stream (_see Plate 25_), at the very point where the fosse
joined it, of a wall of unhewn stones, which barred the waters so as to
conduct them into this fosse. [538]

CIRCUMVALLATION. --Over the extent of the plain of Laumes, and on the
slopes of the mountain of Flavigny, the circumvallation was parallel to
the countervallation, at a mean distance of 200 mètres. It had only one
single fosse, which in the plain was square-bottomed, so as to allow
more soil to be dug out; everywhere else its form was triangular. (_See
Plate_ 28. ) The circumvallation of the mountain of Flavigny ceased
towards the escarpments, where the defences became useless; then, again,
it continued on the plateau, where it formed the connection between the
camps. After this, it descended towards the Oserain, cut the point of
Mont Penneville, re-ascended the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, where
it similarly united the camps, descended into the plain of Grésigny,
which it crossed in a direction parallel to the countervallation, and
ended at camp _D_. On the heights it was made to follow the undulations
of the ground, so that its defenders should occupy as much as possible a
commanding position with respect to that of the assailants. Moreover,
the works of the circumvallation were not everywhere the same. Thus,
near the escarpments and ravines which cut this line, the Romans had
made no fosse with epaulment, but only accessory defences, such as
_abatis_ and wolf-pits, which even alternated on divers points.

Above the _castellum_ 21, between Grésigny and Mont Réa, the excavations
have brought to light a fosse of great dimensions, the bottom of which
was full of bones of animals of divers kinds. Its position, near a small
ravine in which runs a brook, may lead us to suppose that here was the
_abattoir_ of the Roman army. In considering this fosse, and those which
have been discovered on the top and on the slopes of Mont Réa, as
forming part of the circumvallation, there will be found for the
development of this line about twenty kilomètres, which represents with
sufficient accuracy the fourteen miles of the text of the
“Commentaries. ”[539]

WOLF-PITS. --In the plain of Laumes, at the top of the circumvallation,
and close to the exterior bank of the fosse, there have been counted
more than fifty wolf-pits, in five rows. Others have been cleared out on
the heights--nine between the camp _A_ and the escarpments, twenty-seven
on the mountain of Bussy, near the _castellum_ 15; they are dug in the
rock, and in such a perfect state of preservation that they appear as
though they had been made but yesterday. At the bottom of some of these
last, fifteen arrow-heads were picked up. All these wolf-pits are three
feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and a little less than one
foot at the bottom.