No More Learning

i. 59; ii. 97; iv. 15.

[296] Who got better pay for lighter service.

[297] i. e. at Mainz, Bonn, Novaesium and Vetera.

[298] See note 283.


THE SIEGE OF VETERA

After the arrival of these veteran cohorts Civilis was now at the 21
head of a respectable army. But being still uncertain of his plans,
and engaged in reckoning up the Roman forces, he made all who were
with him swear allegiance to Vespasian, and sent envoys to the two
legions, who after their defeat in the former engagement[299] had
retired into Vetera, asking them to take the same oath. The answer
came back that they never followed the advice either of a traitor or
of an enemy: Vitellius was their emperor, and they would keep their
allegiance and their arms for him so long as they had breath in their
bodies. A Batavian deserter need not try to decide the destiny of
Rome; he should rather expect the punishment he richly deserved. When
this was reported to Civilis he flew into a passion, and called the
whole Batavian people to take arms. They were joined by the Bructeri
and Tencteri,[300] and Germany was summoned to come and share the
plunder and the glory.

Threatened with this gathering storm, Munius Lupercus and Numisius 22
Rufus, who were in command of the two legions, proceeded to strengthen
the ramparts and walls. They pulled down the buildings near the
military camp, which had grown into a small town during the long years
of peace, fearing that the enemy might make use of them. But they
omitted to provide a sufficient store of provisions for the camp, and
authorized the soldiers to make up the deficiency by looting, with the
result that what might have supplied their needs for a long time was
consumed in a few days. Meanwhile Civilis advanced, himself holding
the centre with the flower of the Batavi: on both banks of the Rhine
he massed large bands of Germans to strike terror into the enemy: the
cavalry galloped through the fields, while the ships were
simultaneously moved up the stream. Here could be seen the colours of
veteran Roman cohorts, there the figures of beasts which the Germans
had brought from their woods and groves, as their tribes do when they
go to battle. It seemed both a civil and a savage war at once; and
this strange confusion astounded the besieged. The hopes of the
assailants rose when they saw the circumference of the ramparts, for
there were barely five thousand Roman soldiers to defend a camp which
had been laid out to hold two legions. [301] However, a large number of
camp-followers had collected there on the break-up of peace, and
remained to give what assistance they could to the military
operations.

The camp was built partly on the gentle slope of a hill and partly 23
on the level ground. Augustus had believed that it would serve as a
base of operations and a check upon the German tribes: as for their
actually coming to assault our legions, such a disaster never
occurred to him. Consequently no trouble had been taken in choosing
the site or erecting defences: the strength of the troops had always
seemed sufficient.

The Batavians and the Germans from across the Rhine[302] now formed up
tribe by tribe--the separation was designed to show their individual
prowess--and opened fire from a distance. Finding that most of their
missiles fell harmlessly on to the turrets and pinnacles of the walls,
and that they were being wounded by stones hurled from above, they
charged with a wild shout and surged up to the rampart, some using
scaling-ladders, others climbing over their comrades who had formed a
'tortoise'. But no sooner had some of them begun to scale the wall,
than they were hurled down by the besieged, who thrust at them with
sword and shield, and buried under a shower of stakes and javelins.
The Germans are always impetuous at the beginning of an action and
over-confident when they are winning; and on this occasion their greed
for plunder even steeled them to face difficulties. They actually
attempted to use siege-engines, with which they were quite unfamiliar.
But though they had no skill themselves, some of the deserters and
prisoners showed them how to build a sort of bridge or platform of
timber, on to which they fitted wheels and rolled it forward. Thus
some of them stood on this platform and fought as though from a mound,
while others, concealed inside, tried to undermine the walls. However,
stones hurled from catapults soon destroyed this rude engine. Then
they began to get ready hurdles and mantlets, but the besieged shot
blazing spears on to them from engines, and even attacked the
assailants themselves with fire-darts. At last they gave up all hope
of an assault and resolved to try a waiting policy, being well aware
that the camp contained only a few days' provisions and a large number
of non-combatants. They hoped that famine would breed treason, and
counted, besides, on the wavering loyalty of the slaves and the usual
hazards of war to aid them.

Meanwhile, Flaccus,[303] who had received news of the siege of 24
Vetera, dispatched a party to recruit auxiliaries in Gaul, and gave
Dillius Vocula, in command of the Twenty-second, a force of picked
soldiers from his two legions. [304] Vocula was to hurry by forced
marches along the bank of the Rhine, while Flaccus himself was to
approach by water, since he was in bad health and unpopular with his
men. Indeed, they grumbled openly that he had let the Batavian cohorts
get away from Mainz, had connived at Civilis' schemes, and invited the
Germans to join the alliance. Vespasian, they said, owed his rise more
to Flaccus than to all the assistance of Antonius Primus or of
Mucianus, for overt hatred and hostility can be openly crushed, but
treachery and deceit cannot be detected, much less parried. While
Civilis took the field himself and arranged his own fighting line,
Hordeonius lay on a couch in his bedroom and gave whatever orders
best suited the enemy's convenience. Why should all these companies
of brave soldiers be commanded by one miserable old invalid? Let them
rather kill the traitor and free their brave hearts and good hopes
from the incubus of such an evil omen. Having worked on each other's
feelings by these complaints, they were still further incensed by the
arrival of a letter from Vespasian. As this could not be concealed,
Flaccus read it before a meeting of the soldiers, and the messengers
who brought it were sent to Vitellius in chains.

With feelings thus appeased the army marched on to Bonn, the 25
head-quarters of the First legion. There the men were still more
indignant with Flaccus, on whom they laid the blame of their recent
defeat. [305] It was by his orders, they argued, that they had taken
the field against the Batavians on the understanding that the legions
from Mainz were in pursuit. But no reinforcements had arrived and his
treachery was responsible for their losses. The facts, moreover, were
unknown to the other armies, nor was any report sent to their emperor,
although this treacherous outbreak could have been nipped in the bud
by the combined aid of all the provinces. In answer Flaccus read out
to the army copies of all the letters which he had sent from time to
time all over Gaul and Britain and Spain to ask for assistance, and
introduced the disastrous practice of having all letters delivered to
the standard-bearers of the legions, who read them to the soldiers
before the general had seen them. He then gave orders that one of the
mutineers should be put in irons, more by way of vindicating his
authority than because one man was especially to blame. Leaving Bonn,
the army moved on to Cologne, where they were joined by large numbers
of Gallic auxiliaries, who at first zealously supported the Roman
cause: later, when the Germans prospered, most of the tribes took arms
against us, actuated by hopes of liberty and an ambition to establish
an empire of their own when once they had shaken off the yoke.

Meanwhile the army's indignation steadily increased. The imprisonment
of a single soldier was not enough to terrify them, and, indeed, the
prisoner actually accused the general of complicity in crime, alleging
that he himself had carried messages between Flaccus and Civilis. 'It
is because I can testify to the truth,' he said, 'that Flaccus wants
to get rid of me on a false charge. ' Thereupon Vocula, with admirable
self-possession, mounted the tribunal and, in spite of the man's
protestations, ordered him to be seized and led away to prison. This
alarmed the disaffected, while the better sort obeyed him promptly.
The army then unanimously demanded that Vocula should lead them, and
Flaccus accordingly resigned the chief command to him. However, 26
there was much to exasperate their disaffection. They were short both
of pay and of provisions: the Gauls refused either to enlist or to pay
tribute: drought, usually unknown in that climate, made the Rhine
almost too low for navigation, and thus hampered their commissariat:
patrols had to be posted at intervals all along the bank to prevent
the Germans fording the river: and in consequence of all this they had
less food and more mouths to eat it. To the ignorant the lowness of
the river seemed in itself an evil omen, as though the ancient
bulwarks of the empire were now failing them. In peace they would have
called it bad luck or the course of nature: now it was 'fate' and 'the
anger of heaven'.

On entering Novaesium[306] they were joined by the Sixteenth legion.
Herennius Gallus[307] now shared with Vocula the responsibility of
command. As they could not venture out against the enemy, they
encamped . . . at a place called Gelduba,[308] where the soldiers were
trained in deploying, in fortification and entrenchment, and in
various other military manoeuvres. To inspire their courage with the
further incentive of plunder, Vocula led out part of the force against
the neighbouring tribe of the Cugerni,[309] who had accepted Civilis'
offers of alliance. The rest of the troops were left behind with 27
Herennius Gallus,[310] and it happened that a corn-ship with a full
cargo, which had run aground close to the camp, was towed over by the
Germans to their own bank. This was more than Gallus could tolerate,
so he sent a cohort to the rescue. The number of the Germans soon
increased: both sides gradually gathered reinforcements and a regular
battle was fought, with the result that the Germans towed off the
ship, inflicting heavy losses. The defeated troops followed what had
now become their regular custom, and threw the blame not on their own
inefficiency but on their commanding-officer's bad faith. They dragged
him from his quarters, tore his uniform and flogged him, bidding him
tell them how much he had got for betraying the army, and who were his
accomplices. Then their indignation recoiled on Hordeonius Flaccus: he
was the real criminal: Gallus was only his tool. At last their threats
so terrified Gallus that he, too, charged Flaccus with treason. He was
put in irons until the arrival of Vocula, who at once set him free,
and on the next day had the ringleaders of the riot executed. The army
showed, indeed, a strange contrast in its equal readiness to mutiny
and to submit to punishment. The common soldiers' loyalty to Vitellius
was beyond question,[311] while the higher ranks inclined towards
Vespasian. Thus we find a succession of outbreaks and penalties; an
alternation of insubordination with obedience to discipline; for the
troops could be punished though not controlled.

Meanwhile the whole of Germany was ready to worship Civilis, 28
sending him vast reinforcements and ratifying the alliance with
hostages from their noblest families. He gave orders that the country
of the Ubii and Treviri was to be laid waste by their nearest
neighbours, and sent another party across the Maas to harass the
Menapii and Morini[312] and other frontier tribes of Gaul. In both
quarters they plundered freely, and were especially savage towards the
Ubii, because they were a tribe of German origin who had renounced
their fatherland and adopted the name of Agrippinenses. [313] A Ubian
cohort was cut to pieces at the village of Marcodurum,[314] where they
were off their guard, trusting to their distance from the Rhine. The
Ubii did not take this quietly, nor hesitate to seek reprisals from
the Germans, which they did at first with impunity. In the end,
however, the Germans proved too much for them, and throughout the war
the Ubii were always more conspicuous for good faith than good
fortune. Their collapse strengthened Civilis' position, and emboldened
by success, he now vigorously pressed on the blockade of the legions
at Vetera, and redoubled his vigilance to prevent any message creeping
through from the relieving army. The Batavians were told off to look
after the engines and siege-works: the Germans, who clamoured for
battle, were sent to demolish the rampart and renew the fight directly
they were beaten off. There were so many of them that their losses
mattered little.

Nightfall did not see the end of their task. They built huge fires 29
of wood all round the ramparts and sat drinking by them; then, as the
wine warmed their hearts, one by one they dashed into the fight with
blind courage. In the darkness their missiles were ineffective, but
the barbarian troops were clearly visible to the Romans, and any one
whose daring or bright ornaments made him conspicuous at once became a
mark for their aim. At last Civilis saw their mistake, and gave orders
to extinguish the fires and plunge the whole scene into a confusion of
darkness and the din of arms. Discordant shouts now arose: everything
was vague and uncertain: no one could see to strike or to parry.
Wherever a shout was heard, they would wheel round and lunge in that
direction. Valour was useless: chance and chaos ruled supreme: and the
bravest soldier often fell under a coward's bolt. The Germans fought
with blind fury. The Roman troops were more familiar with danger; they
hurled down iron-clamped stakes and heavy stones with sure effect.
Wherever the sound of some one climbing or the clang of a
scaling-ladder betrayed the presence of the enemy, they thrust them
back with their shields and followed them with a shower of javelins.
Many appeared on top of the walls, and these they stabbed with their
short swords. And so the night wore on. Day dawned upon new 30
methods of attack. The Batavians had built a wooden tower of two
stories and moved it up to the Head-quarters Gate,[315] which was the
most accessible spot. However, our soldiers, by using strong poles and
hurling wooden beams, soon battered it to pieces, with great loss of
life to those who were standing on it. While they were still dismayed
at this, we made a sudden and successful sally. Meanwhile the
legionaries, with remarkable skill and ingenuity, invented still
further contrivances. The one which caused most terror was a crane
with a movable arm suspended over their assailants' heads: this arm
was suddenly lowered, snatched up one or more of the enemy into the
air before his fellows' eyes, and, as the heavy end was swung round,
tossed him into the middle of the camp. Civilis now gave up hope of
storming the camp and renewed a leisurely blockade, trying all the
time by messages and offers of reward to undermine the loyalty of the
legions.

FOOTNOTES:

[299] Chap. 18.

[300] The Bructeri lived between the Lippe and the Upper Ems,
the Tencteri along the eastern bank of the Rhine, between its
tributaries the Ruhr and the Sieg, i. e. opposite Cologne.

[301] i. e. about 12,000 men. The bulk of the Fifth and a
detachment of the Fifteenth had gone to Italy.

[302] i. e. Frisii, Bructeri, Tencteri, &c.

[303] At Mainz.

[304] His other legion was IV Macedonica.

[305] Cp. chap. 20.

[306] Neuss.

[307] He commanded the First legion, which had joined the main
column at Bonn.

[308] Gellep. Some words are lost, perhaps giving the distance
from Novaesium.

[309] See note 282.

[310] At Gelduba.

[311] Cp. iii. 61.

[312] The Menapii lived between the Maas and the Scheldt; the
Morini on the coast in the neighbourhood of Boulogne. They
were a proverb for 'the back of beyond'.

[313] See i. 56, note 106.

[314] Düren.

[315] i. e. the gate on to the street leading to Head-quarters.


THE RELIEF OF VETERA

Such was the course of events in Germany up to the date of the 31
battle of Cremona. [316] News of this arrived by letter from Antonius
Primus, who enclosed a copy of Caecina's edict,[317] and Alpinius
Montanus,[318] who commanded one of the defeated auxiliary cohorts,
came in person to confess that his party had been beaten. The troops
were variously affected by the news. The Gallic auxiliaries, who had
no feelings of affection or dislike to either party and served without
sentiment, promptly took the advice of their officers and deserted
Vitellius. The veterans hesitated; under pressure from Flaccus and
their officers they eventually took the oath of allegiance, but it was
clear from their faces that their hearts were not in it, and while
repeating the rest of the formula they boggled at the name of
Vespasian, either muttering it under their breath or more often
omitting it altogether. Their suspicions were further inflamed 32
when Antonius' letter to Civilis was read out before the meeting; it
seemed to address Civilis as a member of the Flavian party, and to
argue hostility to the German army. The news was next brought to the
camp at Gelduba, where it gave rise to the same comments and the same
scenes. Montanus was sent to carry instructions to Civilis that he was
to cease from hostilities and not to make war on Rome under a false
pretext; if it was to help Vespasian that he had taken arms, he had
now achieved his object. Civilis at first replied in guarded terms.
Then, as he saw that Montanus was an impetuous person who would
welcome a revolution, he began to complain of all the dangers he had
endured in the service of Rome for the last twenty-five years. 'A fine
reward I have received,' he cried, 'for all my labours--my brother's
execution,[319] my own imprisonment,[319] and the bloodthirsty
clamours of this army, from which I claim satisfaction by natural
right since they have sought my destruction. As for you Trevirans and
all the rest that have the souls of slaves, what reward do you hope
to gain for shedding your blood so often in the cause of Rome, except
the thankless task of military service, endless taxation, and the rods
and axes of these capricious tyrants? Look at me! I have only a single
cohort under my command, and yet with the Canninefates and Batavi, a
mere fraction of the Gallic peoples, I am engaged in destroying their
great useless camp and besieging them with famine and the sword. In
short, our venture will either end in freedom or, if we are beaten, we
shall be no worse off than before. ' Having thus inflamed Montanus he
told him to take back a milder answer and dismissed him. On his return
Montanus pretended that his errand had been fruitless, and said
nothing about the rest of the interview: but it soon came to light.

Retaining a portion of his force, Civilis sent the veteran cohorts 33
with the most efficient of the German troops against Vocula and his
army. [320] He gave the command to Julius Maximus and his nephew
Claudius Victor. After rushing the winter-quarters of a cavalry
regiment at Asciburgium[321] on their way, they fell upon the Roman
camp and so completely surprised it that Vocula had no time to address
his army or to form it for battle. The only precaution he could take
in the general panic was to mass the legionaries in the centre with
the auxiliaries scattered on either flank. Our cavalry charged, but
found the enemy in good order ready to receive them, and came flying
back on to their own infantry. What followed was more of a massacre
than a battle. The Nervian cohorts, either from panic or treachery,
left our flanks exposed; thus the legions had to bear the brunt. They
had already lost their standards and were being cut down in the
trenches, when a fresh reinforcement suddenly changed the fortune of
the fight. Some Basque auxiliaries,[322] originally levied by Galba,
who had now been summoned to the rescue, on nearing the camp heard the
sound of fighting, and while the enemy were occupied, came charging in
on their rear. This caused more consternation than their numbers
warranted, the enemy taking them for the whole Roman force, either
from Novaesium or from Mainz. This mistake encouraged the Roman
troops: their confidence in others brought confidence in themselves.
The best of the Batavians, at least of their infantry, fell. The
cavalry made off with the standards and prisoners taken in the earlier
stage of the battle. Though our losses that day were numerically
larger, they were unimportant, whereas the Germans lost their best
troops.

On both sides the generals deserved defeat, and failed to make 34
good use of their success. Their fault was the same. Had Civilis
furnished the attacking column with more troops, they could never have
been surrounded by such a small force, and having stormed the camp
would have destroyed it. Vocula, on the other hand, had not even set
scouts to warn him of the enemy's approach, and consequently no sooner
sallied out than he was beaten. Then, when he had won the victory, he
showed great lack of confidence, and wasted day after day before
moving against the enemy. If he had made haste to follow up his
success and struck at the enemy at once, he might have raised the
siege of Vetera at one blow.

Meanwhile Civilis had been playing upon the feelings of the besieged
by pretending that the Romans had been defeated and success had
favoured his arms. The captured standards and colours were carried
round the walls and the prisoners also displayed. One of these did a
famous deed of heroism. Shouting at the top of his voice, he revealed
the truth. The Germans at once struck him dead, which only served to
confirm his information. Soon, too, the besieged saw signs of harried
fields and the smoke of burning farms, and began to realize that a
victorious army was approaching. When he was in sight of the camp
Vocula ordered his men to plant the standards and construct a trench
and rampart round them: they were to deposit all their baggage there
and fight unencumbered. This made them shout at the general to give
them the signal; and they had learnt to use threats too. Without even
taking time to form their line they started the battle, all tired as
they were, and in disorder. Civilis was ready waiting for them,
trusting quite as much to their mistakes as to the merits of his own
men. The Romans fought with varying fortune. All the most mutinous
proved cowards: some, however, remembered their recent victory and
stuck to their places, cutting down the enemy, and encouraging
themselves and their neighbours. When the battle was thus renewed,
they waved their hands and signalled to the besieged not to lose their
opportunity. These were watching all that happened from the walls, and
now came bursting out at every gate. It chanced that at this point
Civilis' horse fell and threw him; both armies believed the rumour
that he had been wounded and killed. This caused immense consternation
to his army and immense encouragement to ours. However, Vocula failed
to pursue them when they fled, and merely set about strengthening the
rampart and turrets, apparently in fear of another blockade. His
frequent failure to make use of his victory gives colour to the
suspicion that he preferred war. [323]

What chiefly distressed our troops was the lack of supplies.
The 35
baggage-train of the legions was sent to Novaesium with a crowd of
non-combatants to fetch provisions thence by land, the enemy being now
masters of the river. The first convoy got through safely, while
Civilis was recovering from his fall. But when he heard that a second
foraging-party had been sent to Novaesium under guard of several
cohorts, and that they were proceeding on their way with their arms
piled in the wagons as if it was a time of perfect peace, few keeping
to the standards and all wandering at will, he sent some men forward
to hold the bridges and any places where the road was narrow, and then
formed up and attacked. The battle was fought on a long straggling
line, and the issue was still doubtful when nightfall broke it off.
The cohorts made their way through to Gelduba, where the camp remained
as it was,[324] garrisoned by the soldiers who had been left behind
there. It was obvious what dangers the convoy would have to face on
the return journey; they would be heavily laden and had already lost
their nerve. Vocula[325] accordingly added to his force a thousand
picked men from the Fifth and Fifteenth legions who had been at Vetera
during the siege, all tough soldiers with a grievance against their
generals. Against his orders, more than the thousand started with him,
openly complaining on the march that they would not put up with famine
and the treachery of their generals any longer. On the other hand,
those who stayed behind grumbled that they were left to their fate now
that part of the garrison had been removed. Thus there was a double
mutiny, one party calling Vocula back, the others refusing to return
to camp.

Meanwhile Civilis laid siege to Vetera. Vocula retired to Gelduba, 36
and thence to Novaesium, shortly afterwards winning a cavalry skirmish
just outside Novaesium. The Roman soldiers, however, alike in success
and in failure, were as eager as ever to make an end of their
generals. Now that their numbers were swelled by the arrival of the
detachments from the Fifth and the Fifteenth[326] they demanded their
donative, having learnt that money had arrived from Vitellius. Without
further delay Flaccus gave it to them in Vespasian's name, and this
did more than anything else to promote mutiny. They indulged in wild
dissipation and met every night in drinking-parties, at which they
revived their old grudge against Hordeonius Flaccus. None of the
officers ventured to interfere with them--the darkness somehow
obscured their sense of duty--and at last they dragged Flaccus out of
bed and murdered him. They were preparing to do the same with Vocula,
but he narrowly escaped in the darkness, disguised as a slave.
When the excitement subsided, their fears returned, and they sent 37
letters round by centurions to all the Gallic communities, asking for
reinforcements and money for the soldiers' pay.

Without a leader a mob is always rash, timorous, and inactive. On the
approach of Civilis they hurriedly snatched up their arms, and then
immediately dropped them and took to flight. Misfortune now bred
disunion, and the army of the Upper Rhine[327] dissociated itself
from the rest. However, they set up the statues of Vitellius again in
the camp and in the neighbouring Belgic villages, although by now
Vitellius was dead. [328] Soon the soldiers of the First, Fourth, and
Twenty-second repented of their folly and rejoined Vocula. He made
them take a second oath of allegiance to Vespasian and led them off to
raise the siege of Mainz. The besieging army, a combined force of
Chatti,[329] Usipi, and Mattiaci,[330] had already retired, having got
sufficient loot and suffered some loss. Our troops surprised them
while they were scattered along the road, and immediately attacked.
Moreover, the Treviri had built a rampart and breastwork all along
their frontier and fought the Germans again and again with heavy loss
to both sides. Before long, however, they rebelled, and thus sullied
their great services to the Roman people.

FOOTNOTES:

[316] The end of October, A. D. 69 (see iii. 30-34).

[317] Caecina, as consul, had probably while at Cremona issued
a manifesto in favour of joining the Flavian party.

[318] Cp. iii. 35.

[319] See chap. 13.

[320] At Gelduba (chap. 26).

[321] Asberg.

[322] From the north-east frontier of the Tarragona division
of Spain, of which Galba had been governor. Hordeonius
explained (chap. 25) that he had summoned aid from Spain.

[323] Mr. Henderson calls this sentence 'a veritable
masterpiece of improbability', and finds it 'hard to speak
calmly of such a judgement'. He has to confess that a military
motive for Vocula's inaction is hard to find. Tacitus, feeling
the same, offers a merely human motive. Soldiers of fortune
often prefer war to final victory, and in these days the
dangers of peace were only equalled by its ennui. Besides,
Tacitus' explanation lends itself to an epigram which he would
doubtless not have exchanged for the tedium of tactical truth.

[324] Cp. chap. 26.

[325] Having strengthened the defences of Vetera, he was now
going back to Gelduba.

[326] From the Vetera garrison.

[327] i. e. the troops which Flaccus at Mainz had put under
Vocula for the relief of Vetera (chap. 24).

[328] It was therefore later than December 21.

[329] Cp. chap. 12.

[330] The Usipi lived on the east bank of the Rhine between
the Sieg and the Lahn; the Mattiaci between the Lahn and the
Main, round Wiesbaden.


ROME AND THE EMPIRE UNDER VESPASIAN

During these events Vespasian took up his second consulship and 38
Titus his first, both in absence. [331] Rome was depressed and beset by
manifold anxieties. Apart from the real miseries of the moment, it
was plunged into a groundless panic on the rumour of a rebellion in
Africa, where Lucius Piso was supposed to be plotting a revolution.
Piso, who was governor of the province, was far from being a
firebrand. But the severity of the winter delayed the corn-ships, and
the common people, accustomed to buy their bread day by day, whose
interest in politics was confined to the corn-supply, soon began to
believe their fears that the coast of Africa was being blockaded and
supplies withheld. The Vitellians, who were still under the sway of
party spirit, fostered this rumour, and even the victorious party were
not entirely displeased at it, for none of their victories in the
civil war had satisfied their greed, and even foreign wars fell far
short of their ambition.

On the first of January the senate was convened by the Urban 39
Praetor,[332] Julius Frontinus, and passed votes of thanks and
congratulation to the generals, armies, and foreign princes. [333]
Tettius Julianus,[334] who had left his legion when it went over to
Vespasian, was deprived of his praetorship, which was conferred upon
Plotius Grypus. [335] Hormus[336] was raised to equestrian rank.
Frontinus then resigned his praetorship and Caesar Domitian succeeded
him. His name now stood at the head of all dispatches and edicts, but
the real authority lay with Mucianus, although Domitian, following
the promptings of his friends and of his own desires, frequently
asserted his independence. But Mucianus' chief cause of anxiety lay in
Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus. The fame of their exploits was still
fresh; the soldiers worshipped them; and they were popular in Rome,
because they had used no violence off the field of battle. It was even
hinted that Antonius had urged Crassus Scribonianus[337] to seize the
throne. He was a man who owed his distinction to famous ancestors and
to his brother's memory, and Antonius could promise him adequate
support for a conspiracy. However, Scribonianus refused. He had a
terror of all risks, and would hardly have been seduced even by the
certainty of success. Being unable to crush Antonius openly, Mucianus
showered compliments on him in the senate and embarrassed him with
promises, hinting at the governorship of Nearer Spain, which the
departure of Cluvius Rufus[338] had left vacant. Meanwhile he lavished
military commands on Antonius' friends. Then, having filled his empty
head with ambitious hopes, he destroyed his influence at one stroke by
moving the Seventh legion,[339] which was passionately attached to
Antonius, into winter-quarters. The Third, who were similarly devoted
to Arrius Varus, were sent back to Syria,[340] and part of the army
was taken out to the war in Germany. Thus, on the removal of the
disturbing factors, the city could resume its normal life under the
old regime of law and civil government.

On the day of his first appearance in the senate Domitian spoke a 40
few moderate sentences regretting the absence of his father and
brother. His behaviour was most proper, and, as his character was
still an unknown quantity, his blushes were taken for signs of
modesty. [341] He moved from the chair that all Galba's honours should
be restored, to which Curtius Montanus proposed an amendment that some
respect should also be paid to the memory of Piso. The senate approved
both proposals, though nothing was done about Piso. Next, various
commissions were appointed by lot to restore the spoils of war to the
owners; to examine and affix the bronze tablets of laws, which in
course of time had dropped off the walls; to revise the list of public
holidays, which in these days of flattery had been disgracefully
tampered with; and to introduce some economy into public expenditure.
Tettius Julianus was restored to his praetorship as soon as it was
discovered that he had taken refuge with Vespasian: but Grypus was
allowed to retain his rank. [342] It was then decided to resume the
hearing of the case of Musonius Rufus against Publius Celer[343]
Publius was convicted and the shade of Soranus satisfied. This strict
verdict made the day memorable in the annals of Rome, and credit was
also due to private enterprise, for everybody felt that Musonius had
done his duty in bringing the action. On the other hand, Demetrius, a
professor of Cynic philosophy, earned discredit for defending an
obvious criminal[344] more for ostentatious motives than from honest
conviction. As for Publius, courage and fluency alike failed him at
the critical moment. This trial was the signal for further reprisals
against prosecutors. Junius Mauricus[345] accordingly petitioned
Domitian that the senate might be allowed access to the minutes of the
imperial cabinet, in order to find out who had applied for leave to
bring a prosecution and against whom. The answer was that on such a
question as this the emperor must be consulted. Accordingly, at 41
the instigation of its leading members, the senate framed an oath in
these words, 'I call heaven to witness that I have never countenanced
any action prejudicial to any man's civil status, nor have I derived
any profit or any office from the misfortune of any Roman citizen. '
The magistrates vied with each other in their haste to take this oath,
and the other members did the same, when called upon to speak. Those
who had a guilty conscience were alarmed, and managed to alter the
wording of the oath by various devices. The house meanwhile applauded
every sign of scruple, and protested against each case of perjury.
This kind of informal censure fell most severely on Sariolenus Vocula,
Nonius Attianus, and Cestius Severus, who were notorious as habitual
informers under Nero. Against Sariolenus there was also a fresh charge
of having continued his practices with Vitellius. The members went on
shaking their fists at him until he left the house. They next turned
on Paccius Africanus, trying to hound him out in the same way. He was
supposed to have suggested to Nero the murder of the two brothers
Scribonius,[346] who were famous for their friendship and their
wealth. Africanus dared not admit his guilt, though he could not very
well deny it. So he swung round on Vibius Crispus,[347] who was
pestering him with questions, and tried to turn the tables by
implicating him in the charges which he could not rebut, thus shifting
the odium on to his accomplice.

On this occasion Vipstanus Messala[348] gained a great reputation, 42
both for dutiful affection and for eloquence, by venturing to
intercede for his brother Aquilius Regulus,[349] although he had not
attained the senatorial age. [350] Regulus had fallen into great
disfavour for having brought about the ruin of the noble families of
the Crassi and of Orfitus. It was supposed that, though quite a young
man, he had voluntarily undertaken the prosecution, not to escape any
danger which was threatening him, but from purely ambitious motives.
Crassus' wife, Sulpicia Praetextata, and his four sons were anxious to
secure revenge if the senate would grant a trial. Messala therefore
made no attempt to defend the case or the accused, but tried to
shelter his brother, and had already won over some of the senators.
Curtius Montanus now attacked him in a savage speech, and even went so
far as to charge Regulus with having given money to Piso's murderer
after Galba's death, and with having bitten Piso's head. [351] 'That,'
said he, 'Nero certainly did not compel you to do. You purchased
neither position nor safety by that savage piece of cruelty. We may
put up with the pleas of those wretches who prefer to ruin others
rather than endanger their own lives. But your father's banishment had
guaranteed your security. His property had been divided amongst his
creditors. [352] You were not of an age to stand for office. Nero had
nothing either to hope or to fear from you. Your talents were as yet
untried and you had never exerted them in any man's defence, yet your
lust for blood, your insatiable ambition, led you to stain your young
hands in the blood of Rome's nobility. At one swoop you caused the
ruin of innocent youths, of old and distinguished statesmen, of
high-born ladies; and out of the country's disaster you secured for
yourself the spoils of two ex-consuls,[353] stuffed seven million
sesterces into your purse, and shone with the reflected glory of a
priesthood. You would blame Nero's lack of enterprise because he took
one household at a time, thus causing unnecessary fatigue to himself
and his informers, when he might have ruined the whole senate at a
single word. Why, gentlemen, you must indeed keep and preserve to
yourselves a counsellor of such ready resource. Let each generation
have its good examples: and as our old men follow Eprius Marcellus or
Vibius Crispus, let the rising generation emulate Regulus. Villainy
finds followers even when it fails. What if it flourish and prosper?
If we hesitate to touch a mere ex-quaestor, shall we be any bolder
when he has been praetor and consul? Or do you suppose that the race
of tyrants came to an end in Nero? That is what the people believed
who outlived Tiberius or Caligula, and meanwhile there arose one more
infamous and more bloody still. [354] We are not afraid of Vespasian.
We trust his years and his natural moderation. But a good precedent
outlives a good sovereign. Gentlemen, we are growing effete: we are no
longer that senate which, after Nero had been killed, clamoured for
the punishment of all informers and their menials according to our
ancestors' rigorous prescription. The best chance comes on the day
after the death of a bad emperor. '

The senate listened to Montanus's speech with such sympathy that 43
Helvidius began to hope that it might be possible to get a verdict
even against Marcellus. Beginning with a eulogy of Cluvius Rufus, who,
though quite as rich and as eloquent as Marcellus, had never brought
any one into trouble under Nero, he went on to attack Marcellus, both
by contrasting him with Rufus and by pressing home the charge against
him. Feeling that the house was warming to this rhetoric, Marcellus
got up as though to leave, exclaiming, 'I am off, Helvidius: I leave
you your senate: you can tyrannize over it under Caesar's nose. '
Vibius Crispus followed Marcellus, and, though both were angry, their
expressions were very different. Marcellus marched out with flashing
eyes, Crispus with a smile on his face. Eventually their friends went
and brought them back. Thus the struggle grew more and more heated
between a well-meaning majority and a small but powerful minority; and
since they were both animated by irreconcilable hatred, the day was
spent in vain recriminations.

At the next sitting Domitian opened by recommending them to forget 44
their grievances and grudges and the unavoidable exigences of the
recent past. Mucianus then at great length moved a motion in favour of
the prosecutors, issuing a mild warning, almost in terms of entreaty,
to those who wanted to revive actions which had been begun and
dropped. Seeing that their attempt at independence was being
thwarted, the senate gave it up. However, that it might not seem as if
the senate's opinion had been flouted and complete impunity granted
for all crimes committed under Nero, Mucianus forced Octavius Sagitta
and Antistius Sosianus, who had returned from exile, to go back to the
islands to which they had been confined. Octavius had committed
adultery with Pontia Postumina, and, on her refusal to marry him, had
murdered her in a fit of jealous fury. Sosianus was an unprincipled
scoundrel who had been the ruin of many. [355] The senate had found
them both guilty, and passed a heavy sentence of exile, nor had their
penalty been remitted, although others were allowed to return.
However, this failed to allay the ill-feeling against Mucianus, for
Sosianus and Sagitta, whether they returned or not, were of no
importance, whereas people were afraid of the professional
prosecutors, who were men of wealth and ability and experts in crime.

Unanimity was gradually restored in the senate by the holding of a 45
trial according to ancient precedent, before a court of the whole
house. A senator named Manlius Patruitus complained that he had been
beaten before a mob of people in the colony of Siena by order of the
local magistrates. Nor had the affront stopped there. They had held a
mock funeral before his eyes, and had accompanied their dirges and
lamentations with gross insults levelled at the whole senate. The
accused were summoned; their case was tried; they were convicted and
punished. A further decree of the senate was passed admonishing the
commons of Siena to pay more respect to the laws. About the same time
Antonius Flamma was prosecuted by Cyrene for extortion, and exiled for
the inhumanity of his conduct.

Meanwhile, a mutiny almost broke out among the soldiers. The men 46
who had been discharged by Vitellius[356] came together again in
support of Vespasian, and demanded re-admission. They were joined by
the selected legionaries who had also been led to hope for service in
the Guards, and they now demanded the pay they had been promised. Even
the Vitellians[357] alone could not have been dispersed without
serious bloodshed, but it would require immense sums of money to
retain the services of such a large number of men. Mucianus
accordingly entered the barracks to make a careful estimate of each
man's term of service. He formed up the victorious troops with their
own arms and distinctive decorations, each company a few paces from
the next. Then the Vitellians who had surrendered, as we have
described, at Bovillae,[358] and all the other soldiers who had been
hunted down in the city and its neighbourhood, were marched out almost
entirely without arms or uniforms. Mucianus then had them sorted out,
and drew up in separate corps the troops of the German army, of the
British army, and of any others that were in Rome. Their first glance
at the scene astounded them. Facing them they saw what looked like a
fighting front bristling with weapons, while they were caught in a
trap, defenceless and foul with dirt. As soon as they began to be
sorted out a panic seized them. The German troops in particular were
terrified at their isolation, and felt they were being told off for
slaughter. They embraced their comrades and clung upon their necks,
asking for one last kiss, begging not to be left alone, crying out,
'Our cause is the same as yours, why should our fate be different? '
They appealed now to Mucianus, now to the absent emperor, and lastly
to the powers of Heaven, until Mucianus came to the rescue of their
imaginary terrors by calling them all 'sworn servants of one emperor',
for he found that the victorious army was joining in and seconding
their tears with cheering. On that day the matter ended there. A few
days later, when Domitian addressed them, they received him with
renewed confidence, refused his offer of lands, and begged for
enlistment and their pay instead. This was only a petition, but one
that could not be refused: so they were admitted to the Guards.
Subsequently, those who had grown old and completed the regular term
of service[359] were honourably discharged. Others were dismissed for
misbehaviour, but one by one at different times, which is always the
safest method of weakening any kind of conspiracy.

To return to the senate; a bill was now passed that a loan of 47
sixty million sesterces should be raised from private individuals and
administered by Pompeius Silvanus. This may have been a financial
necessity, or they may have wanted it to seem so. At any rate the
necessity soon ceased to exist, or else they gave up the pretence.
Domitian then carried a proposal that the consulships conferred by
Vitellius should be cancelled, and that a state funeral should be held
in honour of Flavius Sabinus. [360] Both proposals are striking
evidence of the fickleness of human fortune, which so often makes the
first last and the last first.

It was about this time that Lucius Piso,[361] the pro-consul of 48
Africa, was killed. To give a true explanation of this murder we must
go back and take a brief survey of certain matters which are closely
connected with the reasons for such crimes. Under the sainted Augustus
and Tiberius the pro-consul of Africa had in his command one legion
and some auxiliaries with which to guard the frontier of the
empire. [362] Caligula, who was restless by nature and harboured
suspicions of the then pro-consul, Marcus Silanus, withdrew the
legion from his command and put it under a legate whom he sent out for
the purpose. As each had an equal amount of patronage and their
functions overlapped, Caligula thus caused a state of friction which
was further aggravated by regrettable quarrels. The greater permanence
of his tenure[363] gradually strengthened the legate's position, and
perhaps an inferior is always anxious to vie with his betters. The
most eminent governors, on the other hand, were more careful of their
comfort than of their authority.

At the present time the legion in Africa was commanded by Valerius 49
Festus,[364] an extravagant young man, immoderately ambitious, whose
kinship with Vitellius had given him some anxiety. He had frequent
interviews with Piso, and it is impossible to tell whether he tempted
Piso to rebel or resisted Piso's temptations. No one was present at
their interviews, which were held in private, and after Piso's death
most people were inclined to sympathize with his murderer. Beyond
doubt the province and the garrison were unfavourable to Vespasian.
Besides, some of the Vitellian refugees from Rome pointed out to Piso
that the Gallic provinces were wavering. Germany was ready to rebel,
and he himself was in danger; 'and,' they added, 'if you earn
suspicion in peace your safest course is war. ' Meanwhile, Claudius
Sagitta, who commanded Petra's Horse,[365] made a good crossing and
outstripped the centurion Papirius, who had been sent out by Mucianus
and was commissioned, so Sagitta affirmed, to assassinate Piso.
Sagitta further stated that Galerianus,[366] Piso's cousin and
son-in-law, had already been murdered, and told him that while his one
hope lay in taking a bold step, there were two courses open to him: he
might either take up arms on the spot, or he might prefer to sail to
Gaul and offer to lead the Vitellian armies. This made no impression
on Piso.