" by saying that thou hast an
immediate
know-
ledge or consciousness of them.
ledge or consciousness of them.
Fichte - Nature of the Scholar
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl.
handle.
net/2027/wu.
89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.
hathitrust.
org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
289
But, in the first place, hast thou forgotten that it is not
our object to relate to each other what presents itself in
consciousness, as in a journal of the human mind, but to
consider its various phenomena in their connexion, and to
explain them by, and deduce them from, each other; and
that consequently none of thy observations, which certain-
ly cannot be denied, but which must be explained, can over-
turn any one of my just conclusions.
I. I shall never lose sight of this.
Spirit. Then do not, in the remarkable resemblance of this consciousness of bodies out of thyself, which yet thou
canst not describe, to real perception, overlook the great dif-
ference nevertheless existing between them.
I. I was about to mention this difference. Each indeed
appears as an immediate, not as an acquired or produced
consciousness. But sensation is consciousness of my own
state. Not so the consciousness of the object itself, which
has absolutely no reference to me. I know that it is, and
this is all; it does not concern me. If, in the first case, I
seem like a soft strain of music which is modulated now in
this way now in that, in the other, I appear like a mirror
before which objects pass without producing the slightest
change in it.
This distinction however is in my favour. Just so much
the more do I seem to have a distinct consciousness of an
existence out of myself, entirely independent of the sense of
my own state of being;--of an existence out of myself, I
say--for this differs altogether in kind from the conscious-
ness of my own internal states.
Spirit. Thou observest well--but do not rush too
hastily to a conclusion. If that whereon we have already
agreed remains true, and thou canst be immediately con-
scious of thyself only; if the consciousness now in question
be not a consciousness of thine own passivity, and still less
a consciousness of thine own activity;--may it not then be
an unrecognised consciousness of thine own being ? --of thy
being in so far as thou art a knowing being,--an Intelli-
gence?
Pa
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 290
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
/. I do not understand thee; but help me once more,
for I wish to understand thee.
Spirit. I must then demand thy whole attention, for I
am here compelled to go deeper, and expatiate more widely,
than ever. What art thou?
I. To answer thy question in the most general way,--I
am I, myself. *
Spirit. I am well satisfied with this answer. What dost
thou mean when thou sayest "I";--what lies in this con-
ception,--and how dost thou attain it 1
I. On this point I can make myself understood only by
contrast. External existence--the thing, is something out of me, the cognitive being, /am myself this cognitive be-
ing, one with the object of my cognition. As to my con-
sciousness of the former, there arises the question,--Since
the thing cannot know itself, how can a knowledge of it
arise? --how can a consciousness of the thing arise in me,
since I myself am not the thing, nor any of its modes or
forms, and all these modes and forms lie within the circle of
its own being, and by no means in mine 1 How does the
thing reach me 1 What is the tie between me, the subject,
and the thing which is the object of my knowledge 1 But as
to my consciousness of myself, there can be no such quest-
ion. In this case, I have my knowledge within myself, for
I am intelligence. What I am, I know because I am it;
and that whereof I know immediately that I am it, that I
am because I immediately know it . There is here no need
of any tie between subject and object; my own nature is
this tie. I am subject and object:--and this subject-object-
ivity, this return of knowledge upon itself, is what I mean
by the term "I," when I deliberately attach a definite
meaning to it.
Spirit. Thus it is in the identity of subject and object
that thy nature as an intelligence consists 1
I. Yes.
Spirit. Canst thou then comprehend the possibility of
thy becoming conscious of this identity, which is neither
subject nor object, but which lies at the foundation of both,
and out of which both arise 1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
291
/. By no means. It is the condition of all my conscious-
ness, that the conscious being, and what he is conscious of,
appear distinct and separate. I cannot even conceive of
any other consciousness. In the very act of recognising
myself, I recognise myself as subject and object, both how-
ever being immediately bound up with each other.
Spirit. Canst thou become conscious of the moment in
which this inconceivable one separated itself into these
two?
I. How can I, since my consciousness first becomes pos-
sible in and through their separation,--since it is my con-
sciousness itself that thus separates them 1 Beyond con-
sciousness itself there is no consciousness.
Spirit. It is this separation, then, that thou necessarily
recognisest in becoming conscious of thyself? In this thy
very original being consists?
/ So it is.
Spirit. And on what then is it founded?
I. I am intelligence, and have consciousness in myself.
This separation is the condition and result of consciousness.
It has its foundation, therefore, in myself, like conscious-
ness.
Spirit. Thou art intelligence, thou sayest, at least this is
all that is now in question, and as such thou becomest an
object to thyself. Thy knowledge, therefore in its objective
capacity, presents itself before thyself, i. e. before thy know-
ledge in its subjective capacity; and floats before it, but with-
out thou thyself being conscious of such a presentation?
1. So it is.
Spirit. Canst thou not then adduce some more exact
characteristics of the subjective and objective elements as
they appear in consciousness 1
I. The subjective appears to contain within itself the foundation of consciousness as regards its form, but by no
means as regards its substance. That there is a conscious-
ness, an inward perception and conception,--of this the
foundation lies in itself; but that precisely this or that is
conceived,--in this it is dependent on the objective, with
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 292
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
which it is conjoined and by which it is likewise borne
along. The objective, on the contrary, contains the founda-
tion of its being within itself; it is in and for itself,--it is,
as it is^^bccau^ejt is. The subjective appears as the still and
passive mirror of the objective; the latter floats before it.
That the former should reflect images generally, lies in it-
self. That precisely this image and none other should be
reflected, depends on the latter.
Spirit. The subjective, then, according to its essential
nature, is precisely so constituted as thou hast previously
described thy consciousness of an existence out of thyself to
be?
I. It is true, and this agreement is remarkable. I begin
to believe it half credible, that out of the internal laws of
my own consciousness may proceed even the presentation of
an existence out of myself, and independent of me; and
that this presentation may at bottom be nothing more than
the presentation of these laws themselves.
Spirit. And why only half credible?
I. Because I do not yet see why precisely such a presen-
tation--a presentation of a mass extended through space--
should arise.
Spirit. Thou hast already seen that it is only thine own
sensation which thou extendest through space; and thou
hast had some forebodings that it is by this extension in
space alone that thy sensation becomes transformed for thee
into something sensible. We have therefore to do at present
only with space itself, and to explain its origin in conscious-
ness.
I. So it is.
Spirit. Let us then make the attempt . I know that thou
canst not become conscious of thy intelligent activity as
such, in so far as it remains in its original and unchangeable
unity;--i. e. in the condition which begins with thy very be-
ing, and can never be destroyed without at the same time
destroying that being;--and such a consciousness therefore
I do not ascribe to thee. But thou canst become conscious
of it in so far as it passes from one state of transition to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
29-S
another within the limits of this unchangeable unity.
When thou dost represent it to thyself in the performance
of this function, how does it appear to thee--this internal
spiritual activity?
I. My spiritual faculty appears as if in a state of internal
motion, swiftly passing from one point to another;--in
short, as an extended line. A definite thought makes a
point in this line.
Spirit. And why as an extended line?
I. Can I give a reason for that beyond the circle of which
I cannot go without at the same time overstepping the
limits of my own existence 1 It is so, absolutely. Spirit. Thus, then, does a particular act of thy conscious-
ness appear to thee. But what shape then is assumed, not
by thy produced, but by thy inherited, knowledge, of which
all specific thought is but the revival and farther definition?
--how does this present itself to thee? Under what image
does it appear?
I. Evidently as something in which one may draw lines
and make points in all directions, namely, as space.
Spirit. Now then, it will be entirely clear to thee, how
that, which really proceeds from thyself, may nevertheless,
appear to thee as an existence external to thyself,--nay,
must necessarily appear so.
Thou hast penetrated to the true source of the presenta-
tion of things out of thyself. This presentation is not per-
ception, for thou perceivest thyself only;--as little is it
thought, for things do not appear to thee as mere results of
thought. It is an actual, and indeed absolute and immediate consciousness of an existence out of thyself, just as per-
ception is an immediate consciousness of thine own condi-
tion. Do not permit thyself to be perplexed by sophists and
half-philosophers; things do not appear to thee through any
representation;--of the thing that exists, and that can exist,
thou art immediately conscious;--and there is no other
thing than that of which thou art conscious. Thou thyself
art the thing; thou thyself, by virtue of thy finitude--the
innermost law of thy being--art thus presented before thy-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 294
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
self, and projected out of thyself; and all that thou perceiv-
est out of thyself is still--thyself only. This consciousness
has been well named Intuition^ In all consciousnes I con-
template myself, forT am myself:--to the subjective, con-
scious being, consciousness is self-contemplation. And the
objective, that which is contemplated and of which I am
conscious, is also myself,--the same self which contemplates,
but now floating as an objective presentation before the
subjective. In this respect, consciousness is an active retro-
spect of my own intuitions; an observation of myself from
my own position; a projection of myself out of myself by
means of the only mode of action which is properly mine,--
perception. I am a living faculty of vision. I see (conscious-
ness) my own vision (the thing of which lam conscious. )
Hence this object is also thoroughly transparent to_thy_
mind's eye, because it is thy mind itself. Thou dividest,
limitest, determinest, the possible forms of things, and the
relations of these forms, previous to all perception . No
wonder,--for in so doing thou dividest, limitest, and deter-
minest thine own knowledge, which undoubtedly is suffi-
ciently known to thee. Thus does a knowledge of things
become possible. It is not in the things, and cannot pro-
ceed out of them. It proceeds from thee, and is indeed
thine own nature.
There is no outward sense, for there is no outward per-
ception. There is, however, an outward intuition;--not of
things, but this outward intuition--this knowledge appar-
ently external to the subjective being, and hovering before
it,--is itself the thing, and there is no other. By means of
this outward intuition are perception and sense regarded
as external. It remains eternally true, for it is proved,--
that I see or feel a surface,--my sight or feeling takes the
shape of the sight or feeling of a surface. Space,--illumina-
ted, transparent, palpable, penetrable space,--the purest
image of my knowledge, is not seen, but is an intuitive pos-
session of my own mind; in it even my faculty of vision it-
self is contained. The light is not out of, but in me, and I
myself am the light. Thou hast already answered my quest-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
295
ion, "How dost thou know of thy sensations, of thy seeing,
feeling, &c. ?
" by saying that thou hast an immediate know-
ledge or consciousness of them. Now, perhaps, thou wilt be
able to define more exactly this immediate consciousness
of sensation.
I. It must be a two-fold consciousness. Sensation is it- \self an immediate consciousness; for I am sensible of my
own sensation. But from this there arises no knowledge of
outward existence, but only the feeling of my own state. I
am however, originally, not merely a sensitive, but also an
intuitive being; not merely a practical being, but also
an intelligence. I intuitively contemplate my sensation
itself, and thus there arises from myself and my own nature,
the cognition of an existence. Sensation becomes transform-
ed into its own object; my affections, as red, smooth, and
the like, into a something red, smooth, &c. out of myself; and
this something, and my relative sensation, I intuitively con-//' itemplate in space, because the intuition itself is space.
Thus does it become clear why I believe that I see or feel
surfaces, which, in fact, I neither see nor feeL I intuitively
regard my own sensation of sight or touch, as the sight or touch of a surface. y'
Spirit. Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself.
I. But now it is not at all by means of an inference,
either recognised or unrecognised, from the principle of
causality, that the thing is originated for me; it floats im-
mediately before me, and is presented to my consciousness
without any process of reasoning. I cannot say, as I have
formerly said, that perception becomes transformed into a
something perceivable, for the perceivable, as such, has pre-
cedence in consciousness. It is not with an affection of my-
self, as red, smooth, or the like, that consciousness begins,
but with a red, smooth object out of myself.
Spirit. If, however, thou wert obliged to explain what is
red, smooth, and the like, couldst thou possibly make any
other reply than that it was that by which thou wert affect-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2! )C
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ed in a certain manner that thou namest red, smooth, &c. ?
I. Certainly not,--if you were to ask me, and I were to
enter upon the question and attempt an explanation. But
originally no one asks me the question, nor do I ask it of
myself. I forget myself entirely, and lose myself in my in-
tuition of the object; become conscious, not of my own state,
but only of an existence out of myself. Red, green, and the
like, are properties of the thing; it is red or green, and this
is all. There can be no farther explanation, any more than
there can be a farther explanation of these affections in me,
on which we have already agreed. This is most obvious in
the sensation of sight. Colour appears as something out of
myself; and the common understanding of man, if left to it-
self, and without farther reflection, would scarcely be per-
suaded to describe red, green, &c. as that which excited
within him a specific affection.
Spirit. But, doubtless, it would if asked regarding sweet
or sour. It is not our business at present to inquire whe-
ther the impression made by means of sight be a pure sen-
sation, or whether it may be not rather be a middle term
between sensation and intuition, and the bond by which
they are united in our minds. But I admit thy assertion,
and it is extremely welcome to me. Thou canst, indeed,
lose thyself in the intuition; and unless thou directest par-
ticular attention to thyself, or takest an interest in some
external action, thou dost so, naturally and necessarily. This
is the remark to which the defenders of a groundless con-
sciousness of external things appeal, when it is shown that
the principle of causality, by which the existence of such
things might be inferred, exists only in ourselves; they deny
that any such inference is made, and, in so far as they refer
to actual consciousness in particular cases, this cannot be
disputed. These same defenders, when the nature of intui-
tion is explained to them from the laws of intelligence it-
self, themselves draw this inference anew, and never weary
of repeating that there must be something external to us
which compels us to this belief.
I. Do not trouble thyself about them at present, but in-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK IL KNOWLEDGE.
297
struct me. I have no preconceived opinion, and seek for
truth only.
Spirit. Nevertheless, intuition necessarily proceeds from
the perception of thine own state, although thou art not al-
ways clearly conscious of this perception, as thou hast al-
ready seen. Even in that consciousness in which thou losest
thyself in the object, there is always something which is only
possible by means of an unrecognised reference to thyself,
and close observation of thine own state.
I. Consequently, at all times and places the conscious-
ness of existence out of myself must be accompanied by an
unobserved consciousness of myself?
Spirit. Just so.
I. The former being determined through the latter,--as
it actually is?
Spirit. That is my meaning.
I. Prove this to me, and I shall be satisfied.
Spirit. Dost thou imagine only things in general as
placed in space, or each of them individually as occupying a
certain portion of space?
/. The latter,--each thing has its determinate bulk.
Spirit. And do different things occupy the same part of
space?
I. By no means; they exclude each other. They are be-
side, over or under, behind or before, each other;--nearer to
me, or further from me. ,
Spirit. And how dost thou come to this measurement
and arrangement of them in space? Is it by sensation?
I. How could that be, since space itself is no sensation?
Spirit. Or intuition?
I. This cannot be. Intuition is immediate and infal-
lible. What is contained in it does not appear as produced,
and cannot deceive. But I must train myself to estimate,
measure and deliberate upon, the size of an object, its dis-
tance, its position with respect to other objects. It is a
truth known to every beginner, that we originally see all
objects in the same line; that we learn to estimate their
greater or lesser distances; that the child attempts to grasp
Qa
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2. 98
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
distant objects as if they lay immediately before his eyes;
and that one born blind who should suddenly receive sight
would do the same. This conception of distances is there-
fore a judgment;--no intuition, but an arrangement of my
different intuitions by means of the understanding, I may
err in my estimate of the size, distance, &c. of an object; and
the so-called optical deceptions are not deceptions of sight,
but erroneous judgments formed concerning the size of the
object, concerning the size of its different parts in relation
to each other, and consequently concerning its true figure
and its distance from me and from other objects. But it
does really exist in space, as I contemplate it, and the
colours which I see in it are likewise really seen by me;--
and here there is no deception.
Spirit. And what then is the principle of this judgment,
--to take the most distinct and easy case,--thy judgment
of the proximity or distance of objects,--how dost thou esti-
mate this distance?
I. Doubtless by the greater strength or feebleness of im-
pressions otherwise equal. I see before me two objects of
the same red colour. The one whose colour I see more vi-
vidly, I regard as the nearer: that whose colour seems to me
fainter, as the more distant, and as so much the more dis-
tant as the colour seems fainter.
Spirit. Thus thou dost estimate the distance according to
the degree of strength or weakness in the sensation; and
this strength or weakness itself,--dost thou also estimate it?
I. Obviously only in so far as I take note of my own af-
fections, and even of very slight differences in these. --Thou
hast conquered! All consciousness of objects out of myself
is determined by the clearness and exactitude of my con-
sciousness of my own states, and in this consciousness there
is always a conclusion drawn from the effect in myself to a
cause out of myself.
Spirit. Thou art quickly vanquished; and I must now
myself carry forward, in thy place, the controversy against
myself. My argument can only apply to those cases in
which an actual and deliberate estimate of the uise, dia-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
299
tance, and position, of objects takes place, and in which
thou art conscious of making such an estimate. Thou wilt
however admit that this is by no means the common case,
and that for the most part thou rather becomest conscious
of the size, distance, &c. of an object at the very same un-
divided moment in which thou becomest conscious of the
object itself.
I. When once we learn to estimate the distances of ob-
jects by the strength of the impression, the rapidity of this
judgment is merely the consequence of its frequent exercise.
I have learnt, by a lifelong experience, rapidly to observe
the strength of the impression and thereby to estimate the
distance. My present conception is founded upon a combi-
nation, formerly made, of sensation, intuition, and previous
judgments; although at the moment I am conscious only of
the present conception. I no longer apprehend generally
red, green, or the like, out of myself, but a red or a green at
this, that, or the other distance; but this last addition is merely
a renewal of a judgment formerly arrived at by deliberate
reflection.
Spirit. Has it not then, at length, become clear to thee
whether thou discoverest the existence of things out of thy-
self by intuition, or by reasoning, or both,--and in how far
by each of these?
J. Perfectly; and I believe that I have now attained the
fullest insight into the origin of my conceptions of objects
out of myself.
1. I am absolutely conscious of myself, because I am this
I,--myself; and that partly as a practical being,
partly as an intelligence. The first consciousness is
Sensation, the second Intuition--unlimited space.
2. I cannot comprehend the unlimited, for I am finite. I
therefore set apart, in thought, a certain portion of
universal space, and place the former in a certain re-
lation to the latter.
3. The measure of this limited portion of space is the ex-
tent of my own sensibility, according to a principle
which may be thus expressed :--Whatever affects me
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 300
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
in such or such a manner is to be placed, in space, in
such or such relations to the other things which
-->affect me.
The properties or attributes of the object proceed from
the perception of my own internal state; the space which it
fills, from intuitive contemplation. By a process of thought,
both are conjoined; the former being added to the latter.
It is so, assuredly, as we have said before:--that which is
merely a state or affection of myself, by being transferred or
projected into space becomes an attribute of the object; but
it is so projected into space, not by intuition, but by thought,
by measuring, regulating thought. Not that this act is to
be regarded as an intellectual discovery or creation; but
only as a more exact definition, by means of thought, of
something which is already given in sensation and intuition,
independent of all thought.
Spirit. Whatever affects me in such or such a manner is
to be placed in such or such relations:--thus dost thou rea-
son in defining and arranging objects in space. But does
not the declaration that a thing affects thee in a certain
manner, include the assumption that it affects thee gene-
rally?
I. Undoubtedly.
Spirit. And is any presentation of an external object pos-
sible, which is not in this manner limited and defined in
space?
/. No; for no object exists in space generally, but each
one in a determinate portion of space.
Spirit. So that in fact, whether thou art conscious of it or
not, every external object is assumed by thee as affecting
thyself, as certainly as it is assumed as filling a determinate
portion of space?
/. That follows, certainly.
Spirit. And what kind of presentation is that of an object
affecting thyself?
I. Evidently a thought; and indeed a thought founded
on the principle of causality already mentioned. I see now,
still more clearly, that the consciousness of the object is en-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
301
grafted on my self-consciousness in two ways,--partly by in-
tuition, and partly by thought founded on the principle of
causality. The object, however strange it may seem, is at
once the immediate object of my consciousness, and the re-
sult of deliberate thought.
Spirit. In different respects, however. Thou must be
capable of being conscious of this thought of the object?
I. Doubtless; although usually I am not so.
Spirit. Therefore to thy passive state, thy affection, thou
dost superadd in thought an activity out of thyself, such as
thou hast above described in the case of thy thought accord-
ing to the principle of causality?
I. Yes.
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
289
But, in the first place, hast thou forgotten that it is not
our object to relate to each other what presents itself in
consciousness, as in a journal of the human mind, but to
consider its various phenomena in their connexion, and to
explain them by, and deduce them from, each other; and
that consequently none of thy observations, which certain-
ly cannot be denied, but which must be explained, can over-
turn any one of my just conclusions.
I. I shall never lose sight of this.
Spirit. Then do not, in the remarkable resemblance of this consciousness of bodies out of thyself, which yet thou
canst not describe, to real perception, overlook the great dif-
ference nevertheless existing between them.
I. I was about to mention this difference. Each indeed
appears as an immediate, not as an acquired or produced
consciousness. But sensation is consciousness of my own
state. Not so the consciousness of the object itself, which
has absolutely no reference to me. I know that it is, and
this is all; it does not concern me. If, in the first case, I
seem like a soft strain of music which is modulated now in
this way now in that, in the other, I appear like a mirror
before which objects pass without producing the slightest
change in it.
This distinction however is in my favour. Just so much
the more do I seem to have a distinct consciousness of an
existence out of myself, entirely independent of the sense of
my own state of being;--of an existence out of myself, I
say--for this differs altogether in kind from the conscious-
ness of my own internal states.
Spirit. Thou observest well--but do not rush too
hastily to a conclusion. If that whereon we have already
agreed remains true, and thou canst be immediately con-
scious of thyself only; if the consciousness now in question
be not a consciousness of thine own passivity, and still less
a consciousness of thine own activity;--may it not then be
an unrecognised consciousness of thine own being ? --of thy
being in so far as thou art a knowing being,--an Intelli-
gence?
Pa
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 290
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
/. I do not understand thee; but help me once more,
for I wish to understand thee.
Spirit. I must then demand thy whole attention, for I
am here compelled to go deeper, and expatiate more widely,
than ever. What art thou?
I. To answer thy question in the most general way,--I
am I, myself. *
Spirit. I am well satisfied with this answer. What dost
thou mean when thou sayest "I";--what lies in this con-
ception,--and how dost thou attain it 1
I. On this point I can make myself understood only by
contrast. External existence--the thing, is something out of me, the cognitive being, /am myself this cognitive be-
ing, one with the object of my cognition. As to my con-
sciousness of the former, there arises the question,--Since
the thing cannot know itself, how can a knowledge of it
arise? --how can a consciousness of the thing arise in me,
since I myself am not the thing, nor any of its modes or
forms, and all these modes and forms lie within the circle of
its own being, and by no means in mine 1 How does the
thing reach me 1 What is the tie between me, the subject,
and the thing which is the object of my knowledge 1 But as
to my consciousness of myself, there can be no such quest-
ion. In this case, I have my knowledge within myself, for
I am intelligence. What I am, I know because I am it;
and that whereof I know immediately that I am it, that I
am because I immediately know it . There is here no need
of any tie between subject and object; my own nature is
this tie. I am subject and object:--and this subject-object-
ivity, this return of knowledge upon itself, is what I mean
by the term "I," when I deliberately attach a definite
meaning to it.
Spirit. Thus it is in the identity of subject and object
that thy nature as an intelligence consists 1
I. Yes.
Spirit. Canst thou then comprehend the possibility of
thy becoming conscious of this identity, which is neither
subject nor object, but which lies at the foundation of both,
and out of which both arise 1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
291
/. By no means. It is the condition of all my conscious-
ness, that the conscious being, and what he is conscious of,
appear distinct and separate. I cannot even conceive of
any other consciousness. In the very act of recognising
myself, I recognise myself as subject and object, both how-
ever being immediately bound up with each other.
Spirit. Canst thou become conscious of the moment in
which this inconceivable one separated itself into these
two?
I. How can I, since my consciousness first becomes pos-
sible in and through their separation,--since it is my con-
sciousness itself that thus separates them 1 Beyond con-
sciousness itself there is no consciousness.
Spirit. It is this separation, then, that thou necessarily
recognisest in becoming conscious of thyself? In this thy
very original being consists?
/ So it is.
Spirit. And on what then is it founded?
I. I am intelligence, and have consciousness in myself.
This separation is the condition and result of consciousness.
It has its foundation, therefore, in myself, like conscious-
ness.
Spirit. Thou art intelligence, thou sayest, at least this is
all that is now in question, and as such thou becomest an
object to thyself. Thy knowledge, therefore in its objective
capacity, presents itself before thyself, i. e. before thy know-
ledge in its subjective capacity; and floats before it, but with-
out thou thyself being conscious of such a presentation?
1. So it is.
Spirit. Canst thou not then adduce some more exact
characteristics of the subjective and objective elements as
they appear in consciousness 1
I. The subjective appears to contain within itself the foundation of consciousness as regards its form, but by no
means as regards its substance. That there is a conscious-
ness, an inward perception and conception,--of this the
foundation lies in itself; but that precisely this or that is
conceived,--in this it is dependent on the objective, with
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 292
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
which it is conjoined and by which it is likewise borne
along. The objective, on the contrary, contains the founda-
tion of its being within itself; it is in and for itself,--it is,
as it is^^bccau^ejt is. The subjective appears as the still and
passive mirror of the objective; the latter floats before it.
That the former should reflect images generally, lies in it-
self. That precisely this image and none other should be
reflected, depends on the latter.
Spirit. The subjective, then, according to its essential
nature, is precisely so constituted as thou hast previously
described thy consciousness of an existence out of thyself to
be?
I. It is true, and this agreement is remarkable. I begin
to believe it half credible, that out of the internal laws of
my own consciousness may proceed even the presentation of
an existence out of myself, and independent of me; and
that this presentation may at bottom be nothing more than
the presentation of these laws themselves.
Spirit. And why only half credible?
I. Because I do not yet see why precisely such a presen-
tation--a presentation of a mass extended through space--
should arise.
Spirit. Thou hast already seen that it is only thine own
sensation which thou extendest through space; and thou
hast had some forebodings that it is by this extension in
space alone that thy sensation becomes transformed for thee
into something sensible. We have therefore to do at present
only with space itself, and to explain its origin in conscious-
ness.
I. So it is.
Spirit. Let us then make the attempt . I know that thou
canst not become conscious of thy intelligent activity as
such, in so far as it remains in its original and unchangeable
unity;--i. e. in the condition which begins with thy very be-
ing, and can never be destroyed without at the same time
destroying that being;--and such a consciousness therefore
I do not ascribe to thee. But thou canst become conscious
of it in so far as it passes from one state of transition to
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:10 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
29-S
another within the limits of this unchangeable unity.
When thou dost represent it to thyself in the performance
of this function, how does it appear to thee--this internal
spiritual activity?
I. My spiritual faculty appears as if in a state of internal
motion, swiftly passing from one point to another;--in
short, as an extended line. A definite thought makes a
point in this line.
Spirit. And why as an extended line?
I. Can I give a reason for that beyond the circle of which
I cannot go without at the same time overstepping the
limits of my own existence 1 It is so, absolutely. Spirit. Thus, then, does a particular act of thy conscious-
ness appear to thee. But what shape then is assumed, not
by thy produced, but by thy inherited, knowledge, of which
all specific thought is but the revival and farther definition?
--how does this present itself to thee? Under what image
does it appear?
I. Evidently as something in which one may draw lines
and make points in all directions, namely, as space.
Spirit. Now then, it will be entirely clear to thee, how
that, which really proceeds from thyself, may nevertheless,
appear to thee as an existence external to thyself,--nay,
must necessarily appear so.
Thou hast penetrated to the true source of the presenta-
tion of things out of thyself. This presentation is not per-
ception, for thou perceivest thyself only;--as little is it
thought, for things do not appear to thee as mere results of
thought. It is an actual, and indeed absolute and immediate consciousness of an existence out of thyself, just as per-
ception is an immediate consciousness of thine own condi-
tion. Do not permit thyself to be perplexed by sophists and
half-philosophers; things do not appear to thee through any
representation;--of the thing that exists, and that can exist,
thou art immediately conscious;--and there is no other
thing than that of which thou art conscious. Thou thyself
art the thing; thou thyself, by virtue of thy finitude--the
innermost law of thy being--art thus presented before thy-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 294
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
self, and projected out of thyself; and all that thou perceiv-
est out of thyself is still--thyself only. This consciousness
has been well named Intuition^ In all consciousnes I con-
template myself, forT am myself:--to the subjective, con-
scious being, consciousness is self-contemplation. And the
objective, that which is contemplated and of which I am
conscious, is also myself,--the same self which contemplates,
but now floating as an objective presentation before the
subjective. In this respect, consciousness is an active retro-
spect of my own intuitions; an observation of myself from
my own position; a projection of myself out of myself by
means of the only mode of action which is properly mine,--
perception. I am a living faculty of vision. I see (conscious-
ness) my own vision (the thing of which lam conscious. )
Hence this object is also thoroughly transparent to_thy_
mind's eye, because it is thy mind itself. Thou dividest,
limitest, determinest, the possible forms of things, and the
relations of these forms, previous to all perception . No
wonder,--for in so doing thou dividest, limitest, and deter-
minest thine own knowledge, which undoubtedly is suffi-
ciently known to thee. Thus does a knowledge of things
become possible. It is not in the things, and cannot pro-
ceed out of them. It proceeds from thee, and is indeed
thine own nature.
There is no outward sense, for there is no outward per-
ception. There is, however, an outward intuition;--not of
things, but this outward intuition--this knowledge appar-
ently external to the subjective being, and hovering before
it,--is itself the thing, and there is no other. By means of
this outward intuition are perception and sense regarded
as external. It remains eternally true, for it is proved,--
that I see or feel a surface,--my sight or feeling takes the
shape of the sight or feeling of a surface. Space,--illumina-
ted, transparent, palpable, penetrable space,--the purest
image of my knowledge, is not seen, but is an intuitive pos-
session of my own mind; in it even my faculty of vision it-
self is contained. The light is not out of, but in me, and I
myself am the light. Thou hast already answered my quest-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
295
ion, "How dost thou know of thy sensations, of thy seeing,
feeling, &c. ?
" by saying that thou hast an immediate know-
ledge or consciousness of them. Now, perhaps, thou wilt be
able to define more exactly this immediate consciousness
of sensation.
I. It must be a two-fold consciousness. Sensation is it- \self an immediate consciousness; for I am sensible of my
own sensation. But from this there arises no knowledge of
outward existence, but only the feeling of my own state. I
am however, originally, not merely a sensitive, but also an
intuitive being; not merely a practical being, but also
an intelligence. I intuitively contemplate my sensation
itself, and thus there arises from myself and my own nature,
the cognition of an existence. Sensation becomes transform-
ed into its own object; my affections, as red, smooth, and
the like, into a something red, smooth, &c. out of myself; and
this something, and my relative sensation, I intuitively con-//' itemplate in space, because the intuition itself is space.
Thus does it become clear why I believe that I see or feel
surfaces, which, in fact, I neither see nor feeL I intuitively
regard my own sensation of sight or touch, as the sight or touch of a surface. y'
Spirit. Thou hast well understood me, or rather thyself.
I. But now it is not at all by means of an inference,
either recognised or unrecognised, from the principle of
causality, that the thing is originated for me; it floats im-
mediately before me, and is presented to my consciousness
without any process of reasoning. I cannot say, as I have
formerly said, that perception becomes transformed into a
something perceivable, for the perceivable, as such, has pre-
cedence in consciousness. It is not with an affection of my-
self, as red, smooth, or the like, that consciousness begins,
but with a red, smooth object out of myself.
Spirit. If, however, thou wert obliged to explain what is
red, smooth, and the like, couldst thou possibly make any
other reply than that it was that by which thou wert affect-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2! )C
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
ed in a certain manner that thou namest red, smooth, &c. ?
I. Certainly not,--if you were to ask me, and I were to
enter upon the question and attempt an explanation. But
originally no one asks me the question, nor do I ask it of
myself. I forget myself entirely, and lose myself in my in-
tuition of the object; become conscious, not of my own state,
but only of an existence out of myself. Red, green, and the
like, are properties of the thing; it is red or green, and this
is all. There can be no farther explanation, any more than
there can be a farther explanation of these affections in me,
on which we have already agreed. This is most obvious in
the sensation of sight. Colour appears as something out of
myself; and the common understanding of man, if left to it-
self, and without farther reflection, would scarcely be per-
suaded to describe red, green, &c. as that which excited
within him a specific affection.
Spirit. But, doubtless, it would if asked regarding sweet
or sour. It is not our business at present to inquire whe-
ther the impression made by means of sight be a pure sen-
sation, or whether it may be not rather be a middle term
between sensation and intuition, and the bond by which
they are united in our minds. But I admit thy assertion,
and it is extremely welcome to me. Thou canst, indeed,
lose thyself in the intuition; and unless thou directest par-
ticular attention to thyself, or takest an interest in some
external action, thou dost so, naturally and necessarily. This
is the remark to which the defenders of a groundless con-
sciousness of external things appeal, when it is shown that
the principle of causality, by which the existence of such
things might be inferred, exists only in ourselves; they deny
that any such inference is made, and, in so far as they refer
to actual consciousness in particular cases, this cannot be
disputed. These same defenders, when the nature of intui-
tion is explained to them from the laws of intelligence it-
self, themselves draw this inference anew, and never weary
of repeating that there must be something external to us
which compels us to this belief.
I. Do not trouble thyself about them at present, but in-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK IL KNOWLEDGE.
297
struct me. I have no preconceived opinion, and seek for
truth only.
Spirit. Nevertheless, intuition necessarily proceeds from
the perception of thine own state, although thou art not al-
ways clearly conscious of this perception, as thou hast al-
ready seen. Even in that consciousness in which thou losest
thyself in the object, there is always something which is only
possible by means of an unrecognised reference to thyself,
and close observation of thine own state.
I. Consequently, at all times and places the conscious-
ness of existence out of myself must be accompanied by an
unobserved consciousness of myself?
Spirit. Just so.
I. The former being determined through the latter,--as
it actually is?
Spirit. That is my meaning.
I. Prove this to me, and I shall be satisfied.
Spirit. Dost thou imagine only things in general as
placed in space, or each of them individually as occupying a
certain portion of space?
/. The latter,--each thing has its determinate bulk.
Spirit. And do different things occupy the same part of
space?
I. By no means; they exclude each other. They are be-
side, over or under, behind or before, each other;--nearer to
me, or further from me. ,
Spirit. And how dost thou come to this measurement
and arrangement of them in space? Is it by sensation?
I. How could that be, since space itself is no sensation?
Spirit. Or intuition?
I. This cannot be. Intuition is immediate and infal-
lible. What is contained in it does not appear as produced,
and cannot deceive. But I must train myself to estimate,
measure and deliberate upon, the size of an object, its dis-
tance, its position with respect to other objects. It is a
truth known to every beginner, that we originally see all
objects in the same line; that we learn to estimate their
greater or lesser distances; that the child attempts to grasp
Qa
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 2. 98
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
distant objects as if they lay immediately before his eyes;
and that one born blind who should suddenly receive sight
would do the same. This conception of distances is there-
fore a judgment;--no intuition, but an arrangement of my
different intuitions by means of the understanding, I may
err in my estimate of the size, distance, &c. of an object; and
the so-called optical deceptions are not deceptions of sight,
but erroneous judgments formed concerning the size of the
object, concerning the size of its different parts in relation
to each other, and consequently concerning its true figure
and its distance from me and from other objects. But it
does really exist in space, as I contemplate it, and the
colours which I see in it are likewise really seen by me;--
and here there is no deception.
Spirit. And what then is the principle of this judgment,
--to take the most distinct and easy case,--thy judgment
of the proximity or distance of objects,--how dost thou esti-
mate this distance?
I. Doubtless by the greater strength or feebleness of im-
pressions otherwise equal. I see before me two objects of
the same red colour. The one whose colour I see more vi-
vidly, I regard as the nearer: that whose colour seems to me
fainter, as the more distant, and as so much the more dis-
tant as the colour seems fainter.
Spirit. Thus thou dost estimate the distance according to
the degree of strength or weakness in the sensation; and
this strength or weakness itself,--dost thou also estimate it?
I. Obviously only in so far as I take note of my own af-
fections, and even of very slight differences in these. --Thou
hast conquered! All consciousness of objects out of myself
is determined by the clearness and exactitude of my con-
sciousness of my own states, and in this consciousness there
is always a conclusion drawn from the effect in myself to a
cause out of myself.
Spirit. Thou art quickly vanquished; and I must now
myself carry forward, in thy place, the controversy against
myself. My argument can only apply to those cases in
which an actual and deliberate estimate of the uise, dia-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
299
tance, and position, of objects takes place, and in which
thou art conscious of making such an estimate. Thou wilt
however admit that this is by no means the common case,
and that for the most part thou rather becomest conscious
of the size, distance, &c. of an object at the very same un-
divided moment in which thou becomest conscious of the
object itself.
I. When once we learn to estimate the distances of ob-
jects by the strength of the impression, the rapidity of this
judgment is merely the consequence of its frequent exercise.
I have learnt, by a lifelong experience, rapidly to observe
the strength of the impression and thereby to estimate the
distance. My present conception is founded upon a combi-
nation, formerly made, of sensation, intuition, and previous
judgments; although at the moment I am conscious only of
the present conception. I no longer apprehend generally
red, green, or the like, out of myself, but a red or a green at
this, that, or the other distance; but this last addition is merely
a renewal of a judgment formerly arrived at by deliberate
reflection.
Spirit. Has it not then, at length, become clear to thee
whether thou discoverest the existence of things out of thy-
self by intuition, or by reasoning, or both,--and in how far
by each of these?
J. Perfectly; and I believe that I have now attained the
fullest insight into the origin of my conceptions of objects
out of myself.
1. I am absolutely conscious of myself, because I am this
I,--myself; and that partly as a practical being,
partly as an intelligence. The first consciousness is
Sensation, the second Intuition--unlimited space.
2. I cannot comprehend the unlimited, for I am finite. I
therefore set apart, in thought, a certain portion of
universal space, and place the former in a certain re-
lation to the latter.
3. The measure of this limited portion of space is the ex-
tent of my own sensibility, according to a principle
which may be thus expressed :--Whatever affects me
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 300
THE VOCATION OF MAN.
in such or such a manner is to be placed, in space, in
such or such relations to the other things which
-->affect me.
The properties or attributes of the object proceed from
the perception of my own internal state; the space which it
fills, from intuitive contemplation. By a process of thought,
both are conjoined; the former being added to the latter.
It is so, assuredly, as we have said before:--that which is
merely a state or affection of myself, by being transferred or
projected into space becomes an attribute of the object; but
it is so projected into space, not by intuition, but by thought,
by measuring, regulating thought. Not that this act is to
be regarded as an intellectual discovery or creation; but
only as a more exact definition, by means of thought, of
something which is already given in sensation and intuition,
independent of all thought.
Spirit. Whatever affects me in such or such a manner is
to be placed in such or such relations:--thus dost thou rea-
son in defining and arranging objects in space. But does
not the declaration that a thing affects thee in a certain
manner, include the assumption that it affects thee gene-
rally?
I. Undoubtedly.
Spirit. And is any presentation of an external object pos-
sible, which is not in this manner limited and defined in
space?
/. No; for no object exists in space generally, but each
one in a determinate portion of space.
Spirit. So that in fact, whether thou art conscious of it or
not, every external object is assumed by thee as affecting
thyself, as certainly as it is assumed as filling a determinate
portion of space?
/. That follows, certainly.
Spirit. And what kind of presentation is that of an object
affecting thyself?
I. Evidently a thought; and indeed a thought founded
on the principle of causality already mentioned. I see now,
still more clearly, that the consciousness of the object is en-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:11 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? BOOK II. KNOWLEDGE.
301
grafted on my self-consciousness in two ways,--partly by in-
tuition, and partly by thought founded on the principle of
causality. The object, however strange it may seem, is at
once the immediate object of my consciousness, and the re-
sult of deliberate thought.
Spirit. In different respects, however. Thou must be
capable of being conscious of this thought of the object?
I. Doubtless; although usually I am not so.
Spirit. Therefore to thy passive state, thy affection, thou
dost superadd in thought an activity out of thyself, such as
thou hast above described in the case of thy thought accord-
ing to the principle of causality?
I. Yes.
