The classic expression of this idea is the slogan that was common among bour- geois of the
eighteenth
century: "Felix mentis": happy because of one's owns achievements.
Sloterdijk - Rage and Time
By plunging into a vibrant community, newcomers are often given for the first time the feeling of hav- ing found a home and of not playing an equal and detached spectator but a particular role in the dramas of the world.
The second attraction of political Islam emanates from the fact that it— in a way only preceded by communism—is capable of offering its followers a clear, aggressive, and grandiosely theatrical "worldview" that rests on a clear differentiation of friend and enemy, an unmistakable mission to win, and an exhilaratingly Utopian final vision: the reconstitution of the global emirate, which is supposed to provide a shelter for the Islamic millennium, stretched out from Andalusia to the far East. With it the figure of the class enemy is replaced with that of the enemy of the faith, and class struggle is replaced by holy war—while keeping the dualistic schema of a war of prin- ciples, it demands a necessarily long war rich in casualties. As usual, in its last battle the party of the good is destined to win.
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THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
It can easily be seen that when it is used for political purposes, so-called fundamentalism is less of a matter of faith than an appeal to act or, more specifically, a matter of providing roles through which great numbers of potential actors are put into a position in which they can move from the- ory to praxis—or rather from frustration to praxis. In general it is true what demographic research has brought to light: "religion provides . . . additional oil for a fire whose original fuel does not come from it. "30 As a matrix of radical activations, Islam is on a par with historical communism; perhaps it is even superior because it can present itself with regard to its culture of origin not as a movement of radical rupture but as one of a revo- lutionary reestablishment.
The third and politically most important reason for the inevitably grow- ing dramatics of political Islam (even if at this hour, after a series of defeats, it seems to have lost quite a bit of its initial attraction) results from the demographic dynamic of its field of recruitment. Just like the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, it is essentially a youth movement or, more specifically, a movement of young men. Its verve to a large degree results from the excess of vitality of an unstoppable giant wave of unem- ployed and, socially speaking, hopeless male adolescents between the ages of fifteen and thirty—in their majority second, third, and fourth sons, who can enact their futile rage only by participating in the next best aggression programs. By creating in their base countries counter-worlds to the existing one, Islamic organizations create a grid of alternative positions in which angry, ambitious young men can feel important—including the impulse to attack both close and faraway enemies today rather than tomorrow.
These numerically enormous groups constitute the natural allegiance of agitators from the elder generation, whose sermons derive their content almost automatically from the willingness among the members of their congregation to be outraged—whereas the Islamic tradition only provides the semantic forms to add captions to real anger and violence tensions. As in a laboratory experiment, it was possible to observe these conditions dur- ing a scheme to create "spontaneous riots" because of the Danish carica- tures of Mohammed in February 2006. While politically correct Europeans agonized over how to apologize to allegedly or actually offended Muslims, anonymous activists in Iraq continued to turn the wheel of provocation or, even better, the wheel of combative self-stimulation a bit further by way of destroying the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the most important Shiite sacred buildings in the north of Baghdad. They destroyed it with a
221
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
bomb attack, which led to dozens of Sunni houses of worship being dev- astated during counterattacks. These events speak a clear language. They reveal more about the hunger for a triggering event among the groups who are ready to attack than about an allegedly inevitable clash of civilizations. The agitators would feel sorry if they had to realize that the external cata- lysts were in fact sorry.
From this perspective it is legitimate to claim that Islam, in its Islamist variation, could transform itself to become a religious readymade excel-
31
Its suitability comes from characteristics of
lent for mobilizing purposes.
Muslim dogmatic theology that from the start were publicly committed to the war against "infidels. " The unprepared reader of the Koran has to be amazed about how it is possible that a sacred book is not afraid to repudiate itself when almost on every page it threatens the enemies of the prophet and of the faith with suffering in the eternal flames. The explanations of schol- ars hardly help to get over this estrangement, even if they try to trace the polemical passages of the Koran back to their historical context: the prophet engages in these passages in a form of early-socialist criticism against the wealthy of his time, the arrogant and ruthless merchants from Mecca who did not want to hear anything anymore about the egalitarian and gener- ous values of the old Arab tribal culture. Mohammed's teachings, scholars argue, ties in with these values as it commits his followers to caring for the weak. The initially plausible reference to the monotheistic privilege of zeal- ousness both for God and against the infidels fails to provide a sufficient explanation. It is just as evident to claim that no human being would want to concern himself with the opaque passages in the Koran if it were not for the fact that millions of aggressive gangs of searchers for God choose their words so to fit their coming deeds (while the comparably heated passages of the psalms of rage in the Old Testament have left the small audience of churches and synagogues cold for a long time).
The new mobilization movements—whether legitimate or not from the standpoint of Koran theology—could, assuming that birth rates remain high, influence a reservoir of several million young men in the Arabic hemi- sphere by the middle of the twenty-first century, men who probably only find an existentially attractive horizon of meaning in departing to politically and religiously concealed projects of self-destruction. In thousands of Koran schools, which recently sprang up like mushrooms everywhere that has boiling excesses of adolescent men, the anxious cohorts are indoctrinated with the concepts of holy war. Only a small portion of them will be able to
222
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
manifest themselves in external terrorism. The more significant portion will probably be invested in life-consuming civil wars on Arab soil—wars for which the Iran-Iraq massacre between 1980 and 1988 has provided a hint. In the case of the new wars, however, the quantitative proportions will, it can be predicted, skyrocket to a monstrous level. Giant battles of exterminations between Shiite and Sunni war parties are not unthinkable—the destruc- tion of the mosques and sacred sites of the other side provide the preamble for that. That Israel is anticipating further trials by fire cannot be missed. Without a far-sighted politics of sealing itself off, the Jewish enclave cannot survive the next decades. The truth is: even people who know the situation today do not have the slightest idea of how the approaching Muslim "youth bulge," the most extensive wave of genocidal excesses of adolescent men in
32
the history of mankind, could be contained by peaceful means.
These references to the actual mass-basis of radical Islamic movements mark at the same time the limit at which their commensurability with historical communism ends. The coming adherents of the Islamic goal of expansion do not at all resemble a class of workers and employees who unite to seize governmental power in order to put an end to their misery. Rather, they embody an agitated subproletariat or, even worse, a desper- ate movement of economically superfluous and socially useless people for whom there are too few acceptable positions available in their own sys-
tem, even if they should get to power through coups d'etat or elections. Because of demographic circumstances, concepts of the enemy in such movements cannot be sociologically defined, as was still possible within a Marxist conception of a "class of exploiters. " One can only define them by way of religion, political orientation, and culture—internally they are directed against the, in the eyes of the activists, despicable elites who make too many political concessions to the West. Externally they turn against the West as such, insofar as the latter is portrayed as the manifestation of humiliating, corrosive, and obscene cultural imports. Naturally, Islamist leaders will sooner or later attempt to gain power over the reserve coun- tries of the East in order to occupy positions of command over the redistri- bution of massive fortunes coming out of the oil business. Thus they could for some time appease their patronage by letting them participate in the oil manna. Since increasing energy prices during the coming decades will support a provocative laziness in bringing about reforms of the existing oil theocracies, riots in these countries are very likely. The case of Iran has shown what can happen next.
223
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
However much it might be the case that Islamist theocracy insists on the formally and materially totalitarian demand to regulate all aspects of living in a virtually Islamized global society according to the law of the Koran, it is less capable of confronting the economical, political, technical, and artistic facts of the contemporary age. While communism presented an authentic expression of Western modernization tendencies and, in some respects, though not in terms of economy, was the avant-garde of these tendencies, political Islamism bears the obvious mark of an antimodern disposition and dissynchronicity with the modern world. Part of this is its problematic relationship to the global culture of knowledge, as well as its thoroughly parasitic relationship to the weapons technology of the West. This situation is, for the time being, not changed by the extreme demographic dynamic of the Islamic world, whose population increased between 1900 and 2000 from 150 million to 1. 2 billion—eight times its original size. Although the "popu-
33
lation weapon" is, as Gunnar Heinsohn has shown, of modern origin, turns against its owners in the case of a lack of opportunities to expand and emigrate. If one of the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian physician Abdel Aziz Rantisi, most recently announced that the forthcoming century would be that of Islam, he commits a fallacy common today of confusing culture and biomass. He would be right only in the unlikely case that the Islamic world as a whole is soon successful in escaping from its self-incurred back- wardness. Even the most sympathetic interpreters currently have only illu- sory ideas about how this is supposed to happen.
In considering the hijacking of the airplanes that were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of Septem- ber 11, 2001, within the context of our observations, it becomes clear that it was not a demonstration of Islamic strength but a symbol of a sardonic lack of means, the compensation for which could only have been the sacrifice of human lives masked as being sacred. No Marx of political Islam will ever be able to argue that although modern technology emerged out of the lap of Western civilization, it will only reach its complete determination in the hands of Islamic operators. The lesson of September 11 is that the enemies of the West expect success exclusively from the vengeful reversal of Western tools against their creators. The Islamophile Friedrich Nietzsche would have to modify his judgments today. The accusations that he leveled in his curse against Christianity have, behind his back, arrived at a different address.
Radical Islamism provides the first example of a purely vengeful ideology
34
that only knows how to punish not how to create something new.
224
it
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
The weakness of Islam as a political religion, be it in its modest or radi- cal variations, rests on its backward-looking orientation. So far its leaders have not been capable of formulating nontechnical, romantic, angry con- cepts for the world of tomorrow. Without a doubt it is possible to set the rising protest masses of the Near and Middle East on their feet by using a rhetoric that is angry and terrific during the forthcoming half century. As a moblilizer of thymotic reserves on a large scale, Islamism has in fact not at all reached its climax. The dream of the activists for a neo-medieval Great Islamic Empire will continue to inspire numerous dreamers, even if the political conditions for its realization are missing in every respect. On the other hand, it is possible that conventional central powers could emerge out of the likely regional formations of empires of Islamic countries. That they would be able to create cultural artifacts, which would awaken a libido of imitation in other places, is unlikely. What remains decisive for the course of events is the fact that the heads of Islamism are, in their current condition, completely incapable of contributing to the writing of the next chapters of cultural evolution, not to mention dictating them, even if their countries of origin carry the "victory banner of procreation"35 as proudly as possible in front of them.
So far Islamism has little to show that would enable it to creatively continue the technological, economic, and scientific conditions of exis- tence for humankind during the twenty-first century. It would already be a titanic achievement if it were able to realize in due time the modern- ization of its own inventory. What is certain is that Islam has awakened from its dogmatic slumber. After centuries of stagnation, it returns to the world stage—in order to discover with embarrassment that it is incapable of adding to the major achievements in the area of culture that the cos- mopolitan, moderate, and inventive Islam was responsible for up until the thirteenth century. It could take another hundred years until its mas- terminds will be talked about not because of their threats but because of their achievements.
It will not be an empty time of waiting for the West. Because in the Islamic world there are several demographically explosive countries with plans to implement aggressive empire politics—particularly Iran and Paki- stan, to a lesser degree Egypt and Morocco—we will be confronted in future decades with a number of incoherent but spontaneously allied offensives, reminiscent of the semimodern departure movements of angry losers from Italy and Germany during the most unpleasant of times.
225
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Under these circumstances, the expectations of Islamism as a potential successor of communism and its role as a global opposition movement should be set low. In reality they are absolutely illusory. It is not at all pos- sible to see how it would be capable of organizing a new universal collective of dissidence potentials in the countries of globalized capitalism. However, a number of regional major banks of rage will accumulate huge thymotic potentials over longer periods of time. But these will, most likely, waste their capital by spilling blood instead of investing it in promising culture and business companies. For the first half of the twenty-first century, the Islamist youth movements in dozens of countries in the Near and Middle East will be the radiating trouble spots on the crisis maps of strategic ana- lysts. However, whatever the Islamic advances will add to a politics of rage during the next decades—and the next twenty or thirty years could become one of the most fatal periods of all times if worst-case scenarios should materialize—their projects will hardly go beyond the level of a politically black romanticism based on immanent reasons. Thus the mobilization of those who choose a detour through God-given battles aims for a dark goal: the self-destruction of the superfluous.
Anyone holding onto the demand that world history has to proceed as the world's court of judgment is looking forward to disappointing times. In any case, one would have to look out for other judges. Because there is not much good one can hope for from criminal courts, the future will at most hold arbitration courts. Under these circumstances, only global capitalism qualifies for the role. It alone could grow to become its own enemy during the next round of the game, an enemy that excites itself to the point where it has to take itself as seriously as a contender who is deciding who is to be and who is not to be.
226
CONCLUSION BEYOND RESENTMENT
AFTER EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID DURING THE COURSE of this investigation, it would be absurd to claim that rage's best days are behind it. On the contrary, rage (together with its thymotic siblings, pride, the need for recognition, and resentment) is a basic force in the ecosystem of affects, whether interpersonal, political, or cultural. This thesis remains valid, even if rage cannot concentrate itself in the future in the form of uni- versal collectives of a communist type, but rather only in regional collec- tions. If regression from a certain achieved state of political psychology is not possible, the thymotic energies I have discussed here should be officially accredited as an adequate image of the real, inasmuch as they have fallen victim to an organized misinterpretation.
What has truly reached an end is the psychohistorical constellation of religiously and politically inflated retributive thinking that was characteris- tic ofthe Christian, socialist, and Communist courtrooms. Nietzsche found the right concept to characterize its essence when—with an eye to Paul and his invention of "Christianity"—he diagnosed that resentment could become a mark of genius. As long as the liaison of spirit and resentment
227
CONCLUSION
was stable, the desire for justice in the world—beyond earthly life or within actual history—could find shelter in fictitious beliefs: the theology of the wrath of God and the thymotic global economy of communism. In both systems, nothing less was at stake than the correction of accounts of suffering and injustice in a world that is morally out of balance. Both sought to turn resentment into a positive emotion in order to keep awake the sense of the unacceptability of an unjust world. It is because of their efforts that the highly unlikely phenomenon of "criticism" came into existence in Western civilization—insofar as we understand "criticism" to mean the spirit that has been fueled by ingenious resentment of sub- mission to mere facts, in particular facts of injustice. "Criticism" in this sense is not an absolute privilege of the West, however much it unfolded paradigmatically in the West; it is present in every culture that was suc- cessful in withdrawing from domination by servile, holistic, monologi- cal, and masochistic motives. Anyone insisting that democratic politics and forms of life could be universal should consider the cultures of coun- seling, the practices of discussion, and the traditions of criticisin of "the
1
The following insight needs to be asserted like an axiom: under condi- tions of globalization no politics of balancing suffering on the large scale is possible that is built on holding past injustices against someone, no matter if it is codified by redemptive, social-messianic, or democratic-messianic ide- ologies. This insight sets narrow limits to the moral productivity of move- ments of accusation even if they—as in the case of socialism, feminism, and postcolonialism—advocate a cause that is, in itself, respectable. It is much more important to delegitimize the inherited fatal alliance of intelligence and resentment to create a space for future paradigms of detoxified worldly wisdom. The criteria are not all that new—John Locke, the mastermind of the liberal English bourgeoisie, expressed them in a simple language in 1690:
2
the basic rights to life, freedom, and property. With regard to the historical
success of this triad, the evidence is clear: only in those areas of the world where these norms are respected do we have true forms of Enlightenment. Two centuries after Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche—although in a form that is, while fully justified from the standpoint of therapy, without doubt too pathetic—complemented these premises of successful civilizations with a hygienic program that puts the liberation from the spirit of resentment on the agenda. Nietzsche was concerned about the replacement of the toxic figure of "vengeful humility" with a form of intelligence that assures itself
others" as regional sources of democracy.
228
CONCLUSION
anew about its thymotic motives. It is obvious that without an open culture of ambition, this cannot be done. Such a culture would have to be post- monotheistic in the sense that it breaks open retributive metaphysics and its political reflexes with an appropriate level of thoroughness. The goal is a meritocracy, which balances, in an intercultural and transcultural way, an antiauthoritarian relaxed morality, on the one hand, and a distinctive normative consciousness and respect for inalienable personal rights, on the other. The adventure of morality takes place through the parallel pro- gram of elitist and egalitarian forces. Only within these parameters can a change of accent away from acquisition drives and toward giving virtues be conceived.
The investment costs for this education program are high. What is at stake in it is the creation of a code of conduct for multicivilizational com- plexes. Such a schema needs to be strong enough to cope with the fact that the condensed or globalized world remains, for the time being at least, structured in a multi-megalomaniac and inter-paranoid way. It is not possible to integrate a universe out of energetic, thymotic, irritable actors through ideal syntheses from the top. It is only possible to keep it at a bal- ance through power relationships. Great politics proceeds only by balanc- ing acts. To stay in balance means not evading any necessary fights and not provoking unnecessary ones. It also means not giving up on the course of the world with its entropic processes, primarily the destruction of the envi- ronment and the demoralization of human relationships. Part of this means learning to see oneself always through the eyes of others. What in former times was to be achieved by an overstrained religious humility will have to be accomplished by a culture of rationally built second-order observations. This alone could stop the malignant naivete by connecting the desire to be respected with the ability to see oneself in relative terms. Time is required to solve these tasks—but not the historical time of the epic and tragedy. Essen- tial time needs to be determined as the time of civilizational learning. Those who only want to make "history" remain below this definition.
The term "transition" should not mislead us into ignoring the fact that one always exercises under conditions of emergency in order to prevent emergency from happening wherever possible. Mistakes are not permitted and yet are likely. If the exercises go well, it might be the case that a set of interculturally binding disciplines emerge that could, for the first time, rightly be referred to with an expression that, until now, has been used pre- maturely: world culture.
229
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
I. Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 13.
2. I thus disagree with the legend, which is popular among theologians, that myth
always implies the transfiguration of the existing world. According to this leg- end myth only comes to being with prophetic speech because of myth's distance from the world and its critical dimension. In reality myth is already as prophetic as prophecy is still mythic.
3. Cf. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz. Den Krieg denken (Clausewitz: Thinking war) (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), as well as Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
4. Concerning the unconscious nexus of humanism and bellicosity, see Bazon Brock and Gerlinde Koschick, eds. , Krieg und Kunst (War and art) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002).
5. Cf. Iliad 9. 328 f.
231
INTRODUCTION
6. See Peter Sloterdijk, "Bilder der Gewalt—Gewalt der Bilder: Von der antiken Mythologie zur postmodernen Bilderindustrie," in Iconic Turn: Die neueMachtder Bilder (The new power of images), ed. Christa Maar and Hubert Burda (Cologne: Dumont, 2004), 333-34, for a reference to the continuous existence of irruptive ancient rage in the "natural theology of explosion" of modern mass culture.
7. The later stoic phenomenology of rage states that rage does not allow for any past. One can hide all other vices, but "anger parades itself; it shows on the face [seprofert et infaciem exit); the greater it is, the more obviously it seethes o u t . . . . The other affections make themselves seen [apparent). Anger sticks right out [eminet]" (Seneca, "On Anger," in Moral and Political Essays, ed. John M. Coo- per and J. F. Procope [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 18). Dur- ing the twentieth century, academic psychology sometimes speaks of "explosive reactions"; cf. Ernst Kretschmer, Medizinische Psychologie (Medical psychology) (Leipzig: Thieme 1930), 183-84.
8. Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (The Man Without Qualities) (Ham- burg: Rowohlt 1952), 1239-43.
9. The expression is borrowed from Heinrich Mann, who reports in his Napoleon essay from 1925 about the fatal Corsican, "He enters the world like a bullet enters the battle. This is how the revolution sent him. " Later I will show that the con- cept of revolution rests not least in a modernization of ancient menis. Its psycho- logical kernel is the transformation of the subject into an active gathering place of worid rage.
10. Bruno Snell, "Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer," in Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Denkens bei den Griechen (The discovery of spirit: Studies of the emergence of European thinking in ancient Greece) (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1946), 15-37.
11. Cf. , for reasons of curiosity, Jiirgen Manthey, Die Unsterblichkeit Achills. Vom Ursprung des Erzahlens (The immortality of Achilles: On the origin of narrating) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 31-32.
12. Concerning the ancient conception of genius, see the work of the Roman rheto- rician Censorinus, De die natali, as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Spharen I, Blasen (Spheres I: Bubbles) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), chap. 6, "Divider of Soul Space," 421-85.
13. Seneca De ira 1. 6: "Non est ergo natura hominis poenae appetens; ideo ne ira qui- dem secundum naturam hominis, quia poenae appetens est [therefore punish- ment does not go with being a good man. Nor, for that reason, does anger, since punishment does go with anger]. " One can establish a distant analogy between the philosophical domestication of anger in the Greeks and the civilization of the
232
INTRODUCTION
rage of God in the theology of "the priestly writings" of post-Babylonian Juda- ism. The change of emphasis toward individualized repentance withdraws the conditions of the prophetic speeches of threat from the divine penalization and destructive rage. See Miggelbrink, Derzornige Gott, 48-49.
14. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 146-50.
15. The classic catalogue of cardinal sins still provides an image that balances between erotic and thymotic vices. This is based on the assumption that one rightly can assign avaritia (avarice), luxuria (voluptuousness), and gula (intemperance) to the erotic pole, while superbia (arrogance, pride), ira (rage), and invidia (jeal- ousy, enviousness) belong to the thymotic pole. Only acedia (melancholia) does not fit into this categorization because it expresses a sadness without subject and object.
16.
The classic expression of this idea is the slogan that was common among bour- geois of the eighteenth century: "Felix mentis": happy because of one's owns achievements. This expression decorates the facade of one of the most beauti- ful classicist buildings in Amsterdam for a good reason. This temple of enlight- enment, located at the street Kaisergracht, the canal of the king, was built in 1787 and after 1945 was temporarily the headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party. Today it is the location of one of the most lively cultural centers of the Netherlands.
17. Cf. Robert Shaeffer, The Resentment Against Achievement: Understanding the Assault Upon Ability (Buffalo, N. Y. : Prometheus Books, 1988).
18. Cf. Heiner Miihlmann, Die Natur derKulturen. Entwurfeiner kulturdynamischen Theorie (The Nature of civilizations: An attempt of a culture-dynamic theory) (Vienna: Springer, 1996).
19. We also owe one of the best summaries of the ancient and more recent discourses about thymos to a student of Strauss, Francis Fukuyama. See the rich passages of the unread best-seller The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992; New York: Pen- guin, 2006). Also see the final section of the introduction, "The Postcommunist Situation," this volume.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7. 7.
21. Seneca, who cites this passage from Aristotle's treatise On the Soul (De anima) in
his work De ira (1. 9), objects to the Greek thinker with the argument that affects
are just as bad as helpers as they are as leaders.
22. Cf. Fukuyama, The End of History, 165-66.
23. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in EnglisTi^tmns. Bruce Fink
(New York: Norton, 2006); Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 233
INTRODUCTION
Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H.
Nichols (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1980).
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other
Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2005), 145.
25. Ibid. , 144.
26. Concerning the invention of the "symbolic" as the domain of the (holy) father
in a situation of an actual weakening of the paternal function, see Michel Tort, Fin du dogme paternal (The End of the paternal dogma) (Paris: Aubier, 2005), 123-24.
27. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (New York: Penguin, 1994).
28. Cf. the deduction of modern entrepreneurial psychology from the innovation that arises from the pressure of paying off one's debts in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger's essential work, Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungeloste Riitsel der Wirschaftswissenscha. fi (Property, interest, and money: unsolved riddles of eco- nomics) (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996).
cc
29. See Walter Burkert, Vergeltung" zwischen Ethologie und Ethik. Reflexe und
Reflexionen in Texten und Mythologien desAltertums ("Retaliation" between eth- nology and ethics: reflexes and reflections in texts and mythologies of antiquity) (Munich: Siemens Stiftung 1992), 21-22.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Old and New Tablets," in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2006), 159.
31. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 42.
32. Boris Groys, Das kommunistische Postskriptum (The communist postscript) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006).
33. See the discursive justification of this metaphor in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, Eigentumsokonomik (Property economics) (Marburg: Metropolis, 2006).
34. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 157.
35. Boris Groys, Anne von der Heyden, and Peter Weibel, eds. , Zurueck aus der
Zukunft. Osteuropaeische Kulturen im Zeitalter des Postkommunismus (Back from the future: Eastern European cultures during the age of postcommunism) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005).
36. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 61-95.
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1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
37- Ibid. , 73.
38. Fukuyama, The End of History, 284.
39. Cf. Gunnar Heinsohn, Sohne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der
Nationen (Sons and Global power: terror within the rise and fall of nations) (Zurich: Orell Fiissli, 2003), and his Finis Germaniae, Kursbuch 162 (Hamburg: Zeit, 2005), 18-29.
40. The proposition concerning the end of history exists in at least four different ver- sions: two are from Kojeve: the end of history in Stalinism and the end of history in the American way of life and in Japanese snobbism; one is in Dostoevsky: the end of history in the "Crystal Palace"; and one in Heidegger: the end of history in boredom. Concerning the last two versions, see Peter Sloterdijk, "Heideggers Politik: Das Ende der Geschichte vertagen" (Heidegger's politics: coping with the end of history), closing statement at the conference Heidegger. Le danger et la promesse, Strasbourg, December 5, 2004; as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Im Weltin- nenraum des Kapitals. Fur eine philosophische Theorie der Globalisierung (In the world interior of capital: for a philosophical theory of globalization) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 258-348. There you also find the technical definition of "world history" as the successful phase of unilateralism and the constituting phase of the world system (1492-1944).
41. Cf. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004); Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds. , Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2005).
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
1. Thomas Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Every-
man's Library, 2005), 538.
2. Robert A. F. Thurman, Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
3. Cf. Juliane Vogel, Die Furie und das Gesetz. Zur Dramaturgie der "grossen Szene' in
der Tragoedie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Fury and law: On the dramaturgy of the "great
scene" in the tragedy of the nineteenth century) (Freiburg: Rombach, 2002).
4. Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," in Selected Writings, vol. 4, trans.
Harry Zorn, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 392; Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2001).
5. Concerning the source of the formula "x as such—x pure and simple," see Karl
Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique ofPolitical Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), 105. ^
235
6. 7.
8.
1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
6. 7.
8. 9. 10.
Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, 537.
Quoted according to Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 56; Conquest is doubtful about the authenticity of this statement.
See the doubts concerning the authenticity of the classic quotation in Christo- pher Read, Lenin: A Revolutionary Life (London: Routledge, 2005), 11.
2. THE WRATHFUL GOD
Cf. Regis Debray, God: An Itinerary, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London: Verso, 2004).
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916; New York: Penguin, 2003).
Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, Thirteenth-Eighteenth Centuries, trans. Eric Nicholson (New York: St Martin's Press 1990).
Gustave Flaubert, Dictionary ofReceived Ideas, trans. Jacques Barzun (New York: New Directions, 1968).
Boris Groys, "Readymade," in Lfber das Neue. Versuch einer Kulturkommune (On the new: a study of cultural economics) (Munich: Fischer, 1992), 73-74; "Simuli- erte Ready-mades von Fischli und Weiss," in Kunst-Kommentare (Vienna: Pas- sagen, 1977), 131-32; "Fundamentalismus als Mittelweg zwischen Hoch-und Mas- senkulture," in Logik der Sammlung. Am Ende des musealen Zeitalters (Logic of collection: at the end of the age of the museum) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 63-64; "On the New," Research Journal ofAnthology and Aesthetics 38 (2000): 5-17.
Cf. Raffaele Pettazonni, The All-Knowing God: Researches Into the Early Religion and Culture, trans. H. J. Rose (London: Methuen, 1956).
Cf. Jan Assmann, Politische Theologie zwischen Agypten und Israel (Political the- ology between Egypt and Israel) (Munich: Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, 1992), 85. RuedigerSafranski,DasBoseoderdasDramaderFreiheit(Evil;or,thedramaof freedom) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 32.
The concept of the "archive" is further explained through the cultural philo- sophical works of Boris Groys in chapter 3.
See, especially, Erich Zenger, A God of Vengeance? trans. Linda M. Maloney (Louisville, Ky. : Westminster John Knox Press, 1996). Zenger vehemently and for good hermeneutic reasons turns against the elimination of Jewish prayers of hatred from the Christian canon as well as from the hourly prayer of the Church. The theological arguments of the author are not as convincing as his herme- neutic ones. It is not clear what it is supposed to mean when he writes that the
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
236
3. THE RAGE REVOLUTION
"shrill tones of the psalms of enmity can serve to shock Christianity out of the
well-regulated slumber of its structural amnesia about God" (74).
11. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 450.
12. Isaiah's argument that God only keeps a remainder is taken up again at a deci- sive passage of Augustine in his merciless teaching of mercy in the year 397: "To Simplician: On Various Questions. Book I (De Diversis Quaestionibus)," in
Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1953) 370-406,1. 2.
13. Gerd Theifien and Annette Merz, Der historische Jesus. Ein Lehrbuch (The his-
torical Jesus: a textbook) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1996), 249. 14. Concerning the metaphysical implications of the figure of speech "this world" (or "this life"), see Peter Sloterdijk, "1st die Welt verneinbar? Uber den Geist Indiens und die abendlandische Gnosis" (Can the world be unified? on the spirit of India and occidental gnosis), in Weltfremdheit (Unworldliness) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 220-33, especially section 1, "Fingerspitzengedanen" (Fingertip
thoughts).
15. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, ed.
Helmut Werner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 287.
16 In this context the works of Jacques Le Goff are most impotant. See his The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986).
17. TertuUian, Apology, De spectaculis; Minucius Felix, Octavius, trans. T. R. Glover
(Cambridge Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 297-301.
18. Cf. Nicholas Kwame Apetorgbor, TertuUian: Die Rache Gottes und die Verpflich- tung des Menschen zum Verzicht auf Rache. Die Bedeutung der Theologie Tertul-
liansfur das heutige afrikanische Christentum (TertuUian: The wrath of god and the human duty to renounce revenge. The significance of Tertullian's theology for contemporary African Christianity), (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2004).
19.
The second attraction of political Islam emanates from the fact that it— in a way only preceded by communism—is capable of offering its followers a clear, aggressive, and grandiosely theatrical "worldview" that rests on a clear differentiation of friend and enemy, an unmistakable mission to win, and an exhilaratingly Utopian final vision: the reconstitution of the global emirate, which is supposed to provide a shelter for the Islamic millennium, stretched out from Andalusia to the far East. With it the figure of the class enemy is replaced with that of the enemy of the faith, and class struggle is replaced by holy war—while keeping the dualistic schema of a war of prin- ciples, it demands a necessarily long war rich in casualties. As usual, in its last battle the party of the good is destined to win.
220
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
It can easily be seen that when it is used for political purposes, so-called fundamentalism is less of a matter of faith than an appeal to act or, more specifically, a matter of providing roles through which great numbers of potential actors are put into a position in which they can move from the- ory to praxis—or rather from frustration to praxis. In general it is true what demographic research has brought to light: "religion provides . . . additional oil for a fire whose original fuel does not come from it. "30 As a matrix of radical activations, Islam is on a par with historical communism; perhaps it is even superior because it can present itself with regard to its culture of origin not as a movement of radical rupture but as one of a revo- lutionary reestablishment.
The third and politically most important reason for the inevitably grow- ing dramatics of political Islam (even if at this hour, after a series of defeats, it seems to have lost quite a bit of its initial attraction) results from the demographic dynamic of its field of recruitment. Just like the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, it is essentially a youth movement or, more specifically, a movement of young men. Its verve to a large degree results from the excess of vitality of an unstoppable giant wave of unem- ployed and, socially speaking, hopeless male adolescents between the ages of fifteen and thirty—in their majority second, third, and fourth sons, who can enact their futile rage only by participating in the next best aggression programs. By creating in their base countries counter-worlds to the existing one, Islamic organizations create a grid of alternative positions in which angry, ambitious young men can feel important—including the impulse to attack both close and faraway enemies today rather than tomorrow.
These numerically enormous groups constitute the natural allegiance of agitators from the elder generation, whose sermons derive their content almost automatically from the willingness among the members of their congregation to be outraged—whereas the Islamic tradition only provides the semantic forms to add captions to real anger and violence tensions. As in a laboratory experiment, it was possible to observe these conditions dur- ing a scheme to create "spontaneous riots" because of the Danish carica- tures of Mohammed in February 2006. While politically correct Europeans agonized over how to apologize to allegedly or actually offended Muslims, anonymous activists in Iraq continued to turn the wheel of provocation or, even better, the wheel of combative self-stimulation a bit further by way of destroying the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the most important Shiite sacred buildings in the north of Baghdad. They destroyed it with a
221
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
bomb attack, which led to dozens of Sunni houses of worship being dev- astated during counterattacks. These events speak a clear language. They reveal more about the hunger for a triggering event among the groups who are ready to attack than about an allegedly inevitable clash of civilizations. The agitators would feel sorry if they had to realize that the external cata- lysts were in fact sorry.
From this perspective it is legitimate to claim that Islam, in its Islamist variation, could transform itself to become a religious readymade excel-
31
Its suitability comes from characteristics of
lent for mobilizing purposes.
Muslim dogmatic theology that from the start were publicly committed to the war against "infidels. " The unprepared reader of the Koran has to be amazed about how it is possible that a sacred book is not afraid to repudiate itself when almost on every page it threatens the enemies of the prophet and of the faith with suffering in the eternal flames. The explanations of schol- ars hardly help to get over this estrangement, even if they try to trace the polemical passages of the Koran back to their historical context: the prophet engages in these passages in a form of early-socialist criticism against the wealthy of his time, the arrogant and ruthless merchants from Mecca who did not want to hear anything anymore about the egalitarian and gener- ous values of the old Arab tribal culture. Mohammed's teachings, scholars argue, ties in with these values as it commits his followers to caring for the weak. The initially plausible reference to the monotheistic privilege of zeal- ousness both for God and against the infidels fails to provide a sufficient explanation. It is just as evident to claim that no human being would want to concern himself with the opaque passages in the Koran if it were not for the fact that millions of aggressive gangs of searchers for God choose their words so to fit their coming deeds (while the comparably heated passages of the psalms of rage in the Old Testament have left the small audience of churches and synagogues cold for a long time).
The new mobilization movements—whether legitimate or not from the standpoint of Koran theology—could, assuming that birth rates remain high, influence a reservoir of several million young men in the Arabic hemi- sphere by the middle of the twenty-first century, men who probably only find an existentially attractive horizon of meaning in departing to politically and religiously concealed projects of self-destruction. In thousands of Koran schools, which recently sprang up like mushrooms everywhere that has boiling excesses of adolescent men, the anxious cohorts are indoctrinated with the concepts of holy war. Only a small portion of them will be able to
222
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
manifest themselves in external terrorism. The more significant portion will probably be invested in life-consuming civil wars on Arab soil—wars for which the Iran-Iraq massacre between 1980 and 1988 has provided a hint. In the case of the new wars, however, the quantitative proportions will, it can be predicted, skyrocket to a monstrous level. Giant battles of exterminations between Shiite and Sunni war parties are not unthinkable—the destruc- tion of the mosques and sacred sites of the other side provide the preamble for that. That Israel is anticipating further trials by fire cannot be missed. Without a far-sighted politics of sealing itself off, the Jewish enclave cannot survive the next decades. The truth is: even people who know the situation today do not have the slightest idea of how the approaching Muslim "youth bulge," the most extensive wave of genocidal excesses of adolescent men in
32
the history of mankind, could be contained by peaceful means.
These references to the actual mass-basis of radical Islamic movements mark at the same time the limit at which their commensurability with historical communism ends. The coming adherents of the Islamic goal of expansion do not at all resemble a class of workers and employees who unite to seize governmental power in order to put an end to their misery. Rather, they embody an agitated subproletariat or, even worse, a desper- ate movement of economically superfluous and socially useless people for whom there are too few acceptable positions available in their own sys-
tem, even if they should get to power through coups d'etat or elections. Because of demographic circumstances, concepts of the enemy in such movements cannot be sociologically defined, as was still possible within a Marxist conception of a "class of exploiters. " One can only define them by way of religion, political orientation, and culture—internally they are directed against the, in the eyes of the activists, despicable elites who make too many political concessions to the West. Externally they turn against the West as such, insofar as the latter is portrayed as the manifestation of humiliating, corrosive, and obscene cultural imports. Naturally, Islamist leaders will sooner or later attempt to gain power over the reserve coun- tries of the East in order to occupy positions of command over the redistri- bution of massive fortunes coming out of the oil business. Thus they could for some time appease their patronage by letting them participate in the oil manna. Since increasing energy prices during the coming decades will support a provocative laziness in bringing about reforms of the existing oil theocracies, riots in these countries are very likely. The case of Iran has shown what can happen next.
223
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
However much it might be the case that Islamist theocracy insists on the formally and materially totalitarian demand to regulate all aspects of living in a virtually Islamized global society according to the law of the Koran, it is less capable of confronting the economical, political, technical, and artistic facts of the contemporary age. While communism presented an authentic expression of Western modernization tendencies and, in some respects, though not in terms of economy, was the avant-garde of these tendencies, political Islamism bears the obvious mark of an antimodern disposition and dissynchronicity with the modern world. Part of this is its problematic relationship to the global culture of knowledge, as well as its thoroughly parasitic relationship to the weapons technology of the West. This situation is, for the time being, not changed by the extreme demographic dynamic of the Islamic world, whose population increased between 1900 and 2000 from 150 million to 1. 2 billion—eight times its original size. Although the "popu-
33
lation weapon" is, as Gunnar Heinsohn has shown, of modern origin, turns against its owners in the case of a lack of opportunities to expand and emigrate. If one of the leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian physician Abdel Aziz Rantisi, most recently announced that the forthcoming century would be that of Islam, he commits a fallacy common today of confusing culture and biomass. He would be right only in the unlikely case that the Islamic world as a whole is soon successful in escaping from its self-incurred back- wardness. Even the most sympathetic interpreters currently have only illu- sory ideas about how this is supposed to happen.
In considering the hijacking of the airplanes that were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of Septem- ber 11, 2001, within the context of our observations, it becomes clear that it was not a demonstration of Islamic strength but a symbol of a sardonic lack of means, the compensation for which could only have been the sacrifice of human lives masked as being sacred. No Marx of political Islam will ever be able to argue that although modern technology emerged out of the lap of Western civilization, it will only reach its complete determination in the hands of Islamic operators. The lesson of September 11 is that the enemies of the West expect success exclusively from the vengeful reversal of Western tools against their creators. The Islamophile Friedrich Nietzsche would have to modify his judgments today. The accusations that he leveled in his curse against Christianity have, behind his back, arrived at a different address.
Radical Islamism provides the first example of a purely vengeful ideology
34
that only knows how to punish not how to create something new.
224
it
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
The weakness of Islam as a political religion, be it in its modest or radi- cal variations, rests on its backward-looking orientation. So far its leaders have not been capable of formulating nontechnical, romantic, angry con- cepts for the world of tomorrow. Without a doubt it is possible to set the rising protest masses of the Near and Middle East on their feet by using a rhetoric that is angry and terrific during the forthcoming half century. As a moblilizer of thymotic reserves on a large scale, Islamism has in fact not at all reached its climax. The dream of the activists for a neo-medieval Great Islamic Empire will continue to inspire numerous dreamers, even if the political conditions for its realization are missing in every respect. On the other hand, it is possible that conventional central powers could emerge out of the likely regional formations of empires of Islamic countries. That they would be able to create cultural artifacts, which would awaken a libido of imitation in other places, is unlikely. What remains decisive for the course of events is the fact that the heads of Islamism are, in their current condition, completely incapable of contributing to the writing of the next chapters of cultural evolution, not to mention dictating them, even if their countries of origin carry the "victory banner of procreation"35 as proudly as possible in front of them.
So far Islamism has little to show that would enable it to creatively continue the technological, economic, and scientific conditions of exis- tence for humankind during the twenty-first century. It would already be a titanic achievement if it were able to realize in due time the modern- ization of its own inventory. What is certain is that Islam has awakened from its dogmatic slumber. After centuries of stagnation, it returns to the world stage—in order to discover with embarrassment that it is incapable of adding to the major achievements in the area of culture that the cos- mopolitan, moderate, and inventive Islam was responsible for up until the thirteenth century. It could take another hundred years until its mas- terminds will be talked about not because of their threats but because of their achievements.
It will not be an empty time of waiting for the West. Because in the Islamic world there are several demographically explosive countries with plans to implement aggressive empire politics—particularly Iran and Paki- stan, to a lesser degree Egypt and Morocco—we will be confronted in future decades with a number of incoherent but spontaneously allied offensives, reminiscent of the semimodern departure movements of angry losers from Italy and Germany during the most unpleasant of times.
225
THE DISPERSION OF RAGE IN THE ERA OF THE CENTER
Under these circumstances, the expectations of Islamism as a potential successor of communism and its role as a global opposition movement should be set low. In reality they are absolutely illusory. It is not at all pos- sible to see how it would be capable of organizing a new universal collective of dissidence potentials in the countries of globalized capitalism. However, a number of regional major banks of rage will accumulate huge thymotic potentials over longer periods of time. But these will, most likely, waste their capital by spilling blood instead of investing it in promising culture and business companies. For the first half of the twenty-first century, the Islamist youth movements in dozens of countries in the Near and Middle East will be the radiating trouble spots on the crisis maps of strategic ana- lysts. However, whatever the Islamic advances will add to a politics of rage during the next decades—and the next twenty or thirty years could become one of the most fatal periods of all times if worst-case scenarios should materialize—their projects will hardly go beyond the level of a politically black romanticism based on immanent reasons. Thus the mobilization of those who choose a detour through God-given battles aims for a dark goal: the self-destruction of the superfluous.
Anyone holding onto the demand that world history has to proceed as the world's court of judgment is looking forward to disappointing times. In any case, one would have to look out for other judges. Because there is not much good one can hope for from criminal courts, the future will at most hold arbitration courts. Under these circumstances, only global capitalism qualifies for the role. It alone could grow to become its own enemy during the next round of the game, an enemy that excites itself to the point where it has to take itself as seriously as a contender who is deciding who is to be and who is not to be.
226
CONCLUSION BEYOND RESENTMENT
AFTER EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID DURING THE COURSE of this investigation, it would be absurd to claim that rage's best days are behind it. On the contrary, rage (together with its thymotic siblings, pride, the need for recognition, and resentment) is a basic force in the ecosystem of affects, whether interpersonal, political, or cultural. This thesis remains valid, even if rage cannot concentrate itself in the future in the form of uni- versal collectives of a communist type, but rather only in regional collec- tions. If regression from a certain achieved state of political psychology is not possible, the thymotic energies I have discussed here should be officially accredited as an adequate image of the real, inasmuch as they have fallen victim to an organized misinterpretation.
What has truly reached an end is the psychohistorical constellation of religiously and politically inflated retributive thinking that was characteris- tic ofthe Christian, socialist, and Communist courtrooms. Nietzsche found the right concept to characterize its essence when—with an eye to Paul and his invention of "Christianity"—he diagnosed that resentment could become a mark of genius. As long as the liaison of spirit and resentment
227
CONCLUSION
was stable, the desire for justice in the world—beyond earthly life or within actual history—could find shelter in fictitious beliefs: the theology of the wrath of God and the thymotic global economy of communism. In both systems, nothing less was at stake than the correction of accounts of suffering and injustice in a world that is morally out of balance. Both sought to turn resentment into a positive emotion in order to keep awake the sense of the unacceptability of an unjust world. It is because of their efforts that the highly unlikely phenomenon of "criticism" came into existence in Western civilization—insofar as we understand "criticism" to mean the spirit that has been fueled by ingenious resentment of sub- mission to mere facts, in particular facts of injustice. "Criticism" in this sense is not an absolute privilege of the West, however much it unfolded paradigmatically in the West; it is present in every culture that was suc- cessful in withdrawing from domination by servile, holistic, monologi- cal, and masochistic motives. Anyone insisting that democratic politics and forms of life could be universal should consider the cultures of coun- seling, the practices of discussion, and the traditions of criticisin of "the
1
The following insight needs to be asserted like an axiom: under condi- tions of globalization no politics of balancing suffering on the large scale is possible that is built on holding past injustices against someone, no matter if it is codified by redemptive, social-messianic, or democratic-messianic ide- ologies. This insight sets narrow limits to the moral productivity of move- ments of accusation even if they—as in the case of socialism, feminism, and postcolonialism—advocate a cause that is, in itself, respectable. It is much more important to delegitimize the inherited fatal alliance of intelligence and resentment to create a space for future paradigms of detoxified worldly wisdom. The criteria are not all that new—John Locke, the mastermind of the liberal English bourgeoisie, expressed them in a simple language in 1690:
2
the basic rights to life, freedom, and property. With regard to the historical
success of this triad, the evidence is clear: only in those areas of the world where these norms are respected do we have true forms of Enlightenment. Two centuries after Locke, Friedrich Nietzsche—although in a form that is, while fully justified from the standpoint of therapy, without doubt too pathetic—complemented these premises of successful civilizations with a hygienic program that puts the liberation from the spirit of resentment on the agenda. Nietzsche was concerned about the replacement of the toxic figure of "vengeful humility" with a form of intelligence that assures itself
others" as regional sources of democracy.
228
CONCLUSION
anew about its thymotic motives. It is obvious that without an open culture of ambition, this cannot be done. Such a culture would have to be post- monotheistic in the sense that it breaks open retributive metaphysics and its political reflexes with an appropriate level of thoroughness. The goal is a meritocracy, which balances, in an intercultural and transcultural way, an antiauthoritarian relaxed morality, on the one hand, and a distinctive normative consciousness and respect for inalienable personal rights, on the other. The adventure of morality takes place through the parallel pro- gram of elitist and egalitarian forces. Only within these parameters can a change of accent away from acquisition drives and toward giving virtues be conceived.
The investment costs for this education program are high. What is at stake in it is the creation of a code of conduct for multicivilizational com- plexes. Such a schema needs to be strong enough to cope with the fact that the condensed or globalized world remains, for the time being at least, structured in a multi-megalomaniac and inter-paranoid way. It is not possible to integrate a universe out of energetic, thymotic, irritable actors through ideal syntheses from the top. It is only possible to keep it at a bal- ance through power relationships. Great politics proceeds only by balanc- ing acts. To stay in balance means not evading any necessary fights and not provoking unnecessary ones. It also means not giving up on the course of the world with its entropic processes, primarily the destruction of the envi- ronment and the demoralization of human relationships. Part of this means learning to see oneself always through the eyes of others. What in former times was to be achieved by an overstrained religious humility will have to be accomplished by a culture of rationally built second-order observations. This alone could stop the malignant naivete by connecting the desire to be respected with the ability to see oneself in relative terms. Time is required to solve these tasks—but not the historical time of the epic and tragedy. Essen- tial time needs to be determined as the time of civilizational learning. Those who only want to make "history" remain below this definition.
The term "transition" should not mislead us into ignoring the fact that one always exercises under conditions of emergency in order to prevent emergency from happening wherever possible. Mistakes are not permitted and yet are likely. If the exercises go well, it might be the case that a set of interculturally binding disciplines emerge that could, for the first time, rightly be referred to with an expression that, until now, has been used pre- maturely: world culture.
229
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
I. Cf. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 13.
2. I thus disagree with the legend, which is popular among theologians, that myth
always implies the transfiguration of the existing world. According to this leg- end myth only comes to being with prophetic speech because of myth's distance from the world and its critical dimension. In reality myth is already as prophetic as prophecy is still mythic.
3. Cf. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz. Den Krieg denken (Clausewitz: Thinking war) (Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1980), as well as Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).
4. Concerning the unconscious nexus of humanism and bellicosity, see Bazon Brock and Gerlinde Koschick, eds. , Krieg und Kunst (War and art) (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002).
5. Cf. Iliad 9. 328 f.
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INTRODUCTION
6. See Peter Sloterdijk, "Bilder der Gewalt—Gewalt der Bilder: Von der antiken Mythologie zur postmodernen Bilderindustrie," in Iconic Turn: Die neueMachtder Bilder (The new power of images), ed. Christa Maar and Hubert Burda (Cologne: Dumont, 2004), 333-34, for a reference to the continuous existence of irruptive ancient rage in the "natural theology of explosion" of modern mass culture.
7. The later stoic phenomenology of rage states that rage does not allow for any past. One can hide all other vices, but "anger parades itself; it shows on the face [seprofert et infaciem exit); the greater it is, the more obviously it seethes o u t . . . . The other affections make themselves seen [apparent). Anger sticks right out [eminet]" (Seneca, "On Anger," in Moral and Political Essays, ed. John M. Coo- per and J. F. Procope [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 18). Dur- ing the twentieth century, academic psychology sometimes speaks of "explosive reactions"; cf. Ernst Kretschmer, Medizinische Psychologie (Medical psychology) (Leipzig: Thieme 1930), 183-84.
8. Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (The Man Without Qualities) (Ham- burg: Rowohlt 1952), 1239-43.
9. The expression is borrowed from Heinrich Mann, who reports in his Napoleon essay from 1925 about the fatal Corsican, "He enters the world like a bullet enters the battle. This is how the revolution sent him. " Later I will show that the con- cept of revolution rests not least in a modernization of ancient menis. Its psycho- logical kernel is the transformation of the subject into an active gathering place of worid rage.
10. Bruno Snell, "Die Auffassung des Menschen bei Homer," in Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Denkens bei den Griechen (The discovery of spirit: Studies of the emergence of European thinking in ancient Greece) (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1946), 15-37.
11. Cf. , for reasons of curiosity, Jiirgen Manthey, Die Unsterblichkeit Achills. Vom Ursprung des Erzahlens (The immortality of Achilles: On the origin of narrating) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 31-32.
12. Concerning the ancient conception of genius, see the work of the Roman rheto- rician Censorinus, De die natali, as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Spharen I, Blasen (Spheres I: Bubbles) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998), chap. 6, "Divider of Soul Space," 421-85.
13. Seneca De ira 1. 6: "Non est ergo natura hominis poenae appetens; ideo ne ira qui- dem secundum naturam hominis, quia poenae appetens est [therefore punish- ment does not go with being a good man. Nor, for that reason, does anger, since punishment does go with anger]. " One can establish a distant analogy between the philosophical domestication of anger in the Greeks and the civilization of the
232
INTRODUCTION
rage of God in the theology of "the priestly writings" of post-Babylonian Juda- ism. The change of emphasis toward individualized repentance withdraws the conditions of the prophetic speeches of threat from the divine penalization and destructive rage. See Miggelbrink, Derzornige Gott, 48-49.
14. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 146-50.
15. The classic catalogue of cardinal sins still provides an image that balances between erotic and thymotic vices. This is based on the assumption that one rightly can assign avaritia (avarice), luxuria (voluptuousness), and gula (intemperance) to the erotic pole, while superbia (arrogance, pride), ira (rage), and invidia (jeal- ousy, enviousness) belong to the thymotic pole. Only acedia (melancholia) does not fit into this categorization because it expresses a sadness without subject and object.
16.
The classic expression of this idea is the slogan that was common among bour- geois of the eighteenth century: "Felix mentis": happy because of one's owns achievements. This expression decorates the facade of one of the most beauti- ful classicist buildings in Amsterdam for a good reason. This temple of enlight- enment, located at the street Kaisergracht, the canal of the king, was built in 1787 and after 1945 was temporarily the headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party. Today it is the location of one of the most lively cultural centers of the Netherlands.
17. Cf. Robert Shaeffer, The Resentment Against Achievement: Understanding the Assault Upon Ability (Buffalo, N. Y. : Prometheus Books, 1988).
18. Cf. Heiner Miihlmann, Die Natur derKulturen. Entwurfeiner kulturdynamischen Theorie (The Nature of civilizations: An attempt of a culture-dynamic theory) (Vienna: Springer, 1996).
19. We also owe one of the best summaries of the ancient and more recent discourses about thymos to a student of Strauss, Francis Fukuyama. See the rich passages of the unread best-seller The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992; New York: Pen- guin, 2006). Also see the final section of the introduction, "The Postcommunist Situation," this volume.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7. 7.
21. Seneca, who cites this passage from Aristotle's treatise On the Soul (De anima) in
his work De ira (1. 9), objects to the Greek thinker with the argument that affects
are just as bad as helpers as they are as leaders.
22. Cf. Fukuyama, The End of History, 165-66.
23. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in EnglisTi^tmns. Bruce Fink
(New York: Norton, 2006); Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 233
INTRODUCTION
Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H.
Nichols (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1980).
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other
Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2005), 145.
25. Ibid. , 144.
26. Concerning the invention of the "symbolic" as the domain of the (holy) father
in a situation of an actual weakening of the paternal function, see Michel Tort, Fin du dogme paternal (The End of the paternal dogma) (Paris: Aubier, 2005), 123-24.
27. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (New York: Penguin, 1994).
28. Cf. the deduction of modern entrepreneurial psychology from the innovation that arises from the pressure of paying off one's debts in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger's essential work, Eigentum, Zins und Geld: Ungeloste Riitsel der Wirschaftswissenscha. fi (Property, interest, and money: unsolved riddles of eco- nomics) (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1996).
cc
29. See Walter Burkert, Vergeltung" zwischen Ethologie und Ethik. Reflexe und
Reflexionen in Texten und Mythologien desAltertums ("Retaliation" between eth- nology and ethics: reflexes and reflections in texts and mythologies of antiquity) (Munich: Siemens Stiftung 1992), 21-22.
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Old and New Tablets," in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2006), 159.
31. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 42.
32. Boris Groys, Das kommunistische Postskriptum (The communist postscript) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006).
33. See the discursive justification of this metaphor in Gunnar Heinsohn and Otto Steiger, Eigentumsokonomik (Property economics) (Marburg: Metropolis, 2006).
34. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 157.
35. Boris Groys, Anne von der Heyden, and Peter Weibel, eds. , Zurueck aus der
Zukunft. Osteuropaeische Kulturen im Zeitalter des Postkommunismus (Back from the future: Eastern European cultures during the age of postcommunism) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005).
36. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 61-95.
234
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
37- Ibid. , 73.
38. Fukuyama, The End of History, 284.
39. Cf. Gunnar Heinsohn, Sohne und Weltmacht. Terror im Aufstieg und Fall der
Nationen (Sons and Global power: terror within the rise and fall of nations) (Zurich: Orell Fiissli, 2003), and his Finis Germaniae, Kursbuch 162 (Hamburg: Zeit, 2005), 18-29.
40. The proposition concerning the end of history exists in at least four different ver- sions: two are from Kojeve: the end of history in Stalinism and the end of history in the American way of life and in Japanese snobbism; one is in Dostoevsky: the end of history in the "Crystal Palace"; and one in Heidegger: the end of history in boredom. Concerning the last two versions, see Peter Sloterdijk, "Heideggers Politik: Das Ende der Geschichte vertagen" (Heidegger's politics: coping with the end of history), closing statement at the conference Heidegger. Le danger et la promesse, Strasbourg, December 5, 2004; as well as Peter Sloterdijk, Im Weltin- nenraum des Kapitals. Fur eine philosophische Theorie der Globalisierung (In the world interior of capital: for a philosophical theory of globalization) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 258-348. There you also find the technical definition of "world history" as the successful phase of unilateralism and the constituting phase of the world system (1492-1944).
41. Cf. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004); Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds. , Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2005).
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
1. Thomas Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Every-
man's Library, 2005), 538.
2. Robert A. F. Thurman, Anger: The Seven Deadly Sins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
3. Cf. Juliane Vogel, Die Furie und das Gesetz. Zur Dramaturgie der "grossen Szene' in
der Tragoedie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Fury and law: On the dramaturgy of the "great
scene" in the tragedy of the nineteenth century) (Freiburg: Rombach, 2002).
4. Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," in Selected Writings, vol. 4, trans.
Harry Zorn, (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 392; Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2001).
5. Concerning the source of the formula "x as such—x pure and simple," see Karl
Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique ofPolitical Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993), 105. ^
235
6. 7.
8.
1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
6. 7.
8. 9. 10.
Mann, Joseph and his Brothers, 537.
Quoted according to Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 56; Conquest is doubtful about the authenticity of this statement.
See the doubts concerning the authenticity of the classic quotation in Christo- pher Read, Lenin: A Revolutionary Life (London: Routledge, 2005), 11.
2. THE WRATHFUL GOD
Cf. Regis Debray, God: An Itinerary, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London: Verso, 2004).
James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916; New York: Penguin, 2003).
Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, Thirteenth-Eighteenth Centuries, trans. Eric Nicholson (New York: St Martin's Press 1990).
Gustave Flaubert, Dictionary ofReceived Ideas, trans. Jacques Barzun (New York: New Directions, 1968).
Boris Groys, "Readymade," in Lfber das Neue. Versuch einer Kulturkommune (On the new: a study of cultural economics) (Munich: Fischer, 1992), 73-74; "Simuli- erte Ready-mades von Fischli und Weiss," in Kunst-Kommentare (Vienna: Pas- sagen, 1977), 131-32; "Fundamentalismus als Mittelweg zwischen Hoch-und Mas- senkulture," in Logik der Sammlung. Am Ende des musealen Zeitalters (Logic of collection: at the end of the age of the museum) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 63-64; "On the New," Research Journal ofAnthology and Aesthetics 38 (2000): 5-17.
Cf. Raffaele Pettazonni, The All-Knowing God: Researches Into the Early Religion and Culture, trans. H. J. Rose (London: Methuen, 1956).
Cf. Jan Assmann, Politische Theologie zwischen Agypten und Israel (Political the- ology between Egypt and Israel) (Munich: Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung, 1992), 85. RuedigerSafranski,DasBoseoderdasDramaderFreiheit(Evil;or,thedramaof freedom) (Munich: Hanser, 1997), 32.
The concept of the "archive" is further explained through the cultural philo- sophical works of Boris Groys in chapter 3.
See, especially, Erich Zenger, A God of Vengeance? trans. Linda M. Maloney (Louisville, Ky. : Westminster John Knox Press, 1996). Zenger vehemently and for good hermeneutic reasons turns against the elimination of Jewish prayers of hatred from the Christian canon as well as from the hourly prayer of the Church. The theological arguments of the author are not as convincing as his herme- neutic ones. It is not clear what it is supposed to mean when he writes that the
1. RAGE TRANSACTIONS
236
3. THE RAGE REVOLUTION
"shrill tones of the psalms of enmity can serve to shock Christianity out of the
well-regulated slumber of its structural amnesia about God" (74).
11. Ralf Miggelbrink, Der zornige Gott. Die Bedeutung einer anstofiigen biblischen
Tradition (The wrathful god: The significance of a scandalous biblical tradition)
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002), 450.
12. Isaiah's argument that God only keeps a remainder is taken up again at a deci- sive passage of Augustine in his merciless teaching of mercy in the year 397: "To Simplician: On Various Questions. Book I (De Diversis Quaestionibus)," in
Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1953) 370-406,1. 2.
13. Gerd Theifien and Annette Merz, Der historische Jesus. Ein Lehrbuch (The his-
torical Jesus: a textbook) (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1996), 249. 14. Concerning the metaphysical implications of the figure of speech "this world" (or "this life"), see Peter Sloterdijk, "1st die Welt verneinbar? Uber den Geist Indiens und die abendlandische Gnosis" (Can the world be unified? on the spirit of India and occidental gnosis), in Weltfremdheit (Unworldliness) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 220-33, especially section 1, "Fingerspitzengedanen" (Fingertip
thoughts).
15. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, ed.
Helmut Werner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 287.
16 In this context the works of Jacques Le Goff are most impotant. See his The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986).
17. TertuUian, Apology, De spectaculis; Minucius Felix, Octavius, trans. T. R. Glover
(Cambridge Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2003), 297-301.
18. Cf. Nicholas Kwame Apetorgbor, TertuUian: Die Rache Gottes und die Verpflich- tung des Menschen zum Verzicht auf Rache. Die Bedeutung der Theologie Tertul-
liansfur das heutige afrikanische Christentum (TertuUian: The wrath of god and the human duty to renounce revenge. The significance of Tertullian's theology for contemporary African Christianity), (Hamburg: Dr. Kovac, 2004).
19.
