No More Learning

Caesar complained, and the clause was subsequently appended but not confirmed by special decree of the people, so that this enactment inserted by mere interpolation in the
law could only be looked on de jure as nullity. Where Pompeius, therefore, might have
simply kept by the law, he had preferred first to make spontaneous concession, then to recall and lastly to cloak this recall in manner most disloyal.
While in this way the shortening of Caesar's governor- Attempt to ship was only aimed at indirectly, the regulations issued c^^, at the same time as to the governorships sought the same governor-
p"
already promulgated
object directly. The ten years for which the governorship had been secured to Caesar, in the last instance through the law proposed by Pompeius himself in concert with
VOL.
X45
T
(p.
a
it by
it,
a
;
a
178
DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
Crassus, ran according to the usual mode of reckoning 69. 49. from 1 March 695 to the last day of February 705. As, however, according to the earlier practice, the proconsul
or propraetor had the right of entering on his provincial magistracy immediately after the termination of his consul ship or praetorship, the successor of Caesar was to be
60. nominated, not from the urban magistrates of 704, but 49. from those of 705, and could not therefore enter before 48. 1st Jan. 706. So far Caesar had still during the last 49. ten months of the year 705 a right to the command, not
on the ground of the Pompeio-Licinian law, but on the
of the old rule that a command with a set term still continued after the expiry of the term up to the arrival of the successor. But now, since the new regulation
62. of 702 called to the governorships not the consuls and praetors going out, but those who had gone out five years ago or more, and thus prescribed an interval between the civil magistracy and the command instead of the previous immediate sequence, there was no longer any difficulty in straightway filling up from another quarter every legally vacant governorship, and so, in the case in question, bringing about for the Gallic provinces the
49. change of command on the 1st March 705, instead of the 48. 1 st Jan. 706. The pitiful dissimulation and procrastinating artifice of Pompeius are after a remarkable manner mixed
up, in these arrangements, with the wily formalism and the constitutional erudition of the republican party. Years before these weapons of state-law could be employed, they had them duly prepared, and put themselves in a condition on the one hand to compel Caesar to the resignation of his command from the day when the term secured to him by Pompeius' own law expired, that is from the 1st
49. March 705, by sending successors to him, and on the other hand to be able to treat as null and void the votes 48. tendered for him at the elections for 706. Caesar, not
ground
CHAP, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 179
<n a position to hinder these moves in the game, kept silence and left things to their own course.
Gradually therefore the slow course of constitutional Debates u procedure developed itself. According to custom the ncayi senate had to deliberate on the governorships of the year
705, so far as they went to former consuls, at the beginning 49.
of 703, so far as they went to former praetors, at the 61. beginning of 704 ; that earlier deliberation gave the first 60. occasion to discuss the nomination of new governors for
the two Gauls in the senate, and thereby the first occasion
for open collision between the constitutional party pushed forward by Pompeius and the senatorial supporters of Caesar. The consul Marcus Marcellus introduced a proposal to give the two provinces hitherto administered
by the proconsul Gaius Caesar from the 1st March 705 49. to the two consulars who were to be provided with governor ships for that year. The long-repressed indignation burst forth in a torrent through the sluice once opened ; every thing that the Catonians were meditating against Caesar
was brought forward in these discussions. For them it was a settled point, that the right granted by exceptional law to the proconsul Caesar of announcing his candidature for the consulship in absence had been again cancelled by a subsequent decree of the people, and that the reservation inserted in the latter was invalid. The senate should in their opinion cause this magistrate, now that the subjugation of Gaul was ended, to discharge immediately the soldiers who had served out their time. The cases in which Caesar had bestowed burgess-rights and established colonies in Upper Italy were described by them as un constitutional and null; in further illustration of which Marcellus ordained that a respected senator of the Caesarian colony of Comum, who, even if that place had not burgess but only Latin rights, was entitled to lay claim to Roman citizenship 132), should receive the
(p.
18o DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
punishment of scourging, which was admissible only in the case of non-burgesses.
The supporters of Caesar at this time — among whom Gaius Vibius Pansa, who was the son of a man proscribed by Sulla but yet had entered on a political career, formerly
an officer in Caesar's army and in this year tribune of the people, was the most notable—affirmed in the senate that both the state of things in Gaul and equity demanded not only that Caesar should not be recalled before the time, but that he should be allowed to retain the command along with the consulship; and they pointed beyond doubt to the facts, that a few years previously Pompeius had just in the same way combined the Spanish governorships with the consulate, that even at the present time, besides the important office of superintending the supply of food to the capital, he held the supreme command in Italy in addition to the Spanish, and that in fact the whole men capable of arms had been sworn in by him and had not yet been released from their oath.
The process began to take shape, but its course was not on that account more rapid. The majority of the senate, seeing the breach approaching, allowed no sitting capable of issuing a decree to take place for months ; and other months in their turn were lost over the solemn procrastina tion of Pompeius. At length the latter broke the silence and ranged himself, in a reserved and vacillating fashion as usual but yet plainly enough, on the side of the constitu tional party against his former ally. He summarily and abruptly rejected the demand of the Caesarians that their master should be allowed to conjoin the consulship and the proconsulship ; this demand, he added with blunt coarse ness, seemed to him no better than if a son should offer to flog his father. He approved in principle the proposal 01
Marcellus, in so far as he too declared that he would not allow Caesar directly to attach the consulship to the pro
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 181
consulship. He hinted, however, although without making
any binding declaration on the point, that they would perhaps grant to Caesar admission to the elections for 706 48. without requiring his personal announcement, as well as the continuance of his governorship at the utmost to the 13th Nov. 705. But in the meantime the incorrigible pro- 49. crastinator consented to the postponement of the nomination
of successors to the last day of Feb. 704, which was asked 60. by the representatives of Caesar, probably on the ground
of a clause of the Pompeio-Licinian law forbidding
any discussion in the senate as to the nomination of successors before the beginning of Caesar's last year of office.
In this sense accordingly the decrees of the senate were issued (29 Sept 703). The filling up of the Gallic 61. governorships was placed in the order of the day for the 1st March 704 ; but even now it was attempted to break up 60. the army of Caesar — just as had formerly been done by decree of the people with the army of Lucullus (iv. 349, 387) —by inducing his veterans to apply to the senate for their discharge. Caesar's supporters effected, indeed, as far as they constitutionally could, the cancelling of these decrees
by their tribunictan veto; but Pompeius very distinctly declared that the magistrates were bound unconditionally
to obey the senate, and that intercessions and similar antiquated formalities would produce no change. The oligarchical party, whose organ Pompeius now made himself, betrayed not obscurely the design, in the event of
a victory, of revising the constitution in their sense and removing everything which had even the semblance of popular freedom ; as indeed, doubtless for this reason, it omitted to avail itself of the comitia at all in its attacks directed against Caesar. The coalition between Pompeius
and the constitutional party was thus formally declared ;
sentence too was already evidently passed on Caesar, and
Connter- arrange- ments of Caesar.
182 DEATH OF CRASSUS liCJK V
the term of its promulgation was simply postponed. The elections for the following year proved thoroughly idverse to him.
During these party manoeuvres of hia antagonist's pre paratory to war, Caesar had succeeded in getting rid of the Gallic insurrection and restoring the state of peace in the
81. whole subject territory. As early ar. the summer of 703,
under the convenient pretext of defending the frontier
but evidently in token of the fact that the legions in Gaul were now beginning to be no longer needed there, he movee one of them to North Italy. He could not avoid per ceiving now at any rate, not earlier, that he would not br spared the necessity of drawing the sword against his fellow-citizens; nevertheless, as was highly desirable to leave the legions still j: time in the barely pacified Gaul, he sought even yet to procrastinate, and, ^i'i acquainted with the extreme lovi of peace in the majority of the senate,
did not abandon the hope of still restrvning them from the declaration cf war in spite of the nrejfure exercised over them by Poirpoius. He did ao'. even hesitate to make great sacrifices, only he might avoiJ for the present open variance with the supreme gx/f. luing board. When the
60. senate (in the spring of 70/,) r. t thti suggestion of Pompeius requested both him and Cvjjx to furnish each legion for the impending Parthkx war (p. 167) and when agreeably to this resolution Po:r. pe:us demanded back from Caesar the legion lent to bira Fjme years before, so as to send to Syria, Caesar complied with the double demand, because neither the opportuneness of this decree of the senate nor the justice of the demand of Pompeius could themselves be disputed, and the keeping within the bounds of the law and of formal loyalty was of more consequence to Caesar than few thousand soldiers. The two legions came without delay and placed themselves at the disposal of the govern
ment, but instead of sending them to the Euphrates, the
03)
a
in
a it
(p. 1
if
f a.
if it
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 183
latter kept them at Capua in readiness for Pompeius ; and the public had once more the opportunity of comparing the manifest endeavours of Caesar to avoid a rupture with the perfidious preparation for war by his opponents.
For the discussions with the senate Caesar had succeeded Curia in purchasing not only one of the two consuls of the year, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, but above all the tribune of the people Gaius Curio, probably the most eminent among the many profligate men of parts in this epoch ; 1 unsurpassed in refined elegance, in fluent and clever oratory, in dexterity
of intrigue, and in that energy which in the case of vigorous but vicious characters bestirs itself only the more powerfully amid the pauses of idleness ; but also unsurpassed in his dissolute life, in his talent for borrowing —his debts were estimated at 60,000,000 sesterces (^600,000) —and in his moral and political want of principle. He had previously offered himself to be bought by Caesar and had been rejected ; the talent, which he thenceforward displayed in his attacks on Caesar, induced the latter subsequently to buy him up—the price was high, but the commodity was worth the money.
Curio had in the first months of his tribunate of the Debates people played the independent republican, and had as such JJ^J^ thundered both against Caesar and against Pompeius. He Caesar and
""1P""1
availed himself with rare skill of the apparently impartia position which this gave him, when in March 704 the 60. proposal as to the filling up of the Gallic governorships for
the next year came up afresh for discussion in the senate ;
he completely approved the decree, but asked that it should
be at the same time extended to Pompeius and his extra ordinary commands. His arguments — that a constitutional state of things could only be brought about by the removal
of all exceptional positions, that Pompeius as merely en trusted by the senate with the proconsulship could still less
* Homo ingtniotissimt ntquam (Vellci. 48).
ii.
i84
DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
than Caesar refuse obedience to that the one-sided removal of one of the two generals would only increase the danger to the constitution —carried complete conviction to superficial politicians and to the public at large and the declaration of Curio, that he intended to prevent any one sided proceedings against Caesar the veto constitutionally belonging to him, met with much approval in and out of the senate. Caesar declared his consent at once to Curio's proposal and offered to resign his governorship and command at any moment on the summons of the senate, provided Pompeius would do the same he might safely do so, for
without his Italo-Spanish command was no longer formidable. Pompeius again for that very reason could not avoid refusing his reply—that Caesar must first resign, and that he meant speedily to follow the example thus set—was the less satisfactory, that he did not even specify definite term for his retirement. Again the decision was delayed for months; Pompeius and the Catonians, perceiving the dubious humour of the majority of the senate, did not venture to bring Curio's proposal to a vote. Caesar employed the summer in establishing the state of peace in the regions which he had conquered, in holding great review of his troops on the Scheldt, and in making triumphal march through the province of North Italy, which was entirely devoted to him autumn found him in Ravenna, the southern frontier-town of his province.
The vote which could no longer be delayed on Curio's proposai at length took place, and exhibited the defeat of the party of Pompeius and Cato in all its extent. By 370 votes against 20 the senate resolved that the proconsuls of Spain and Gaul should both be called upon to resign their offices; and with boundless joy the good burgesses of Rome heard the glad news of the saving achievement of Curio. Pompeius was thus recalled the senate no less
Pompeius
Caesar and Pompeius
recalled.
by
it,
;
;
a a
a
;
;
by
chap, 1x RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 185
than Caesar, and while Caesar was ready to comply with the command, Pompeius positively refused obedience. The presiding consul Gaius Marcellus, cousin of Marcus Marcellus and like the latter belonging to the Catonian party, addressed a severe lecture to the servile majority; and it was, no doubt, vexatious to be thus beaten in their own camp and beaten by means of a phalanx of poltroons. But where was victory to come from under a leader, who, instead of shortly and distinctly dictating his orders to the senators, resorted in his old days a second time to the in structions of a professor of rhetoric, that with eloquence polished up afresh he might encounter the youthful vigour
and brilliant talents of Curio ?
The coalition, defeated in the senate, was in the most
painful position. The Catonian section had undertaken to push matters to a rupture and to carry the senate along with them, and now saw their vessel stranded after a most vexatious manner on the sandbanks of the indolent majority. Their leaders had to listen in their conferences to the bitterest reproaches from Pompeius; he pointed out em phatically and with entire justice the dangers of the seem ing peace ; and, though it depended on himself alone to cut the knot by rapid action, his allies knew very well that they could never expect this from him, and that it was for them, as they had promised, to bring matters to a crisis. After the champions of the constitution and of senatorial government had already declared the constitutional rights of the burgesses and of the tribunes of the people to be
meaningless formalities 181), they now found them selves driven by necessity to treat the constitutional decision; of the senate itself in similar manner and, as the legitimate government would not let itself be saved with its own consent, to save against its will. This was neither new nor accidental Sulla v. 97) and Lucullus
(iv. 33s)hadbeenobligedtocarryeveryenergeticresolu-
DecUrm- non,"w"
;
it
a (i
(p.
The n/caesar1
Caesar had completely attained the object of devolving l^e 'mt'ative °f c'yil war on his opponents. He had, while himself keeping on legal ground, compelled Pompeius to declare war, and to declare not as representative of the legitimate authority, but as general of an openly revolution ary minority of the senate which overawed the majority. This result was not to be reckoned of slight importance, although the instinct of the masses could not and did not deceive itself for moment as to the fact that the war con
BO.
186 DEATH OF CRASSUS book t
tion conceived by them in the true interest of the govern ment with a high hand irrespective of just as Cato and his friends now proposed to do the machinery of the constitution was in fact utterly effete, and the senate was now—as the comitia had been for centuries—nothing but
worn-out wheel slipping constantly out of its track.
It was rumoured (Oct. 704) that Caesar had moved four legions from Transalpine into Cisalpine Gaul and stationed them at Placentia. This transference of troops was of itself within the prerogative of the governor; Curio
moreover palpably showed in the senate the utter ground
lessness of the rumour; and they by
the proposal of the consul Gaius Marcellus to give Pompeius on the strength of orders to march against Caesar. Yet the said consul, in concert with the two consuls elected for
49. 705 who likewise belonged to the Catonian party, proceeded to Pompeius, and these three men by virtue of their own plenitude of power requested the general to put himself at the head of the two legions stationed at Capua, and to call the Italian militia to arms at his discretion. more in formal authorization for the commencement of civil war can hardly be conceived; but people had no longer time to attend to such secondary matters
Pompeius accepted The military preparations, the levies began in order personally to forward them, Pompeius left the capital in
60. December 704.
majority rejected
a
it
it.
a
;
;aA
it
a
it,
;
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS
187
cerned other things than questions of formal law. Now, when war was declared, it was Caesar's interest to strike a blow as soon as possible. The preparations of his oppo nents were just beginning, and even the capital was not
In ten or twelve days an army three times as strong as the troops of Caesar that were in Upper Italy could be collected at Rome ; but still it was not impossible
to surprise the city undefended, or even perhaps by a rapid winter campaign to seize all Italy, and to shut off the best resources of his opponents before they could make them available. The sagacious and energetic Curio, who after resigning his tribunate (10 Dec. 704) had immediately 60. gone to Caesar at Ravenna, vividly represented the state
of things to his master ; and it hardly needed such a repre sentation to convince Caesar that longer delay now could only be injurious. But, as he with the view of not giving
his antagonists occasion to complain had hitherto brought
no troops to Ravenna itself, he could for the present do nothing but despatch orders to his whole force to set out with all haste; and he had to wait till at least the one legion stationed in Upper Italy reached Ravenna. Mean while he sent an ultimatum to Rome, which, if useful for nothing else, by its extreme submissiveness still farther compromised his opponents in public opinion, and perhaps even, as he seemed himself to hesitate, induced them to prosecute more remissly their preparations against him.
In this ultimatum Caesar dropped all the counter-demands which he formerly made on Pompeius, and offered on his own part both to resign the governorship of Transalpine Gaul, and to dismiss eight of the ten legions belonging to him, at the term fixed by the senate ; he declared himself content, if the senate would leave him either the governor
ship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one, or that of Cis
alpine Gaul alone with two, legions, not, forsooth, up to his investiture with the consulship, but till after the close of
occupied.
188 DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
48. the consular elections for 706. He thus consented to those proposals of accommodation, with which at the begin ning of the discussions the senatorial party and even Pompeius himself had declared that they would be satis fied, and showed himself ready to remain in a private position from his election to the consulate down to his entering on office. Whether Caesar was in earnest with these astonishing concessions and had confidence that he should be able to carry through his game against Pompeius even after granting so much, or whether he reckoned that those on the other side had already gone too far to find in these proposals of compromise more than a proof that Caesar regarded his cause itself as lost, can no longer be with certainty determined. The probability that Caesar committed the fault of playing too bold game, far rather than the worse fault of promising something which he was not minded to perform and that, strangely enough his proposals had been accepted, he would have made good his word.
Last
the senate.
Curio undertook once more to represent his master in tne Hon's den. In three days he made the journey from Ravenna to Rome. When the new consuls Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus the younger1 assembled the senate
49. for the first time on Jan. 705, he delivered in full meeting the letter addressed by the general to the senate. The tribunes of the people, Marcus Antonius well known in the chronicle of scandal of the city as the intimate friend of Curio and his accomplice in all his follies, but at the same time known from the Egyptian and Gallic campaigns as brilliant cavalry officer, and Quintus Cassius, Pompeius' former quaestor,—the two, who were now in Curio's stead managing the cause of Caesar in Rome — insisted on the
To be distinguished from the consul having the same name of 704
60.
49. the latter was a cousin, the consul of 705 a brother, of the Marcus Mar ti, cellus who was consul In 703.
;
'
a
1;
a
a if
is,
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 189
immediate reading of the despatch. The grave and clear words in which Caesar set forth the imminence of civil war, the general wish for peace, the arrogance of Pompeius, and his own yielding disposition, with all the irresistible force of truth ; the proposals for a compromise, of a mod eration which doubtless surprised his own partisans; the distinct declaration that this was the last time that he should offer his hand for peace —made the deepest impres sion. In spite of the dread inspired by the numerous soldiers of Pompeius who flocked into the capital, the sentiment of the majority was not doubtful; the consuls could not venture to let it find expression. Respecting the proposal renewed by Caesar that both generals might be enjoined to resign their commands simultaneously, respecting all the projects of accommodation suggested by his letter, and respecting the proposal made by Marcus Coelius Rums and Marcus Calidius that Pompeius should be urged immediately to depart for Spain, the consuls refused—as they in the capacity of presiding officers were entitled to do—to let a vote take place. Even the pro posal of one of their most decided partisans who was
simply not so blind to the military position of affairs as his party, Marcus Marcellus —to defer the determination till the Italian levy en masse could be under arms and could protect the senate —was not allowed to be brought to a vote. Pompeius caused it to be declared through his usual organ, Quintus Scipio, that he was resolved to take up the cause of the senate now or never, and that he would let it drop if they longer delayed. The consul Lentulus said in plain terms that even the decree of the senate was do longer of consequence, and that, if it should persevere in its servility, he would act of himself and with his power ful friends take the farther steps necessary. Thus over-
awed, the majority decreed what was commanded —that
n*psa. r
should at a definite and not distant day give up
190
DEATH OF CRASSUS book v
Transalpine Gaul to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Cisalpine Gaul to Marcus Servilius Nonianus, and should dismiss his army, failing which he should be esteemed a traitor. When the tribunes of Caesar's party made use of their right of veto against this resolution, not only were they, as they at least asserted, threatened in the senate- house itself by the swords of Pompeian soldiers, and forced, in order to save their lives, to flee in slaves' clothing from the capital ; but the now sufficiently overawed senate treated their formally quite constitutional interference as an attempt at revolution, declared the country in danger, and in the usual forms called the whole burgesses to take up arms, and all magistrates faithful to the constitution to
49. place themselves at the head of the armed (7 Jan. 705). Now it was enough. When Caesar was informed by the
tribunes who had fled to his camp entreating protection as to the reception which his proposals had met with in the capital, he called together the soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which had meanwhile arrived from its cantonments near Tergeste (Trieste) at Ravenna, and unfolded before them the state of things. It was not merely the man of
genius versed in the knowledge and skilled in the control of men's hearts, whose brilliant eloquence shone forth and glowed in this agitating crisis of his own and the world's destiny; nor merely the generous commander-in-chief and the victorious general, addressing soldiers, who had been called by himself to arms and for eight years had followed his banners with daily - increasing enthusiasm. There spoke, above all, the energetic and consistent states man, who had now for nine-and-twenty years defended the cause of freedom in good and evil times ; who had braved for it the daggers of assassins and the executioners of the aristocracy, the swords of the Germans and the waves of the unknown ocean, without ever yielding or wavering ; who had torn to pieces the Sullan constitution,
Caesar totoltaly
chap, ix RUPTURE BETWEEN THE JOINT RULERS 191
'iad overthrown the rule of the senate, and had furnished the defenceless and unarmed democracy with protection and with arms by means of the struggle beyond the Alps And he spoke, not to the Clodian public whose republican enthusiasm had been long burnt down to ashes and dross, but to the young men from the towns and villages of Northern Italy, who still felt freshly and purely the mighty influence of the thought of civic freedom ; who were still capable of fighting and of dying for ideals ; who had them selves received for their country in a revolutionary way from Caesar the burgess - rights which the government refused to them ; whom Caesar's fall would leave once more at the mercy of the fasces, and who already pos sessed practical proofs 179 /. ) of the inexorable use which the oligarchy proposed to make of these against the Trans- padanes. Such were the listeners before whom such an orator set forth the facts —the thanks for the conquest of Gaul which the nobility were preparing for the general and his army the contemptuous setting aside of the comitia the overawing of the senate the sacred duty of protecting with armed hand the tribunate of the people wrested five hundred years ago by their fathers arms hand from the nobility, and of keeping the ancient oath which these had taken for themselves as for their children's children that they would man man stand firm even to death for the tribunes of the people 350). And then, when he — the leader and general of the popular party — sum moned the soldiers of the people, now that conciliatory means had been exhausted and concession had reached its utmost limits, to follow him in the last, the inevitable, the decisive struggle against the equally hated and despised, equally perfidious and incapable, and fact ludicrously incorrigible aristocracy — there was not an officer or soldier who could hold back. The order was given for
departure
at the head of his vanguard Caesar crossed
;
;
in
(i.
a;
by
(p.
in
;
193
DEATH OF CRASSUS book t
the narrow brook which separated his province from Italy, and which the constitution forbade the proconsul of Gaul to pass. When after nine years' absence he trod once more the soil of his native land, he trod at the same time the path of revolution. " The die was cast. "
CH. X BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, THAPSUS
193
CHAPTER X
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALUS, AND THAPSU3
Arms were thus to decide which of the two men who had hitherto jointly ruled Rome was now to be its first sole
The
tfao^at on other
tide.
*'
ruler. Let us see what were the comparative resources
at the disposal of Caesar and Pompeius for the waging of the impending war.
Caesar's power rested primarily on the wholly unlimited Caesar's
authority which he enjoyed within his party. If the ideas of democracy and of monarchy met together in this was not the result of coalition which had been accidentally entered into and might be accidentally dissolved on the contrary was involved in the very essence of democracy without representative constitution, that democracy and monarchy should find in Caesar at once their highest and ultimate expressioa In political as in military matters throughout the first and the final decision lay with Caesar. However high the honour in which he held any serviceable instrument, remained an instrument still Caesar stood in his own party without confederates, surrounded only military-political adjutants, who as rule had risen from the army and as soldiers were trained never to ask the reason and purpose of any thing, but unconditionally to obey. On this account especially, at the decisive moment when the civil war began, of all the officers and soldiers of Caesar one alone refused him obedience and the cir-
*bsoIut0
within hi» part'.
vou
146
.
T
a
it
;
a
;
by
it
a
it,
;
a
Labienus.
cumstance that that one was precisely the foremost of them all, serves simply to confirm this view of the relation of Caesar to his adherents.
Titus Labienus had shared with Caesar all the troubles of the dark times of Catilina (iv. 457) as well as all the lustre of the Gallic career of victory, had regularly held inde pendent command, and frequently led half the army ; as he was the oldest, ablest, and most faithful of Caesar's adju tants, he was beyond question also highest in position and
194
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
60. highest in honour. As late as in 704 Caesar had entrusted to him the supreme command in Cisalpine Gaul, in order partly to put this confidential post into safe hands, partly to forward the views of Labienus in his canvass for the consul ship. But from this very position Labienus entered into communication with the opposite party, resorted at the
49. beginning of hostilities in 705 to the headquarters of Pompeius instead of those of Caesar, and fought through the whole civil strife with unparalleled bitterness against his old friend and master in war. We are not suffi ciently informed either as to the character of Labienus or as to the special circumstances of his changing sides ; but in the main his case certainly presents nothing but a further proof of the fact, that a military chief can reckon far more surely on his captains than on his marshals. To all appearance Labienus was one of those persons who combine with military efficiency utter in
capacity as statesmen, and who in consequence, if they unhappily choose or are compelled to take part in politics, are exposed to those strange paroxysms of giddiness, of which the history of Napoleon's marshals supplies so many tragi-comic examples. He may probably have held himself entitled to rank alongside of Caesar as the second chief of the democracy ; and the rejection of this claim of his may have sent him over to the camp of his opponents. His case rendered for the first time apparent
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
195
the whole gravity of the evil, that Caesar's treatment of his officers as adjutants without independence admitted of the rise of no men fitted to undertake a separate com mand in his camp, while at the same time he stood urgently in need of such men amidst the diffusion — which might easily be foreseen —of the impending struggle through all the provinces of the wide empire. But this disadvantage was far outweighed by that unity in the supreme leadership, which was the primary condition of all success, and a condition only to be preserved at such a cost
This unity of leadership acquired its full power through Caesar'i the efficiency of its instruments. Here the army comes, army' first of all, into view. It still numbered nine legions of infantry or at the most 50,000 men, all of whom however
had faced the enemy and two-thirds had served in all the campaigns against the Celts. The cavalry consisted of German and Noric mercenaries, whose usefulness and trust worthiness had been proved in the war against Vercingetorix.
The eight years' warfare, full of varied vicissitudes, against
the Celtic nation — which was brave, although in a military
point of view decidedly inferior to the Italian—had given
Caesar the opportunity of organizing his army as he alone
knew how to organize it The whole efficiency of the
soldier presupposes physical vigour ; in Caesar's levies more
regard was had to the strength and activity of the recruits
than to their means or their morals. But the serviceable-
ness of an army, like that of any other machine, depends
above all on the ease and quickness of its movements ; the soldiers of Caesar attained a perfection rarely reached an* probably never surpassed in their readiness for immediate departure at any time, and in the rapidity of their marching. Courage, of course, was valued above everything; Caesar practised with unrivalled mastery the art of stimulating
martial emulation and the esprit de corps, so that the pre-
196
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
eminence accorded to particular soldiers and divisions appeared even to those who were postponed as the necessary hierarchy of valour. He weaned his men from fear by not unfrequently —where it could be done without serious danger—keeping his soldiers in ignorance of an approaching conflict, and allowing them to encounter the enemy unex pectedly. But obedience was on a parity with valour. The soldier was required to do what he was bidden, without
asking the reason or the object; many an aimless fatigue was imposed on him solely as a training in the difficult art of blind obedience. The discipline was strict but not harassing; it was exercised with unrelenting vigour when the soldier was in presence of the enemy ; at other times, especially after victory, the reins were relaxed, and if an otherwise efficient soldier was then pleased to indulge in perfumery or to deck himself with elegant arms and the like, or even if he allowed himself to be guilty of outrages
or irregularities of a very questionable kind, provided only his military duties were not immediately affected, the foolery and the crime were allowed to pass, and the general lent a deaf ear to the complaints of the provincials on such points. Mutiny on the other hand was never pardoned, either in the instigators, or even in the guilty corps itself.
But the true soldier ought to be not merely capable, brave, and obedient, he ought to be all this willingly and spontaneously; and it is the privilege of gifted natures alone to induce the animated machine which they govern to a joyful service by means of example and of hope, and especially by the consciousness of being turned to befitting use. As the officer, who would demand valour from his troops, must himself have looked danger in the face with them, Caesar had even when general found opportunity of drawing his sword and had then used it like the best ; in activity, moreover, and fatigue he was constantly far more exacting from himself than from his soldiers. Caesar took
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
197
care that victory, which primarily no doubt brings gain to the general, should be associated also with personal hopes in the minds of the soldiers. We have already mentioned that he knew how to render his soldiers enthusiastic for the cause of the democracy, so far as the times which had become prosaic still admitted of enthusiasm, and that the political equalization of the Transpadane country —the native land of most of his soldiers — with Italy proper was set forth as one of the objects of the struggle (iv. 457). Of course material recompenses were at the same time not wanting — as well special rewards for distinguished feats of arms as general rewards for every efficient soldier; the officers had their portions, the soldiers received presents, and the most lavish gifts were placed in prospect for the
triumph.
Above all things Caesar as a true commander under
stood how to awaken in every single component element, large or small, of the mighty machine the consciousness of its befitting application. The ordinary man is destined for service, and he has no objection to be an instrument, if he feels that a master guides him. Everywhere and at all times the eagle eye of the general rested on the whole army, rewarding and punishing with impartial justice, and directing the action of each towards the course con ducive to the good of all : so that there was no experi menting or trifling with the sweat and blood of the humblest, but for that very reason, where it was necessary, unconditional devotion even to death was required. With out allowing each individual to see into the whole springs
of action, Caesar yet allowed each to catch such glimpses of the political and military connection of things as to secure that he should be recognized — and it may be idealized —by the soldiers as a statesman and a general. He treated his soldiers throughout, not as his equals, but as men who are entitled to demand and were able to
198
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
endure the truth, and who had to put faith in the promises and the assurances of their general, without thinking of deception or listening to rumours ; as comrades through long years in warfare and victory, among whom there was hardly any one that was not known to him by name and that in the course of so many campaigns had not formed more or less of a personal relation to the general ; as good companions, with whom he talked and dealt confidentially and with the cheerful elasticity peculiar to him ; as clients, to requite whose services, and to avenge whose wrongs and death, constituted in his view a sacred duty. Perhaps there never was an army which was so perfectly what an army ought to be—a machine able for its ends and willing for its ends, in the hand of a master, who transfers to it his own elasticity. Caesar's soldiers were, and felt them selves, a match for a tenfold superior force ; in connection with which it should not be overlooked, that under the Roman tactics — calculated altogether for hand-to-hand conflict and especially for combat with the sword — the practised Roman soldier was superior to the novice in a far higher degree than is now the case under the circum stances of modern times. 1 But still more than by the superiority of valour the adversaries of Caesar felt them selves humbled by the unchangeable and touching fidelity with which his soldiers clung to their general. It is perhaps without a parallel in history, that when the general summoned his soldiers to follow him into the civil war,
1 A centurion of Caesar's tenth legion, taken prisoner, declared to the commander-in-chief of the enemy that he was ready with ten of his men to make head against the best cohort of the enemy (500 men ; Bell. Afric. 45). " In the ancient mode of fighting," to quote the opinion of Napoleon I. , "a battle consisted simply of duels ; what was only correct in the mouth ot that centurion, would be mere boasting in the mouth of the modern soldier. " Vivid proofs of the soldierly spirit that pervaded Caesar's army are furnished by the Reports —appended to his Memoirs — respecting the African and the second Spanish wars, of which the former appears to have had as its author an officer of the second rank, while the latter is in every respect a subaltern camp-journal.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
199
with the single exception already mentioned of Labienus, no Roman officer and no Roman soldier deserted him. The hopes of his opponents as to an extensive desertion were thwarted as ignominiously as the former attempts to break up his army like that of Lucullus (p. 181). Labienus himself appeared in the camp of Pompeius with a band doubtless of Celtic and German horsemen but without a single legionary. Indeed the soldiers, as if they would show that the war was quite as much their matter as that of their general, settled among themselves that they would give credit for the pay, which Caesar had promised to double for them at the outbreak of the civil war, to their commander up to its termination, and would meanwhile support their poorer comrades from the general means ; besides, every subaltern officer equipped and paid a trooper out of his own purse.
While Caesar thus had the one thing which was need- Field of ful—unlimited political and military authority and a trust- 9awtr- worthy army ready for the fight — his power extended, comparatively speaking, over only a very limited space.
It was based essentially on the province of Upper Italy.
This region was not merely the most populous of all the Uppa
'.
districts of Italy, but also devoted to the cause of the democracy as its own. The feeling which prevailed there is shown by the conduct of a division of recruits from Opitergium (Oderzo in the delegation of Treviso), which not long after the outbreak of the war in the Illyrian waters, surrounded on a wretched raft by the war-vessels of the enemy, allowed themselves to be shot at during the whole day down to sunset without surrendering, and, such of them as had escaped the missiles, put themselves to death with their own hands during the following night. It is easy to conceive what might be expected of such a population. As they had already granted to Caesar the means of more than doubling his original army, so after
-
Italy.
300 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK T
the outbreak of the civil war recruits presented themselves in great numbers for the ample levies that were immediately instituted.
In Italy proper, on the other hand, the influence of Caesar was not even remotely to be compared to that of his opponents. Although he had the skill by dexterous manoeuvres to put the Catonian party in the wrong, and had sufficiently commended the rectitude of his cause to all who wished for a pretext with a good conscience either to remain neutral, like the majority of the senate, or to
embrace his side, like his soldiers and the Transpadanes, the mass of the burgesses naturally did not allow themselves to be misled by these things and, when the commandant of Gaul put his legions in motion against Rome, they beheld — despite all formal explanations as to law — in Cato and Pompeius the defenders of the legitimate republic, in Caesar the democratic usurper. People in general moreover expected from the nephew of Marius, the son-in- law of Cinna, the ally of Catilina, a repetition of the Marian and Cinnan horrors, a realization of the saturnalia of anarchy projected by Catilina; and though Caesar certainly gained allies through this expectation —so that the political refugees immediately put themselves in a body at his disposal, the ruined men saw in him their deliverer, and the lowest ranks of the rabble in the capital and country towns were thrown into a ferment on the news of his advance, — these belonged to the class of friends who are more dangerous than foes.
In the provinces and the dependent states Caesar had even less influence than in Italy. Transalpine Gaul indeed as far as the Rhine and the Channel obeyed him, and the colonists of Narbo as well as the Roman burgesses else where settled in Gaul were devoted to him; but in the Narbonese province itself the constitutional party had numerous adherents, and now even the newly-conquered
Prerinces.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS sol
regions were far more a burden than a benefit to Caesar in the impending civil war; in fact, for good reasons he made no use of the Celtic infantry at all in that war, and but sparing use of the cavalry. In the other provinces and the neighbouring half or wholly independent states Caesar had indeed attempted to procure for himself sup port, had lavished rich presents on the princes, caused great buildings to be executed in various towns, and granted to them in case of need f. nancial and military assistance; but on the whole, of course, not much had been gained by this means, and the relations with the German and Celtic princes in *he regions of the Rhine and the Danube, —particularly the connection with the Noric king Voccio, so important for the recruiting of cavalry,— were probably the only relations of this sort which were of any moment for him.
While Caesar thut entered the struggle only as com- The mandant of Gaul, without other essential resources than c °* efficient adjutants, a faithful army, and a devoted province, Pompeius began it as de facto supreme head of the Roman commonwealth, and in full possession of all the resources
that stood at the disposal of the legitimate government of
the great Roman empire. But while his position was in a
political and military point of view far more considerable,
it was also on the other hand far less definite and firm.
The unity of leadership, which resulted of itself and by
necessity from the position of Caesar, was inconsistent
with the nature of a coalition ; and although Pompeius,
too much of a soldier to deceive himself as to its being indispensable, attempted to force it on the coalition and
got himself nominated by the senate as sole and absolute generalissimo by land and sea, yet the senate itself could
not be set aside nor hindered from a preponderating
influence on the political, and an occasional and therefore
doubly injurious interference with the military, superin-
202 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
tendence. The recollection of the twenty years' war waged on both sides with envenomed weapons between Pompeius and the constitutional party ; the feeling which vividly prevailed on both sides, and which they with difficulty concealed, that the first consequence of the victory when achieved would be a rupture between the victors ; the contempt which they entertained for each
other and with only too good grounds in either case ; the inconvenient number of respectable and influential men in the ranks of the aristocracy and the intellectual and moral inferiority of almost all who took part in the matter —altogether produced among the opponents of Caesar a reluctant and refractory co-operation, which formed the saddest contrast to the harmonious and compact action on the other side.
While all the disadvantages incident to the coalition of P? *TM powers naturally hostile were thus felt in an unusual coalition, measure by Caesar's antagonists, this coalition was certainly
still a very considerable power. It had exclusive command of the sea ; all ports, all ships of war, all the materials for equipping a fleet were at its disposal. The two Spains— as it were the home of the power of Pompeius just as the two Gauls were the home of that of Caesar—were faithful adherents to their master and in the hands of able and trustworthy administrators. In the other provinces also, of course with the exception of the two Gauls, the posts of the governors and commanders had during recent years been filled up with safe men under the influence of Pompeius and the minority of the senate. The client- states throughout and with great decision took part against Caesar and in favour of Pompeius. The most important princes and cities had been brought into the closest personal relations with Pompeius in virtue of the different sections of his manifold activity. In the war against the Marians, for instance, he had been the companion in arms
Field of
chap, Z PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
203
of the Icings of Numidia and Mauretania and had re established the kingdom of the former (iv. 94) ; in the Mithradatic war, in addition to a number of other minor principalities spiritual and temporal, he had re-established the kingdoms of Bosporus, Armenia, and Cappadocia, and created that of Deiotarus in Galatia (iv. 431, 437); it was primarily at his instigation that the Egyptian war was undertaken, and it was by his adjutant that the rule of the Lagids had been confirmed afresh (iv. 451). Even the city of Massilia in Caesar's own province, while indebted to the latter doubtless for various favours, was indebted to Pompeius at the time of the Sertorian war for a very con siderable extension of territory (p. 8); and, besides, the ruling oligarchy there stood in natural alliance —strengthened by various mutual relations — with the oligarchy in Rome. But these personal and relative considerations as well as
the glory of the victor in three continents, which in these more remote parts of the empire far outshone that of the conqueror of Gaul, did perhaps less harm to Caesar in those quarters than the views and designs—which had not remained there unknown —of the heir of Gaius Gracchus as to the necessity of uniting the dependent states and the usefulness of provincial colonizations. No one of the dependent dynasts found himself more
threatened by this peril than Juba king of Numidia. Not Juba of
umid*1
only had he years before, in the lifetime of his father Hiempsal, fallen into a vehement personal quarrel with Caesar, but recently the same Curio, who now occupied almost the first place among Caesar's adjutants, had pro posed to the Roman burgesses the annexation of the Numidian kingdom. Lastly, if matters should go so far as to lead the independent neighbouring states to interfere hi the Roman civil war, the only state
really powerful, that of the Parthians, was practically already allied with the aristocratic party by the connection entered into
imminently
204
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA,
between Pacorus and Bibulus (p. 164), while Caesar was far too much a Roman to league himself for party-interests with the conquerors of his friend Crassus.
Italy As to Italy the great majority of the burgesses were, as
against Caesar.
has been already mentioned, averse to Caesar — more especially, of course, the whole aristocracy with their very considerable following, but also in a not much less degree the great capitalists, who could not hope in the event of a thorough reform of the commonwealth to preserve their partisan jury-courts and their monopoly of extortion. Of equally anti-democratic sentiments were the small capitalists, the landholders and generally all classes that had anything to lose; but in these ranks of life the cares of the next rent-term and of sowing and reaping outweighed, as a rule, every other consideration.
The army at the disposal of Pompeius consisted chiefly of the Spanish troops, seven legions inured to war and in every respect trustworthy ; to which fell to be added the divisions of troops—weak indeed, and very much scattered —which were to be found in Syria, Asia, Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and elsewhere. In Italy there were under arms at the outset only the two legions recently given off by Caesar, whose effective strength did not amount to more than 7000 men, and whose trustworthiness was more than doubtful, because —levied in Cisalpine Gaul and old comrades in arms of Caesar—they were in a high degree displeased at the unbecoming intrigue by which they had been made to change camps (p. 182), and recalled with longing their general who had magnanimously paid to them beforehand at their departure the presents which were promised to every soldier for the tritmph. But, apart from the circumstance that the Spanish troops might arrive in Italy with the spring either by the land route through Gaul or by sea, the men of the three legions still remaining from
The Pompeian army.
IS. the levies of 699 131), as well as the Italian levy sworn
(p.
chap, x
PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
205
to allegiance in 702 147), could be recalled from their 61 furlough. Including these, the number of troops standing
at the disposal of Pompeius on the whole, without reckon
ing the seven legions Spain and those scattered in other provinces, amounted in Italy alone to ten legions or about 60,000 men, so that was no exaggeration at all, when Pompeius asserted that he had only to stamp with his foot
to cover the ground with armed men. true that required some interval—though but short—to render these soldiers available but the arrangements for this purpose as well as for the carrying out of the new levies ordered
the senate consequence of the outbreak of the civil war were already everywhere in progress. Immediately
after the decisive decree of the senate Jan. 705), the it. very depth of winter the most eminent men of the aristo cracy set out to the different districts, to hasten the calling
up of recruits and the preparation of arms. The want of cavalry was much felt, as for this arm they had been ac customed to rely wholly on the provinces and especially on
the Celtic contingents to make at least beginning, three hundred gladiators belonging to Caesar were taken from the fencing-schools of Capua and mounted — step which however met with so general disapproval, that Pompeius again broke up this troop and levied room of horsemen from the mounted slave-herdmen of Apulia.
The state -treasury was at low ebb as usual
busied themselves in supplementing the inadequate amourt of cash out of the local treasuries and even from the temple- treasures of the municipia.
Under these circumstances the war opened at the begin-
ning of January 705. Of troops capable of marching J^a Caesar had not more than legion — 5000 infantry and offensive.
This number was specified by Pompeius himself (Caesar, B. C. 6), and agrees with the statement that he lost in Italy about 60 cohort on 30,000 men, and took 25,000 over to Greece (Caesar, B. C. iii. 10).
300
they
Caesar "*
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;
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;
it
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;
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206 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
300 cavalry — at Ravenna, which was by the highway some 240 miles distant from Rome ; Pompeius had two weak legions — 7000 infantry and a small squadron of cavalry —
under the orders of Appius Claudius at Luceria, from which, likewise by the highway, the distance was just about as great to the capital. The other troops of Caesar, leaving out of account the raw divisions of recruits still in course of formation, were stationed, one half on the Saone and Loire, the other half in Belgica, while Pompeius* Italian reserves were already arriving from all sides at their rendezvous ; long before even the first of the Transalpine divisions of Caesar could arrive in Italy, a far superior army could not but be ready to receive it there. It seemed folly, with a band of the strength of that of Catilina and for the moment without any effective reserve, to assume the aggressive against a superior and hourly- increasing army under an able general ; but it was a folly in the spirit of Hannibal. If the beginning of the struggle were postponed rill spring, the Spanish troops of Pompeius would assume the offensive in Transalpine, and his Italian troops in Cisalpine, Gaul, and Pompeius, a match for Caesar in tactics and superior to him in experience, was
a formidable antagonist in such a campaign running its regular course. Now perhaps, accustomed as he was to operate slowly and surely with superior masses, he might be disconcerted by a wholly improvised attack ; and that which could not greatly discompose Caesar's thirteenth legion after the severe trial of the Gallic surprise and the January campaign in the land of the Bellovaci (p. 93),— the suddenness of the war and the toil of a winter cam paign — could not but disorganize the Pompeian corps consisting of old soldiers of Caesar or of ill-trained recruits, and still only in the course of formation.
Accordingly Caesar advanced into Italy. 1 Two highways 1 The decree of the senate was passed on the 7th January ; on the 18th
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
WJ
led at that time from the Romagna to the south; the Aemilio-Cassian which led from Bononia over the Apennines to Arretium and Rome, and the Popillio-Flaminian, which led from Ravenna along the coast of the Adriatic to Fanum and was there divided, one branch running westward through the Furlo pass to Rome, another southward to Ancona and thence onward to Apulia. On the former Marcus Antonius advanced as far as Arretium, on the second Caesar himself pushed forward. Resistance was nowhere encountered ; the recruiting officers of quality had no military skill, their bands of recruits were no soldiers, the inhabitants of the country towns were only anxious not to be involved in a siege. When Curio with 1500 men approached Iguvium, where a
couple of thousand Umbrian recruits had assembled under the praetor Quintus Minucius Thermus, general and soldiers took to night at the bare tidings of his approach; and similar results on a small scale everywhere ensued.
Caesar had to choose whether he would march against Rome Rome, from which his cavalry at Arretium were already only evacua,ci about 1 30 miles distant, or against the legions encamped at
Luceria. He chose the latter plan. The consternation of
the opposite party was boundless. Pompeius received the
news of Caesar's advance at Rome ; he seemed at first dis
posed to defend the capital, but, when the tidings arrived
of Caesar's entrance into the Picenian territory and of his
first successes there, he abandoned Rome and ordered its evacuation. A panic, augmented by the false report that
Caesar's cavalry had appeared before the gates, came over
the world of quality. The senators, who had been informed
that every one who should remain behind in the capital
would be treated as an accomplice of the rebel Caesar,
it had been already for several days known in Rome that Caesar had crossed the boundary (Cic. ad Alt vii. 10 ; ix. 10, 4) ; the messenger needed at the very least three days from Rome to Ravenna. According to this the setting out of Caesar falls about the lath January, which according to the current reduction corresponds to the Julian 94 Nov. 704.
50.
2oS BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
flocked in crowds out at the gates. The consuls themselves had so totally lost their senses, that they did not even secure the treasure ; when Pompeius called upon them to fetch
for which there was sufficient time, they returned the reply that they would deem safer, he should first occupy Picenum. All was perplexity consequently great council of war was held Teanum Sidicinum (23 Jan. ), at which Pompeius, Labienus, and both consuls were present. First of all proposals of accommodation from Caesar were again submitted even now he declared himself ready at once to dismiss his army, to hand over his provinces to the successors nominated, and to become candidate in the regular way for the consulship, provided that Pompeius were to depart for Spain, and Italy were to be disarmed. The answer was, that Caesar would immediately return to his province, they would bind themselves to procure the disarming of Italy and the departure of Pompeius by decree of the senate to be passed in due form in the capital perhaps this reply was intended not as bare artifice to deceive, but as an acceptance of the proposal of compromise; was, however, in reality the opposite. The personal conference which Caesar desired with Pompeius the latter declined, and could not but decline, that he might not by the semblance of new coalition with Caesar provoke still more the distrust already felt by the constitutional party. Con cerning the management of the war was agreed in Teanum, that Pompeius should take the command of the troops stationed at Luceria, on which notwithstanding their untrustworthiness all hope depended that he should ad vance with these into his own and Labienus' native country, Picenum that he should personally call the general levy there to arms, as he had done some thirty-five years ago (iv. 78), and should attempt at the head of the faithful Picentine cohorts and the veterans formerly under Caesar to set limit to the advance of the enemy.
a
if
;
;
it ;
if
a
a
a
it ;
; it
a
a
in
it,
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
Everything depended on whether Picenum would hold Conflicts fa
"ceoua*'
out until Pompeius should come up to its defence. Already Caesar with his reunited army had penetrated into it along the coast road by way of Ancona. Here too the prepara tions were in full course ; in the very northernmost Picenian town Auximum a considerable band of recruits was collected under Publius Attius Varus; but at the entreaty of the municipality Varus evacuated the town even before Caesar appeared, and a handful of Caesar's soldiers which overtook the troop not far from Auximum totally dispersed it after a brief conflict —the first in this war. In like manner soon afterwards Gaius Lucilius Hirrus with 3000 men evacuated Camerinum, and Publius Lentulus Spinther with Asculum. The men, thoroughly devoted to Pompeius, willingly for the most part abandoned their houses and farms, and followed their leaders over the frontier ; but the district itself was already lost, when the officer sent Pompeius for the temporary conduct of the defence, Lucius Vibullius Rums — no genteel senator, but a soldier
5000
by
experienced in war—arrived there ; he had to content him self with taking the six or seven thousand recruits who were saved away from the incapable recruiting officers, and conducting them for the time to the nearest rendezvous.
.
This was Corfinium, the place of meeting for the levies Corfinium
in the Albensian, Marsian and Paelignian territories ; the body of recruits here assembled, of nearly 1 5,000 men, was the contingent of the most warlike and trustworthy regions of Italy, and the flower of the army in course of formation for the constitutional party. When Vibullius arrived here, Caesar was still several days' march behind ; there was nothing to prevent him from immediately starting agreeably to Pompeius' instructions and conducting the saved Picenian recruits along with those assembled at Corfinium to join the main army in Apulia. But the commandant in Corfinium
was the designated successor to Caesar in the governorship
leB
VOL. V
147
109
110 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, bookv
of Transalpine Gaul, Lucius Domitius, one of the most narrow-minded and stubborn of the Roman aristocracy ; and he not only refused to comply with the orders of Pompeius, but also prevented Vibullius from departing at least with the men from Picenum for Apulia. So firmly was he persuaded that Pompeius only delayed from obstinacy and must necessarily come up to his relief, that he scarcely made any serious preparations for a siege and did not even gather into Corfinium the bands of recruits placed in the surrounding towns. Pompeius however did not appear, and for good reasons ; for, while he might perhaps apply his two untrust worthy legions as a reserved support for the Picenian general levy, he could not with them alone offer battle to Caesar. Instead of him after a few days Caesar came
(14 Feb. ). His troops had been joined in Picenum by the twelfth, and
before Corfinium by the eighth, legion from beyond the Alps, and, besides these, three new legions had been formed partly from the Pompeian men that were taken prisoners or presented themselves voluntarily, partly from the recruits that were at once levied everywhere ; so that Caesar before Corfinium was already at the head of an army of 40,000 men, half of whom had seen service. So long as Domitius hoped for the arrival of Pompeius, he caused the town to be defended ; when the letters of Pompeius had at length undeceived him, he resolved, not forsooth to persevere at the forlorn post—by which he would have rendered the greatest service to his party — nor even to capitulate, but, while the common soldiers were informed that relief was close at hand, to make his own escape along with his officers of quality during the next night Yet he had not the judgment to carry into effect even this pretty scheme.
The confusion of his behaviour betrayed him. A part of the men began to mutiny ; the Marsian recruits, who held such an infamy on the part of their general to be impossible, wished to fight against the mutineers; but they too were
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 2n
obliged reluctantly to believe the truth of the accusation, whereupon the whole garrison arrested their staff and handed themselves, and the town over to Caesar (20 Feb. ). The corps in Alba, 3000 strong, and 1500 recruits assembled in Tarracina thereupon laid down their arms, as soon as Caesar's patrols of horsemen appeared; third division Sulmo of 3500 men had been previously compelled to surrender.
Pompeius had given up Italy as lost, so soon as Caesar had occupied Picenum; only he wished to delay his embarkation as long as possible, with the view of saving so much of his force as could still be saved. Accordingly he had slowly put himself motion for the nearest seaport Brundisium. Thither came the two legions of Luceria and such recruits as Pompeius had been able hastily to collect in the deserted Apulia, as well as the troops raised by the consuls and other commissioners in Campania and con ducted in all haste to Brundisium thither too resorted number of political fugitives, including the most respected of the senators accompanied by their families. The embarkation began but the vessels at hand did not suffice to transport all at once the whole multitude, which still amounted to 25,000 persons. No course remained but to divide the army. The larger half went first March); with the smaller division of some 10,000 men Pompeius awaited at Brundisium the return of the fleet for, however desirable the possession of Brundisium might be for an eventual attempt to reoccupy Italy, they did not presume
"to hold the place permanently against Caesar. Meanwhile Caesar arrived before Brundisium; the siege began. Caesar attempted first of all to close the mouth of the harbour by moles and floating bridges, with view to exclude the returning fleet; but Pompeius caused the trading vessels lying in the harbour to be armed, and managed to prevent the complete closing of the harbour
and caPtured-
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;
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;
;
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Military and financial results of the seizure
212 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK V
until the fleet appeared and the troops—whom Pompeius with great dexterity, in spite of the vigilance of the besiegers and the hostile feeling of the inhabitants, with drew from the town to the last man unharmed —were carried off beyond Caesar's reach to Greece (17 March). The further pursuit, like the siege itself, failed for want of
a fleet
In a campaign of two months, without a single serious
engagement, Caesar had so broken up an army of ten legions, that less than the half of it had with great difficulty escaped in a confused flight across the sea, and the whole Italian peninsula, including the capital with the state-chest and all the stores accumulated there, had fallen into the power of the victor. Not without reason did the beaten party bewail the terrible rapidity, sagacity, and energy of the "monster. "
But it may be questioned whether Caesar gained or lost more by the conquest of Italy. In a military respect, no doubt, very considerable resources were now not merely withdrawn from his opponents, but rendered available for
of Italy. a. himself; even in the spring of 705 his army embraced, in consequence of the levies en masse instituted everywhere, a considerable number of legions of recruits in addition to the nine old ones. But on the other hand it now became necessary not merely to leave behind a considerable garrison in Italy, but also to take measures against the closing of the transmarine traffic contemplated by his opponents who commanded the sea, and against the famine with which the capital was consequently threatened ; whereby Caesar's already sufficiently complicated military task was complicated further stilL Financially it was
certainly of importance, that Caesar had the good fortune to obtain possession of the stock of money in the capital ; but the principal sources of income and particularly the revenues from the east were withal in the hands of the
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
213
enemy, and, in consequence of the greatly increased demands for the army and the new obligation to provide for the starving population of the capital, the considerable sums which were found quickly melted away. Caesar soon found himself compelled to appeal to private credit, and, as it seemed that he could not possibly gain any long respite by this means, extensive confiscations were generally anticipated as the only remaining expedient.
More serious difficulties still were created by the
placed on the conquest of Italy. The apprehension of an Fear of
Its political political relations amidst which Caesar found himself ns
anarchical revolution was universal among the propertied classes. Friends and foes saw in Caesar a second Catilina ; Pompeius believed or affected to believe that Caesar had been driven to civil war merely by the impossibility of paying his debts. This was certainly absurd ; but in fact Caesar's antecedents were anything but reassuring, and still less reassuring was the aspect of the retinue that now surrounded him. Individuals of the most broken reputa tion, notorious personages like Quintus Hortensius, Gaius Curio, Marcus Antonius, —the latter the stepson of the Catilinarian Lentulus who was executed by the orders of Cicero —were the most prominent actors in it ; the highest posts of trust were bestowed on men who had long ceased even to reckon up their debts ; people saw men who held office under Caesar not merely keeping dancing-girls— which was done by others also — but appearing publicly in company with them. Was there any wonder, that even grave and politically impartial men expected amnesty for all exiled criminals, cancelling of creditors' claims, compre hensive mandates of confiscation, proscription, and murder, nay, even a plundering of Rome by the Gallic soldiery ?
*y
But in this respect the " monster " deceived the expecta- dispelled tions of his foes as well as of his friends. As soon even as ^ c"e,"B, Caesar occupied the first Italian town, Ariminum, he
ThieMi
prohibited all common soldiers from appearing armed within the walls ; the country towns were protected from all injury throughout and without distinction, whether they had given him a friendly or hostile reception. When the mutinous garrison surrendered Corfinium late in the evening, he in the face of every military consideration postponed the occupation of the town till the following morning, solely that he might not abandon the burgesses to the nocturnal invasion of his exasperated soldiers. Of the prisoners the common soldiers, as presumably indifferent to politics, were incorporated with his own army, while the officers were not merely spared, but also freely released without distinction of person and without the exaction of any promises whatever ; and all which they claimed as private property was frankly given up to them, without even investigating with any strictness the warrant for their claims. Lucius Domitius himself was thus treated, and even Labienus had the money and baggage which he had left behind sent after him to the enemy's camp. In the most painful financial embarrassment the immense estates of his opponents whether present or absent were not assailed ; indeed Caesar preferred to borrow from friends, rather than that he should stir up the possessors of property against him even by exacting the formally admissible, but practically antiquated, land tax (iv. 156). The victor regarded only the half, and that not the more difficult half, of his task as solved with the victory ; he saw the security for its duration, according to his own expression, only in the unconditional pardon of the vanquished, and had accordingly during the whole march from Ravenna to Brundisium incessantly renewed his efforts to bring about a personal conference with Pompeius and a tolerable accommodation.
But, if the aristocracy had previously refused to listen to any reconciliation, the unexpected emigration of a kind
«4
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
S15
so disgraceful had raised their wrath to madness, and the
wild vengeance breathed by the beaten contrasted strangely
with the placability of the victor. The communications
regularly coming from the camp of the emigrants to their
friends left behind in Italy were full of projects for confiscations and proscriptions, of plans for purifying the
senate and the state, compared with which the restoration
of Sulla was child's play, and which even the moderate
men of their own party heard with horror. The frantic The mast passion of impotence, the wise moderation of power, TMp/e produced their effect. The whole mass, in whose eyes gained fcr material interests were superior to political, threw itself
into the arms of Caesar. The country towns idolized " the uprightness, the moderation, the prudence " of the victor ; and even opponents conceded that these demonstrations of respect were meant in earnest. The great capitalists, farmers of the taxes, and jurymen, showed no special desire, after the severe shipwreck which had befallen the constitutional party in Italy, to entrust themselves farther to the same pilots ; capital came once more to the light, and "the rich lords resorted again to their daily task of writing their rent-rolls. " Even the great majority of the senate, at least numerically speaking—for certainly but few of the nobler and more influential members of the senate were included in it — had notwithstanding the orders of Pompeius and of the consuls remained behind in Italy, and a portion of them even in the capital itself; and they acqui esced in Caesar's rule. The moderation of Caesar, well calculated even in its very semblance of excess, attained its object : the trembling anxiety of the propertied classes as to the impending anarchy was in some measure allayed. This was doubtless an incalculable gain for the future ; the prevention of anarchy, and of the scarcely less dangerous alarm of anarchy, was the indispensable preliminary con dition to the future reorganization of the commonwealth.
316 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK V
But at the moment this moderation was more dangerous for Caesar than the renewal of the Cinnan and Catilinarian
Indigna
tion of the
anarchist
party fury would have been ; it did not convert enemies into against
Caesar.
friends, and it converted friends into enemies. Caesar's Catilinarian adherents were indignant that murder and
remained in abeyance; these audacious and
desperate personages, some of whom were men of talent,
The might be expected to prove cross and untractable. The
pillage
republican
party in
Italy. converted nor propitiated by the leniency of the conqueror.
republicans of all shades, on the other hand, were neither
According to the creed of the Catonian party, duty towards what they called their fatherland absolved them from every other consideration ; even one who owed freedom and life to Caesar remained entitled and in duty bound to take up arms or at least to engage in plots against him. The less decided sections of the constitutional party were no doubt found willing to accept peace and protection from the new monarch; nevertheless they ceased not to curse the monarchy and the monarch at heart The more clearly the change of the constitution became manifest, the more distinctly the great majority of the burgesses — both in the capital with its keener susceptibility of political excitement, and among the more energetic population of the country and country towns — awoke to a consciousness of their republican sentiments ; so far the friends of the constitution in Rome reported with truth to their brethren of kindred views in exile, that at home all classes and all persons were friendly to Pompeius. The discontented temper of all these circles was further increased by the moral pressure, which the more decided and more notable men who shared such views exercised from their very position as emigrants over the multitude of the humbler and more lukewarm. The conscience of the honourable man smote him in regard to his remaining in Italy ; the half-aristocrat fancied that he was ranked among the plebeians, if he
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 217
did not go into exile with the Domitii and the Metelli, and even if he took his seat in the Caesarian senate of nobodies. The victor's special clemency gave to this silent opposition increased political importance ; seeing that Caesar abstained from terrorism, it seemed as if his secret opponents could display their disinclination to his rule without much danger.
Very soon he experienced remarkable treatment in this PauWe respect at the hands of the senate. Caesar had begun ^^ the struggle to liberate the overawed senate from its senate to
This was done; consequently he wished to obtain from the senate approval of what had been done, and full powers for the continuance of the war. For this purpose, when Caesar appeared before the capital (end of March) the tribunes of the people belonging to his party convoked for him the senate (1 April). The meeting was tolerably numerous, but the more notable of the very senators that remained in Italy were absent, including even the former leader of the servile majority Marcus Cicero and Caesar's own father-in-law Lucius Piso; and, what was worse, those who did appear were not inclined to enter into Caesar's proposals. When Caesar spoke of full power to continue the war, one of the only two consulars present, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a very timid man who desired nothing but a quiet death in his bed, was of opinion that Caesar would deserve well of his
country if he should abandon the thought of carrying the war to Greece and Spain. When Caesar thereupon requested the senate at least to be the medium of trans mitting his peace proposals to Pompeius, they were not indeed opposed to that course in itself, but the threats of the emigrants against the neutrals had so terrified the latter, that no one was found to undertake the message of peace. Through the disinclination of the aristocracy to help the erection of the monarch's throne, and through
oppressors.
Provisional
memof'the affairs of
2l8 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book V
the same inertness of the dignified corporation, by means of which Caesar had shortly before frustrated the legal nomination of Pompeius as generalissimo in the civil war, he too was now thwarted when making a like request Other impediments, moreover, occurred. Caesar desired, with the view of regulating in some sort of way his position, to be named as dictator; but his wish was not complied with, because such a magistrate could only be constitutionally appointed by one of the consuls, and the attempt of Caesar to buy the consul Lentulus—of which owing to the disordered condition of his finances there was a good prospect—nevertheless proved a failure. The tribune of the people Lucius Metellus, moreover, lodged a protest against all the steps of the proconsul, and made signs as though he would protect with his person the public chest, when Caesar's men came to empty Caesar could not avoid in this case ordering that the inviolable person should be pushed aside as gently as possible otherwise, he kept by his purpose of abstaining from all
violent steps. He declared to the senate, just as the constitutional party had done shortly before, that he had certainly desired to regulate things in legal way and with the help of the supreme authority; but, since this help was refused, he could dispense with
Without further concerning himself about the senate an<* tne formalities of state law, he handed over the
administration of the capital to the praetor Marcus Aemilius Lepidus as city - prefect, and made the requisite arrangements for the administration of the provmces that obeyed him and the continuance of the war. Even amidst the din of the gigantic struggle, and with all the alluring sound of Caesar's lavish promises, still made deep impression on the multitude of the capital, when they saw in their free Rome the monarch for the first time wielding monarch's power and break
temporary ecaP"
The provinces.