" Now idolatry is
reckoned
among the most grievous
sins.
sins.
Summa Theologica
i) that "justice seems to be
more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing. "
The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are
honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal. "
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater
virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality
tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own
nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature
it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and
use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and
pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality:
and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to
the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while
all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the
Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good;
and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the
individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those
goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to
a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the
aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it
follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for
the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain
excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should
judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily
and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which
pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is
not the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to
whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
rather than to liberality.
Reply to Objection 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by
giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are
better than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply to Objection 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved
is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than
others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful
in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
same reason he becomes famous.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS
(EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1)
covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness
[avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because,
to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external
goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is
derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies
literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is
alluding (cf. A[2], OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire external
goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are
naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is
sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance).
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's
neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ([3244]FS, Q[72], A[4]). But
covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is
opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which
man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this
pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1
Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own
body. " In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's
neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be
without covetousness, contented with such things as you have. "
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil
must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure.
Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain
measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be
commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate
with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods
come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above
(Q[117], A[3]; [3245]FS, Q[2] , A[1]). Hence it must needs be that
man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other
words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external
riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with
his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed
this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is
what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of
possessing. " It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as
means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as
it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But
covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about
external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the
acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or
keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against
one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches,
without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be
possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify
immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when,
for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them,
immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself,
because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as
do the sins of the flesh.
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal
sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal
things.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated
according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature.
Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things,
just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they
are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with
regard to riches.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
called {philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to
anything that is desired immoderately. " Now in every sin there is
immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above
([3246]FS, Q[71], A[6], OBJ[3]). Therefore covetousness is a general
sin.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
[avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus
aeris]," i. e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
{philargyria}, i. e. "love of silver. " Now silver, which stands for
money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured
by money, as stated above ([3247]Q[117], A[2], ad 2). Therefore
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems
to be a general sin.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil. " Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Ex.
20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods. " Therefore the
concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a
general sin.
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special
sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity,
malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated
above ([3248]FS, Q[72], A[1]). Now the object of a sin is the good
towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of
sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good.
And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are
desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently
covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of
having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence
covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally
employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute
masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have
health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis),
consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all
immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a
homily (xvi in Ev. ) that "covetousness is a desire not only for money,
but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately
sought after. " In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in
this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in
the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: All those external things that are subject to the
uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as
they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external
goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is
a special vice.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence
for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet
those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger
and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth. ) that there are two
kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which
covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v,
2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.
Objection 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv,
1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to
liberality.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall not
be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits
from them. " Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the
desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches
in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and
keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by
stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice,
and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): "Her
princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed
blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness. " Secondly, it
denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for
instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too
much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way
covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
affections, as stated above ([3249]Q[117], A[2], ad 3, A[3], ad 3,
A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a
blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
should regret what they had given, and give but little. "
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the
measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view
of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in
the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and
keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these
proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the
point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter
depends on the rule of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no
opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought
according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one
ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as
opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no
one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of
death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom.
1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness
[Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such things
are worthy of death. " Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to
one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil
says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that
thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou
mightest succor. "
Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
covetousness a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save
through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.
But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness on the
soul. " Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal
sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon this
foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he
builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how
he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness.
Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially,
for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. "
Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3250](A[3]) covetousness is twofold. In
one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the
unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to
theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66],
AA[6],8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3),
when we were treating of theft.
In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in
which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the
love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such
wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the
love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin.
If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of
this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer
the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of
riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then
covetousness is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal
sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is
bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through
fear of their want or on account of his having too much.
Reply to Objection 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings
darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by
preferring the love of riches to the love of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it
is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to
love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale. " Tully
also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based
chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to
love money. " But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity. "
Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most
grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable
sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and
helplessness of any kind make men illiberal. " Therefore covetousness is
the most grievous of sins.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is
"a serving of idols.
" Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
sins. Therefore covetousness is also.
On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according
to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far
as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the
greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that
is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against
external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to
belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered
on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately
subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin:
for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good.
Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it
is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of
the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view
the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even
to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however,
corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while
conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of
the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted,
rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous
of sins.
Reply to Objection 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the
part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus.
10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own
soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that is, his
life---to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues:
"Because while he liveth he hath cast away"---that is, despised---"his
bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of
a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference
to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as
a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in
one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's
sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the
greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives
way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication
not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more
dangerous.
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account
of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man,
like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not
in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
grievous a sin as idolatry.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results
from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who,
through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. " Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom.
xxix in Matth. ) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed
by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness
seems not to be a spiritual sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the
affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and
sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures
are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are
consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which
are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins
of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while
spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without
pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes
pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches.
Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks
the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a
bodily object.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom. " Hence a vice of the flesh
is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from
its originating in some defect of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who
was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the
flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since
while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself,
the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([3251]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those
vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends
of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is
not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness
arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those
who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses,
allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's
property. " Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of
being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one
which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when
an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man
sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most
desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human
life, as stated above ([3252]FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a
thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable
it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be
self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the
last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking
possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All
things obey money. " Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money,
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason,
but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the
sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong
chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that
principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the
principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice,
because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man
is a fool rather than a knave. "
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to something
else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all
sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it
has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1;
[3253]FS, Q[84], A[4]), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
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Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. " For covetousness
is opposed to liberality, as stated above [3254](A[3]). Now treachery,
fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object,
violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have
no connection with covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they
should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut. ) enumerates nine
daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity. " Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many
kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls
illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted,
skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal
deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers,
despoilers of the dead, and robbers. " Therefore it seems that the
aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.
Objection 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i. e.
covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of
covetousness.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.
I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise
therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since
covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two
things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this
respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because,
to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with
his riches [*See[3255] Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to
covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness
may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In
this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with
excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied
with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the
execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other
people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence,"
sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is
"falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his statement
by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we
have "fraud"; if persons, then we have "treachery," as in the case of
Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital
sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind
allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end;
seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another
for it to have species.
Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the
Article.
Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid.
For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since
false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special
kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of
filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under
violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.
Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be
said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he
gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
{kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as
whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have
given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make
little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of
money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by
violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
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Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at
the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not
opposite to covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to
be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore
it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his
substance living riotously. " Therefore it seems that prodigality is
opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and
liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of
them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies
excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while
covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess
in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is
opposed to covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard
principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be
"prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous. " Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv,
1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in
giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in
receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since
while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he
is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good
purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he
receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money,
not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for
the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he
becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the
concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no
pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in
becoming intemperate. "
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Whether prodigality is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils. " But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the
rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others. " Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mat. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor. " Therefore prodigality is not
a sin.
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as
referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual
covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. [3258]FS,
Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is
speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and
in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from
covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good
inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage
correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the
desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that
will become rich," etc.
more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing. "
The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and just men are
honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal. "
I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater
virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality
tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own
nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature
it tends to set in order one's own affection towards the possession and
use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and
pleasures relating to one's own body, takes precedence of liberality:
and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to
the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while
all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the
Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good;
and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the
individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those
goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to
a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the
aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it
follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for
the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain
excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should
judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily
and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which
pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is
not the greatest of virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to
whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
rather than to liberality.
Reply to Objection 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by
giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are
better than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply to Objection 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved
is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than
others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful
in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
same reason he becomes famous.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS
(EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1)
covetousness; (2) prodigality.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) To which virtue it is opposed;
(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?
(7) Whether it is a capital vice?
(8) Of its daughters.
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Whether covetousness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness
[avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because,
to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external
goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is
derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies
literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is
alluding (cf. A[2], OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire external
goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are
naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is
sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance).
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's
neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ([3244]FS, Q[72], A[4]). But
covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is
opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which
man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this
pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1
Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own
body. " In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's
neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is
not a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be
without covetousness, contented with such things as you have. "
I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil
must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure.
Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain
measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be
commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate
with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods
come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above
(Q[117], A[3]; [3245]FS, Q[2] , A[1]). Hence it must needs be that
man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other
words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external
riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with
his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed
this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is
what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of
possessing. " It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as
means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as
it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But
covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about
external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the
acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or
keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against
one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches,
without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be
possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify
immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when,
for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them,
immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself,
because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as
do the sins of the flesh.
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal
sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal
things.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated
according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature.
Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things,
just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they
are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with
regard to riches.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is a special sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
called {philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to
anything that is desired immoderately. " Now in every sin there is
immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above
([3246]FS, Q[71], A[6], OBJ[3]). Therefore covetousness is a general
sin.
Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
[avarus] man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass [avidus
aeris]," i. e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
{philargyria}, i. e. "love of silver. " Now silver, which stands for
money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured
by money, as stated above ([3247]Q[117], A[2], ad 2). Therefore
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems
to be a general sin.
Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil. " Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Ex.
20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods. " Therefore the
concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a
general sin.
On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special
sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all iniquity,
malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated
above ([3248]FS, Q[72], A[1]). Now the object of a sin is the good
towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of
sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good.
And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are
desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently
covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of
having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence
covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.
Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been originally
employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute
masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have
health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis),
consequently the term "covetousness" has been amplified to denote all
immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a
homily (xvi in Ev. ) that "covetousness is a desire not only for money,
but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately
sought after. " In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in
this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in
the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: All those external things that are subject to the
uses of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as
they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external
goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is
a special vice.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence
for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet
those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger
and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth. ) that there are two
kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which
covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v,
2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Objection 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.
Objection 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv,
1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to
liberality.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall not
be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits
from them. " Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the
desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches
in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and
keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by
stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice,
and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): "Her
princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed
blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness. " Secondly, it
denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for
instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too
much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way
covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
affections, as stated above ([3249]Q[117], A[2], ad 3, A[3], ad 3,
A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a
blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
should regret what they had given, and give but little. "
Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher.
Reply to Objection 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the
measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view
of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in
the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and
keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these
proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the
point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter
depends on the rule of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no
opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought
according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one
ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as
opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no
one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of
death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom.
1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness
[Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such things
are worthy of death. " Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to
one's own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil
says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that
thou keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou
mightest succor. "
Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
covetousness a mortal sin.
Objection 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save
through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.
But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness on the
soul. " Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal
sin.
On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon this
foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that "he
builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how
he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of covetousness.
Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially,
for it is said of him that "he shall be saved, yet so as by fire. "
Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3250](A[3]) covetousness is twofold. In
one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the
unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to
theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66],
AA[6],8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3),
when we were treating of theft.
In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in
which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the
love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such
wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the
love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin.
If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of
this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer
the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of
riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then
covetousness is a venial sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal
sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is
bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through
fear of their want or on account of his having too much.
Reply to Objection 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings
darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by
preferring the love of riches to the love of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it
is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than to
love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale. " Tully
also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is based
chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to
love money. " But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness
is the most grievous of sins.
Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity. "
Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most
grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable
sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old age and
helplessness of any kind make men illiberal. " Therefore covetousness is
the most grievous of sins.
Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is
"a serving of idols.
" Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
sins. Therefore covetousness is also.
On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according
to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.
I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far
as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the
greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that
is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is
committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against
external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to
belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered
on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately
subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin:
for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good.
Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it
is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of
the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view
the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even
to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however,
corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while
conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of
the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted,
rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected.
Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous
of sins.
Reply to Objection 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the
part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus.
10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own
soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul---that is, his
life---to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues:
"Because while he liveth he hath cast away"---that is, despised---"his
bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of
a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference
to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as
a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal
good.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in
one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man's
sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the
greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives
way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication
not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more
dangerous.
Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account
of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man,
like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not
in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
grievous a sin as idolatry.
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Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the
flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results
from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who,
through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.
Objection 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. " Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom.
xxix in Matth. ) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed
by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness
seems not to be a spiritual sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.
I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the
affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and
sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures
are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are
consummated in the carnal senses---for instance, the pleasures of the
table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which
are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins
of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while
spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without
pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes
pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches.
Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks
the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a
bodily object.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement takes its species from the term
"whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom. " Hence a vice of the flesh
is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from
its originating in some defect of the flesh.
Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who
was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the
flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since
while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself,
the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
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Whether covetousness is a capital vice?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([3251]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those
vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends
of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is
not a capital vice.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness
arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those
who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses,
allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people's
property. " Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of
being a capital vice in respect of other vices.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the
capital vices.
I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one
which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when
an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man
sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most
desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human
life, as stated above ([3252]FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a
thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable
it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be
self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as the
last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as
Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of taking
possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All
things obey money. " Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money,
is a capital vice.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason,
but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the
sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong
chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that
principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although
liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the
principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice,
because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among
sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.
On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of
reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal man
is a fool rather than a knave. "
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to something
else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all
sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it
has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1;
[3253]FS, Q[84], A[4]), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
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Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and
insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy. " For covetousness
is opposed to liberality, as stated above [3254](A[3]). Now treachery,
fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object,
violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have
no connection with covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore they
should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut. ) enumerates nine
daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity. " Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.
Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many
kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls
illiberality, for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted,
skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal
deeds," and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers,
despoilers of the dead, and robbers. " Therefore it seems that the
aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.
Objection 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal," i. e.
covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of
covetousness.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.
I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise
therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since
covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two
things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this
respect covetousness gives rise to "insensibility to mercy," because,
to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with
his riches [*See[3255] Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to
covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness
may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In
this way it gives rise to "restlessness," by hindering man with
excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man shall not be satisfied
with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the
execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other
people's goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to "violence,"
sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is
"falsehood," if it be mere words, "perjury" if he confirm his statement
by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we
have "fraud"; if persons, then we have "treachery," as in the case of
Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital
sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind
allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end;
seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another
for it to have species.
Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the
Article.
Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid.
For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since
false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special
kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of
filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under
violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.
Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species
rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be
said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he
gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
{kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as
whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have
given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make
little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether
by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the
dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.
Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of
money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by
violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?
(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at
the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not
opposite to covetousness.
Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to
be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore
it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his
substance living riotously. " Therefore it seems that prodigality is
opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and
liberality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.
I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue
in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality
differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards
affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than
he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of
them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies
excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while
covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess
in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is
opposed to covetousness.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard
principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be
"prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous. " Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving,
without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv,
1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in
giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in
receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since
while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he
is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it
may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good
purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he
receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money,
not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for
the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on
account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to
intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he
becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the
concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no
pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in
becoming intemperate. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether prodigality is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils. " But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the
rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others. " Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), "Be not .
. . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Mat. 19:21), "Sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor. " Therefore prodigality is not
a sin.
On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of
which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful
through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as
referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual
covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [*Cf. [3258]FS,
Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is
speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and
in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from
covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good
inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to
satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage
correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the
desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that
will become rich," etc.
