Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it.
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it.
Summa Theologica
Whence, although God knows the total number
of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the
universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain
to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate
end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only
by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It
is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for
whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the
missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis. ']"
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as
applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to
present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished,
but not the number of the predestined.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must
be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God
the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal
parts to the good of the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common
state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear
that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance
of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be
half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of
things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest.
Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is
deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are
saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the
mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which
very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature
fall short.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since
the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause
anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered
by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account
of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg. : 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord? '] Or who hath been
His counsellor? " (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be
hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
it cannot be furthered by anything.
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would
not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such
a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under
the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those
of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would
not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good
works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most
certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by
good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways;
in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped
thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we
are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? " In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are
God's co-adjutors. " Nor is this on account of any defect in the power
of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the
beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may
communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the
first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]),
indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be
furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
__________________________________________________________________
THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i. e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the
book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to
each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory. " But divine
energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine
power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if
the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be
a book of death, as there is a book of life.
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of
God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew. "
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to
possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined
is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be
written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart. "
For things are written down in material books to help the memory.
Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God
standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His. "
Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses.
In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus
we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and
this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old
and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done,
and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his
deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the
names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the
art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the
life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore
the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
regard to the life of the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? " (Jn. 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination,
as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the
life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are
not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book
of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again
that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier
is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since
this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the
life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above
([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life
regards the life of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of
glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election,
and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is
chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end,
but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be
chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is
directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to
obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.
Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life. " But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in
a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it
becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life,
inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the
present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident,
either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that
state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus
a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of
the living. " But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is
placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that
shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is
promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men),
it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out,
of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man,
but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription
of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two
sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for
eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed
by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it
through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal
life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in
reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those,
however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine
predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book
of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to
have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these
latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting
out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God
knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not
ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the
book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were
any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in
themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting
out of the book of life refers.
Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of
the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein
anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in
the knowledge of God, although not anew.
__________________________________________________________________
THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is power in God?
Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and
action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better
than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the
divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there
is no power in God.
Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19],
A[4]) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the
cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore,
to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is
pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be
an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the
other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active
power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else;
whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something
else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore,
that in God there is active power in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is
founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but
passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as
it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be
nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God
nobler than His power.
Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself;
except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the
divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists
in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action,
or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle
of an effect.
Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something
really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified.
Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the
knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as
the cause precedes the operation and effect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the power of God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.
Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect;
otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were
infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if
the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one. " Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power
to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine
essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity
in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not
follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly
manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is
not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal
agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is
clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him
either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5];
[208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than
His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of
God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even
if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be
ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards
an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered
toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the
effect produced by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a
body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can
move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The
reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent;
wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more
quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power
were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to
move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal
agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be
manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since
it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg. : 'Hath not God', etc. ] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. " Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God. "
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His
active power, not to passive power, as was shown above [210](A[1]).
Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to
His omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because
of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3)
that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood
either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for
instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For
there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true,
though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one
were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet. " Or he may be
understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be
evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is,
perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought
that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in
sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God
has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ([211]Q[21],
A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine
omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the
first foundation of all good things.
Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in
reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in
reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is
named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things
which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to
create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference
to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to
be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to
those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above ([212]Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of
God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For
what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is
only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in
itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore,
and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for
the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates
not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his
running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to
have been.
Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power
is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he
did not run.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than
virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not
have been corrupt.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch. ): "Although God can do
all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted. " Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.
I answer that, As was said above ([213]Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall
under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make undone
the things that have been done. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the
past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus,
it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is
nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference
to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible
things do come beneath the scope of divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the
divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He
can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of
possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of
the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not
to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and
body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been
corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the
fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
from the sinner.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can do what He does not?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
except what He does.
Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what
He does.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels? " (Mat. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does
not.
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there
could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that
which now is. But we showed above ([214]Q[19], A[3]) that God does not
act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all
things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to
those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events
produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not
happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to
this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom
and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God,
which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be
fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not
in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the
whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by
divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as
said above ([215]Q[21], A[2]), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom
that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of
things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end
is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the
maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is
an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the
divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no
other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that
God can do other things than those He has done.
Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are
distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and
will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in
the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above ([216]Q[19], A[3]), neither
are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered
as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as
directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is
said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a
kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
[217](A[3]). What is, however, attributed to the divine power,
according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must
say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He
has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen
that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not
pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to
His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His
nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet
the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when
it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and
just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two
ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would
be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His
power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is
that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to
what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted.
Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the
things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
another order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can do better than what He does?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done.
Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been
envious. " For the same reason, if God could have made better things
than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been
envious.
of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the
universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain
to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate
end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only
by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.
It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the
elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It
is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for
whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the
missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis. ']"
Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as
applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to
present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished,
but not the number of the predestined.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must
be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God
the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal
parts to the good of the whole universe.
Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common
state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear
that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance
of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be
half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of
things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest.
Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds
the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is
deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are
saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the
mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which
very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature
fall short.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since
the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause
anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered
by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account
of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He
predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg. : 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord? '] Or who hath been
His counsellor? " (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be
furthered by the prayers of the saints.
Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be
hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore
it cannot be furthered by anything.
On the contrary, It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife
because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive"
(Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was
predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had
never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the
prayers of the saints.
I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors.
Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that
prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).
Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects
are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to
bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would
not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such
a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under
the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those
of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would
not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good
works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most
certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: "Labor more that by
good works you may make sure your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways;
in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped
thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we
are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? " In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We are
God's co-adjutors. " Nor is this on account of any defect in the power
of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the
beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may
communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the
first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]),
indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be
furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
__________________________________________________________________
THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)
We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:
(1) What is the book of life?
(2) Of what life is it the book?
(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)---i. e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not
predestination.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the
book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to
each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory. " But divine
energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine
power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination.
Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if
the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be
a book of death, as there is a book of life.
On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of
God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew. "
I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to
possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined
is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be
written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart. "
For things are written down in material books to help the memory.
Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has
predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as
the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the
knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to
eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure foundation of God
standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His. "
Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses.
In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus
we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and
this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old
and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done,
and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his
deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life.
Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the
names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the
art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?
Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the
life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge
of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore
the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in
regard to the life of the predestined.
Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is
called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of
nature be so called.
Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? " (Jn. 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination,
as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the
life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are
not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book
of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again
that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier
is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since
this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the
life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above
([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life
regards the life of glory.
Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of
glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election,
and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is
chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.
From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no
election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end,
but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be
chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is
directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to
obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively.
Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply,
but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?
Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life. " But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in
a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.
On the contrary, It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of
the living" (Ps. 68:29).
I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it
becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life,
inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the
present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident,
either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that
state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus
a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out of the book of
the living. " But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is
placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, "He that
shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not
blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is
promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men),
it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out,
of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man,
but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription
of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two
sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and
from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for
eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed
by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it
through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal
life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life
simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in
reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those,
however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine
predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book
of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to
have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these
latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting
out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and
afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God
knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not
ordained when he falls from grace.
Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the
book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were
any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in
themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting
out of the book of life refers.
Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of
the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein
anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in
the knowledge of God, although not anew.
__________________________________________________________________
THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)
After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is power in God?
(2) Whether His power is infinite?
(3) Whether He is almighty?
(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is power in God?
Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and
action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better
than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown
above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.
Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the
divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in
God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there
is no power in God.
Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19],
A[4]) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the
cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore,
to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is
round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
I answer that, Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at
all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is
pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any
imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be
an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the
other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active
power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else;
whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something
else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore,
that in God there is active power in the highest degree.
Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is
founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but
passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as
it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only
active power.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be
nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for
both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God
nobler than His power.
Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself;
except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the
divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists
in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action,
or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of
"suppositum" possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly
the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle
of an effect.
Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something
really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified.
Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the
knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as
the cause precedes the operation and effect.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the power of God is infinite?
Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.
Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect;
otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were
infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if
the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23).
Therefore, His power is not infinite.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one. " Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power
to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine
essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above
([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity
in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not
follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly
manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is
not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal
agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself
in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is
clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him
either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5];
[208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than
His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of
God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even
if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be
ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards
an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered
toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the
effect produced by it.
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a
body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can
move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The
reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent;
wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in
its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more
quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power
were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to
move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal
agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be
manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since
it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God is omnipotent?
Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for
He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is
not omnipotent.
Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not
omnipotent.
Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His
omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th
Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the
divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater,
however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another
world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom
of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom
of this world foolish [*Vulg. : 'Hath not God', etc. ] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible. " Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them;
but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent,
all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we
take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what
necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be
nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But
this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Lk. 1:37).
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God
can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to
be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a
thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some
power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible
to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the
very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent
through being able to do all things that are possible to created
nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we
were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that
are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in
explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing
else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able
to do.
It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being
warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power
in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of
being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence,
whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the
absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called
omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come
within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the
aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God. "
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His
active power, not to passive power, as was shown above [210](A[1]).
Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to
His omnipotence.
Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action;
hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because
of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3)
that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood
either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for
instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For
there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true,
though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one
were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet. " Or he may be
understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be
evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is,
perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought
that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.
Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in
sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God
has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ([211]Q[21],
A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine
omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the
first foundation of all good things.
Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in
reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in
reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is
named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things
which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to
create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference
to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to
be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to
those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above ([212]Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of
God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can make the past not to have been?
Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For
what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is
only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in
itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore,
and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for
the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates
not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his
running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to
have been.
Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power
is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he
did not run.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than
virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not
have been corrupt.
On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch. ): "Although God can do
all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted. " Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.
I answer that, As was said above ([213]Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall
under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to make undone
the things that have been done. "
Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the
past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus,
it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is
nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference
to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible
things do come beneath the scope of divine power.
Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the
divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to
His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He
can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of
possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of
the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not
to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and
body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been
corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the
fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed
from the sinner.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can do what He does not?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
except what He does.
Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them
to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what
He does.
On the contrary, It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels? " (Mat. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does
not.
I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there
could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that
which now is. But we showed above ([214]Q[19], A[3]) that God does not
act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all
things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to
those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events
produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not
happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to
this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom
and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God,
which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be
fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not
in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the
whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by
divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as
said above ([215]Q[21], A[2]), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom
that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of
things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end
is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the
maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is
an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the
divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no
other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that
God can do other things than those He has done.
Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are
distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and
will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in
the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above ([216]Q[19], A[3]), neither
are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered
as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as
directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is
said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a
kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
[217](A[3]). What is, however, attributed to the divine power,
according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must
say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He
has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen
that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not
pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to
His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His
nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet
the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when
it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and
just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in two
ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would
be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His
power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is
that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to
what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted.
Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the
things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
another order.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can do better than what He does?
Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing
is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done.
Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been
envious. " For the same reason, if God could have made better things
than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been
envious.
