No More Learning

In the application of the pure conceptions of the under standing to possible experience, the employment of their syn thesis is either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition alone, partly on the existence of a pheno menon. But the d priori conditions of intuition are in relation
to a possible experience absolutely necessary, those of the ex istence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are in them selves contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of absolute necessity, that will be apodeictic those, on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an priori necessity indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in nn experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Con sequently they will not possess that immediate evidence which peculiar to the former, although their application to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth and certitude. But of this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles.
The table of the categories naturally our guide to the table of principles, because these are nothing else than rules
? for the objective employment of the former. all principles of the pure understanding are--
Axioms of Intuition.
Accordingly,
3. Analogies
of Experience.
have chosen advisedly, in order that we might not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of tht
2. Anticipations
of Perception.
These appellations
4. Postulates of Empirical Thought in general.
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1.
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;
? 122 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
evidence and the employment of these principles. It will, however, soon nppear that --a fact which concerns bcth the evidence of these principles, and the a priori determination of phenomena -- according to the categories of Quantity and Quality (if we attend merely to the form of these), the prin ciples of these categories are distinguishable from those of the two others, inasmuch as the former are possessed of an intui tive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in both instances a complete certitude. I shall therefore call the former mathematical,* and the latter dynamical principles. f It must be observed, however, that by these terms I mean,
just as little in the one case the principles of mathematics, as those of general (physical) dynamics, in the other. I have
here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, in their application to the internal sense, (without distinction of the representations given therein), by means of which the sciences of mathematics and dynamics become possible. Ac cordingly, I have named these principles rather with reference to their application, than their content ; and I shall now pro ceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the table.
I.
Axioms of Intuition.
The principle of these "All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities. "
Mathematically, in the Kantian sense. -- 7V.
All combination (conjunctio) either composition {composilio) or connection (nexus). The former the synthesis of manifold, the parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For example, the two triangles into which square divided by diagonal, do not necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind the synthesis of the homogeneous in every thing that can be mathematically considered. This synthesis can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition, the former of which
applied to extensive, the latter to intensive quantities. The second sort of combination {nexus) the synthesis of manifold, in so far as its parti do belong necessarily to each other for example, the accident to sub stance, or the effect to the causa. Consequently synthesis of that which, though heterogineous, represented as connected, priori. This combination -- not an arbitrary one -- entitle dynamical, because con cerns the connection of the existence of the manifold. This, again, may be divided into the physical synthesis of the phenomena among each other, and the mitaphysical synthesis, or the connection of phenomena a priori in the faculty of cognition.
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? AXIOMS Of INTUITIOIC. 123
Pboof.
All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all with out exception. Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of manifold, through which the repre sentations of determinate space or time are generated that
to say, through the composition
the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold
(homogeneous). Now the consciousness of homogeneous manifold in intuition, so far as thereby the representation of an object rendered possible, the conception of quan tity (quanti). Consequently, even the perception of an object as phsenomenon possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous mani fold the conception of quantity cogitated that to
say, all phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as intuitions in space or time, they must be repre sented by means of the same synthesis, through which space and time themselves are determined.
An extensive quantity call that wherein the representa tion of the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the representation of the whole. cannot repre sent to myself any line, however small, without drawing in thought, that is, without generating from point all its parts one after another, and in this way alone producing this intui tion. Precisely the same the case with every, even the smallest portion of time. cogitate therein only the succes sive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by means of the different portions of time and the addition of them, determinate quantity of time produced. As the pure intuition in all phenomena either time or space, so every phenomenon in its character of intuition an extensive
? inasmuch as can only be cognized in our appre hension by successive synthesis (from part to part). All phenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as aggregates, that as collection of previously given parts which not the case with every sort of quantities, but only with those
which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive.
quantity,
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;
a
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it
I is is
I
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a
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is a is
a
;
? 124 TRAXSCEWDKJTTAL DOCTBITTE.
On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or geometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous intuition a priori, under which alone the schema of a pure conception of external intuition can exist ; for example, " between two points only one straight line is possible," " two straight lines cannot enclose a space," &c. These are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities (quanta) as such.
But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say, the answer to the question, How large is this or that object ? although, in respect to this question, we have vari ous propositions synthetical and immediately certain (inde- monstrabilia) ; we have, in the proper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the propositions, " If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal ;" " If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal ;" are analytical, because I am immediately conscious of the identity of the produc tion of the one quantity with the production of the other ; whereas axioms must be h priori synthetical propositions. On the other hand, the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical, but not uni versal, like those of geometry, and for this reason cannot be called axioms, but numerical formula? . That 7+5 = 12, is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the represen tation of seven, nor of five, nor of the composition of the two numbers, do I cogitate the number twelve. (Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both, is not at present the ques tion ; for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only point whether really cogitate the predicate in the repre sentation of the subject. ) But although the proposition synthetical, nevertheless only singular proposition. In so far as regard here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the units), cannot take place except in onn manner, although our use of these numbers afterwards ge neral. If say, " triangle can be constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are greater than the third," exercise merely the pure function of the productive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter, and construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number seven possible only in one manner, and so like
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? ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 123
wise the number twelve, which results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such propositions, then, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we should have an infinity of these), but numerical formule.
This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phe nomena greatly enlarges our & priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered appli cable in all its precision to objects of experience, and without it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident ; on the contrary, contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very point. Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition
(of space and time) ; consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter, is indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, such as the statement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in space (for example, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles), must fall to the ground.
For, if these objections hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all mathematics, objective validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how far, mathematics cnn be applied to phe nomena. The synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of all intuition, is that which renders possible the appre hension of a phenomenon, and therefore every external expe rience, consequently all cognition of the objects of experience ; and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which errone ously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the formal
conditions of our sensibility, and represents these, although mere phenomena, as things in themselves, presented as such to our understandings. But in this case, no a prion syn thetical cognition of them could be possible, consequently not through pure conceptions of space, and the science which
determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would
itself be impossible.
II. Anticipations of Perception.
The principle of these is, "In all phamomena the Real, thai tvnich is an object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that has
Degree. "
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is,
? TKANSCEWBENTAL DOCTMKE.
Proof.
Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, u con
sciousness, which contains an element of sensation. Phsenomena
as objects of perception are not pure, that merely formal in tuitions, like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves. * They contain, then, over and above the intui tion, the materials for an object (through which represented something existing in space or time), that to say, they con tain the real of sensation, as representation merely subjec tive, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject
affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure con
sciousness possible, inasmuch as the real in this conscious ness entirely evanishes, and there remains merely formal consciousness priori) of the manifold in time and space consequently there possible synthesis also of the production of the quantity of sensation from its commencement, that from the pure intuition = onwards, up to certain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself not an objective
? and in to be found neither the intuition of space nor of time, cannot possess any extensive quantity, and yet there does belong to quantity (and that means of its
apprehension, in which empirical consciousne*is can within certain time rise from nothing = up to its given amount), consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive quantity, that degree of influence on sense to all objects of perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.
All cognition, by means of which am enabled to cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an Anticipation and without doubt this the sense in which Epicurus employed his expression vpoy. ^i;. But as there in phsenomena something which never cog nized priori, which on this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition, that to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), follows, that
sensation just that element in cognition which cannot be at
They can be perceived only as phsenomena, and some part of them
must always belong to the non-ego whereas pure intuitions are entirely the orodncts of the mind itself, and as such arc cognized in thenuehn. -- Tr
representation,
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ANTICIPATIONS OP PKBCEPTIOJT.
127
? 11 anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to Quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent a priori that which may always be given a pos teriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense --special, because it may seem surprising to forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really is the case here.
Apprehension,* by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that do not take into consideration succes sion of many sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which not successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity the want of sensation in moment of time would represent as empty, consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation rea
? lity (real as phenomenon) absence of negation = 0. of diminution, so that
that which corresponds to the
Now every sensation capable can decrease, and thus gradually
Therefore, between reality phenomenon and negation, there exists continuous concatenation of many pos sible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other always smaller than that between the given sen sation and zero, or complete negation. ' That to say, the realiia phenomenon has always quantity, which however not discoverable in Apprehension, inasmuch as Apprehension takes place means of mere sensation in one instant, and not the successive synthesis of many sensations, and there fore does not progress from parts to the whole.
has quantity, but not an extensive quantity.
Now that quantity which apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation
to negation = term intensive quantity. Consequently, rea lity in phenomenon has intensive quantity, that degree,
Apprehension tbs Kantian word for perception, in the largest ? cast in which we employ that term. the genus which includes under
M species, perception proper and sensation proper. -- Tr.
Consequently,
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in a
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? 128 TRANSCENDENTAL iJOCTltlNX.
If we consider tins reality as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, for example, a change) ;
we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momen tum, for example, the momentum of weight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the appre hension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with Causality I have at present nothing to do.
Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quautity, which may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour -- for example, red -- has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight, &c.
This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part simple*), is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given, without enclosing it within bound aries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and moments are only boundaries, that the mere places or positions of their limi tation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to limit or determine them and we cannot conceive either space or time composed of constituent parts which are given
before space or time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in the production of these Quantities progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate the
expression flowing.
All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect
both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with
In the former case they are extensive quanti ties in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the manifold of phenomenon interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not properly phe- nomenon as quantity, which not produced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of certain kind, bul
Simplex. -- 7V.
? reality).
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;
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? AjrTicii'vrioxs or fekception. 129
by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, 1 employ the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver, which to be sure, continuous quantity, in which no part the smallest, but every part might constitute piece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, the words thirteen dollars understand so many coins (be their value in silver what may), would be quite erroneous to use the expression quantity of dollars on the contrary, must call them aggregate, that number of coins. And as in every number we must have unity as the foundation, so phenomenon taken as unity quantity, and as such always
continuous quantity (quantum continuum).
Now, seeing all phsenomena, whether considered as extensive
or intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition, "All change (transition of thing from one >>tate into another) con tinuous," might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were not that the causality of change lies entirely beyond the bounds of transcendental philosophy, and presup
poses empirical principles. For of the possibility of cause which changes the condition of things, that which de termines them to the contrary of certain given state, the under standing gives us priori no knowledge; not merely because has no insight into the possibility of (for such insight ab sent in several priori cognitions), but because the notion of change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that we have
nothing which we could here employ but the pure funda mental conceptions of all possible experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical science, which built upon certain fundamental
experiences.
Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great in
fluence which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw.
all reality in perception has degree, between which ai. d x
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it
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a
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? 130 THANSCENDENTAi DOCTIlUiE.
negation there is an endless sequence of ever . smaller degree*, and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations ; no perception, and consequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately
or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon ; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception ; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single . phenomenon, and the difference of the degrees in its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that no part thereof empty, yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon un changed, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which space or time filled, and the intensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the ex tensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered.
We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philo
sophers, remarking great difference in the quantity of the matter of different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously, that this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would sus pect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely on metaphysical hypothesis -- sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space must not here call impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) always iden tical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensivo quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, Air which they can have no ground in experience, and which conse
? quently merely metaphysical, oppose
transcendental de-
* It should be remembered that Kant means by matter, that which in the object corresponds to sensation the subject--the real in pheno menon. -- V.
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? ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 1. 31
monstration, which it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned pre supposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space -- for example, caloric, or any other reality in the phsenomenal world -- can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty ; on the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees, as completely as another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard
I wish
ciple of the pure understanding, that the nature of our per
ceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a phsenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori principle of the understanding.
Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an enquirer whom initiation into tran scendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We may natu rally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phsenomena, and consequently--the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself ab straction being made of its empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution : How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and & priori respecting pheno-
mena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is pecu liarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sen
? to their specific gravity ;
only
to
prove,
from a
prin
sation itself?
x2
? ? ? 132 TRANSCENDENTAL TOl. TltlNE.
The quality of sensation is in all cases n. erely empirical, and cannot be represented a priori (for example, colours, taste, &c). But the real -- that which corresponds to sensation -- iu opposition to negation=0, only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical con sciousness.
That is to say, the empirical consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a sen sation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illumi nated. We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and represent to our selves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum,* a syn thesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such are given only d posteriori, but this property thereof, namely,
that they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only a single quality, namely, continuity ; but in respect to all quality (the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize d priori any thing more than the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to experience.
III.
ANALOGIES OF EXPERLENCB.
The principle of these is : Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of per
? ceptions.
Proof.
Experience is an empirical cognition ; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci-
? The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power oi nlensive quantity in the cauie of a sensation, for example, redness, weight, Ac, is called in the Kantian terminology, Us moment. The term momentum which we employ, must not he confounded with the word com "conly employed ic :atural science. -- Ti.
? ? ? AXALOGIES OP EXPEllIEKCJt. 133
ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog
nition of objects of the senses, that of experience merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension only placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of necessity the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, to be discovered therein. But as experience cognition of objects means of perceptions, follows that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe rience not as put together time, but as objectively
time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place ny means of their connexion in time in general, consequently ouly means of priori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience possible only by means of representation of the necessary connexion of perception.
The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon determined in re-pect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience, and render possible.
The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse quently, as this unity lies priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com plex of all representations), and indeed relates priori to its form, that to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time, --
the a priori transcendental unity of ap perception, to which subjected all that can belong to my
e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become *n object for me. This synthetical and priori determine*?
necessity imposed
(not
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it
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&
by is
by
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is it a
in
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in
a is
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? 134
7BAKS0IKDETITA1 DOOTBIJ'E.
unity in relntion of perceptions in time is therefore the rule : " All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.
These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, aid the synthesis of the empirical in tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the
mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its
? synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phe nomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determiuately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others.
The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic to phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan tities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose, and give a priori, that is con struct, the degree of our sensations of the "in-light. * We may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive.
The case is very different with those principles whose pro vince it is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con-
? Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads of " Aiioms of Intuition," and " Anticipations of Perception," authorize the application to phamacnena of determinations of size and number, that is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its dif
ferent effects on water, *c, and on mercury in a thermometer. -- 7V.
? ? ? ANALOGIES OF EXPEBIENCE. 13. 1
st. ucted, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perceptkin is given us, in a certain relation 01 time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can not then say a priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the for mer but only how connected, quoad its existence, in
Analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formule, which enounce
the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always constitutive, so that two terms of the proportion are given, the third also given, that can be constructed the aid of these formule. But in philosophy, analogy not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three given terms, can give a priori and cognize the relation to fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although certainly possess rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience therefore only rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (pheno mena) not as constitutive, but merely as regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought
general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phsenomena), the synthesis of per ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these
? For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con
perceptions).
stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both
Known the two terms and and the relation of to not only the relation of to some other number given, but that number itself, 12, given, that constructed. Therefore 3:6=6: 12. -- TV.
Given known effect, known cause, and another known effect, we reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but ? hose relation to the known effect we know from the comparison of the
Thus, our own known actions our own known motives -= the known actions of others x, that the inotivrs of others
three given terms.
which we cannot immediately cognize. -- TV.
? ? :
is,
:
I aaf
f
? is
in
a
is
6
a
a
is,
it
is I
if
it
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6, is
is,
3 6,
a is
is by
is,
is
? lIUNsCKItDKNTAL TWICTRrRK.
possess & priori, but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse quently also in the manner of demonstration.
But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently
the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con cerning them synthetically h priori. But they are nothing but phcenomena ; a complete knowledge of which -- a know ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate --is the only possible experience. It follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of plienomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phsenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the categories in the principles them selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under the title of formulce of the former.
A.
FIRST ANALOOY.
PBIKCIFLX OF THE PEBMAKEXCE OF STTBSTAWCE.
In all changes of phcenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi nished.
Pboof.
All phcenomena exist in time, wherein alone ns substratum, that as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co existence and succession can "ie represented. Consequently
? ? ? is,
? OT TUB PE11MANENCE OT SUBSTAVCE.
137
time, in which all changes of phsenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which buc- cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of per ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that
phsenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre sents time in general, and in which ail change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phsenomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per tains to the existence of things, substance all that per tains to existence enn be cogitated only as determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined,
substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phsenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished.
? Our apprehension of the manifold in
phenomenon always successive, consequently always changing. By
alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani fold, as an object of experience, co-existent or successive, unless had for foundation something that exists always, that something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) that to say, the permanent
the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time possible. Permanence
in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phsenomena time (just as co-existence cannot be regarded as modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive). * If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos sible. only by means of the permanent that existence
The latter part of thii sentence aetma to contradict the former. Th>> sequel will explain. -- TV.
? ? *
is,
is
in
It is
is, it
a
in
is
isis is
;
is it is
is,
a
is
aa
;
? 138 TltANSCEXDENTAL DOCTRINE.
in different pa. ts of the successive aeries of time receives k quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never' has even the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con dition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that of experience and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent the object in itself, that the substance (phenomenon) but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub stances, consequently to its determinations.
? find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as substratum of all change in phenomena indeed, am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself
more precise and definite manner, when he says " In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable. " But of this decidedly synthetical pro
nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof nay, very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as deserves to
do, at the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of na ture. In truth, the statement that substance permanent,
position,
For this very permanence the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenome
non and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable nothing but determination. But because proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that
Not tubt'antia noumenon. -- Tr.
tautological.
cannot be drawn from conceptions,
synthetical proposition priori, and as philosophers never re flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved exeep'. means of deduction of the possibility of experience, no wonder that while has served as the foundation of all ex-
inasmuch as concerns
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it ;
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by a is, is
in
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;
? OF THE FEBMANENCE 01 SUBSTANCE. li'J
perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it tins never been supported by proof.
A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke? " He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke. " Thus he presumed it to be incon trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like manner was the saying, *' From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- mena. For if that in the phsenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phsenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de nihilo nihil," -- " in nihilum nil posse reverti," are two propo sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even
? in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needier, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their
should arise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This permanence however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe nomenal world.
The determinations of substance, which are only par ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They
are always real, because they concern the existence of sub
substance)
? ? a
is,
? 110 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE.
stance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe n particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation.
Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical, "Only the permanent
? is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that when certain deter minations cease, others begin. "
Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely determination of the permanent, cannot be possible perception, for this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of transition from one state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which perma nent. Grant that thing absolutely begins to be we must then have point of time in which was not. But how and
what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless that which already exists For void time -- preceding --
(substance)
? ? by by
1
a it
it is
aa a
;
is
a
a
is,
? OF THE BUCCE8&ION OF TIME. 141
is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin ning with objects which existed previously, and which con tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the per manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.
Substances (in the world of phsenomena) are the substratum of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and in that case phsenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as co-existent, but as successive.
Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor tunity to speak in the sequel.
B. SECOND ANALOGY
PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY.
All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.
Proof.
(That all phsenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that successive being and non-being of the de terminations of substance, which permanent; consequently that being of substance itself which follows on the non- being thereof, or non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, impossible --all this has been fully es tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin ciple might have been expressed as follows "All alteration (succession) of phenomena merely change for the changes
? ? ? is
;":
a is
is, a
a
is
? 142 TBANSCENDBHTAL DOOTBnrE.
of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with
I perceive that phsenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, whicft determines the in ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the
one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can
not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places one state before, and the other after ; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the
two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof. )
? relation of the successive phsenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is
determined as necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phsenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus ality, that experience itself, that empirical cognition of phte- nomena, becomes possible and consequently, that phsenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only virtue of this law.
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena always successive.