No More Learning

Meanwhile the second Roman corps under Publius found itself vigorously assailed by the two other Phoenician armies under Hasdrubal son of Gisgo and Mago, and the daring squadrons of Massinissa's horse gave to the Cartha ginians a decided advantage. The Roman camp was almost surrounded ; when the Spanish auxiliaries already on the way should arrive, the Romans would be completely hemmed in. The bold resolve of the proconsul to encounter with his best troops the advancing Spaniards, before their appearance should fill up the gap in the blockade, ended unfortunately. The Romans indeed had at first the advantage ; but the Numidian horse, who were rapidly despatched in pursuit, soon overtook them and prevented them both from following up the victory which
they had already half gained, and from marching back, until the Phoenician infantry came up and at length the fall of the general converted the lost battle into a defeat After Publius had thus fallen, Gnaeus, who slowly retreating had with difficulty defended himself against the one Carthaginian army, found himself suddenly assailed at once by three, and all retreat cut off by the Numidian cavalry. Hemmed in upon a bare hill, which did not even afford the possibility of pitching a camp, the whole corps were cut down or taken prisoners. As to the fate of the general himself no certain information was ever obtained. A small division alone was conducted by Gaius Marcius, an excellent officer of the school of Gnaeus, in safety to the other bank of the Ebro; and thither the legate Titus Fonteius also succeeded in bringing safely the portion of the corps of Publius that had been left in the camp ; most even of the Roman garrisons scattered in the south of
Spain south of the Ebro lost to the Romans.
3*4
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Spain were enabled to flee thither. In all Spain south of the Ebro the Phoenicians ruled undisturbed; and the moment seemed not far distant, when the river would be crossed, the Pyrenees would be open, and the communica tion with Italy would be restored. But the emergency in the Roman camp called the right man to the command. The choice of the soldiers, passing over older and not incapable officers, summoned that Gaius Marcius to become leader of the army; and his dexterous management and, quite as much perhaps, the envy and discord among the three Carthaginian generals, wrested from these the further fruits of their important victory. Such of the Carthaginians as had crossed the river were driven back, and the line of the Ebro was held in the meanwhile, till Rome gained time to send a new army and a new general.
the balance of arms. An expedition to Andalusia in the 810. following year (544) was most successful ; Hasdrubal Barcas was beset and surrounded, and escaped a capitulation only by ignoble stratagem and open perfidy. But Nero was not
Nero sent to Spain.
Fortunately the turn of the war in Italy, where Capua had just fallen, allowed this to be done. A strong legion — 12,000 men — arriving under the propraetor Gaius Claudius Nero, restored
Publius Scipio.
the right general for the Spanish war. He was an able officer, but a harsh, irritable, unpopular man, who had little skill in the art of renewing old connections or of forming new ones, or in taking advantage of the injustice and arrogance with which the Carthaginians after the death of the Scipios had treated friend and foe in Further Spain, and had exasperated all against them.
The senate, which formed a correct judgment as to the importance and the peculiar character of the Spanish war, and had learned from the Uticenses brought in as prisoners by the Roman fleet the great exertions which were making in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa with a numerous army over the Pyrenees, resolved to
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
325
despatch to Spain new reinforcements and an extraordinary general of higher rank, the nomination of whom they deemed it expedient to leave to the people. For long— so runs the story—nobody announced himself as ready to take in hand the complicated and perilous business ; but at last a young officer of twenty-seven, Publius Scipio (son of the general of the same name that had fallen in Spain), who had held the offices of military tribune and aedile, came forward to solicit it It is incredible that the Roman senate should have left to accident an election of such importance in this meeting of the Comitia which it had itself suggested, and equally incredible that ambition and
should have so died out in Rome that no tried officer presented himself for the important post. If on the other hand the eyes of the senate turned to the young, talented, and experienced officer, who had brilliantly distinguished himself in the hotly- contested days on the Ticinus and at Cannae, but who still had not the rank requisite for his coming forward as the successor of men who had been praetors and consuls, it was very natural to adopt this course, which compelled the people out of good nature to admit the only candidate notwithstanding his defective qualification, and which could not but bring both him and the Spanish expedition, which was doubtless very unpopular, into favour with the multitude. If the effect of this ostensibly unpremeditated candidature was thus calculated, it was perfectly successful. The son, who went to avenge the death of a father whose life he had saved nine years before on the Ticinus ; the young man of manly beauty and long locks, who with modest blushes offered himself in the absence of a better for the post of danger ; the mere military tribune, whom the votes of the centuries now raised at once to the roll of the highest magistracies— all this made a wonderful and indelible impression on the citizens and farmers of Rome. And in truth Publius
patriotism
326
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
was one, who was himself enthusiastic, and who inspired enthusiasm. He was not one of the few who by their energy and iron will constrain the world to adopt and to move in new paths for centuries, or who at any rate grasp the reins of destiny for years till its wheels roll over them. Publius Scipio gained battles and conquered countries under the instructions of the senate ; with the aid of his military laurels he took also a prominent position in Rome as a statesman; but a wide interval separates such a man from an Alexander or a Caesar. As an officer, he rendered at least no greater service to his country than Marcus Marcellus; and as a politician, although not
himself fully conscious of the unpatriotic and personal character of his policy, he injured his country at least as much, as he benefited it by his military skill. Yet a special charm lingers around the form of that graceful hero; it is surrounded, as with a dazzling halo, by the atmosphere of serene and confident inspiration, in which Scipio with mingled credulity and adroitness always moved. With quite enough of enthusiasm to warm men's hearts, and enough of calculation to follow in every case the dictates of intelligence, while not leaving out of account the vulgar; not naive enough to share the belief of the multitude in his divine inspirations, nor straightforward enough to set it aside, and yet in secret thoroughly
that he was a man specially favoured of the gods—in a word, a genuine prophetic nature ; raised above the people, and not less aloof from them ; a man of stead fast word and kingly spirit, who thought that he would humble himself by adopting the ordinary title of a king, but could never understand how the constitution of the republic should in his case be binding ; so confident in his own greatness that he knew nothing of envy or of hatred,
courteously acknowledged other men's merits, and com passionately forgave other men's faults ; an excellent officer
Scipio
perhaps
persuaded
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
327
and a refined diplomatist without the repellent
impress of either calling, uniting Hellenic culture with the fullest national feeling of a Roman, an accomplished speaker and of graceful manners — Publius Scipio won the hearts of soldiers and of women, of his countrymen and of the Spaniards, of his rivals in the senate and of his greater Carthaginian antagonist. His name was soon on every one's lips, and his was the star which seemed destined to bring victory and peace to his country.
Publius Scipio went to Spain in 544—5, accompanied by Scipio goe§ the propraetor Marcus Silanus, who was to succeed Nero 2°io20o' and to serve as assistant and counsellor to the young commander-in-chief, and by his intimate friend Gaius
Laelius as admiral, and furnished with a legion exceeding
the usual strength and a well-filled chest His appearance
on the scene was at once signalized by one of the boldest
and most fortunate coups de main that are known in history.
Of the three Carthaginian generals Hasdrubal Barcas was
stationed at the sources, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo at
the mouth, of the Tagus, and Mago at the Pillars of
Hercules ; the nearest of them was ten days' march from
special
the Phoenician capital New Carthage. Suddenly in the spring of 545, before the enemy's armies began to move, Scipio set out with his whole army of nearly 30,000 men and the fleet for this town, which he could reach from the mouth of the Ebro by the coast route in a few days, and surprised the Phoenician garrison, not above 1000 men strong, by a combined attack by sea and land. The town, situated on a tongue of land projecting into the harbour, found itself threatened at once on three sides by the Roman fleet, and on the fourth by the legions; and all help was far distant Nevertheless the commandant Mago defended himself with resolution and armed the citizens, as the soldiers did not suffice to man the walls. A sortie was attempted ; but the Romans repelled it with ease and,
Capture
? . ^w 209.
328
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book iii
without taking time to open a regular siege, began the assault on the landward side. Eagerly the assailants pushed their advance along the narrow land approach to the town ; new columns constantly relieved those that were fatigued; the weak garrison was utterly exhausted; but the Romans had gained no advantage. Scipio had not expected any ; the assault was merely designed to draw away the garrison from the side next to the harbour, where, having been informed that part of the latter was left dry at ebb-tide, he meditated a second attack. While the assault was raging on the landward side, Scipio sent a division with ladders over the shallow bank "where Neptune himself showed them the way," and they had actually the good fortune to find the walls at that point undefended. Thus the city was won on the first day;
whereupon Mago in the citadel capitulated. With the Carthaginian capital there fell into the hands of the Romans 18 dismantled vessels of war and 63 transports, the whole war-stores, considerable supplies of corn, the war- chest of 600 talents (more than ,£140,000), ten thousand captives, among whom were eighteen Carthaginian geru- siasts or judges, and the hostages of all the Spanish allies of Carthage. Scipio promised the hostages permission to return home so soon as their respective communities should have entered into alliance with Rome, and employed the resources which the city afforded to reinforce and improve the condition of his army. He ordered the artisans of New Carthage, 2000 in number, to work for the Roman
to them liberty at the close of the war, and he selected the able-bodied men among the remain
ing multitude to serve as rowers in the fleet But the burgesses of the city were spared, and allowed to retain their liberty and former position. Scipio knew the Phoenicians, and was aware that they would obey; and it was important that a city possessing the only excellent
army, promising
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
329
harbour on the east coast and rich silver-mines should be secured by something more than a garrison. —
Success thus crowned the bold enterprise bold, because it was not unknown to Scipio that Hasdrubal Barcas had received orders from his government to advance towards Gaul and was engaged in fulfilling them, and because the weak division left behind on the Ebro was not in a position seriously to oppose that movement, should the return of Scipio be delayed. But he was again at Tarraco, before Hasdrubal made his appearance on the Ebro. The hazard of the game which the young general played, when he abandoned his primary task in order to execute a dashing stroke, was concealed by the fabulous success which
and Scipio had gained in concert. The mar vellous capture of the Phoenician capital so abundantly justified all the expectations which had been formed at home regarding the wondrous youth, that none could venture to utter any adverse opinion. Scipio's command was indefinitely prolonged ; he himself resolved no longer to confine his efforts to the meagre task of guarding the passes of the Pyrenees. Already, in consequence of the fall of New Carthage, not only had the Spaniards on the north of the Ebro completely submitted, but even beyond the Ebro the most powerful princes had exchanged the Carthaginian for the Roman protectorate.
Neptune
Scipio employed the winter of 545-6 in breaking up his
fleet and increasing his land army with the men thus acquired, so that he might at once guard the north and assume the offensive in the south more energetically than before; and he marched in 546 to Andalusia. There he 208. encountered Hasdrubal Barcas, who, in the execution of his long-cherished plan, was moving northward to the help of
his brother. A battle took place at Baecula, in which the Romans claimed the victory and professed to have made
1 0,000 captives ; but Hasdrubal substantially attained his
209-208.
g^^ Andalusia.
Spain conquered.
207.
107.
330
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
Hasdnibal end, although at the sacrifice of a portion of his army. crosses the ^yjtn j^ chest, his elephants, and the best portion of his
Pyrenees.
troops, he fought his way to the north coast of Spain ; marching along the shore, he reached the western passes of the Pyrenees which appear to have been unoccupied, and before the bad season began he was in Gaul, where he took up quarters for the winter. It was evident that the resolve of Scipio to combine offensive operations with the defensive which he had been instructed to maintain was inconsiderate and unwise. The immediate task assigned to the Spanish army, which not only Scipio's father and uncle, but even Gaius Marcius and Gaius Nero had accomplished with much inferior means, was not enough for the arrogance of the victorious general at the head of a numerous army; and he was mainly to blame for the extremely critical position of Rome in the summer of 547, when the plan of Hannibal for a combined attack on the Romans was at length realized. But the gods covered the errors of their favourite with laurels. In Italy the peril fortunately passed over ; the Romans were glad to accept the bulletin of the ambiguous victory of Baecula, and, when fresh tidings of victory arrived from Spain, thought no more of the circumstance that they had had to combat the ablest general and the flower of the Hispano- Phoenician army in Italy.
After the removal of Hasdrubal Barcas the two generals wno were le^ jn gpam determined for the time being to retire, Hasdrubal son of Gisgo to Lusitania, Mago even to the Baleares ; and, until new reinforcements should arrive from Africa, they left the light cavalry of Massinissa alone to wage a desultory warfare in Spain, as Muttines had done so successfully in Sicily. The whole east coast thus fell into the power of the Romans. In the following year (547) Hanno actually made his appearance from Africa with a third army, whereupon Mago and Hasdrubal
they
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
331
returned to Andalusia. But Marcus Silanus defeated the united armies of Mago and Hanno, and captured the latter in person. Hasdrubal upon this abandoned the idea of keeping the open field, and distributed his troops among the Andalusian cities, of which Scipio was during this year able to storm only one, Oringis. The Phoenicians seemed vanquished ; but yet they were able in the following year
once more to send into the field a powerful army, 209 32 elephants, 4000 horse, and 70,000 foot, far the greater part of whom, it is true, were hastily -collected Spanish militia. Again a battle took place at Baecula. The Roman army numbered little more than half that of the enemy, and was also to a considerable extent composed of Spaniards. Scipio, like Wellington in similar circumstances, disposed his Spaniards so that they should not partake in
the fight — the only possible mode of preventing their dispersion — while on the other hand he threw his Roman troops in the first instance on the Spaniards. The day was nevertheless obstinately contested; but at length the Romans were the victors, and, as a matter of course, the defeat of such an army was equivalent to its complete dissolution —Hasdrubal and Mago singly made their escape
to Gades. The Romans were now without a rival in the peninsula ; the few towns that did not submit with good
will were subdued one by one, and some of them were
with cruel severity. Scipio was even able to visit Syphax on the African coast, and to enter into com munications with him and also with Massinissa with reference to an expedition to Africa — a foolhardy venture, which was not warranted by any corresponding advantage, however much the report of it might please the curiosity of the citizens of the capital at home. Gades alone, where Mago held command, was still Phoenician. For a moment it seemed as after the Romans had entered upon the Carthaginian heritage and had sufficiently undeceived the
(548)
punished
if,
Gades becomes Roman.
33a
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
Magogoes loIt«lr-
expectation cherished here and there among the Spaniards that after the close of the Phoenician rule they would get rid of their Roman guests also and regain their ancient freedom, a general insurrection against the Romans would break forth in Spain, in which the former allies of Rome would take the lead. The sickness of the Roman general and the mutiny of one of his corps, occasioned by their pay being in arrear for many years, favoured the rising. But Scipio recovered sooner than was expected, and dexterously suppressed the tumult among the soldiers ; upon which the communities that had taken the lead in the national rising were subdued at once before the insurrection gained ground. Seeing that nothing came of this move- ment and Gades could not be permanently held, the Carthaginian government ordered Mago to gather together whatever could be got in ships, troops, and money, and with these, if possible, to give another turn to the war in Italy. Scipio could not prevent this — his dismantling of the fleet now avenged itself—and he was a second time obliged to leave in the hands of his gods the defence, with which he had been entrusted, of his country against new invasions. The last of Hamilcar's sons left the peninsula without opposition. After his departure Gades, the oldest and last possession of the Phoenicians on Spanish soil, submitted on favourable conditions to the new masters. Spain was, after a thirteen years' struggle, converted from a Carthaginian into a Roman province, in which the conflict with the Romans was still continued for centuries by means of insurrections always suppressed and yet never subdued, but in which at the moment no enemy stood opposed to Rome. Scipio embraced the first moment of
206. apparent peace to resign his command (in the end of 548), and to report at Rome in person the victories which he had achieved and the provinces which he had won.
While the war was thus terminated in Sicily
by
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
333
Marcellus, in Greece by Publius Sulpicius, and in Spain by Italian Scipio, the mighty struggle went on without interruption in war'
the Italian peninsula. There after the battle of Cannae
had been fought and its effects in loss or gain could by
degrees be discerned, at the commencement of 540, the 214.
fifth year of the war, the dispositions of the opposing Position of Romans and Phoenicians were the following. North Italy 1 e arnuefc had been reoccupied by the Romans after the departure of Hannibal, and was protected by three legions, two of
which were stationed in the Celtic territory, the third as a reserve in Picenum. Lower Italy, as far as Mount Garganus and the Volturnus, was, with the exception of the fortresses and most of the ports, in the hands of Hannibal. He lay with his main army at Arpi, while Tiberius Gracchus with four legions confronted him in Apulia, resting upon the fortresses of Luceria and Beneventum. In the land of the Bruttians, where the inhabitants had thrown themselves entirely into the arms ofHannibal, and where even the ports—excepting Rhegium, which the Romans protected from Messana—had been occupied by the Phoenicians, there was a second Carthaginian army under Hanno, which in the meanwhile saw no enemy to face it The Roman main army of four legions under the two consuls, Quintus Fabius and Marcus Marcellus, was on the point of attempting to recover Capua. To these there fell to be added on the Roman side the reserve of two legions in the capital, the garrisons placed in all the seaports —Tarentum and Brundisium having been reinforced by a legion on account of the Macedonian land ing apprehended there—and lastly the strong fleet which had undisputed command of the sea. If we add to these the Roman armies in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the whole number of the Roman forces, even apart from the
garrison service in the fortresses of Lower Italy which was provided for by the colonists occupying them, may be
334
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book in
estimated at not less than 200,000 men, of whom one- third were newly enrolled for this year, and about one-half were Roman citizens. It may be assumed that all the men capable of service from the 17th to the 46th year were under arms, and that the fields, where the war permitted them to be tilled at all, were cultivated by the slaves and the old men, women, and children As may well be con ceived, under such circumstances the finances were in the most grievous embarrassment; the land-tax, the main source of revenue, came in but very irregularly. Yet not withstanding these difficulties as to men and money the Romans were able — slowly indeed and by exerting all their energies, but still surely — to recover what they had so rapidly lost ; to increase their armies yearly, while those of the Phoenicians were diminishing ; to gain ground year by year on the Italian allies of Hannibal, the Campanians, Apulians, Samnites, and Bruttians, who neither sufficed, like the Roman fortresses in Lower Italy, for their own protection nor could be adequately protected by the weak army of Hannibal; and finally, by means of the method of warfare instituted by Marcus Marcellus, to develop the talent of their officers and to bring into full play the superiority of the Roman infantry. Hannibal might doubt less still hope for victories, but no longer such victories as those on the Trasimene lake and on the Aufidus ; the times of the citizen-generals were gone by. No course was left to him but to wait till either Philip should execute his long-promised descent or his own brothers should join him from Spain, and meanwhile to keep himself, his army, and his clients as far as possible free from harm and in
good humour. We hardly recognize in the obstinate defensive system which he now began the same general who had carried on the offensive with almost unequalled impetuosity and boldness ; it is marvellous in a psycho logical as well as in a military point of view, that the same
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
335
man should have accomplished the two tasks set to him — tasks so diametrically opposite in their character —with equal completeness.
At first the war turned chiefly towards Campania. Han- Conflict* nibal appeared in good time to protect its capital, which he in . prevented from being invested but he was unable either to Italy, wrest any of the Campanian towns held the Romans from
their strong Roman garrisons, or to prevent—in addition to
number of less important country towns — Casilinum, which secured his passage over the Volturnus, from being taken the two consular armies after an obstinate defence. An attempt of Hannibal to gain Tarentum, with the view especially of acquiring safe landing-place for the Mace donian army, proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Bruttian army of the Carthaginians under Hanno had various en counters Lucania with the Roman army of Apulia here Tiberius Gracchus sustained the struggle with good results, and after successful combat not far from Beneventum, in which the slave legions pressed into service had distinguished themselves, he bestowed liberty and burgess-rights on his slave-soldiers the name of the people.
In the following year (541) the Romans recovered the
rich and important Arpi, whose citizens, after the Roman b_q,jje soldiers had stolen into the town, made common cause with Romans, them against the Carthaginian garrison. In general the
bonds of the symmachy formed by Hannibal were relaxing
number of the leading Capuans and several of the Bruttian towns passed over to Rome even Spanish divi sion of the Phoenician army, when informed by Spanish emissaries of the course of events in their native land, passed from the Carthaginian into the Roman service.
The year 542 was more unfavourable for the Romans in 212. consequence of fresh political and military errors, of which J^^ Hannibal did not fail to take advantage. The connections HannibaL which Hannibal maintained in the towns of Magna Graecia
Arpl [21i.
;
a
aa by
;
a in in
;
a
by
;
J5*
Conflicts Caoua.
had led to no serious result ; save that the hostages from Tarentum and Thurii, who were kept at Rome, were in duced by his emissaries to make a foolhardy attempt at escape, in which they were speedily recaptured by the Roman posts. But the injudicious spirit of revenge dis played by the Romans was of more service to Hannibal than his intrigues ; the execution of all the hostages who had sought to escape deprived them of a valuable pledge, and the exasperated Greeks thenceforth meditated how they might open their gates to Hannibal. Tarentum was actu ally occupied by the Carthaginians in consequence of an understanding with the citizens and of the negligence of the Roman commandant; with difficulty the Roman garrison maintained itself in the citadel. The example of Tarentum was followed by Heraclea, Thurii, and Metapontum, from which town the garrison had to be withdrawn in order to save the Tarentine Acropolis. These successes so greatly increased the risk of a Macedonian landing, that Rome felt herself compelled to direct renewed attention and renewed exertions to the Greek war, which had been almost totally neglected ; and fortunately the capture of Syracuse and the favourable state of the Spanish war enabled her to do so.
At the chief seat of war, in Campania, the struggle went on "^ verv varvm£, success. The legions posted in the neighbourhood of Capua had not yet strictly invested the city, but had so greatly hindered the cultivation of the soil and the ingathering of the harvest, that the populous city was in urgent need of supplies from without. Hannibal accordingly collected a considerable supply of grain, and directed the Campanians to receive it at Beneventum ; but their tardiness gave the consuls Quintus Flaccus and Appius Claudius time to come up, to inflict a severe defeat on Hanno who protected the grain, and to seize his camp and all his stores. The two consuls then invested the town,
336
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK ill
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
337
while Tiberius Gracchus stationed himself on the Appian Way to prevent Hannibal ftom approaching to relieve it But that brave officer fell in consequence of the shameful stratagem of a perfidious Lucanian; and his death was equivalent to a complete defeat, for his army, consisting mostly of those slaves whom he had manumitted, dispersed after the fall of their beloved leader. So Hannibal found the road to Capua open, and by his unexpected appearance compelled the two consuls to raise the blockade which they had barely begun. Their cavalry had already, before Han nibal's arrival, been thoroughly defeated by the Phoenician cavalry, which lay as a garrison in Capua under Hanno and Bostar, and by the equally excellent Campanian horse.
The total destruction of the regular troops and free bands
in Lucania led by Marcus Centenius, a man imprudently promoted from a subaltern to be a general, and the not
much less complete defeat of the negligent and arrogant
praetor Gnaeus Fulvius Flaccus in Apulia, closed the long
series of the misfortunes of this year. But the stubborn per severance of the Romans again neutralized the rapid success
of Hannibal, at least at the most decisive point. As soon
as Hannibal turned his back on Capua to proceed to Apulia,
the Roman armies once more gathered around that city,
one at Puteoli and Volturnum under Appius Claudius,
another at Casilinum under Quintus Fulvius, and a third
on the Nolan road under the praetor Gaius Claudius Nero.
The three camps, well entrenched and connected with one
another by fortified lines, precluded all access to the place,
and the large, inadequately provisioned city could not but
find itself compelled by the mere investment to surrender
at no distant time, should no relief arrive. As the winter
of 542-3 drew to an end, the provisions were almost 212-211. exhausted, and urgent messengers, who were barely able to
steal through the well-guarded Roman lines, requested speedy help from Hannibal, who was at Tarentum, occupied
vol. tl
54
Hannibal marches towards Rome.
with the siege of the citadel. With 33 elephants and his best troops he departed by forced marches from Tarentum for Campania, captured the Roman post at Calatia, and took up his camp on Mount Tifata close by Capua, in the confident expectation that the Roman generals would, now raise the siege as they had done the year before. But the Romans, who had had time to entrench their camps and their lines like a fortress, did not stir, and looked on unmoved from their ramparts, while on one side the Cam- panian horsemen, on the other the Numidian squadrons, dashed against their lines. A serious assault could not be thought of by Hannibal ; he could foresee that his advance would soon draw the other Roman armies after him to Campania, if even before their arrival the scarcity of supplies in a region so systematically foraged did not drive him
away. Nothing could be done in that quarter.
Hannibal tried a further expedient, the last which occurred
to his inventive genius, to save the important city. After giving the Campanians information of his intention and ex horting them to hold out, he started with the relieving army from Capua and took the road for Rome. With the same dexterous boldness which he had shown in his first Italian campaigns, he threw himself with a weak army between the armies and fortresses of the enemy, and led his troops through Samnium and along the Valerian Way past Tibur to the bridge over the Anio, which he passed and encamped on the opposite bank, five miles from the city. The child ren's children of the Romans still shuddered, when they were told of "Hannibal at the gate"; real danger there was none. The country houses and fields in the neighbour hood of the city were laid waste by the enemy ; the two legions in the city, who went forth against them, prevented the investment of the walls. Besides, Hannibal had never expected to surprise Rome by a coup de main, such as
Scipio soon afterwards executed against New Carthage, and
33»
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
339
still less had he meditated a siege in earnest ; his only hope was that in the first alarm part of the besieging army of Capua would march to Rome and thus give him an oppor tunity of breaking up the blockade. Accordingly after a brief stay he departed. The Romans saw in his withdrawal a miraculous intervention of the gods, who by portents and visions had compelled the wicked man to depart, when in truth the Roman legions were unable to compel him ; at the spot where Hannibal had approached nearest to the city, at the second milestone on the Appian Way in front of the
Capene gate, with grateful credulity the Romans erected an altar to the god "who turned back and protected"
Hannibal in reality retreated, because this was part of hisplan, and directed his march towards Capua. But the Roman generals had not committed the mistake on which their opponent had reckoned ; the legions remained
unmoved in the lines round Capua, and only a weak corps had been detached on the news of Hannibal's march towards Rome. When Hannibal learned this, he suddenly turned against the consul Publius Galba, who had imprudently followed him from Rome, and with whom he had hitherto avoided an engagement, vanquished him, and took his camp by storm.
But this was a poor compensation for the now inevitable Capua
fall of Capua. Long had its citizens, particularly the better ap"u te*' classes, anticipated with sorrowful forebodings what was
coming ; the senate-house and the administration of the city
were left almost exclusively to the leaders of the popular
party hostile to Rome. Now despair seized high and low, Campanians and Phoenicians alike. Twenty-eight senators
chose a voluntary death ; the remainder gave over the city
to the discretion of an implacably exasperated foe. Of
course a bloody retribution had to follow ; the only discus
sion was as to whether the process should be long or short :
whether the wiser and more appropriate course was to probe
(Rediculus Tutanus).
Superiority of the Romans.
to the bottom the further ramifications of the treason even beyond Capua, or to terminate the matter by rapid execu tions. Appius Claudius and the Roman senate wished to take the former course ; the latter view, perhaps the less inhuman, prevailed. Fifty-three of the officers and magis trates of Capua were scourged and beheaded in the market places of Cales and Teanum by the orders and before the eyes of the proconsul Quintus Flaccus, the rest of the senators were imprisoned, numbers of the citizens were sold into slavery, and the estates of the more wealthy were con fiscated. Similar penalties were inflicted upon Atella and Calatia. These punishments were severe ; but, when regard is had to the importance of the revolt of Capua from Rome,
and to what was the ordinary if not warrantable usage of war in those times, they were not unnatural. And had not the citizens themselves pronounced their own sentence, when immediately after their defection they put to death all the Roman citizens present in Capua at the time of the revolt? But it was unjustifiable in Rome to embrace this opportunity of gratifying the secret rivalry that had long subsisted between the two largest cities of Italy, and of wholly annihilating, in a political point of view, her hated and envied competitor by abolishing the constitution of the Campanian city.
Immense was the impression produced by the fall of Capua, and all the more that it had not been brought about by surprise, but by a two years' siege carried on in spite of all the exertions of Hannibal. It was quite as much a token that the Romans had recovered their ascendency in Italy, as its defection some years before to Hannibal had been a token that that ascendency was lost. In vain Hannibal had tried to counteract the impression of this news on his allies by the capture of Rhegium or of the citadel of Taren- tum. His forced march to surprise Rhegium had yielded no result The citadel of Tarentum suffered greatly from
34©
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
CHAP. VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
341
famine, after the Tarentino-Carthaginian squadron closed the harbour; but, as the Romans with their much more powerful fleet were able to cut off the supplies from that squadron itself, and the territory, which Hannibal com manded, scarce sufficed to maintain his army, the besiegers on the side next the sea suffered not much less than did the
in the citadel, and at length they left the harbour. No enterprise was now successful ; Fortune herself seemed to have deserted the Carthaginians. These consequences of the fall of Capua —the deep shock given to the respect and confidence which Hannibal had hitherto enjoyed among the Italian allies, and the endeavours made by every community that was not too deeply compromised to gain readmission on tolerable terms into the Roman
symmachy—affected Hannibal much more keenly than the immediate loss. He had to choose one of two courses; either to throw garrisons into the wavering towns, in which
case he would weaken still more his army already too weak and would expose his trusty troops to destruction in small divisions or to treachery — 500 of his select Numidian horsemen were put to death in this way in 544 on the 210. defection of the town of Salapia ; or to pull down and burn
the towns which could not be depended on, so as to keep them out of the enemy's hands — a course, which could not raise the spirits of his Italian clients. On the fall of Capua
the Romans felt themselves once more confident as to the
final issue of the war in Italy ; they despatched considerable reinforcements to Spain, where the existence of the Roman army was placed in jeopardy by the fall of the two Scipios ;
and for the first time since the beginning of the war they ventured on a diminution in the total number of their troops, which had hitherto been annually augmented not withstanding the annually -increasing difficulty of levying them, and had risen at last to 23 legions. Accordingly in
the next year (544) the Italian war was prosecuted more 210.
besieged
209. Tarentum
capitulates.
remissly than hitherto by the Romans, although Marcus Marcellus had after the close of the Sicilian war resumed the command of the main army ; he applied himself to the besieging of fortresses in the interior, and had indecisive conflicts with the Carthaginians. The struggle for the Acropolis of Tarentum also continued without decisive result In Apulia Hannibal succeeded in defeating the proconsul Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus at Herdoneae. In the following year (545) the Romans took steps to regain possession of the second large city, which had passed over to Hannibal. the city of Tarentum. While Marcus Marcellus continued the struggle against Hannibal in person with his wonted obstinacy and energy, and in a two days' battle, beaten on the first day, achieved on the second
a costly and bloody victory ; while the consul
Fulvius induced the already wavering Lucanians and Hir- pinians to change sides and to deliver up their Phoeni cian garrisons ; while well-conducted razzias from Rhegium compelled Hannibal to hasten to the aid of the hard- pressed Bruttians; the veteran Quintus Fabius, who had once more — for the fifth time — accepted the consulship and along with it the commission to reconquer Tarentum, established himself firmly in the neighbouring Messapian territory, and the treachery of a Bruttian division of the
surrendered to him the city. Fearful excesses were committed by the exasperated victors. They put to death all of the garrison or of the citizens whom they could find, and pillaged the houses. 30,000 Tarentines are said to have been sold as slaves, and 3000 talents (^730,000) are stated to have been sent to the state treasury. It was the last feat in arms of the general of eighty years ; Hannibal arrived to the relief of the city when all was over, and withdrew to Metapontum.
After Hannibal had thus lost his most important acquisi tions and found himself hemmed In by degrees to the
Hannibal driven back.
34*
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
garrison
Quintus
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
343
south-western point of the peninsula, Marcus Marcellus, who
had been chosen consul for the next year (546), hoped that, 208.
in connection with his capable colleague Titus Quintius Crispinus, he should be able to terminate the war by a
decisive attack. The old soldier was not disturbed by the
burden of his sixty years; sleeping and waking he was
haunted by the one thought of defeating Hannibal and of liberating Italy. But fate reserved that wreath of victory Death of
M*"*TM'
for a younger brow. While engaged in an unimportant reconnaissance in the district of Venusia, both consuls
were suddenly attacked by a division of African cavalry. Marcellus maintained the unequal struggle — as he had fought forty years before against Hamilcar and fourteen years before at Clastidium —till he sank dying from his horse ; Crispinus escaped, but died of his wounds received
in the conflict (546). 208.
It was now the eleventh year of the war. The danger which some years before had threatened the very existence
of the state seemed to have vanished; but all the more
the Romans felt the heavy burden — a burden pressing more severely year after year —of the endless war. The finances of the state suffered beyond measure. After the battle of Cannae (538) a special bank-commission (tres viri 218. mensarit) had been appointed, composed of men held in
the highest esteem, to form a permanent and circumspect board of superintendence for the public finances in these difficult times.
It may have done what it could ; but the state of things was such as to baffle all financial sagacity.
At the very beginning of the war the Romans had debased
the silver and copper coin, raised the legal value of the silver piece more than a third, and issued a gold coin far above the value of the metal. This very soon proved insufficient; they were obliged to take supplies from the contractors on credit, and connived at their conduct because they needed them, till the scandalous malversation
Pressure of
344
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
at last induced the aediles to make an example of some of the worst by impeaching them before the people. Appeals were often made, and not in vain, to the patriotism of the wealthy, who were in fact the very persons that suffered comparatively the most The soldiers of the better classes and the subaltern officers and equites in a body, either voluntarily or constrained by the esprit de corps, declined to receive pay. The owners of the slaves armed by the state and manumitted after the engagement at Beneventum
335) replied to the bank-commission, which offered them payment, that they would allow to stand over to 214. the end of the war (540). When there was no longer
money in the exchequer for the celebration of the national festivals and the repairs of the public buildings, the companies which had hitherto contracted for these matters declared themselves ready to continue their services for
214. time without remuneration (540). fleet was even fitted out and manned, just as in the first Punic war, by means 210. of voluntary loan among the rich (544). They spent the
moneys belonging to minors and at length, in the year of the conquest of Tarentum, they laid hands on the last long-spared reserve fund (,£164,000). The state never theless was unable to meet its most necessary payments the pay of the soldiers fell dangerously into arrear, parti cularly in the more remote districts. But the embarrass ment of the state was not the worst part of the material distress. Everywhere the fields lay fallow even where the war did not make havoc, there was want of hands for the hoe and the sickle. The price of the medimnus bushel and half) had risen to 15 denarii (10s. ), at least three times the average price in the capital and many would have died of absolute want, supplies had not arrived from Egypt, and above all, the revival of agriculture in Sicily 314) had not prevented the distress from coming to the worst. The effect which such state of things must
a
a
A
(p.
if,
if
a
; it :
(a
;
;a
a
(p.
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
345
have had in ruining the small farmers, in eating away the savings which had been so laboriously acquired, and in
converting flourishing villages into nests of beggars and brigands, is illustrated by similar wars of which fuller details have been preserved.
Still more ominous than this material distress was the increasing aversion of the allies to the Roman war, which consumed their substance and their blood. In regard to the non-Latin communities, indeed, this was of less conse
The war itself showed that they could do nothing, so long as the Latin nation stood by Rome ; their greater or less measure of dislike was not of much moment. Now, however, Latium also began to waver. Most of the Latin communes in Etruria, Latium, the territory of the Marsians, and northern Campania —and so in those very districts of Italy which directly had suffered least from the war—announced to the Roman senate in 545 that thence- forth they would send neither contingents nor contributions, and would leave it to the Romans themselves to defray the costs of a war waged in their interest The consternation in Rome was great ; but for the moment there were no means of compelling the refractory. Fortunately all the Latin communities did not act in this way. The colonies in the land of the Gauls, in Picenum, and in southern Italy, headed by the powerful and patriotic Fregellae, declared on the contrary that they adhered the more closely and faithfully to Rome ; in fact, it was very clearly evident to all of these that in the present war their existence was, if possible, still more at stake than that of the capital, and that this war was really waged not for Rome merely, but for the Latin hegemony in Italy, and in truth for the independence of the Italian nation. That partial defection itself was certainly not high treason, but merely the result of shortsightedness and exhaustion ; beyond doubt these same towns would have rejected with horror an alliance
The aiile*
quence.
209.
Hudro- bal's approach.
34«
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL BOOK III
with the Phoenicians. But still there was a variance between Romans and Latins, which did not fail injuriously to react on the subject population of these districts. A dangerous ferment immediately showed itself in Arretium ; a conspiracy organized in the interest of Hannibal among the Etruscans was discovered, and appeared so perilous that Roman troops were ordered to march thither. The military and police suppressed this movement without difficulty ; but it was a significant token of what might happen in those districts, if once the Latin strongholds ceased to inspire terror.
Amidst these difficulties and strained relations, news suddenly arrived that Hasdrubal had crossed the Pyrenees 208. in the autumn of 546, and that the Romans must be pre
pared to carry on the war next year with both the sons of Hamilcar in Italy. Not in vain had Hannibal persevered at his post throughout the long anxious years ; the aid, which the factious opposition at home and the shortsighted Philip had refused to him, was at length in the course of being brought to him by his brother, who, like himself, largely in herited the spirit of Hamilcar. Already 8000 Ligurians, enlisted by Phoenician gold, were ready to unite with Hasdrubal ; if he gained the first battle, he might hope that like his brother he should be able to bring the Gauls and perhaps the Etruscans into arms against Rome. Italy, moreover, was no longer what it had been eleven years before ; the state and the individual citizens were exhausted, the Latin league was shaken, their best general had just fallen in the field of battle, and Hannibal was not sub dued. In reality Scipio might bless the star of his genius, if it averted the consequences of his unpardonable blunder from himself and from his country.
As in the times of the utmost danger, Rome once more called out twenty-three legions. Volunteers were summoned to arm, and those legally exempt from military service were
New ments.
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
347
included in the levy. Nevertheless, they were taken by surprise. Far earlier than either friends or foes expected, Hasdrubal was on the Italian side of the Alps (547); the Gauls, now accustomed to such transits, were readily bribed TMTM to open their passes, and furnished what the army required.
If the Romans had any intention of occupying the outlets of the Alpine passes, they were again too late; already they heard that Hasdrubal was on the Po, that he was calling the Gauls to arms as successfully as his brother had formerly done, that Placentia was invested. With all haste the consul Marcus Livius proceeded to the northern army ; and it was high time that he should appear. Etruria and Umbria were in sullen ferment ; volunteers from them re inforced the Phoenician army. His colleague Gaius Nero summoned the praetor Gaius Hostilius Tubulus from Venusia to join him, and hastened with an army of 40,000 men to intercept the march of Hannibal to the north. The latter collected all his forces in the Bruttian territory, and, advancing along the great road leading from Rhegium to Apulia, encountered the consul at Grumentum. An obstinate engagement took place in which Nero claimed the victory ; but Hannibal was able at all events, although with some loss, to evade the enemy by one of his usual adroit flank-marches, and to reach Apulia without hindrance. There he halted, and encamped at first at Venusia, then at Canusium : Nero, who had followed closely in his steps, encamped opposite to him at both places. That Hannibal voluntarily halted and was not prevented from advancing by the Roman army, appears to admit of no doubt ; the reason for his taking up his position exactly at this point and not farther to the north, must have depended on arrangements concerted between himself and Hasdrubal, or on conjectures as to the route of the latter's march, with which we are not acquainted. While the two armies thus lay inactive, face to face, the despatch from Hasdrubal
Hudralad
J^mIb-j on the
348
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book III
Battle of Sena.
which was anxiously expected in Hannibal's camp was intercepted by the outposts of Nero. It stated that Hasdrubal intended to take the Flaminian road, in other words, to keep in the first instance along the coast and then at Fanum to turn across the Apennines towards Narnia, at which place he hoped to meet Hannibal. Nero immediately ordered the reserve in the capital to proceed to Narnia as the point selected for the junction of the two
Phoenician armies, while the division stationed at Capua went to the capital, and a new reserve was formed there. Convinced that Hannibal was not acquainted with the purpose of his brother and would continue to await him in Apulia, Nero resolved on the bold experiment of hastening northward by forced marches with a small but select corps of 7000 men and, if possible, in connection
with his colleague, compelling Hasdrubal to fight He was able to do so, for the Roman army which he left behind still continued strong enough either to hold its ground against Hannibal if he should attack or to ac company him and to arrive simultaneously with him at the
decisive scene of action, should he depart.
Nero found his colleague Marcus Livius at Sena Gallica
awaiting the enemy. Both consuls at once marched against Hasdrubal, whom they found occupied in crossing the Me- taurus. Hasdrubal wished to avoid battle and to escape
flank movement, but his guides left him in the lurch he lost his way on the ground strange to him, and was at length attacked on the march by the
Roman cavalry and detained until the Roman infantry arrived and battle became inevitable. Hasdrubal stationed the Spaniards on the right wing, with his ten elephants in
front of and the Gauls on the left, which he kept back. Long the fortune of battle wavered on the right wing, and the consul Livius who commanded there was hard pressed, till Nero, repeating his strategical operation as tactical
from the Romans by
a
it,
a
;
a
a
it,
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
349
manoeuvre, allowed the motionless enemy opposite to him to remain as they stood, and marching round his own army fell upon the flank of the Spaniards. This decided the
The severely bought and very bloody victory was complete ; the army, which had no retreat, was destroyed,
and the camp was taken by assault. Hasdrubal, when he Death of
**
day.
saw the admirably-conducted battle lost, sought and found like his father an honourable soldier's death. As an officer and a man, he was worthy to be the brother of Hannibal.
On the day after the battle Nero started, and after
Hannibal fourteen days' absence once more confronted £j'TM
scarcely
Hannibal in Apulia, whom no message had reached, and Bruttian who had not stirred. The consul brought the message ternt0S17* with him ; it was the head of Hannibal's brother, which
the Roman ordered to be thrown into the enemy's outposts, repaying in this way his great antagonist, who scorned to
war with the dead, for the honourable burial which he had
given to Paullus, Gracchus, and Marcellus. Hannibal saw
that his hopes had been in vain, and that all was over.
He abandoned Apulia and Lucania, even Metapontum, and retired with his troops to the land of the Bruttians, whose ports formed his only means of withdrawal from Italy. By the energy of the Roman generals, and still more by a con juncture of unexampled good fortune, a peril was averted from Rome, the greatness of which justified Hannibal's tenacious perseverance in Italy, and which fully bears com parison with the magnitude of the peril of Cannae. The joy in Rome was boundless ; business was resumed as in time of peace ; every one felt that the danger of the war was surmounted.
Nevertheless the Romans were in no hurry to terminate Stagnation the war. The state and the citizens were exhausted by the £, u. jJTM' excessive moral and material strain on their energies ; men
gladly abandoned themselves to carelessness and repose.
3SO
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book III
The army and fleet were reduced ; the Roman and Latin farmers were brought back to their desolate homesteads ; the exchequer was filled by the sale of a portion of the Campanian domains. The administration of the state was regulated anew and the disorders which had prevailed were done away ; the repayment of the voluntary war-loan was begun, and the Latin communities that remained in arrears were compelled to fulfil their neglected obligations with heavy interest.
The war in Italy made no progress. It forms a brilliant proof of the strategic talent of Hannibal as well as of the incapacity of the Roman generals now opposed to him, that after this he was still able for four years to keep the field in the Bruttian country, and that all the superiority of his opponents could not compel him either to shut himself up in fortresses or to embark. It is true that he was obliged to retire farther and farther, not so much in consequence of the indecisive engagements which took place with the Romans, as because his Bruttian allies were always becoming more troublesome, and at last he could only reckon on the towns which his army garrisoned. Thus he voluntarily abandoned Thurii j Locri was, on the suggestion of Publius
208. Scipio, recaptured by an expedition from Rhegium
As if at last his projects were to receive a brilliant justifica tion at the hands of the very Carthaginian authorities who had thwarted him in them, these now, in their apprehension as to the anticipated landing of the Romans, revived of their
206. 205. own accord those plans (548, 549), and sent reinforcements and subsidies to Hannibal in Italy, and to Mago in Spain, with orders to rekindle the war in Italy so as to achieve some further respite for the trembling possessors of the Libyan country houses and the shops of Carthage. An embassy was likewise sent to Macedonia, to induce Philip
SOS. to renew the alliance and to land in Italy (549). But it was too late. Philip had made peace with Rome some
(549).
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
331
months before; the impending political annihilation of Carthage was far from agreeable to him, but he took no step openly at least against Rome. A small Macedonian corps went to Africa, the expenses of which, according to the assertion of the Romans, were defrayed by Philip from his own pocket ; this may have been the case, but the Romans had at any rate no proof of as the subsequent course of events showed. No Macedonian landing in Italy was thought of.
Mago, the youngest son of Hamilcar, set himself to his task more earnestly. With the remains of the Spanish army, which he had conducted in the first instance to Minorca, he landed in 549 at Genoa, destroyed the city, and summoned the Ligurians and Gauls to arms. Gold and the novelty of the enterprise led them now, as always, to come to him in troops he had formed connections even throughout Etruria, where political prosecutions never ceased. But the troops which he had brought with him
were too few for serious enterprise against Italy proper and Hannibal likewise was much too weak, and his influence in Lower Italy had fallen much too low, to permit him to advance with any prospect of success. The rulers of Carthage had not been willing to save their native country, when its salvation was possible; now, when they were
willing, was possible no longer.
Nobody probably in the Roman senate doubted either
Mago in **
206.
Thoj
that the war on the part of Carthage against Rome was ^^on
at an end, or that the war on the part of Rome against Carthage must now be begun but unavoidable as was the expedition to Africa, they were afraid to enter on its prepara tion.
ofScipio.
They required for above all, an able and beloved and they had none. Their best generals had either the field of battle, or they were, like Quintus Fabius
leader
fallen
and Quintus Fulvius, too old for such an entirely new and probably tedious war. The victors of Sena, Gaius Nero
in ;
it
it,
;
;
a
;
it,
35a
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book iii
and Marcus Livius, would perhaps have been equal to the task, but they were both in the highest degree unpopular aristocrats ; it was doubtful whether they would succeed in procuring the command —matters had already reached such a pass that ability, as such, determined the popular choice only in times of grave anxiety — and it was more than doubtful whether these were the men to stimulate the exhausted people to fresh exertions. At length Publius Scipio returned from Spain, and the favourite of the multitude, who had so brilliantly fulfilled, or at any rate seemed to have fulfilled, the task with which it had entrusted him, was immediately chosen consul for the next year. He entered
205. on office (549) with the firm determination of now realizing that African expedition which he had projected in Spain. In the senate, however, not only was the party favourable to a methodical conduct of the war unwilling to entertain the project of an African expedition so long as Hannibal remained in Italy, but the majority was by no means favourably disposed towards the young general himself. His Greek refinement and his modern culture and tone of thought were but little agreeable to the austere and some what boorish fathers of the city ; and serious doubts existed both as to his conduct of the Spanish war and as to his military discipline. How much ground there was for the
objection that he showed too great indulgence towards his officers of division, was very soon demonstrated by the dis graceful proceedings of Gaius Pleminius at Locri, the blame of which certainly was indirectly chargeable to the scandal ous negligence which marked Scipio's supervision. In the proceedings in the senate regarding the organization of the African expedition and the appointment of a general for
the new consul, wherever usage or the constitution came into conflict with his private views, showed no great reluc tance to set such obstacles aside, and very clearly indicated that in case of need he was disposed to rely for support
it,
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
353
against the governing board on his fame and his popularity with the people. These things could not but annoy the senate and awaken, moreover, serious apprehension as to whether, in the impending decisive war and the eventual negotiations for peace with Carthage, such a general would hold himself bound by the instructions which he received— an apprehension which his arbitrary management of the Spanish expedition was by no means fitted to allay. Both sides, however, displayed wisdom enough not to push matters too far. The senate itself could not fail to see that the African expedition was necessary, and that it was not wise indefinitely to postpone it ; it could not fail to see that Scipio was an extremely able officer and so far well adapted to be the leader in such a war, and that he, if any one, could prevail on the people to protract his command as long as was necessary and to put forth their last energies.
The majority came to the resolution not to refuse to Scipio the desired commission, after he had previously observed, at least in form, the respect due to the supreme governing board and had submitted himself beforehand to the decree of the senate. Scipio was to proceed this year to Sicily to superintend the building of the fleet, the preparation of siege materials, and the formation of the expeditionary army, and then in the following year to land in Africa. For this purpose the army of Sicily — still composed of those
two legions that were formed from the remnant of the army of Cannae —was placed at his disposal, because a weak garrison and the fleet were quite sufficient for the protection of the island ; and he was permitted moreover to raise volunteers in Italy. It was evident that the senate did not appoint the expedition, but merely allowed it : Scipio did not obtain half the resources which had formerly been placed at the command of Regulus, and he got that very
corps which for years had been subjected by the senate to intentional degradation. The African army was, in the
vol. 11
55
204.
Prepare- Africa,
view of the majority of the senate, a forlorn hope of disrated companies and volunteers, the loss of whom in any event the state had no great occasion to regret.
Any one else than Scipio would perhaps have declared that the African expedition must either be undertaken with other means, or not at all ; but Scipio's confidence accepted the terms, whatever they were, solely with the view of attain ing the eagerly-coveted command. He carefully avoided, as far as possible, the imposition of direct burdens on the people, that he might not injure the popularity of the expedi tion. Its expenses, particularly those of building the fleet which were considerable, were partly procured by what was termed a voluntary contribution of the Etruscan cities—that
war tribute imposed as punishment on the Arretines and other communities disposed to favour the Phoenicians — partly laid upon the cities of Sicily. In forty days the fleet was ready for sea. The crews were reinforced by volunteers, of whom seven thousand from all parts of Italy responded to the call of the beloved officer. So Scipio set sail for
Africa in the spring of 550 with two strong legions of veterans (about 30,000 men), 40 vessels of war, and 400 transports, and landed successfully, without meeting the slightest re sistance, at the Fair Promontory the neighbourhood of Utica.
The Carthaginians, who had long expected that the plundering expeditions, which the Roman squadrons had fre quently made during the last few years to the African coast, would be followed more serious invasion, had not only, in order to ward off, endeavoured to bring about revival of the Italo-Macedonian war, but had also made armed pre paration at home to receive the Romans. Of the two rival
Berber kings, Massinissa of Cirta (Constantine), the ruler of the Massylians, and Syphax of Siga (at the mouth of the Tafna westward from Oran), the ruler of the Massaesylians, they had succeeded in attaching the latter, who was far the
354
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
it
a
by a
in
is,
by a
a
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
355
more powerful and hitherto had been friendly to the Romans, by treaty and marriage alliance closely to Carthage, while they cast off the other, the old rival of Syphax and ally of the Carthaginians. Massinissa had after desperate resistance succumbed to the united power of the Carthaginians and of Syphax, and had been obliged to leave his territories a prey to the latter ; he himself wandered with a few horsemen in the desert Besides the contingent to be expected from Syphax, a Carthaginian army of 20,000 foot, 6000 cavalry, and 140 elephants — Hanno had been sent out to hunt elephants for the very purpose—was ready to fight for the protection of the capital, under the command of Hasdrubal son of Gisgo, a general who had gained experience in Spain ; in the port there lay a strong fleet A Macedonian corps under Sopater, and a consignment of Celtiberian mercenaries, were immediately expected.
On the report of Scipio's landing, Massinissa immediately Scipio arrived in the camp of the general, whom not long before he ^^g ^ had confronted as an enemy in Spain; but the landless coast, prince brought in the first instance nothing beyond his per
sonal ability to the aid of the Romans, and the Libyans, al
though heartily weary of levies and tribute, had acquired too
bitter experience in similar cases to declare at once for the
invaders. So Scipio began the campaign. So long as he
was only opposed by the weaker Carthaginian army, he had
the advantage, and was enabled after some successful cavalry skirmishes to proceed to the siege of Utica; but when Syphax
arrived, according to report with 50,000 infantry and 10,000
cavalry, the siege had to be raised, and a fortified naval camp
had to be constructed for the winter on a promontory, which
easily admitted of entrenchment, between Utica and Carthage.
Here the Roman general passed the winter of 550-1. From 204-208. the disagreeable situation in which the spring found him he
extricated himself by a fortunate coup de main. The Africans,
lulled into security by proposals of peace suggested by Scipio
Surprise
with more artifice than honour, allowed themselves to be
Carthagi-
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL look in
surprised on one and the same night in their two camps ; the man camP- reed huts of the Numidians burst into flames, and, when the Carthaginians hastened to their help, their own camp shared the same fate ; the fugitives were slain without resistance by
Negotia- peace;
the Roman divisions. This nocturnal surprise was more destructive than many a battle ; nevertheless the Carthagi nians did not suffer their courage to sink, and they rejected even the advice of the timid, or rather of the judicious, to recall Mago and Hannibal. Just at this time the expected Celtiberian and Macedonian auxiliaries arrived ; it was re solved once more to try a pitched battle on the "Great Plains," five days' march from Utica. Scipio hastened to accept it ; with little difficulty his veterans and volunteers dispersed the hastily -collected host of Carthaginians and Numidians, and the Celtiberians, who could not reckon on any mercy from Scipio, were cut down after obstinate resist ance. After this double defeat the Africans could no longer keep the field. An attack on the Roman naval camp attempted by the Carthaginian fleet, while not unsuccessful, was far from decisive, and was greatly outweighed by the capture of Syphax, which Scipio's singular good fortune threw in his way, and by which Massinissa became to the Romans what Syphax had been at first to the Carthaginians.
After such defeats the Carthaginian peace party, which had been reduced to silence for sixteen years, was able once more to raise its head and openly to rebel against the government of the Barcides and the patriots. Hasdrubal son of Gisgo was in his absence condemned by the
government to death, and an attempt was made to obtain an armistice and peace from Scipio. He demanded the cession of their Spanish possessions and of the islands of the Mediterranean, the transference of the kingdom of Syphax to Massinissa, the surrender of all their vessels of war except 20, and a war contribution of 4000 talents
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
357
(nearly j£i, 000,000) —terms which seemed so singularly favourable to Carthage, that the question obtrudes itself
whether they were offered by Scipio more in his own
interest or in that of Rome. The Carthaginian plenipoten
tiaries accepted them under reservation of their being
ratified by the respective authorities, and accordingly a Carthaginian embassy was despatched to Rome. But Machina- the patriot party in Carthage were not disposed to give up jj^"^. the struggle so cheaply; faith in the nobleness of their thaginian
Patnotl
cause, confidence in their great leader, even the example
that had been set to them by Rome herself, stimulated
them to persevere, apart from the fact that peace of ne
cessity involved the return of the opposite party to the
helm of affairs and their own consequent destruction. The patriotic party had the ascendency among the citizens ; it
was resolved to allow the opposition to negotiate for peace,
and meanwhile to prepare for a last and decisive effort-
Orders were sent to Mago and Hannibal to return with all
speed to Africa. Mago, who for three years (549-551) 205-208. had been labouring to bring about a coalition in Northern
Italy against Rome, had just at this time in the territory of the Insubres (about Milan) been defeated by the far superior double army of the Romans. The Roman cavalry had been brought to give way, and the infantry had been thrown into confusion ; victory seemed on the point of declaring for the Carthaginians, when a bold attack by a Roman troop on the enemy's elephants, and above all a serious wound received by their beloved and able com mander, turned the fortune of the battle. The Phoenician army was obliged to retreat to the Ligurian coast, where it received and obeyed the order to embark ; but Mago died of his wound on the voyage.
Hannibal would probably have anticipated the order, Hannibal had not the last negotiations with Philip presented to him ^^d t0 a renewed prospect of rendering better service to his
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL ' book in
country in Italy than in Libya ; when he received it at Croton, where he latterly had his head-quarters, he lost no time in complying with it He caused his horses to be put to death as well as the Italian soldiers who refused to follow him over the sea, and embarked in the transports that had been long in readiness in the roadstead of Croton. The Roman citizens breathed freely, when the mighty
Libyan lion, whose departure no one even now ventured to compel, thus voluntarily turned his back on Italian ground. On this occasion the decoration of a grass wreath was bestowed by the senate and burgesses on the only survivor of the Roman generals who had traversed that troubled time with honour, the veteran of nearly
ninety years, Quintus Fabius. To receive this wreath — which by the custom of the Romans the army that a general had saved presented to its deliverer—at the hands of the whole community was the highest distinction which had ever been
bestowed upon a Roman citizen, and the last honorary
decoration accorded to the old general, who died in the 108. course of that same year (551). Hannibal, doubtless not under the protection of the armistice, but solely through his rapidity of movement and good fortune, arrived at
Leptis without hindrance, and the last of the " lion's brood " of Hamilcar trode once more, after an absence of thirty-six years, his native soil. He had left when still almost boy, to enter on that noble and yet so thoroughly fruitless career of heroism, in which he had set out towards the west to return homewards from the east, having described
wide circle of victory around the Carthaginian sea. Now, when what he had wished to prevent, and what he would have prevented had he been allowed, was done, he was summoned to help and possible, to save and he obeyed without complaint or reproach.
On his arrival the patriot party came forward openly the disgraceful sentence against Hasdrubal was cancelled
;;
a
if
;
a
it,
chap, vi FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
359
new connections were formed with the Numidian sheiks Recom- through the dexterity of Hannibal ; and not only did the TMencement assembly of the people refuse to ratify the peace practically hostilities, concluded, but the armistice was broken by the plundering
of a Roman transport fleet driven ashore on the African coast, and by the seizure even of a Roman vessel of war carrying Roman envoys. In just indignation Scipio started from his camp at Tunes (552) and traversed the rich 202. valley of the Bagradas (Mejerdah), no longer allowing the townships to capitulate, but causing the inhabitants of the villages and towns to be seized en masse and sold. He
had already penetrated far into the interior, and was at Naraggara (to the west of Sicca, now El Kef, on the frontier between Tunis and Algiers), when Hannibal, who had marched out from Hadrumetum, fell in with him. The Carthaginian general attempted to obtain better conditions from the Roman in a personal conference ; but Scipio, who
had already gone to the extreme verge of concession, could not possibly after the breach of the armistice agree to yield further, and it is not credible that Hannibal had any other object in this step than to show to the multitude that the patriots were not absolutely opposed to peace. The conference led to no result
The two armies accordingly came to a decisive battle at Battle of Zama (presumably not far from Sicca). 1 Hannibal arranged Zama- bis infantry in three lines; in the first rank the Cartha
ginian hired troops, in the second the African militia and
the Phoenician civic force along with the Macedonian
corps, in the third the veterans who had followed him from
Italy. In front of the line were placed the 80 elephants;
the cavalry were stationed on the wings. Scipio likewise
1 Of the two places bearing this name, the more westerly, situated
about 60 miles west of Hadrumetum, was probably the scene of the battle (comp. Hermes, xx. 144, 318). The time was the spring or summer of
the year 55a ; the fixing of the day as the 19th October, on account of 302. the alleged solar eclipse, is of no account.
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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book hi
disposed his legions in three ranks, as was the wont of the Romans, and so arranged them that the elephants could pass through and alongside of the line without breaking it Not only was this disposition completely successful, but the elephants making their way to the side disordered also
the Carthaginian cavalry on the wings, so that Scipio's cavalry—which moreover was by the arrival of Massinissa's troops rendered far superior to the enemy — had little trouble in dispersing them, and were soon engaged in full
The struggle of the infantry was more severe. The conflict lasted long between the first ranks on either side; at length in the extremely bloody hand-to-hand encounter both parties fell into confusion, and were obliged to seek a support in the second ranks. The Romans found that support; but the Carthaginian militia showed itself so unsteady and wavering, that the mercenaries believed themselves betrayed and a hand-to-hand combat arose between them and the Carthaginian civic force. But Hannibal now hastily withdrew what remained of the first two lines to the flanks, and pushed forward his choice Italian troops along the whole line. Scipio, on the other hand, gathered together in the centre as many of the first
line as still were able to fight, and made the second and third ranks close up on the right and left of the first. Once more on the same spot began a still more fearful conflict ; Hannibal's old soldiers never wavered in spite of the superior numbers of the enemy, till the cavalry of the Romans and of Massinissa, returning from the pursuit of the beaten cavalry of the enemy, surrounded them on all sides. This not only terminated the struggle, but anni hilated the Phoenician army; the same soldiers, who fourteen years before had given way at Cannae, had re taliated on their conquerors at Zama. With a handful of men Hannibal arrived, a fugitive, at Hadrumetum.
After this day folly alone could counsel a continuance
pursuit.
Peace.
chap, VI FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA
361
of the war on the part of Carthage. On the other hand it was in the power of the Roman general immediately to
begin the siege of the capital, which was neither protected
nor provisioned, and, unless unforeseen accidents should intervene, now to subject Carthage to the fate which Hannibal had wished to bring upon Rome. Scipio did
not do so; he granted peace (553), but no longer upon 201. the former terms. Besides the concessions which had already in the last negotiations been demanded in favour
of Rome and of Massinissa, an annual contribution of 200 talents (^48,000) was imposed for fifty years on the
Carthaginians ; and they had to bind themselves that they would not wage war against Rome or its allies or indeed beyond the bounds of Africa at all, and that in Africa they would not wage war beyond their own territory without having sought the permission of Rome — the practical effect of which was that Carthage became tributary and lost her political independence. It even appears that the Cartha ginians were bound in certain cases to furnish ships of war to the Roman fleet
Scipio has been accused of granting too favourable conditions to the enemy, lest he might be obliged to hand over the glory of terminating the most severe war which Rome had waged, along with his command, to a successor. The charge might have had some foundation, had the first proposals been carried out ; it seems to have no warrant in reference to the second. His position in Rome was
not such as to make the favourite of the people, after the victory of Zama, seriously apprehensive of recall—already
before the victory an attempt to supersede him had been referred by the senate to the burgesses, and by them decidedly rejected. Nor do the conditions themselves warrant such a charge. The Carthaginian city never, after its hands were thus tied and a powerful neighbour was placed by its side, made even an attempt to withdraw from
36a
THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL book HI
Roman supremacy, still less to enter into rivalry with Rome; besides, every one who cared to know knew that the war just terminated had been undertaken much more by Hannibal than by Carthage, and that it was absolutely impossible to revive the gigantic plan of the patriot party. It might seem little in the eyes of the vengeful Italians, that only the five hundred surrendered ships of war perished in the flames, and not the hated city itself; spite and pedantry might contend for the view that an opponent is only really vanquished when he is annihilated, and might censure the man who had disdained to punish more
thoroughly the crime of having made Romans tremble. Scipio thought otherwise; and we have no reason and therefore no right to assume that the Roman was in this instance influenced by vulgar motives rather than by the noble and magnanimous impulses which formed part of his character. It was not the consideration of his own possible recall or of the mutability of fortune, nor was it any apprehension of the outbreak of a Macedonian war at certainly no distant date, that prevented the self-reliant and confident hero, with whom everything had hitherto succeeded beyond belief, from accomplishing the destruction of the unhappy city, which fifty years afterwards his adopted grandson was commissioned to execute, and which might indeed have been equally well accomplished now. It is much more probable that the two great generals, on whom the decision of the political question now devolved, offered and accepted peace on such terms in order to set just and reasonable limits on the one hand to the furious venge ance of the victors, on the other to the obstinacy and imprudence of the vanquished. The noble-mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists are no less apparent in the magnanimous submission of Hannibal to what was inevitable, than in the wise abstinence of Scipio from an extravagant and insulting use of victory. Is it to
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be supposed that one so generous, unprejudiced, and intelligent should not have asked himself of what benefit it could be to his country, now that the political power of the Carthaginian city was annihilated, utterly to destroy that ancient seat of commerce and of agriculture, and wickedly to overthrow one of the main pillars of the then existing civilization? The time had not yet come when the first men of Rome lent themselves to destroy the civilization of their neighbours, and frivolously fancied that they could wash away from themselves the eternal infamy of the nation by shedding an idle tear.
Thus ended the second Punic or, as the Romans more
called the Hannibalic war, after had devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules for seventeen years. Before this war the policy of the Romans had no higher aim than to acquire command of the mainland of the Italian peninsula within its natural boundaries, and of the Italian islands and seas clearly proved by their treatment of Africa on the conclusion of peace that they also terminated the war with the impression, not that they had laid the foundation of sovereignty over the states of the Mediterranean or of the so-called universal empire, but that they had rendered
dangerous rival innocuous and had given to Italy agreeable neighbours.