No More Learning

Low creatures endeavor to blackmail
him, and circulate scandalous stories respecting his financial manage-
ment: he bravely tells the whole truth, and stands absolutely acquit-
ted of the least suspicion of official malfeasance. In 1799, when war
with France is imminent, Washington, again selected as commander-
in-chief, selects him as the first of three major-generals on whom he
must depend. Finally, when Aaron Burr challenges him he accepts
the challenge; he makes his will, meets his enemy, and falls with a
mortal wound.
The news of his death sent a thrill of horror through the country,
not unlike that which followed the assassination of Lincoln and Gar-
field. The story of the duel has often been told, but nowhere so
vividly as in the diary of Gouverneur Morris, recently published.
His countrymen mourned the death of Hamilton as they had mourned
for no other statesman except Washington. Morris's speech at the
funeral, under circumstances of great popular excitement, brings to
mind the speech of Brutus over the body of Cæsar. Unless there
had been great restraint on the part of the orator, the passions of
the multitude would have been inflamed against the rival who fired
the fatal shot.
It is time to pass from that which is transient in Hamilton's life
to that which will endure as long as this government shall last,—
to the ideas suggested and embodied by the framers of the Constitu-
tion in fundamental measures. The distinction of Hamilton does not
depend upon the stations that he held, however exalted they may
appear, in either the political or the military service of his country.
It was his "thinking" that made him famous; his (( thinking" that
perpetuated his influence as well as his fame, through the nine dec-
ades that have followed since his death. Even now, when his per-
sonality is obscurely remembered, his political doctrines are more
firmly established than ever before. The adjustment of the demo-
cratic principles of which Jefferson was the exponent and the national
principles which Hamilton advocated still prevails; but as Morse saga-
ciously says, "the democratic system of Jefferson is administered in
the form and on the principles of Hamilton. "
In the anxious days of the Confederation,- when the old govern-
ment had been thrown off, and when men were groping with conflict-
ing motives after a new government which should secure union with
independence, national or Continental authority with the preservation
of State rights,- Hamilton was one of the earliest to perceive the true
solution of the problem. He bore his part in the debates, always in-
clining toward a strong federal government. The conclusions which
were reached by the Convention did not meet his unqualified assent;


## p. 6895 (#279) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6895
but he accepted them as the best results that could then be secured.
He became their expounder and their defender. The essays which
he wrote, with those of his two colleagues Jay and Madison, were col-
lected in a volume known as 'The Federalist,'— a volume which is of
the first importance in the interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States. Successive generations of judges, senators, statesmen,
and publicists, recur to its pages as to a commentary of the highest
value. The opinion of Mr. Curtis, the historian of the Constitution,
will not be questioned. "These essays," he says, "gave birth to
American constitutional law, which was thus placed above arbitrary
construction and brought into the domain of legal truth. "
"They
made it a science, and so long as the Constitution shall exist, they
will continue to be resorted to as the most important source of con-
temporaneous interpretation which the annals of the country afford. ”
Hamilton's confidence in the power of the press to enlighten and
guide the public was balanced by grave apprehensions as to the fate
of the Constitution. "A nation," he said, "without a national govern-
ment is an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in
a time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole peo-
ple, is a prodigy to the completion of which I look forward with
trembling anxiety. " We who have lived to see the end of a century
of constitutional government, in the course of which appeal has been
made to the sword, we who live secure in the unique advantages of
our dual governments, find it hard even to imagine the rocks
through which the ship of State was steered by the framers of the
Constitution.
As a financier, not less than as a statesman, Hamilton showed
exceptional ability. He had the rare qualities of intellect which
enabled him to perceive the legitimate sources of revenue, the proper
conditions of national credit, and the best method of distributing
over a term of years the payment required by the emergencies of
the State. Commerce and trade were palsied; currency was wanting;
confidence was shaken; counsels were conflicting. These difficulties
were like a stimulant to the mind of Hamilton. He mastered the
situation, he proposed remedies, he secured support, he restored credit.
From his time to the present, in peace and war, notwithstanding
temporary embarrassments and occasional panics, the finances of the
government have been sound, and its obligations accepted wherever
offered. In the long line of honest and able secretaries who have
administered the treasury, Hamilton stands as the first and greatest
financier.
His ability was not alone that of a reasoner upon the principles
of political economy. He was ingenious and wise in devising methods
by which principles may be reduced to practice. The Treasury


## p. 6896 (#280) ###########################################

6896
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
Department was to be organized. Hamilton became the organizer.
While Congress imposed upon him the duty of preparing far-reaching
plans for the creation of revenue, which he produced with promptness
and sagacity, he also found time to devise the complex machinery
that was requisite, and the system of accounts. "So well were these
tasks performed," says Morse, "that the plans still subsist, developing
and growing with the nation, but at bottom the original arrangements
of Hamilton. "
This administrative ability was shown on a large scale the second
time, but in another field. When it became necessary, in view of a
foreign war that seemed impending, to organize an army, it was
Washington who called to this service his former comrade in arms,
the man who had organized the Treasury at the beginning of his
first administration. Here, as before, Hamilton's abilities were em-
ployed successfully.
The limits of this article preclude the enumeration of Hamilton's
services in many subordinate ways,-for example, his influence in
securing the acceptance of the treaty with England. It is enough in
conclusion to repeat the words of two great thinkers. Daniel Web-
ster spoke as follows in 1831:—
"He was made Secretary of the Treasury; and how he fulfilled the duties
of such a place, at such a time, the whole country perceived with delight and
the whole world saw with admiration. He smote the rock of the national
resources, and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth. He touched the
dead corpse
of the public credit, and it sprung upon its feet. The fabled
birth of Minerva from the brain of Jove was hardly more sudden or more
perfect than the financial system of the United States, as it burst forth from
the conceptions of Alexander Hamilton. »
And Francis Lieber, in his 'Civil Liberty and Self-Government,'
wrote thus in 1853-
"The framers of our Constitution boldly conceived a federal republic, or
the application of the representative principle, with its two houses, to a con-
federacy. It was the first instance in history. The Netherlands, which served
our forefathers as models in many respects, even in the name bestowed on
our confederacy, furnished them with no example for this great conception.
It is the chief American contribution to the common treasures of political
civilization. It is that by which America will influence other parts of the
world, more than by any other political institution or principle. . . I con-
sider the mixture of wisdom and daring shown in the framing of our Consti-
tution as one of the most remarkable facts in all history. "
медитат


## p. 6897 (#281) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6897
FROM THE FEDERALIST'
DEFENSE OF HIS VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION
HUS have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to
myself; with what success, your conduct must determine.
I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed, in the
assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my en-
deavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely
to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities
which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties,
and which have been not a little provoked by the language and
conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a
conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been
indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has
something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the
indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refuta-
tion of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been
rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been
such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men; and the
unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have
been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public
eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all
honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may
have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression
which I did not intend: it is certain that I have frequently felt a
struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former
has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has
been neither often nor much.
THE WISDOM OF BRIEF PRESIDENTIAL TERMS OF OFFICE
T MAY perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in
office can affect the independence of the executive on the legis-
lature, unless the one were possessed of the power of appoint-
ing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may be
drawn from the principle already remarked; that is, from the
slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage,
and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on
account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. An-
other answer, perhaps more obvious though not more conclusive,
XII-432


## p. 6898 (#282) ###########################################

6898
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
will result from the consideration of the influence of the legisla-
tive body over the people; which might be employed to prevent
the re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any
sinister project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious
to its resentment.
It may be asked also whether a duration of four years would
answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less
period, which would at least be recommended by greater security
against ambitious designs, would not for that reason be prefera-
ble to a longer period, which was at the same time too short for
the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of
the magistrate.
It cannot be affirmed that a duration of four years, or any
other limited duration, would completely answer the end pro-
posed; but it would contribute toward it in a degree which would
have a material influence upon the spirit and character of the
government. Between the commencement and termination of
such a period there would always be a considerable interval, in
which the prospect of annihilation would be sufficiently remote
not to have an improper effect upon the conduct of a man
indued with a tolerable portion of fortitude; and in which he
might reasonably promise himself that there would be time.
enough before it arrived, to make the community sensible of the
propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue. Though
it be probable that—as he approached the moment when the pub-
lic were by a new election to signify their sense of his conduct —
his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline; yet both
the one and the other would derive support from the opportuni-
ties which his previous continuance in the station had afforded
him, of establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of his
constituents. He might then hazard with safety, in proportion
to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to
the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his
fellow-citizens. As on the one hand, a duration of four years
will contribute to the firmness of the executive in a sufficient
degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the compo-
sition; so, on the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for
the public liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the
most feeble beginnings, from the mere power of assenting or dis-
agreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have by rapid strides
reduced the prerogatives of the Crown and the privileges of the


## p. 6899 (#283) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6899
nobility within the limits they conceived to be compatible with
the principles of a free government, while they raised themselves
to the rank and consequence of a coequal branch of the legisla-
ture, if they have been able in one instance to abolish both the
royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient estab-
lishments, as well in the Church as State; if they have been
able on a recent occasion to make the monarch tremble at the
prospect of an innovation attempted by them, what would be
to be feared from an elective magistrate of four years' duration,
with the confined authorities of a President of the United States?
What, but that he might be unequal to the task which the Con-
stitution assigns him?
-
OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PRESIDENT AND A SOVEREIGN
Α
ND it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pre-
tense for the parallel which has been attempted between
him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the con-
trast in this respect still more striking, it may be of use to throw
the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer group.
The President of the United States would be an officer elected
by the people for four years; the king of Great Britain is a per-
petual and hereditary prince. The one would be amenable to
personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is
sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative
upon the acts of the legislative body; the other has an absolute
negative. The one would have a right to command the military
and naval forces of the nation; the other, in addition to this right,
possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and regulating
fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a
concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the forma-
tion of treaties; the other is the sole possessor of the power of
making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent authority
in appointing to offices; the other is the sole author of all appoint-
ments. The one can confer no privileges whatever; the other can
make denizens of aliens, noblemen of commoners, can erect cor-
porations with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The
one can prescribe no rules concerning the commerce or currency
of the nation; the other is in several respects the arbiter of com-
merce, and in this capacity can establish markets and fairs, can
regulate weights and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited


## p. 6900 (#284) ###########################################

6900
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
time, can coin money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation.
of foreign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction;
the other is the supreme head and governor of the national
Church! What answer shall we give to those who would per-
suade us that things so unlike resemble each other? The same
that ought to be given to those who tell us that a government,
the whole power of which would be in the hands of the elective
and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a mon-
archy, and a despotism.
THE MILITIA SYSTEM AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A STANDING ARMY
ERE I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal
legislature from this State on the subject of a militia
establishment, I should hold to him in substance the
following discourse:--
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United
States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of
being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military
movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is
not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of
it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other
classes of the citizens to be under arms for the purpose of going
through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be
necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle.
them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real
grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and
loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive
labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the
present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the
whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To
attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and
industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the
experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not
long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with
respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed
and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it
will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course
of a year.
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must
be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable, yet it is a matter


## p. 6901 (#285) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6901
of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should as
soon as possible be adopted for the proper establishment of the
militia. The attention of the government ought particularly to
be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent,
upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of
need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to
have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the
field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This
will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if
circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form
an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable
to the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of citi-
zens little if at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of
arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of
their fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that
can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security
against it if it should exist. "
CONFEDERACY AS EXPRESSED IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
TH
HOUGH the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species
of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or
sovereign, whose authority extended over the whole nation; and
a number of subordinate vassals or feudatories, who had large
portions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior
vassals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon
the tenure of fealty or obedience to the persons of whom they
held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign within
his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation were
a continual opposition to the authority of the sovereign, and fre-
quent wars between the great barons or chief feudatories them-
selves. The power of the head of the nation was commonly too
weak either to preserve the public peace, or to protect the people
against the oppressions of their immediate lords. This period of
European affairs is emphatically styled by historians the times of
feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and
warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a
personal weight and influence which answered for the time the
purposes of a more regular authority. But in general the power


## p. 6902 (#286) ###########################################

6902
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
of the barons triumphed over that of the prince, and in many
instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great
fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In
those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his
vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those
vassals over their dependents. The barons or nobles, equally the
enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common peo-
ple, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger and
mutual interest effected a union between them fatal to the power
of the aristocracy. Had the nobles by a conduct of clemency
and justice preserved the fidelity and devotion of their retainers.
and followers, the contests between them and the prince must
almost always have ended in their favor, and in the abridgment
or subversion of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or con-
jecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be
cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
clanship which was at an early day introduced into that king-
dom, uniting the nobles and their dependents by ties equivalent
to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant over-
match for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with
England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced
it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and
more energetic system of civil polity had previously established
in the latter kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be
compared with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their
favor, that from the reasons already explained, they will gener-
ally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with
so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all
encroachments of the national government.
OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED STATES AS RELATED TO
ITS COMMERCE
THE
HE relative situation of these States; the number of rivers
with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash
their shores; the facility of communication in every direc-
tion; the affinity of language and manners; the familiar habits of
intercourse, all these are circumstances that would conspire to
render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty,


## p. 6903 (#287) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6903
and would insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations
of each other. The separate States or confederacies would be
necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that
kind of trade by the lowness of their duties. The temper of our
governments, for a long time to come, would not permit those
rigorous precautions by which the European nations guard the
avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by
water; and which even there are found insufficient obstacles to
the adventurous stratagems of avarice.
In France there is an army of patrols (as they are called)
constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the
inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Necker computes
the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This
shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic
where there is an inland communication, and places in a strong
light the disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this
country would be incumbered, if by disunion the States should
be placed in a situation with respect to each other resembling
that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and
vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed
would be intolerable in a free country.
If on the contrary there be but one government pervading all
the States, there will be as to the principal part of our commerce
but one side to guard,- the Atlantic coast. Vessels arriving di-
rectly from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would
rarely choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and critical
perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their com-
ing into port. They would have to dread both the dangers of
the coast and of detection, as well after as before their arrival at
the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigi-
lance would be competent to the prevention of any material
infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels,
judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a
small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the
government having the same interest to provide against violations.
everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in each State would.
have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also
we should preserve, by union, an advantage which nature holds
out to us and which would be relinquished by separation. The
United States lie at a great distance from Europe, and at a consid-
erable distance from all other places with which they would have


## p. 6904 (#288) ###########################################

6904
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
extensive connections of foreign trade. The passage from them
to us in a few hours, or in a single night, as between the coasts
of France and Britain, and of other neighboring nations, would
be impracticable. This is a prodigious security against a direct
contraband with foreign countries; but a circuitous contraband to
one State through the medium of another would be both easy
and safe. The difference between a direct importation from
abroad and an indirect importation through the channel of a
neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time and oppor-
tunity, with the additional facilities of inland communication,
must be palpable to every man of discernment.
It is therefore evident that one national government would
be able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports
beyond comparison further than would be practicable to the States
separately, or to any partial confederacies.
THE STANDING ARMY AS A PERIL TO A REPUBLIC
THE
HE disciplined armies always kept on foot on the Continent
of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty
and economy, have notwithstanding been productive of the
signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable,
and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the
progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortifica-
tion has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe
are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually ob-
struct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three
frontier garrisons, to gain admittance into an enemy's country.
Similar impediments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength
and delay the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading
army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring country
almost as soon as intelligence of its approach could be received;
but now a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting
on the defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede and
finally to frustrate the enterprises of one much more considerable.
The history of war in that quarter of the globe is no longer a
history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns
taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more
beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The
jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long


## p. 6905 (#289) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6905
as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of
one State open to another, would facilitate inroads.
The popu-
lous States would with little difficulty overrun their less populous
neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult.
to be retained. War therefore would be desultory and predatory.
Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars.
The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in
the events which would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought, though I confess it
would not long remain a just one. Safety from external dan-
ger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the
ardent love of liberty will after a time give way to its dic-
tates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to
war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of con-
tinual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty
to resort, for repose and security, to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more
safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less
free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are standing armies and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing
armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitu-
tion; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.
Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition,
is at most problematical and uncertain. But standing armies,
it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution.
of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension,
which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly
produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first
have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with
their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the
inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and
effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by forti-
fications. They would at the same time be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which
their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction towards
monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive
at the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give
the States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority
over their neighbors. Small States, or States of less natural


## p. 6906 (#290) ###########################################

6906
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
strength, under vigorous governments and with the assistance of
disciplined armies have often triumphed over large States, or
States of greater natural strength, which have been destitute
of these advantages. Neither the pride nor the safety of the
more important States or confederacies would permit them long
to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They
would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had
been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence.
Thus we should, in a little time, see established in every part
of this country the same engines of despotism which have
been the scourge of the Old World. This at least would be the
natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more
likely to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this
standard.
DO REPUBLICS PROMOTE PEACE?
N°
OTWITHSTANDING the concurring testimony of experience in
this particular, there are still to be found visionary or de-
signing men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of
perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and
alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is
pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the man-
ners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which
have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics like ours
will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions
with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and
will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true in-
terest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philo-
sophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact
pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
that momentary passions and immediate interests have a
active and imperious control over human conduct than general or
remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have republics
in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not
the former administered by men as well as the latter? Are
there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of un-
just acquisitions that affect nations as well as kings?
Are not
popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage,
resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent


## p. 6907 (#291) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6907
propensities?
Is it not well known that their determinations are
often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confi-
dence, and are of course liable to be tinctured by the passions
and views of those individuals? Has commerce hitherto done
anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love
of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of
power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded
upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of
territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce in many
instances administered new incentives to the appetite, both for
the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible
guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these
inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two
of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were
they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the
neighboring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little bet-
ter than a well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of
carnage and conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in
the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried
her arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio in turn gave him an overthrow in the territories of Car-
thage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice in later times figured more than once in wars of
ambition, till, becoming an object of terror to the other Italian
States, Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable
league which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this
haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts
and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of
Europe. They had furious contests with England for the domin-
ion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most
implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has
been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few
nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war;
and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have in
numerous instances proceeded from the people.
1


## p. 6908 (#292) ###########################################

6908
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many
popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importu-
nities of their representatives have upon various occasions dragged
their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to
their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of
the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between
the rival houses of Austria and Bourbon, which so long kept
Europe in a flame, it is well known that the antipathies of the
English against the French, seconding the ambition or rather the
avarice of a favorite leader, protracted the war beyond the limits
marked out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in oppo-
sition to the views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great
measure grown out of commercial considerations, the desire of
supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular
branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and
navigation.
PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS
THE
HE causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There
are some which have a general and almost constant opera-
tion upon the collective bodies of society. Of this descrip-
tion are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and
dominion, the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and
safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed though
an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the
rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial na-
tions. And there are others, not less numerous than either of
the former, which take their origin entirely in private passions;
in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men
of this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have
in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and
assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled
to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or per-
sonal gratification.
--
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of
a prostitute, at the expense of much of the blood and treasure
of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city
of the Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique


## p. 6909 (#293) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6909
against the Megarensians, another nation of Greece, or to avoid
a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice in
a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias, or to get rid of the
accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating
the funds of the State in the purchase of popularity, or from a
combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that
famous and fatal war distinguished in the Grecian annals by the
name of the Peloponnesian War; which after various vicissitudes,
intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athe-
nian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal who was prime minister to Henry
VIII. , permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown, enter-
tained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid
prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the
favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the
plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by
his counsels as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a
sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal mon-
archy, it was the Emperor Charles V. , of whose intrigues Wolsey
was at once the instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulance
of another, and the cabals of a third, had in the contemporary
policy, ferments, and pacifications of a considerable part of Eu-
rope, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to
be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations
in the production of great national events, either foreign or
domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary
waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance
with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will them-
selves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a
tolerable knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of
such lights, to form their opinion either of the reality or extent
of that agency.


## p. 6910 (#294) ###########################################

6910
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
RESULTS OF THE CONFEDERATION
WⓇ
E MAY indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached almost
the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely
anything that can wound the pride or degrade the char-
acter of an independent nation, which we do not experience. Are
there engagements to the performance of which we are held by
every tie respectable among men? these are the subjects of con-
stant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners,
and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent peril,
for the preservation of our political existence? these remain
without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge.
Have we valuable territories and important posts in the posses-
sion of a foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought
long since to have been surrendered? these are still retained,
to the prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are
we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? we have
neither troops, nor treasury, nor government. Are we even in a
condition to remonstrate with dignity? the just imputations on
our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be
removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free par-
ticipation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes
us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of
public danger? we seem to have abandoned its cause as des-
perate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national
wealth? ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respecta-
bility in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign
encroachments? the imbecility of our government even forbids
them to treat with us; our ambassadors abroad are the mere
pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural de-
crease in the value of land a symptom of national distress? the
price of improved land in most parts of the country is much lower
than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at mar-
ket, and can only be fully explained by that want of private and
public confidence which are so alarmingly prevalent among all
ranks, and which have a direct tendency to depreciate property
of every kind. Is private credit the friend and patron of indus-
try? that most useful kind which relates to borrowing and lend-
ing is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more
from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money.
To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither


## p. 6911 (#295) ###########################################

ALEXANDER HAMILTON
6911
pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded: What
indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignifi-
cance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed with
natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the
dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
INSTANCES OF THE EVILS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
F
ROM such a parade of constitutional powers, in the represent-
atives and head of this [the German] Confederacy, the nat-
ural supposition would be that it must form an exception
to the general character which belongs to its kindred systems.
Nothing would be further from the reality. The fundamental
principle on which it rests, that the Empire is a community of
sovereigns, that the Diet is a representation of sovereigns, and
that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the Empire a
nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure
against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermenta-
tions in its own bowels.
The history of Germany is a history of wars between the
Emperor and the princes and States themselves; of the licentious-
ness of the strong and the oppression of the weak; of foreign
intrusions and foreign intrigues; of requisitions of men and money
disregarded, or partially complied with; of attempts to enforce
them, altogether abortive, or attended with slaughter and desola-
tion, involving the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility,
confusion, and misery.
In the sixteenth century, the Emperor, with one part of the
Empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes
and States. In one of the conflicts, the Emperor himself was
put to flight and very near being made prisoner by the Elector
of Saxony. The late King of Prussia was more than once pitted
against his imperial sovereign, and commonly proved an over-
match for him. Controversies and wars among the members
themselves have been so common, that the German annals are
crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous
to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of
thirty years, in which the Emperor with one half of the Empire.
was on one side, and Sweden with the other half on the oppo-
site side. Peace was at length negotiated and dictated by foreign


## p. 6912 (#296) ###########################################

6912
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties,
made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice
among these sovereign subjects produced the experiment of divid-
ing the Empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving
them an interior organization; and of charging them with the
military execution of the laws against delinquent and contuma-
cious members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate
more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is
the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monster.
They either fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with
all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole
circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which
they were instituted to remedy.
It may be asked, perhaps, What has so long kept this dis-
jointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is
obvious. The weakness of most of the members, who are unwill-
ing to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the
weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the
formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence
which the Emperor derives from his separate and hereditary
dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with
which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him.
the first prince in Europe, these causes support a feeble and
precarious union; whilst the repellent quality incident to the
nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens,
prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolida-
tion. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be sur-
mounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a revolution
to take place which would give to the Empire the force and
pre-eminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long
considered themselves as interested in the changes made by
events in this constitution; and have on various occasions be-
trayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a govern-
ment over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice
of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities
flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government
and self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful
neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one
third of its people and territories.


## p. 6913 (#297) ###########################################

6913
ANTHONY HAMILTON
(1646? -1720)
HE author of 'Gramont's Memoirs,' usually known as Count
Hamilton, was a man without a nationality. Born in Ireland
of Scotch blood, grandson of the Earl of Abercorn, he was
a baby when his parents followed the relics of the royal family to
France after the execution of Charles I. ; and he remained there till
1660, his education and formative influences during childhood being
wholly French, which language was really his mother tongue. At
the Restoration he returned to England and became an ornament of
Charles II. 's court, though debarred from
office for being a Catholic. James II. gave
him command of an Irish regiment and
made him governor of Limerick; but on
James's abdication he returned to France
and remained there, a notable figure in
Louis XIV. 's court, whose wit and elastic
moral atmosphere were alike congenial to
him.

He made good French translation of
Pope's Essay on Man,' cordially acknowl-
edged by the author. He wrote graceful
poems; and in ridicule of the prevalent
craze for Oriental tales, which he declared
quite within the powers of any one with
the slenderest literary faculty, wrote several stories of the Arabian
Nights order, without plot or denouement, usually promising the
finish in "the next volume," which was never written. These stories
are clever and witty enough to be still read, and some of their
expressions have become stock literary quotations, but they are curios
rather than living works.
More can be said for another work, which has permanent vitality,-
the 'Memoirs' of his brother-in-law the Duke of Gramont. The lat-
ter was a conspicuous soldier and courtier during the Regency, and
Hamilton's senior by twenty years. This dashing, witty profligate,
with generous impulses and no conscience, was a true product of
the court of Louis XIV. and of that of the English Charles II. An
aristocrat of long descent, a soldier of renown, with his laughing
XII-433
COUNT DE GRAMONT


## p. 6914 (#298) ###########################################

6914
ANTHONY HAMILTON
eyes, his dimple, and his conversational gift, he was popular every-
where.
Hamilton met him first in England, whither a social imprudence
had led him, and where he became engaged to his biographer's
beautiful sister. Then he was recalled, and started for home, un-
mindful of his promises. The young lady's brothers hurried after
him:
"Chevalier! chevalier! haven't you forgotten something at Lon-
don ? »
"I beg your pardon, gentlemen," said the chevalier. "I have for-
gotten to marry your sister. ”
He went back with them, married Miss Hamilton, and took her to
France. The incident is characteristic of his careless ready wit; and
it did not seem to weaken Hamilton's admiring affection.
Gramont's prime quality was social talent. He loved extravagant
living, intrigue, and bons-mots, and the life that receives most stimulus
from other personalities. To write as he conversed was impossible
to him. Yet he had been told that the record of his life was too
interesting to be lost, and his vanity liked the thought. There was
talk of giving the task to Boileau, who wanted it. But Boileau might
be severe or satiric; so Hamilton was preferred.
Hamilton, in spite of his knowledge of court life in France and
England, and his somewhat malicious wit, was rather taciturn and
unsuccessful as a society man. He loved better the quiet of Saint-
Germain, and solitary, thoughtful constitutionals in its forest. To
write was easier for him than to talk. He appreciated the life in
which he did not shine, and could do justice to the duke's reminis-
cences.
The result is a brilliant picture of the court of Charles II. , of that
pleasure-seeking king and the beauties and fascinations of his mis-
tresses. There are many other scandalous tales as well, involving
the Duke of Buckingham, Lord and Lady Chesterfield, Gramont him-
self, and other celebrities. In spirit and style the work is wholly
French, a long succession of witty, malicious gossip. The author
addresses himself in the opening sentence to those who read for
amusement. To such the memoirs are perennially interesting.


## p. 6915 (#299) ###########################################

ANTHONY HAMILTON
6915
NOTHING VENTURE, NOTHING HAVE
From Gramont's Memoirs >
[De Gramont and his friend M. Matta being much pressed for money, the
Count relates an incident of his early youth, and suggests acting on its
hint, to raise the sum they require. ]
THE
HEY had never yet conferred about the state of their finances,
although the steward had acquainted each separately that
he must either receive money to continue the expenses, or
give in his accounts. One day when the chevalier came home
sooner than usual, he found Matta fast asleep in an easy-chair;
and being unwilling to disturb his rest, he began musing on his
project. Matta awoke without his perceiving it; and having for a
short time observed the deep contemplation he seemed involved
in, and the profound silence between two persons who had never
before held their tongues for a moment when together, he broke
it by a sudden fit of laughter, which increased in proportion as
the other stared at him.
"A merry way of waking, and ludicrous enough," said the
chevalier: what is the matter, and whom do you laugh_at? »
«<
"Faith, chevalier," said Matta, "I am laughing at a dream I
had just now, which is so natural and diverting that I must
make you laugh at it also. I was dreaming that we had dis-
missed our maître-d'hôtel, our cook, and our confectioner, having
resolved for the remainder of the campaign to live upon others
as others have lived upon us: this was my dream. Now tell me,
chevalier, on what were you musing? "
"Poor fellow! " said the chevalier, shrugging his shoulders;
"you are knocked down at once, and thrown into the utmost
consternation and despair, at some silly stories which the maître-
d'hôtel has been telling you as well as me. What! after the
figure we have made in the face of the nobility and foreigners in
the army, shall we give it up and like fools and beggars sneak
off, upon the first failure of our money? Have you no senti-
ments of honor? Where is the dignity of France ? "
"And where is the money? " said Matta; "for my men say
the Devil may take them if there be ten crowns in the house;
and I believe you have not much more, for it is above a week
since I have seen you pull out your purse or count your money,
an amusement you were very fond of in prosperity. "


## p. 6916 (#300) ###########################################

6916
ANTHONY HAMILTON
"I own all this," said the chevalier; "but yet I will force you
to confess that you are but a mean-spirited fellow upon this
occasion. What would have become of you if you had been
reduced to the situation I was in at Lyons, four days before I
arrived here? I will tell you the story.
"When I returned to my mother's house, I had so much the
air of a courtier and a man of the world that she began to
respect me, instead of chiding me for my infatuation towards
the army.
I became her favorite; and finding me inflexible, she
only thought of keeping me with her as long as she could, while
my little equipage was preparing. The faithful Brinon, who was
to attend me as valet-de-chambre, was likewise to discharge the
office of governor and equerry, being perhaps the only Gascon
who was ever possessed of so much gravity and ill-temper. He
passed his word for my good behavior and morality, and prom-
ised my mother that he would give a good account of my person
in the dangers of the war; but I hope he will keep his word
better as to this last article than he has done to the former.
"My equipage was sent away a week before me.
This was
so much time gained by my mother to give me good advice. At
length, after having solemnly enjoined me to have the fear of
God before my eyes and to love my neighbor as myself, she
suffered me to depart under the protection of the Lord and the
sage Brinon. At the second stage we quarreled. He had re-
ceived four hundred louis d'or for the expenses of the campaign;
I wished to have the keeping of them myself, which he strenu-
ously opposed. Thou old scoundrel,' said I, 'is the money
thine, or was it given thee for me? You suppose I must have
a treasurer, and receive no money without his order. ' I know
not whether it was from a presentiment of what afterwards hap-
pened that he grew melancholy: however, it was with the great-
est reluctance and the most poignant anguish that he found
himself obliged to yield; one would have thought that I had
wrested his very soul from him. I found myself more light and
merry after I had eased him of his trust; he on the contrary
appeared so overwhelmed with grief that it seemed as if I had
laid four hundred pounds of lead upon his back, instead of taking
away those four hundred louis. He went on so heavily that
I was forced to whip his horse myself, and turning to me now
and then, 'Ah! sir,' said he, 'my lady did not think it would be
so. His reflections and sorrows were renewed at every stage;


## p. 6917 (#301) ###########################################

ANTHONY HAMILTON
6917
for instead of giving a shilling to the post-boy, I gave him half
a crown.
"Having at last reached Lyons, two soldiers stopped us at
the gate of the city, to carry us before the governor. I took
one of them to conduct me to the best inn, and delivered Brinon
into the hands of the other, to acquaint the commandant with
the particulars of my journey and my future intentions.
"There are as good taverns at Lyons as at Paris; but my
soldier, according to custom, carried me to a friend of his own,
whose house he extolled as having the best accommodations and
the greatest resort of good company in the whole town. The
master of this hotel was as big as a hogshead; his name Cerise,
a Swiss by birth, a poisoner by profession, and a thief by cus-
tom. He showed me into a tolerably neat room, and desired to
know whether I pleased to sup by myself or at the ordinary. I
chose the latter, on account of the beau monde which the soldier
had boasted of.
"Brinon, who was quite out of temper at the many questions
which the governor had asked him, returned more surly than an
old ape; and seeing that I was dressing my hair in order to go
down-stairs, 'What are you about now, sir? ' said he.
'Are you
going to tramp about the town? No, no; have we not had tramp-
ing enough ever since the morning? Eat a bit of supper, and go
to bed betimes, that you may get on horseback by daybreak. '
'Mr. Comptroller,' said I, 'I shall neither tramp about the town,
nor eat alone, nor go to bed early. I intend to sup with the
company below. ' 'At the ordinary! ' cried he; 'I beseech you,
sir, do not think of it! Devil take me if there be not a dozen
brawling fellows playing at cards and dice, who make noise
enough to drown the loudest thunder! '
"I was grown insolent since I had seized the money; and
being desirous to shake off the yoke of a governor, 'Do you
know, Mr. Brinon,' said I, 'that I don't like a blockhead to set
up for a reasoner? Do you go to supper, if you please; but take
care that I have post-horses ready before daybreak. '
"The moment he mentioned cards and dice I felt the money
burn in my pocket. I was somewhat surprised, however, to find
the room where the ordinary was served filled with odd-looking
creatures.