, Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part.
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part.
Summa Theologica
Consequently for the former
sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is
blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take
into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human
life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of
reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for
such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is
preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence
directs, "he is the reverse. "
Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is
subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes
guilt.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is
good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of
merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in
matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not
all related to another person, for some are related to the person of
the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious
or demeritorious.
Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as
he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what
belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs
to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does
not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or
evil purpose.
Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does
not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the
same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and
perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a
good or an evil deed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just man that
it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked
unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him. "
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according
to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something
to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that
every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the
member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the
hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to
another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in
his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of
the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man
ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society,
retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that
which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is
retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community,
forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due
to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution
to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be
just to himself.
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or
blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or
sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or
demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards
another.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i. e. the community.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far
as he belongs to another, i. e. the community, of which he forms part,
he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill:
just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in
respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to
himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according
as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not
meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
above [1202](A[3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for
good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no
good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): "If thou sin, what
shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give
Him? " Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or
demeritorious in the sight of God.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the
sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the
Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is
written (Is. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that
cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it
is drawn? " where man while acting is evidently compared to an
instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by
good or evil deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through
being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or
demerit in God's sight.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are
done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil. "
Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit
and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires
merit or demerit in God's sight.
I answer that, A human action, as stated above [1203](A[3]), acquires
merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by
reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our
actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God.
On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is
our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above
(Q[19], A[10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable
to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the
part of the whole community of the universe, because in every
community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the
common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such
things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the [1204]FP,
Q[103], A[5]: and especially of rational creatures. Consequently it is
evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to
Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's.
Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything
by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God,
or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the
order instituted by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that,
at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained
above ([1205]Q[9], A[6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he
acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic,
according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that
every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body
politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to
God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires
merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is
concerned.
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TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)
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OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;
secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things
to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them:
(3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the
apprehensive part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
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Whether any passion is in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul.
Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of
matter and form, as stated in the [1206]FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore
there is no passion in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii,
3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore
passion is not in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every
passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in Topic.
vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the
soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the
flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our
members. " Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore
passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a
general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to
be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper
sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away:
and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is
unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and
loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to
be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And
here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is
said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing
recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to
be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated
that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we
have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas
the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less
excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions
are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of
"feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5).
But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect
of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot
be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the
"composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because
when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of
a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more
properly a passion than joy.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way
as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in
those things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as
implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything
that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter
and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it
is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of
understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself
to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in
De Anima i, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
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Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of
the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in
any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus,
and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is
found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part:
for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous
passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the
apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action
is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion
in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement
of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our
writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer
to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance,
disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering
the Greek more accurately, call them passions. " From this it is evident
that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But
affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the
apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather
than in the apprehensive part.
I answer that, As we have already stated [1207](A[1]) the word
"passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to
the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power
rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through
its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves:
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i. e.
the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves. " On the
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in
itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which
"intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find
it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain
to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind. " Consequently it is
evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive,
rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the
opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i. e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i. e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive,
namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it
is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs
of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change,
in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object.
And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the
sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the
object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the
movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ;
for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the
heart. " Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of
the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal
organ.
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Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction;
not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens]
them. " But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since
its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the
intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more
intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these
are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil. "
I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because
things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to
God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite,
they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to
ours. "
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HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
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Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of
the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible
and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy
or sorrow. " But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore
all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc.
, Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part. " But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species;
for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the
passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the
passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different
objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties
differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species
of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter;
so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers,
differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
regarding different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the
object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as
such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or
avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.
Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to
the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and
such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible
faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its
object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making
some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions
terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the
passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and
sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible
power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
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Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible
passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance,
love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the
irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just
as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach
and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic.
i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii,
3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i. e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being. " The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i. e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to
be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
[1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good,
as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since
nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:
wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of
good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible
passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there
can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty
or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered
as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it,
which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to
the passion of "despair. " In like manner the arduous evil, considered
as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs
to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to
it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to
evil; and this tendency is called "daring. " Consequently, in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as
between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger. " But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor,
when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement,
except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
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Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest.
sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is
blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take
into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human
life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of
reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for
such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is
preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence
directs, "he is the reverse. "
Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is
subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes
guilt.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is
good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or
demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of
merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in
matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not
all related to another person, for some are related to the person of
the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious
or demeritorious.
Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as
he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what
belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs
to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does
not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or
evil purpose.
Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does
not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the
same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and
perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.
Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a
good or an evil deed.
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just man that
it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked
unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him. "
I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to
retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according
to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something
to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that
every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and
member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the
member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the
hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to
another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in
his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the
individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of
the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man
ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society,
retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that
which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is
retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community,
forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due
to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual,
who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution
to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be
just to himself.
It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or
blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or
sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or
demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards
another.
Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not
ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless
ordained to the good or evil of another, i. e. the community.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far
as he belongs to another, i. e. the community, of which he forms part,
he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill:
just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in
respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to
himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
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Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according
as it is good or evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not
meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
above [1202](A[3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for
good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no
good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): "If thou sin, what
shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give
Him? " Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or
demeritorious in the sight of God.
Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the
sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the
Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is
written (Is. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that
cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it
is drawn? " where man while acting is evidently compared to an
instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by
good or evil deeds.
Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through
being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or
demerit in God's sight.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are
done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil. "
Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit
and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires
merit or demerit in God's sight.
I answer that, A human action, as stated above [1203](A[3]), acquires
merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by
reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our
actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God.
On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is
our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above
(Q[19], A[10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable
to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the
part of the whole community of the universe, because in every
community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the
common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such
things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the [1204]FP,
Q[103], A[5]: and especially of rational creatures. Consequently it is
evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to
Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's.
Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything
by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God,
or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the
order instituted by God.
Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that,
at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained
above ([1205]Q[9], A[6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he
acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic,
according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that
every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body
politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to
God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires
merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is
concerned.
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TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;
secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things
to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them:
(3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?
(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the
apprehensive part?
(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will?
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Whether any passion is in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul.
Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of
matter and form, as stated in the [1206]FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore
there is no passion in the soul.
Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii,
3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore
passion is not in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every
passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in Topic.
vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the
soul.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the
flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our
members. " Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore
passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul.
I answer that, The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a
general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,
although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is
passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to
be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper
sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away:
and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is
unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and
loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to
be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And
here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is
said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing
recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to
be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated
that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we
have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas
the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less
excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions
are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of
"feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5).
But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect
of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot
be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the
"composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because
when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of
a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more
properly a passion than joy.
Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way
as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in
those things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as
implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything
that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter
and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it
is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of
understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.
Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself
to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in
De Anima i, 3.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by
transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not
found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is
corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.
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Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of
the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in
any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus,
and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is
found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part:
for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous
passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the
apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.
Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action
is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the
apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the
apprehensive part.
Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a
corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion
in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily
transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive
appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement
of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our
writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer
to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance,
disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering
the Greek more accurately, call them passions. " From this it is evident
that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But
affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the
apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather
than in the apprehensive part.
I answer that, As we have already stated [1207](A[1]) the word
"passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to
the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power
rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through
its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves:
hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i. e.
the objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves. " On the
other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in
itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, which
"intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find
it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain
to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind. " Consequently it is
evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive,
rather than with the apprehensive part.
Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the
opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in
things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the
approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing
approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing
possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with
light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the
more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity
depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from
that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of
privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that
which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at
first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as
it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a
thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things
that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i. e. to God, there is but
little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently,
there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i. e. the apprehensive, power
of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.
Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active,
because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the
exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive,
namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it
is through the external action that we come into contact with things.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs
of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change,
in respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object.
And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is
the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by
receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of
another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;
for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar
change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the
sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through
gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the
object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive
appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the
movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ;
for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the
heart. " Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more
consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of
the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal
organ.
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Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual
appetite, which is called the will?
Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive
than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.
ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction;
not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens]
them. " But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since
its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the
intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.
Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more
intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which
is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object
of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore
passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the
sensitive appetite.
Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these
are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive
appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and
the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than
in the intellectual appetite.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while
describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive
appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a
movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil. "
I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be
found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal
transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not
only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now
there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the
intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means
of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more
properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the
intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions
of Damascene quoted above.
Reply to Objection 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well
affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place
without any alteration in the body.
Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the
power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because
things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty
agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has
greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the
sensitive appetite is more passive.
Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to
God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite,
they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without
passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels
feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery
while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont
to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they
have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to
ours. "
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HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from
those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based
on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in
species, but not contrary to one another?
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Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of
the irascible part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible
and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that
the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy
or sorrow. " But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore
all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the
irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of
heaven is like to leaven," etc.
, Jerome's gloss says: "We should have
prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire
of virtue, in the concupiscible part. " But hatred is in the
concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as
is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the
concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically
according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and
concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the
same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species;
for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the
concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is
divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the
passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
(Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically
distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species
from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers
have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the
passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different
objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties
differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required
to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species
of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of
genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while
diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter;
so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers,
differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions
regarding different specific objects, included under the one common
object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,
and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of
these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the
object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul
must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as
such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or
avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an
arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty.
Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to
the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and
such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous,
through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible
faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the
irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the
obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its
object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making
some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions
terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the
passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and
sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible
faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible
passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible
power.
Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the
concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this
very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and
hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies
to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the
concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible
passions.
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Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the
contrariety of good and evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible
passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions,
as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible
passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance,
love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the
irascible passions.
Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just
as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other
contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in
Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save
that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil.
Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions
other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach
and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now
approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the
apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic.
i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the
soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated
in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good
and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every
contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii,
3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of
movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and
movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs
properly to changes, i. e. to generation, which is a change "to being,"
and to corruption, which is a change "from being. " The other
contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly
to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is
contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul:
one, according to contrariety of objects, i. e. of good and evil; the
other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to
be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the
irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of
this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above
[1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good,
as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since
nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In
like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it:
wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a
term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of
good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible
passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or
dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there
can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same
object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good
or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty
or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered
as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it,
which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered
as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to
the passion of "despair. " In like manner the arduous evil, considered
as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs
to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to
it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to
evil; and this tendency is called "daring. " Consequently, in the
irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as
between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and
withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
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Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a
contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or
in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both
kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore
every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil
for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive
part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a
passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a
contrary.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of
approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every
approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa.
Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set
down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore
not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot
have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or
according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a
difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the
appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the
limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a
movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of
"anger. " But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil
is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary
to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good
and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which
can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor,
when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement,
except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs
to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of
anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary
thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary
to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or
privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different,
but not contrary to one another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,
specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.
For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the
objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this
distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no
passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,
differ specifically.
Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of
form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety,
as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that
are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in
approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every
difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the
difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and
withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first
two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as
stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not
diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be
infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power
to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the
concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;
rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power
there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one
another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes,
which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now,
the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first,
from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from
water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their
active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference
of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as
if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either
draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing
it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the
first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to
the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the
body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above.
Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover
gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest,
when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause
are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same
applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were,
a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the
first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain
inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this
belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which
is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet
possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment
of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or
"concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion
of "aversion" or "dislike. " Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it
causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this
belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in
respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness. "
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or
inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising
from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair. "
In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring. " But in
respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is
no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above
[1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of
"anger. "
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are
three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,
joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible
faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has
not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing
specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the
irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
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OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the
soul?
(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice
of an act?
(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?
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Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good
or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are
properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog. ). But
passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other
animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in
accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the
sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they
have no connection with human, i. e. moral, good or evil.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions. " But we are praised and
blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally
good or evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of
the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if
our love is good. "
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:
first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the
reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to
wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral
good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above
([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the
command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.
Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to
the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward
members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much
more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be
called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either
from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the
will.
Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are
common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they
are proper to man.
Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called
rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i,
13).
Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not
exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are
subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is
angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a
certain way, i. e. according to, or against reason. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those
things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances
rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance
of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is
evil morally.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to
nature is passion. " But in movements of the soul, what is against
nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide
Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with
nature to that which is against nature. " Therefore these passions are
morally evil.
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of
sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these
emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they
fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they
rejoice in good works. "
I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from
that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are
evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are
good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual
and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of
the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of
the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of
the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement
of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a
movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following
their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest.
