Thus, the Mexican case presents a partial
contrast
to the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
Revolution and War_nodrm
.
.
will be a mere matter of marching," and Henry Clay of Kentucky declared that "the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at our feet.
" Quoted in Donald R.
Hickey, The War of 1 8 1 2 : A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 73; and Stagg, Mr.
Madison's War, 5 n.
8.
? ? [28o]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
that one cannot understand the foreign policy of a revolutionary state by looking solely at its internal characteristics or ideological underpinnings.
Another similarity was the Founding Fathers' belief that the creation of the republic was an event of universal significance. This vision was some- times used to justify support for sympathetic revolutions elsewhere (as in Hamilton's dreams of fomenting democratic revolutions in Latin America or Jefferson's vision of an "Empire of Liberty" in the Western Hemisphere), but attempts to carry out these ambitions were limited by U. S. weakness, the belief that the American experience was unique and would be difficult to duplicate, and the fear that trying to export the revolution would com- promise American "virtue," generate excessive military requirements, and tarnish the republican experiment. 40
Like other revolutionary elites, U. S. leaders were also prone to a com- bination of insecurity and overconfidence. On the one hand, they viewed the republic as fragile and worried that the new nation would succumb to a combination of foreign subversion and internal division. These fears intensified the bitter struggle between Federalists and Republicans, as each faction feared that the other intended to betray the republic to an alien ideal. Such behavior is characteristic of revolutionary regimes, where founding principles are seen as sacred but are still being trans- lated into concrete policies and where political competition is not yet bounded by ? raditions, norms, and institutions. 41 Insecurity also lay at the root of U. S. expansionism, as Jefferson believed that foreign control of the Mississippi Valley and the Floridas would pose a permanent threat to the new nation.
On the other hand, U. S. leaders were optimistic about America's long- term potential and "confident of America's importance in the world . . . and of its future greatness. "42 This hopeful vision could be used to justify a pol- icy of either accommodation or confrontation, however; Hamilton argued against war with England in 1795 by invoking both America's present weakness and its glowing long-range prospects, while Jefferson and Madi- son saw American commerce as a powerful diplomatic weapon and advo- cated an aggressive commercial policy against EnglandY Like other revolutionary states, in short, the United States was repeatedly tom be- tween concern for its immediate survival and a remarkable confidence in its ability to chart its own course.
40 As a result, until 1812 U. S. leaders did not succumb to the same bellicosity displayed by other revolutionary states. Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 3 1 3 .
41 SeeElkinsandMcKitrick,AgeofFederalism,78,270.
42 See Horsman, Diplomacy ofthe New Republic, 4-6; and Hutson, John Adams, 6-10.
43 As Hamilton put it, "few nations can have stronger inducements than the United States
to cultivate peace. " Quoted in Lycan, Hamilton, 216; and see also Combs, Jay Treaty, 1 18-19; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 434?
? ? Revolution and War
U. S. relations with other countries were also subject to spirals of misper- ception and hostility, most obviously with revolutionary France. The revo- lutionaries in France initially regarded the United States as a inspiration. , and many U. S. leaders saw the fall of the French monarchy as a vindicatiol! 1l of their own experience and a crucial advance in the struggle for liberty. These perceptions obscured the many differences between the two nations' experiences, however, and disillusionment was swift. Genet's tenure as France's minister to the United States was a disaster because of his erro- neous belief that a direct appeal to the American people would enable him to reverse the Federalists' policy of neutrality, and his successors' efforts to aid the Republicans in the 1795 election backfired just as badly. The XYZ ne- gotiations in 1797 revealed equally profound misconceptions on France's part, as exaggerated beliefs in the strength of the "French party" in the United States led Talleyrand to provoke a quarrel that neither country
wanted.
Domestic divisions within the United States contributed to these prob- lems by preventing foreign powers from anticipating U. S. responses cor- rectly. Genet's blunders are understandable in light of the enthusiastic welcome he received upon his arrival; ironically, the sympathies he had aroused made his activities seem even more dangerous to the Federalists and fueled their desire to restrain him. Similarly, although the Republicans condemned English maritime policy in 1794 and 1805, the Federalists em- phasized the need to avoid a direct confrontation for which the United States was poorly prepared. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Britain could not foresee how the United States would react, while the fear
that their internal rivals were in cahoots with the foreign adversary encour- aged both Federalists and Republicans to respond more vigorously than cir- cumstances warranted. 44
Finally, this case highlights the trade-offs and tensions between revolu- tionary ideals and external constraints. The idealism of the Founding Fa- thers was evident in their aversion to traditional diplomacy and their disdain for protocol, in their desire to avoid "entangling alliances" and their opposition to a permanent military establishment, and in their faith that commercial policy would be a powerful diplomatic weapon and their fear of "foreign corruption. " Yet despite these deeply rooted convictions, the for- eign policy behavior of the new republic did not differ dramatically from that of other powers. U. S. leaders were keenly concerned with enhancing
44 These same divisions may have encouraged spiraling but discouraged war. Because the Federalists would not support war with England while the Republicans were opposed to war with France, it was difficult for the nation as a whole to go to war with either one. The War of 1812 supports this conjecture: the Federalists still opposed the decision for war, but the Re- publicans now controlled both the legislative and executive branches and did not need the Federalists' approval.
? ? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
their security; they also favored the preservation of a balance of power and were willing to modify their revolutionary ideals in the face of external pressure. 45 The demands of the War of Independence led to the alliance with France in 1778 (which directly contradicted the principles of the Model Treaty), and external pressures eventually convinced the new nation to abandon the Articles of Confederation in favor of a federal system that could stand up more effectively to foreign pressure. The need for economic recovery encouraged Hamilton and the Federalists to seek a rapprochement with England via the Jay Treaty, and the naval threat from France inspired a rapid military buildup in 1797-98. Even Jefferson, whose idealism and An- glophobia were especially pronounced, was quick to use U. S. naval power against the Barbary pirates and was willing to contemplate an alliance with
England in order to check French ambitions in the Mississippi Valley. 46 Jef- ferson also recognized the strategic benefits of removing the European pres- ence in North America, and he was willing to relax his Republican convictions in order to achieve this goal. 47 Like other revolutionary states, in short, in its early diplomacy the United States displayed both a commitment to strongly held ideals and a willingess to abandon them in the name of na- tional security.
The similarities just noted are striking, if only because Americans today are not inclined to see any resemblance between the Founding Fathers and such figures as Robespierre, Lenin, and Khomeini. Yet the differences be- tween the American Revolution and the other cases we have examined are equally important, beginning with the relative mildness of the revolution- ary process itself. The American Revolution resembles an elite "revolution from above" in certain respects, in that most of its leaders, who were drawn from the prerevolutionary elite, did not set out to overturn the es- tablished social order. Although their actions had revolutionary effects and gave rise to the creation of a novel set of political and social. institu- tions, the process was also a remarkably deliberate and carefully reasoned
45 The realist component of early U. S. foreign policy is presented most revealingly in Hut- son, John Adams, "Early American Foreign Policy," and "Intellectual Foundations"; and Ger- ald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
46 Jefferson at one point maintained that United States "should practice neither commerce nor navigation, but stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China. " But he added that this was "theory only, and a theory which the servants of America were not at lib- erty to follow. " See Combs, Jay Treaty, 74; and Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty, )Q-)1.
47 Jefferson's pragmatism is also revealed by his decision to ratify the Louisiana Purchase via congressional approval rather than via a constitutional amendment. As Dumas Malone suggests, Jefferson "was generally more realistic when in office than when in opposition, less doctrinaire; and his situation with respect to the treaty and its promises can best be described by saying that he was caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances. " Jefferson the President, First Term, 318-2o, 332; and see Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 149.
? ? ? Revolution and War
affair. 48 There were sharp political quarrels, and occasional uprisings such as the Shays's and Whiskey rebellions, but these events pale in compari- son to the Jacobin Terror, the Vendee rebellion, the Russian Civil War, or the internal struggles in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The divisions be- tween Federalists and Republican did not end in the expulsion or exter- mination of one side by the other but in a peaceful transfer of power in 1801. And because the internal struggle was less severe, the perceived threat of outside interference was less ominous as well. 49
A second difference was the ideology of the revolution. The American revolutionaries did not see the capture of state power as the means to im- pose a far-reaching reconstruction of society. On the contrary, they were deeply suspicious of state power and devoted to the preservation of liberty, which they conceived as freedom from arbitrary government authority. 50 Thus, where the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions produced strong state bureaucracies designed to facilitate social change at home and mobi- lize the nation for war, the American state was constrained by the profound opposition to a large military establishment and by a system of checks and balances that formed its principal defense against arbitrary executive powell" and the tyranny of democratic. majorities. 51
This discussion brings us to the central question: Why didn't the American Revolution lead to war? The revolution created a radically dif- ferent vision of society and government and disrupted the balance of power in North America. The new nation was internally divided and suspicious of foreign powers, and it faced serious diplomatic challenges from several quarters. Yet with the partial exceptions of the Quasi-War with France, the naval war with the Barbary states, and its frontier skiJr- mishes with the indigenous Indian tribes, the United States did not go to war until 1812. The explanation for this apparent anomaly rests on four main factors.
First, unlike that of most of the other revolutions examined in this study, the ideology of the American Revolution discouraged active efforts to ex- port its principles. Where the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and Iranian clerics used
48 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1 776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Urui- versity of North Carolina Press, 1969), 3-10.
49 See Jolm Shy, "Force, Order, and Democracy in the American Revolution," in Greene, American Revolution, 76-. -77
50 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), 35-43, 55-93, 319; Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 18-28, 61? 5, 6o8-6o9; and Buel, Securing the Revolution.
51 According to Lois Schwoerer, "the anti-standing army bias . . . became a basic assump- tion of almost every political leader" in America. "No Standing Armies! ": The Anti-Army Ideol- ogy in Sevmteenth Century England (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 195; and Carp, "Problem of National Defense," 2o-24.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
control of the state to promote social change at home and abroad, the Founding Fathers saw state power as a danger and refused to grant it unchecked authority. By inhibiting efforts to build a strong state (and espe- cially a strong military establishment), their ideology strictly limited the ability of U. S. leaders to conduct an activist diplomacy. In addition, many U. S. leaders sought to limit their involvement with other states so as not to contaminate the republican experiment, and even men as politically op- posed as Jefferson and Hamilton agreed that the United States should serve as an example while refraining from active efforts to spread its principles abroad. The United States would be a model for other societies but would not try to remake them in its own image. 52
The absence of war was also due to the new country's paradoxical com- bination of weakness and invulnerability. On the one hand, the United States was too weak to pose a serious threat to the other great powers, so those states could take a more relaxed view of events across the ocean. In- deed, neither England nor France placed a high priority on relations with the United States during the 1790s, preoccupied as they were with domestic events and the expanding war in Europe. 53 At the same time, its vast size, sparse population, and poorly developed communications made the new nation extremely difficult to conquer (as the English experience in the War of Independence had demonstrated). 54 Thus, foreign powers had little rea- son to confront the United States (except at sea) but ample incentive to avoid a major military commitment in North America. These same consid- erations dampened U. S. concerns: although U. S. leaders were worried about subversion and disloyalty and occasionally indulged in unfounded
52 As John Quincy Adams put it in 1821: "Wherever the standard of freedom and indepen- dence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America's] heart . . . be. But she goes not abroad in search off monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher to the freedom and indepen- dence of all. She is fthe champion and vindicator only of her own. " Quoted in Armstrong, Rev- olution and World Order, 52; and see also DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 6-7; Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire ofLiberty, 24o-43, 252-54; and Hutson, "Early American Diplomacy," 49-50.
53 DuringtheXYZaffair,TalleyrandremarkedthattheUnitedStateswasofnormore"con- sequence to [the Directory] nor ought it to be treated with greater respect than Geneva or Genoa," and Director Jean-Franr;ois Reubell devoted only three lines of a thirty-four page re- port on French diplomacy to the United States and referred to John Adams as "President of Congress. " British officials were similarly inclined. According to Jerald Combs, Prime Minis- ter Pitt "tended to ignore American problems" and left them in the hands of his subordinates. According to DeConde, "in the 1790s the United States was relatively so insignificant . . . that in any struggle in which the major maritime powers took a real interest it could be little more than a pawn. " See Combs, jay Treaty, 87; DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 503; Elkins and Mc- Kitrick, Age ofFederalism, 401-403, 506-507, 570, and 874-76 n. 131; and Stinchcombe, XYZ Af-
fair, 35?
54 See Shy, "Force, Order, and Democracy," and Jonathan R. Dull, "Two Republics in a Hos-
tile World," in Greene, American Revolution, 78, 158.
? ? Revolution and War
fears of invasion, their relative invulnerability discouraged a precipitous re- sort to force. Thus, Hamilton argued against war in 1794 by saying that "to subvert by force republican liberty in this country, nothing short of entiire conquest would suffice," and the attempt "would be absolutely ruinous ? o the undertakers. "55
Third, U. S. efforts to avoid war were greatly aided by its geographic sep- aration from Europe. Distance reduced the threat that it might pose to Eu- ropean interests and raised the costs of European involvement in Norfth America. This effect was perhaps most evident in Napoleon's decision to abandon his plans to occupy New Orleans and his willingness to sell tlhe Louisiana Territory, but the same factor made it easier for Britain to cede dominance of the continent to its former colonies. Although fears of foreign invasion did arise from time to time, they were generally fleeting.
Lastly, the revolution in France (and the subsequent outbreak of war in Europe) was a stroke of good fortune for the United States, although it cre- ated a number of problems as well. On the one hand, the European con- flict discouraged England, France, and Spain from taking direct action against the new republic, helped U. S. leaders obtain the Jay and Pinckney treaties, and led directly to the Louisiana Purchase. On the other hand, the war in Europe repeatedly threatened to drag the U. S. in, as it finally did in 1812. On balance, however, rivalries elsewhere were an asset for the United States. They aided the expansion of U. S. commerce and gave other states an incentive to stay on good terms with it. Given the relative weak- ness of the United States during its first three decades, this was no small advantage.
The American Revolution bears more than a passing resemblance to the cases examined in chapters 3-5. Foreign responses to the revolution we? re heavily influenced by a concern for the balance of power; the Founding Fathers attributed to the revolution a universal significance, and they saw themselves as both vulnerable in the short term and destined to control a continent over time. Like other revolutionary leaders, they were suspi- cious of foreign powers and obsessed with security, and a combination of internal divisions and misperceptions helped trigger hostile spirals wnth France and England. These disputes brought the United States close to war on several occasions and might have led to open warfare in any of them. At a minimum, therefore, the American Revolution supports the claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the like- lihood of war.
55 QuotedinLycan,Hamilton,216. Madisonexpressedasimilarviewtenyearsearlier,say- ing, "No European nation can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear. " Quoted in Combs, Jay Treaty, 73?
[286]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Unlike revolutionary France, Russia, or Iran, however, the United States did not cross the line for nearly three decades. This anomaly is explained by the limited aims of the Founding Fathers and by the size, weakness, and ge- ographic isolation of the new nation, which combined to make the large- scale use of force either impossible or unappealing. Had the new nation bordered on the other great powers, the danger of war would have been far greater. Although this case demonstrates that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, it is largely consistent with the theory.
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Like the American Revolution, the revolution in Mexico at first appears to challenge many of the central arguments of this book. The revolution was prolonged and violent, with far-reaching effects on Mexico itself, but its in- ternational effects were relatively mild. In particular, although other states' interests were affected by the revolution, they did not see it as a major threat, and it did not Aead to war.
Thus, the Mexican case presents a partial contrast to the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
Upon closer examination, however, the Mexican Revolution does not ! >eem quite so different. Although all-out war did not occur, U. S. troops did intervene in 1914 and 1916 and the border between the two states was the site of repeated raids and armed clashes. 56 These events brought the two states close to war in 1916, after which U. S. -Mexican relations remained troubled for nearly two decades. Most importantly, relations between the
n'volutionary government and several other states exhibited many of the same sources of conflict that were present in the French, Russian, and Iran- ian. cases. Thus, this case supports the claim that revolutions heighten secu- rity competion and increase the risk of war.
The Diplomacy of the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began in November 1910, when a group of liberal refo ,rmers led by Francisco Madero issued a proclamation calling for the over- throw of Porfirio Diaz, the de facto dictator who had governed Mexico for nearly thirty-five years. 57 This initiative sparked a series of rural rebellions
56 In 1920, a U. S. Senate subcommittee estimated that 550 Americans had been killed in Mexico between 1911 and 1920, while U. S. armed forces had killed 541 Mexicans on Mexican soil. Hobert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico,
1916-1 932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 176-77.
57 On Madero and the onset of the revolution, see Stanley Ross, Francisco Madero: Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis u nder Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952); and Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1 .
? ? ? Revolution and War
that overwhelmed the federal army and forced Diaz into exile in April 1911. Madero became president in November, but he was unable to overcome con- servative resistance and unwilling to satisfy the demands of the rural rebels. His popularity declined, the rural rebellions resumed, and Madero was ousted and killed in a counterrevolutionary coup in February 1913.
Madero was replaced by Victoriano Huerta, a conservative general who tried to restore the Porfirian system. Pressures for change were too far ad- vanced, however, and Huerta was soon challenged by the so-called Consti- tutionalist movement, a diverse coalition that united moderate reformers such as Venustiano Carranza (its self-designated "first chief") with rural populists such as Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Huerta eventually faced opposition from the United States as well, as President Woodrow Wilson viewed him as an illegitimate usurper and withheld U. S. recognition. When diplomatic pressure failed to persuade Huerta to hold elections and establish a legitimate constitutional order, Wilson stepped up his own efforts to bring the dictator down. He lifted the U. S. embargo on weapons shipments to Mexico in February 1914 (allowing the Constitution-
alists to obtain arms more easily) and ordered the U. S. Marines to occupy the port of Vera Cruz in April. The latter decision triggered unexpected op- position in Mexico and the United States alike, and brought a sharp letter of protest from Carranza. 58
Huerta's resignation in July caused a brief burst of optimism, but the Constitutionalist coalition had already begun to unravel and a civil war be- tween the main revolutionary factions was underway by the fall. 59 U. S. offi- cials favored Villa at first, believing that he would win quickly and would be easier to deal with than Carranza, and hoped that a rapid end to the fighting would eliminate the need for U. S. involvement. 60 As the fighting in- tensified and Carranza gained the upper hand, however, Wilson and his aides began to worry about the safety of foreign nationals and property and acknowledged that intervention might be necessary. 61 Relations with Car-
58 See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1 9 1 D-1 9 1 7 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 125 n. 41.
59 On the origins of the civil war, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Con- stitutionalist Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), chap. 6; Robert E. Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention at Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 196o); and Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 2.
60 Whereas Carranza had opposed the occupation of Vera Cruz and rejected U. S. media- tion, Villa endorsed the Vera Cruz intervention and went to some lengths to court U. S. offi- cials. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Strugglefor Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 251-52, 258-59; and Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 53-55, 75-J6, 12Q-21, 128-40.
61 Wilson at fust hoped to stay out of Mexico and told a crowd in Indianapolis in January, "It isnoneofmybusines,s anditisnoneofyourbusinesshowlong[theMexicanpeople]takeinde- termining [their form of government]. . . . The country is theirs. . . . And so far as my influence
[288)
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ranza had been strained since Vera Cruz, and reports from confidential agents in Mexico convinced Wilson that Carranza lacked the stature or abil- ity to unify the country. 62 U. S. officials now began to press for the formation of a coalition government in Mexico, in part because this solution would allow Washington to play the rivan factions off against each other. 63 In June, Wilson issued a formal note calling for the contending factions "to act to- gether . . . for the relief and redemption of their country," and he warned that the United States might be forced to intervene "in order to help Mexico save herself. " Villa accepted Wilson's proposal but Carranza rejected it, de-
claring, "History furnishes no example in any age or any country of civil war terminating by the union of the contending parties. One or the other must triumph. "64 Wilson invited representatives from the contending fac- tions to a conference of Latin American states in August and offered the un- workable suggestion that both Villa and Carranza retire in favor of some alternative leader. The conference accomplished nothing, and a number of U. S. officials began to support the idea of a counterrevolutionary coup by a group of conservative Mexican exiles. 65 Wilson was increasingly preoccu- pied by events in Europe and concerned about German intrigues in Mexico, however, and he soon reversed course and extended de facto recognition to
Carranza in October. 66
Recognition brought a brief honeymoon between the United States and
Carranza, but lingering suspicions and misunderstandings took the two
? goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them. " By March, however, Wilson ad- mitted to Secretary of State Lansing, " I do not yet allow myself to think of intervention as more than a remote pJJSsibility . . . [but] the possibility is worth preparing for. " Arthur Link notes, "The stronger Carranza grew, the stronger seme ed to become the determination of the President and his advisors not to recognize [him]. " See Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 459, 464, 468.
62 In August 1915, Lansing remarked, "I doubt very much as to (Carranza's) personality being strong enough or one that would be able to restore peace in Mexico. " Quoted in P. Ed- ward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 191C>-1917 {Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1970), 174?
63 Lansing wrrote in July, "We do not wish the Carranza faction to lbe the only one to deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us the opportunity to invite a compromise of factions. I think, therefore, it is politic for the time to allow Villa to obtain sufficient financial resources to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected. " Quoted in Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 285; and see also Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 300; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 174; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 487.
64 Carranza's rejection led Wilson to declare, "I think I have never known of a man more impossible to deal with on human principles than this man Carranza. " For these quotations see Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 476-77, 481; and Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 165.
65 See Katz, Secret War, 303-305; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 471-76.
66 Wilson's decision-making is recounted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 48? 1. On the role of Germany in U. S. calculations, see Katz, Secret War, 301-302, and "Pancho Villa and the At- tack on Columbus, New Mexico," American Historical Review 83, no. 1 {1978), 1o8.
? ? ? Revolution and War
countries to the brink of war the following year. The catalyst was Villa, who was now convinced that Carranza had sold out to the United States. In a last-ditch attempt to revive his fortunes, Villa launched a series of attacks on U. S. citizens and property, beginning with the murder of seventeen U. S. mining engineers in January 1916 and culminating in a raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March. 67 The border region had been torn by a number of vi- olent raids and intrigues during the previous year, and Wilson now dis- patched a "Punitive Expedition" under General John J. Pershing to apprehend Villla or destroy his forces. 68
As Villa had hoped, the U. S. decision to intervene ended the rapproche- ment with Carranza and partly restored his own prestige. Wilson believed (incorrectly) that Carranza had approved the U. S. expedition, and though the Mexican leader's initial response was measured, he could not afford to be viewed as a U. S. lackey and his opposition soon stiffened. Tensions grew worse when talks between U. S. and Mexican military representa- tives failed to produce an agreement, U. S. troops clashed with a group of Mexican civilians in the village of Parral in April, and Mexican bandits at- tacked . Glen Springs, Texas in May. Wilson promptly mobilized 150,000 U. S. militiamen along the border. The U. S. Army began preparing plans for a full-scale invasion, and another skirmish between U. S. and Mexican forces at Carrizal on June 21 convinced several U. S. officials that war was imminent. 69
Both Carranza and Wilson were committed to avoiding war, however, and the crisis eased when the two leaders agreed to form a "joint commis- sion" to discuss the various points of dispute. Wilson offered to withdraw the Punitive Expedition in exchange for Mexican adherence to a series of one-sided conditions regarding border security, the protection of foreign lives and property, religious tolerance, and other domestic issues. No Mexi-
67 See Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Raid on Columbus," and Secret War, 305-3 10; and James A. Sandos, "PanC'ho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's MexicanDiplomacy Re- considered," Joumal ofLatin American Studies 13, no. 2 (1981).
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force.
? ? [28o]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
that one cannot understand the foreign policy of a revolutionary state by looking solely at its internal characteristics or ideological underpinnings.
Another similarity was the Founding Fathers' belief that the creation of the republic was an event of universal significance. This vision was some- times used to justify support for sympathetic revolutions elsewhere (as in Hamilton's dreams of fomenting democratic revolutions in Latin America or Jefferson's vision of an "Empire of Liberty" in the Western Hemisphere), but attempts to carry out these ambitions were limited by U. S. weakness, the belief that the American experience was unique and would be difficult to duplicate, and the fear that trying to export the revolution would com- promise American "virtue," generate excessive military requirements, and tarnish the republican experiment. 40
Like other revolutionary elites, U. S. leaders were also prone to a com- bination of insecurity and overconfidence. On the one hand, they viewed the republic as fragile and worried that the new nation would succumb to a combination of foreign subversion and internal division. These fears intensified the bitter struggle between Federalists and Republicans, as each faction feared that the other intended to betray the republic to an alien ideal. Such behavior is characteristic of revolutionary regimes, where founding principles are seen as sacred but are still being trans- lated into concrete policies and where political competition is not yet bounded by ? raditions, norms, and institutions. 41 Insecurity also lay at the root of U. S. expansionism, as Jefferson believed that foreign control of the Mississippi Valley and the Floridas would pose a permanent threat to the new nation.
On the other hand, U. S. leaders were optimistic about America's long- term potential and "confident of America's importance in the world . . . and of its future greatness. "42 This hopeful vision could be used to justify a pol- icy of either accommodation or confrontation, however; Hamilton argued against war with England in 1795 by invoking both America's present weakness and its glowing long-range prospects, while Jefferson and Madi- son saw American commerce as a powerful diplomatic weapon and advo- cated an aggressive commercial policy against EnglandY Like other revolutionary states, in short, the United States was repeatedly tom be- tween concern for its immediate survival and a remarkable confidence in its ability to chart its own course.
40 As a result, until 1812 U. S. leaders did not succumb to the same bellicosity displayed by other revolutionary states. Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 3 1 3 .
41 SeeElkinsandMcKitrick,AgeofFederalism,78,270.
42 See Horsman, Diplomacy ofthe New Republic, 4-6; and Hutson, John Adams, 6-10.
43 As Hamilton put it, "few nations can have stronger inducements than the United States
to cultivate peace. " Quoted in Lycan, Hamilton, 216; and see also Combs, Jay Treaty, 1 18-19; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 434?
? ? Revolution and War
U. S. relations with other countries were also subject to spirals of misper- ception and hostility, most obviously with revolutionary France. The revo- lutionaries in France initially regarded the United States as a inspiration. , and many U. S. leaders saw the fall of the French monarchy as a vindicatiol! 1l of their own experience and a crucial advance in the struggle for liberty. These perceptions obscured the many differences between the two nations' experiences, however, and disillusionment was swift. Genet's tenure as France's minister to the United States was a disaster because of his erro- neous belief that a direct appeal to the American people would enable him to reverse the Federalists' policy of neutrality, and his successors' efforts to aid the Republicans in the 1795 election backfired just as badly. The XYZ ne- gotiations in 1797 revealed equally profound misconceptions on France's part, as exaggerated beliefs in the strength of the "French party" in the United States led Talleyrand to provoke a quarrel that neither country
wanted.
Domestic divisions within the United States contributed to these prob- lems by preventing foreign powers from anticipating U. S. responses cor- rectly. Genet's blunders are understandable in light of the enthusiastic welcome he received upon his arrival; ironically, the sympathies he had aroused made his activities seem even more dangerous to the Federalists and fueled their desire to restrain him. Similarly, although the Republicans condemned English maritime policy in 1794 and 1805, the Federalists em- phasized the need to avoid a direct confrontation for which the United States was poorly prepared. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Britain could not foresee how the United States would react, while the fear
that their internal rivals were in cahoots with the foreign adversary encour- aged both Federalists and Republicans to respond more vigorously than cir- cumstances warranted. 44
Finally, this case highlights the trade-offs and tensions between revolu- tionary ideals and external constraints. The idealism of the Founding Fa- thers was evident in their aversion to traditional diplomacy and their disdain for protocol, in their desire to avoid "entangling alliances" and their opposition to a permanent military establishment, and in their faith that commercial policy would be a powerful diplomatic weapon and their fear of "foreign corruption. " Yet despite these deeply rooted convictions, the for- eign policy behavior of the new republic did not differ dramatically from that of other powers. U. S. leaders were keenly concerned with enhancing
44 These same divisions may have encouraged spiraling but discouraged war. Because the Federalists would not support war with England while the Republicans were opposed to war with France, it was difficult for the nation as a whole to go to war with either one. The War of 1812 supports this conjecture: the Federalists still opposed the decision for war, but the Re- publicans now controlled both the legislative and executive branches and did not need the Federalists' approval.
? ? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
their security; they also favored the preservation of a balance of power and were willing to modify their revolutionary ideals in the face of external pressure. 45 The demands of the War of Independence led to the alliance with France in 1778 (which directly contradicted the principles of the Model Treaty), and external pressures eventually convinced the new nation to abandon the Articles of Confederation in favor of a federal system that could stand up more effectively to foreign pressure. The need for economic recovery encouraged Hamilton and the Federalists to seek a rapprochement with England via the Jay Treaty, and the naval threat from France inspired a rapid military buildup in 1797-98. Even Jefferson, whose idealism and An- glophobia were especially pronounced, was quick to use U. S. naval power against the Barbary pirates and was willing to contemplate an alliance with
England in order to check French ambitions in the Mississippi Valley. 46 Jef- ferson also recognized the strategic benefits of removing the European pres- ence in North America, and he was willing to relax his Republican convictions in order to achieve this goal. 47 Like other revolutionary states, in short, in its early diplomacy the United States displayed both a commitment to strongly held ideals and a willingess to abandon them in the name of na- tional security.
The similarities just noted are striking, if only because Americans today are not inclined to see any resemblance between the Founding Fathers and such figures as Robespierre, Lenin, and Khomeini. Yet the differences be- tween the American Revolution and the other cases we have examined are equally important, beginning with the relative mildness of the revolution- ary process itself. The American Revolution resembles an elite "revolution from above" in certain respects, in that most of its leaders, who were drawn from the prerevolutionary elite, did not set out to overturn the es- tablished social order. Although their actions had revolutionary effects and gave rise to the creation of a novel set of political and social. institu- tions, the process was also a remarkably deliberate and carefully reasoned
45 The realist component of early U. S. foreign policy is presented most revealingly in Hut- son, John Adams, "Early American Foreign Policy," and "Intellectual Foundations"; and Ger- ald Stourzh, Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
46 Jefferson at one point maintained that United States "should practice neither commerce nor navigation, but stand with respect to Europe precisely on the footing of China. " But he added that this was "theory only, and a theory which the servants of America were not at lib- erty to follow. " See Combs, Jay Treaty, 74; and Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty, )Q-)1.
47 Jefferson's pragmatism is also revealed by his decision to ratify the Louisiana Purchase via congressional approval rather than via a constitutional amendment. As Dumas Malone suggests, Jefferson "was generally more realistic when in office than when in opposition, less doctrinaire; and his situation with respect to the treaty and its promises can best be described by saying that he was caught in a chain of inexorable circumstances. " Jefferson the President, First Term, 318-2o, 332; and see Kaplan, Colonies into Nation, 149.
? ? ? Revolution and War
affair. 48 There were sharp political quarrels, and occasional uprisings such as the Shays's and Whiskey rebellions, but these events pale in compari- son to the Jacobin Terror, the Vendee rebellion, the Russian Civil War, or the internal struggles in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The divisions be- tween Federalists and Republican did not end in the expulsion or exter- mination of one side by the other but in a peaceful transfer of power in 1801. And because the internal struggle was less severe, the perceived threat of outside interference was less ominous as well. 49
A second difference was the ideology of the revolution. The American revolutionaries did not see the capture of state power as the means to im- pose a far-reaching reconstruction of society. On the contrary, they were deeply suspicious of state power and devoted to the preservation of liberty, which they conceived as freedom from arbitrary government authority. 50 Thus, where the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions produced strong state bureaucracies designed to facilitate social change at home and mobi- lize the nation for war, the American state was constrained by the profound opposition to a large military establishment and by a system of checks and balances that formed its principal defense against arbitrary executive powell" and the tyranny of democratic. majorities. 51
This discussion brings us to the central question: Why didn't the American Revolution lead to war? The revolution created a radically dif- ferent vision of society and government and disrupted the balance of power in North America. The new nation was internally divided and suspicious of foreign powers, and it faced serious diplomatic challenges from several quarters. Yet with the partial exceptions of the Quasi-War with France, the naval war with the Barbary states, and its frontier skiJr- mishes with the indigenous Indian tribes, the United States did not go to war until 1812. The explanation for this apparent anomaly rests on four main factors.
First, unlike that of most of the other revolutions examined in this study, the ideology of the American Revolution discouraged active efforts to ex- port its principles. Where the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and Iranian clerics used
48 See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1 776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Urui- versity of North Carolina Press, 1969), 3-10.
49 See Jolm Shy, "Force, Order, and Democracy in the American Revolution," in Greene, American Revolution, 76-. -77
50 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Har- vard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), 35-43, 55-93, 319; Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 18-28, 61? 5, 6o8-6o9; and Buel, Securing the Revolution.
51 According to Lois Schwoerer, "the anti-standing army bias . . . became a basic assump- tion of almost every political leader" in America. "No Standing Armies! ": The Anti-Army Ideol- ogy in Sevmteenth Century England (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 195; and Carp, "Problem of National Defense," 2o-24.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
control of the state to promote social change at home and abroad, the Founding Fathers saw state power as a danger and refused to grant it unchecked authority. By inhibiting efforts to build a strong state (and espe- cially a strong military establishment), their ideology strictly limited the ability of U. S. leaders to conduct an activist diplomacy. In addition, many U. S. leaders sought to limit their involvement with other states so as not to contaminate the republican experiment, and even men as politically op- posed as Jefferson and Hamilton agreed that the United States should serve as an example while refraining from active efforts to spread its principles abroad. The United States would be a model for other societies but would not try to remake them in its own image. 52
The absence of war was also due to the new country's paradoxical com- bination of weakness and invulnerability. On the one hand, the United States was too weak to pose a serious threat to the other great powers, so those states could take a more relaxed view of events across the ocean. In- deed, neither England nor France placed a high priority on relations with the United States during the 1790s, preoccupied as they were with domestic events and the expanding war in Europe. 53 At the same time, its vast size, sparse population, and poorly developed communications made the new nation extremely difficult to conquer (as the English experience in the War of Independence had demonstrated). 54 Thus, foreign powers had little rea- son to confront the United States (except at sea) but ample incentive to avoid a major military commitment in North America. These same consid- erations dampened U. S. concerns: although U. S. leaders were worried about subversion and disloyalty and occasionally indulged in unfounded
52 As John Quincy Adams put it in 1821: "Wherever the standard of freedom and indepen- dence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America's] heart . . . be. But she goes not abroad in search off monsters to destroy. She is the well wisher to the freedom and indepen- dence of all. She is fthe champion and vindicator only of her own. " Quoted in Armstrong, Rev- olution and World Order, 52; and see also DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 6-7; Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire ofLiberty, 24o-43, 252-54; and Hutson, "Early American Diplomacy," 49-50.
53 DuringtheXYZaffair,TalleyrandremarkedthattheUnitedStateswasofnormore"con- sequence to [the Directory] nor ought it to be treated with greater respect than Geneva or Genoa," and Director Jean-Franr;ois Reubell devoted only three lines of a thirty-four page re- port on French diplomacy to the United States and referred to John Adams as "President of Congress. " British officials were similarly inclined. According to Jerald Combs, Prime Minis- ter Pitt "tended to ignore American problems" and left them in the hands of his subordinates. According to DeConde, "in the 1790s the United States was relatively so insignificant . . . that in any struggle in which the major maritime powers took a real interest it could be little more than a pawn. " See Combs, jay Treaty, 87; DeConde, Entangling Alliance, 503; Elkins and Mc- Kitrick, Age ofFederalism, 401-403, 506-507, 570, and 874-76 n. 131; and Stinchcombe, XYZ Af-
fair, 35?
54 See Shy, "Force, Order, and Democracy," and Jonathan R. Dull, "Two Republics in a Hos-
tile World," in Greene, American Revolution, 78, 158.
? ? Revolution and War
fears of invasion, their relative invulnerability discouraged a precipitous re- sort to force. Thus, Hamilton argued against war in 1794 by saying that "to subvert by force republican liberty in this country, nothing short of entiire conquest would suffice," and the attempt "would be absolutely ruinous ? o the undertakers. "55
Third, U. S. efforts to avoid war were greatly aided by its geographic sep- aration from Europe. Distance reduced the threat that it might pose to Eu- ropean interests and raised the costs of European involvement in Norfth America. This effect was perhaps most evident in Napoleon's decision to abandon his plans to occupy New Orleans and his willingness to sell tlhe Louisiana Territory, but the same factor made it easier for Britain to cede dominance of the continent to its former colonies. Although fears of foreign invasion did arise from time to time, they were generally fleeting.
Lastly, the revolution in France (and the subsequent outbreak of war in Europe) was a stroke of good fortune for the United States, although it cre- ated a number of problems as well. On the one hand, the European con- flict discouraged England, France, and Spain from taking direct action against the new republic, helped U. S. leaders obtain the Jay and Pinckney treaties, and led directly to the Louisiana Purchase. On the other hand, the war in Europe repeatedly threatened to drag the U. S. in, as it finally did in 1812. On balance, however, rivalries elsewhere were an asset for the United States. They aided the expansion of U. S. commerce and gave other states an incentive to stay on good terms with it. Given the relative weak- ness of the United States during its first three decades, this was no small advantage.
The American Revolution bears more than a passing resemblance to the cases examined in chapters 3-5. Foreign responses to the revolution we? re heavily influenced by a concern for the balance of power; the Founding Fathers attributed to the revolution a universal significance, and they saw themselves as both vulnerable in the short term and destined to control a continent over time. Like other revolutionary leaders, they were suspi- cious of foreign powers and obsessed with security, and a combination of internal divisions and misperceptions helped trigger hostile spirals wnth France and England. These disputes brought the United States close to war on several occasions and might have led to open warfare in any of them. At a minimum, therefore, the American Revolution supports the claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the like- lihood of war.
55 QuotedinLycan,Hamilton,216. Madisonexpressedasimilarviewtenyearsearlier,say- ing, "No European nation can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear. " Quoted in Combs, Jay Treaty, 73?
[286]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Unlike revolutionary France, Russia, or Iran, however, the United States did not cross the line for nearly three decades. This anomaly is explained by the limited aims of the Founding Fathers and by the size, weakness, and ge- ographic isolation of the new nation, which combined to make the large- scale use of force either impossible or unappealing. Had the new nation bordered on the other great powers, the danger of war would have been far greater. Although this case demonstrates that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, it is largely consistent with the theory.
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Like the American Revolution, the revolution in Mexico at first appears to challenge many of the central arguments of this book. The revolution was prolonged and violent, with far-reaching effects on Mexico itself, but its in- ternational effects were relatively mild. In particular, although other states' interests were affected by the revolution, they did not see it as a major threat, and it did not Aead to war.
Thus, the Mexican case presents a partial contrast to the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
Upon closer examination, however, the Mexican Revolution does not ! >eem quite so different. Although all-out war did not occur, U. S. troops did intervene in 1914 and 1916 and the border between the two states was the site of repeated raids and armed clashes. 56 These events brought the two states close to war in 1916, after which U. S. -Mexican relations remained troubled for nearly two decades. Most importantly, relations between the
n'volutionary government and several other states exhibited many of the same sources of conflict that were present in the French, Russian, and Iran- ian. cases. Thus, this case supports the claim that revolutions heighten secu- rity competion and increase the risk of war.
The Diplomacy of the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began in November 1910, when a group of liberal refo ,rmers led by Francisco Madero issued a proclamation calling for the over- throw of Porfirio Diaz, the de facto dictator who had governed Mexico for nearly thirty-five years. 57 This initiative sparked a series of rural rebellions
56 In 1920, a U. S. Senate subcommittee estimated that 550 Americans had been killed in Mexico between 1911 and 1920, while U. S. armed forces had killed 541 Mexicans on Mexican soil. Hobert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico,
1916-1 932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 176-77.
57 On Madero and the onset of the revolution, see Stanley Ross, Francisco Madero: Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis u nder Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952); and Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1 .
? ? ? Revolution and War
that overwhelmed the federal army and forced Diaz into exile in April 1911. Madero became president in November, but he was unable to overcome con- servative resistance and unwilling to satisfy the demands of the rural rebels. His popularity declined, the rural rebellions resumed, and Madero was ousted and killed in a counterrevolutionary coup in February 1913.
Madero was replaced by Victoriano Huerta, a conservative general who tried to restore the Porfirian system. Pressures for change were too far ad- vanced, however, and Huerta was soon challenged by the so-called Consti- tutionalist movement, a diverse coalition that united moderate reformers such as Venustiano Carranza (its self-designated "first chief") with rural populists such as Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Huerta eventually faced opposition from the United States as well, as President Woodrow Wilson viewed him as an illegitimate usurper and withheld U. S. recognition. When diplomatic pressure failed to persuade Huerta to hold elections and establish a legitimate constitutional order, Wilson stepped up his own efforts to bring the dictator down. He lifted the U. S. embargo on weapons shipments to Mexico in February 1914 (allowing the Constitution-
alists to obtain arms more easily) and ordered the U. S. Marines to occupy the port of Vera Cruz in April. The latter decision triggered unexpected op- position in Mexico and the United States alike, and brought a sharp letter of protest from Carranza. 58
Huerta's resignation in July caused a brief burst of optimism, but the Constitutionalist coalition had already begun to unravel and a civil war be- tween the main revolutionary factions was underway by the fall. 59 U. S. offi- cials favored Villa at first, believing that he would win quickly and would be easier to deal with than Carranza, and hoped that a rapid end to the fighting would eliminate the need for U. S. involvement. 60 As the fighting in- tensified and Carranza gained the upper hand, however, Wilson and his aides began to worry about the safety of foreign nationals and property and acknowledged that intervention might be necessary. 61 Relations with Car-
58 See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1 9 1 D-1 9 1 7 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 125 n. 41.
59 On the origins of the civil war, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Con- stitutionalist Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), chap. 6; Robert E. Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention at Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 196o); and Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 2.
60 Whereas Carranza had opposed the occupation of Vera Cruz and rejected U. S. media- tion, Villa endorsed the Vera Cruz intervention and went to some lengths to court U. S. offi- cials. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Strugglefor Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 251-52, 258-59; and Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 53-55, 75-J6, 12Q-21, 128-40.
61 Wilson at fust hoped to stay out of Mexico and told a crowd in Indianapolis in January, "It isnoneofmybusines,s anditisnoneofyourbusinesshowlong[theMexicanpeople]takeinde- termining [their form of government]. . . . The country is theirs. . . . And so far as my influence
[288)
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ranza had been strained since Vera Cruz, and reports from confidential agents in Mexico convinced Wilson that Carranza lacked the stature or abil- ity to unify the country. 62 U. S. officials now began to press for the formation of a coalition government in Mexico, in part because this solution would allow Washington to play the rivan factions off against each other. 63 In June, Wilson issued a formal note calling for the contending factions "to act to- gether . . . for the relief and redemption of their country," and he warned that the United States might be forced to intervene "in order to help Mexico save herself. " Villa accepted Wilson's proposal but Carranza rejected it, de-
claring, "History furnishes no example in any age or any country of civil war terminating by the union of the contending parties. One or the other must triumph. "64 Wilson invited representatives from the contending fac- tions to a conference of Latin American states in August and offered the un- workable suggestion that both Villa and Carranza retire in favor of some alternative leader. The conference accomplished nothing, and a number of U. S. officials began to support the idea of a counterrevolutionary coup by a group of conservative Mexican exiles. 65 Wilson was increasingly preoccu- pied by events in Europe and concerned about German intrigues in Mexico, however, and he soon reversed course and extended de facto recognition to
Carranza in October. 66
Recognition brought a brief honeymoon between the United States and
Carranza, but lingering suspicions and misunderstandings took the two
? goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them. " By March, however, Wilson ad- mitted to Secretary of State Lansing, " I do not yet allow myself to think of intervention as more than a remote pJJSsibility . . . [but] the possibility is worth preparing for. " Arthur Link notes, "The stronger Carranza grew, the stronger seme ed to become the determination of the President and his advisors not to recognize [him]. " See Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 459, 464, 468.
62 In August 1915, Lansing remarked, "I doubt very much as to (Carranza's) personality being strong enough or one that would be able to restore peace in Mexico. " Quoted in P. Ed- ward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 191C>-1917 {Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1970), 174?
63 Lansing wrrote in July, "We do not wish the Carranza faction to lbe the only one to deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us the opportunity to invite a compromise of factions. I think, therefore, it is politic for the time to allow Villa to obtain sufficient financial resources to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected. " Quoted in Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 285; and see also Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 300; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 174; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 487.
64 Carranza's rejection led Wilson to declare, "I think I have never known of a man more impossible to deal with on human principles than this man Carranza. " For these quotations see Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 476-77, 481; and Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 165.
65 See Katz, Secret War, 303-305; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 471-76.
66 Wilson's decision-making is recounted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 48? 1. On the role of Germany in U. S. calculations, see Katz, Secret War, 301-302, and "Pancho Villa and the At- tack on Columbus, New Mexico," American Historical Review 83, no. 1 {1978), 1o8.
? ? ? Revolution and War
countries to the brink of war the following year. The catalyst was Villa, who was now convinced that Carranza had sold out to the United States. In a last-ditch attempt to revive his fortunes, Villa launched a series of attacks on U. S. citizens and property, beginning with the murder of seventeen U. S. mining engineers in January 1916 and culminating in a raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March. 67 The border region had been torn by a number of vi- olent raids and intrigues during the previous year, and Wilson now dis- patched a "Punitive Expedition" under General John J. Pershing to apprehend Villla or destroy his forces. 68
As Villa had hoped, the U. S. decision to intervene ended the rapproche- ment with Carranza and partly restored his own prestige. Wilson believed (incorrectly) that Carranza had approved the U. S. expedition, and though the Mexican leader's initial response was measured, he could not afford to be viewed as a U. S. lackey and his opposition soon stiffened. Tensions grew worse when talks between U. S. and Mexican military representa- tives failed to produce an agreement, U. S. troops clashed with a group of Mexican civilians in the village of Parral in April, and Mexican bandits at- tacked . Glen Springs, Texas in May. Wilson promptly mobilized 150,000 U. S. militiamen along the border. The U. S. Army began preparing plans for a full-scale invasion, and another skirmish between U. S. and Mexican forces at Carrizal on June 21 convinced several U. S. officials that war was imminent. 69
Both Carranza and Wilson were committed to avoiding war, however, and the crisis eased when the two leaders agreed to form a "joint commis- sion" to discuss the various points of dispute. Wilson offered to withdraw the Punitive Expedition in exchange for Mexican adherence to a series of one-sided conditions regarding border security, the protection of foreign lives and property, religious tolerance, and other domestic issues. No Mexi-
67 See Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Raid on Columbus," and Secret War, 305-3 10; and James A. Sandos, "PanC'ho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's MexicanDiplomacy Re- considered," Joumal ofLatin American Studies 13, no. 2 (1981).
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force.
