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Afric. 88, 90; Appian, 95), not because consisted of 300 members, but because this was the ancient normal number of senators 98). very likely that
this assembly recruited Its ranks by equitcs of repute but, when Plutarch makes the three hundred to be Italian wholesale dealers (Cato Min. 59, 61), he has misunderstood his authority [Bell. Afr. 90). Of a similar kind must have been the arrangement as to the quasi-senate already in Thessalonica.
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and small, and in unnerving and discouraging the multitude by their own sluggishness and hopelessness.
While these displayed the utter prostration of weakness, The ultra* the ultras on the other hand exhibited in full display its exaggerated action. With them there was no attempt to
conceal that the preliminary to any negotiation for peace
was the bringing over of Caesar's head ; every one of the attempts towards peace, which Caesar repeatedly made even now, was tossed aside without being examined, or employed only to cover insidious attempts on the lives of the commissioners of their opponent. That the declared partisans of Caesar had jointly and severally forfeited life and property, was a matter of course; but it fared little better with those more or less neutral. Lucius Domitius, the hero of Corfinium, gravely proposed in the council of war that those senators who had fought in the army of Pompeius should come to a vote on all who had either re mained neutral or had emigrated but not entered the army, and should according to their own pleasure individually acquit them or punish them by fine or even by the forfeiture of life and property. Another of these ultras formally lodged with Pompeius a charge of corruption and treason against Lucius Afranius for his defective defence of Spain. Among these deep-dyed republicans their political theory assumed almost the character of a confession of religious faith ; they accordingly hated their own more lukewarm partisans and Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible, still more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterize orthodox theologians; and they were mainly to blame for the numberless and bitter separate quarrels which distracted the emigrant army and emigrant senate. But they did not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus, Titus Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Caesar'a
The pre-
^^,n*
army as fell into their hands to be executed en masse; which, as may well be conceived, did not tend to make Caesar's troops fight with less energy. If the counter revolution in favour of the friends of the constitution, for which all the elements were in existence 216), did not break out in Italy during Caesar's absence, the reason, according to the assurance of discerning opponents of Caesar, lay chiefly in the general dread of the unbridled fury of the republican ultras after the restoration should have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp were in despair over this frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might and could but he was too pusillanimous and in too awkward position to prevent or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as became him as commander-in- chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least carried moral consistency 4nto the struggle, attempted with more energy to check such proceedings he induced the emigrant senate to prohibit special decree the pillage of subject towns and the putting to death of burgess otherwise than in battle. The able Marcus Marcellus had similar views. No one, indeed, knew better than Cato and Marcellus that the extreme party would carry out their saving deeds, necessary, in defiance of all decrees of the senate. But even now, when they had still to regard considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras could not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the victory for reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla themselves would have turned away with horror; and we can understand why Cato, according to his own confession, was more afraid of the victory than of the defeat of his own party.
The management of the military preparations in the Macedonian camp was in the hands of Pompeius the commander-in-chief. His position, always troublesome
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and galling, had become still worse through the unfortunate events of 705. In the eyes of his partisans he was mainly *•. to blame for this result. This judgment was in various respects not just. A considerable part of the misfortunes endured was to be laid to the account of the perversity and insubordination of the lieutenant-generals,
of the consul Lentulus and Lucius Domitius; from the moment when Pompeius took the head of the army, he had led it with skill and courage, and had saved at least very considerable forces from the shipwreck; that he was not a match for Caesar's altogether superior genius, which was now recognized by all, could not be
made matter of reproach to him. But the result alone decided men's judgment. Trusting to the general Pompeius,
the constitutional party had broken with Caesar; the pernicious consequences of this breach recoiled upon the general Pompeius; and, though owing to the notorious military incapacity of all the other chiefs no attempt was made to change the supreme command, yet confidence at
any rate in the commander-in-chief was paralyzed. To these painful consequences of the defeats endured were added the injurious influences of the emigration. Among the refugees who arrived there were certainly a number of efficient soldiers and capable officers, especially those belonging to the former Spanish army ; but the number of those who came to serve and fight was just as small as that of the generals of quality who called themselves pro consuls and imperators with as good title as Pompeius, and of the genteel lords who took part in active military service more or less reluctantly, was
alarmingly great. Through these the mode of life in the capital was introduced
into the camp, not at all to the advantage of the army ; the tents of such grandees were graceful bowers, the ground elegantly covered with fresh turf, the walls clothed with ivy; silver plate stood on the table, and the wine-cup
VOL V
149
especially
fairly
,
The
often circulated there even in broad daylight. Those fashionable warriors formed a singular contrast with Caesar's daredevils, who ate coarse bread from which the former recoiled, and who, when that failed, devoured even roots and swore that they would rather chew the bark of trees than desist from the enemy. While, moreover, the action of Pompeius was hampered by the necessity of having regard to the authority of a collegiate board personally disinclined to him, this embarrassment was singularly increased when the senate of emigrants took up its abode almost in his very headquarters and all the venom of the emigrants now found vent in these senatorial sittings. Lastly there was nowhere any man of mark, who could have thrown his own weight into the scale against all these preposterous doings. Pompeius himself was in tellectually far too secondary for that purpose, and far too hesitating, awkward, and reserved. Marcus Cato would have had at least the requisite moral authority, and would not have lacked the good will to support Pompeius with it ; but Pompeius, instead of calling him to his assistance, out of distrustful jealousy kept him in the background, and preferred for instance to commit the highly important chief command of the fleet to the in every respect incapable Marcus Bibulus rather than to Cato.
While Pompeius thus treated the political aspect of *"s position with his characteristic perversity, and did his best to make what was already bad in itself still worse, he devoted himself on the other hand with commendable zeal to his duty of giving military organization to the considerable but scattered forces of his party. The flower of his force was composed of the troops brought with him from Italy, out of which with the supplementary aid of the Illyrian prisoners of war and the Romans domiciled in Greece five legions in all were formed. Three others came from the east — the two Syrian legions formed from
pSnwdul Pompeius.
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chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
243
the remains of the army of Crassus, and one made up out of the two weak legions hitherto stationed in Cilicia. Nothing stood in the way of the withdrawal of these corps of occupation : because on the one hand the Pompeians had an understanding with the Parthians, and might even have had an alliance with them if Pompeius had not indignantly refused to pay them the price which they demanded for it—the cession of the Syrian province added by himself to the empire ; and on the other hand Caesar's plan of despatching two legions to Syria, and inducing the Jews once more to take up arms by means of the prince Aristobulus kept a prisoner in Rome, was frustrated partly by other causes, partly by the death of Aristobulus. New legions were moreover raised—one from the veteran soldiers settled in Crete and Macedonia, two from the Romans of Asia Minor. To all these fell to be added 2000 volunteers, who were derived from the remains of the Spanish select corps and other similar sources ; and, lastly, the contingents of the subjects. Pompeius like Caesar had disdained to make requisitions of infantry from them ; only the Epirot, Aetolian, and Thracian militia were called out
to guard the coast, and moreover 3000 archers from Greece
and Asia Minor and 1200 slingers were taken up as light
troops.
The cavalry on the other hand — with the exception of Hb
a noble guard, more respectable than militarily important, CAy**f- formed from the young aristocracy of Rome, and of the Apulian slave - herdsmen whom Pompeius had mounted
205)—consisted exclusively of the contingents of the subjects and clients of Rome. The flower of consisted of the Celts, partly from the garrison of Alexandria (iv. 452), partly the contingents of king Deiotarus who in spite of his great age had appeared person at the head of his
and of the other Galatian dynasts. With them were associated the excellent Thracian horsemen, who
troops,
in
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Fleet.
were partly brought up by their princes Sadala and Rhascuporis, partly enlisted by Pompeius in the Mace donian province ; the Cappadocian cavalry ; the mounted archers sent by Antiochus king of Commagene ; the con tingents of the Armenians from the west side of the Euphrates under Taxiles, and from the other side under Megabates, and the Numidian bands sent by king Juba —the whole body amounted to 7000 horsemen.
Lastly the fleet of Pompeius was very considerable. It was formed partly of the Roman transports brought from Brundisium or subsequently built, partly of the war vessels of the king of Egypt, of the Colchian princes, of the Cilician dynast Tarcondimotus, of the cities of Tyre, Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and generally of all the Asiatic and Greek maritime states; and it numbered nearly 500 sail, of which the Roman vessels formed a fifth. Immense magazines of corn and military stores were accumulated in Dyrrhachium. The war-chest was well filled, for the Pompeians found themselves in possession of the principal sources of the public revenue and turned to their own account the moneyed resources of the client-princes, of the senators of distinction, of the farmers of the taxes, and generally of the whole Roman and non-Roman
lation within their reach. Every appliance that the reputation of the legitimate government and the much- renowned protectorship of Pompeius over kings and peoples could move in Africa, Egypt, Macedonia, Greece, Western Asia and Syria, had been put in motion for the protection of the Roman republic; the report which circulated in Italy that Pompeius was arming the Getae, Colchians, and Armenians against Rome, and the designation of " king of kings" given to Pompeius in the camp, could hardly be called exaggerations. On the whole he had command over an army of 7000 cavalry and eleven legions, of whicht it is true, but five at the most could be described as
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chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
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accustomed to war, and over a fleet of 500 saiL The temper of the soldiers, for whose provisioning and pay Pompeius manifested adequate care, and to whom in the event of victory the most abundant rewards were promised, was throughout good, in several—and these precisely the most efficient — divisions even excellent; but a great part of the army consisted of newly-raised troops, the formation and training of which, however zealously it was prosecuted, necessarily required time. The force altogether was imposing, but at the same time of a some what motley character.
According to the design of the commander-in-chief the Junction army and fleet were to be in substance completely united p,,,,TM^ by the winter of 705-706 along the coast and in the waters [49-48.
of Epirus. The admiral Bibulus had already arrived with
1 10 ships at his new headquarters, Corcyra. On the other hand the land-army, the headquarters of which had been during the summer at Berrhoea on the Haliacmon, had not yet come up ; the mass of it was moving slowly along the great highway from Thessalonica towards the west coast to the future headquarters Dyrrhachium ; the two legions, which Metellus Scipio was bringing up from Syria, remained at Pergamus in Asia for winter quarters and were expected in Europe only towards spring. They were taking time in fact for their movements. For the moment the ports of Epirus were guarded, over and above the fleet, merely by their own civic defences and the levies of the adjoining districts.
Tt thus remained possible for Caesar, notwithstanding Caesar the intervention of the Spanish war, to assume the offensive p^^u,, also in Macedonia ; and he at least was not slow to act
He had long ago ordered the collection of vessels of war
and transports in Brundisium, and after the capitulation
of the Spanish army and the fall of Massilia had directed
the greater portion of the select troops employed there
coast of Epirus.
*|£
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
to proceed to that destination. The unparalleled exer tions no doubt, which were thus required by Caesar from his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts had done, and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions, the ninth, on its march through Placentia was a dangerous indication of the temper prevailing in the army ; but Caesar's presence of mind and personal authority gained the mastery, and from this quarter nothing impeded the embarkation. But the want of ships, through which the
48. pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened also to frustrate this expedition. The war-vessels, which Caesar had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports, were not yet ready or at any rate not on the spot ; his squadron in the Adriatic had been in the previous year destroyed at Curicta 235) he found at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war and scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the third part of his army — of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry — destined for Greece. The considerable fleet of the enemy exclusively commanded the Adriatic and especially all the harbours of the mainland and islands on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances the question presents itself, why Caesar did not instead of the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria, which relieved him from all the perils threatened the fleet and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly came from Gaul, than the route by Brundisium. It true that the regions of Illyria were rugged and poor beyond description but they were traversed by other armies not long afterwards, and this obstacle can hardly have appeared insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul. Perhaps he apprehended that during the troublesome march through
Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the Adriatic, whereby their parts might come at once to be changed — with Caesar in Macedonia, and Pompeius in
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Italy ; although such a rapid change was scarcely to be expected from his slow-moving antagonist Perhaps Caesar had decided for the mariume route on the supposition that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condi tion to command respect, and, when after his return from Spain he became aware of the true state of things in the Adriatic, it might be too late to change the plan of campaign. Perhaps —and, in accordance with Caesar's quick temperament always urging him to decision, we may even say in all probability —he found himself irre sistibly tempted by the circumstance that the Epirot coast was still at the moment unoccupied but would certainly be covered in a few days by the enemy, to thwart once more by a bold stroke the whole plan of his antagonist
However this may be, on the 4th Jan. 706 1 Caesar set 48.
sail with six legions greatly thinned by toil and sickness lancJ^n and 600 horsemen from Brundisium for the coast of Epirui. Epirus. It was a counterpart to the foolhardy Britannic expedition ; but at least the first throw was fortunate.
The coast was reached in the middle of the Acrocer-
aunian (Chimara) cliffs, at the little-frequented roadstead
of Paleassa (Paljassa). The transports were seen both
from the harbour of Oricum (creek of Avlona) where a Pompeian squadron of eighteen sail was lying, and from
the headquarters of the hostile fleet at Corcyra ; but in
the one quarter they deemed themselves too weak, in the
other they were not ready to sail, so that the first freight
was landed without hindrance. While the vessels at
once returned to bring over the second, Caesar on that
same evening scaled the Acroceraunian mountains. His First
success*
1 According to the rectified calendar on the 5th Nov. 705. 49.
first successes were as great as the surprise of his enemies. The Epirot militia nowhere offered resistance ; the import ant seaport towns of Oricum and Apollonia along with a
Caesar cut Italy.
number of smaller townships were taken, and Dyrrhachium, selected by the Pompeians as their chief arsenal and filled with stores of all sorts, but only feebly garrisoned, was in the utmost danger.
But the further course of the campaign did not cor- respond to this brilliant beginning. Bibulus subsequently made up in some measure for the negligence, of which he had allowed himself to be guilty, by redoubling his exer tions. He not only captured nearly thirty of the trans ports returning home, and caused them with every living thing on board to be burnt, but he also established along the whole district of coast occupied by Caesar, from the island Sason (Saseno) as far as the ports of Corcyra, a most careful watch, however troublesome it was rendered by the inclement season of the year and the necessity of bringing everything necessary for the guard-ships, even wood and water, from Corcyra ; in fact his successor Libo —for he himself soon succumbed to the unwonted fatigues —even blockaded for a time the port of Brundisium, till the want of water again dislodged him from the little island in front of it on which he had established himself. It was not possible for Caesar's officers to convey the second
of the army over to their general. As little did he himself succeed in the capture of Dyrrhachium. Pom- peius learned through one of Caesar's peace envoys as to his preparations for the voyage to the Epirot coast, and, thereupon accelerating his march, threw himself just at the right time into that important arsenal. The situation of Caesar was critical. Although he extended his range in Epirus as far as with his slight strength was at all possible, the subsistence of his army remained difficult and precari ous, while the enemy, in possession of the magazines of Dyrrhachium and masters of the sea, had abundance of
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portion
With his army presumably little above 20,000 strong he could not offer battle to that of Pompeius at
everything.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
949
least twice as numerous, but had to deem himself fortunate that Pompeius went methodically to work and, instead of immediately forcing a battle, took up his winter quarters between Dyrrhachium and Apollonia on the right bank of the Apsus, facing Caesar on the left, in order that after the arrival of the legions from Pergamus in the spring he might annihilate the enemy with an irresistibly superior force. Thus months passed. If the arrival of the better season, which brought to the enemy a strong additional force and the free use of his fleet, found Caesar still in the same position, he was to all appearance lost, with his weak band wedged in among the rocks of Epirus between the immense fleet and the three times superior land army of the enemy; and already the winter was drawing to a close. His sole hope still depended on the transport fleet ; that it should steal or fight its way through the blockade was hardly to be hoped for; but after the first voluntary foolhardiness this second venture was enjoined by necessity. How desperate his situation appeared to Caesar himself, is shown by his resolution —when the fleet still came not— to sail alone in a fisherman's boat across the Adriatic to Brundisium in order to fetch it; which, in reality, was only abandoned because no mariner was found to under take the daring voyage.
But his appearance in person was not needed to induce Antonha the faithful officer who commanded in Italy, Marcus jjpLnu? * Antonius, to make this last effort for the saving of his
master. Once more the transport fleet, with four legions
and 800 horsemen on board, sailed from the harbour of Brundisium, and fortunately a strong south wind carried it
past Libo's galleys. But the same wind, which thus saved
the fleet, rendered it impossible for it to land as it was
directed on the coast of Apollonia, and compelled it to
sail past the camps of Caesar and Pompeius and to steer
to the north of Dyrrhachium towards Lissus, which town
Junction
85o
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
fortunately still adhered to Caesar 236). When sailed past the harbour of Dyrrhachium, the Rhodian galleys started in pursuit, and hardly had the ships of Antonius entered the port of Lissus when the enemy's squadron appeared before But just at this moment the wind suddenly veered, and drove the pursuing galleys back into the open sea and partly on the rocky coast Through the most marvellous good fortune the landing of the second freight had also been successful.
Antonius and Caesar were no doubt still some four armr"" days' march from each other, separated by Dyrrhachium
and the whole army of the enemy but Antonius happily effected the perilous march round about Dyrrhachium through the passes of the Graba Balkan, and was received by Caesar, who had gone to meet him, on the right bank of the Apsus. Pompeius, after having vainly attempted to prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy and to force the corps of Antonius to fight itself, took up new position at Asparagium on the river Genusus (Skumbi), which flows parallel to the Apsus between the latter and the town of Dyrrhachium, and here remained once more immoveable. Caesar felt himself now strong enough to give battle but Pompeius declined it On the other hand Caesar succeeded in deceiving his adversary and throwing himself unawares with his better marching troops, just as at Ilerda, between the enemy's camp and the fortress of Dyrrhachium on which rested as basis. The chain of the Graba Balkan, which stretching in direction from east to west ends on the Adriatic the narrow tongue of land at Dyrrhachium, sends off—fourteen miles to the east of Dyrrhachium —in south-westerly direc tion lateral branch which likewise turns in the form of crescent towards the sea, and the main chain and lateral branch of the mountains enclose between themselves small plain extending round cliff on the seashore. Here
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Pompeius now took up his camp, and, although Caesar's army kept the land route to Dyrrhachium closed against him, he yet with the aid of his fleet remained constantly in communication with the town and was amply and easily provided from it with everything needful ; while among the Caesarians, notwithstanding strong detachments to the country lying behind, and notwithstanding all the exertions of the general to bring about an organized system of con veyance and thereby a regular supply, there was more than scarcity, and flesh, barley, nay even roots had very fre quently to take the place of the wheat to which they were accustomed.
As his phlegmatic opponent persevered in his inaction, Caesar Caesar undertook to occupy the circle of heights which J^? *0^"
enclosed the plain on the shore held by Pompeius, with the view of being able at least to arrest the movements of the superior cavalry of the enemy and to operate with more freedom against Dyrrhachium, and if possible to compel his opponent either to battle or to embarkation. Nearly the half of Caesar's troops was detached to the interior; it seemed almost Quixotic to propose with the rest virtually to besiege an army perhaps twice as strong, concentrated in position, and resting on the sea and the fleet. Yet Caesar's veterans by infinite exertions invested the Pom- peian camp with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and afterwards added, just as before Alesia, to this inner line a second outer one, to protect themselves against attacks from Dyrrhachium and against attempts to turn their position which could so easily be executed with the aid of the fleet. Pompeius attacked more than once portions of these entrenchments with a view to break if possible the enemy's line, but he did not attempt to prevent the invest ment by a battle ; he preferred to construct in his turn a number of entrenchments around his camp, and to connect them with one another by lines. Both sides exerted
Pompeius.
Caesar,! broken.
themselves to push forward their trenches as far as possible, and the earthworks advanced but slowly amidst constant conflicts. At the same time skirmishing went on on the opposite side of Caesar's camp with the garrison of Dyrrhachium ; Caesar hoped to get the fortress into his power by means of an understanding with some of its inmates, but was prevented by the enemy's fleet. There was incessant fighting at very different points —on one of the hottest days at six places simultaneously —and, as a rule, the tried valour of the Caesarians had the advantage in these skirmishes; once, for instance, a single cohort maintained itself in its entrenchments against four legions for several hours, till support came up. No prominent success was attained on either side ; yet the effects of the investment came by degrees to be oppressively felt by the
Pompeians. The stopping of the rivulets flowing from the heights into the plain compelled them to be content with scanty and bad well-water. Still more severely felt was the want of fodder for the beasts of burden and the horses, which the fleet was unable adequately to remedy ; numbers of them died, and it was of but little avail that the horses were conveyed by the fleet to Dyrrhachium, because there also they did not find sufficient fodder.
Pompeius could not much longer delay to free himself ^rom n's disagreeable position by a blow struck against the enemy. He was informed by Celtic deserters that the enemy had neglected to secure the beach between his two chains of entrenchments 600 feet distant from each other by a cross-wall, and on this he formed his plaa While he caused the inner line of Caesar's entrenchments to be attacked by the legions from the camp, and the outer line by the light troops placed in vessels and landed beyond the enemy's entrenchments, a third division landed in the space left between the two lines and attacked in the rear their already sufficiently occupied defenders. The entrenchment
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353
next to the sea was taken, and the garrison fled in wild confusion ; with difficulty the commander of the next trench
Marcus Antonius succeeded in maintaining it and in setting
a limit for the moment to the advance of the Pompeians ;
but, apart from the considerable loss, the outermost entrenchment along the sea remained in the hands of the Pompeians and the line was broken through. Caesar the Caesar more eagerly seized the opportunity, which soon after d^tei* presented itself, of attacking a Pompeian legion, which had incautiously become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry.
But the attacked offered valiant resistance, and, as the ground on which the fight took place had been several times employed for the encampment of larger and lesser divisions and was intersected in various directions by mounds and ditches, Caesar's right wing along with the cavalry entirely missed its way ; instead of supporting the left in attacking the Pompeian legion, it got into a narrow trench that led from one of the old camps towards the river. So Pompeius, who came up in all haste with five legions to the aid of his troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated from each other, and one of them in an utterly forlorn position. When the Caesarians saw him advance, a panic seized them ; the whole plunged into disorderly flight ; and, if the matter ended with the loss of 1000 of the best soldiers and Caesar's army did not sustain a complete defeat, this was due simply to the circumstance that Pompeius also could not freely develop his force on the broken ground, and to the further fact that, fearing a stratagem, he at first held back his troops.
But, even as it was, these days were fraught with mischief. Not only had Caesar endured the most serious losses and forfeited at a blow his entrenchments, the result of four months of gigantic labour ; he was by the recent engagements thrown back again exactly to the point from which he had set out From the sea he was more com pletely driven than ever, since Pompeius' elder son Gnaeus
Conie-
5,uence" °* Caesars
defeats.
2<4
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
had by a bold attack partly burnt, partly carried off, Caesar's few ships of war lying in the port of Oricum, and had soon afterwards also set fire to the transport fleet that was left behind in Lissus ; all possibility of bringing up fresh reinforcements to Caesar by sea from Brundisium was thu: lost The numerous Pompeian cavalry, now released from their confinement, poured themselves over the adjacent country and threatened to render the provisioning of Caesar's army, which had always been difficult, utterly impossible. Caesar's daring enterprise of carrying on offensive operations without ships against an enemy in command of the sea and resting on his fleet had totally failed. On what had hitherto been the theatre of war he found himself in presence of an impregnable defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow either against Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other hand it depended now solely on Pompeius whether he should proceed to attack under the most favourable cir cumstances an antagonist already in grave danger as to his means of subsistence. The war had arrived at a crisis. Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance, played the game of war without special plan, and only adjusted his defence according to the exigencies of each attack ; and this was not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him opportunity of making his recruits capable of fighting, of bringing up his reserves, and of bringing more fully into play the superiority of his fleet in the Adriatic. Caesar was beaten not merely in tactics but also in strategy. This defeat had not, it is true, that effect which Pompeius not without reason expected ; the eminent soldierly energy of Caesar's veterans did not allow matters to come to an immediate and total breaking up of the army by hunger and mutiny. But yet it seemed as if it depended solely on his opponent by judiciously following up his victory to reap its full fruits.
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
255
It was for Pompeius to assume the aggressive ; and he War
was resolved to do so. Three different ways of rendering P^P*0 his victory fruitful presented themselves to him. The first Pompeiu* and simplest was not to desist from assailing the vanquished
army, and, if it departed, to pursue it Secondly, Pompeius
might leave Caesar himself and his best troops in Greece,
and might cross in person, as he had long been making preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy, where
the feeling was decidedly antimonarchical and the forces of
Caesar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave
and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not
be of very much moment Lastly, the victor might turn Sdpio and inland, effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, Calvinns- and attempt to capture the troops of Caesar stationed in
the interior. The latter forsooth had, immediately after
the arrival of the second freight from Italy, on the one hand despatched strong detachments to Aetolia and Thessaly to
procure means of subsistence for his army, and on the other
had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnaeus Domitius
Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian highway towards Macedonia, with the view of intercepting and if possible
defeating in detail the corps of Scipio advancing on the same
road from Thessalonica. Calvinus and Scipio had already approached within a few miles of each other, when Scipio
suddenly turned southward and, rapidly crossing the Haliacmon (Inje Karasu) and leaving his baggage there
under Marcus Favonius, penetrated into Thessaly, in order
to attack with superior force Caesar's legion of recruits
employed in the reduction of the country under Lucius
Cassius Longinus. But Longinus retired over the mountains towards Ambracia to join the detachment under
Gnaeus Calvisius Sabinus sent by Caesar to Aetolia, and
Scipio could only cause him to be pursued by his Thracian
cavalry, for Calvinus threatened his reserve left behind
under Favonius on the Haliacmon with the same fate which
Caesar's
jr*"6*' Dyrrha-
he had himself destined for Longinus. So Calvinus and Scipio met again on the Haliacmon, and encamped there for a considerable time opposite to each other.
Pompeius might choose among these plans ; no choice was left to Caesar. After that unfortunate engagement he entered on his retreat to Apollonia. Pompeius followed. ^he marcn fr°m Dyrrhachium to Apollonia along a difficult road crossed by several rivers was no easy task for a defeated army pursued by the enemy; but the dexterous leadership of their general and the indestructible marching energy of the soldiers compelled Pompeius after four days' pursuit to suspend it as useless. He had now to decide between the Italian expedition and the march into the interior. However advisable and attractive the former might seem, and though various voices were raised in its favour, he preferred not to abandon the corps of Scipio, the more especially as he hoped by this march to ^et the corps of Calvinus into his hands. Calvinus lay at the moment on the Egnatian road at Heraclea Lyncestis, between Pompeius and Scipio, and, after Caesar had re treated to Apollonia, farther distant from the latter than from the great army of Pompeius ; without knowledge, moreover, of the events at Dyrrhachium and of his hazardous position, since after the successes achieved at Dyrrhachium the whole country inclined to Pompeius and the messengers of Caesar were everywhere seized. It was not till the enemy's main force had approached within a few hours of him that Calvinus learned from the accounts of the enemy's advanced posts themselves the state of things. A quick departure in a southerly direction towards Thessaly withdrew him at the last moment from imminent destruction ; Pompeius had to content himself with having liberated Scipio from his position of peril. Caesar had meanwhile arrived unmolested at Apollonia. Immediately after the disaster of Dyrrhachium he had resolved if possible to transfer the struggle from the
Theoaly
•56
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
257
coast away into the interior, with the view of getting beyond the reach of the enemy's fleet —the ultimate cause of the failure of his previous exertions. The march to Apollonia had only been intended to place his wounded in safety and to pay his soldiers there, where his depots were stationed ; as soon as this was done, he set out for Thessaly, leaving behind garrisons in Apollonia, Oricum, and Lissus. The corps of Calvinus had also put itself in motion towards Thessaly; and Caesar could effect a junction with the reinforcements coming up from Italy, this time by the land- route through Illyria—two legions under Quintus Cornificius —still more easily in Thessaly than in Epirus. Ascending by difficult paths in the valley of the Aous and crossing the mountain-chain which separates Epirus from Thessaly, he arrived at the Peneius; Calvinus was likewise directed thither, and the junction of the two armies was thus accomplished by the shortest route and that which was least exposed to the enemy. It took place at Aeginium not far from the source of the Peneius. The first Thessalian town before which the now united army appeared, Gomphi, closed its gates against it ; it was quickly stormed and given up to pillage, and the other towns of Thessaly terrified by this example submitted, so soon as Caesar's legions merely appeared before the walls. Amidst these marches and conflicts, and with the help of the supplies—albeit not too ample — which the region on the Peneius afforded, the traces and recollections of the calamitous days through which they had passed gradually vanished.
The victories of Dyrrhachium had thus borne not much immediate fruit for the victors. Pompeius with his unwieldy army and his numerous cavalry had not been able to follow his versatile enemy into the mountains ; Caesar like Calvinus had escaped from pursuit, and the two stood united and in full security in Thessaly. Perhaps it would have been the best course, if Pompeius had now without delay embarked
VOL. Y
150
The Pharsalus.
with his main force for Italy, where success was scarcely doubtful. But in the meantime only a division of the fleet departed for Sicily and Italy. In the camp of the coalition the contest with Caesar was looked on as so completely decided by the battles of Dyrrhachium that it only remained to reap the fruits of victory, in other words, to seek out and capture the defeated army. Their former over-cautious reserve was succeeded by an arrogance still less justified by the circumstances ; they gave no heed to the facts, that they had, strictly speaking, failed in the pursuit, that they had to hold themselves in readiness to encounter a completely re freshed and reorganized army in Thessaly, and that there was no small risk in moving away from the sea, renouncing the support of the fleet, and following their antagonist to the battle-field chosen by himself. They were simply resolved at any price to fight with Caesar, and therefore to get at him as soon as possible and by the most convenient way. Cato took up the command in Dyrrhachium, where a garrison was left behind of eighteen cohorts, and in Corcyra, where 300 ships of war were left ; Pompeius and Scipio proceeded —the former, apparently, following the Egnatian way as far as Fella and then striking into the great road to the south, the latter from the Haliacmon through the passes of Olympus —to the lower Peneius and met at Larisa.
Caesar lay to the south of Larisa in the plain—which extends between the hill-country of Cynoscephalae and the chain of Othrys and is intersected by a tributary of the Peneius, the Enipeus —on the left bank of the latter stream near the town of Pharsalus ; Pompeius pitched his camp opposite to him on the right bank of the Enipeus along the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae. 1 The entire army
1 The exact determination of the field of battle Is difficult. Appian (h. 75) expressly place* it between (New) Pharsalus (now Fersala) and the Enipeus. Of the two streams, which alone are of any Importance in the
2S»
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
259
of Pompeius was assembled; Caesar on the other hand still expected the corps of nearly two legions formerly
question, and are undoubtedly the Apidanus and Enipeus of the ancients— the Sofadhitiko and the Fersaliti — the former has its sources in the mountains of Thaumaci (Dhomoko) and the Dolopian heights, the latter in mount Othrys, and the Fersaliti alone flows past Pharsalus ; now as the Enipeus according to Strabo (be p. 432) springs from mount Othrys and flows past Pharsalus, the Fersaliti has been most justly pronounced by Leake (Northern Greece, iv. 320) to be the Enipeus, and the hypothesis followed by Goler that the Fersaliti is the Apidanus is untenable. With this all the other statements of the ancients as to the two rivers agree. Only we must doubtless assume with Leake, that the river of Vlokho formed by the union of the Fersaliti and the Sofadhitiko and going to the Peneius was called by the ancients Apidanus as well as the Sofadhitiko ; which, however, is the more natural, as while the Sofadhitiko probably has, the Fersaliti has not, constantly water (Leake, iv. 321). Old Pharsalus, from which the battle takes its name, must therefore have been situated between Fersala and the Fersaliti. Accordingly the battle was fought on
the left bank of the Fersaliti, and in such a way that the Pompeians, standing with their faces towards Pharsalus, leaned their right wing on the river (Caesar, B. C. iii. 83 ; Frontinus, Strut, ii. 3, 22). The camp of the Pompeians, however, cannot have stood here, but only on the slope of the heights of Cynoscephalae, on the right bank of the Enipeus, partly because they barred the route of Caesar to Scotussa, partly because their line of retreat evidently went over the mountains that were to be found above the camp towards Larisa ; if they had, according to Leake's hypothesis (iv.
482), encamped to the east of Pharsalus on the left bank of the Enipeus, they could never have got to the northward through this stream, which at this very point has a deeply cut bed (Leake, iv. 469), and Pompeius must have fled to Lamia instead of Larisa. Probably therefore the Pompeians pitched their camp on the right bank of the Fersaliti, and passed the river both in order to fight and in order, after the battle, to regain their camp, whence they then moved up the slopes of Crannon and Scotussa, which culminate above the latter place in the heights of Cynoscephalae. This was not impossible. The Enipeus is a narrow slow-flowing rivulet, which Leake found two feet deep in November, and which in the hot
season often lies quite dry (Leake, i. 448, and iv. 472 ; comp. Lucan, vi. 373), and the battle was fought in the height of summer. Further the armies before the battle lay three miles and a half from each other (Appian, II. C. ii. 65), so that the Pompeians could make all preparations and also properly secure the communication with their camp by bridges. Had the battle terminated in a complete rout, no doubt the retreat to and over the river could not have been executed, and doubtless for this reason Pompeius only reluctantly agreed to fight here. The left wing of the Pompeians which was the most remote from the base of retreat felt this ; but the
retreat at least of their centre and their right wing was not accomplished in such haste as to be impracticable under the given conditions. Caesar and his copyists are silent as to the crossing of the river, because this would place in too clear a light the eagerness for battle of the Pompeians apparent otherwise from the whole narrative, and they are also silent as to the conditions of retreat favoui abi" for these.
26o
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
detached to Aetolia and Thessaly, now stationed under Quintus Fufius Calenus in Greece, and the two legions of Cornificius which were sent after him by the land-route from Italy and had already arrived in Illyria. The army of Pompeius, numbering eleven legions or 47,000 men and 7000 horse, was more than double that of Caesar in infantry, and seven times as numerous in cavalry; fatigue and conflicts had so decimated Caesar's troops, that his eight legions did not number more than 22,000 men under arms, consequently not nearly the half of their normal amount. The victorious army of Pompeius provided with a countless cavalry and good magazines had provisions in abundance,
while the troops of Caesar had difficulty in keeping them selves alive and only hoped for better supplies from the corn-harvest not far distant. The Pompeian soldiers, who had learned in the last campaign to know war and trust their leader, were in the best of humour. All military reasons on the side of Pompeius favoured the view, that the decisive battle should not be long delayed, seeing that they now confronted Caesar in Thessaly ; and the emigrant impatience of the many genteel officers and others accompanying the army doubtless had more weight than even such reasons in the council of war. Since the events of Dyrrhachium these lords regarded the triumph of their party as an ascertained fact ; already there was eager strife as to the filling up of Caesar's supreme pontificate, and instructions were sent to Rome to hire houses at the Forum for the next elections. When Pompeius hesitated on his part to cross the rivule* which separated the two armies, and which Caesar with his much weaker army did not venture to pass, this excited great indignation ; Pompeius, it was alleged, only delayed the battle in order to rule somewhat longer over so many consulars and praetorians and to perpetuate his part of Agamemnon. Pompeius yielded; and Caesar, who under the impression that matters would not come to a battle, had
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS 261
just projected a mode of turning the enemy's army and for that purpose was on the point of setting out towards Scotussa, likewise arrayed his legions for battle, when he saw the Pompeians preparing to offer it to him on his bank.
Thus the battle of Pharsalus was fought on the 9th August 706, almost on the same field where a hundred and fifty years before the Romans had laid the foundation of their dominion in the east 433). Pompeius rested his right wing on the Enipeus Caesar opposite to him rested his left on the broken ground stretching in front of the Enipeus; the two other wings were stationed out in the plain, covered each case by the cavalry and the light troops. The intention of Pompeius was to keep his infantry on the defensive, but with bis cavalry to scatter the weak band of horsemen which, mixed after the German fashion with light infantry, confronted him, and then to take Caesar's right wing in rear. His infantry courageously sustained the first charge of that of the enemy, and the
there came to stand. Labienus likewise dispersed the enemy's cavalry after brave but short resist ance, and deployed his force to the left with the view of turning the infantry. But Caesar, foreseeing the defeat of his cavalry, had stationed behind on the threatened flank of his right wing some 2000 of his best legionaries. As the enemy's horsemen, driving those of Caesar before them, galloped along and around the line, they suddenly came upon this select corps advancing intrepidly against them and, rapidly thrown into confusion the unexpected and unusual infantry attack,1 they galloped at full speed from
With this connected the well-known direction of Caesar to his sol diers to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen. The infantry —which here in an altogether irregular way acted on the offensive against cavalry, who were not to be reached with the sabres —were not to throw their pila, but to use them as hand-spears against the cavalry and, in order to defend themselves better against these, to thrust at their faces (Plutarch, Pomp.
The battle. 48.
engagement
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the field of battle. The victorious legionaries cut to pieces the enemy's archers now unprotected, then rushed at the left wing of the enemy, and began now on their part to turn it At the same time Caesar's third division hitherto re served advanced along the whole line to the attack. The unexpected defeat of the best arm of the Pompeian army, as it raised the courage of their opponents, broke that of the army and above all that of the general. When Pompeius, who from the outset did not trust his infantry, saw the horsemen gallop off, he rode back at once from the field of battle to the camp, without even awaiting the issue of the general attack ordered by Caesar. His legions began to waver and soon to retire over the brook into the camp, which was not accomplished without severe loss.
The day was thus lost and many an able soldier had fallen, but the army was still substantially intact, and the situation of Pompeius was far less perilous than that of Caesar after the defeat of Dyrrhachium. But while Caesar in the vicissitudes of his destiny had learned that fortune
loves to withdraw herself at certain moments even from her favourites in order to be once more won back through their perseverance, Pompeius knew fortune hitherto only as the constant goddess, and despaired of himself and of her when she withdrew from him ; and, while in Caesar's grander
nature despair only developed yet mightier energies, the inferior soul of Pompeius under similar pressure sank into the infinite abyss of despondency. As once in the war with Sertorius he had been on the point of abandoning the office
69, 71 ; Caa. 45 ; Appian, ii. 76, 78 ; Flor. 12 Oros. vi. 15 erron eously Frontinus, iv. 7, 32). The anecdotical turn given to this instruction, that the Pompeian horsemen were to be brought to run away by the fear of receiving scars in their faces, and that they actually galloped off " hold ing their hands before their eyes " (Plutarch), collapses of itself for has point only on the supposition that the Pompeian cavalry had consisted principally of the young nobility of Rome, the " graceful dancers" and this was not the case (p. 224). At the most may be, that the wit of the camp gave to that simple and judicious military order this very irrational but certainly comic turn.
362
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, BOOK v
it
ii. ;
; ;
;
it
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
263
entrusted to him in presence of his superior opponent and of departing (iv. 298), so now, when he saw the legions retire over the stream, he threw from him the fatal general's scarf, and rode off by the nearest route to the sea, to find means of embarking there. His army discouraged and leaderless —for Scipio, although recognized by Pompeius as colleague in supreme command, was yet general-in-chief only in name
—hoped
Flight of omPeluv
to find protection behind the camp-walls ; but Caesar allowed it no rest ; the obstinate resistance of the Roman and Thracian guard of the camp was speedily over come, and the mass was compelled to withdraw in disorder to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa, at the foot of which the camp was pitched. It attempted by moving forward along these hills to regain Larisa ; but the troops of Caesar, heeding neither booty nor fatigue and advancing by better paths in the plain, intercepted the route of the fugitives ; in fact, when late in the evening the Pompeians suspended their march, their pursuers were able even to draw an entrenched line which precluded the fugitives from access to the only rivulet to be found in the neighbourhood.
So ended the day of Pharsalus. The enemy's army was not only defeated, but annihilated; 15,000 of the enemy lay dead or wounded on the field of battle, while the Caesarians missed only 200 men ; the body which remained together, amounting still to nearly 20,000 men, laid down their arms on the morning after the battle ; only isolated troops, including, it is true, the officers of most note, sought a refuge in the mountains ; of the eleven eagles of the enemy nine were handed over to Caesar. Caesar, who on the very day of the battle had reminded the soldiers that they should not forget the fellow-citizen in the foe, did not treat the captives as did Bibulus and Labienus ; neverthe less he too found it necessary now to exercise some severity. The common soldiers were incorporated in the army, fines or confiscations of property were inflicted on the men of
48.
The political effects of the battle of Phar-
The east submits.
better rank ; the senators and equites of note who were taken, with few exceptions, suffered death. The time for clemency was past; the longer the civil war lasted, the more remorseless and implacable it became.
Some time elapsed, before the consequences of the 9th of August 706 could be fully discerned. What admitted of least doubt, was the passing over to the side of Caesar of all those who had attached themselves to the party vanquished at Pharsalus merely as to the more powerful ; the defeat was so thoroughly decisive, that the victor was joined by all who were not willing or were not obliged to fight for a lost cause. All the kings, peoples, and cities, which had hitherto been the clients of Pompeius, now recalled their naval and military contingents and declined to receive the refugees of the beaten party ; such as Egypt, Cyrene, the communities of Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia and Asia Minor, Rhodes, Athens, and generally the whole east In fact Pharnaces king of the Bosporus pushed his officious- ness so far, that on the news of the Pharsalian battle he took possession not only of the town of Phanagoria which several years before had been declared free by Pompeius, and of the dominions of the Colchian princes confirmed by him, but even of the kingdom of Little Armenia which
had conferred on king Deiotarus. Almost the sole exceptions to this general submission were the little town of Megara which allowed itself to be besieged and stormed by the Caesarians, and Juba king of Numidia, who had for long expected, and after the victory over Curio expected only with all the greater certainty, that his kingdom would be annexed by Caesar, and was thus obliged for better or for worse to abide by the defeated party.
In the same way as the client communities submitted to the victor of Pharsalus, the tail of the constitutional party —all who had joined it with half a heart or had even, like
The aristocracy after the battle of Pharsalus.
a64
BRUNDISWM, ILERDA, BOOK V
Pompeius
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
s6$
Marcus Cicero and his congeners, merely danced around the aristocracy like the witches around the Brocken— approached to make their peace with the new monarch, a peace accordingly which his contemptuous indulgence readily and courteously granted to the petitioners. But the flower of the defeated party made no compromise. All was over with the aristocracy ; but the aristocrats could never become converted to monarchy. The highest revelations of humanity are perishable; the religion once true may become a lie,1 the polity once fraught with blessing may become a curse ; but even the gospel that is past still finds confessors, and if such a faith cannot remove mountains like faith in the living truth, it yet remains true to itself down to its very end, and does not depart from the realm of the living till it has dragged its last priests and its last partisans along with and new generation, freed from those shadows of the past and the perishing, rules over world that has renewed its youth. So was in Rome. Into whatever abyss of degeneracy the aristocratic rule had now sunk, had once been great political system the sacred fire, by which Italy had been conquered and Hannibal had been vanquished, continued to glow—
somewhat dimmed and dull — in the Roman nobility so long as that nobility existed, and rendered cordial understanding between the men of the old rigime and the new monarch impossible. large portion of the constitutional party submitted at least outwardly, and recognized the monarchy so far as to accept pardon from Caesar and to retire as much as possible into private life which, however, ordinarily was not done without the
may here state once for all that in this and other passages, where Dr. Mommsen appears incidentally to express views of religion or philosophy with which can scarcely be supposed to agree, have not thought right — as is, believe, sometimes done similar cases — to omit or modify any portion of what he has written. The reader must judge for himself as to this truth or value of such assertions as those given in the text — Tr. ]
although
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366 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
mental reservation of thereby preserving themselves for a future change of things. This course was chiefly followed by the partisans of lesser note ; but the able Marcus Marcellus, the same who had brought about the rupture with Caesar 174), was to be found among these judicious persons and voluntarily banished himself to Lesbos. In the majority, however, of the genuine aristocracy passion was more powerful than cool reflection along with which, no doubt, self-deceptions as to success being still possible and apprehensions of the inevitable vengeance of the victor variously co-operated.
No one probably formed judgment as to the situation of affairs with so painful clearness, and so free from fear or hope on his own account, as Marcus Cato. Completely convinced that after the days of Ilerda nd Pharsalus the monarchy was inevitable, and morally firm enough to confess to himself this bitter truth and to act in accordance with he hesitated for moment whether the constitu
tional party ought at all to continue war, which would necessarily require sacrifices for lost cause on the part of many who did not know why they offered them. And when he resolved to fight against the monarchy not for victory, but for speedier and more honourable fall, he yet sought as far as possible to draw no one into this war, who chose to survive the fall of the republic and to be reconciled to monarchy. He conceived that, so long as the republic had been merely threatened, was right and duty to compel the lukewarm and bad citfeen to take part in the struggle but that now was senseless and cruel to compel the individual to share the ruin of the lost republic. Not only did he himself discharge every one who desired to return to Italy but when the wildest of the wild partisans, Gnaeus Pompeius the younger, insisted on the execution of these people and of Cicero in particular,
was Cato alone who his moral authority prevented
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chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
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Pompeius also had no desire for peace. Had he been Pompehu. a man who deserved to hold the position which he occupied, we might suppose him to have perceived that
he who aspires to a crown cannot return to the beaten
track of ordinary existence, and that there is accordingly no place left on earth for one who has failed. But Pompeius was hardly too noble-minded to ask a favour, which the victor would have been perhaps magnanimous enough not to refuse to him; on the contrary, he was probably too mean to do so. Whether it was that he could not make up his mind to trust himself to Caesar, or that in his usual vague and undecided way, after the first immediate impression of the disaster of Pharsalus had vanished, be began again to cherish hope, Pompeius was resolved to continue the struggle against Caesar and to seek for himself yet another battle-field after that of Pharsalus.
Thus, however much Caesar had striven by prudence Military and moderation to appease the fury of his opponents and Jj^batSL,
to lessen their number, the struggle nevertheless went on
without alteration. But the leading men had almost all The taken part in the fight at Pharsalus ; and, although they all ^2*4 escaped with the exception of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus,
who was killed in the flight, they were yet scattered in all directions, so that they were unable to concert a common
plan for the continuance of the campaign. Most of them
found their way, partly through the desolate mountains of Macedonia and Illyria, partly by the aid of the fleet, to
Corcyra, where Marcus Cato commanded the reserve left
behind. Here a sort of council of war took place under
the presidency of Cato, at which Metellus Scipio, Titus Labienus, Lucius Afranius, Gnaeus Pompeius the younger and others were present; but the absence of the commander- in-chief and the painful uncertainty as to his fate, as well as the internal dissensions of the party, prevented the
Macedonia cTeece.
Italy.
368 BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
adoption of any common resolution, and ultimately each took the course which seemed to him the most suitable for himself or for the common cause. It was in fact in a high degree difficult to say among the many straws to which they might possibly cling which was the one that would keep longest above water.
Macedonia and Greece were lost by the battle of Pharsalus. It is true that Cato, who had immediately on the news of the defeat evacuated Dyrrhachium, still held Corcyra, and Rutilius Lupus the Peloponnesus, during a time for the constitutional party. For a moment it seemed also as if the Pompeians would make a stand at Patrae in the Peloponnesus ; but the accounts of the advance of Calenus sufficed to frighten them from that quarter. As little was there any attempt to maintain Corcyra. On the Italian and Sicilian coasts the Pompeian squadrons despatched thither after the victories of Dyrrha chium (p. 258) had achieved not unimportant successes against the ports of Brundisium, Messana and Vibo, and at Messana especially had burnt the whole fleet in course of being fitted out for Caesar ; but the ships that were thus active, mostly from Asia Minor and Syria, were recalled by their communities in consequence of the
Pharsalian battle, so that the expedition came to an end of itself. In Asia Minor and Syria there were at the moment no troops of either party, with the exception of the Bosporan army of Pharnaces which had taken posses sion, ostensibly on Caesar's account, of different regions belonging to his opponents. In Egypt there was still indeed a considerable Roman army, formed of the troops left behind there by Gabinius (iv. 452) and thereafter recruited from Italian vagrants and Syrian or Cilician banditti ; but it was self-evident and was soon officially confirmed by the recall of the Egyptian vessels, that the court of Alexandria by no means had the intention of
The east,
E8yPL
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
369
holding firmly by the defeated party or of even placing
its force of troops at their disposal. Somewhat more favourable prospects presented themselves to the van quished in the west In Spain Pompeian sympathies Spain, were so strong among the population, that the Caesarians
had or. that account to give up the attack which they con templated from this quarter against Africa, and an insurrec
tion seemed inevitable, so soon as a leader of note should appear in the peninsula. In Africa moreover the coalition, Africa, or rather Juba king of Numidia, who was the true regent
there, had been arming unmolested since the autumn of
While the whole east was consequently lost to the 49. coalition by the battle of Pharsalus, it might on the other hand continue the war after an honourable manner probably
in Spain, and certainly in Africa ; for to claim the aid of the king of Numidia, who had for a long time been subject
to the Roman community, against revolutionary fellow- burgesses was for Romans a painful humiliation doubtless, but by no means an act of treason. Those again who
in this conflict of despair had no further regard for right
or honour, might declare themselves beyond the pale of the law, and commence hostilities as robbers ; or might enter into alliance with independent neighbouring states, and introduce the public foe into the intestine strife ; or, lastly, might profess monarchy with the lips and prosecute the restoration of the legitimate republic with the dagger of the assassin.
That the vanquished should withdraw and renounce the Hostility new monarchy, was at least the natural and so far the truest ^J0 expression of their desperate position. The mountains and pirate*, above all the sea had been in those times ever since the
memory of man the asylum not only of all crime, but also of intolerable misery and of oppressed right ; it was natural for Pompeians and republicans to wage a defiant war against the monarchy of Caesar, which had ejected them,
705.
Paithian alliance.
ajo BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
in the mountains and on the seas, and especially natural for them to take up piracy on a greater scale, with more compact organization, and with more definite aims. Even after the recall of the squadrons that had come from the east they still possessed a very considerable fleet of their own, while Caesar was as yet virtually without vessels of
war ; and their connection with the Dalmatae who had risen in their own interest against Caesar 235), and their control over the most important seas and seaports, pre sented the most advantageous prospects for naval war, especially on small scale. As formerly Sulla's hunting out of the democrats had ended in the Sertorian insurrec tion, which was conflict first waged by pirates and then by robbers and ultimately became very serious war, so possibly, there was in the Catonian aristocracy or among the adherents of Pompeius as much spirit and fire as in the Marian democracy, and there was found among them true sea-king, commonwealth independent of the monarchy of Caesar and perhaps match for
arise on the still unconquered sea.
Far more serious disapproval in every respect due to
the idea of dragging an independent neighbouring state into the Roman civil war and of bringing about by its means counter-revolution law and conscience condemn the
deserter more severely than the robber, and victorious band of robbers finds its way back to free and well- ordered commonwealth more easily than the emigrants who are conducted back by the public foe. Besides was scarcely probable that the beaten party would be able to effect restoration in this way. The only state, from which they could attempt to seek support, was that of the Parthians; and as to this was at least doubtful whether would make their cause its own, and very improbable that would fight out that cause against
Caesar.
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chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
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The time for republican conspiracies had not yet come.
While the remnant of the defeated party thus allowed Caesar themselves to be helplessly driven about by fate, and even p^jjjjjlu, those who had determined to continue the struggle knew to Egypt, not how or where to do so, Caesar, quickly as ever resolving and quickly acting, laid everything aside to
pursue Pompeius —the only one of his opponents whom
he respected as an officer, and the one whose personal
capture would have probably paralyzed a half, and that
perhaps the more dangerous half, of his opponents. With
a few men he crossed the Hellespont — his single bark encountered in it a fleet of the enemy destined for the
Black Sea, and took the whole crews, struck as with stupefaction by the news of the battle of Pharsalus,
prisoners — and as soon as the most necessary prepara
tions were made, hastened in pursuit of Pompeius to the
east. The latter had gone from the Pharsalian battle
field to Lesbos, whence he brought away his wife and
his second son Sextus, and had sailed onward round
Asia Minor to Cilicia and thence to Cyprus. He might
have joined his partisans at Corcyra or Africa ; but repugnance toward his aristocratic allies and the thought
of the reception which awaited him there after the day
of Pharsalus and above all after his disgraceful flight,
appear to have induced him to take his own course and
rather to resort to the protection of the Parthian king
than to that of Cato. While he was employed in collecting money and slaves from the Roman revenue-
farmers and merchants in Cyprus, and in arming a band
of 2000 slaves, he received news that Antioch had
declared for Caesar and that the route to the Parthians
was no longer open. So he altered his plan and sailed
to Egypt, where a number of his old soldiers served in
the army and the situation and rich resources of the
Death of omperas.
the sister from the kingdom and compelled her to seek a refuge in Syria, whence she made preparations to get back to her paternal kingdom. Ptolemaeus and Pothinus lay with the whole Egyptian army at Pelusium for the sake of protecting the eastern frontier against her, just when Pompeius cast anchor at the Casian promontory and sent a request to the king to allow him to land. The Egyptian court, long informed of the disaster at Pharsalus, was on the point of refusing to receive Pompeius ; but the king's tutor Theodotus pointed out that in that case Pompeius would probably employ his connections in the Egyptian army to instigate rebellion ; and that it would be safer, and also preferable with regard to Caesar, if they embraced the opportunity of making away with Pompeius. Political reasonings of this sort did not readily fail of their effect among the statesmen of the Hellenic world.
Achillas the general of the royal troops and some of the former soldiers of Pompeius went off in a boat to his vessel; and invited him to come to the king and, as the water was shallow, to enter their barge. As he was stepping ashore, the military tribune Lucius Septimius stabbed him from behind, under the eyes of his wife and son, who were compelled to be spectators of the murder from the deck of their vessel, without being able to rescue or revenge
a7a
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book V
country allowed him time and opportunity to reorganize the war.
In Egypt, after the death of Ptolemaeus Auletes (May •1. 703) his children, Cleopatra about sixteen years of age and Ptolemaeus Dionysus about ten, had ascended the throne according to their father's will jointly, and as consorts ; but soon the brother or rather his guardian Pothinus had driven
48. (28 Sept 706). On the same day, on which thirteen years before he had entered the capital in triumph over Mithradates (iv. 444), the man, who for a generation had been called the Great and for years had ruled Rome,
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
*J3
died on the desert sands of the inhospitable Casian shore by the hand of one of his old soldiers. A good officer, but otherwise of mediocre gifts of intellect and of heart, fate had with superhuman constancy for thirty years allowed him to solve all brilliant and toilless tasks ; had
him to pluck all laurels planted and fostered by others ; had brought him face to face with all the conditions requisite for obtaining the supreme power—
in order to exhibit in his person an example of spurious greatness, to which history knows no parallel. Of all pitiful parts there is none more pitiful than that of passing for more than one really is ; and it is the fate of monarchy that this misfortune inevitably clings to
for barely once thousand years does there arise among the people man who king not merely in name, but in reality. If this disproportion between semblance and reality has never perhaps been so abruptly marked as Pompeius, the fact may well excite grave reflection that was precisely he who in certain sense opened the series of Roman monarchs.
When Caesar following the track of Pompeius arrived Arrival of in the roadstead of Alexandria, all was already over. With Caesar- deep agitation he turned away when the murderer brought
to his ship the head of the man, who had been his son-in-
law and for long years his colleague in rule, and to get
whom alive into his power he had come to Egypt. The
dagger of the rash assassin precluded an answer to the question, how Caesar would have dealt with the captive Pompeius; but, while the humane sympathy, which still
found place in the great soul of Caesar side by side
with ambition, enjoined that he should spare his former
friend, his interest also required that he should annihilate Pompeius otherwise than by the executioner. Pompeius
had been for twenty years the acknowledged ruler of
Rome dominion so deeply rooted does not perish
permitted
only
TOL.
ISI
; ▼a
a
in it
a
a
in a
is a
it,
274
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
with the ruler's death. The death of Pompeius did not break up the Pompeians, but gave to them instead of an aged, incapable, and worn-out chief in his sons Gnaeus and Sextus two leaders, both of whom were young and active and the second was a man of decided capacity. To the newly - founded hereditary monarchy hereditary pretendership attached itself at once like a parasite, and it was very doubtful whether by this change of persons Caesar did not lose more than he gained.
Meanwhile in Egypt Caesar had now nothing further to
Caesar
S. " do, and the Romans and the Egyptians expected that he
would immediately set sail and apply himself to the sub jugation of Africa, and to the huge task of organization which awaited him after the victory. But Caesar faithful
to his custom — wherever he found himself in the wide empire — of finally regulating matters at once and in
person, and firmly convinced that no resistance was to be expected either from the Roman garrison or from the court, being, moreover, in urgent pecuniary embarrassment, landed in Alexandria with the two amalgamated legions
him to the number of 3200 men and 800 Celtic and German cavalry, took up his quarters in the
royal palace, and proceeded to collect the necessary sums of money and to regulate the Egyptian succession, without allowing himself to be disturbed by the saucy remark of Pothinus that Caesar should not for such petty matters neglect his own so important affairs. In his dealing with the Egyptians he was just and even indulgent. Although the aid which they had given to Pompeius justified the
accompanying
of a war contribution, the exhausted land was spared from this; and, while the arrears of the sum (9. stipulated for in 695 (iv. 451) and since then only about
half paid were remitted, there was required merely a final payment of 10,000,000 denarii (,£400,000). The belli gerent brother and sister were enjoined immediately to
imposing
CHAP, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
875
suspend hostilities, and were invited to have their dispute investigated and decided before the arbiter. They sub mitted ; the royal boy was already in the palace and Cleopatra also presented herself there. Caesar adjudged the kingdom of Egypt, agreeably to the testament of Auletes, to the intermarried brother and sister Cleopatra and Ptolemaeus Dionysus, and further gave unasked the kingdom of Cyprus —cancelling the earlier act of annexa tion (iv. 450) — as the appanage of the second-born of Egypt to the younger children of Auletes, Arsinoe and Ptolemaeus the younger.
But a storm was secretly preparing. Alexandria was Insurrec-
a cosmopolitan city as well as Rome, hardly inferior to Alexandria, the Italian capital in the number of its inhabitants, far
superior to it in stirring commercial spirit, in skill of handicraft, in taste for science and art : in the citizens
there was a lively sense of their own national importance,
and, if there was no political sentiment, there was at any
rate a turbulent spirit, which induced them to indulge in
their street riots as regularly and as heartily as the Parisians
of the present day : one may conceive their feelings, when
they saw the Roman general ruling in the palace of the
Lagids and their kings accepting the award of his tribunal.
Pothinus and the boy-king, both as may be conceived very dissatisfied at once with the peremptory requisition of old
debts and with the intervention in the throne-dispute which
could only issue, as it did, in favour of Cleopatra, sent —in order to pacify the Roman demands — the treasures of the temples and the gold plate of the king with intentional ostentation to be melted at the mint; with increasing indignation the Egyptians —who were pious even to superstition, and who rejoiced in the world - renowned magnificence of their court as if it were a possession of their own — beheld the bare walls of their temples and the wooden cups on the table of their king. The Roman
Caesar in Alexandria.
of her charms in general and least of all towards her judge, Caesar also appeared among all his victories to value most those won over beautiful women. It was a merry prelude to graver scenes. Under the leadership of Achillas and, as was afterwards proved, by the secret orders of the king and his guardian, the Roman army of occupation stationed in Egypt appeared unexpectedly in Alexandria; and as soon as the citizens saw that it had come to attack Caesar, they made common cause with the soldiers.
With a presence of mind, which in some measure justifies his earlier foolhardiness, Caesar hastily collected
276
BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book v
army of occupation also, which had been essentially denationalized by its long abode in Egypt and the many intermarriages between the soldiers and Egyptian women, and which moreover numbered a multitude of the old soldiers of Pompeius and runaway Italian criminals and slaves in its ranks, was indignant at Caesar, by whose orders it had been obliged to suspend its action on the Syrian frontier, and at his handful of haughty legionaries. The tumult even at the landing, when the multitude saw the Roman axes carried into the old palace, and the numerous cases in which his soldiers were assassinated in the city, had taught Caesar the immense danger in which he was placed with his small force in presence of that exasperated multitude. But it was difficult to return on account of the north-west winds prevailing at this season of the year, and the attempt at embarkation
might easily become a signal for the outbreak of the insurrection; besides, it was not the nature of Caesar to take his
departure without having accomplished his work. He accordingly ordered up at once reinforcements from Asia, and meanwhile, till these arrived, made a show of the utmost self-possession. Never was there greater
gaiety in his camp than during this rest at Alexandria ; and while the beautiful and clever Cleopatra was not sparing
chap, x PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
277
his scattered men ; seized the persons of the king and his ministers ; entrenched himself in the royal residence and the adjoining theatre ; and gave orders, as there was no time to place in safety the war - fleet stationed in the principal harbour immediately in front of the theatre, that it should be set on fire and that Pharos, the island with the light-tower commanding the harbour, should be oc cupied by means of boats. Thus at least a restricted position for defence was secured, and the way was kept open to procure supplies and reinforcements. At the same time orders were issued to the commandant of Asia Minor as well as to the nearest subject countries, the Syrians and Nabataeans, the Cretans and the Rhodians, to send troops and ships in all haste to Egypt. The insurrection at the head of which the princess Arsinoe and her confidant the eunuch Ganymedes had placed themselves, meanwhile had free course in all Egypt and in the greater part of the capital. In the streets of the latter there was daily fighting, but without success either on the part of Caesar in gaining freer scope and breaking through to the fresh water lake of Marea which lay behind the town, where he could have provided himself with water and forage, or on the part of the Alexandrians in acquiring superiority over the besieged and depriving them of all drinking water ; for, when the Nile canals in Caesar's part of the town had been spoiled by the introduction of salt water, drinkable water was unexpectedly found in wells dug on the beach.
As Caesar was not to be overcome from the landward side, the exertions of the besiegers were directed to destroy his fleet and cut him off from the sea by which supplies reached him. The island with the lighthouse and the mole by which this was connected with the mainland divided the harbour into a western and an eastern half, which
1rere in communication with each other through two arched openings in the mole. Caesar commanded the island and
aj$ BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, book t
the east harbour, while the mole and the west harbour were in possession of the citizens ; and, as the Alexandrian fleet was burnt, his vessels sailed in and out without hindrance. The Alexandrians, after having vainly at tempted to introduce fire-ships from the western into the eastern harbour, equipped with the remnant of their arsenal
a small squadron and with this blocked up the way of Caesar's vessels, when these were towing in a fleet of transports with a legion that had arrived from Asia Minor ; but the excellent Rhodian mariners of Caesar mastered the enemy. Not long afterwards, however, the citizens captured the lighthouse-island,1 and from that point totally closed the narrow and rocky mouth of the east harbour for larger ships; so that Caesar's fleet was compelled to take its station in the open roads before the east harbour, and his communication with the sea hung only on a weak thread. Caesar's fleet, attacked in that roadstead repeatedly by the superior naval force of the enemy, could neither shun the unequal strife, since the loss of the lighthouse- island closed the inner harbour against nor yet withdraw, for the loss of the roadstead would have debarred Caesar
from the sea. Though the brave legionaries, supported by the dexterity of the Rhodian sailors, had always hitherto decided these conflicts in favour of the Romans, the Alexandrians renewed and augmented their naval armaments with unwearied perseverance the besieged had to fight as often as pleased the besiegers, and the former should be on single occasion vanquished, Caesar would be totally hemmed in and probably lost.
It was absolutely necessary to make an attempt to recover the lighthouse-island. The double attack, which
The loss of the lighthouse-island must have fallen out, where there now chasm (B. A. 12), for the island was in fact at first in Caesar's power (B. C. iii. 12 B. A. 8). The mole must have been constantly in the power of the enemy, for Caesar held intercourse with the island only by ships.
wholly
;
1 a
is
a
it
if
;
it,
chap, X PHARSALUS, AND THAPSUS
379
was made by boats from the side of the harbour and by the war-vessels from the seaboard, in reality brought not only the island but also the lower part of the mole into Caesar's power ; it was only at the second arch-opening of the mole that Caesar ordered the attack to be stopped, and the mole to be there closed towards the city by a transverse wall. But while a violent conflict arose here around the entrenchers, the Roman troops left the lower part of the mole adjoining the island bare of defenders ; a division of Egyptians landed there unexpectedly, attacked in the rear the Roman soldiers and sailors crowded together on the mole at the transverse wall, and drove the whole mass in wild confusion into the sea. A part were taken on board by the Roman ships ; the most were drowned. Some 400 soldiers and a still greater number of men belonging to the fleet were sacrificed on this day ; the general himself, who had shared the fate of his men, had been obliged to seek refuge in his ship, and when this sank from having been overloaded with men, he had to save himself by swimming to another. But, severe as was the loss suffered, it was amply compensated by the recovery of the lighthouse-island, which along with the mole as far as the first arch-opening remained in the hands of Caesar.