50c5) maintain on the contrary that a dharma of a certain type is only an equal and immediately antecedent
condition
of a dharma of that same type: mind arises from mind, sensation arises from sensation, etc.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
; and 2) from the point of view of its moral character: like it, it is defiled.
But it can belong to a different category than the category of its
cause. "Category" means the method of abandoning: it is susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b). When there is a similarity between a cause and its result from this last point of view, the universal cause is at one and the same time a similar cause.
Four alternative cases present themselves:
1. A similar cause which is not a universal cause: for example, a non-universal defilement (rdga, etc. ) related to the defilements of their own category;
2. A universal cause which is not a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of another category;
3. A universal cause which is also a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of their own category;
4. All other dharmas are neither similar causes nor universal 406
causes.
57e. Extinction through intelligence is disconnection.
Disconnection (visamyoga) or visamyogaphala, "result that con- sists of disconnection" is extinction (ksaya-nirodhd) obtained by the speculative consciousness (dht=prajnd). Visamyogaphala is hence
pratisamkhyanirodha. (See above p. 280).
58a-b. A dharma is the result of the virile activity of the
dharma through the force by which it arises.
This refers to a conditioned dharma.
Examples: the absorption of the First Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in Kamadhatu which instigates it or prepares it; the absorption of the Second Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in the First Dhyana.
A pure dharma can be the result of the virile activity of an impure dharma (the laukikdgradhannas have duhkhe dharmajndnakfdnti for their result, vi. 25c-d).
? A mind that can create fictive beings (nirmdnacitta) is the result of 407
the virile activity of a mind in a Dhyana (vii. 48). And thus following. Pratisamkhyanirodha or Nirvana is considered to be a "result of virile activity;" now the definition given inKarika 58a-b does not apply
to nirodha which, being eternal, does not arise. We say then that it is the result of the virile activity of the dharma by the force of which one obtains possession of it.
58c-d. Any conditioned dharma is the predominating result {adhipatiphala) of conditioned dharmas, with the exception of
408 the dharmas that are later than it.
What difference is there between the result of virile activity and a predominating result?
The first refers to the agent; the second refers to both the agent and the non-agent. For example, a created thing is the result of the virile activity and the predominating result of the artisan who created it; it is only the predominating result of what is not the artisan.
***
In what condition {avastha)--the past, present, or future--is each of the causes {hetu) found when they grasp and when they produce their result?
[59. Five causes grasp their results in the present; two produce
it in the present; two produce it in both past and present; and
409 one produces it in the past.
What is understood by "grasping a result" and "producing a
410 result? "
411
A dharma produces a result at the moment when it gives this result the power of arising, that is, at the moment when, the future result being turned towards arising or is ready to arise, this dharma gives it the power that causes it to enter into the present. ]
A dharma grasps a result when it become its seed
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59a-b. Five causes grasp their result in the present.
Five causes grasp their results only when they are in the present: in the past, they have already grasped their results; in the future, they have no activity (v. 25).
The same holds for karanahetu\ but the stanza does not mention it, because kdranahetu does not necessarily have a result.
59b. Two produce their result in the present.
The mutually coexistent cause (sahabhu) and the associated cause (samprayuktaka) produce their results only when they are in the present: these two causes in fact grasp and produce their results at the same time.
59c. Two produce their results in both the past and the present.
The similar cause (sabhdga) and the universal cause (sarvatraga) produce their results both when they are in the present and when they are in the past.
How can they produce their outflowing results (nisj/anda, ii. 56c) when they are in the present? We have seen (ii. 52b, 54a) that they are earlier than their results.
One says that they produce their results in the present, because
they produce them immediately. When their result has arisen, they are
past: they have already produced it; they do not produce the same
412 result twice.
***
i. It happens that, at a given moment, a good similar cause {sabhagahetu) grasps a result but does not produce a result. Four alternatives: to grasp, to produce, to grasp and to produce, and to
413 neither grasp nor to produce.
1. The possession of the roots of good that the person who has cut
off the roots of good (iv. 80a) abandons at the last moment, grasps a
414 result, but does not produce a result.
? 2. The possession of the roots of good that the person who again
takes up the roots of good (iv. 80c) acquires in the first moment,
produces a result, but does not grasp a result.
415
We must say: This same possession,--the possession abandoned
at the last moment by the person who has cut off the roots of good,-- produces its result, but does not grasp it at the moment when this person again takes up the roots of good.
3. The possession of the person whose roots of good are not cut off--with the exception of the two proceeding cases: that of the person who has achieved cutting them off, and that of the person who again takes up the roots of good--both grasp and produce.
4. In all other cases, possession neither grasps nor produces: for example, the possession of the roots of good of a person whose roots of good are cut off; the possession of the roots of good of a superior stage by a person who has fallen from this stage: these possessions have already grasped their result, and hence do not grasp it any more; they do not produce it, since the person cannot have possession of these roots at the present time.
ii. The Vibhasa establishes the same alternatives with respect to bad similar causes:
1. The possession of the bad dharmas that a person who obtains detachment from desire abandons at the last moment.
2. The possession that a person who fell from detachment acquires in the first moment.
We must say: These same possessions, when a person falls from detachment.
3. The possession of a person who is not detached, with the exception of the two preceding cases.
4. Possession in all other cases: for example the possession of a person detached and not subject to falling.
iii. There are also four alternatives regarding defiled-neutral similar causes:
1. The last possession of defiled-neutral dharmas that the saint who becomes an Arhat abandons.
2. The first possession that a fallen Arhat acquires.
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Or better: the aforementioned possession of an Arhat who has fallen.
3. The possession of a non-detached person in Bhavagra, the two preceding cases being excluded.
4. Possession in all other cases: the possession of an Arhat.
iv. When an undefiled-neutral similar cause produces its result, it grasps it (for the undefiled-neutral lasts until Nirvana), but it can grasp its result without producing it: for example, in the case of the
last skandhas of an Arhat which have no outflowing (nisyanda).
v. We have up to now considered the dharmas that are not "subject to consciousness" (salambana). If we consider the mind and its mental
states in their sucessive moments, we can establish the four following alternatives for good similar causes:
1. It grasps but does not produce. When a good mind is immediately followed by a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, this good mind, as a similar cause, grasps, that is, projects an outflowing result, namely a good future mind, which is or is not destined to arise; it does not produce an outflowing result, since the mind that follows it, defiled or undefiled-neutral, is not the outflowing of a good mind.
2. It produces but does not grasp. When a good mind immediately follows a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, a good earlier mind produces an outflowing result, namely the good mind that we have just considered; this earlier mind does not grasp a result, since it grasped it formerly.
3. It grasps and it produces. Two good minds follow one another, the first grasping and producing an outflowing result, which is the second mind.
4. It neither grasps nor produces. When defiled or undefiled- neutral minds succeed one another, the earlier good mind, as a similar cause, formerly grasped its result and shall later produce its result; but for an instant it neither grasps nor produces.
We can in like manner establish the alternatives regarding bad similar causes.
59d. One cause produces its result in the past.
? The retributive cause produces its result when it is in the past, for this result is not simultaneous to, nor immediately following its cause.
##*
Some other Masters, [the scholars of the West (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 630bl5)] say that there are four results different from the five results that we have just mentioned. These four are:
1. pratisthaphala, a base result: a circle of water is the result of the circle of wind (iii. 45) and thus following to plants, which are the result of earth;
2. prayogaphala, a result of preparatory exercise: anutpddajndna, etc. (vi. 50) is the result of subhd, etc. (vi. ll);
3. sdmagrtphala, a result of a complex: the visual consciousness is the result of the organ of sight, of a visible thing, of light and of an act of attention {Madhyarnakavrtti, 454);
4. bhavanaphala, a result of meditation: a mind capable of creating fictive beings (vii. 48) is the result of a Dhyana.
[According to the Sarvastivadins,] the first of these four results is included in the category of the predominent result; the other three are included in the category of virile result.
***
We have explained causes and results. We must now examine how many causes produce the different dharmas.
From this point of view, the dharmas are ranged into four categories: 1. defiled dharmas, that is, the defilements, the dharmas associated with a defilement, and the dharmas having their origins in a defilement (iv. 8); 2. retributive dharmas or dharmas arisen from a retributive cause (vipdkahetu, ii. 54c); 3. the first pure dharmas, that is, duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti (i. 38b, vi. 27) and the dharmas coexistent with this ksanti\ and 4. the other dharmas, that is, the neutral dharmas, with the exception of the dharmas of retribution, and the good dharmas, with the exception of the first pure dharmas.
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Chapter Two
60-61b. The mind and its mental states are: 1) defiled; 2) arisen from a retributive cause; 3) others; and 4) pure for the first time, arising from causes that remain when one excludes, in this order, 1) the retributive cause, 2) the universal cause, 3) these two causes, 4 ) these two causes plus the similar cause. The associated cause is further excluded with respect to the
416 dharmas that are not mind or mental states.
The mind and its mental states, 1) when they are defiled, arise from five causes excluding the retributive cause; 2) when they are retributive, they arise from five causes with the exclusion of the universal cause; 3) when they are different from these two categories and from the fourth, they arise from four causes, with the exclusion of the retributive cause and the universal cause; 4) when they are pure for the first time, they arise from three causes, with the exclusion of the aforementioned two causes and the similar cause.
The dharmas that are not mind or mental states, namely the material dharmas and the samskaras not associated with the mind (ii. 35), accordingly as they fall into one of four categories, arising from causes proper to this category with the exclusion of the associated causes are: defiled and retributive, four causes; different, three causes; pure for the first time (anasravasamvara, iv. 13), two causes.
These is no dharma that comes from a single cause: the reason for being and the mutually coexistant cause are never absent.
**#
We have explained causes (hetu). What are conditions (pratyaya)? 417
Where is this said?
In the Sutra, it says "There are four conditions (pratyayas), namely causes as a condition (hetupratyayata), an equal and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyayata), an object as condition (alambanapratyayatd), and a predominating influence as condition (adhipatipratyayata). "
6lc. The pratyayas are said to be four.
? 418 Pratyayata means "a type of pratyaya-
***
What is "cause as a condition"?
61d. The pratyaya that bears the name of hetu is five hetus.
Excepting karanahetu, the five remaining hetus constitute hetu- pratyayata, causes as condition.
***
What is "an equal and immediately antecedent condition"?
62a-b. The mind and its mental states that have arisen, with the exception of the last ones, are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
If one excepts the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat at the moment of Nirvana, all minds and mental states which have arisen are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
i. Only mind and mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions. Of what dharmas are they the equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
1. This type of condition is called samanantara (equal and immediately antecedent) because it produces equal (sama) and im- mediate (anantara) dharmas. The prefix sam is understood in the sense of equality.
419
Consequently only minds and their mental states are equal and
immediately antecedent conditions, for there is no equality between a
cause and its result with respect to the other dharmas\ for example the
material dharmas. In fact, after a rupa of the sphere of Kamadhatu,
there can arise at the same time two rupas, one of Kamadhatu, the
420
, or two rupas, one from Kamadhatu, the whereas one mind in Kamadhatu and one mind in Rupadhatu can never arise at the same time after a mind in
other from Rupadhatu
other pure;
421
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Kamadhatu. The appearance of the rupas is confused: now an equal and immediately antecedent condition does not produce confused results; hence material dharmas are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions.
Vasumitra says: A second rilpa of accumulation can arise in the
same body, without which the series of a rilpa of accumulation would
more or by less. Hence it is not an equal and immediately antecedent condition. Less arises from more: as when a great mass of straw, burned, becomes ash. More arises from less: as when a small seed produces the roots of a fig tree, its trunk, its branches, and its leaves.
2. [Objection:] When minds immediately succeed one another, do they always admit the same number of types of associated mental states? No. The earlier mind admits of a larger number of types of mental states, and the following mind, a lesser number; and vice versa. Minds, good, bad, or neutral, succeed one another; but they do not admit of the same number of associated mental states (ii. 28-30); the absorptions, which succeed one another, admit of or do not admit of vitarka and vicara (viii. 7). Hence there is no equality for the mental states as well as for the material dharmas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 52a21).
That is true: there is a succession from less to more, and vice versa (second opinion of the Vibhasd); but only by the accumulation or the diminution of the number of types of mental states (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 50c5). There is never any inequality with respect to a determined type: more numerous sensations never arise after less numerous sensations, nor vice versa; this means that a mind accompanied by a single sensation is never followed by a mind associated with two or three sensations. The same for ideas (samjna) and the other mental states.
Thus is it only in relation to its own type that an earlier mental state is an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a later mental state? Is sensation then the equal and immediately antecedent condition of a single sensation?
be broken; hence rilpa is not an equal and immediately antecedent 422
condition.
The Bhadanta says: A rilpa dharma is immediately followed by
423
? No. In a general way the earlier mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mental states that follow, and only of the mental states of their type. But there is no succession from less to more with respect to one type, and vice versa: this justifies the expression samanantara, "equal and immediate. "
3. The Abhidharmikas who take the name of Samtanasabhagikas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p.
50c5) maintain on the contrary that a dharma of a certain type is only an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a dharma of that same type: mind arises from mind, sensation arises from sensation, etc.
[Objection:] In this hypothesis, when a defiled (klista=akusala or nivrtavyakrta) dharma arises after an undefiled dharma, this defiled dharma does not proceed from an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
It is a previously destroyed defilement that is the equal and immediately antecedent condition of the defilement that defiles this second dharma. The previous defilement is considered as immediately preceeding the later defilement, even though it is separated by an undefiled dharma, separation by a dharma of a different nature does not constitute separation, as the leaving-mind of the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamapatti, ii43a) has for its equal and immedi- ately antecedent condition the mind-of-entry-into-absorption which was previously destroyed: absorption does not constitute a separation.
We think that the theory of the Samtanasabhagikas is inadmissible, for, in this theory, a pure mind produced for the first time (i. 38b) would not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.
424 4. The samskdras dissociated from the mind {viprayukta, ii. 35),
like the material dharmas, are produced disparately: hence they are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions. In fact after possession in the sphere of Kamadhatu, possession relative to the dharmas of the three spheres of existence and to pure dharmas etc. , can be produced at the same time.
ii. Why deny that the future dharmas are equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
Future dharmas are disparate: there is not, among them, any early
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425
and later (see p. 266).
A. Then how does the Blessed One know that such and such a
future dharma will arise first, and that such and such a dharma will arise later? He knows the order of the arising of all that arises until the end of time.
426
1. First answer.
{anumana) drawn from the past and the present. He sees the past: "From such a type of action such a retributive result arises; such a dharma proceeds from such a dharma\ and he sees the present: "Here is such a type of action: such a retributive result shall arise in the future from this action; here is such a dharma', such a dharma shall proceed from this dharma?
However the consciousness of the Blessed One is called pranidhi- jnana (vii. 37), and is not a consciousness from inference. By means of inferences drawn from the past and from the present, the Blessed One immediately sees the dharma that resides, disparately, in the future, and he produces the consciousness, "This man, having accomplished
428 such an action, shall certainly receive such a future retribution. "
To believe you, if the Blessed One does not consider the past, then he does not know the future. Hence he is not omniscient.
His consciousness results from an inference 427
429
certain dharma which is the indication of the results which will arise in
2. According to other Masters,
the future, namely a certain samskara disassociated from the mind.
430
The Blessed One contemplates it,
without his having cultivated the Dhyanas and the Abhijnas (vii. 42; cyutyupapadajnana) for it.
The Sautrantikas: If this is the case, then the Blessed One would be
431
an interpreter of signs;
3. Consequently the Blessed One knows immediately and at his will
all things, not be inference, and not by divination. This is the opinion of the Sautrantikas, justified by the word of the Blessed One (Ekottara, TD 2, p. 640a4; comp. Digha, i. 31), "The qualities of the Buddhas, the spheres of the Buddhas, are incomprehensible. "
B. If the future does not have any earlier or later division of time, how can one say, "Only duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti arises immediately
there is in the series of beings a
he would not be a "seer. "
and he knows future results
? after the laukika agradharmas, and not any other dharma" (vi. 27) and thus following until "Ksayajndna arises immediately after vajro- pamasamddhi (vi. 46c)? "
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 51bl) answer:] If the arising of this dharma is bound to that dharma, then immediately after that, this arises, as a bud arises after the seed without any equal and immediately antecedent condition intervening.
iii. Why are the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat equal and immediately antecedent conditions {Vibhasa, TD 27,50a22)?
Because no mind or mental states arise after them.
But you have said (i. 17) that the manas is the mind that is disappearing and which serves as the support of the following mind. Since no mind follows the last mind of an Arhat, this last mind should not receive either the name of manas, or the name of equal and immediately antecedent condition; and yet you consider it as being manas.
The case is not the same. That which constitutes the manas is not its activity, the fact of supporting the susequent mind; rather, it is the quality of being a support {dsraya) for this mind; whether his (latter mind) arises or does not arise is of little importance. The last mind of an Arhat is "support:" if a subsequent mind, which would be supported by this support, does not arise, it is through the lack of other causes necessary to its arising. On the contrary, what constitutes an equal and immediately antecedent condition is its activity. Once this condition has grasped or projected a result, nothing in the world can hinder this result from arising. Hence the last mind of an Arhat is justly called manas, but not an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
iv. Does a dharma which is cittasamanantara, that is, which has a certain mind {cittankantara) for its equal and immediate antecedent
432 condition, immediately follow this mind?
There are four alternatives:
1. The mind and the mental states of leaving of the two
absorptions free from mind (ii. 41), and all the moments of these two absorptions with the exception of the first, have the mind entering into absorption for their equal and immediately antecedent condition,
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but they do not immediately follow this mind (ii. 64b).
2. The characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c) 1) of the first moment of
the two absorptions, and 2) of all minds and all mental states of a conscious state, immediately follow a mind, but do not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.
3. The first moment of the two absorptions, and all minds and mental states of a conscious state, have the mind that they immediately follow for their equal and immediately antecedent condition.
4. The characteristics 1) of all the moments of the two absorptions with the exception of the first, and 2) of the mind and the mental states of leaving these two absorptions, have no equal and immediately antecedent condition, for they are dharmas disassociated from the mind {viprayukta, ii. 35); and they do not immediately follow a mind
###
What is an objea as condition?
62c. All dharmas are the objects of consciousness.
All the dharmas, conditioned as well as unconditioned, are "objects of consciousness" of the mind and its mental states, but not in- discriminately so. For example, the visual consciousness and the mental states, sensation, etc. , which are associated with it, have all visible things for their object; the hearing consciousness, sounds; the smelling consciousness, odors; and the touch consciousness, tangible things. The mental consciousness and the mental states that are associated with it have all the dharmas for their objects. (Karika 62c is then understood literally with respect to the manas).
When a dharma is the objea of a mind, it is not possible that this dharma, at any moment, is not the object of this mind. This means that even if a visible objea is not grasped as an object by the visual consciousness, it is an objea, for, whether it is grasped or not grasped as an object, its nature remains the same, as fuel is combustible, even when it is not on fire.
We can establish a threefold determination in considering the
? problem from the point of view of the mind that grasps a dharma as its object. The mind is determined 1) with regard to its ayatana: for example, a visual consciousness is supported only on a visible thing (rupa-ayatana)', 2) with regard to the dravya or substantial thing: a certain visual consciousness, the consciousness of blue, of red, etc. , is supported by blue, red, etc. (see i. 10); and 3) with regard to a moment (ksana): a certain visual consciousness is supported in a certain moment of blue.
Is the mind determined in the same way with regard to its support
(dsraya), that is, its organ, the organ of sight, etc. ? 433
The response is affirmative. However, in the present, the mind is bound to its support; but in the past and the future, it is separated from it.
According to others, it is bound to its support in both the past and
434 the present.
***
What is a predominating condition?
62d. The cause termed karana is called adhipati, predominant.
AdhipatipraSyayatd or predominating condition is karanahetu, the "reason for being'* cause (ii. 50a), for karanahetu is a "predominating condition" (adhipatipratyaya).
This name is justified from two points of view. The predominating condition is that which belongs to the greatest number of dharmas, and which is exercised with respect to the greatest number of dharmas.
1. All the dharmas are "an object as condition" of the mental consciousness. However the dharmas coexisting with a certain mind are not the object of this mind, whereas they are karanahetu of it. Thus the dharmas, without exception, are "predominating conditions" as karanahetu, not as "an object as condition. "
2. Every dharma has all dharmas for its karanahetu, with the exception of itself.
No dharma of any type is a condition of itself. And a conditioned
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dharma is not a condition of an unconditioned dharma, and vice versa. ***
In what state (avastha), past, present, or future, are the dharmas found with regard to which the diverse conditions exercise their activity?
Let us first examine cause as condition, that is, as five causes, with the exclusion of karar^ahetu.
63a-b. Two causes exercise their activity with regard to a
4 perishing dharma. ^
"Perishing" means "of the present. " A present dharma is called "perishing," "in the act of perishing," because, having arisen, it is turned towards its destruction.
Sahabhilhetu (ii. 50b) and samprayuktakahetu (53c) operate with regard to a present dharma, because they operate with regard to a
436
dharma that arises at the same time as they do.
63b-c. Three, with regard to an arising dharma.
"An arising dharma' means a future dharma, because a future dharma, not having arisen, is turned towards arising.
The three causes in question are sabhagahetu (ii. 52a), sarvatra- gahetu (54a), and vipakahetu (54c).
Concerning the other conditions:
63c-d. Two other conditions, in reverse order.
First in the list of conditions there comes the equal and immedi- ately antecedent condition: it exercises it activity as do the three causes, namely with regard to an arising dharma, for the minds and mental states of a given moment cede their place to the mind and mental states which are arising.
Next in the list there comes an object as condition: it exercises its activity as do the two causes, namely with regard to a perishing dharma: this perishing dharma is mind and mental states, the "subjects
? of the consciousness" (dlambaka), which, perishing,--that is, of the present,--grasp a present object.
The activity of predominent influence as a condition only consists in not creating any obstacle either to a past, present, or future dharma.
#*#
The different types of dharmas arise by reason of how many conditions?
64a. The mind and its mental states arise by reason of four
437 conditions.
1. Causes as conditions: the five causes; 2. equal and immediately antecedent condition: the earlier mind and mental states, which have arisen not separated by other minds or mental states; 3. an object as condition: the five objects of which physical matter is the first, or, in the case of the mental consciousness, all the dharmas; and 4. a predominating influence as condition: all the dharmas, except the mind and its mental states whose arising is under consideration.
64b. The two absorptions, by reason of three.
One must exclude the object as condition, because the absorption of non-consciousness (ii. 42) and the absorption of extinction (ii. 43) do not grasp an object. We have: 1. causes as conditions: two causes, sahabhuhetu (the laksanas, arising, etc. ii. 45c, of the absorption), and sabhdgahetu (the good former dharmas, already arisen, belonging to the stage of absorption, that is, to the Fourth Dhyana or to Bhavagra, according to the case); 2. an equal and immediately antecedent condition, the mind of entry into the absorption and the mental states that are associated with this mind; the mind of entry is not separated by any mind of any of the moments of the absorption; and 3. the predominating influence as condition, as above.
These two absorptions arise from an application, from an inflec- tion of the mind: they then have the mind as an equal and immediately antecedent condition. They hinder the arising of the mind: thus they
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are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mind leaving the absorption, even though they are immediately contigous to it (nirantara, see p. 301).
64c. The other dharmas, by reason of two.
The other dharmas, namely the other samskaras disassociated form the mind and the material dharmas, arise by reason of the causes as conditions and the predominating influence as condition (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 702b21).
##*
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana,
438 or any other name.
How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.
64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a
439 succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.
1. If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.
[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later! "
If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.
a. [ The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.
? If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.
[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.
This would admit that samsdra does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).
b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.
This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later! " We do not see why the second desire, at first non- efficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.
What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?
[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction
(ptiti).
He is then not God, the Sovereign {Isvara), in what concerns his
own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world? Further, do you say that God finds satisfaction in seeing the creatures that he has created in the prey of all the sufferings of existence, including the tortures of the hells? Homage to this God! Well said, in truth, is the popular stanza, "He is called Rudra because he burns, because he is excited, ferocious, terrible,
440
an eater of flesh, blood, and marrow/'
3. The followers of God, the single cause of the world, deny visible
causes,--causes and conditions,--the efficacy of the seed with regard to the sprout, etc. If, modifying their position, they admit the existence of these causes, and pretend that these causes serve God as auxiliaries, this then is no more that a pious affirmation, for we do not maintain
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any activity of a cause besides the activity of the so-called secondary causes. Furthermore, God would not be sovereign with regard to auxiliary causes, since these cooperate in the production of the effect through their own efficacy. Perhaps, in order to avoid the negation of causes, which are visible, and in order to avoid the affirmation of present action by God, which is not visible, the Theist would say that the work of God is creation: but creation, dependent only on God, would never have a beginning, like God himself, and this is a consequence that the Theist rejects.
We would refute the doctrine of Purusa, of Pradhana, etc. , as we have refuted the theist doctrine, mutatis mutandis. Thus, no dharma arises from a single cause.
Alas, persons are unclear!
cause. "Category" means the method of abandoning: it is susceptible of being abandoned by Seeing the Truth of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b). When there is a similarity between a cause and its result from this last point of view, the universal cause is at one and the same time a similar cause.
Four alternative cases present themselves:
1. A similar cause which is not a universal cause: for example, a non-universal defilement (rdga, etc. ) related to the defilements of their own category;
2. A universal cause which is not a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of another category;
3. A universal cause which is also a similar cause: the universal defilements related to a defilement of their own category;
4. All other dharmas are neither similar causes nor universal 406
causes.
57e. Extinction through intelligence is disconnection.
Disconnection (visamyoga) or visamyogaphala, "result that con- sists of disconnection" is extinction (ksaya-nirodhd) obtained by the speculative consciousness (dht=prajnd). Visamyogaphala is hence
pratisamkhyanirodha. (See above p. 280).
58a-b. A dharma is the result of the virile activity of the
dharma through the force by which it arises.
This refers to a conditioned dharma.
Examples: the absorption of the First Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in Kamadhatu which instigates it or prepares it; the absorption of the Second Dhyana is the result of the virile activity of a mind in the First Dhyana.
A pure dharma can be the result of the virile activity of an impure dharma (the laukikdgradhannas have duhkhe dharmajndnakfdnti for their result, vi. 25c-d).
? A mind that can create fictive beings (nirmdnacitta) is the result of 407
the virile activity of a mind in a Dhyana (vii. 48). And thus following. Pratisamkhyanirodha or Nirvana is considered to be a "result of virile activity;" now the definition given inKarika 58a-b does not apply
to nirodha which, being eternal, does not arise. We say then that it is the result of the virile activity of the dharma by the force of which one obtains possession of it.
58c-d. Any conditioned dharma is the predominating result {adhipatiphala) of conditioned dharmas, with the exception of
408 the dharmas that are later than it.
What difference is there between the result of virile activity and a predominating result?
The first refers to the agent; the second refers to both the agent and the non-agent. For example, a created thing is the result of the virile activity and the predominating result of the artisan who created it; it is only the predominating result of what is not the artisan.
***
In what condition {avastha)--the past, present, or future--is each of the causes {hetu) found when they grasp and when they produce their result?
[59. Five causes grasp their results in the present; two produce
it in the present; two produce it in both past and present; and
409 one produces it in the past.
What is understood by "grasping a result" and "producing a
410 result? "
411
A dharma produces a result at the moment when it gives this result the power of arising, that is, at the moment when, the future result being turned towards arising or is ready to arise, this dharma gives it the power that causes it to enter into the present. ]
A dharma grasps a result when it become its seed
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59a-b. Five causes grasp their result in the present.
Five causes grasp their results only when they are in the present: in the past, they have already grasped their results; in the future, they have no activity (v. 25).
The same holds for karanahetu\ but the stanza does not mention it, because kdranahetu does not necessarily have a result.
59b. Two produce their result in the present.
The mutually coexistent cause (sahabhu) and the associated cause (samprayuktaka) produce their results only when they are in the present: these two causes in fact grasp and produce their results at the same time.
59c. Two produce their results in both the past and the present.
The similar cause (sabhdga) and the universal cause (sarvatraga) produce their results both when they are in the present and when they are in the past.
How can they produce their outflowing results (nisj/anda, ii. 56c) when they are in the present? We have seen (ii. 52b, 54a) that they are earlier than their results.
One says that they produce their results in the present, because
they produce them immediately. When their result has arisen, they are
past: they have already produced it; they do not produce the same
412 result twice.
***
i. It happens that, at a given moment, a good similar cause {sabhagahetu) grasps a result but does not produce a result. Four alternatives: to grasp, to produce, to grasp and to produce, and to
413 neither grasp nor to produce.
1. The possession of the roots of good that the person who has cut
off the roots of good (iv. 80a) abandons at the last moment, grasps a
414 result, but does not produce a result.
? 2. The possession of the roots of good that the person who again
takes up the roots of good (iv. 80c) acquires in the first moment,
produces a result, but does not grasp a result.
415
We must say: This same possession,--the possession abandoned
at the last moment by the person who has cut off the roots of good,-- produces its result, but does not grasp it at the moment when this person again takes up the roots of good.
3. The possession of the person whose roots of good are not cut off--with the exception of the two proceeding cases: that of the person who has achieved cutting them off, and that of the person who again takes up the roots of good--both grasp and produce.
4. In all other cases, possession neither grasps nor produces: for example, the possession of the roots of good of a person whose roots of good are cut off; the possession of the roots of good of a superior stage by a person who has fallen from this stage: these possessions have already grasped their result, and hence do not grasp it any more; they do not produce it, since the person cannot have possession of these roots at the present time.
ii. The Vibhasa establishes the same alternatives with respect to bad similar causes:
1. The possession of the bad dharmas that a person who obtains detachment from desire abandons at the last moment.
2. The possession that a person who fell from detachment acquires in the first moment.
We must say: These same possessions, when a person falls from detachment.
3. The possession of a person who is not detached, with the exception of the two preceding cases.
4. Possession in all other cases: for example the possession of a person detached and not subject to falling.
iii. There are also four alternatives regarding defiled-neutral similar causes:
1. The last possession of defiled-neutral dharmas that the saint who becomes an Arhat abandons.
2. The first possession that a fallen Arhat acquires.
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Or better: the aforementioned possession of an Arhat who has fallen.
3. The possession of a non-detached person in Bhavagra, the two preceding cases being excluded.
4. Possession in all other cases: the possession of an Arhat.
iv. When an undefiled-neutral similar cause produces its result, it grasps it (for the undefiled-neutral lasts until Nirvana), but it can grasp its result without producing it: for example, in the case of the
last skandhas of an Arhat which have no outflowing (nisyanda).
v. We have up to now considered the dharmas that are not "subject to consciousness" (salambana). If we consider the mind and its mental
states in their sucessive moments, we can establish the four following alternatives for good similar causes:
1. It grasps but does not produce. When a good mind is immediately followed by a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, this good mind, as a similar cause, grasps, that is, projects an outflowing result, namely a good future mind, which is or is not destined to arise; it does not produce an outflowing result, since the mind that follows it, defiled or undefiled-neutral, is not the outflowing of a good mind.
2. It produces but does not grasp. When a good mind immediately follows a defiled or undefiled-neutral mind, a good earlier mind produces an outflowing result, namely the good mind that we have just considered; this earlier mind does not grasp a result, since it grasped it formerly.
3. It grasps and it produces. Two good minds follow one another, the first grasping and producing an outflowing result, which is the second mind.
4. It neither grasps nor produces. When defiled or undefiled- neutral minds succeed one another, the earlier good mind, as a similar cause, formerly grasped its result and shall later produce its result; but for an instant it neither grasps nor produces.
We can in like manner establish the alternatives regarding bad similar causes.
59d. One cause produces its result in the past.
? The retributive cause produces its result when it is in the past, for this result is not simultaneous to, nor immediately following its cause.
##*
Some other Masters, [the scholars of the West (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 630bl5)] say that there are four results different from the five results that we have just mentioned. These four are:
1. pratisthaphala, a base result: a circle of water is the result of the circle of wind (iii. 45) and thus following to plants, which are the result of earth;
2. prayogaphala, a result of preparatory exercise: anutpddajndna, etc. (vi. 50) is the result of subhd, etc. (vi. ll);
3. sdmagrtphala, a result of a complex: the visual consciousness is the result of the organ of sight, of a visible thing, of light and of an act of attention {Madhyarnakavrtti, 454);
4. bhavanaphala, a result of meditation: a mind capable of creating fictive beings (vii. 48) is the result of a Dhyana.
[According to the Sarvastivadins,] the first of these four results is included in the category of the predominent result; the other three are included in the category of virile result.
***
We have explained causes and results. We must now examine how many causes produce the different dharmas.
From this point of view, the dharmas are ranged into four categories: 1. defiled dharmas, that is, the defilements, the dharmas associated with a defilement, and the dharmas having their origins in a defilement (iv. 8); 2. retributive dharmas or dharmas arisen from a retributive cause (vipdkahetu, ii. 54c); 3. the first pure dharmas, that is, duhkhe dharmajndnaksdnti (i. 38b, vi. 27) and the dharmas coexistent with this ksanti\ and 4. the other dharmas, that is, the neutral dharmas, with the exception of the dharmas of retribution, and the good dharmas, with the exception of the first pure dharmas.
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60-61b. The mind and its mental states are: 1) defiled; 2) arisen from a retributive cause; 3) others; and 4) pure for the first time, arising from causes that remain when one excludes, in this order, 1) the retributive cause, 2) the universal cause, 3) these two causes, 4 ) these two causes plus the similar cause. The associated cause is further excluded with respect to the
416 dharmas that are not mind or mental states.
The mind and its mental states, 1) when they are defiled, arise from five causes excluding the retributive cause; 2) when they are retributive, they arise from five causes with the exclusion of the universal cause; 3) when they are different from these two categories and from the fourth, they arise from four causes, with the exclusion of the retributive cause and the universal cause; 4) when they are pure for the first time, they arise from three causes, with the exclusion of the aforementioned two causes and the similar cause.
The dharmas that are not mind or mental states, namely the material dharmas and the samskaras not associated with the mind (ii. 35), accordingly as they fall into one of four categories, arising from causes proper to this category with the exclusion of the associated causes are: defiled and retributive, four causes; different, three causes; pure for the first time (anasravasamvara, iv. 13), two causes.
These is no dharma that comes from a single cause: the reason for being and the mutually coexistant cause are never absent.
**#
We have explained causes (hetu). What are conditions (pratyaya)? 417
Where is this said?
In the Sutra, it says "There are four conditions (pratyayas), namely causes as a condition (hetupratyayata), an equal and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyayata), an object as condition (alambanapratyayatd), and a predominating influence as condition (adhipatipratyayata). "
6lc. The pratyayas are said to be four.
? 418 Pratyayata means "a type of pratyaya-
***
What is "cause as a condition"?
61d. The pratyaya that bears the name of hetu is five hetus.
Excepting karanahetu, the five remaining hetus constitute hetu- pratyayata, causes as condition.
***
What is "an equal and immediately antecedent condition"?
62a-b. The mind and its mental states that have arisen, with the exception of the last ones, are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
If one excepts the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat at the moment of Nirvana, all minds and mental states which have arisen are an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
i. Only mind and mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions. Of what dharmas are they the equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
1. This type of condition is called samanantara (equal and immediately antecedent) because it produces equal (sama) and im- mediate (anantara) dharmas. The prefix sam is understood in the sense of equality.
419
Consequently only minds and their mental states are equal and
immediately antecedent conditions, for there is no equality between a
cause and its result with respect to the other dharmas\ for example the
material dharmas. In fact, after a rupa of the sphere of Kamadhatu,
there can arise at the same time two rupas, one of Kamadhatu, the
420
, or two rupas, one from Kamadhatu, the whereas one mind in Kamadhatu and one mind in Rupadhatu can never arise at the same time after a mind in
other from Rupadhatu
other pure;
421
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Kamadhatu. The appearance of the rupas is confused: now an equal and immediately antecedent condition does not produce confused results; hence material dharmas are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions.
Vasumitra says: A second rilpa of accumulation can arise in the
same body, without which the series of a rilpa of accumulation would
more or by less. Hence it is not an equal and immediately antecedent condition. Less arises from more: as when a great mass of straw, burned, becomes ash. More arises from less: as when a small seed produces the roots of a fig tree, its trunk, its branches, and its leaves.
2. [Objection:] When minds immediately succeed one another, do they always admit the same number of types of associated mental states? No. The earlier mind admits of a larger number of types of mental states, and the following mind, a lesser number; and vice versa. Minds, good, bad, or neutral, succeed one another; but they do not admit of the same number of associated mental states (ii. 28-30); the absorptions, which succeed one another, admit of or do not admit of vitarka and vicara (viii. 7). Hence there is no equality for the mental states as well as for the material dharmas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 52a21).
That is true: there is a succession from less to more, and vice versa (second opinion of the Vibhasd); but only by the accumulation or the diminution of the number of types of mental states (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 50c5). There is never any inequality with respect to a determined type: more numerous sensations never arise after less numerous sensations, nor vice versa; this means that a mind accompanied by a single sensation is never followed by a mind associated with two or three sensations. The same for ideas (samjna) and the other mental states.
Thus is it only in relation to its own type that an earlier mental state is an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a later mental state? Is sensation then the equal and immediately antecedent condition of a single sensation?
be broken; hence rilpa is not an equal and immediately antecedent 422
condition.
The Bhadanta says: A rilpa dharma is immediately followed by
423
? No. In a general way the earlier mental states are equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mental states that follow, and only of the mental states of their type. But there is no succession from less to more with respect to one type, and vice versa: this justifies the expression samanantara, "equal and immediate. "
3. The Abhidharmikas who take the name of Samtanasabhagikas (Vibhasd, TD 27, p.
50c5) maintain on the contrary that a dharma of a certain type is only an equal and immediately antecedent condition of a dharma of that same type: mind arises from mind, sensation arises from sensation, etc.
[Objection:] In this hypothesis, when a defiled (klista=akusala or nivrtavyakrta) dharma arises after an undefiled dharma, this defiled dharma does not proceed from an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
It is a previously destroyed defilement that is the equal and immediately antecedent condition of the defilement that defiles this second dharma. The previous defilement is considered as immediately preceeding the later defilement, even though it is separated by an undefiled dharma, separation by a dharma of a different nature does not constitute separation, as the leaving-mind of the absorption of extinction (nirodhasamapatti, ii43a) has for its equal and immedi- ately antecedent condition the mind-of-entry-into-absorption which was previously destroyed: absorption does not constitute a separation.
We think that the theory of the Samtanasabhagikas is inadmissible, for, in this theory, a pure mind produced for the first time (i. 38b) would not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.
424 4. The samskdras dissociated from the mind {viprayukta, ii. 35),
like the material dharmas, are produced disparately: hence they are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions. In fact after possession in the sphere of Kamadhatu, possession relative to the dharmas of the three spheres of existence and to pure dharmas etc. , can be produced at the same time.
ii. Why deny that the future dharmas are equal and immediately antecedent conditions?
Future dharmas are disparate: there is not, among them, any early
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425
and later (see p. 266).
A. Then how does the Blessed One know that such and such a
future dharma will arise first, and that such and such a dharma will arise later? He knows the order of the arising of all that arises until the end of time.
426
1. First answer.
{anumana) drawn from the past and the present. He sees the past: "From such a type of action such a retributive result arises; such a dharma proceeds from such a dharma\ and he sees the present: "Here is such a type of action: such a retributive result shall arise in the future from this action; here is such a dharma', such a dharma shall proceed from this dharma?
However the consciousness of the Blessed One is called pranidhi- jnana (vii. 37), and is not a consciousness from inference. By means of inferences drawn from the past and from the present, the Blessed One immediately sees the dharma that resides, disparately, in the future, and he produces the consciousness, "This man, having accomplished
428 such an action, shall certainly receive such a future retribution. "
To believe you, if the Blessed One does not consider the past, then he does not know the future. Hence he is not omniscient.
His consciousness results from an inference 427
429
certain dharma which is the indication of the results which will arise in
2. According to other Masters,
the future, namely a certain samskara disassociated from the mind.
430
The Blessed One contemplates it,
without his having cultivated the Dhyanas and the Abhijnas (vii. 42; cyutyupapadajnana) for it.
The Sautrantikas: If this is the case, then the Blessed One would be
431
an interpreter of signs;
3. Consequently the Blessed One knows immediately and at his will
all things, not be inference, and not by divination. This is the opinion of the Sautrantikas, justified by the word of the Blessed One (Ekottara, TD 2, p. 640a4; comp. Digha, i. 31), "The qualities of the Buddhas, the spheres of the Buddhas, are incomprehensible. "
B. If the future does not have any earlier or later division of time, how can one say, "Only duhkhe dharmajnanaksanti arises immediately
there is in the series of beings a
he would not be a "seer. "
and he knows future results
? after the laukika agradharmas, and not any other dharma" (vi. 27) and thus following until "Ksayajndna arises immediately after vajro- pamasamddhi (vi. 46c)? "
[The Vaibhasikas {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 51bl) answer:] If the arising of this dharma is bound to that dharma, then immediately after that, this arises, as a bud arises after the seed without any equal and immediately antecedent condition intervening.
iii. Why are the last mind and the last mental states of the Arhat equal and immediately antecedent conditions {Vibhasa, TD 27,50a22)?
Because no mind or mental states arise after them.
But you have said (i. 17) that the manas is the mind that is disappearing and which serves as the support of the following mind. Since no mind follows the last mind of an Arhat, this last mind should not receive either the name of manas, or the name of equal and immediately antecedent condition; and yet you consider it as being manas.
The case is not the same. That which constitutes the manas is not its activity, the fact of supporting the susequent mind; rather, it is the quality of being a support {dsraya) for this mind; whether his (latter mind) arises or does not arise is of little importance. The last mind of an Arhat is "support:" if a subsequent mind, which would be supported by this support, does not arise, it is through the lack of other causes necessary to its arising. On the contrary, what constitutes an equal and immediately antecedent condition is its activity. Once this condition has grasped or projected a result, nothing in the world can hinder this result from arising. Hence the last mind of an Arhat is justly called manas, but not an equal and immediately antecedent condition.
iv. Does a dharma which is cittasamanantara, that is, which has a certain mind {cittankantara) for its equal and immediate antecedent
432 condition, immediately follow this mind?
There are four alternatives:
1. The mind and the mental states of leaving of the two
absorptions free from mind (ii. 41), and all the moments of these two absorptions with the exception of the first, have the mind entering into absorption for their equal and immediately antecedent condition,
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but they do not immediately follow this mind (ii. 64b).
2. The characteristics (laksanas, ii. 45c) 1) of the first moment of
the two absorptions, and 2) of all minds and all mental states of a conscious state, immediately follow a mind, but do not have any equal and immediately antecedent condition.
3. The first moment of the two absorptions, and all minds and mental states of a conscious state, have the mind that they immediately follow for their equal and immediately antecedent condition.
4. The characteristics 1) of all the moments of the two absorptions with the exception of the first, and 2) of the mind and the mental states of leaving these two absorptions, have no equal and immediately antecedent condition, for they are dharmas disassociated from the mind {viprayukta, ii. 35); and they do not immediately follow a mind
###
What is an objea as condition?
62c. All dharmas are the objects of consciousness.
All the dharmas, conditioned as well as unconditioned, are "objects of consciousness" of the mind and its mental states, but not in- discriminately so. For example, the visual consciousness and the mental states, sensation, etc. , which are associated with it, have all visible things for their object; the hearing consciousness, sounds; the smelling consciousness, odors; and the touch consciousness, tangible things. The mental consciousness and the mental states that are associated with it have all the dharmas for their objects. (Karika 62c is then understood literally with respect to the manas).
When a dharma is the objea of a mind, it is not possible that this dharma, at any moment, is not the object of this mind. This means that even if a visible objea is not grasped as an object by the visual consciousness, it is an objea, for, whether it is grasped or not grasped as an object, its nature remains the same, as fuel is combustible, even when it is not on fire.
We can establish a threefold determination in considering the
? problem from the point of view of the mind that grasps a dharma as its object. The mind is determined 1) with regard to its ayatana: for example, a visual consciousness is supported only on a visible thing (rupa-ayatana)', 2) with regard to the dravya or substantial thing: a certain visual consciousness, the consciousness of blue, of red, etc. , is supported by blue, red, etc. (see i. 10); and 3) with regard to a moment (ksana): a certain visual consciousness is supported in a certain moment of blue.
Is the mind determined in the same way with regard to its support
(dsraya), that is, its organ, the organ of sight, etc. ? 433
The response is affirmative. However, in the present, the mind is bound to its support; but in the past and the future, it is separated from it.
According to others, it is bound to its support in both the past and
434 the present.
***
What is a predominating condition?
62d. The cause termed karana is called adhipati, predominant.
AdhipatipraSyayatd or predominating condition is karanahetu, the "reason for being'* cause (ii. 50a), for karanahetu is a "predominating condition" (adhipatipratyaya).
This name is justified from two points of view. The predominating condition is that which belongs to the greatest number of dharmas, and which is exercised with respect to the greatest number of dharmas.
1. All the dharmas are "an object as condition" of the mental consciousness. However the dharmas coexisting with a certain mind are not the object of this mind, whereas they are karanahetu of it. Thus the dharmas, without exception, are "predominating conditions" as karanahetu, not as "an object as condition. "
2. Every dharma has all dharmas for its karanahetu, with the exception of itself.
No dharma of any type is a condition of itself. And a conditioned
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dharma is not a condition of an unconditioned dharma, and vice versa. ***
In what state (avastha), past, present, or future, are the dharmas found with regard to which the diverse conditions exercise their activity?
Let us first examine cause as condition, that is, as five causes, with the exclusion of karar^ahetu.
63a-b. Two causes exercise their activity with regard to a
4 perishing dharma. ^
"Perishing" means "of the present. " A present dharma is called "perishing," "in the act of perishing," because, having arisen, it is turned towards its destruction.
Sahabhilhetu (ii. 50b) and samprayuktakahetu (53c) operate with regard to a present dharma, because they operate with regard to a
436
dharma that arises at the same time as they do.
63b-c. Three, with regard to an arising dharma.
"An arising dharma' means a future dharma, because a future dharma, not having arisen, is turned towards arising.
The three causes in question are sabhagahetu (ii. 52a), sarvatra- gahetu (54a), and vipakahetu (54c).
Concerning the other conditions:
63c-d. Two other conditions, in reverse order.
First in the list of conditions there comes the equal and immedi- ately antecedent condition: it exercises it activity as do the three causes, namely with regard to an arising dharma, for the minds and mental states of a given moment cede their place to the mind and mental states which are arising.
Next in the list there comes an object as condition: it exercises its activity as do the two causes, namely with regard to a perishing dharma: this perishing dharma is mind and mental states, the "subjects
? of the consciousness" (dlambaka), which, perishing,--that is, of the present,--grasp a present object.
The activity of predominent influence as a condition only consists in not creating any obstacle either to a past, present, or future dharma.
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The different types of dharmas arise by reason of how many conditions?
64a. The mind and its mental states arise by reason of four
437 conditions.
1. Causes as conditions: the five causes; 2. equal and immediately antecedent condition: the earlier mind and mental states, which have arisen not separated by other minds or mental states; 3. an object as condition: the five objects of which physical matter is the first, or, in the case of the mental consciousness, all the dharmas; and 4. a predominating influence as condition: all the dharmas, except the mind and its mental states whose arising is under consideration.
64b. The two absorptions, by reason of three.
One must exclude the object as condition, because the absorption of non-consciousness (ii. 42) and the absorption of extinction (ii. 43) do not grasp an object. We have: 1. causes as conditions: two causes, sahabhuhetu (the laksanas, arising, etc. ii. 45c, of the absorption), and sabhdgahetu (the good former dharmas, already arisen, belonging to the stage of absorption, that is, to the Fourth Dhyana or to Bhavagra, according to the case); 2. an equal and immediately antecedent condition, the mind of entry into the absorption and the mental states that are associated with this mind; the mind of entry is not separated by any mind of any of the moments of the absorption; and 3. the predominating influence as condition, as above.
These two absorptions arise from an application, from an inflec- tion of the mind: they then have the mind as an equal and immediately antecedent condition. They hinder the arising of the mind: thus they
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are not equal and immediately antecedent conditions of the mind leaving the absorption, even though they are immediately contigous to it (nirantara, see p. 301).
64c. The other dharmas, by reason of two.
The other dharmas, namely the other samskaras disassociated form the mind and the material dharmas, arise by reason of the causes as conditions and the predominating influence as condition (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 702b21).
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All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana,
438 or any other name.
How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.
64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a
439 succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.
1. If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.
[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later! "
If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.
a. [ The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.
? If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.
[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.
This would admit that samsdra does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).
b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.
This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later! " We do not see why the second desire, at first non- efficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.
What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?
[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction
(ptiti).
He is then not God, the Sovereign {Isvara), in what concerns his
own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world? Further, do you say that God finds satisfaction in seeing the creatures that he has created in the prey of all the sufferings of existence, including the tortures of the hells? Homage to this God! Well said, in truth, is the popular stanza, "He is called Rudra because he burns, because he is excited, ferocious, terrible,
440
an eater of flesh, blood, and marrow/'
3. The followers of God, the single cause of the world, deny visible
causes,--causes and conditions,--the efficacy of the seed with regard to the sprout, etc. If, modifying their position, they admit the existence of these causes, and pretend that these causes serve God as auxiliaries, this then is no more that a pious affirmation, for we do not maintain
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any activity of a cause besides the activity of the so-called secondary causes. Furthermore, God would not be sovereign with regard to auxiliary causes, since these cooperate in the production of the effect through their own efficacy. Perhaps, in order to avoid the negation of causes, which are visible, and in order to avoid the affirmation of present action by God, which is not visible, the Theist would say that the work of God is creation: but creation, dependent only on God, would never have a beginning, like God himself, and this is a consequence that the Theist rejects.
We would refute the doctrine of Purusa, of Pradhana, etc. , as we have refuted the theist doctrine, mutatis mutandis. Thus, no dharma arises from a single cause.
Alas, persons are unclear!
