J38 LETTERS ON A
REGICIDE
PEACE.
Edmund Burke
His father, with many excellent qualities.
had a short reign, -because, being a native Russian,
he was unfortunately advised to act in the spirit of
a foreigner. His mother reigned over Russia threeand-thirty years with the greatest glory, - because,
with the disadvantage of being a foreigner born, she
made herself a Russian. A wise prince like the present will improve his country; but it will be cautiously and progressively, upon its own native groundwork of religion, manners, habitudes, and alliances. If I
prognosticate right, it is not the Emperor of Russia
that ever will call for extravagant proofs of our desire to reconcile ourselves to the irreconcilable enemy
of all thrones.
I do -not know why I should not include America
among the European powers,- because she is of European origin, and has not yet, like France, destroyed
all traces of manners, laws, opinions, and usages
which she drew from Europe. As long as that Europe shall have any possessions either in the southern
or the northern parts of that America, even separated
as it is by the ocean, it must be considered as a part
of the European system. It is not America, menaced
with internal ruin from the attempts to plant Jacobinism instead of liberty in that country, - it is not
America, whose independence is directly attacked by
the French, the enemies of the independence of all
nations, that calls upon us to give security by disarming ourselves in a treacherous peace. By such
a peace, we shall deliver the Americans, their liberty, and their order, without resource, to the mercy
of their imperious allies, who will have peace or neu
? ? ? ? 424 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
trality with no state which is not ready to join her
in war against England.
Having run round the whole circle of the Euro.
pean system, wherever it acts, I must affirm that all
the foreign powers who are not leagued with France
for the utter destruction of all balance through Europe and throughout the world demand other assurances from this kingdom than are given in that Declaration. They require assurances, not of the
sincerity of our good dispositions towards the usurpation in France, but of our affection towards the
college of the ancient states of Europe, and pledges
of our constancy, our fidelity, and of our fortitude
in resisting to the last the power that menaces them
all. The apprehension from which they wish to be
delivered cannot be from anything they dread in
the ambition of England. Our power must be their
strength. They hope more from us than they fear.
I am sure the only ground of their hope, and of our
hope, is in the greatness of mind hitherto shown by
the people of this nation, and its adherence to the
unalterable principles of its ancient policy, whatever
government may finally prevail in France. I have
entered into this detail of the wishes and expectations of the European powers, in order to point out
more clearly not so much what their disposition as
(a consideration of far greater importance) what
their situation demands, according as that situation
is related to the Regicide Republic and to this kingdom.
Then, if it is not to satisfy the foreign powers we
make this assurance, to what power at home is it
that we pay all this humiliating court? Not to the
old Whigs or to the ancient Tories of this kingdom,
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 425
-if any memory of such ancient divisions still exists amongst us. To which of the principles of these parties is this assurance agreeable? Is it to the
Whigs we are to recommend the aggrandizement of
France, and the subversion of the balance of power? Is it to the Tories we are to recommend our eagerness to cement ourselves with the enemies of
royalty and religion? But if these parties, which
by their dissensions have so often distracted the kingdom, which by their union have once saved it, and which by their collision and mutual resistance have
preserved the variety of this Constitution in its unity, be (as I believe they are) nearly extinct by the growth of new ones, which have their roots in the
present circumstances of the times, I wish to know
to which of these new descriptions this Declaration
is addressed. It can hardly be to those persons who,
in the new distribution of parties, consider the conservation in England of the ancient order of things
as necessary to preserve order everywhere else, and
who regard the general conservation of order in other
countries as reciprocally necessary to preserve the
same state of things in these islands. That party
never can wish to see Great Britain pledge herself
to give the lead and the ground of advantage and
superiority to the France of to-day, in any treaty
which is to settle Europe. I insist upon it, that, so
far from expecting such an engagement, they are
generally stupefied and confounded with it. That
the other party, which demands great changes here,
and is so pleased to see them everywhere else, which
party I call Jacobin, that this faction does, from the
bottom of its heart, approve the Declaration, and does
erect its crest upon the engagement, there can be
? ? ? ? 426 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
little doubt. To them it may be addressed with propriety, for it answers their purposes in every point. The party in opposition within the House of Lords
and Commons it is irreverent, and half a breach of
privilege, (far from my thoughts,) to consider as
Jacobin. This party has always denied the existence
of such a faction, and has treated the machinations
of those whom you and I call Jacobins as so many
forgeries and fictions of the minister and his adherents, to find a pretext for destroying freedom and setting up an arbitrary power in this kingdom. However, whether this minority has a leaning towards the French system or only a charitable toleration of those
who lean that way, it is certain that they have always attacked the sincerity of the minister in the
same modes, and on the very same grounds, and
nearly in the same terms, with the Directory. It
must therefore be at the tribunal of the minority
(from the whole tenor of the speech) that the minister appeared to consider himself obliged to purge himself of duplicity. It was at their bar that he
held up his hand; it was on their sellette that he
seemed to answer interrogatories; it was on their
principles that he defended his whole conduct. They
certainly take what the French call the haut du pave.
They have loudly called for the negotiation. It was
accorded to them. They engaged their support of
the war with vigor, in case peace was not granted
on honorable terms. Peace was not granted on any
terms, honorable or shamefill. Whether these judges,
few in number, but powerful in jurisdiction, are satisfied, -whether they to whom this new pledge is hypothecated have redeemed their own, - whether
they have given one particle more of their support
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 427
to ministry, or even favored them wvith their good
opinion or their candid construction, I leave it to
those who recollect that memorable debate to determine.
The fact is, that neither this Declaration, nor the
negotiation which is its subject, could serve any one
good purpose, foreign or domestic; it could conduce
to no end, either with regard to allies or neutrals.
It tends neither to bring back the misled, nor to
give courage to the fearful, nor to animate and confirm those who are hearty and zealous in the cause.
I hear it has been said (though I can scarcely
believe it) by a distinguished person, in an assembly
where, if there be less of the torrent and tempest
of eloquence, more guarded expression is to be expected, that, indeed, there was no just ground of
hope in this business from the beginning.
It is plain that this noble person, however conversant in negotiation, having been employed in no less
than four embassies, and in two hemispheres, and in
one of those negotiations having fully experienced
what it was to proceed to treaty without previous
encouragement, was not'at all consulted in this experiment. For his Majesty's principal minister declared, on the very same day, in another House, " his Majesty's deep and sincere regret at its unfortunate
and abrupt termination, so different from the wishes
and hopes that were entertained," -- and in other
parts of the speech speaks of this abrupt termination
as a great disappointment, and as a fall from sincere
endeavors and sanguine expectation. Here are, indeed, sentiments diametrically opposite, as to the
hopes with which the negotiation was commenced
and carried on; and what is curious is, the grounds
? ? ? ? 428 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
of the hopes on the one side and the despair on the
other are exactly the same. The logical conclusion
from the common premises is, indeed, in favor of the
noble lord; for they are agreed that the enemy was
far from giving the least degree of countenance to
any such hopes, and that they proceeded in spite of
every discouragement which the enemy had thrown
in their way. But there is another material point
in which they do not seem to differ: that is to say,
the result of the desperate experiment of the noble
lord, and of the promising attempt of the great minister, in satisfying the people of England, and in causing discontent to the people of France, - or, as
the minister expresses it, "in uniting England and
in dividing France. "
For my own part, though I perfectly agreed with
the noble lord that the attempt was desperate, so
desperate, indeed, as to deserve his name of an experiment, yet no fair man can possibly doubt that the minister was perfectly sincere in his proceeding, and
that, from his ardent wishes for peace with the Regicides, he was led to conceive hopes which were founded rather in his vehement desires than in any
rational ground of political speculation. Convinced
as I am of this, it had been better, in my humble
opinion, that persons of great name and authority
had abstained from those topics which had been used
to call the minister's sincerity into doubt, and had
not adopted the sentiments of the Directory upon the
subject of all our negotiations: for the noble lord
expressly says that the experiment was made for the
satisfaction of the country. The Directory says exactly the same thing. Uponl granting, in colnsequence of our supplications,:! . 'port to Lord Ma) les
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 429
bury, in order to remove all sort of hope from its
success, they charged all our previous steps, even to
that moment of submissive demand to be admitted to
their presence, on duplicity and perfidy, and assumed
that the object of all the steps we had taken was that
"of justifying the continuance of the war in the eyes
of the English nation, and of throwing all the odium of it upon the French. " " The English nation "
(said they) "supports impatiently the continuance
of the war, and a reply must be made to its complaints
and its reproaches; the Parliament is about to be
opened, and the mouths of the orators who will declaim
against the war must be shut; the demands for new
taxes must be justified; and to obtain these results, it is
necessary to be able to advance that the French government refuses every reasonable proposition for peace. " I am sorry that the language of the friends to ministry
and the enemies to mankind should be so much in
unison.
As to the fact in which these parties are so well
agreed, that the experiment ought to have been made
for the satisfaction of this country, (meaning the
country of England,) it were well to be wished that
persons of eminence would cease to make themselves
representatives of the people of England, without a
letter of attorney, or any other act of procuration.
In legal construction, the sense of the people of England is to be collected from the House of Commons;
and though I do not deny the possibility of an abuse
of this trust as well as any other, yet I think, without the most weighty reasons and in the most urgent exigencies, it is highly dangerous to suppose that
the House speaks anything contrary to the sense
of the people, or that the representative is silent.
? ? ? ? 430 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
when the sense of the constituent, strongly, decidedly, and upon long deliberation, speaks audibly upon any topic of moment. If there is a doubt
whether the House of Commons represents perfectly
the whole commons of Great Britain, (I think there
is none,) there can be no question but that the Lords
and the Commons together represent the sense of the
whole people to the crown and to the world. Thus
it is, when we speak legally and constitutionally. In
a great measure it is equally true, when we speak
prudentially. But I do not pretend to assert that
there are no other principles to guide discretion than
those which are or can be fixed by some law or some
constitution: yet before the legally presumed sense
of the people should be superseded by a supposition
of one more real, (as in all cases where a legal presumption is to be ascertained,) some strong proofs ought to exist of a contrary disposition in the people
at large, and some decisive indications of their desire upon this subject. There can be no question,
that, previously to a direct message from the crown,
neither House of Parliament did indicate anything
like a wish for such advances as we have made or
such negotiations as we have carried on. The Parliament has assented to ministry; it is not ministry that has obeyed the impulse of Parliament. The people at large have their organs through which they
can speak to Parliament and to the crown by a
respectful petition, and though not with absolute
authority, yet with weight, they can instruct their
representatives. The fieeholders and other electors
in this kingdom have another and a surer mode of
expressing their sentiments concerning the conduct
which is held by members of Parliament. In the
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 431
middle of these transactions this last opportunity has
been held out to them. In all these points of view I
positively assert that the people have nowhere and in
no way expressed their wish of throwing themselves
and their sovereign at the feet of a wicked and rancorous foe, to supplicate mercy, which, from the
nature of that foe, and from the circumstances of
affairs, we had no sort of ground to expect. It is
undoubtedly the business of ministers very much to
consult the inclinations of the people, but they ought
to take great care that they do not receive that inclination from the few persons who may happen to approach them. The petty interests of such gentlemen, their low conceptions of things, their fears arising
from the danger to which the very arduous and
critical situation of public affairs may expose their
places, their apprehensions from the hazards to which
the discontents of a few popular men at elections may
expose their seats in Parliament, - all these causes
trouble and confuse the representations which they
make to ministers of the real temper of the nation.
If ministers, instead of following the great indications
of the Constitution, proceed on such reports, they
will take the whispers of a cabal for the voice of the
people, and the counsels of imprudent timidity for
the wisdom of a nation.
I well remember, that, when the fortune of the war
began (and it began pretty early) to turn, as it is
common and natural, we were dejected by the losses
that had been sustained, and with the doubtful issue
of the contests that were foreseen. But not a word
was uttered that supposed peace upon ally proper
terms was in our power, or therefore that it should
be in our desire. As usual, with or without reason,
? ? ? ? 432 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
we criticized the conduct of the war, and compared
our fortunes with our measures. The mass of the
nation went no further. For I suppose that you always understood me as speaking of that very preponderating part of the nation which had always been equally adverse to the French principles and to the
general progress of their Revolution throughout Europe, - considering the final success of their arms
and the triumph of their principles as one and the
same thing.
The first means that were used, by any one professing our principles, to change the minds of this party
upon that subject, appeared in a small pamphlet circulated with considerable industry. It was commonly given to the noble person himself who has passed judgment upon all hopes from negotiation, and justified our late abortive attempt only as an experiment
made to satisfy the country; and yet that pamphlet
led the way in endeavoring to dissatisfy that very
country with the continuance of the war, and to raise
in the people the most sanguine expectations from
some such course of negotiation as has been fatally
pursued. This leads me to suppose (and I am glad
to have reason for supposing) that there was no foundation for attributing the performance in question to
that author; but without mentioning his name in the
title-page, it passed for his, and does still pass uncontradicted. It was entitled, " Some Remarks on the
Apparent Circumstances of the War in the Fourth
Week of October, 1795. "
This sanguine little king's-fisher, (not prescient of
the storm, as by his instinct he. ought to be,) appearing at that uncertain season before the rigs of old
Michaelmas were yet well composed, and when the
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 433
inclement storms of winter were approaching, began
to flicker over the seas, and was busy in building its
halcyon nest, as if the angry ocean had been soothed
by the genial breath of May. Very unfortunately,
this auspice was instantly followed by a speech from
the throne in the very spirit and principles of that
pamphlet.
I say nothing of the newspapers, which are undoubtedly in the interest, and which are supposed by some to be directly or indirectly under the influence
of ministers, and which, with less authority than the
pamphlet I speak of, had indeed for some time before:
held a similar language, in direct contradiction to,
their more early tone: insomuch that I can speak it
with a certain assurance, that very many, who wished
to administration as well as you and I do, thought,
that, in giving their opinion in favor of this peace,
they followed the opinion of ministry; --they were
conscious that they did not lead it. My infdrence,
therefore, is this: that the negotiation, whatever its
merits may be, in the general principle and policy of
undertaking it, is, what every political measure in
general ought to be, the sole work of administration;
and that, if it was an experiment to satisfy anybody,
it was to satisfy those whom the ministers were in the
daily habit of condemning, and by whom they were
daily condemned, - I mean the leaders of the opposition in Parliament. I am certain that the ministers were then, and are now, invested with the fullest confidence of the major part of the nation, to pursue such measures of peace or war as the nature of things
shall suggest as most adapted to the public safety.
It is in this light, therefore, as a measure which
ought to have been avoided and ought not to be reVOL. V. 28
? ? ? ? 434 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
peated, that I tale the liberty of discussing the merits of this system of Regicide negotiations. It is not
a matter of light experiment, that leaves us where it
found us. Peace or war are the great hinges upon
which the very being of nations turns. Negotiations
are the means of making peace or preventing war, and
are therefore of more serious importance than almost
any single event of war can possibly be.
At the very outset, I do not hesitate to affirm, that
this country in particular, and the public law in general, have suffered more by this negotiation of experiment than by all the battles together that we have lost from the commencement of this century to this
time, when it touches so nearly to its close. I therefore have the misfortune not to coincide in opinion
with the great statesman who set on foot a negotiation, as he said, " in spite of the constant opposition
he had met with from France. " He admits, "that
the difficulty in this negotiation became most seriously increased, indeed, by the situation in which we
were placed, and the manner in which alone the enemy would admit of a negotiation. " This situation
so described, and so truly described, rendered our sclicitation not only degrading, but from the very outset evidently hopeless.
I find it asserted, and even a merit taken for it,
"that this country surmounted every difficulty of
form and etiquette which the enemy had thrown in
our way. " An odd way of surmounting a difficulty,
by cowering under it! I find it asserted that an
heroic resolution had been taken, and avowed in Parliament, previous to this negotiation, " that no consideration of etiquette should stand in the way of it. " Etiquette, if I understand rightly the term, which
? ? ? ? LETTERt IIn. 435
in any extent is of modern usage, had its original
application to those ceremonial and formal observances practised at courts, which had been established by long usage, in order to preserve the sovereign
power from the rude intrusion of licentious familiarity, as well as to preserve majesty itself from a disposition to consult its ease at the expense of its
dignity. The term came afterwards to have a greater
latitude, and to be employed to signify certain formal
methods used in the transactions between sovereign
states.
In the more limited, as well as in the larger sense
of the term, without knowing what the etiquette is, it
is impossible to determine whether it is a vain and
captious punctilio, or a form necessary to preserve
decorum in character and order in business. I readily admit that nothing tends to facilitate the issue of all public transactions more than a mutual disposition
in the parties treating to waive all ceremony. But
the use of this temporary suspension of the recognized modes of respect consists in its being mutual, and in the spirit of conciliation in which all ceremony
is laid aside. On the contrary, when one of the parties to a treaty intrenches himself up to the chin in these ceremonies, and will not on his side abate a single punctilio, and that all the concessions are uponl one side only, the party so conceding does by this act
place himself in a relation of inferiority, and thereby
fundamentally subverts that equality which is of the
very essence of all treaty.
After this formal act of degradation, it was'but a
matter of course that gross insult should be offered
to our ambassador, and that lie should tamely submit
to it. He found himself provoked to complain of the
? ? ? ? 436 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE r~ACE.
atrocious libels against his public character and his
person which appeared in a paper under the avowed
patronage of that government. The Regicide Directory, on this complaint, did not recognize the paper: and that was all. They did not punish, they did not
dismiss, they did not even reprimand the writer.
As to our ambassador, this total want of reparation
for the injury was passed by under the pretence of
despising it.
In this but too serious business, it is not possible
here to avoid a smile. Contempt is not a thing to
be despised. It may be borne with a calm and equal
mind, but no man by lifting his head high can pretend that he does not perceive the scorns that are poured down upon him from above. All these sudden complaints of injury, and all these deliberate submissions to it, are the inevitable consequences
of the situation in which we had placed ourselves: a
situation wherein the insults were such as Nature
would not enable us to bear, and circumstances
would not permit us to resent.
It was not long, however, after this contempt of
contempt upon the part of our ambassador, (who by
the way represented his sovereign,) that a new object
was furnished for displaying sentiments of the same
kind, though the case was infinitely aggravated. Not
the ambassador, but the king himself, was libelled
and insulted, -libelled, not by a creature of the
Directory, but by the Directory itself. At least, so
Lord Malmesbury understood it, and so he answered
it in his note of the 12th November, 1796, in which
he says, -" With regard to the offensive and injurious
insinuations which are contained in that paper, and
which are only calculated to throw new obstacles in
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 437
the way of the accommodation which the French
government professes to desire, THE KING HAS
DEEMED IT FAR BENEATH HIS DIGNITY to
permit an answer to be made to them on his part,
in any manner whatsoever. "
I am of opinion, that, if his Majesty had kept aloof
from that wash and offscouring of everything that is
low and barbarous in the world, it might be well
thought unworthy of his dignity to take notice of
such scurrilities: they must be considered as much
the natural expression of that kind of animal as it is
the expression of the feelings of a dog to bark. But
when the king had been advised to recognize not only the monstrous composition as a sovereign power, but, in conduct, to admit something in it like a superiority, - when the bench of Regicide was made at
least coordinate with his throne, and raised upon a
platform full as elevated, this treatment could not be
passed by under the appearance of despising it. It
would not, indeed, have been proper to keep up a war
of the same kind; but an immediate, manly, and decided resentment ought to have been the consequence. We ought not to have waited for the disgraceful dismissal of our ambassador. There are cases in which
we may pretend to sleep; but the wittol rule has some
sense in it, Non omnibus dormio. We might, however,
have seemed ignorant of the affront; but what was
the fact? Did we dissemble or pass it by in silence?
When dignity is talked of, a language which I did not
expect to hear in such a transaction, I must say, what
all the world must feel, that it was not for the king's
dignity to notice this insult and not to resent it.
This mode of proceeding is formed on new ideas of
the correspondence between sovereign powers.
? ? ? ?
J38 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
This was far from the only ill effect of the policy
of degradation. The state of inferiority in which we
were placed, in this vain attempt at treaty, drove us
headlong from error into error, and led. us to wander
far away, not only from all the paths which have
been beaten in the old course of political communication between mankind, but out of the ways even
of the most common prudence. Against all rules,
after we had met nothing but rebuffs in return to.
all our proposals, we made two confidential communications to those in whom we had no confidence and
who reposed no confidence in us. What was worse,
we were fully aware of the madness of the step we
were taking. Ambassadors are not sent to a hostile
power, persevering in sentiments of hostility, to make
candid, confidential, and amicable communications.
Hitherto the world has considered it as the duty
of an ambassador ill such a situation to be cautious,
guarded, dexterous, and circumspect. It is true
that mutual confidence and common interest dispense with all rules, smooth the rugged way, remove every obstacle, and make all things plain and level. When, ill the last century, Temple and De
Witt negotiated the famous Triple Alliance, their
candor, their freedom, and the most confidential disclosures were the result of true policy. Accordingly,
in spite of all the dilatory forms of the complex government of the United Provinces, the treaty was
concluded in three days. It did not take a much
longer time to bring the same state (that of Holland) through a still more complicated transaction,
-that of the Grand Alliance. But in the present
case, this unparalleled candor, this unpardonable
want of reserve, produced, what might have been
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 439
expected from it, the most serious evils. It instructed the enemy in the whole plan of our demands and concessions. It made the most fatal discoveries.
And first,. it induced us to lay down the basis of
a treaty which itself had nothing to rest upon. It
seems, we thought we had gained a great point in
getting this basis admitted, - that is, a basis of mutual compensation and exchange of conquests. If a disposition to peace, and with any reasonable assurance, had been previously indicated, such a plan of arrangement might with propriety and safety be
proposed; because these arrangements were not, ill
effect, to make the basis, but a part of the superstructure, of the fabric of pacification. The order of things would thus be reversed. The mutual disposition to peace would form the reasonable base, upon which the scheme of compensation upon one side or
the other might be constructed. This truly fundamental base being once laid, all differences arising from the spirit of huckstering and barter might be
easily adjusted. If the restoration of peace, with a
view to the establishment of a fair balance of power
in Europe, had been made the real basis of the treaty,
the reciprocal value of the compensations could not
be estimated according to their proportion to each
other, but according to their proportionate relation to
that end: to that great end the whole would be sub
servient. The effect of the treaty would be in a
manner secured before the detail of particulars was
begun, and for a plain reason, -because the hostile
spirit on both sides had been conjured down; but if,
in the full fury and unappeased rancor of war, a little traffic is attempted, it is easy to divine what must be the consequence to those who endeavor to open
that kind of petty commerce.
? ? ? ? 440 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
To illustrate what I have said, I go back nlo further
than to the two last Treaties of Paris, and to the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which preceded the first of
these two Treaties of Paris by about fourteen or fifteen years. I do not mean here to criticize any of them. My opinions upon some particulars of the
Treaty of Paris in 1763 are published in a pamphlet *
which your recollection will readily bring into your
view. I recur to them only to show that their basis
had not been, and never could have been, a mere
dealing of truck and barter, but that the parties being
willing, fiom common fatigue or common suffering,
to put an end to a war the first object of which had
either been obtained or despaired of, the lesser objects
were not thought worth the price of further contest.
The parties understanding one another, so much was
given away without considering from whose budget it
came, not as the value of the objects, but as the value
of peace to the parties might require.
At the last Treaty of Paris, the subjugation of
America being despaired of on the part of Great
Britain, and the independence of America being
looked upon as secure on the part of France, the
main cause of the war was removed; and then the
conquests which France had made upon us (for we
had made none of importance upon her) were surrendered with sufficient facility. Peace was restored as peace. In America the parties stood as they were
possessed. A limit was to be settled, but settled as a
limit to secure that peace, and not at all on a system
of equivalents, for which, as we then stood with the
United States, there were little or no materials.
At the preceding Treaty of Paris, I mean that of
* Observations on a Late State of the Nation.
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 441
1763, there was nothing at all on which to fix a basis
of compensation from reciprocal cession of conquests.
They were all on one side. The question with us
was not what we were to receive, and on what consideration, but what we were to keep for indemnity or to cede for peace. Accordingly, no place being
left for barter, sacrifices were made on our side to
peace; and we surrendered to the French their most
valuable possessions in the West Indies without any
equivalent. The rest of Europe fell soon after into
its ancient order; and the German war ended exactly where it had begun.
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was built upon a
similar basis. All the conquests in Europe had been
made by France. She had subdued the Austrian
Netherlands, and broken open the gates of Holland.
We had taken nothing in the West Indies; and Cape
Breton was a trifling business indeed. France gave
up all for peace. The Allies had given up all that
was ceded at Utrecht. Louis the Fourteenth made
all, or nearly all, the cessions at Ryswick, and at
Nimeguen. In all those treaties, and in all the preceding, as well as in the others which intervened, the question never had been that of barter. The balance
of power had been ever assumed as the known common law of Europe at all times and by all powers: the question had only been (as it must happen) on
the more or less inclination of that balance.
This general balance was regarded in four principal points of view: the GREAT MIDDLE BALANCE, which comprehended Great Britain, France, and Spain; the
BALANCE OF THE NORTH; the BALANCE, external and
internal, of GERMANY; and the BALANCE OF ITALY.
In all those systems of balance, England was the
? ? ? ? 442 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
power to whose custody it was thought it might be
most safely committed.
France, as she happened to stand, secured the balance or endangered it. Without question, she had been long the security for the balance of Germany,
and, under her auspices, the system, if not formed,
had been at least perfected. She was so in some
measure with regard to Italy, more than occasionally. She had a clear interest in the balance of the North, and had endeavored to preserve it. But when
we began to treat with the present France, or, more
properly, to prostrate ourselves to her, and to try if
we should be admitted to ransom our allies upon a
system of mutual concession and compensation, we
had not one of the usual facilities. For, first, we had
not the smallest indication of a desire for peace on
the part of the enemy, but rather the direct contrary.
Men do not make sacrifices to obtain what they do
not desire: and as for the balance of power, it was
so far from being admitted by France, either on the
general system, or with regard to the particular systems that I have mentioned, that, in the whole body of their authorized or encouraged reports and discussions upon the theory of tile diplomatic system, they constantly rejected the very idea of the balance of
power, and treated it as the true cause of all the
wars and calamities that had afflicted Europe; and
their practice was correspondent to the dogmatic
positions they had laid down. The Empire and
the Papacy it was their great object to destroy;
and this, now openly avowed and steadfastly acted
upon, might have been discerned with very little
acuteness of sight, from the very first dawnings of
the Revolution, to be the main drift of their policy:
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 443
for they professed a resolution to destroy everything
which can hold states together by the tie of opinion.
Exploding, therefore, all sorts of balances, they
avow their design to erect themselves into a new
description of empire, which is not grounded on any
balance, but forms a sort of impious hierarchy, of
which France is tb be the head and the guardian.
The law of this their empire is anything rather than
the public law of Europe, the ancient conventions
of its several states, or the ancient opinions which
assign to them superiority or preeminence of any
sort, or any other kind of connection in virtue of
ancient relations. They permit, and that is all, the
temporary existence of some of the old communities:
but whilst they give to these tolerated states this
temporary respite, in order to secure them in a condition of real dependence on themselves, they invest them on every side by a body of republics, formed
on the model, and dependent ostensibly, as well as
substantially, on the will of the mother republic to
which they owe their origin. These are to be so many garrisons to check and control the states which are to be permitted to remain on the old model until
they are ripe for a change. It is in this manner that
France, on her new system, means to form an universal empire, by producing an universal revolution. By this means, forming a new code of communities
according to what she calls the natural rights of mail
and of states, she pretends to secure eternal peace to
the world, guarantied by her generosity and justice,
which are to grow with the extent of her power. To
talk of the balance of power to the governors of such
a country was a jargon which they could not understand even through an interpreter. Before men can
? ? ? ? 444 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
transact any affair, they must have a common language to speak, and some common, recognized principles on which they can argue; otherwise all is
cross purpose and confusion. It was, therefore, an
essential preliminary to the whole proceeding, to fix
whether the balance of power, the liberties and laws
of the Empire, and the treaties of different belligerent
powers in past times, when they put an end to hostilities, were to be considered as the basis of the present
negotiation.
The whole of the enemy's plan was known when
Lord Malmesbury was sent with his scrap of equivalents to Paris. Yet, in this unfortunate attempt at
negotiation, instead of fixing these points, and assuming the balance of power and the peace of Europe as the basis to which all cessions on all sides
were to be subservient, our solicitor for peace was
directed to reverse that order. He was directed to
make mutual concessions, on a mere comparison of
their marketable value, the base of treaty. The balance of power was to be thrown in as an inducement, and a sort of make-weight to supply the manifest deficiency, which must stare him and the world in the face, between those objects which he was to
require the enemy to surrender and those which he
had to offer as a fair equivalent.
To give any force to this inducement, and to
make it answer even the secondary purpose of equalizing equivalents having in themselves no natural
proportionate value, it supposed that the enemy, coI1trary to the most notorious fact, did admit this balance of power to be of some value, great or small;
whereas it is plain, that, in the enemy's estimate of
things, the consideration of the balance of power, as
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 4t45
we have said before, was so far from going in diminution of the value of what the Directory was desired to surrender, or of giving an additional price to our objects offered in exchange, that the hope of
the utter destruction of that balance became a new
motive to the junto of Regicides for preserving, as a
means for realizing that hope, what we wished them
to abandon.
Thus stood the basis of the treaty, on laying the
first stone of the foundation. At the very best, upon
our side, the question stood upon a mere naked bargain and sale. Unthinking people here triumphed,
when they thought they had obtained it; whereas,
when obtained as a basis of a treaty, it was just the
worst we could possibly have chosen. As to our offer
to cede a most unprofitable, and, indeed, beggarly,
chargeable counting-house or two in the East Indies,
we ought not to presume that they would consider
this as anything else than a mockery. As to anything of real value, we had nothing under heaven to
offer, (for which we were not ourselves in a very
dubious struggle,) except the island of Martinico only. When this object was to be weighed against
the Directorial conquests, merely as an object of a
value at market, the principle of barter became
perfectly ridiculous: a single quarter in the single
city of Amsterdam was worth ten Martinicos, and
would have sold for many more years' purchase in
any market overt in Europe. How was this gross
and glaring defect in the objects of exchange to be
supplied? It was to be made up by argument. And
what was that argument? The extreme utility of
possessions in the West Indies to the augmentation
of the naval power of France. A very curious topic
? ? ? ? 446 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
of argument to be proposed and insisted on by an
ambassador of Great Britain! It is directly and
plainly this:-" Come, we know that of all things
you wish a naval power, and it is natural you should,
who wish to destroy the very sources of the British
greatness, to overpower our marine, to destroy our
commerce, to eradicate our foreign influence, and to
lay us open to an invasion, which at one stroke may
complete our servitude and ruin and expunge us
from among the nations of the earth. Here I have
it in my budget, the infallible arcanum for that purpose. You are but novices in the art of naval resources. Let you have the West Indies back, and
your maritime preponderance is secured, for which
you would do well to be moderate in your demands
upon the Austrian Netherlands. "
Under any circumstances, this is a most extraordinary topic of argument; but it is rendered by
much the more unaccountable, when we are told,
that, if the war has been diverted from the great
object of establishing society and good order in Europe by destroying the usurpation in France, this diversion was made to increase the naval resources and power of Great Britain, and to lower, if not annihilate, those of the marine of France. I leave all this
to the very serious reflection of every Englishman.
This basis was no sooner admitted than the rejection of a treaty upon that sole foundation was a thing
of course. The enemy did not think it worthy of a
discussion, as in truth it was not; and immediately,
as usual, they began, in the most opprobrious and
most insolent manner, to question our sincerity and
good faith: whereas, in truth, there was no one symptom wanting of openness and fair dealing. What
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 447
could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all
that you wished to obtain, and the price you meant
to pay for it, and to desire him to imitate your ilgenuous proceeding, and in the same manner to open his
honest heart to you? Here was no want of fair dealing, but there was too evidently a fault of another
kind: there was much weakness, -there was an eager and impotent desire of associating with this unsocial power, and of attempting the connection by any means. however manifestly feeble and ineffectual.
The event was committed to chance, --that is, to
such a manifestation of tile desire of France for peace
as would induce the Directory to forget the advantages they had in the system of barter. Accordingly,
the general desire for such a peace was triumphantly reported from the moment that Lord Malmesbury
had set his foot on shore at Calais.
It has been said that the Directory was compelled
against its will to accept the basis of barter (as if that
had tended to accelerate the work of pacification! )
by the voice of all France. Had this been the case,
the Directors would have continued to listen to that
voice to which it seems they were so obedient: they
would have proceeded with the negotiation upon that
basis. But the fact is, that they instantly broke up
the negotiation, as soon as they had obliged our ambassador to violate all the principles of treaty, and
weakly, rashly, and unguardedly to expose, without
any counter proposition, the whole of our project
with regard to ourselves and our allies, and without
holding out the smallest hope that they would admit
the smallest part of our pretensions.
When they had thus drawn from us all that they
could draw out, they expelled Lord Malmesbury, and
? ? ? ? 448 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
they appealed, for the propriety of their conduct, to
that very France which we thought proper to suppose
had driven them to this fine concession: and I do not
find that in either division of the family of thieves,
the younger branch, or the elder, or in any other
body whatsoever, there was any indignation excited,
or any tumult raised, or anything like the virulence
of opposition which was shown to the king's ministers
here, on account of that transaction.
Notwithstanding all this, it seems a hope is still entertained that the Directory will have that tenderness
for the carcass of their country, by whose very distemper, and on whose festering wounds, like vermin,
they are fed, that these pious patriots will of themselves come into a more moderate and reasonable way
of thinking and acting. In the name of wonder,
what has inspired our ministry with this hope any
more than with their former expectations?
Do these hopes only arise from continual disappointment? Do they grow out of the usual grounds
of despair? What is there to encourage them, in the
conduct or even in the declarations of the ruling powers in France, from the first formation of their mischievous republic to the hour in which I write? Is not the Directory composed of the same junto? . Are
they not the identical men who, from the base and
sordid vices which belonged to their original place
and situation, aspired to the dignity of crimes, - and
from the dirtiest, lowest, most fraudulent, and most
knavish of chicaners, ascended in the scale of robbery,
sacrilege, and assassination in all its forms, till at last
they had imbrued their impious hands in the blood
of their sovereign? Is it from these men that we are
to hope for this paternal tenderness to their country,
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 449
and this sacred regard for the peace and happiness of
all nations?
But it seems there is still another lurking hope,
akin to that which duped us so egregiously before,
when our delightful basis was accepted: we still
flatter ourselves that the public voice of France will
compel this Directory to more moderation. Whence
does this hope arise? What public voice is there ill
France? There are, indeed, some writers, who, since
this monster of a Directory has obtained a great, regular, military force to guard them, are indulged in a
sufficient liberty of writing; and some of them write
well, undoubtedly. But the world knows that int
France there is no public, -that the country is&
composed but of two descriptions, audacious tyrants.
and trembling slaves. The contests between the tyrants is the only vital principle that can be discerned
in France. The only thing which there appears like
spirit is amongst their late associates, and fastest
friends of the Directory, - the more furious and
untamable part of the Jacobins. This discontented
member of the faction does almost balance the reigning divisions, and it threatens every moment to predominate. For the present, however, the dread of their fury forms some sort of security to their fellows,
who now exercise' a more regular and therefore a
somewhat less ferocious tyranny. Most of the slaves
choose a quiet, however reluctant, submission to those
who. are somewhat satiated with blood, and who, like
wolves, are a little more tame from being a little less
hungry, in preference to an irruption of the famished
devourers who are prowling and howling about the
fold.
This circumstance assures some degree of perma --
VOL. V. 29
? ? ? ? 450 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEAtE.
nence to the power of those whom we know to be
permanently our rancorous and implacable enemies.
But to those very enemies who have sworn our destruction we have ourselves given a further and far
better security, by rendering the cause of the royalists desperate. Those brave and virtuous, but unfortunate adherents to the ancient Constitution of their country, after the miserable slaughters which
have been made in that body, after all their losses
by emigration, are still numerous, but unable to exert themselves against the force of the usurpation
evidently countenanced and upheld by those very
princes who had called them to arm for the support
of the legal monarchy. Where, then, after chasing
these fleeting hopes of ours from point to point of the
political horizon; are they at last really found? Not
where, under Providence, the hopes of Englishmen
used to be placed, in our own courage and in our
own virtues, but in the moderation and virtue' of the
most atrocious monsters that have ever disgraced
and plagued mankind.
The only excuse to be made for all our mendicant diplomacy is the same as in the case of all
other mendicancy, namely, that it has been founded
on absolute necessity. This deserves consideration.
Necessity, as it has no law, so it has no shame. But
moral necessity is not like metaphysical, or even
physical. In that category it is a word of loose signification, and conveys different ideas to different minds.
To the low-minded, the slightest necessity becomes
an invincible necessity. "The slothful man saith,
There is a lion in the way, and I shall be devoured in
the streets. " But when the necessity pleaded is not
in the nature of things, but in the vices of him who
? ? ? ?
had a short reign, -because, being a native Russian,
he was unfortunately advised to act in the spirit of
a foreigner. His mother reigned over Russia threeand-thirty years with the greatest glory, - because,
with the disadvantage of being a foreigner born, she
made herself a Russian. A wise prince like the present will improve his country; but it will be cautiously and progressively, upon its own native groundwork of religion, manners, habitudes, and alliances. If I
prognosticate right, it is not the Emperor of Russia
that ever will call for extravagant proofs of our desire to reconcile ourselves to the irreconcilable enemy
of all thrones.
I do -not know why I should not include America
among the European powers,- because she is of European origin, and has not yet, like France, destroyed
all traces of manners, laws, opinions, and usages
which she drew from Europe. As long as that Europe shall have any possessions either in the southern
or the northern parts of that America, even separated
as it is by the ocean, it must be considered as a part
of the European system. It is not America, menaced
with internal ruin from the attempts to plant Jacobinism instead of liberty in that country, - it is not
America, whose independence is directly attacked by
the French, the enemies of the independence of all
nations, that calls upon us to give security by disarming ourselves in a treacherous peace. By such
a peace, we shall deliver the Americans, their liberty, and their order, without resource, to the mercy
of their imperious allies, who will have peace or neu
? ? ? ? 424 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
trality with no state which is not ready to join her
in war against England.
Having run round the whole circle of the Euro.
pean system, wherever it acts, I must affirm that all
the foreign powers who are not leagued with France
for the utter destruction of all balance through Europe and throughout the world demand other assurances from this kingdom than are given in that Declaration. They require assurances, not of the
sincerity of our good dispositions towards the usurpation in France, but of our affection towards the
college of the ancient states of Europe, and pledges
of our constancy, our fidelity, and of our fortitude
in resisting to the last the power that menaces them
all. The apprehension from which they wish to be
delivered cannot be from anything they dread in
the ambition of England. Our power must be their
strength. They hope more from us than they fear.
I am sure the only ground of their hope, and of our
hope, is in the greatness of mind hitherto shown by
the people of this nation, and its adherence to the
unalterable principles of its ancient policy, whatever
government may finally prevail in France. I have
entered into this detail of the wishes and expectations of the European powers, in order to point out
more clearly not so much what their disposition as
(a consideration of far greater importance) what
their situation demands, according as that situation
is related to the Regicide Republic and to this kingdom.
Then, if it is not to satisfy the foreign powers we
make this assurance, to what power at home is it
that we pay all this humiliating court? Not to the
old Whigs or to the ancient Tories of this kingdom,
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 425
-if any memory of such ancient divisions still exists amongst us. To which of the principles of these parties is this assurance agreeable? Is it to the
Whigs we are to recommend the aggrandizement of
France, and the subversion of the balance of power? Is it to the Tories we are to recommend our eagerness to cement ourselves with the enemies of
royalty and religion? But if these parties, which
by their dissensions have so often distracted the kingdom, which by their union have once saved it, and which by their collision and mutual resistance have
preserved the variety of this Constitution in its unity, be (as I believe they are) nearly extinct by the growth of new ones, which have their roots in the
present circumstances of the times, I wish to know
to which of these new descriptions this Declaration
is addressed. It can hardly be to those persons who,
in the new distribution of parties, consider the conservation in England of the ancient order of things
as necessary to preserve order everywhere else, and
who regard the general conservation of order in other
countries as reciprocally necessary to preserve the
same state of things in these islands. That party
never can wish to see Great Britain pledge herself
to give the lead and the ground of advantage and
superiority to the France of to-day, in any treaty
which is to settle Europe. I insist upon it, that, so
far from expecting such an engagement, they are
generally stupefied and confounded with it. That
the other party, which demands great changes here,
and is so pleased to see them everywhere else, which
party I call Jacobin, that this faction does, from the
bottom of its heart, approve the Declaration, and does
erect its crest upon the engagement, there can be
? ? ? ? 426 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
little doubt. To them it may be addressed with propriety, for it answers their purposes in every point. The party in opposition within the House of Lords
and Commons it is irreverent, and half a breach of
privilege, (far from my thoughts,) to consider as
Jacobin. This party has always denied the existence
of such a faction, and has treated the machinations
of those whom you and I call Jacobins as so many
forgeries and fictions of the minister and his adherents, to find a pretext for destroying freedom and setting up an arbitrary power in this kingdom. However, whether this minority has a leaning towards the French system or only a charitable toleration of those
who lean that way, it is certain that they have always attacked the sincerity of the minister in the
same modes, and on the very same grounds, and
nearly in the same terms, with the Directory. It
must therefore be at the tribunal of the minority
(from the whole tenor of the speech) that the minister appeared to consider himself obliged to purge himself of duplicity. It was at their bar that he
held up his hand; it was on their sellette that he
seemed to answer interrogatories; it was on their
principles that he defended his whole conduct. They
certainly take what the French call the haut du pave.
They have loudly called for the negotiation. It was
accorded to them. They engaged their support of
the war with vigor, in case peace was not granted
on honorable terms. Peace was not granted on any
terms, honorable or shamefill. Whether these judges,
few in number, but powerful in jurisdiction, are satisfied, -whether they to whom this new pledge is hypothecated have redeemed their own, - whether
they have given one particle more of their support
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 427
to ministry, or even favored them wvith their good
opinion or their candid construction, I leave it to
those who recollect that memorable debate to determine.
The fact is, that neither this Declaration, nor the
negotiation which is its subject, could serve any one
good purpose, foreign or domestic; it could conduce
to no end, either with regard to allies or neutrals.
It tends neither to bring back the misled, nor to
give courage to the fearful, nor to animate and confirm those who are hearty and zealous in the cause.
I hear it has been said (though I can scarcely
believe it) by a distinguished person, in an assembly
where, if there be less of the torrent and tempest
of eloquence, more guarded expression is to be expected, that, indeed, there was no just ground of
hope in this business from the beginning.
It is plain that this noble person, however conversant in negotiation, having been employed in no less
than four embassies, and in two hemispheres, and in
one of those negotiations having fully experienced
what it was to proceed to treaty without previous
encouragement, was not'at all consulted in this experiment. For his Majesty's principal minister declared, on the very same day, in another House, " his Majesty's deep and sincere regret at its unfortunate
and abrupt termination, so different from the wishes
and hopes that were entertained," -- and in other
parts of the speech speaks of this abrupt termination
as a great disappointment, and as a fall from sincere
endeavors and sanguine expectation. Here are, indeed, sentiments diametrically opposite, as to the
hopes with which the negotiation was commenced
and carried on; and what is curious is, the grounds
? ? ? ? 428 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
of the hopes on the one side and the despair on the
other are exactly the same. The logical conclusion
from the common premises is, indeed, in favor of the
noble lord; for they are agreed that the enemy was
far from giving the least degree of countenance to
any such hopes, and that they proceeded in spite of
every discouragement which the enemy had thrown
in their way. But there is another material point
in which they do not seem to differ: that is to say,
the result of the desperate experiment of the noble
lord, and of the promising attempt of the great minister, in satisfying the people of England, and in causing discontent to the people of France, - or, as
the minister expresses it, "in uniting England and
in dividing France. "
For my own part, though I perfectly agreed with
the noble lord that the attempt was desperate, so
desperate, indeed, as to deserve his name of an experiment, yet no fair man can possibly doubt that the minister was perfectly sincere in his proceeding, and
that, from his ardent wishes for peace with the Regicides, he was led to conceive hopes which were founded rather in his vehement desires than in any
rational ground of political speculation. Convinced
as I am of this, it had been better, in my humble
opinion, that persons of great name and authority
had abstained from those topics which had been used
to call the minister's sincerity into doubt, and had
not adopted the sentiments of the Directory upon the
subject of all our negotiations: for the noble lord
expressly says that the experiment was made for the
satisfaction of the country. The Directory says exactly the same thing. Uponl granting, in colnsequence of our supplications,:! . 'port to Lord Ma) les
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 429
bury, in order to remove all sort of hope from its
success, they charged all our previous steps, even to
that moment of submissive demand to be admitted to
their presence, on duplicity and perfidy, and assumed
that the object of all the steps we had taken was that
"of justifying the continuance of the war in the eyes
of the English nation, and of throwing all the odium of it upon the French. " " The English nation "
(said they) "supports impatiently the continuance
of the war, and a reply must be made to its complaints
and its reproaches; the Parliament is about to be
opened, and the mouths of the orators who will declaim
against the war must be shut; the demands for new
taxes must be justified; and to obtain these results, it is
necessary to be able to advance that the French government refuses every reasonable proposition for peace. " I am sorry that the language of the friends to ministry
and the enemies to mankind should be so much in
unison.
As to the fact in which these parties are so well
agreed, that the experiment ought to have been made
for the satisfaction of this country, (meaning the
country of England,) it were well to be wished that
persons of eminence would cease to make themselves
representatives of the people of England, without a
letter of attorney, or any other act of procuration.
In legal construction, the sense of the people of England is to be collected from the House of Commons;
and though I do not deny the possibility of an abuse
of this trust as well as any other, yet I think, without the most weighty reasons and in the most urgent exigencies, it is highly dangerous to suppose that
the House speaks anything contrary to the sense
of the people, or that the representative is silent.
? ? ? ? 430 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
when the sense of the constituent, strongly, decidedly, and upon long deliberation, speaks audibly upon any topic of moment. If there is a doubt
whether the House of Commons represents perfectly
the whole commons of Great Britain, (I think there
is none,) there can be no question but that the Lords
and the Commons together represent the sense of the
whole people to the crown and to the world. Thus
it is, when we speak legally and constitutionally. In
a great measure it is equally true, when we speak
prudentially. But I do not pretend to assert that
there are no other principles to guide discretion than
those which are or can be fixed by some law or some
constitution: yet before the legally presumed sense
of the people should be superseded by a supposition
of one more real, (as in all cases where a legal presumption is to be ascertained,) some strong proofs ought to exist of a contrary disposition in the people
at large, and some decisive indications of their desire upon this subject. There can be no question,
that, previously to a direct message from the crown,
neither House of Parliament did indicate anything
like a wish for such advances as we have made or
such negotiations as we have carried on. The Parliament has assented to ministry; it is not ministry that has obeyed the impulse of Parliament. The people at large have their organs through which they
can speak to Parliament and to the crown by a
respectful petition, and though not with absolute
authority, yet with weight, they can instruct their
representatives. The fieeholders and other electors
in this kingdom have another and a surer mode of
expressing their sentiments concerning the conduct
which is held by members of Parliament. In the
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 431
middle of these transactions this last opportunity has
been held out to them. In all these points of view I
positively assert that the people have nowhere and in
no way expressed their wish of throwing themselves
and their sovereign at the feet of a wicked and rancorous foe, to supplicate mercy, which, from the
nature of that foe, and from the circumstances of
affairs, we had no sort of ground to expect. It is
undoubtedly the business of ministers very much to
consult the inclinations of the people, but they ought
to take great care that they do not receive that inclination from the few persons who may happen to approach them. The petty interests of such gentlemen, their low conceptions of things, their fears arising
from the danger to which the very arduous and
critical situation of public affairs may expose their
places, their apprehensions from the hazards to which
the discontents of a few popular men at elections may
expose their seats in Parliament, - all these causes
trouble and confuse the representations which they
make to ministers of the real temper of the nation.
If ministers, instead of following the great indications
of the Constitution, proceed on such reports, they
will take the whispers of a cabal for the voice of the
people, and the counsels of imprudent timidity for
the wisdom of a nation.
I well remember, that, when the fortune of the war
began (and it began pretty early) to turn, as it is
common and natural, we were dejected by the losses
that had been sustained, and with the doubtful issue
of the contests that were foreseen. But not a word
was uttered that supposed peace upon ally proper
terms was in our power, or therefore that it should
be in our desire. As usual, with or without reason,
? ? ? ? 432 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
we criticized the conduct of the war, and compared
our fortunes with our measures. The mass of the
nation went no further. For I suppose that you always understood me as speaking of that very preponderating part of the nation which had always been equally adverse to the French principles and to the
general progress of their Revolution throughout Europe, - considering the final success of their arms
and the triumph of their principles as one and the
same thing.
The first means that were used, by any one professing our principles, to change the minds of this party
upon that subject, appeared in a small pamphlet circulated with considerable industry. It was commonly given to the noble person himself who has passed judgment upon all hopes from negotiation, and justified our late abortive attempt only as an experiment
made to satisfy the country; and yet that pamphlet
led the way in endeavoring to dissatisfy that very
country with the continuance of the war, and to raise
in the people the most sanguine expectations from
some such course of negotiation as has been fatally
pursued. This leads me to suppose (and I am glad
to have reason for supposing) that there was no foundation for attributing the performance in question to
that author; but without mentioning his name in the
title-page, it passed for his, and does still pass uncontradicted. It was entitled, " Some Remarks on the
Apparent Circumstances of the War in the Fourth
Week of October, 1795. "
This sanguine little king's-fisher, (not prescient of
the storm, as by his instinct he. ought to be,) appearing at that uncertain season before the rigs of old
Michaelmas were yet well composed, and when the
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 433
inclement storms of winter were approaching, began
to flicker over the seas, and was busy in building its
halcyon nest, as if the angry ocean had been soothed
by the genial breath of May. Very unfortunately,
this auspice was instantly followed by a speech from
the throne in the very spirit and principles of that
pamphlet.
I say nothing of the newspapers, which are undoubtedly in the interest, and which are supposed by some to be directly or indirectly under the influence
of ministers, and which, with less authority than the
pamphlet I speak of, had indeed for some time before:
held a similar language, in direct contradiction to,
their more early tone: insomuch that I can speak it
with a certain assurance, that very many, who wished
to administration as well as you and I do, thought,
that, in giving their opinion in favor of this peace,
they followed the opinion of ministry; --they were
conscious that they did not lead it. My infdrence,
therefore, is this: that the negotiation, whatever its
merits may be, in the general principle and policy of
undertaking it, is, what every political measure in
general ought to be, the sole work of administration;
and that, if it was an experiment to satisfy anybody,
it was to satisfy those whom the ministers were in the
daily habit of condemning, and by whom they were
daily condemned, - I mean the leaders of the opposition in Parliament. I am certain that the ministers were then, and are now, invested with the fullest confidence of the major part of the nation, to pursue such measures of peace or war as the nature of things
shall suggest as most adapted to the public safety.
It is in this light, therefore, as a measure which
ought to have been avoided and ought not to be reVOL. V. 28
? ? ? ? 434 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
peated, that I tale the liberty of discussing the merits of this system of Regicide negotiations. It is not
a matter of light experiment, that leaves us where it
found us. Peace or war are the great hinges upon
which the very being of nations turns. Negotiations
are the means of making peace or preventing war, and
are therefore of more serious importance than almost
any single event of war can possibly be.
At the very outset, I do not hesitate to affirm, that
this country in particular, and the public law in general, have suffered more by this negotiation of experiment than by all the battles together that we have lost from the commencement of this century to this
time, when it touches so nearly to its close. I therefore have the misfortune not to coincide in opinion
with the great statesman who set on foot a negotiation, as he said, " in spite of the constant opposition
he had met with from France. " He admits, "that
the difficulty in this negotiation became most seriously increased, indeed, by the situation in which we
were placed, and the manner in which alone the enemy would admit of a negotiation. " This situation
so described, and so truly described, rendered our sclicitation not only degrading, but from the very outset evidently hopeless.
I find it asserted, and even a merit taken for it,
"that this country surmounted every difficulty of
form and etiquette which the enemy had thrown in
our way. " An odd way of surmounting a difficulty,
by cowering under it! I find it asserted that an
heroic resolution had been taken, and avowed in Parliament, previous to this negotiation, " that no consideration of etiquette should stand in the way of it. " Etiquette, if I understand rightly the term, which
? ? ? ? LETTERt IIn. 435
in any extent is of modern usage, had its original
application to those ceremonial and formal observances practised at courts, which had been established by long usage, in order to preserve the sovereign
power from the rude intrusion of licentious familiarity, as well as to preserve majesty itself from a disposition to consult its ease at the expense of its
dignity. The term came afterwards to have a greater
latitude, and to be employed to signify certain formal
methods used in the transactions between sovereign
states.
In the more limited, as well as in the larger sense
of the term, without knowing what the etiquette is, it
is impossible to determine whether it is a vain and
captious punctilio, or a form necessary to preserve
decorum in character and order in business. I readily admit that nothing tends to facilitate the issue of all public transactions more than a mutual disposition
in the parties treating to waive all ceremony. But
the use of this temporary suspension of the recognized modes of respect consists in its being mutual, and in the spirit of conciliation in which all ceremony
is laid aside. On the contrary, when one of the parties to a treaty intrenches himself up to the chin in these ceremonies, and will not on his side abate a single punctilio, and that all the concessions are uponl one side only, the party so conceding does by this act
place himself in a relation of inferiority, and thereby
fundamentally subverts that equality which is of the
very essence of all treaty.
After this formal act of degradation, it was'but a
matter of course that gross insult should be offered
to our ambassador, and that lie should tamely submit
to it. He found himself provoked to complain of the
? ? ? ? 436 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE r~ACE.
atrocious libels against his public character and his
person which appeared in a paper under the avowed
patronage of that government. The Regicide Directory, on this complaint, did not recognize the paper: and that was all. They did not punish, they did not
dismiss, they did not even reprimand the writer.
As to our ambassador, this total want of reparation
for the injury was passed by under the pretence of
despising it.
In this but too serious business, it is not possible
here to avoid a smile. Contempt is not a thing to
be despised. It may be borne with a calm and equal
mind, but no man by lifting his head high can pretend that he does not perceive the scorns that are poured down upon him from above. All these sudden complaints of injury, and all these deliberate submissions to it, are the inevitable consequences
of the situation in which we had placed ourselves: a
situation wherein the insults were such as Nature
would not enable us to bear, and circumstances
would not permit us to resent.
It was not long, however, after this contempt of
contempt upon the part of our ambassador, (who by
the way represented his sovereign,) that a new object
was furnished for displaying sentiments of the same
kind, though the case was infinitely aggravated. Not
the ambassador, but the king himself, was libelled
and insulted, -libelled, not by a creature of the
Directory, but by the Directory itself. At least, so
Lord Malmesbury understood it, and so he answered
it in his note of the 12th November, 1796, in which
he says, -" With regard to the offensive and injurious
insinuations which are contained in that paper, and
which are only calculated to throw new obstacles in
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 437
the way of the accommodation which the French
government professes to desire, THE KING HAS
DEEMED IT FAR BENEATH HIS DIGNITY to
permit an answer to be made to them on his part,
in any manner whatsoever. "
I am of opinion, that, if his Majesty had kept aloof
from that wash and offscouring of everything that is
low and barbarous in the world, it might be well
thought unworthy of his dignity to take notice of
such scurrilities: they must be considered as much
the natural expression of that kind of animal as it is
the expression of the feelings of a dog to bark. But
when the king had been advised to recognize not only the monstrous composition as a sovereign power, but, in conduct, to admit something in it like a superiority, - when the bench of Regicide was made at
least coordinate with his throne, and raised upon a
platform full as elevated, this treatment could not be
passed by under the appearance of despising it. It
would not, indeed, have been proper to keep up a war
of the same kind; but an immediate, manly, and decided resentment ought to have been the consequence. We ought not to have waited for the disgraceful dismissal of our ambassador. There are cases in which
we may pretend to sleep; but the wittol rule has some
sense in it, Non omnibus dormio. We might, however,
have seemed ignorant of the affront; but what was
the fact? Did we dissemble or pass it by in silence?
When dignity is talked of, a language which I did not
expect to hear in such a transaction, I must say, what
all the world must feel, that it was not for the king's
dignity to notice this insult and not to resent it.
This mode of proceeding is formed on new ideas of
the correspondence between sovereign powers.
? ? ? ?
J38 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
This was far from the only ill effect of the policy
of degradation. The state of inferiority in which we
were placed, in this vain attempt at treaty, drove us
headlong from error into error, and led. us to wander
far away, not only from all the paths which have
been beaten in the old course of political communication between mankind, but out of the ways even
of the most common prudence. Against all rules,
after we had met nothing but rebuffs in return to.
all our proposals, we made two confidential communications to those in whom we had no confidence and
who reposed no confidence in us. What was worse,
we were fully aware of the madness of the step we
were taking. Ambassadors are not sent to a hostile
power, persevering in sentiments of hostility, to make
candid, confidential, and amicable communications.
Hitherto the world has considered it as the duty
of an ambassador ill such a situation to be cautious,
guarded, dexterous, and circumspect. It is true
that mutual confidence and common interest dispense with all rules, smooth the rugged way, remove every obstacle, and make all things plain and level. When, ill the last century, Temple and De
Witt negotiated the famous Triple Alliance, their
candor, their freedom, and the most confidential disclosures were the result of true policy. Accordingly,
in spite of all the dilatory forms of the complex government of the United Provinces, the treaty was
concluded in three days. It did not take a much
longer time to bring the same state (that of Holland) through a still more complicated transaction,
-that of the Grand Alliance. But in the present
case, this unparalleled candor, this unpardonable
want of reserve, produced, what might have been
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 439
expected from it, the most serious evils. It instructed the enemy in the whole plan of our demands and concessions. It made the most fatal discoveries.
And first,. it induced us to lay down the basis of
a treaty which itself had nothing to rest upon. It
seems, we thought we had gained a great point in
getting this basis admitted, - that is, a basis of mutual compensation and exchange of conquests. If a disposition to peace, and with any reasonable assurance, had been previously indicated, such a plan of arrangement might with propriety and safety be
proposed; because these arrangements were not, ill
effect, to make the basis, but a part of the superstructure, of the fabric of pacification. The order of things would thus be reversed. The mutual disposition to peace would form the reasonable base, upon which the scheme of compensation upon one side or
the other might be constructed. This truly fundamental base being once laid, all differences arising from the spirit of huckstering and barter might be
easily adjusted. If the restoration of peace, with a
view to the establishment of a fair balance of power
in Europe, had been made the real basis of the treaty,
the reciprocal value of the compensations could not
be estimated according to their proportion to each
other, but according to their proportionate relation to
that end: to that great end the whole would be sub
servient. The effect of the treaty would be in a
manner secured before the detail of particulars was
begun, and for a plain reason, -because the hostile
spirit on both sides had been conjured down; but if,
in the full fury and unappeased rancor of war, a little traffic is attempted, it is easy to divine what must be the consequence to those who endeavor to open
that kind of petty commerce.
? ? ? ? 440 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
To illustrate what I have said, I go back nlo further
than to the two last Treaties of Paris, and to the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which preceded the first of
these two Treaties of Paris by about fourteen or fifteen years. I do not mean here to criticize any of them. My opinions upon some particulars of the
Treaty of Paris in 1763 are published in a pamphlet *
which your recollection will readily bring into your
view. I recur to them only to show that their basis
had not been, and never could have been, a mere
dealing of truck and barter, but that the parties being
willing, fiom common fatigue or common suffering,
to put an end to a war the first object of which had
either been obtained or despaired of, the lesser objects
were not thought worth the price of further contest.
The parties understanding one another, so much was
given away without considering from whose budget it
came, not as the value of the objects, but as the value
of peace to the parties might require.
At the last Treaty of Paris, the subjugation of
America being despaired of on the part of Great
Britain, and the independence of America being
looked upon as secure on the part of France, the
main cause of the war was removed; and then the
conquests which France had made upon us (for we
had made none of importance upon her) were surrendered with sufficient facility. Peace was restored as peace. In America the parties stood as they were
possessed. A limit was to be settled, but settled as a
limit to secure that peace, and not at all on a system
of equivalents, for which, as we then stood with the
United States, there were little or no materials.
At the preceding Treaty of Paris, I mean that of
* Observations on a Late State of the Nation.
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 441
1763, there was nothing at all on which to fix a basis
of compensation from reciprocal cession of conquests.
They were all on one side. The question with us
was not what we were to receive, and on what consideration, but what we were to keep for indemnity or to cede for peace. Accordingly, no place being
left for barter, sacrifices were made on our side to
peace; and we surrendered to the French their most
valuable possessions in the West Indies without any
equivalent. The rest of Europe fell soon after into
its ancient order; and the German war ended exactly where it had begun.
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was built upon a
similar basis. All the conquests in Europe had been
made by France. She had subdued the Austrian
Netherlands, and broken open the gates of Holland.
We had taken nothing in the West Indies; and Cape
Breton was a trifling business indeed. France gave
up all for peace. The Allies had given up all that
was ceded at Utrecht. Louis the Fourteenth made
all, or nearly all, the cessions at Ryswick, and at
Nimeguen. In all those treaties, and in all the preceding, as well as in the others which intervened, the question never had been that of barter. The balance
of power had been ever assumed as the known common law of Europe at all times and by all powers: the question had only been (as it must happen) on
the more or less inclination of that balance.
This general balance was regarded in four principal points of view: the GREAT MIDDLE BALANCE, which comprehended Great Britain, France, and Spain; the
BALANCE OF THE NORTH; the BALANCE, external and
internal, of GERMANY; and the BALANCE OF ITALY.
In all those systems of balance, England was the
? ? ? ? 442 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
power to whose custody it was thought it might be
most safely committed.
France, as she happened to stand, secured the balance or endangered it. Without question, she had been long the security for the balance of Germany,
and, under her auspices, the system, if not formed,
had been at least perfected. She was so in some
measure with regard to Italy, more than occasionally. She had a clear interest in the balance of the North, and had endeavored to preserve it. But when
we began to treat with the present France, or, more
properly, to prostrate ourselves to her, and to try if
we should be admitted to ransom our allies upon a
system of mutual concession and compensation, we
had not one of the usual facilities. For, first, we had
not the smallest indication of a desire for peace on
the part of the enemy, but rather the direct contrary.
Men do not make sacrifices to obtain what they do
not desire: and as for the balance of power, it was
so far from being admitted by France, either on the
general system, or with regard to the particular systems that I have mentioned, that, in the whole body of their authorized or encouraged reports and discussions upon the theory of tile diplomatic system, they constantly rejected the very idea of the balance of
power, and treated it as the true cause of all the
wars and calamities that had afflicted Europe; and
their practice was correspondent to the dogmatic
positions they had laid down. The Empire and
the Papacy it was their great object to destroy;
and this, now openly avowed and steadfastly acted
upon, might have been discerned with very little
acuteness of sight, from the very first dawnings of
the Revolution, to be the main drift of their policy:
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 443
for they professed a resolution to destroy everything
which can hold states together by the tie of opinion.
Exploding, therefore, all sorts of balances, they
avow their design to erect themselves into a new
description of empire, which is not grounded on any
balance, but forms a sort of impious hierarchy, of
which France is tb be the head and the guardian.
The law of this their empire is anything rather than
the public law of Europe, the ancient conventions
of its several states, or the ancient opinions which
assign to them superiority or preeminence of any
sort, or any other kind of connection in virtue of
ancient relations. They permit, and that is all, the
temporary existence of some of the old communities:
but whilst they give to these tolerated states this
temporary respite, in order to secure them in a condition of real dependence on themselves, they invest them on every side by a body of republics, formed
on the model, and dependent ostensibly, as well as
substantially, on the will of the mother republic to
which they owe their origin. These are to be so many garrisons to check and control the states which are to be permitted to remain on the old model until
they are ripe for a change. It is in this manner that
France, on her new system, means to form an universal empire, by producing an universal revolution. By this means, forming a new code of communities
according to what she calls the natural rights of mail
and of states, she pretends to secure eternal peace to
the world, guarantied by her generosity and justice,
which are to grow with the extent of her power. To
talk of the balance of power to the governors of such
a country was a jargon which they could not understand even through an interpreter. Before men can
? ? ? ? 444 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
transact any affair, they must have a common language to speak, and some common, recognized principles on which they can argue; otherwise all is
cross purpose and confusion. It was, therefore, an
essential preliminary to the whole proceeding, to fix
whether the balance of power, the liberties and laws
of the Empire, and the treaties of different belligerent
powers in past times, when they put an end to hostilities, were to be considered as the basis of the present
negotiation.
The whole of the enemy's plan was known when
Lord Malmesbury was sent with his scrap of equivalents to Paris. Yet, in this unfortunate attempt at
negotiation, instead of fixing these points, and assuming the balance of power and the peace of Europe as the basis to which all cessions on all sides
were to be subservient, our solicitor for peace was
directed to reverse that order. He was directed to
make mutual concessions, on a mere comparison of
their marketable value, the base of treaty. The balance of power was to be thrown in as an inducement, and a sort of make-weight to supply the manifest deficiency, which must stare him and the world in the face, between those objects which he was to
require the enemy to surrender and those which he
had to offer as a fair equivalent.
To give any force to this inducement, and to
make it answer even the secondary purpose of equalizing equivalents having in themselves no natural
proportionate value, it supposed that the enemy, coI1trary to the most notorious fact, did admit this balance of power to be of some value, great or small;
whereas it is plain, that, in the enemy's estimate of
things, the consideration of the balance of power, as
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 4t45
we have said before, was so far from going in diminution of the value of what the Directory was desired to surrender, or of giving an additional price to our objects offered in exchange, that the hope of
the utter destruction of that balance became a new
motive to the junto of Regicides for preserving, as a
means for realizing that hope, what we wished them
to abandon.
Thus stood the basis of the treaty, on laying the
first stone of the foundation. At the very best, upon
our side, the question stood upon a mere naked bargain and sale. Unthinking people here triumphed,
when they thought they had obtained it; whereas,
when obtained as a basis of a treaty, it was just the
worst we could possibly have chosen. As to our offer
to cede a most unprofitable, and, indeed, beggarly,
chargeable counting-house or two in the East Indies,
we ought not to presume that they would consider
this as anything else than a mockery. As to anything of real value, we had nothing under heaven to
offer, (for which we were not ourselves in a very
dubious struggle,) except the island of Martinico only. When this object was to be weighed against
the Directorial conquests, merely as an object of a
value at market, the principle of barter became
perfectly ridiculous: a single quarter in the single
city of Amsterdam was worth ten Martinicos, and
would have sold for many more years' purchase in
any market overt in Europe. How was this gross
and glaring defect in the objects of exchange to be
supplied? It was to be made up by argument. And
what was that argument? The extreme utility of
possessions in the West Indies to the augmentation
of the naval power of France. A very curious topic
? ? ? ? 446 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
of argument to be proposed and insisted on by an
ambassador of Great Britain! It is directly and
plainly this:-" Come, we know that of all things
you wish a naval power, and it is natural you should,
who wish to destroy the very sources of the British
greatness, to overpower our marine, to destroy our
commerce, to eradicate our foreign influence, and to
lay us open to an invasion, which at one stroke may
complete our servitude and ruin and expunge us
from among the nations of the earth. Here I have
it in my budget, the infallible arcanum for that purpose. You are but novices in the art of naval resources. Let you have the West Indies back, and
your maritime preponderance is secured, for which
you would do well to be moderate in your demands
upon the Austrian Netherlands. "
Under any circumstances, this is a most extraordinary topic of argument; but it is rendered by
much the more unaccountable, when we are told,
that, if the war has been diverted from the great
object of establishing society and good order in Europe by destroying the usurpation in France, this diversion was made to increase the naval resources and power of Great Britain, and to lower, if not annihilate, those of the marine of France. I leave all this
to the very serious reflection of every Englishman.
This basis was no sooner admitted than the rejection of a treaty upon that sole foundation was a thing
of course. The enemy did not think it worthy of a
discussion, as in truth it was not; and immediately,
as usual, they began, in the most opprobrious and
most insolent manner, to question our sincerity and
good faith: whereas, in truth, there was no one symptom wanting of openness and fair dealing. What
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 447
could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all
that you wished to obtain, and the price you meant
to pay for it, and to desire him to imitate your ilgenuous proceeding, and in the same manner to open his
honest heart to you? Here was no want of fair dealing, but there was too evidently a fault of another
kind: there was much weakness, -there was an eager and impotent desire of associating with this unsocial power, and of attempting the connection by any means. however manifestly feeble and ineffectual.
The event was committed to chance, --that is, to
such a manifestation of tile desire of France for peace
as would induce the Directory to forget the advantages they had in the system of barter. Accordingly,
the general desire for such a peace was triumphantly reported from the moment that Lord Malmesbury
had set his foot on shore at Calais.
It has been said that the Directory was compelled
against its will to accept the basis of barter (as if that
had tended to accelerate the work of pacification! )
by the voice of all France. Had this been the case,
the Directors would have continued to listen to that
voice to which it seems they were so obedient: they
would have proceeded with the negotiation upon that
basis. But the fact is, that they instantly broke up
the negotiation, as soon as they had obliged our ambassador to violate all the principles of treaty, and
weakly, rashly, and unguardedly to expose, without
any counter proposition, the whole of our project
with regard to ourselves and our allies, and without
holding out the smallest hope that they would admit
the smallest part of our pretensions.
When they had thus drawn from us all that they
could draw out, they expelled Lord Malmesbury, and
? ? ? ? 448 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE.
they appealed, for the propriety of their conduct, to
that very France which we thought proper to suppose
had driven them to this fine concession: and I do not
find that in either division of the family of thieves,
the younger branch, or the elder, or in any other
body whatsoever, there was any indignation excited,
or any tumult raised, or anything like the virulence
of opposition which was shown to the king's ministers
here, on account of that transaction.
Notwithstanding all this, it seems a hope is still entertained that the Directory will have that tenderness
for the carcass of their country, by whose very distemper, and on whose festering wounds, like vermin,
they are fed, that these pious patriots will of themselves come into a more moderate and reasonable way
of thinking and acting. In the name of wonder,
what has inspired our ministry with this hope any
more than with their former expectations?
Do these hopes only arise from continual disappointment? Do they grow out of the usual grounds
of despair? What is there to encourage them, in the
conduct or even in the declarations of the ruling powers in France, from the first formation of their mischievous republic to the hour in which I write? Is not the Directory composed of the same junto? . Are
they not the identical men who, from the base and
sordid vices which belonged to their original place
and situation, aspired to the dignity of crimes, - and
from the dirtiest, lowest, most fraudulent, and most
knavish of chicaners, ascended in the scale of robbery,
sacrilege, and assassination in all its forms, till at last
they had imbrued their impious hands in the blood
of their sovereign? Is it from these men that we are
to hope for this paternal tenderness to their country,
? ? ? ? LETTER III. 449
and this sacred regard for the peace and happiness of
all nations?
But it seems there is still another lurking hope,
akin to that which duped us so egregiously before,
when our delightful basis was accepted: we still
flatter ourselves that the public voice of France will
compel this Directory to more moderation. Whence
does this hope arise? What public voice is there ill
France? There are, indeed, some writers, who, since
this monster of a Directory has obtained a great, regular, military force to guard them, are indulged in a
sufficient liberty of writing; and some of them write
well, undoubtedly. But the world knows that int
France there is no public, -that the country is&
composed but of two descriptions, audacious tyrants.
and trembling slaves. The contests between the tyrants is the only vital principle that can be discerned
in France. The only thing which there appears like
spirit is amongst their late associates, and fastest
friends of the Directory, - the more furious and
untamable part of the Jacobins. This discontented
member of the faction does almost balance the reigning divisions, and it threatens every moment to predominate. For the present, however, the dread of their fury forms some sort of security to their fellows,
who now exercise' a more regular and therefore a
somewhat less ferocious tyranny. Most of the slaves
choose a quiet, however reluctant, submission to those
who. are somewhat satiated with blood, and who, like
wolves, are a little more tame from being a little less
hungry, in preference to an irruption of the famished
devourers who are prowling and howling about the
fold.
This circumstance assures some degree of perma --
VOL. V. 29
? ? ? ? 450 LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEAtE.
nence to the power of those whom we know to be
permanently our rancorous and implacable enemies.
But to those very enemies who have sworn our destruction we have ourselves given a further and far
better security, by rendering the cause of the royalists desperate. Those brave and virtuous, but unfortunate adherents to the ancient Constitution of their country, after the miserable slaughters which
have been made in that body, after all their losses
by emigration, are still numerous, but unable to exert themselves against the force of the usurpation
evidently countenanced and upheld by those very
princes who had called them to arm for the support
of the legal monarchy. Where, then, after chasing
these fleeting hopes of ours from point to point of the
political horizon; are they at last really found? Not
where, under Providence, the hopes of Englishmen
used to be placed, in our own courage and in our
own virtues, but in the moderation and virtue' of the
most atrocious monsters that have ever disgraced
and plagued mankind.
The only excuse to be made for all our mendicant diplomacy is the same as in the case of all
other mendicancy, namely, that it has been founded
on absolute necessity. This deserves consideration.
Necessity, as it has no law, so it has no shame. But
moral necessity is not like metaphysical, or even
physical. In that category it is a word of loose signification, and conveys different ideas to different minds.
To the low-minded, the slightest necessity becomes
an invincible necessity. "The slothful man saith,
There is a lion in the way, and I shall be devoured in
the streets. " But when the necessity pleaded is not
in the nature of things, but in the vices of him who
? ? ? ?
