But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph.
Philosopher says (Metaph.
Summa Theologica
Because "that which is first in a genus is the
measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first
thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving. " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i. e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i. e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end. "], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good. "
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that
we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be
that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of
virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of
the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their
being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will
rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as
stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly
good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the
pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a
sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by
making evil use of it, made subject to corruption. " Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):
"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears. "
[Translation: Conington. ]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil
(which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then
pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to
some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive
appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being
a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain
is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But
the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel
pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it
were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of
the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering. "
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But
sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the
interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner
that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called
sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the
word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present;
but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and
future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:
whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in
so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also
in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to
the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly
cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for
their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as
referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10.
Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not
speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but
rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as
denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is
contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and
exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure
extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide
sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For
one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be
the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Mat. 5:5): "Blessed are they
that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore they are not
contrary to one another.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But
to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess.
iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess.
iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases
us. " Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other;
because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the
matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent
should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow. " The Philosopher too
says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain
at having been pleased. " Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary
to one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the
volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the
volition of dissent from the things we do not wish. " But consent and
dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to
one another.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion
or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the
objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure
are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other
accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way,
in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the
presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something
pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a
drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far
as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these
ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the
future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or
for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In like
manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits
in order to obtain it.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so
far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as
it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's
love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since
love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love,
forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this
reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in so
far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain
love for those who are there represented.
Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own
acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are
considered under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be
the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but
accidentally: that is, in so far as either of them is considered under
the aspect of good or evil.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.
Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color,
so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But
whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the
evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But
every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x,
5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy
for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same
habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that
rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not
every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in
respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and
vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e. g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e. g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific
nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in
the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another
in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species
belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another,
but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two
contraries, there is contrariety; e. g. to approach to a white thing,
and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary
relations to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e. g. to
recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This
is most evident in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of
opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the
same thing, e. g. "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness
and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the
other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white. "
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their
objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one
another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of
"avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial
are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure
in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one
another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not
contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another,
but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend,
and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be
contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only
specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness
and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species
from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow
do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in
Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of
matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are
generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the
subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of
pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting
what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore
on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of
sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but
chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say
that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every
pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): "The
sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation. " Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act
is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin.
xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If
therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object
of sorrow is evil.
But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of
certain things. " Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a
cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work
of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy
it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation
there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow.
But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of
the flesh. " Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i. e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but
joy and gladness. " Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found
in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure
of contemplation.
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but
in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something
harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and
pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in
this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. ], "no sorrow is contrary to that
pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the
same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as
being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of
itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat
is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the
object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the
mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other.
Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as
bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain
annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being
troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the
pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation
is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming"
but a perfect operation, as stated above ([1303]Q[31], A[1]).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above
([1304]Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at
first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur
directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor
"tediousness. " Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes
use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is
incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled
with contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above [1305](A[4]):
while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of
contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not
caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something
which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are
not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.
Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it
is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i. e. in so far as
the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a
more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which
the appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is
not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with
it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure. " Now
that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is
natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is
sought.
Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due
to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the
suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more
eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning
sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the
movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised. " Therefore the
movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking
pleasure.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of
evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning
of sorrow.
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is
a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable
evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any
repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so
unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be
entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire
for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another
reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought
for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is
to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason
of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.
Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every
natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches
the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it
leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were
more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what
is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of
itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than
he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of
the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is
felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love. " Now from the lack
of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of
some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure
suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it.
Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more
the shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of
that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of
sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved
than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural
well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and
consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from
fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are
contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the
effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but
all.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned
more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And
this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most
savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of
pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and
movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is
suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we
remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without
is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in
its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own
preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens
towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from
within: since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently
pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned.
But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were
from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is
the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the
senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than
pleasure is sought.
Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance
with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,
but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the
dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than
pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which
latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more
than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for
refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the
pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
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Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant
to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow
is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is
loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has
been said above [1306](A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does.
But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;
whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a
contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain
has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than
of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned
more than interior sorrow.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman
is all evil. " Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above [1307](A[1]). But they differ in respect of
those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in
respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined
evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from
an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly.
Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being
repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now,
that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of
another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses
outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because
the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than
the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain is,
simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is
that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward
pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior
appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward
pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only
greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is
repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and
whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and
reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is
said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even
the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of
the heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are
destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain
must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain;
but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is
compared to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended
likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the
apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness
represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by
means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and
abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an
inward apprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by
outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a
corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the
sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more
material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
([1308]Q[22], A[3];[1309] Q[31], A[5] ), the body undergoes a greater
change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like
manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy. " For sorrow is contrary to pleasure.
But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is
incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this
division is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that
are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one
another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ]
"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that
weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for
another's wrongs. " But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's
wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down
inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is
correct.
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in
two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and
virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal. " Such
an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a
genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal. "
Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to
the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes
a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having
something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that
genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a
species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied
to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and
perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles
of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil. " Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus
we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however,
as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is
neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as
one's own evil: and thus we have "envy. " The proper effect of sorrow
consists in a certain "flight of the appetite. " Wherefore the foreign
element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first
part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs
on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also
called "perplexity. " If, however, the mind be weighed down so much,
that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then
we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither
flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.
Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ.
measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first
thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire.
Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that
movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all
movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:
since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not
the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more
certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of
operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because
"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those
are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5.
Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and
malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of
hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the
pleasure which each one aims at achieving. " And the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i. e. the principal,
"end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is
the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i. e. the
political philosopher), "is the architect of the end. "], in regard to
which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good. "
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as
stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that
we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be
that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every
appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since
that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of
virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule
of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to
the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of
the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which
the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of
generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which
serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the
rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their
being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect
pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will
rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as
stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly
good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a
thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the
pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.
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OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must
consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects;
(4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?
(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation?
(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?
(8) Of the species of sorrow.
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Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.
Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the
body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a
sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by
making evil use of it, made subject to corruption. " Therefore pain is
not a passion of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the
appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but
rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx)
that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful
body. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.
Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal
appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather
to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):
"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being
punished by the loss of good. " Therefore pain is not a passion of the
soul.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the
passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild
desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears. "
[Translation: Conington. ]
I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely,
conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two
things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil
(which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and
perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have
not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is
conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that
something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the
pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the
appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the
appetite.
Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to
apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since
the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an
apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension
of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then
pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same
subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective
or sensitive appetite.
Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as
stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to
some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive
appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily
ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being
a kind of ailment.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain
is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But
the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel
pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).
Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it
were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required
for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.
Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of
the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but
because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being
perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.
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Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering. "
But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
not pain.
Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But
sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is
sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is
quite different from pain.
Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of
touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is
not pain, and extends to more objects.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow
[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,"
thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.
I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension,
namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the
interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the
interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior
apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior
apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently
that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is
called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner
that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called
sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior
apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is
caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not
sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of
pleasure.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the
word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily
pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.
Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present;
but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and
future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future:
whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense,
can only regard something present.
Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in
so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also
in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the
other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power,
but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to
the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly
cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for
their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as
referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10.
Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not
speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but
rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as
denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is
contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and
exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure
extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide
sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For
one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be
the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Mat. 5:5): "Blessed are they
that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore they are not
contrary to one another.
Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But
to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess.
iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess.
iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases
us. " Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other;
because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the
matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent
should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow. " The Philosopher too
says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain
at having been pleased. " Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary
to one another.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the
volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the
volition of dissent from the things we do not wish. " But consent and
dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to
one another.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a
difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion
or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the
objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present
evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure
are contrary to one another.
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other
accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way,
in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the
presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something
pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a
drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far
as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these
ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the
future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or
for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In like
manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits
in order to obtain it.
Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so
far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as
it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's
love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since
love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love,
forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this
reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in so
far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain
love for those who are there represented.
Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own
acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are
considered under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be
the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but
accidentally: that is, in so far as either of them is considered under
the aspect of good or evil.
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Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure.
Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color,
so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But
whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another.
Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.
Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the
evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is
contrary to every sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But
every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x,
5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy
for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same
habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that
rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not
every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.
I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in
respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently
things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and
vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.
Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,
e. g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in
relation to something extrinsic, e. g. passions and movements, which
derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those
things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species
contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific
nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or
fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in
the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another
in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or
fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are
specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species
belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another,
but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The
reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two
contraries, there is contrariety; e. g. to approach to a white thing,
and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary
relations to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e. g. to
recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This
is most evident in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of
opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the
same thing, e. g. "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness
and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the
other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white. "
Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their
objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one
another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of
"avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial
are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure
in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one
another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not
contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another,
but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend,
and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be
contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only
specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness
and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.
Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species
from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow
do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in
Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of
matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are
generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the
subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of
pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting
what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore
on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of
sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but
chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say
that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every
pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their
effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,
while the other results in a kind of discomfort.
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Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): "The
sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation. " Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act
is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin.
xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If
therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other
contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object
of sorrow is evil.
But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of
certain things. " Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a
cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work
of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy
it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation
there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow.
But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of
the flesh. " Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its
pleasure.
On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i. e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but
joy and gladness. " Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found
in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure
of contemplation.
I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two
ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but
in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something
harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and
pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in
this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii. ], "no sorrow is contrary to that
pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the
same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as
being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of
itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat
is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the
object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the
mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other.
Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as
bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain
annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being
troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the
pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation
is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that
contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming"
but a perfect operation, as stated above ([1303]Q[31], A[1]).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above
([1304]Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at
first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur
directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no
corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above
that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor
"tediousness. " Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes
use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is
incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled
with contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above [1305](A[4]):
while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of
contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not
caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something
which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are
not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and
the same science considers contraries.
Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it
is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i. e. in so far as
the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a
more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which
the appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is
not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with
it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than
pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There
is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure. " Now
that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is
natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is
sought.
Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and
intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due
to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for
pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the
suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more
eagerly than pleasure is sought.
Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists
according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more
virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"
(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning
sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the
movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised. " Therefore the
movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking
pleasure.
On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good
which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of
evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning
of sorrow.
I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the
shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is
a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable
evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any
repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so
unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be
entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire
for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another
reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought
for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is
to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason
of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.
Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every
natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches
the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it
leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were
more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what
is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of
itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.
But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than
he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of
the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is
felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love. " Now from the lack
of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of
some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure
suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it.
Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more
the shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of
that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of
sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved
than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural
well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and
consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from
fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are
contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the
effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but
all.
Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned
more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And
this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most
savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of
pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.
Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and
movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is
suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we
remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without
is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in
its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own
preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens
towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from
within: since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently
pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned.
But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were
from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is
the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the
senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than
pleasure is sought.
Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance
with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,
but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the
dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than
pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which
latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more
than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for
refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the
pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
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Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant
to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow
is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is
loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has
been said above [1306](A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior
sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does.
But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;
whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a
contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain
has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than
of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned
more than interior sorrow.
On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the
heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman
is all evil. " Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses
all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart
surpasses every outward wound.
I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ
in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive
power, as stated above [1307](A[1]). But they differ in respect of
those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in
respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect
of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil
repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined
evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an
apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from
an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.
If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward
pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both
these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly.
Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the
appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being
repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now,
that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of
another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses
outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because
the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than
the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain is,
simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is
that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward
pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior
appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of
inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward
pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only
greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is
repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and
whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and
reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is
said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even
the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of
the heart.
Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are
destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain
must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain;
but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is
compared to the appetite.
Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended
likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the
apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness
represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by
means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and
abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being
caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an
inward apprehension.
Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by
outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a
corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the
sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more
material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more
material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above
([1308]Q[22], A[3];[1309] Q[31], A[5] ), the body undergoes a greater
change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like
manner, from outward than from inward pain.
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Whether there are only four species of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor,
distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ] calls
"anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy. " For sorrow is contrary to pleasure.
But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is
incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are
"indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this
division is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that
are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one
another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix. ]
"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that
weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for
another's wrongs. " But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's
wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down
inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is
correct.
On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa
[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.
I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is
something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in
two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and
virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal. " Such
an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a
genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that
genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal. "
Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to
the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes
a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having
something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that
genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a
species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied
to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and
perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles
of mathematics are applied to natural matter.
In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are
reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign
to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the
object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is "one's own
evil. " Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either
through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus
we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however,
as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is
neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as
one's own evil: and thus we have "envy. " The proper effect of sorrow
consists in a certain "flight of the appetite. " Wherefore the foreign
element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first
part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs
on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also
called "perplexity. " If, however, the mind be weighed down so much,
that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then
we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither
flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor
especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the
external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward
thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is
stated in Polit. i, 1.
Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one
meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow
is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the
proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.
Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain
later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite
species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the
notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.
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OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the
presence of an evil?
(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?
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Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good
rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ.
Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods.
Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some
good.
Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the
sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above
([1312]Q[23], A[4];[1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore
sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ.
