According to the Cabinet Mission Scheme, there was to be Union
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p.
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The state-
ment said, “We strongly protest against this offer on behalf of the
Sikh community and hereby declare that the Sikhs will fight to the
bitter end against the proposal. ” Dr. N. B. Khare who at that
time was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, stated on 15
July, 1944 that "it was clear that Mr. Gandhi had accepted Mr.
Rajagopalachari's proposal of dividing the country into more than
one political State. According to Gandhiji himself, vivisection of
India was a sin, so the Mahatma at the present moment is willing
to do a sinful act consciously. ” On 20 July, 1944, Savarkar, Presi-
dent of the Hindu Mahasabha, issued a statement in which he
criticised Mahatma Gandhi and Rajaji "for conceding the Pakistan
claim to Muslims without consulting other organisations and, in
particular, the Hindu Mahasabha. ” Qazi Mohammed Isha, Presi-
dent of Baluchistan Muslim League and a member of the Working
Committee of All India Muslim League, issued a statement on 24
July, 1944, in which he clearly stated that “the Muslim nation
refuses to accept the position of a petitioner. " The All Parties
Hindu Conference was held at Lahore on 13 August, 1944 and
it passed a resolution rejecting Rajaji's formula because it "strikes
at the root of the fundamental geographical culture and historical
oneness, national integrity and administrative unity of India by
proposing the dismemberment and vivisection of the country. ”
Srinivasa Sastri of the National Liberal Federation rejected the
formula because he said: "I dread this idea of division of India. I
dread it like poison. ” It was under these circumstances that
nothing came out of Rajaji's formula.
GANDHI-JINNAH TALKS (1944)
In the month of September, 1944,
September, 1944, there were talks between
Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah at Bombay with a view to find
## p. 847 (#889) ############################################
LIAQUAT-DESAI PACT
847
out some solution of the deadlock prevailing in the country. There
were lengthy negotiations but nothing came out of them as Mr.
Jinnah insisted that the Muslims were a separate nation and
Mahatma Gandhi was not prepared to admit this claim of Mr.
Jinnah. The only result of those talks was that Mr. Jinnah emerg-
ed with greater prestige in India than before. It was realised that
Mr. Jinnah occupied a very high position in the politics of the
country and that was the reason why Mahatma Gandhi was taking
pains to come to a settlement with him.
LIAQUAT-DESAI PACT (1945)
Another attempt was made in the beginning of 1945 to bring
about an understanding between the Congress and the Muslim
League so that they could participate in the formation of an interim
Government at the Centre. This was the Desai-Liaquat Pact.
This pact was between Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress
Party in the Central Assembly and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Deputy
Leader of the Muslim League party in the Central Assembly.
According to that Pact, the Congress and the Muslim League were
to join on the basis of parity in forming an interim Government at
the Centre. The representatives of the minorities like the Sikhs
and the Scheduled Castes were also to be included in the Govern-
ment. The Government was to function within the frame-work of
the Government of India Act, 1935. If the Cabinet could not get
a particular measure passed in the Central Assembly, it was not to
scek recourse to the reserve powers of the Governor-General. The
interim Government was to secure the release of the members of
the Congress Working Committee. There were to be coalition
Ministries in the Provinces consisting of Congress and Muslim
League Members.
Bhulabhai Desai had got the approval of Mahatma Gandhi for
the Pact and Lord Wavell was also in favour of it. However,
Mr. Jinnah made a public statement to the effect that he had no
knowledge of the Desai-Liaquat Pact and whatever had been done
was without any authority from the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah
told Liaquat Ali Khan that he should not have entered into the
Pact without his knowledge and approval. The view of Liaquat
Ali Khan was that it was very necessary for the Muslim League
to come to some understanding with the Congress because the
British were likely to leave India any moment and the rigid atti-
tude of Mr. Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi was not desirable. His
view was that the younger men should make an attempt to solve
## p. 848 (#890) ############################################
848
PAKISTAN
the deadlock and that is why he entered into a Pact with Bhulabhai
Desai.
SIMLA CONFERENCE
Lord Wavell called a Conference at Simla to resolve the deadlock
in the country. The Conference met at 11 A. M. on 25 June, 1945.
All the invitees, except Mahatma Gandhi, were present. In his
opening speech, Lord Wavell made it clear that the Conference
was not intended to solve the complex problems of India. More-
over, it did not in any way prejudice or prejudge the final issue
between the parties. He asked the members present to consider
him as a sincere friend of India and help him in coming to some
interim settlement.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, as the President of the Congress,
took pains to explain the position of the Congress. He made it
clear that the British plan dealt with purely temporary and interim
arrangements and it should not be regarded as a precedent for the
permanent arrangement in the future. He also attached consider-
able importance to the declaration that the provisional plan was
intended as a preliminary step towards the achievement of the goal
of India's independence. He also made it clear that although the
Congress Working Committee was taking part in the Conference,
its decision had to be ratified by the All India Congress Committee
many of whose members were still in jails. Maulana Azad also
sought certain clarifications from the Government.
On 26 June, 1945, the Conference discussed the scope, functions
and responsibilities of the Executive Council of the Governor-
General. After about one hour session on 27 June, the Conference
.
adjourned till 29 June to enable the delegates to continue their
private discussions. On 28 June, the private deliberations of the
Conference reached a stage of impasse between the Muslim League
and the Congress. On 29 June, the Conference met as scheduled
but was adjourned after about an hour “to enable the delegates to
carry on further consultations” to submit lists of names for the
Executive Council. It was accepted to reassemble on 14 July,
1945 at Simla.
In the meanwhile, the Secretary to the Governor-General wrote
a letter to Mr. Jinnah on 29 June requesting to him "to prepare
and send him a list giving the names of members of the Muslim
League who, in your opinion, could suitably be included in the pro-
posed Executive Council. The number of names in this list should
be not less than eight or more than twelve. ” Mr. Jinnah was given
## p. 849 (#891) ############################################
SIMLA CONFERENCE
849
the choice to suggest "the names of persons of any community who
are not members of the Muslim League. ”
On 1 July, 1945, Pandit G. B. Pant had a talk with Mr. Jinnah
regarding the fears expressed in the Muslims League circles that
under the new proposals the Muslims would be in a minority and
thus would not get a fair deal. On 2 July, Nawabzada Liaquat
Ali Khan, General Secretary of the All India Muslim League, gave
an interview at Simla in which he contended that the stand of the
Congress party for a share in the Muslim quota of seats in the pro-
posed Executive Council was "most unreasonable and has no justi-
fication whatsoever. "
On 7 July, 1945, Maulana Azad forwarded a panel of 15 names
of whom five were caste Hindus, five Muslims, two non-caste
Hindus, 1 Indian Christian, one Parsi and one Sikh.
Mr. Jinnah sent a reply to the Viceroy on 7 July, 1945 in which
he maintained "that all the Muslim members of the proposed Exe-
cutive Council should be chosen from the Muslim League, subject
to a confidential discussion between Your Excellency and the
President of the Muslim League,” before they were finally recom-
mended by the Viceroy to His Majesty's Government for appoint-
ment. Mr. Jinnah had an interview with Lord Wavell on 8 July,
1945 for about an hour and a half. However, Lord Wavell refus-
ed to give a guarantee to Mr. Jinnah that all the Mulim members
of the proposed Executive Council would be chosen from the Mus-
lim League. On 9 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah informed Lord Wavell:
“I regret I am not in a position to send the names on behalf of the
Muslim League for inclusion in the proposed Executive Council
as desired by you. "
The Simla Conference met at 11 A. M. on 14 July, 1945 and
Lord Wavell made an official announcement of the failure of the
Conference. The words used by him were: “the Conference has
therefore failed. . . . . . I wish to make it clear that the responsibility
for failure is mine. "
At a Press Conference at Simla on 14 July, Maulana Azad stated
that the Conference had failed because Mr. Jinnah insisted that the
Muslim League alone must nominate all the Muslim members to
the Executive Council of the Viceroy and that demand was not
accepted by the Congress.
Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Premier and leader of the
Unionist Party of the Punjab, stated on 15 July "that the differen-
ces between them (the Congress and the League) were the cause
of the failure of the Conference-not the allotment of a seat to a
Punjabi Muslim. ” In his press statement issued on 15 July, Master
Tara Singh, the Akali Sikh Leader, said: “The situation boiled
.
## p. 850 (#892) ############################################
850
PAKISTAN
down to this. The League insisted upon the recognition of its right
to nominate all the Muslim members of the Executive Council, as
the sole representative body of the Muslims. But the Congress
refused to admit this position and insisted upon its national charac-
ter and consequently upon its right of nominating at least one of
the Muslim members of the Executive Council. So the dispute was
for one seat only which resulted in this gigantic failure. ” The view
of the Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of North-Western Frontier Province,
was that “the entire responsibility of the failure of the Simla Con-
ference lay on the obstinate attitude of Mr. Jinnah. ” Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mookerjee, President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha,
maintained that the Conference broke down "because Mr. Jinnah's
increasing demands were unacceptable to others and the Viceroy
was not prepared to have an interim settlement without the co-
operation and consent of the Muslim League. ”
About the Simla Conference, the Times of London wrote: “There
will be natural disposition, in spite of Lord Wavell's counsel, to
place the blame for the failure on Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim
League. ” The Daily Telegraph wrote: “As on previous occasions,
the cause of the deadlock has been the ancient hostility between
the Muslims and the Hindus. Though the Viceroy labɔured tire-
lessly to produce a more accommodating spirit, Mr. Jinnah would
not agree even to submit a list of names unless the exclusive right
of the Muslim League to speak for the Muslims was accepted in
advance. " The News. Chronicle observed: “The responsibility for
the failure of the Simla Conference was not Lord Wavell's. It was
Mr. Jinnah's and Mr. Jinnah's alone. The Muslim League is no
more completely representative of Muslim India than the Congress
is completely representative of Hindu India. " The Daily Mail re-
marked: “Mr. Gandhi wrecked the Cripps proposals and Simla
was Mr. Jinnah's town. As the leader of the Muslim League, he
duly wrecked the Wavell proposals ”
Mr. Jinnah justified his stand in these words: “On a final exa-
mination and analysis of the Wavell Plan, we found that it was a
snare. There was the combination consisting of the Gandhi Hindu
Congress who stand for India's Hindu National Independence as
one India, and the latest exponent of geographical unity, Lord
Wavell, and Glancy-Khizr (leader of the Punjab Unionist Party),
who are bent upon creating disruption among the Musalmans in
the Punjab. "
It is contended on behalf of the Muslim League that once Mr.
Jinnah came to know that Lord Wavell wanted to include a non-
League Muslim from the Punjab, he was determined to wreck the
Conference. The reason was that he wanted to impress upon all
## p. 851 (#893) ############################################
ELECTIONS OF 1945
851
the Muslim leaders in India and particularly the Muslim leaders
of the Punjab that they were not going to get any prize offices by
remaining outside the Muslim League. It was hoped that in that
manner Mr. Jinnah would be able to bring all the Muslim leaders
under the banner of the Muslim League. It is also pointed out
that Sir Feroz Khan Noon, the Defence Member of the Executive
Council of the Viceroy, assured Mr. Jinnah that Lord Wavell
would not go ahead with his plan without the approval of the
Muslim League. It is also pointed out that Mr. Jinnah was not
keen about the success of the Simla Conference becaus. . his claim
that the Muslim League was the sole representative organisation of
the Muslims had not been established through general elections.
The North-Western Frontier Province had a Congress Ministry.
The Punjab had a Unionist Ministry. The Sind Ministry of Sir
Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah was dependent on Congress sup-
port and Bengal was under Section 93. Mr. Jinnah was in favour
of having general elections so that the Muslim League, with its
enhanced prestige and popularity in 1945, may be able to have
Ministries of its own in some Provinces. That is the reason why
Mr. Jinnah was not anxious about the success of the Sirnla Confer-
ence.
ELECTIONS IN 1945
The Labour Party came to power in England on 10 July, 1945.
Mr. Attlee became the Prime Minister and Pethick Lawrence was
appointed the Secretary of State for India. The war with Japan
ended officially on 14 August, 1945. Lord Wavell was summoned to
London for consultation. He came back to India on 18 Septem
ber, 1945. In a broadcast to the people of India, he declared that
the British Government had decided to hold elections to the Central
and Provincial Legislatures. General elections were actually held
toward the end of 1945. As regards the Central Assembly, the
Muslim League won all the Muslim seats. The Party position in
the Central Assembly was that the Congress had 57, the Muslim
League 30, Independents 5, Akali Sikhs 2 and Europeans 8. The
total number of elected seats was 102. In the Provinces, the Con-
gress was able to form Ministries in Assam, Bihar, the United Pro-
vinces, Bombay, Madras, Orissa, the Central Provinces and the
North-Western Frontier Province. Although the Muslim League
had done equally well, it was able to form Ministries only in Bengal
and Sind. The Muslim League won 79 out of 86 Muslim seats,
but it was not able to form a ministry in the Punjab as it failed to
have a clear majority in a house of 175 members. Khizr Hayat
## p. 852 (#894) ############################################
852
PAKISTAN
Khan Tiwana was able to form a Ministry with the help of the
Congress and Sikh votes. In the North-Western Province, the
Muslim League won 17 seats and the Congress 19.
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO INDIA
On 4 December, 1945, Mr. Herbert Morrison, Lord President
of the Council and leader of the House of Commons, made a state-
ment in the House of Commons on the Government Policy towards
India. He pointed out that the policy of the Labour Government
was to promote the early realisation of full self-Government in India.
He also declared that His Majesty's Government regarded the set-
ting up of a constitution-making body by which the Indians will
decide their own future as a matter of the greatest urgency. He
also declared that His Majesty's Government were arranging for
a Parliamentary delegation to go to India under the auspices of the
Empire Parliamentary Association to convey in person ihe general
wish and desire of the people of England that India should speedily
attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner state
in the British Commonwealth and the desire of Parliament to do
everything within its power to promote the speedy attainment of
that objective. A similar statement was made by Lord Pethick
Lawrence in the House of Lords.
On 1 January, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence observed thus in
a broadcast: "I want you to realise that myself, the British Govern-
ment, and, I believe, the whole of the British people earnestly desire
to see India rise 'to the free and full status of an equal partner in
the British Commonwealth'. We will do our utmost to assist India
.
to attain that position. There is no longer any need for denuncia-
tions or organised pressure to secure this end. If there was ever a
time when there was cause for that, it is no longer. ”
The British Parliamentary delegation arrived in New Delhi on
6 January, 1946 and left India on 8 February, 1946 after visiting
various parts of the country and after discussions with various poli-
tical parties of India. The leader of delegation was Professor
Robert Richard. In his final press Conference, he said, "There are
deep divisions among you, but these divisions disappear in the unity
with which you very rightly demand a measure of self-govern-
ment. . . . We are all conscious of the fact that India has at last
attained political manhood. ”
THE CABINET MISSION
On 19 February, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence declared in the
## p. 853 (#895) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
853
House of Lords that the British Government had decided to send a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers to resolve the constitutional
deadlock in India. The members of the Cabinet mission were Lord
Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander.
The mission reached Delhi on 24 March, 1946 and there were pro-
longed discussions between the members of the Cabinet Mission
and Lord Wavell on the one hand and the leaders of the Indian
National Congress and the Muslim League on the ther. The
members of the Cabinet Mission found that they were not able to
accept either the point of view of the Congress or that of the Mus-
lim League. Mr. Jinnah demanded a sovereign Pakistan. The
Congress was even opposed to the creation of an All-India Union
on a three-tier basis. Hence the Mission came to the conclusion
that it must decide the matter in manner which they considered
to be the best under the circumstances. The view of the Mission
was that a new interim Government should be formed and that
should be entrusted with the task of setting up an All-India Com-
mission from the elected members of the Provincial and Central
Assemblies. That Commission was to decide whether there were
to be one or two sovereign states in British India. If the Commis-
sion failed to come to a decision within 30 days, the question was
to be decided by taking votes. If the dissenting minority was more
than a certain prescribed percentage, the question whether they
should be allowed to form a separate state was to be decided in the
following manner. The Muslim representatives in each of the
Legislative Assemblies of Sind, North-Western Frontier Province,
the Punjab and Bengal (with the addition of the district of Sylhet
from Assam) were to meet separately to decide whether they would
like to separate from the rest of India or not. Baluchistan was to
be separated if the contiguous Provinces voted for separation. If
the Muslim representatives of North-Western Frontier Province
voted again separation, the Province was still to be separated if the
surrounding Provinces voted for separation. The non-Muslim re-
presentatives of the districts in which the non-Muslims were in
majority and which were contiguous to India were to be allowed
to vote whether they should be separated from their parent Pro-
vinces and attached to the territory of India. If 75% of the Mus-
lim representatives voted for separation, they were to have a Consti-
tuent Assembly to frame a constitution for their own area. This
scheme was rejected both by the Congress and the Muslim League.
Ultimately, the Cabinet Mission announced their final scheme on
16 May, 1946.
According to the Cabinet Mission Scheme, there was to be Union
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p. 854 (#896) ############################################
854
PAKISTAN
was to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.
The Union was also to have the necessary power to raise the finances
for the above mentioned three subjects. All other subjects were
to vest in the Provinces. The States were to retain all subjects and
powers other than those ceded to the Union of India. The Union
of India was to have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British India and representatives from the Indian states. The
Provinces were to be free to form Groups and each Group was to
determine which Provincial subjects be taken in common.
The
constitutions of the Union of India and of the Groups were to con-
tain a Provision whereby any Province, if a majority in its Legisla-
tive Assembly so desired, could call for a reconsideration of the
terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at
ten yearly intervals thereafter.
As regards the constitution-making machinery, the Legislative
Assemblies of the Provinces were to elect the members of that body
on the basis of one representative for one million of the population.
The Sikh and Muslim Legislators were to elect the quota of their
communities on the basis of their population. The representatives
from the Provinces were to divide themselves into three Sections A,
B and C. Section C was to consist of the representatives of Bengal
and Assam, Section B of the Punjab, Sind and North-Western Fron-
tier Province and Section A of the rest of the Provinces of India.
These Sections were to settle the Provincial constitutions for the
Provinces included in each Section and were also to decide whether
any Group Constitution was to be set for those Provinces and if
so with what provincial subjects the Group should deal. The repre-
sentatives of the Sections were then to reassemble and settle the
Union Constitution. The Provinces of India were given the power
to opt out of the Groups by a decision of their Legislatures after
the general elections under the New Constitution. The Resolutions
of the Union Constituent Assembly regarding major Communal
issues were to require a majority of the representatives present and
voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of
the Constituent Assembly was to decide which Resolution raised
major Communal issues and he was to consult the Federal Court
of India before giving his decision. A plan for Interim Govern-
ment was also envisaged in Cabinet Mission Scheme.
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme. The
resolution of the Muslim League accepting the scheme stated: “In
as much as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in
the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six
Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme
## p. 855 (#897) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
855
outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately re-
sult in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan, and the
consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations,
Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabitirig the vast
sub-continent. It is for these reasons that the Muslim League is
accepting the scheme and will join the constitution-making body,
and it will keep in view the opportunity and right of secession of
Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in
the Mission's plan by implication. ”
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme be-
cause it provided for a weak centre and an opportunity to large
Muslim majority Provinces like the Punjab and Bengal to dominate
in their respective Sections. Those Sections were allowed to frame
both Group and Provincial Constitutions. The Provinces were
given the right to opt out but only after the first general election
and under the terms of the constitution settled by the Section.
Moreover, under Sections B and C, the Muslim League was getting
the entire territory of the Provinces like the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam in parts of which the non-Muslims were in a majority. The
Congress was not happy with the Cabinet Mission Scheme as it
provided for the compulsory grouping of the Provinces. In other
words, a Province like North-Western Frontier Province in which
a Congress Government was functioning, could be compelled to
join Section B. The Province of Assam which had a Hindu
majority, could be compelled to join Section C. Mr. Jinnah was
right in saying that the Cabinet Mission Scheme was a sugar-
coated pill for the Congress. Mr. Jinnah was determined to have
Pakistan and he found that the Cabinet Mission Scheme gave him
an opportunity to have it. To begin with, he would have the
compulsory grouping of the Provinces in the North-West and North-
East. When the group constitutions of Sections B and C were
prepared, he could decide later on to leave the Union of India.
In that case, what he was going to have would be the whole of
the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province, Bengal and
Assam. Once these areas became independent of the Union of
India, the Hindu populations from those areas could be turned out
making room for the Muslims from the rest of India to take their
place. The great merit of the Cabinet Scheme from the point of
view of the Muslim League was that it gave them the whole of the
Punjab and the whole of Assam and Bengal. It the Congress had
accepted this Scheme, it would have lost the whole of the Punjab and
the whole of Bengal and Assam. By not accepting it, the Congress
was ultimately able to save East Punjab, the whole of the Province
of Assam minus the district of Sylhet and the whole of West Bengal.
## p. 856 (#898) ############################################
856
PAKISTAN
That explains the reason while the Muslim League enthusiastically
accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme by a resolution passed on
6 June, 1946. The Working Committee of the Congress passed
the resolution on 26 June, 1946 by which it accepted the scheme
partially. The Congress accepted only that part of the Scheme
which dealt with the constitution-making of the country. The
view of the Congress was that the grouping of the Provinces was
not to be compulsory. However, the Congress rejected the Interim
Government Scheme on the ground that the clarifications given on
the subject were not acceptable to it and the resolution of the
Working Committee of the Congress was ratified by the All-India
Congress Committee.
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the Scheme in its entirety, asked
Lord Wavell to invite the Muslim League to form the Interim
Government but Lord Wavell refused to oblige him as he was
anxious to bring the Congress also into the Interim Government.
On 22 July, 1946, Lord Wavell wrote a personal and confiden-
tial letter to Mr. Jinnah with proposals to form an Interim Govern-
ment. It was stated therein that the Interim Government would
consist of fourteen members. Six members including one Scheduled
Caste representatives, would be nominated by the Congress, five
members would be nominated by the Muslim League. Three re-
presentatives of the minorities would be nominated by Viceroy. One
of these three places would be kept for Sikhs. It was not
open to either the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the
names submitted by the other party, provided those were accepted
by the Viceroy. Distribution of portfolios was to be decided after
the parties had agreed to enter the Government and had submitted
their names. The Congress and the Muslim League were each to
have an equitable share of the most important portfolios. Mr.
Jinnah was also informed that assurances about the status of the
Interim Government which had been given by Lord Wavell in his
Jetter dated 30 May, 1946 to Maulana Azad were to stand. Lord
Wavell ended his letter with the following words: “We should not
spend further time in negotiation but should try out at once a
Government on the basis proposed above. If it does not work and
you find the conditions unsatisfactory, it will be open to you to
withdraw, but I am confident that you will not. ” It is clear from
this letter that the Muslim League was not to have the right to
object to the Congress nominating a Muslim in its quota of six.
Mr. Jinnah sent his reply on 31 July, 1946. He pointed out
## p. 857 (#899) ############################################
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
857
to the Viceroy that “Your present proposal clearly destroys the
principle of parity as well as representation according to communi-
ties and gives a clear majority to the Congress as against the
Muslim League to start with. . . . . . I think you will appreciate that
when you start with six Congress and five Muslim League with a
Congress majority, the minority representatives will hold a very
strong position as a balancing element, who would be nominated by
you without even consultation with the Muslim League and this is
serious departure from what we are assured of in your letter of
June 20. . . . " In the end, Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that
there was no chance of the Muslim League accepting the pro-
posal.
But even before writing this letter on 31 July, 1946, Mr. Jinnah
and the Muslim League Council had passed the resolution on 29
July, 1946 in which the Muslim League withdrew its earlier ac-
ceptance of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. In that resolution, it
was declared that "now the time has come for the Muslim Nation
to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just
rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present
British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domi-
nation”. Mr. Jinnah called upon the Muslims throughout India
to observe 16 August, 1946 as Direct Action Day. He told the
Muslims, “our motto should be discipline, unity and srust in the
power of our own nation. If there is not sufficient power, create
that power. If we do that, the Mission and the British Govern-
ment may be rescued, released and freed from being cowed down
by the threats of the Congress that they would launch a struggle
and start non-co-operation. Let us also say that. ” Mr. Jinnah
also declared, “This day we bid good-bye to
constitutional
methods. . . . today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position
a
to use it (Leonard Mosley: The Last Days of the British Raj,
p. 29).
In reply to Mr. Jinnah's letter of 31 July, 1946, Lord Wavell
wrote to him a personal, secret and final letter on 8 August, 1946
in which he stated that the basis of representation was the same
as the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted on 25
June, 1946. Lord Wavell also informed Mr. Jinnah that in view
of the League Resolution of 29 July, 1946, he had decided to in-
vite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government.
The Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee also
authorised the Congress President to accept the invitation of the
Viceroy to form the Interim Government. On 12 August, 1946, the
Viceroy issued a communique from New Delhi in which it was an-
nounced: "His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His
>
## p. 858 (#900) ############################################
858
PAKISTAN
Majesty's Government, has invited the President of the Congress to
make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim Govern-
ment and the President of the Congress has accepted the invitation.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss
his proposals with His Excellency the Viceroy. ” On 13 August,
1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah from
Wardha informing him about the Viceroy's invitation to him as
Congress President to form the Interim Government. In the same
letter, Mr. Nehru wrote: “I have accepted this invitation. I feel
that my first step should be to approach you and seek your co-
operation in the formation of a coalition provisional Government.
It is naturally our desire to have as representative a Government
as possible. . . ”. Mr. Nehru met Mr. Jinnah on 16 August at
Bombay and after the meeting, Mr. Nehru announced: “Co-
operation in the formation of the Provisional Government is being
offered to the Congress by all elements excepting the Muslim League
for the moment. . . . We shall always look for the larger measure of
co-operation. . . .
16 August, 1946 was Direct Action Day for the Muslim League.
At that time, Mr. S. H. Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister of
Bengal. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Muslim League
and also a member of the Working Committee of the All-India
Muslim League. He has been described as an “outwardly affable
but inwardly ruthless politico. ” In the issue of the Calcutta States-
man on 5 August, 1946, he wrote, "Bloodshed and disorder are not
necessarily evil in themselves, if resorted to for a noble
Among Muslims today, no cause is dearer or nobler than Pakis-
tan. . . . . ” On 16 August, 1946, the Muslims of Calcutta did
havoc on the Hindus. Their shops were looted.
women and children were mercilessly butchered. This state of
affairs continued in Calcutta for three days.
Although Mr. Ian Stephens, the editor of the Statesman, was
pro-Muslim, he was constrained to write in these words about the
Calcutta-killing: “When we wrote two days ago, conditions in
Calcutta were horrifying. They have gone beyond that since.
Whatever the appropriate adjective is, they were nothing in com.
parison with what we have subsequently seen. The latest estimate
of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured
number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many busi-
ness houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is
not a riot.
It needs a word found in medieval history, a fury.
Yet fury sounds spontaneous, and there must have been some de-
liberation and organization to set this fury on its way. The horde
who ran about battering and killing with lathis may have found
cause.
Hindu men,
## p. 859 (#901) ############################################
COMMUNAL RIOTS
859
them lying about or brought them out of their own packets, but
that is not to be believed. We have already commented on the
bands who found it easy to get petrol and vehicles when no others
were permitted on the streets. It is not mere supposition that
men were brought into Calcutta to make an impression
thousands have been brutally hurt, smashed eyes, smashed jaws,
smashed limbs, of men, women and children—these are the kind of
political arguments the twentieth century does not expect. . . . What
befell India's largest city last week was no mere communal riot,
as we have hitherto understood the sanguinary term. For three
days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom
the main guilt for it rests is manifest. There has been criticism
of the Governor. We do not think he has emerged particularly
well. But none except a very great man holding his traditionally
constitutional office during such a swift crisis could have done so.
Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it--
upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet which carries responsi-
bility for law and order in Bengal, and particularly upon the one
able man of large administrative experience, the Chief Minister
(Suhrawardy). That in the whole of India the only Province
.
where carnage occurred, on the League's professed peaceful Direct
Action Day, should have been in Bengal, where a League Ministry
holds office, astounds us. ”
The troubles spread from Calcutta to Noakhali in Bengal.
There also the Muslims who formed the majority feli upon the
Hindus who were in a minority. Thousand of Hindus were killed.
Hindu women were molested and butchered. Children were put
to death in a shameless manner. The trouble spread from Bengal
to Bihar where the Hindus had their revenge on the Muslims.
When all this was going on outside, Lord Wavell and Mr. Nehru
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946. On 24 August,
Lord Wavell officially announced the resignation of the care-taker
Government which had been appointed by the Viceroy in June
1946. Lord Wavell also approved the appointment of an Interim
Government proposed by the Congress Party. It was announced
.
that the Interim Government would take office on 2 September
1946 and would consist of the six Congressmen, five Muslims and
three Minority members.
During a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi which was brought
about by the efforts of the Nawab of Bhopal, Mr. Jinnah cleverly
made Mahatma Gandhi sign the following statement: "The Con-
gress does not challenge but accepts that the Muslim League now is
the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the
## p. 860 (#902) ############################################
860
PAKISTAN
Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic
principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to re-
present the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that
any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to
choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the
members of the Congress as their representatives. ” This was the great
tactical victory for Mr. Jinnah and when Mr. Nehru came to know
of it, he wrote to Mr. Jinnah pointing out that “My colleagues and
I did not accept the formula agreed to by Gandhiji and you. "
Mahatma Gandhi also stated in a prayer meeting that he was
thoroughly ashamed of having signed the formula.
“No public
servant has a right to act in this way. ”
Mr. Nehru formed the Interim Government on 2 September,
1946. When he was taking oath inside, there were cries of Pakis-
tan outside. The demonstrators were shouting that they would
have Pakistan at any cost.
MUSLIM LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Lord Wavell was not satisfied with having secured co-operation
from the Congress. He also wanted the Muslim League to join
the Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah was also anxious to join the
Interim Government so that the Muslim League may be able to
fight the battle of Pakistan from a position of strength. It was
in this atmosphere that Lord Wavell invited Mr. Jinnah to come
to New Delhi and see him. Mr. Jinnah came to Delhi from
Bombay on 15 September, and met the Viceroy on 16, 25 and 28
September, 1946. On 2 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy
for nearly an hour.
ment said, “We strongly protest against this offer on behalf of the
Sikh community and hereby declare that the Sikhs will fight to the
bitter end against the proposal. ” Dr. N. B. Khare who at that
time was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, stated on 15
July, 1944 that "it was clear that Mr. Gandhi had accepted Mr.
Rajagopalachari's proposal of dividing the country into more than
one political State. According to Gandhiji himself, vivisection of
India was a sin, so the Mahatma at the present moment is willing
to do a sinful act consciously. ” On 20 July, 1944, Savarkar, Presi-
dent of the Hindu Mahasabha, issued a statement in which he
criticised Mahatma Gandhi and Rajaji "for conceding the Pakistan
claim to Muslims without consulting other organisations and, in
particular, the Hindu Mahasabha. ” Qazi Mohammed Isha, Presi-
dent of Baluchistan Muslim League and a member of the Working
Committee of All India Muslim League, issued a statement on 24
July, 1944, in which he clearly stated that “the Muslim nation
refuses to accept the position of a petitioner. " The All Parties
Hindu Conference was held at Lahore on 13 August, 1944 and
it passed a resolution rejecting Rajaji's formula because it "strikes
at the root of the fundamental geographical culture and historical
oneness, national integrity and administrative unity of India by
proposing the dismemberment and vivisection of the country. ”
Srinivasa Sastri of the National Liberal Federation rejected the
formula because he said: "I dread this idea of division of India. I
dread it like poison. ” It was under these circumstances that
nothing came out of Rajaji's formula.
GANDHI-JINNAH TALKS (1944)
In the month of September, 1944,
September, 1944, there were talks between
Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah at Bombay with a view to find
## p. 847 (#889) ############################################
LIAQUAT-DESAI PACT
847
out some solution of the deadlock prevailing in the country. There
were lengthy negotiations but nothing came out of them as Mr.
Jinnah insisted that the Muslims were a separate nation and
Mahatma Gandhi was not prepared to admit this claim of Mr.
Jinnah. The only result of those talks was that Mr. Jinnah emerg-
ed with greater prestige in India than before. It was realised that
Mr. Jinnah occupied a very high position in the politics of the
country and that was the reason why Mahatma Gandhi was taking
pains to come to a settlement with him.
LIAQUAT-DESAI PACT (1945)
Another attempt was made in the beginning of 1945 to bring
about an understanding between the Congress and the Muslim
League so that they could participate in the formation of an interim
Government at the Centre. This was the Desai-Liaquat Pact.
This pact was between Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress
Party in the Central Assembly and Liaquat Ali Khan, the Deputy
Leader of the Muslim League party in the Central Assembly.
According to that Pact, the Congress and the Muslim League were
to join on the basis of parity in forming an interim Government at
the Centre. The representatives of the minorities like the Sikhs
and the Scheduled Castes were also to be included in the Govern-
ment. The Government was to function within the frame-work of
the Government of India Act, 1935. If the Cabinet could not get
a particular measure passed in the Central Assembly, it was not to
scek recourse to the reserve powers of the Governor-General. The
interim Government was to secure the release of the members of
the Congress Working Committee. There were to be coalition
Ministries in the Provinces consisting of Congress and Muslim
League Members.
Bhulabhai Desai had got the approval of Mahatma Gandhi for
the Pact and Lord Wavell was also in favour of it. However,
Mr. Jinnah made a public statement to the effect that he had no
knowledge of the Desai-Liaquat Pact and whatever had been done
was without any authority from the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah
told Liaquat Ali Khan that he should not have entered into the
Pact without his knowledge and approval. The view of Liaquat
Ali Khan was that it was very necessary for the Muslim League
to come to some understanding with the Congress because the
British were likely to leave India any moment and the rigid atti-
tude of Mr. Jinnah and Mahatma Gandhi was not desirable. His
view was that the younger men should make an attempt to solve
## p. 848 (#890) ############################################
848
PAKISTAN
the deadlock and that is why he entered into a Pact with Bhulabhai
Desai.
SIMLA CONFERENCE
Lord Wavell called a Conference at Simla to resolve the deadlock
in the country. The Conference met at 11 A. M. on 25 June, 1945.
All the invitees, except Mahatma Gandhi, were present. In his
opening speech, Lord Wavell made it clear that the Conference
was not intended to solve the complex problems of India. More-
over, it did not in any way prejudice or prejudge the final issue
between the parties. He asked the members present to consider
him as a sincere friend of India and help him in coming to some
interim settlement.
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, as the President of the Congress,
took pains to explain the position of the Congress. He made it
clear that the British plan dealt with purely temporary and interim
arrangements and it should not be regarded as a precedent for the
permanent arrangement in the future. He also attached consider-
able importance to the declaration that the provisional plan was
intended as a preliminary step towards the achievement of the goal
of India's independence. He also made it clear that although the
Congress Working Committee was taking part in the Conference,
its decision had to be ratified by the All India Congress Committee
many of whose members were still in jails. Maulana Azad also
sought certain clarifications from the Government.
On 26 June, 1945, the Conference discussed the scope, functions
and responsibilities of the Executive Council of the Governor-
General. After about one hour session on 27 June, the Conference
.
adjourned till 29 June to enable the delegates to continue their
private discussions. On 28 June, the private deliberations of the
Conference reached a stage of impasse between the Muslim League
and the Congress. On 29 June, the Conference met as scheduled
but was adjourned after about an hour “to enable the delegates to
carry on further consultations” to submit lists of names for the
Executive Council. It was accepted to reassemble on 14 July,
1945 at Simla.
In the meanwhile, the Secretary to the Governor-General wrote
a letter to Mr. Jinnah on 29 June requesting to him "to prepare
and send him a list giving the names of members of the Muslim
League who, in your opinion, could suitably be included in the pro-
posed Executive Council. The number of names in this list should
be not less than eight or more than twelve. ” Mr. Jinnah was given
## p. 849 (#891) ############################################
SIMLA CONFERENCE
849
the choice to suggest "the names of persons of any community who
are not members of the Muslim League. ”
On 1 July, 1945, Pandit G. B. Pant had a talk with Mr. Jinnah
regarding the fears expressed in the Muslims League circles that
under the new proposals the Muslims would be in a minority and
thus would not get a fair deal. On 2 July, Nawabzada Liaquat
Ali Khan, General Secretary of the All India Muslim League, gave
an interview at Simla in which he contended that the stand of the
Congress party for a share in the Muslim quota of seats in the pro-
posed Executive Council was "most unreasonable and has no justi-
fication whatsoever. "
On 7 July, 1945, Maulana Azad forwarded a panel of 15 names
of whom five were caste Hindus, five Muslims, two non-caste
Hindus, 1 Indian Christian, one Parsi and one Sikh.
Mr. Jinnah sent a reply to the Viceroy on 7 July, 1945 in which
he maintained "that all the Muslim members of the proposed Exe-
cutive Council should be chosen from the Muslim League, subject
to a confidential discussion between Your Excellency and the
President of the Muslim League,” before they were finally recom-
mended by the Viceroy to His Majesty's Government for appoint-
ment. Mr. Jinnah had an interview with Lord Wavell on 8 July,
1945 for about an hour and a half. However, Lord Wavell refus-
ed to give a guarantee to Mr. Jinnah that all the Mulim members
of the proposed Executive Council would be chosen from the Mus-
lim League. On 9 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah informed Lord Wavell:
“I regret I am not in a position to send the names on behalf of the
Muslim League for inclusion in the proposed Executive Council
as desired by you. "
The Simla Conference met at 11 A. M. on 14 July, 1945 and
Lord Wavell made an official announcement of the failure of the
Conference. The words used by him were: “the Conference has
therefore failed. . . . . . I wish to make it clear that the responsibility
for failure is mine. "
At a Press Conference at Simla on 14 July, Maulana Azad stated
that the Conference had failed because Mr. Jinnah insisted that the
Muslim League alone must nominate all the Muslim members to
the Executive Council of the Viceroy and that demand was not
accepted by the Congress.
Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Premier and leader of the
Unionist Party of the Punjab, stated on 15 July "that the differen-
ces between them (the Congress and the League) were the cause
of the failure of the Conference-not the allotment of a seat to a
Punjabi Muslim. ” In his press statement issued on 15 July, Master
Tara Singh, the Akali Sikh Leader, said: “The situation boiled
.
## p. 850 (#892) ############################################
850
PAKISTAN
down to this. The League insisted upon the recognition of its right
to nominate all the Muslim members of the Executive Council, as
the sole representative body of the Muslims. But the Congress
refused to admit this position and insisted upon its national charac-
ter and consequently upon its right of nominating at least one of
the Muslim members of the Executive Council. So the dispute was
for one seat only which resulted in this gigantic failure. ” The view
of the Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of North-Western Frontier Province,
was that “the entire responsibility of the failure of the Simla Con-
ference lay on the obstinate attitude of Mr. Jinnah. ” Dr. Shyama
Prasad Mookerjee, President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha,
maintained that the Conference broke down "because Mr. Jinnah's
increasing demands were unacceptable to others and the Viceroy
was not prepared to have an interim settlement without the co-
operation and consent of the Muslim League. ”
About the Simla Conference, the Times of London wrote: “There
will be natural disposition, in spite of Lord Wavell's counsel, to
place the blame for the failure on Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim
League. ” The Daily Telegraph wrote: “As on previous occasions,
the cause of the deadlock has been the ancient hostility between
the Muslims and the Hindus. Though the Viceroy labɔured tire-
lessly to produce a more accommodating spirit, Mr. Jinnah would
not agree even to submit a list of names unless the exclusive right
of the Muslim League to speak for the Muslims was accepted in
advance. " The News. Chronicle observed: “The responsibility for
the failure of the Simla Conference was not Lord Wavell's. It was
Mr. Jinnah's and Mr. Jinnah's alone. The Muslim League is no
more completely representative of Muslim India than the Congress
is completely representative of Hindu India. " The Daily Mail re-
marked: “Mr. Gandhi wrecked the Cripps proposals and Simla
was Mr. Jinnah's town. As the leader of the Muslim League, he
duly wrecked the Wavell proposals ”
Mr. Jinnah justified his stand in these words: “On a final exa-
mination and analysis of the Wavell Plan, we found that it was a
snare. There was the combination consisting of the Gandhi Hindu
Congress who stand for India's Hindu National Independence as
one India, and the latest exponent of geographical unity, Lord
Wavell, and Glancy-Khizr (leader of the Punjab Unionist Party),
who are bent upon creating disruption among the Musalmans in
the Punjab. "
It is contended on behalf of the Muslim League that once Mr.
Jinnah came to know that Lord Wavell wanted to include a non-
League Muslim from the Punjab, he was determined to wreck the
Conference. The reason was that he wanted to impress upon all
## p. 851 (#893) ############################################
ELECTIONS OF 1945
851
the Muslim leaders in India and particularly the Muslim leaders
of the Punjab that they were not going to get any prize offices by
remaining outside the Muslim League. It was hoped that in that
manner Mr. Jinnah would be able to bring all the Muslim leaders
under the banner of the Muslim League. It is also pointed out
that Sir Feroz Khan Noon, the Defence Member of the Executive
Council of the Viceroy, assured Mr. Jinnah that Lord Wavell
would not go ahead with his plan without the approval of the
Muslim League. It is also pointed out that Mr. Jinnah was not
keen about the success of the Simla Conference becaus. . his claim
that the Muslim League was the sole representative organisation of
the Muslims had not been established through general elections.
The North-Western Frontier Province had a Congress Ministry.
The Punjab had a Unionist Ministry. The Sind Ministry of Sir
Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah was dependent on Congress sup-
port and Bengal was under Section 93. Mr. Jinnah was in favour
of having general elections so that the Muslim League, with its
enhanced prestige and popularity in 1945, may be able to have
Ministries of its own in some Provinces. That is the reason why
Mr. Jinnah was not anxious about the success of the Sirnla Confer-
ence.
ELECTIONS IN 1945
The Labour Party came to power in England on 10 July, 1945.
Mr. Attlee became the Prime Minister and Pethick Lawrence was
appointed the Secretary of State for India. The war with Japan
ended officially on 14 August, 1945. Lord Wavell was summoned to
London for consultation. He came back to India on 18 Septem
ber, 1945. In a broadcast to the people of India, he declared that
the British Government had decided to hold elections to the Central
and Provincial Legislatures. General elections were actually held
toward the end of 1945. As regards the Central Assembly, the
Muslim League won all the Muslim seats. The Party position in
the Central Assembly was that the Congress had 57, the Muslim
League 30, Independents 5, Akali Sikhs 2 and Europeans 8. The
total number of elected seats was 102. In the Provinces, the Con-
gress was able to form Ministries in Assam, Bihar, the United Pro-
vinces, Bombay, Madras, Orissa, the Central Provinces and the
North-Western Frontier Province. Although the Muslim League
had done equally well, it was able to form Ministries only in Bengal
and Sind. The Muslim League won 79 out of 86 Muslim seats,
but it was not able to form a ministry in the Punjab as it failed to
have a clear majority in a house of 175 members. Khizr Hayat
## p. 852 (#894) ############################################
852
PAKISTAN
Khan Tiwana was able to form a Ministry with the help of the
Congress and Sikh votes. In the North-Western Province, the
Muslim League won 17 seats and the Congress 19.
PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO INDIA
On 4 December, 1945, Mr. Herbert Morrison, Lord President
of the Council and leader of the House of Commons, made a state-
ment in the House of Commons on the Government Policy towards
India. He pointed out that the policy of the Labour Government
was to promote the early realisation of full self-Government in India.
He also declared that His Majesty's Government regarded the set-
ting up of a constitution-making body by which the Indians will
decide their own future as a matter of the greatest urgency. He
also declared that His Majesty's Government were arranging for
a Parliamentary delegation to go to India under the auspices of the
Empire Parliamentary Association to convey in person ihe general
wish and desire of the people of England that India should speedily
attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner state
in the British Commonwealth and the desire of Parliament to do
everything within its power to promote the speedy attainment of
that objective. A similar statement was made by Lord Pethick
Lawrence in the House of Lords.
On 1 January, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence observed thus in
a broadcast: "I want you to realise that myself, the British Govern-
ment, and, I believe, the whole of the British people earnestly desire
to see India rise 'to the free and full status of an equal partner in
the British Commonwealth'. We will do our utmost to assist India
.
to attain that position. There is no longer any need for denuncia-
tions or organised pressure to secure this end. If there was ever a
time when there was cause for that, it is no longer. ”
The British Parliamentary delegation arrived in New Delhi on
6 January, 1946 and left India on 8 February, 1946 after visiting
various parts of the country and after discussions with various poli-
tical parties of India. The leader of delegation was Professor
Robert Richard. In his final press Conference, he said, "There are
deep divisions among you, but these divisions disappear in the unity
with which you very rightly demand a measure of self-govern-
ment. . . . We are all conscious of the fact that India has at last
attained political manhood. ”
THE CABINET MISSION
On 19 February, 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence declared in the
## p. 853 (#895) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
853
House of Lords that the British Government had decided to send a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers to resolve the constitutional
deadlock in India. The members of the Cabinet mission were Lord
Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. A. V. Alexander.
The mission reached Delhi on 24 March, 1946 and there were pro-
longed discussions between the members of the Cabinet Mission
and Lord Wavell on the one hand and the leaders of the Indian
National Congress and the Muslim League on the ther. The
members of the Cabinet Mission found that they were not able to
accept either the point of view of the Congress or that of the Mus-
lim League. Mr. Jinnah demanded a sovereign Pakistan. The
Congress was even opposed to the creation of an All-India Union
on a three-tier basis. Hence the Mission came to the conclusion
that it must decide the matter in manner which they considered
to be the best under the circumstances. The view of the Mission
was that a new interim Government should be formed and that
should be entrusted with the task of setting up an All-India Com-
mission from the elected members of the Provincial and Central
Assemblies. That Commission was to decide whether there were
to be one or two sovereign states in British India. If the Commis-
sion failed to come to a decision within 30 days, the question was
to be decided by taking votes. If the dissenting minority was more
than a certain prescribed percentage, the question whether they
should be allowed to form a separate state was to be decided in the
following manner. The Muslim representatives in each of the
Legislative Assemblies of Sind, North-Western Frontier Province,
the Punjab and Bengal (with the addition of the district of Sylhet
from Assam) were to meet separately to decide whether they would
like to separate from the rest of India or not. Baluchistan was to
be separated if the contiguous Provinces voted for separation. If
the Muslim representatives of North-Western Frontier Province
voted again separation, the Province was still to be separated if the
surrounding Provinces voted for separation. The non-Muslim re-
presentatives of the districts in which the non-Muslims were in
majority and which were contiguous to India were to be allowed
to vote whether they should be separated from their parent Pro-
vinces and attached to the territory of India. If 75% of the Mus-
lim representatives voted for separation, they were to have a Consti-
tuent Assembly to frame a constitution for their own area. This
scheme was rejected both by the Congress and the Muslim League.
Ultimately, the Cabinet Mission announced their final scheme on
16 May, 1946.
According to the Cabinet Mission Scheme, there was to be Union
of India embracing both British India and the Indian states and it
## p. 854 (#896) ############################################
854
PAKISTAN
was to deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications.
The Union was also to have the necessary power to raise the finances
for the above mentioned three subjects. All other subjects were
to vest in the Provinces. The States were to retain all subjects and
powers other than those ceded to the Union of India. The Union
of India was to have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British India and representatives from the Indian states. The
Provinces were to be free to form Groups and each Group was to
determine which Provincial subjects be taken in common.
The
constitutions of the Union of India and of the Groups were to con-
tain a Provision whereby any Province, if a majority in its Legisla-
tive Assembly so desired, could call for a reconsideration of the
terms of the constitution after an initial period of ten years and at
ten yearly intervals thereafter.
As regards the constitution-making machinery, the Legislative
Assemblies of the Provinces were to elect the members of that body
on the basis of one representative for one million of the population.
The Sikh and Muslim Legislators were to elect the quota of their
communities on the basis of their population. The representatives
from the Provinces were to divide themselves into three Sections A,
B and C. Section C was to consist of the representatives of Bengal
and Assam, Section B of the Punjab, Sind and North-Western Fron-
tier Province and Section A of the rest of the Provinces of India.
These Sections were to settle the Provincial constitutions for the
Provinces included in each Section and were also to decide whether
any Group Constitution was to be set for those Provinces and if
so with what provincial subjects the Group should deal. The repre-
sentatives of the Sections were then to reassemble and settle the
Union Constitution. The Provinces of India were given the power
to opt out of the Groups by a decision of their Legislatures after
the general elections under the New Constitution. The Resolutions
of the Union Constituent Assembly regarding major Communal
issues were to require a majority of the representatives present and
voting of each of the two major communities. The Chairman of
the Constituent Assembly was to decide which Resolution raised
major Communal issues and he was to consult the Federal Court
of India before giving his decision. A plan for Interim Govern-
ment was also envisaged in Cabinet Mission Scheme.
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme. The
resolution of the Muslim League accepting the scheme stated: “In
as much as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in
the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six
Muslim Provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme
## p. 855 (#897) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION SCHEME
855
outlined by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately re-
sult in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan, and the
consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations,
Muslims and Hindus, and all the other people inhabitirig the vast
sub-continent. It is for these reasons that the Muslim League is
accepting the scheme and will join the constitution-making body,
and it will keep in view the opportunity and right of secession of
Provinces or groups from the Union, which have been provided in
the Mission's plan by implication. ”
The Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme be-
cause it provided for a weak centre and an opportunity to large
Muslim majority Provinces like the Punjab and Bengal to dominate
in their respective Sections. Those Sections were allowed to frame
both Group and Provincial Constitutions. The Provinces were
given the right to opt out but only after the first general election
and under the terms of the constitution settled by the Section.
Moreover, under Sections B and C, the Muslim League was getting
the entire territory of the Provinces like the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam in parts of which the non-Muslims were in a majority. The
Congress was not happy with the Cabinet Mission Scheme as it
provided for the compulsory grouping of the Provinces. In other
words, a Province like North-Western Frontier Province in which
a Congress Government was functioning, could be compelled to
join Section B. The Province of Assam which had a Hindu
majority, could be compelled to join Section C. Mr. Jinnah was
right in saying that the Cabinet Mission Scheme was a sugar-
coated pill for the Congress. Mr. Jinnah was determined to have
Pakistan and he found that the Cabinet Mission Scheme gave him
an opportunity to have it. To begin with, he would have the
compulsory grouping of the Provinces in the North-West and North-
East. When the group constitutions of Sections B and C were
prepared, he could decide later on to leave the Union of India.
In that case, what he was going to have would be the whole of
the Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province, Bengal and
Assam. Once these areas became independent of the Union of
India, the Hindu populations from those areas could be turned out
making room for the Muslims from the rest of India to take their
place. The great merit of the Cabinet Scheme from the point of
view of the Muslim League was that it gave them the whole of the
Punjab and the whole of Assam and Bengal. It the Congress had
accepted this Scheme, it would have lost the whole of the Punjab and
the whole of Bengal and Assam. By not accepting it, the Congress
was ultimately able to save East Punjab, the whole of the Province
of Assam minus the district of Sylhet and the whole of West Bengal.
## p. 856 (#898) ############################################
856
PAKISTAN
That explains the reason while the Muslim League enthusiastically
accepted the Cabinet Mission Scheme by a resolution passed on
6 June, 1946. The Working Committee of the Congress passed
the resolution on 26 June, 1946 by which it accepted the scheme
partially. The Congress accepted only that part of the Scheme
which dealt with the constitution-making of the country. The
view of the Congress was that the grouping of the Provinces was
not to be compulsory. However, the Congress rejected the Interim
Government Scheme on the ground that the clarifications given on
the subject were not acceptable to it and the resolution of the
Working Committee of the Congress was ratified by the All-India
Congress Committee.
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the Scheme in its entirety, asked
Lord Wavell to invite the Muslim League to form the Interim
Government but Lord Wavell refused to oblige him as he was
anxious to bring the Congress also into the Interim Government.
On 22 July, 1946, Lord Wavell wrote a personal and confiden-
tial letter to Mr. Jinnah with proposals to form an Interim Govern-
ment. It was stated therein that the Interim Government would
consist of fourteen members. Six members including one Scheduled
Caste representatives, would be nominated by the Congress, five
members would be nominated by the Muslim League. Three re-
presentatives of the minorities would be nominated by Viceroy. One
of these three places would be kept for Sikhs. It was not
open to either the Congress or the Muslim League to object to the
names submitted by the other party, provided those were accepted
by the Viceroy. Distribution of portfolios was to be decided after
the parties had agreed to enter the Government and had submitted
their names. The Congress and the Muslim League were each to
have an equitable share of the most important portfolios. Mr.
Jinnah was also informed that assurances about the status of the
Interim Government which had been given by Lord Wavell in his
Jetter dated 30 May, 1946 to Maulana Azad were to stand. Lord
Wavell ended his letter with the following words: “We should not
spend further time in negotiation but should try out at once a
Government on the basis proposed above. If it does not work and
you find the conditions unsatisfactory, it will be open to you to
withdraw, but I am confident that you will not. ” It is clear from
this letter that the Muslim League was not to have the right to
object to the Congress nominating a Muslim in its quota of six.
Mr. Jinnah sent his reply on 31 July, 1946. He pointed out
## p. 857 (#899) ############################################
FORMATION OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT
857
to the Viceroy that “Your present proposal clearly destroys the
principle of parity as well as representation according to communi-
ties and gives a clear majority to the Congress as against the
Muslim League to start with. . . . . . I think you will appreciate that
when you start with six Congress and five Muslim League with a
Congress majority, the minority representatives will hold a very
strong position as a balancing element, who would be nominated by
you without even consultation with the Muslim League and this is
serious departure from what we are assured of in your letter of
June 20. . . . " In the end, Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy that
there was no chance of the Muslim League accepting the pro-
posal.
But even before writing this letter on 31 July, 1946, Mr. Jinnah
and the Muslim League Council had passed the resolution on 29
July, 1946 in which the Muslim League withdrew its earlier ac-
ceptance of the Cabinet Mission Scheme. In that resolution, it
was declared that "now the time has come for the Muslim Nation
to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just
rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present
British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domi-
nation”. Mr. Jinnah called upon the Muslims throughout India
to observe 16 August, 1946 as Direct Action Day. He told the
Muslims, “our motto should be discipline, unity and srust in the
power of our own nation. If there is not sufficient power, create
that power. If we do that, the Mission and the British Govern-
ment may be rescued, released and freed from being cowed down
by the threats of the Congress that they would launch a struggle
and start non-co-operation. Let us also say that. ” Mr. Jinnah
also declared, “This day we bid good-bye to
constitutional
methods. . . . today we have also forged a pistol and are in a position
a
to use it (Leonard Mosley: The Last Days of the British Raj,
p. 29).
In reply to Mr. Jinnah's letter of 31 July, 1946, Lord Wavell
wrote to him a personal, secret and final letter on 8 August, 1946
in which he stated that the basis of representation was the same
as the Muslim League Working Committee had accepted on 25
June, 1946. Lord Wavell also informed Mr. Jinnah that in view
of the League Resolution of 29 July, 1946, he had decided to in-
vite the Congress to make proposals for an interim Government.
The Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee also
authorised the Congress President to accept the invitation of the
Viceroy to form the Interim Government. On 12 August, 1946, the
Viceroy issued a communique from New Delhi in which it was an-
nounced: "His Excellency the Viceroy, with the approval of His
>
## p. 858 (#900) ############################################
858
PAKISTAN
Majesty's Government, has invited the President of the Congress to
make proposals for the immediate formation of an Interim Govern-
ment and the President of the Congress has accepted the invitation.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will shortly visit New Delhi to discuss
his proposals with His Excellency the Viceroy. ” On 13 August,
1946, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Mr. Jinnah from
Wardha informing him about the Viceroy's invitation to him as
Congress President to form the Interim Government. In the same
letter, Mr. Nehru wrote: “I have accepted this invitation. I feel
that my first step should be to approach you and seek your co-
operation in the formation of a coalition provisional Government.
It is naturally our desire to have as representative a Government
as possible. . . ”. Mr. Nehru met Mr. Jinnah on 16 August at
Bombay and after the meeting, Mr. Nehru announced: “Co-
operation in the formation of the Provisional Government is being
offered to the Congress by all elements excepting the Muslim League
for the moment. . . . We shall always look for the larger measure of
co-operation. . . .
16 August, 1946 was Direct Action Day for the Muslim League.
At that time, Mr. S. H. Suhrawardy was the Chief Minister of
Bengal. He was an enthusiastic supporter of the Muslim League
and also a member of the Working Committee of the All-India
Muslim League. He has been described as an “outwardly affable
but inwardly ruthless politico. ” In the issue of the Calcutta States-
man on 5 August, 1946, he wrote, "Bloodshed and disorder are not
necessarily evil in themselves, if resorted to for a noble
Among Muslims today, no cause is dearer or nobler than Pakis-
tan. . . . . ” On 16 August, 1946, the Muslims of Calcutta did
havoc on the Hindus. Their shops were looted.
women and children were mercilessly butchered. This state of
affairs continued in Calcutta for three days.
Although Mr. Ian Stephens, the editor of the Statesman, was
pro-Muslim, he was constrained to write in these words about the
Calcutta-killing: “When we wrote two days ago, conditions in
Calcutta were horrifying. They have gone beyond that since.
Whatever the appropriate adjective is, they were nothing in com.
parison with what we have subsequently seen. The latest estimate
of dead is 3,000, who have lain thick about the streets. The injured
number many thousand and it is impossible to say how many busi-
ness houses and private dwellings have been destroyed. This is
not a riot.
It needs a word found in medieval history, a fury.
Yet fury sounds spontaneous, and there must have been some de-
liberation and organization to set this fury on its way. The horde
who ran about battering and killing with lathis may have found
cause.
Hindu men,
## p. 859 (#901) ############################################
COMMUNAL RIOTS
859
them lying about or brought them out of their own packets, but
that is not to be believed. We have already commented on the
bands who found it easy to get petrol and vehicles when no others
were permitted on the streets. It is not mere supposition that
men were brought into Calcutta to make an impression
thousands have been brutally hurt, smashed eyes, smashed jaws,
smashed limbs, of men, women and children—these are the kind of
political arguments the twentieth century does not expect. . . . What
befell India's largest city last week was no mere communal riot,
as we have hitherto understood the sanguinary term. For three
days, the city concentrated on unrestrained civil war. Upon whom
the main guilt for it rests is manifest. There has been criticism
of the Governor. We do not think he has emerged particularly
well. But none except a very great man holding his traditionally
constitutional office during such a swift crisis could have done so.
Where the primary blame lies is where we have squarely put it--
upon the Provincial Muslim League Cabinet which carries responsi-
bility for law and order in Bengal, and particularly upon the one
able man of large administrative experience, the Chief Minister
(Suhrawardy). That in the whole of India the only Province
.
where carnage occurred, on the League's professed peaceful Direct
Action Day, should have been in Bengal, where a League Ministry
holds office, astounds us. ”
The troubles spread from Calcutta to Noakhali in Bengal.
There also the Muslims who formed the majority feli upon the
Hindus who were in a minority. Thousand of Hindus were killed.
Hindu women were molested and butchered. Children were put
to death in a shameless manner. The trouble spread from Bengal
to Bihar where the Hindus had their revenge on the Muslims.
When all this was going on outside, Lord Wavell and Mr. Nehru
had their preliminary conversations regarding the formation of the
Interim Government on 17 and 18 August, 1946. On 24 August,
Lord Wavell officially announced the resignation of the care-taker
Government which had been appointed by the Viceroy in June
1946. Lord Wavell also approved the appointment of an Interim
Government proposed by the Congress Party. It was announced
.
that the Interim Government would take office on 2 September
1946 and would consist of the six Congressmen, five Muslims and
three Minority members.
During a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi which was brought
about by the efforts of the Nawab of Bhopal, Mr. Jinnah cleverly
made Mahatma Gandhi sign the following statement: "The Con-
gress does not challenge but accepts that the Muslim League now is
the authoritative representative of an overwhelming majority of the
## p. 860 (#902) ############################################
860
PAKISTAN
Muslims of India. As such and in accordance with democratic
principles they alone have today an unquestionable right to re-
present the Muslims of India. But the Congress cannot agree that
any restriction or limitation should be put upon the Congress to
choose such representatives as they think proper from amongst the
members of the Congress as their representatives. ” This was the great
tactical victory for Mr. Jinnah and when Mr. Nehru came to know
of it, he wrote to Mr. Jinnah pointing out that “My colleagues and
I did not accept the formula agreed to by Gandhiji and you. "
Mahatma Gandhi also stated in a prayer meeting that he was
thoroughly ashamed of having signed the formula.
“No public
servant has a right to act in this way. ”
Mr. Nehru formed the Interim Government on 2 September,
1946. When he was taking oath inside, there were cries of Pakis-
tan outside. The demonstrators were shouting that they would
have Pakistan at any cost.
MUSLIM LEAGUE JOINS INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Lord Wavell was not satisfied with having secured co-operation
from the Congress. He also wanted the Muslim League to join
the Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah was also anxious to join the
Interim Government so that the Muslim League may be able to
fight the battle of Pakistan from a position of strength. It was
in this atmosphere that Lord Wavell invited Mr. Jinnah to come
to New Delhi and see him. Mr. Jinnah came to Delhi from
Bombay on 15 September, and met the Viceroy on 16, 25 and 28
September, 1946. On 2 October, Mr. Jinnah met the Viceroy
for nearly an hour.
