Heroism became and remained, in part to the present day, a
dominant
cultural factor.
Peter-Sloterdijk-Critique-of-Cynical-Reason
17.
With Diogenes, under the slogan Remint the Coins, there begins what will be called by the neokynic Nietzsche "the revaluing of all values," the cultural revolution of the "naked truth.
" Nietzsche, of course, ruins the point.
His revaluation turns the kynical rejection of power into a will to power; with this he changes sides and provides the powerful with a philosophy of disinhibition.
18.
Feminism thus has an originally kynical side; indeed, it is perhaps the present-day core of neokynicism.
For example, it encourages women to discover masturbation so as to detach themselves
from the compulsions of marriage.
19. Helmut Schmidt still cites his ethics.
20. This image prevails from about the time of Nero. In Cicero's time, the sects, which dominated
the ideological scene for a hundred years, are scarcely mentioned.
21. The interpretation of the late-ancient existential anxiety-among other things, a premise of
Christianity--is still a challenge to psychohistory.
22. Modern analogy: rival depth-psychological sects (Freudians, Jungians, Reichians, Adlerians,
Janovians, Perlsians, Lacanians, etc. ).
23. Christoph Martin Wieland, too, the best scholar of kynicism in eighteenth-century Germany
and the translator of Lucian, probably sensed that there was something inauthentic in Lucian's con- tempt for Peregrinus. In his novel, Die geheime Geschichte des Peregrinus Proteus (The secret story of Peregrinus Proteus) (1788-89), he thus draws a kinder picture of the philosopher.
24. See chapter 23, "On the German Republic of Impostors," as well as the section in chapter 10 entitled "Knowledge of War and Espionage. "
25. Recall the theses on art as the form of expression of bourgeois neokynicism in chapter 5. The arts possessed an exceptional capacity to process negativity. The concept "realism" refers to this in- vestigatory power of art.
26. Since Marx we know that the moving force that plunges modernity into its apparent progres- sive historicity is based on the alliance between capital and science. At the same time we are forced to distinguish more sharply between continuance (Fortgang) and progress (Fortschritt).
27. ". . . you call. . . evil": The Devil is not only an evolutionist but also a nominalist. "Evil" understands itself in another way: as a "power," as a phenomenon of energy, as a position in a natural polarity. Konrad Lorenz, still arguing in the schema of evolution, nowadays treats the phenomenon of aggression consistently from this standpoint: "so-called evil. "
28. Not actionism but "contemplative praxis," to act in order to become conscious.
29. Nietzsche, who initially again consciously called himelf a Cyniker, also coined the phrase "live dangerously. " It is the motto of kynical empiricism toward which Faust orients himself.
30. In its sharpest formulations, Adorno's Minima Moralia, the main work of moral critique in postwar German philosophy, speaks without reserve of the disgrace of surviving; it would be short- sighted to understand this merely as the reaction to Jewish experiences in those years (1943 on). On the morality of survival see also Elias Canetti, Masse undMacht (Munich, 1976) (Crowds and power; 1962).
31. In chapter 10, the way of seeing that leads to the "black empiricism" of the enlightenment sciences will be described.
32. "Boogie-woogie of the hormones" (Arthur Miller).
33. We are reading it here without regard to its context in the novel.
34. One hundred years after Dostoyevsky wrote this, the full implications of this reflection seem
to be coming to light, since, in Western leftist traditions, a departure from the "spirit of the (Christian) Utopia" is being carried out with a previously unknown profundity and since the intelligentsia ex- periences, directly and on its own responsibility, the ineluctability of the principle of power and of the reason of state. The Left in political power: With this, moral-political and psychic complications with a new degree of complexity begin.
212 ? THE CABINET OF CYNICS
35. "The world is everything that is the case," positivism will say later. If one takes the expression "the case is" somewhat more generously, the great realists of the nineteenth century are thoroughly positivistic--or at least "on the way" to positivism. For Marx, class struggles (although a universal concept) are the case; for Nietzsche, the will to power; for Freud, drives.
36. That is certainly no longer the biblical Jesus but a Jesus from the perspective of Judas, a Judas who seeks disburdening. His tragic cynicism evades an unbearable guilt; psychoanalytically, this probably belongs to the psychodynamic of the patricidal son, who can continue to live without suffocating on his guilt only by finding reasons for why he had to kill.
37. Here we approach the third level of the development of the concept of cynicism which will be presented in Part III.
38. Historicism contributes something decisive to this by educating us to see all phenomena of consciousness as a "product of their time"; it can easily be combined with psychologism as well as sociologism.
39. For this reason, conservatives often have a clear consciousness of "semantics. "
40. See "Minima Amoralia," in chapter 9.
41. Applied to the area of (church) politics, this dualism is expressed as power and spirit.
42. Overcoming of nihilism? "The results of the overcoming . . . are always worse than what
is overcome"; Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 371.
43. Christian substitute: One does it for the good of others.
44. Only once has Diogenes been seen in this way in modernity. Nietzsche's metaphysical happen-
ing in which the "crazy person" with the lantern announces: "God is dead" was the signal of neo- kynicism.
45. In Part IV, I pursue this "translation" further and investigate what subjugation and being sub- jugated mean for epistemology.
46. Mephistopheles: "If I had not reserved fire for myself/1 would have nothing apart for myself. "
47. [Heidegger's term has many connotations. Verfallen can mean "degenerated," "lapsed," "decayed," "addicted," "fallen. " The sense of having fallen ("fallenness") into the habit of everyday- ness seems to predominate. --Trans. ]
48. Nihilism? For a long time, the Marxist critique of Heidegger wanted to see in him nothing other than the swan song of the decadent bourgeoisie that had been left stranded even by the will to a future. Heidegger as speaker for a fascistoid nihilism and cult of death? Hardly. Rather, he con- tributed an impulse against the socialisms of the "great tomorrow," against Utopias of endless sacrifice.
49. Here I take up a motif of Michel Foucault's.
50. Concreteness does not exclude vagueness.
51. [Unbehaustheit recalls, among other things, Diogenes and his tub and suggests the original-
fundamental insecurity of all existence, naked ejection into the world. --Trans. ]
52. An assessment of Nietzsche will always depend strongly on how one conceives of the "will to power. " Encouragement to imperial cynicism? Cathartic confession? Aesthetic motto? Self- correction of an inhibited person? Vitalistic slogan? Metaphysics of narcissism? Propaganda of disin-
hibition?
53. This is a modern equivalent for the Delphic "Know thyself. " The Freudian ego is attributable
rather to Anyone. Is the psychoanalyzed person an accommodated person, someone cut down to size? 54. This reflected amoralism, which, paradoxically, carries the mute promise of an authentic ethi- cal life within it, has found its opponent in socialist moralism. The more recent Critical Theory has also renounced the sensitivistic quasi-amoralism of Adorno's "aesthetic theory" and steers with direct argumentation toward a positive ethics. That may signify an advance in a certain respect--if it avoids falling behind the radical modernity of existential and aesthetic amoralism. The latter already works on modern experiences with every morality and all categorical imperatives: Because these forms of "Ought" result in idealistic overexertions, imperative ethics comes with its own gravedigger-
skepticism, resignation, cynicism. Moralism, with its "you should" inevitably drives us into an "I
THE CABINET OF CYNICS ? 213
can't. " Amoralism, by contrast, which proceeds from the "you can," realistically banks on the chance that what "I can" in the end will also be the right thing. The turn to practical philosophy that happily characterizes every present-day fundamental thinking that is world-wise should not tempt us to again let loose at being with a categorical imperative. Kynical reason, therefore, develops a nonimperative ethics that encourages the Can, instead of entangling us in the depressive complications of the Ought.
55. Recently, Hermann Morchen's extended study of Heidegger and Adorno has taken on these questions.
II. Phenomenological Main Text
Chapter 8
The Cardinal Cynicisms
In hasty ill humor, I have ripped the fig leaves from some naked thoughts.
Heinrich Heine, preface to Germany, a Winter's Tale
From what we have seen then, the concept of cynicism contains more than a first glance would lead us to expect. It is one of those things that, if given an inch, will take a mile. Our curiosity aroused, we wanted at first to "see what's really in it," and thereby --we noticed it too late--we experienced something that bog- gles our minds. We wanted to learn something about cynicism and discovered in doing so that it has long since brought us under its domination.
To this point, we have presented the concept of cynicism in two versions, and a third clearly emerges after chapter 7, "The Cabinet of Cynics. " The first says: Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness--unhappy consciousness in modern- ized form. Our approach here is intuitive, starting with a paradox; it articulates an uneasiness that sees the modern world steeped in cultural insanities, false hopes and their disappointment, in the progress of madness and the suspension of reason, in the deep schism that runs through modern consciousnesses and that seems to separate the rational and the real, what we know and what we do, from each other for all time. In the description we achieved a pathography that probed schizoid phenomena. It tried to find words for the perversely complicated struc- tures of a consciousness that has become reflective and is almost more melancholy than false; it is a consciousness that, under the compulsions of self-preservation, continues to run itself, though run down, in a permanent moral self-denial.
In the second version, the concept of cynicism assumes a historical dimension. A tension becomes apparent that, in the ancient critique of civilization, had first found expression under the name of kynicism: the urge of individuals to maintain
217
218 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
themselves as fully rational living beings against the distortions and semirationali- ties of their societies. Existence in resistance, in laughter, in refusal, in the appeal to the whole of nature and a full life. It begins as plebeian "individualism," panto- mimic, wily, and quick-witted. Some of this trickles through to the more serious Stoa; iridescent transitions to Christianity are effected but die out to the extent that Christian theology negates and even damns the ancient-heathen inheritance. We reserved the concept of cynicism for the reply of the rulers and the ruling cul- ture to the kynical provocation. They definitely see that there is an element of truth in it, but proceed with oppression. From now on, they know what they do.
The concept here undergoes a split into the dichotomy: kynicism-cynicism that, in substance, corresponds to resistance and repression, or more precisely, self-embodiment in resistance and self-splitting in repression. The phenomenon of kynicism is thereby separated from its historical origin and becomes a type that crops up again and again historically whenever, in crisis civilizations and civiliza- tion crises, consciousnesses clash with each other. Kynicism and cynicism are, accordingly, constants in our history, typical forms of a polemical consciousness "from below" and "from above. " In them, the opposition of high culture and peo- ple's culture is lived out as the exposure of paradoxes within high-cultural ethics.
Here, the third version of the concept of cynicism continues on to a phenome- nology of polemical forms of consciousness. The polemic always revolves around the correct conception of the truth as "naked" truth. Cynical thinking, namely, can arise only when two views of things have become possible, an official and an unofficial view, a veiled and a naked view, one from the viewpoint of heroes and one from the viewpoint of valets. In a culture in which one is regularly told lies, one wants to know not merely the truth but the naked truth. Where that cannot be that is not allowed to be, one has to draw out what the "naked" facts look like, no matter what morality has to say about it. In a certain way, "ruling" and "lying" are synonyms. The truth of rulers and that of servants are different.
In this phenomenological sighting of contestable forms of consciousness, we must "sublate" (aufheben) the bias in favor of the kynical standpoint. At first, we will have to patiently and somewhat dryly look at how, in six great arenas of values-the military, politics, sexuality, medicine, religion, and knowledge (the- ory)--kynical and cynical consciousnesses confront, attack, retaliate against each other, qualify each other, provoke each other, and finally get to know and neutral- ize each other. In the cardinal cynicisms, the contours of a combative history of ideas emerge. Such a history describes that "labor on the ideal" that stands at the heart of high-cultural ethics. That this is not a "phenomenology of spirit" in the
1
Hegelian sense will become clear.
phenomenology apart from the irrepressible philosophical battle cry: "Let's get down to things! "
Likewise, it has little to do with Husserlian
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS D 219
? Heinrich Zille, Riesenprogramm (Gigantic program). Variety tent on a Berlin fair- ground around 1900.
Military Cynicism
Five minutes' cowardice is better than a life long dead.
Soldier's saying
Even the Prussian prime minister, von Bismarck, was horrified by the atrocities. "War is hell, and whoever lets it loose with the stroke of a quill is a devil! " he exclaimed, without consider- ing how tirelessly he himself had contributed to it!
2 W. Stieber
Anthropological research says that flight is older than attack. Accordingly, the
human being would be, admittedly, partly predator (hunter), but not a priori a
warring animal. Nevertheless the discovery of weapons --for beating, throwing,
shooting (development of distance, neocortical development)--plays a key role
in anthropogenesis. If one can assume anything at all about the original tendency
of the human psyche regarding struggle and war, one can assume at least this
much: It prefers avoidance to striking. "Cowardly but happy" (G. Kleemann, sub-
title: Why the contemporary primitive human being does not want to fight;
Frankfurt-Berlin-Vienna, 1981). Those who avoid can initially better secure their
chances for survival than those who confront. If cowardice is neutrally under-
stood as the primary inclination to avoid confrontation, in the economy of human
dr
than to hold one's ground. "The smarter person yields. "
'ves it must have priority over the desire to fight. Initially it is smarter to flee
220 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
But at some point in the process of civilization it becomes smarter to stand firm than to flee. How this came to be is not our topic here --a couple of historical con- ceptual lumps may mark out the problem: ecological competition, increase in population density, neolithic revolution, the division between mobile herding cul- tures and sedentary agricultural cultures, and so on. The path to "history," to higher cultures, leads through the militarization of tribes and beyond to the state.
Military cynicism can emerge when three male martial character types have assumed clear contours in a society: the hero, the hesitater, and the coward. (This can even be seen in a rudimentary form in animal species with high intraspecies aggression, e. g. , in deer populations. ) An unambiguous hierarchy of values is es- tablished at whose summit the hero stands; everyone should be basically like him. Heroism is internalized as a model by the males in a combative civilization. But hereby, a new sociopsychological training of human beings also becomes neces- sary, with the aim of acquiring a distribution of martial temperaments not found in nature. Cowardice, present in large quantities as raw material and in everyone, must be reworked into battle-hungry heroism, or at least into brave, battle-ready hesitancy. All training of soldiers in the history of combative civilizations works to produce this unnatural alchemy. The noble family contributes to it just as much as the armed peasant family, as do, later, royal courts, military schools, barracks, and public morals.
Heroism became and remained, in part to the present day, a dominant cultural factor. The cult of the aggressive, triumphant warrior runs through all of recorded history. Where we begin to find written records, there is a high probability that it is the story of a hero, of a warrior who has been through many adventures. Where written records are not found, tales of heroes
3
continue indefinitely back to obscure oral origins.
of those fighters who intervened in European history as early Carolingian ar- mored knights wrote about themselves so glowingly in chivalrous poetry, fas- cinating stories of the great warriors in the times of migrations (the era of the Nibelungen) were told by the tribes.
The division of labor in military temperaments seems to make sense in social terms. The three types represent the advantages of three different "tactics" or styles of fighting. Heroes make use of the advantages that attack offers in many situations where there is a compulsion to fight. Thus, attack is the best defense. Hesitaters constitute the main mass of a "reasonable middle position"; they fight when they have to, and then they fight energetically, but they also know how to curb the danger that can come from the bravado of heroes. Cowards, finally, can occasionally save themselves when all others who "stand firm" are doomed to per- ish. But that is not supposed to be mentioned, and the coward must be held in con- tempt because otherwise the alchemy that is held to make battle-hungry fighters out of timid deserters cannot succeed. Mercilessly, the heroic model of the mili- tary group of men is forced on all. The hero stands in the limelight; to him, the demigod in armor, all honor, acclamation, and esteem are accorded.
Long before the descendants
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 221
There are three attitudes of consciousness to this psychic ideal and exemplary ? mage, according to which one you are. The hero, whenever success raises him above self-doubt, experiences himself as the one who lives at the zenith of his own ideal, radiant and self-confident, a man who can fulfill his own and collective dreams. He will sense the "glory" of a demigod in himself; the thought of losing does not enter his mind. Hence the breathtaking bigmouthedness of heroes who are certain of victory, at the beginning of the battle and after the victory. It speaks for the psychology of the war-experienced Romans that they granted the returned
triumphant general a victory procession through his town, where he could ex- perience his own deification in the state--and with him, the people who in this way learned to stay "in love with success"; but they also put a slave on the victor's chariot who continually had to call him: "Reflect, victor, that you are mortal! " This apotheosis of the victor, the cult of success, of divinity through battle, and of happy success is part of the sociopsychological inheritance of humanity from antiquity--and even today, this experience is repeatedly staged and peddled from sports fields to the Olympics. Pictorially, heroes are almost always represented as youths; the misfortune of heroes is that they die young.
The second attitude toward the ideal is that of the hesitater, of the relative hero.
He probably sees himself as someone who fulfills and obeys the morality of the
hero but who does not enjoy the glamor of success. To be sure, the ideal rules
him, but it does not make him into an exemplary case. He fights and dies when
there is no way out of it, and he can console himself with the certainty that he
is prepared to do what is necessary. He does not feel the continual need to prove
himself as does the topnotch hero, who must even seek out danger simply to keep
4
up his self-image. The hesitater, however, pays for this with a certain medi-
ocrity; he is neither right at the top nor right at the bottom, and when he dies his name is summarily listed among the dead heroes. Perhaps it is a good sign that modern armies cultivate, right up to the top ranks, the soldier of the hesitater type (obedience plus thinking for oneself, the "citizen in uniform"), one who does not have an inner urge to fight. Only in certain military and political leaders is there still a tendency toward the characteristic offensive mentality --"falcons," heroes of armament, those hooked on hegemony.
The third stance toward the heroic ideal is adopted by the coward. Of course, under the unavoidable pressure of the heroic image, he must seek refuge in the hesitatingly brave masses. He must hide the fact that he is really the anti-hero; he must camouflage himself and make himself as unobtrusive as possible. As muddler, improvisor, and man of few words, he cannot even afford to internalize the image of the hero in any rigid way because otherwise self-contempt would crush him. In him, a slight decomposition of the "superego" is already under way. In the coward's consciousness lie simultaneously the germs of military kynicism and of a higher critical realism! For through his experience and self-experience,
222 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
the coward is forced to reflect and look twice. He can confess his cowardice aloud just as little--otherwise he would be even more despised --as he can simply give it up. In him, to be sure often poisoned by a drop of self-contempt, a critical potential against the ethics of heroes begins to grow. Because he himself has to dissemble, he will be more sensitive to the pretense of others. When heroes and hesitaters succumb to a superior power, the coward, who allows himself to flee, is the sole survivor. Hence the sarcastic saying: Horses are the survivors of heroes.
We now drop the fiction that we are speaking of a socially homogeneous army. It becomes volatile for soldiers' cynicism when consideration is given to military hierarchies, which correspond roughly to the class structure of society. In feudal military structures we find, besides the troop of knightly heroes, mostly an ac- quired troop of paid knights or mercenaries and below them the troop of orderlies and aides. Each of these groups also has its own combat morality that corresponds approximately to the three military temperaments. For the knight, combat, even if it is about tangible material interests, belongs to his social status and to the aristocratic self-image. In his combat morality, therefore, "honor" must be given special consideration. Where honor is at stake, there is an excess of motivation over and above the small and concrete causes--up to fighting for the sake of fighting. This is not the case with mercenaries, who have made war their profes- sion: the motley mob of the times of the mercenaries, paid knights, but mainly infantry, foot troops, peasants' sons from Switzerland bought to engage in wars, etc. Their motive to fight cannot be heroic because the paid soldier (Italian soldi, money) conceives of war as a workplace, not as a heroes' stage, which does not exclude collaborating with the military spectacle of heroes or even a certain hero- ism lowered to the level of a craft. Mercenaries are professional hesitaters. They wage war because war feeds them, and they intend to survive the skirmishes. The metier as such is already dangerous enough; one does not have to, in addition, challenge death with heroic frills. At the lower end of the hierarchy, finally, the orderly fights, above all because an accident of birth made him the serf of a knight who, without him, could neither mount nor dismount a horse and could not even get out of his armor without help. The aides act as a kind of a military proletariat whose invisible and unappreciated labor is sublated in the victories of their
masters like swallowed surplus value. Entanglements in masculine ideals aside, the servant has no "intrinsic" motivation to fight except, as far as possible, to keep himself alive during the fighting. For him it would be realistic to be cowardly from the bottom of his heart.
The military cynical process can now be set into motion, and as always it be- gins at the lower kynical-realistic position. Sancho Panza is its first "great" representative. Without much reflection, this clever little peasant knows that he has a right to cowardice, just as his poor noble master, Don Quixote, has a duty
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 223
? Gustave Dore, Don Quixote.
toward heroism. But those who view the heroism of the master with Sancho Panza's eyes inevitably see the craziness and blindness of heroic consciousness. This cheeky military enlightenment, which Cervantes unrelentingly lays out, re- veals that the old desire for a hero's fight is an anachronism and that all purport- edly noble occasions to fight are nothing more than pure projections of the knight's imagination. Thus windmills stand for giants, prostitutes for ladies to be heroically loved, and so forth. To be able to see this, the narrator himself requires the realistic, foot soldier's, plebeian perspective --and beyond this social permis- sion to speak a language befitting this perspective. This could not have happened before the late Middle Ages, when the knights lost their technical superiority in weaponry to the plebeian infantry and when armed mobs of peasants more and more frequently served troops of knightly heroes annihilating defeats. Since the fourteenth century, the heroic star of armored horse combat was in any case in descent. With this, the moment had arrived when anti-heroism found its language and when the cowardly view of heroism became publicly possible. Once the
224 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
? Thomas Rowlandson, The Two Kings of Terror. English caricature of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, 1813.
masters had to swallow their first defeats, the servants sensed their real power. Now, one can laugh realistically.
The constitutions of armies after the Middle Ages up to Napoleonic times, in- deed even up to contemporary times, reveal a paradoxical distortion of the origi- nal connections between combat morality and the type of weaponry. The ancient hero was a lone fighter just as the knight was in feudalism. He sought to prove himself in the duel, but best of all in the constellation of one against many. Mod- ern warfare, however, tendentially depreciates the individual fight. Wars are decided by formations and mass movements. Using the Roman legion as its model, the modern organization of armies pushes the genuinely heroic functions--combined assault, standing firm, man-to-man combat, etc. -toward the bottom. This means that the demands made of heroes fall more and more on those, who, according to their nature and motivation, tend to be hesitaters or cowards. In modern infantries, then, a schizoid drill in heroism --the instilling of an anonymous and unacknowledged courage to die --must be carried out. The top officers, who by virtue of their strategic position, are not as endangered, shove the risk of heroism, death in the front line, more and more onto those who actually have nothing at stake in the war and who often were only acquired as troops ac- cidentally or by force (compulsory conscription, extortion of the poor, entice-
5
As soon as some space had been made in modern soldiery for the well-founded realism of the cowards (kynicism), the military cynical process is stepped up to a higher level: the answer to it now comes from the modern cynical realism of
ment with alcohol, a way out for superfluous peasants' sons, etc. ).
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 225
royalty. Of course, this realism also knows that not one of the poor devils in uni- form can have heroic motives. But they should be heroes nevertheless and look the so-called hero's death in the face, as normally only aristocrats do. For this reason, armies after the Middle Ages are the first social organs that methodically cultivate schizophrenia as a collective condition. In them, the soldier is not "him- self but another, a piece of the heroic machinery. From time to time it also hap- pens that a leader lets his mask fall and reveals that he indeed sympathizes with the poor devils' wish to live, but he cannot acknowledge this wish. "Dogs, do you want to live forever! " The cynic has thoroughly understood his kynical dogs, but nevertheless people have to die. When Frederick II of Prussia speaks thus, in a patriarchal, humorous tone of voice, we are listening to an enlightened master's consciousness in the second round. It has understood the hero humbug but needs the hero's death for the time being as a political tool --here, for the sake of Prus- sia's glory. On this note, have fun being blown to smithereens! From now on, all battles, no matter how nobly advertised, are overshadowed by this cynical self- denial.
The modern development of types of weaponry contributes a good deal, directly and indirectly, to the tension between the consciousness of heroes and that of cowards. In the dispute between cavalry, infantry, and artillery over precedence, this tension has a subliminal effect. For it generally holds that the more horrifyingly a weapon works even from a distance, the more cowardly, in principle, its user can be. Since the late Middle Ages, we have witnessed the as- cent of long-range weapons to systems that decide wars. With a rifle, the infantry soldier, without great risk, can bring down the most noble knight; thus, world history has voted for the technology of gun powder and against the type of weapons used by cavaliers. With a field cannon, in turn, a whole pile of infantry soldiers can be blown to bits. From this has resulted the strategic primacy of ar- tillery, that is, of the "scientific" type of weapon that in the best schizoid manner
6 producesthemostterribleeffectsfromahiddenpositionandgreatdistance. To-
day's air force and missile systems are, for their part, only extrapolated artilleries, the latest consequences of the technical principle: shooting. Napoleon was not a representative of this type of "thinking" for nothing, and it is no accident that, since the First World War, war is waged under the sign of artillery battles of materials. Contemporary literature after the First World War puzzles about the schizophrenia of the "unknown hero," who bore the horrors of war but was essen- tially more technician than fighter, more civil servant than hero.
What we have now described as the "first round" between the kynicism of sol- diers and the cynicism of the generals has been continually repeated since the "bourgeois age" on a higher level and on a greatly extended scale. The bourgeoisie inherited a bit of the heroic tradition from the feudal era, carrying it on into the broad patriotic masses. "The citizen as hero"-a standard problem of the last two hundred years. Is a bourgeois heroism possible? We find the answers in the mili-
226 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
tary traditions of the last centuries: Naturally the militarized bourgeoisie put everything into developing its own heroic tradition, and equally naturally, the neokynical, bourgeois-proletarian strand tried to make its case against it. On the one hand, therefore, we find much "genuine idealism," "Prussianism," boasting, and lies; on the other, a lot of critical realism, laughter, irony, satire, bitterness, and resistance.
How did this come about? In the Napoleonic era, a previously unimaginable
militarization of the masses began in Europe: Bourgeois society arose not only
through the expansion of capitalist forms of trade and production but, at the same
time, politically through a broad, "patriotically" motivated self-recruiting of soci-
ety into the army. The nation became the armed fatherland, a type of super
weapon that welded political egos together. It is said that in the revolutionary
wars of the 1790s, there was for the first time something like a national volunteer
army, that is, practically a mass heroism that mobilized the type of weapon called
souls, patriotic hearts. The "nationalization of the masses" (Mosse) implies not
only an ideological event but above all the greatest event of modern military his-
tory. With it, collective schizophrenia reached a new historical level. Whole na-
tions mobilized themselves in external wars. From then on the tendency to total
war increased, in which the entire life of society could become, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, a means for war-from the universities to the hospitals, from the
churches to the factories, from art to kindergartens. On this level, however, the
kynicism of the coward and the cynicism of the citizen-hero became entangled
in far more complicated tensions with each other than before. The "cowardly"
wish to stay alive sought new forms of expression in the nation-state: explicitly
as pacifism or internationalism (e. g. , of the socialist or anarchist type); implicitly
as the Schweik principle, muddling through; the ethos of "malingerers" (systeme
7
D). In Europe between, say, 1914 and 1945, whoever wanted to represent the
"party of one's own survival," inevitably had to take something from the socialist, the pacifist, or from Schweik.
The sort of entanglements the kynical and the cynical attitude to soldiery can lead to in the twentieth century is shown by the German example. In the autumn of 1918, the German Empire collapsed in an anarchic spectacle. All types screamed out their views and self-representations all at once: the militaristic na- tionalists as heroes who did not even quite want to see that the war had really been lost; the Weimar parties as civil mediating forces and procrastinators who wanted to prevent the worst and try a new beginning; and finally the Spartacists, Com- munists, expressionists, pacifists, Dadaists, etc. , as the "cowardly" fraction, now on the offensive, who damned war without qualification and demanded a new so- ciety based on new principles. One has to be familiar with these collisions in order to understand how German fascism of the type shown in the Hitler movement received its unmistakable quality that can be precisely localized in history. Hitler was one of those fanatical champions of a petit-bourgeois heroism that, in the fric-
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 227
tion with the absolutely unheroic, "cowardly," life-affirming currents and mental- ities during the time of the collapse between 1917 and 1919, culminated in the most advanced position of military cynicism for that time, namely, fascism, as reaction of the German soldiers returned from the world war against the collective "destructive" realisms of the contemporary Schweiks, pacifists, civilians, so-
8
cialists, "Bolshevists," and so on. Fascist military cynicism is a late chapter in
the problem of the "citizen as hero. " It presupposes a high level of schizoid distor- tions, until finally even a declassed petit-bourgeois like Hitler could cling to the image of the hero--especially to an image that was nihilistically ravaged by the war. They wanted to lose their egos in this image (Ich an es).
These interconnections are as complicated as they are saddening. They are so because they reflect a systematic confusion of the will to live. This will to live, with its hopes and identifications, clings on to the militarized nation-states, from which the greatest threat to life expectancy emanates. In the schizoid society, in- dividuals can, in fact, hardly still know how they can pursue their own authentic vital interests and when they are making themselves into a component of a defensive-destructive machinery of the state and military. Driven by the desire to obtain protection and security for themselves, they tie themselves almost ir- revocably to the political-military apparatuses that sooner or later will bring about, or at least slide into, conflict with rivals.
But even militarized fascism lies far below the convoluted windings of military cynicism in the age of nuclear strategy. With the emergence of global weapons of annihilation, weapons that make any question concerning heroism illusory, the tension between heroes, hesitaters, and cowards enters into a completely chaotic phase. Defensive motives apparently gain the upper hand everywhere. Each of the nuclear superpowers openly includes the heroic, hesitating, and cowardly mo- tives of the other in its strategic calculations. Each has to accept that the opponent, in the last analysis, builds up its strategy on the other's cowardice, which is, of course, an armed cowardice having at its disposal a battle-ready hero apparatus. The world situation today has brought about a permanent military eye-contact be- tween two cowardly-heroic hesitaters who both arm themselves unrestrainedly to show the other side that being cowardly will remain the only sensible stance --and that it will never be able to be anything more than a hesitater. The position of the hero remains unoccupied. The world will not see any more victors. This implies a revolutionarily new kind of duel because duelers in the past regarded each other as potential heroes. Today, everyone knows about the opponent's realistic and even indispensable cowardice. The world still lives on because East and West think of each other as cowardly, highly armed Schweiks who, after all the loud- mouthed boasting has been vented, have only one thing in mind, namely, to live on this planet a little longer. But since the military process on the global level has arrived at this nadir of an heroic-cowardly hesitation, the previous system of values has been completely unhinged. The tension, at least theoretically, has dis-
228 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
solved into an open equivalence of all temperaments. Heroism may be quite good, but hesitation is at least as good, and cowardice is perhaps even better. The old negative has become as positive as the old positive has become negative. On the summit of military escalation, then, has the real fight become superfluous? The military alone cannot answer this question, especially not in an age that every- where has proclaimed the (illusory) primacy of politics over the military.
The danger will continue to grow as long as political systems produce the means, ends, and ideas to come into a military, hegemonic, and annihilating con- test with one another. The dynamics of armament in the strategic and scientific area, as mad then as it is now, proves that this is still, undiminished, the case. Now as then, each side fantasizes that the ability to survive can only mean being able to defend oneself; that defensiveness as such has become the greatest threat to survival is perceived--not head-on, clearly, in a way demanding conse- quences, but only secondarily, obliquely, unclearly. Each side assumes that only a balance of progressive terror can secure so-called peace. This conviction is simultaneously realistic and absolutely paranoid; realistic because it is adapted to the interaction of paranoid systems; paranoid because in the long run and essen- tially, it is completely unrealistic. In this system of games it is thus realistic to be mistrustful to the point of a constant state of alert; at the same time, mistrust sustains the pressure to permanently continue the buildup of arms, more weapons could obviate mistrust. Modern politics has accustomed us to looking on a mas- sive folie a deux as the quintessence of realistic consciousness. The way in which two or more powers, in intricately thought-out interaction, drive each other crazy provides contemporary human beings with their model of reality. Those who ac- commodate themselves to this modern-day society, as it is, accommodate them- selves in the last instance to this paranoid realism. And because there is probably
9
no one who, at least subliminally and in "clear moments," does not understand
this, everyone is caught up in modern military cynicism --if they do not expressly and consciously resist it. Those who resist have to, today and probably for a good while longer, put up with being defamed as dreamers, as people who, although perhaps led by good intentions ("The Sermon on the Mount"), have nonetheless begun to flee from reality. But this is not true. The concept of "reality," like no other concept, is used falsely. We must first flee into reality out of the systema- tized paranoia of our everyday world.
Here, in the middle of military-political considerations, a therapeutic problem clearly emerges that possesses both political and spiritual dimensions. How can subjects of power, sick with mistrust but nonetheless realistic, break down their destructiveness and their projections of hostility as long as the interaction of these systems until now has proved that weakness in the face of the opponent has always been exploited as an opportunity to strike again? Each thinks of itself as an essen- tially defensive power and projects aggressive potentials onto the other. In such a structure, relaxation of tension is a priori impossible. Under the conditions of
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 229
the mania for making enemies it remains "realistic" to stay tense and ready for battle. Neither power can show any weakness without provoking the other's strength. With never-ending exertion the opponents must work for a small terrain on which something like self-limitation becomes possible, that is, a weakening of the consciousness of being strong, a relaxing of the feeling of being inflexible. This tiny terrain of self-limitation is, to date, the only bridgehead of reason in the military-cynical process. Everything will depend on its growth. For human be- ings it was difficult enough to learn how to fight, and everything they so far have achieved they have done so as fighters who have accepted challenges and through them developed into themselves (see Toynbee's concept of "challenge"). But to learn how not to fight would be even more difficult because it would be something completely new. Future military history will be written on a completely new front-there, where the struggle to desist struggling will be carried out. The deci- sive blows will be those that are not struck. Under them our strategic subjectivi- ties and our defensive identities will collapse.
The Cynicism of State and Hegemonic Power
Je n'ai rien, je dois beaucoup,
10
je donne le reste aux pauvres.
Testament of an aristocrat
Does an emperor go to the toilet? I think about the question a lot and run to mother. "You'll end up in prison," says mother. So, he doesn't go to the toilet.
Ernst Toller, Eine Jugend in Deutschland (1933)
War and preparation for war go together with: tricks of diplomacy, the suspension of moral concepts, holidays for truth and a field-day for cynicism.
Stanley Baldwin, British prime minister (1936)
The subjects of political reality, states and monarchical powers, can be com- pared with what the heroes were in military reality.
from the compulsions of marriage.
19. Helmut Schmidt still cites his ethics.
20. This image prevails from about the time of Nero. In Cicero's time, the sects, which dominated
the ideological scene for a hundred years, are scarcely mentioned.
21. The interpretation of the late-ancient existential anxiety-among other things, a premise of
Christianity--is still a challenge to psychohistory.
22. Modern analogy: rival depth-psychological sects (Freudians, Jungians, Reichians, Adlerians,
Janovians, Perlsians, Lacanians, etc. ).
23. Christoph Martin Wieland, too, the best scholar of kynicism in eighteenth-century Germany
and the translator of Lucian, probably sensed that there was something inauthentic in Lucian's con- tempt for Peregrinus. In his novel, Die geheime Geschichte des Peregrinus Proteus (The secret story of Peregrinus Proteus) (1788-89), he thus draws a kinder picture of the philosopher.
24. See chapter 23, "On the German Republic of Impostors," as well as the section in chapter 10 entitled "Knowledge of War and Espionage. "
25. Recall the theses on art as the form of expression of bourgeois neokynicism in chapter 5. The arts possessed an exceptional capacity to process negativity. The concept "realism" refers to this in- vestigatory power of art.
26. Since Marx we know that the moving force that plunges modernity into its apparent progres- sive historicity is based on the alliance between capital and science. At the same time we are forced to distinguish more sharply between continuance (Fortgang) and progress (Fortschritt).
27. ". . . you call. . . evil": The Devil is not only an evolutionist but also a nominalist. "Evil" understands itself in another way: as a "power," as a phenomenon of energy, as a position in a natural polarity. Konrad Lorenz, still arguing in the schema of evolution, nowadays treats the phenomenon of aggression consistently from this standpoint: "so-called evil. "
28. Not actionism but "contemplative praxis," to act in order to become conscious.
29. Nietzsche, who initially again consciously called himelf a Cyniker, also coined the phrase "live dangerously. " It is the motto of kynical empiricism toward which Faust orients himself.
30. In its sharpest formulations, Adorno's Minima Moralia, the main work of moral critique in postwar German philosophy, speaks without reserve of the disgrace of surviving; it would be short- sighted to understand this merely as the reaction to Jewish experiences in those years (1943 on). On the morality of survival see also Elias Canetti, Masse undMacht (Munich, 1976) (Crowds and power; 1962).
31. In chapter 10, the way of seeing that leads to the "black empiricism" of the enlightenment sciences will be described.
32. "Boogie-woogie of the hormones" (Arthur Miller).
33. We are reading it here without regard to its context in the novel.
34. One hundred years after Dostoyevsky wrote this, the full implications of this reflection seem
to be coming to light, since, in Western leftist traditions, a departure from the "spirit of the (Christian) Utopia" is being carried out with a previously unknown profundity and since the intelligentsia ex- periences, directly and on its own responsibility, the ineluctability of the principle of power and of the reason of state. The Left in political power: With this, moral-political and psychic complications with a new degree of complexity begin.
212 ? THE CABINET OF CYNICS
35. "The world is everything that is the case," positivism will say later. If one takes the expression "the case is" somewhat more generously, the great realists of the nineteenth century are thoroughly positivistic--or at least "on the way" to positivism. For Marx, class struggles (although a universal concept) are the case; for Nietzsche, the will to power; for Freud, drives.
36. That is certainly no longer the biblical Jesus but a Jesus from the perspective of Judas, a Judas who seeks disburdening. His tragic cynicism evades an unbearable guilt; psychoanalytically, this probably belongs to the psychodynamic of the patricidal son, who can continue to live without suffocating on his guilt only by finding reasons for why he had to kill.
37. Here we approach the third level of the development of the concept of cynicism which will be presented in Part III.
38. Historicism contributes something decisive to this by educating us to see all phenomena of consciousness as a "product of their time"; it can easily be combined with psychologism as well as sociologism.
39. For this reason, conservatives often have a clear consciousness of "semantics. "
40. See "Minima Amoralia," in chapter 9.
41. Applied to the area of (church) politics, this dualism is expressed as power and spirit.
42. Overcoming of nihilism? "The results of the overcoming . . . are always worse than what
is overcome"; Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 371.
43. Christian substitute: One does it for the good of others.
44. Only once has Diogenes been seen in this way in modernity. Nietzsche's metaphysical happen-
ing in which the "crazy person" with the lantern announces: "God is dead" was the signal of neo- kynicism.
45. In Part IV, I pursue this "translation" further and investigate what subjugation and being sub- jugated mean for epistemology.
46. Mephistopheles: "If I had not reserved fire for myself/1 would have nothing apart for myself. "
47. [Heidegger's term has many connotations. Verfallen can mean "degenerated," "lapsed," "decayed," "addicted," "fallen. " The sense of having fallen ("fallenness") into the habit of everyday- ness seems to predominate. --Trans. ]
48. Nihilism? For a long time, the Marxist critique of Heidegger wanted to see in him nothing other than the swan song of the decadent bourgeoisie that had been left stranded even by the will to a future. Heidegger as speaker for a fascistoid nihilism and cult of death? Hardly. Rather, he con- tributed an impulse against the socialisms of the "great tomorrow," against Utopias of endless sacrifice.
49. Here I take up a motif of Michel Foucault's.
50. Concreteness does not exclude vagueness.
51. [Unbehaustheit recalls, among other things, Diogenes and his tub and suggests the original-
fundamental insecurity of all existence, naked ejection into the world. --Trans. ]
52. An assessment of Nietzsche will always depend strongly on how one conceives of the "will to power. " Encouragement to imperial cynicism? Cathartic confession? Aesthetic motto? Self- correction of an inhibited person? Vitalistic slogan? Metaphysics of narcissism? Propaganda of disin-
hibition?
53. This is a modern equivalent for the Delphic "Know thyself. " The Freudian ego is attributable
rather to Anyone. Is the psychoanalyzed person an accommodated person, someone cut down to size? 54. This reflected amoralism, which, paradoxically, carries the mute promise of an authentic ethi- cal life within it, has found its opponent in socialist moralism. The more recent Critical Theory has also renounced the sensitivistic quasi-amoralism of Adorno's "aesthetic theory" and steers with direct argumentation toward a positive ethics. That may signify an advance in a certain respect--if it avoids falling behind the radical modernity of existential and aesthetic amoralism. The latter already works on modern experiences with every morality and all categorical imperatives: Because these forms of "Ought" result in idealistic overexertions, imperative ethics comes with its own gravedigger-
skepticism, resignation, cynicism. Moralism, with its "you should" inevitably drives us into an "I
THE CABINET OF CYNICS ? 213
can't. " Amoralism, by contrast, which proceeds from the "you can," realistically banks on the chance that what "I can" in the end will also be the right thing. The turn to practical philosophy that happily characterizes every present-day fundamental thinking that is world-wise should not tempt us to again let loose at being with a categorical imperative. Kynical reason, therefore, develops a nonimperative ethics that encourages the Can, instead of entangling us in the depressive complications of the Ought.
55. Recently, Hermann Morchen's extended study of Heidegger and Adorno has taken on these questions.
II. Phenomenological Main Text
Chapter 8
The Cardinal Cynicisms
In hasty ill humor, I have ripped the fig leaves from some naked thoughts.
Heinrich Heine, preface to Germany, a Winter's Tale
From what we have seen then, the concept of cynicism contains more than a first glance would lead us to expect. It is one of those things that, if given an inch, will take a mile. Our curiosity aroused, we wanted at first to "see what's really in it," and thereby --we noticed it too late--we experienced something that bog- gles our minds. We wanted to learn something about cynicism and discovered in doing so that it has long since brought us under its domination.
To this point, we have presented the concept of cynicism in two versions, and a third clearly emerges after chapter 7, "The Cabinet of Cynics. " The first says: Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness--unhappy consciousness in modern- ized form. Our approach here is intuitive, starting with a paradox; it articulates an uneasiness that sees the modern world steeped in cultural insanities, false hopes and their disappointment, in the progress of madness and the suspension of reason, in the deep schism that runs through modern consciousnesses and that seems to separate the rational and the real, what we know and what we do, from each other for all time. In the description we achieved a pathography that probed schizoid phenomena. It tried to find words for the perversely complicated struc- tures of a consciousness that has become reflective and is almost more melancholy than false; it is a consciousness that, under the compulsions of self-preservation, continues to run itself, though run down, in a permanent moral self-denial.
In the second version, the concept of cynicism assumes a historical dimension. A tension becomes apparent that, in the ancient critique of civilization, had first found expression under the name of kynicism: the urge of individuals to maintain
217
218 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
themselves as fully rational living beings against the distortions and semirationali- ties of their societies. Existence in resistance, in laughter, in refusal, in the appeal to the whole of nature and a full life. It begins as plebeian "individualism," panto- mimic, wily, and quick-witted. Some of this trickles through to the more serious Stoa; iridescent transitions to Christianity are effected but die out to the extent that Christian theology negates and even damns the ancient-heathen inheritance. We reserved the concept of cynicism for the reply of the rulers and the ruling cul- ture to the kynical provocation. They definitely see that there is an element of truth in it, but proceed with oppression. From now on, they know what they do.
The concept here undergoes a split into the dichotomy: kynicism-cynicism that, in substance, corresponds to resistance and repression, or more precisely, self-embodiment in resistance and self-splitting in repression. The phenomenon of kynicism is thereby separated from its historical origin and becomes a type that crops up again and again historically whenever, in crisis civilizations and civiliza- tion crises, consciousnesses clash with each other. Kynicism and cynicism are, accordingly, constants in our history, typical forms of a polemical consciousness "from below" and "from above. " In them, the opposition of high culture and peo- ple's culture is lived out as the exposure of paradoxes within high-cultural ethics.
Here, the third version of the concept of cynicism continues on to a phenome- nology of polemical forms of consciousness. The polemic always revolves around the correct conception of the truth as "naked" truth. Cynical thinking, namely, can arise only when two views of things have become possible, an official and an unofficial view, a veiled and a naked view, one from the viewpoint of heroes and one from the viewpoint of valets. In a culture in which one is regularly told lies, one wants to know not merely the truth but the naked truth. Where that cannot be that is not allowed to be, one has to draw out what the "naked" facts look like, no matter what morality has to say about it. In a certain way, "ruling" and "lying" are synonyms. The truth of rulers and that of servants are different.
In this phenomenological sighting of contestable forms of consciousness, we must "sublate" (aufheben) the bias in favor of the kynical standpoint. At first, we will have to patiently and somewhat dryly look at how, in six great arenas of values-the military, politics, sexuality, medicine, religion, and knowledge (the- ory)--kynical and cynical consciousnesses confront, attack, retaliate against each other, qualify each other, provoke each other, and finally get to know and neutral- ize each other. In the cardinal cynicisms, the contours of a combative history of ideas emerge. Such a history describes that "labor on the ideal" that stands at the heart of high-cultural ethics. That this is not a "phenomenology of spirit" in the
1
Hegelian sense will become clear.
phenomenology apart from the irrepressible philosophical battle cry: "Let's get down to things! "
Likewise, it has little to do with Husserlian
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS D 219
? Heinrich Zille, Riesenprogramm (Gigantic program). Variety tent on a Berlin fair- ground around 1900.
Military Cynicism
Five minutes' cowardice is better than a life long dead.
Soldier's saying
Even the Prussian prime minister, von Bismarck, was horrified by the atrocities. "War is hell, and whoever lets it loose with the stroke of a quill is a devil! " he exclaimed, without consider- ing how tirelessly he himself had contributed to it!
2 W. Stieber
Anthropological research says that flight is older than attack. Accordingly, the
human being would be, admittedly, partly predator (hunter), but not a priori a
warring animal. Nevertheless the discovery of weapons --for beating, throwing,
shooting (development of distance, neocortical development)--plays a key role
in anthropogenesis. If one can assume anything at all about the original tendency
of the human psyche regarding struggle and war, one can assume at least this
much: It prefers avoidance to striking. "Cowardly but happy" (G. Kleemann, sub-
title: Why the contemporary primitive human being does not want to fight;
Frankfurt-Berlin-Vienna, 1981). Those who avoid can initially better secure their
chances for survival than those who confront. If cowardice is neutrally under-
stood as the primary inclination to avoid confrontation, in the economy of human
dr
than to hold one's ground. "The smarter person yields. "
'ves it must have priority over the desire to fight. Initially it is smarter to flee
220 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
But at some point in the process of civilization it becomes smarter to stand firm than to flee. How this came to be is not our topic here --a couple of historical con- ceptual lumps may mark out the problem: ecological competition, increase in population density, neolithic revolution, the division between mobile herding cul- tures and sedentary agricultural cultures, and so on. The path to "history," to higher cultures, leads through the militarization of tribes and beyond to the state.
Military cynicism can emerge when three male martial character types have assumed clear contours in a society: the hero, the hesitater, and the coward. (This can even be seen in a rudimentary form in animal species with high intraspecies aggression, e. g. , in deer populations. ) An unambiguous hierarchy of values is es- tablished at whose summit the hero stands; everyone should be basically like him. Heroism is internalized as a model by the males in a combative civilization. But hereby, a new sociopsychological training of human beings also becomes neces- sary, with the aim of acquiring a distribution of martial temperaments not found in nature. Cowardice, present in large quantities as raw material and in everyone, must be reworked into battle-hungry heroism, or at least into brave, battle-ready hesitancy. All training of soldiers in the history of combative civilizations works to produce this unnatural alchemy. The noble family contributes to it just as much as the armed peasant family, as do, later, royal courts, military schools, barracks, and public morals.
Heroism became and remained, in part to the present day, a dominant cultural factor. The cult of the aggressive, triumphant warrior runs through all of recorded history. Where we begin to find written records, there is a high probability that it is the story of a hero, of a warrior who has been through many adventures. Where written records are not found, tales of heroes
3
continue indefinitely back to obscure oral origins.
of those fighters who intervened in European history as early Carolingian ar- mored knights wrote about themselves so glowingly in chivalrous poetry, fas- cinating stories of the great warriors in the times of migrations (the era of the Nibelungen) were told by the tribes.
The division of labor in military temperaments seems to make sense in social terms. The three types represent the advantages of three different "tactics" or styles of fighting. Heroes make use of the advantages that attack offers in many situations where there is a compulsion to fight. Thus, attack is the best defense. Hesitaters constitute the main mass of a "reasonable middle position"; they fight when they have to, and then they fight energetically, but they also know how to curb the danger that can come from the bravado of heroes. Cowards, finally, can occasionally save themselves when all others who "stand firm" are doomed to per- ish. But that is not supposed to be mentioned, and the coward must be held in con- tempt because otherwise the alchemy that is held to make battle-hungry fighters out of timid deserters cannot succeed. Mercilessly, the heroic model of the mili- tary group of men is forced on all. The hero stands in the limelight; to him, the demigod in armor, all honor, acclamation, and esteem are accorded.
Long before the descendants
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 221
There are three attitudes of consciousness to this psychic ideal and exemplary ? mage, according to which one you are. The hero, whenever success raises him above self-doubt, experiences himself as the one who lives at the zenith of his own ideal, radiant and self-confident, a man who can fulfill his own and collective dreams. He will sense the "glory" of a demigod in himself; the thought of losing does not enter his mind. Hence the breathtaking bigmouthedness of heroes who are certain of victory, at the beginning of the battle and after the victory. It speaks for the psychology of the war-experienced Romans that they granted the returned
triumphant general a victory procession through his town, where he could ex- perience his own deification in the state--and with him, the people who in this way learned to stay "in love with success"; but they also put a slave on the victor's chariot who continually had to call him: "Reflect, victor, that you are mortal! " This apotheosis of the victor, the cult of success, of divinity through battle, and of happy success is part of the sociopsychological inheritance of humanity from antiquity--and even today, this experience is repeatedly staged and peddled from sports fields to the Olympics. Pictorially, heroes are almost always represented as youths; the misfortune of heroes is that they die young.
The second attitude toward the ideal is that of the hesitater, of the relative hero.
He probably sees himself as someone who fulfills and obeys the morality of the
hero but who does not enjoy the glamor of success. To be sure, the ideal rules
him, but it does not make him into an exemplary case. He fights and dies when
there is no way out of it, and he can console himself with the certainty that he
is prepared to do what is necessary. He does not feel the continual need to prove
himself as does the topnotch hero, who must even seek out danger simply to keep
4
up his self-image. The hesitater, however, pays for this with a certain medi-
ocrity; he is neither right at the top nor right at the bottom, and when he dies his name is summarily listed among the dead heroes. Perhaps it is a good sign that modern armies cultivate, right up to the top ranks, the soldier of the hesitater type (obedience plus thinking for oneself, the "citizen in uniform"), one who does not have an inner urge to fight. Only in certain military and political leaders is there still a tendency toward the characteristic offensive mentality --"falcons," heroes of armament, those hooked on hegemony.
The third stance toward the heroic ideal is adopted by the coward. Of course, under the unavoidable pressure of the heroic image, he must seek refuge in the hesitatingly brave masses. He must hide the fact that he is really the anti-hero; he must camouflage himself and make himself as unobtrusive as possible. As muddler, improvisor, and man of few words, he cannot even afford to internalize the image of the hero in any rigid way because otherwise self-contempt would crush him. In him, a slight decomposition of the "superego" is already under way. In the coward's consciousness lie simultaneously the germs of military kynicism and of a higher critical realism! For through his experience and self-experience,
222 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
the coward is forced to reflect and look twice. He can confess his cowardice aloud just as little--otherwise he would be even more despised --as he can simply give it up. In him, to be sure often poisoned by a drop of self-contempt, a critical potential against the ethics of heroes begins to grow. Because he himself has to dissemble, he will be more sensitive to the pretense of others. When heroes and hesitaters succumb to a superior power, the coward, who allows himself to flee, is the sole survivor. Hence the sarcastic saying: Horses are the survivors of heroes.
We now drop the fiction that we are speaking of a socially homogeneous army. It becomes volatile for soldiers' cynicism when consideration is given to military hierarchies, which correspond roughly to the class structure of society. In feudal military structures we find, besides the troop of knightly heroes, mostly an ac- quired troop of paid knights or mercenaries and below them the troop of orderlies and aides. Each of these groups also has its own combat morality that corresponds approximately to the three military temperaments. For the knight, combat, even if it is about tangible material interests, belongs to his social status and to the aristocratic self-image. In his combat morality, therefore, "honor" must be given special consideration. Where honor is at stake, there is an excess of motivation over and above the small and concrete causes--up to fighting for the sake of fighting. This is not the case with mercenaries, who have made war their profes- sion: the motley mob of the times of the mercenaries, paid knights, but mainly infantry, foot troops, peasants' sons from Switzerland bought to engage in wars, etc. Their motive to fight cannot be heroic because the paid soldier (Italian soldi, money) conceives of war as a workplace, not as a heroes' stage, which does not exclude collaborating with the military spectacle of heroes or even a certain hero- ism lowered to the level of a craft. Mercenaries are professional hesitaters. They wage war because war feeds them, and they intend to survive the skirmishes. The metier as such is already dangerous enough; one does not have to, in addition, challenge death with heroic frills. At the lower end of the hierarchy, finally, the orderly fights, above all because an accident of birth made him the serf of a knight who, without him, could neither mount nor dismount a horse and could not even get out of his armor without help. The aides act as a kind of a military proletariat whose invisible and unappreciated labor is sublated in the victories of their
masters like swallowed surplus value. Entanglements in masculine ideals aside, the servant has no "intrinsic" motivation to fight except, as far as possible, to keep himself alive during the fighting. For him it would be realistic to be cowardly from the bottom of his heart.
The military cynical process can now be set into motion, and as always it be- gins at the lower kynical-realistic position. Sancho Panza is its first "great" representative. Without much reflection, this clever little peasant knows that he has a right to cowardice, just as his poor noble master, Don Quixote, has a duty
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 223
? Gustave Dore, Don Quixote.
toward heroism. But those who view the heroism of the master with Sancho Panza's eyes inevitably see the craziness and blindness of heroic consciousness. This cheeky military enlightenment, which Cervantes unrelentingly lays out, re- veals that the old desire for a hero's fight is an anachronism and that all purport- edly noble occasions to fight are nothing more than pure projections of the knight's imagination. Thus windmills stand for giants, prostitutes for ladies to be heroically loved, and so forth. To be able to see this, the narrator himself requires the realistic, foot soldier's, plebeian perspective --and beyond this social permis- sion to speak a language befitting this perspective. This could not have happened before the late Middle Ages, when the knights lost their technical superiority in weaponry to the plebeian infantry and when armed mobs of peasants more and more frequently served troops of knightly heroes annihilating defeats. Since the fourteenth century, the heroic star of armored horse combat was in any case in descent. With this, the moment had arrived when anti-heroism found its language and when the cowardly view of heroism became publicly possible. Once the
224 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
? Thomas Rowlandson, The Two Kings of Terror. English caricature of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, 1813.
masters had to swallow their first defeats, the servants sensed their real power. Now, one can laugh realistically.
The constitutions of armies after the Middle Ages up to Napoleonic times, in- deed even up to contemporary times, reveal a paradoxical distortion of the origi- nal connections between combat morality and the type of weaponry. The ancient hero was a lone fighter just as the knight was in feudalism. He sought to prove himself in the duel, but best of all in the constellation of one against many. Mod- ern warfare, however, tendentially depreciates the individual fight. Wars are decided by formations and mass movements. Using the Roman legion as its model, the modern organization of armies pushes the genuinely heroic functions--combined assault, standing firm, man-to-man combat, etc. -toward the bottom. This means that the demands made of heroes fall more and more on those, who, according to their nature and motivation, tend to be hesitaters or cowards. In modern infantries, then, a schizoid drill in heroism --the instilling of an anonymous and unacknowledged courage to die --must be carried out. The top officers, who by virtue of their strategic position, are not as endangered, shove the risk of heroism, death in the front line, more and more onto those who actually have nothing at stake in the war and who often were only acquired as troops ac- cidentally or by force (compulsory conscription, extortion of the poor, entice-
5
As soon as some space had been made in modern soldiery for the well-founded realism of the cowards (kynicism), the military cynical process is stepped up to a higher level: the answer to it now comes from the modern cynical realism of
ment with alcohol, a way out for superfluous peasants' sons, etc. ).
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 225
royalty. Of course, this realism also knows that not one of the poor devils in uni- form can have heroic motives. But they should be heroes nevertheless and look the so-called hero's death in the face, as normally only aristocrats do. For this reason, armies after the Middle Ages are the first social organs that methodically cultivate schizophrenia as a collective condition. In them, the soldier is not "him- self but another, a piece of the heroic machinery. From time to time it also hap- pens that a leader lets his mask fall and reveals that he indeed sympathizes with the poor devils' wish to live, but he cannot acknowledge this wish. "Dogs, do you want to live forever! " The cynic has thoroughly understood his kynical dogs, but nevertheless people have to die. When Frederick II of Prussia speaks thus, in a patriarchal, humorous tone of voice, we are listening to an enlightened master's consciousness in the second round. It has understood the hero humbug but needs the hero's death for the time being as a political tool --here, for the sake of Prus- sia's glory. On this note, have fun being blown to smithereens! From now on, all battles, no matter how nobly advertised, are overshadowed by this cynical self- denial.
The modern development of types of weaponry contributes a good deal, directly and indirectly, to the tension between the consciousness of heroes and that of cowards. In the dispute between cavalry, infantry, and artillery over precedence, this tension has a subliminal effect. For it generally holds that the more horrifyingly a weapon works even from a distance, the more cowardly, in principle, its user can be. Since the late Middle Ages, we have witnessed the as- cent of long-range weapons to systems that decide wars. With a rifle, the infantry soldier, without great risk, can bring down the most noble knight; thus, world history has voted for the technology of gun powder and against the type of weapons used by cavaliers. With a field cannon, in turn, a whole pile of infantry soldiers can be blown to bits. From this has resulted the strategic primacy of ar- tillery, that is, of the "scientific" type of weapon that in the best schizoid manner
6 producesthemostterribleeffectsfromahiddenpositionandgreatdistance. To-
day's air force and missile systems are, for their part, only extrapolated artilleries, the latest consequences of the technical principle: shooting. Napoleon was not a representative of this type of "thinking" for nothing, and it is no accident that, since the First World War, war is waged under the sign of artillery battles of materials. Contemporary literature after the First World War puzzles about the schizophrenia of the "unknown hero," who bore the horrors of war but was essen- tially more technician than fighter, more civil servant than hero.
What we have now described as the "first round" between the kynicism of sol- diers and the cynicism of the generals has been continually repeated since the "bourgeois age" on a higher level and on a greatly extended scale. The bourgeoisie inherited a bit of the heroic tradition from the feudal era, carrying it on into the broad patriotic masses. "The citizen as hero"-a standard problem of the last two hundred years. Is a bourgeois heroism possible? We find the answers in the mili-
226 ? THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
tary traditions of the last centuries: Naturally the militarized bourgeoisie put everything into developing its own heroic tradition, and equally naturally, the neokynical, bourgeois-proletarian strand tried to make its case against it. On the one hand, therefore, we find much "genuine idealism," "Prussianism," boasting, and lies; on the other, a lot of critical realism, laughter, irony, satire, bitterness, and resistance.
How did this come about? In the Napoleonic era, a previously unimaginable
militarization of the masses began in Europe: Bourgeois society arose not only
through the expansion of capitalist forms of trade and production but, at the same
time, politically through a broad, "patriotically" motivated self-recruiting of soci-
ety into the army. The nation became the armed fatherland, a type of super
weapon that welded political egos together. It is said that in the revolutionary
wars of the 1790s, there was for the first time something like a national volunteer
army, that is, practically a mass heroism that mobilized the type of weapon called
souls, patriotic hearts. The "nationalization of the masses" (Mosse) implies not
only an ideological event but above all the greatest event of modern military his-
tory. With it, collective schizophrenia reached a new historical level. Whole na-
tions mobilized themselves in external wars. From then on the tendency to total
war increased, in which the entire life of society could become, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, a means for war-from the universities to the hospitals, from the
churches to the factories, from art to kindergartens. On this level, however, the
kynicism of the coward and the cynicism of the citizen-hero became entangled
in far more complicated tensions with each other than before. The "cowardly"
wish to stay alive sought new forms of expression in the nation-state: explicitly
as pacifism or internationalism (e. g. , of the socialist or anarchist type); implicitly
as the Schweik principle, muddling through; the ethos of "malingerers" (systeme
7
D). In Europe between, say, 1914 and 1945, whoever wanted to represent the
"party of one's own survival," inevitably had to take something from the socialist, the pacifist, or from Schweik.
The sort of entanglements the kynical and the cynical attitude to soldiery can lead to in the twentieth century is shown by the German example. In the autumn of 1918, the German Empire collapsed in an anarchic spectacle. All types screamed out their views and self-representations all at once: the militaristic na- tionalists as heroes who did not even quite want to see that the war had really been lost; the Weimar parties as civil mediating forces and procrastinators who wanted to prevent the worst and try a new beginning; and finally the Spartacists, Com- munists, expressionists, pacifists, Dadaists, etc. , as the "cowardly" fraction, now on the offensive, who damned war without qualification and demanded a new so- ciety based on new principles. One has to be familiar with these collisions in order to understand how German fascism of the type shown in the Hitler movement received its unmistakable quality that can be precisely localized in history. Hitler was one of those fanatical champions of a petit-bourgeois heroism that, in the fric-
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 227
tion with the absolutely unheroic, "cowardly," life-affirming currents and mental- ities during the time of the collapse between 1917 and 1919, culminated in the most advanced position of military cynicism for that time, namely, fascism, as reaction of the German soldiers returned from the world war against the collective "destructive" realisms of the contemporary Schweiks, pacifists, civilians, so-
8
cialists, "Bolshevists," and so on. Fascist military cynicism is a late chapter in
the problem of the "citizen as hero. " It presupposes a high level of schizoid distor- tions, until finally even a declassed petit-bourgeois like Hitler could cling to the image of the hero--especially to an image that was nihilistically ravaged by the war. They wanted to lose their egos in this image (Ich an es).
These interconnections are as complicated as they are saddening. They are so because they reflect a systematic confusion of the will to live. This will to live, with its hopes and identifications, clings on to the militarized nation-states, from which the greatest threat to life expectancy emanates. In the schizoid society, in- dividuals can, in fact, hardly still know how they can pursue their own authentic vital interests and when they are making themselves into a component of a defensive-destructive machinery of the state and military. Driven by the desire to obtain protection and security for themselves, they tie themselves almost ir- revocably to the political-military apparatuses that sooner or later will bring about, or at least slide into, conflict with rivals.
But even militarized fascism lies far below the convoluted windings of military cynicism in the age of nuclear strategy. With the emergence of global weapons of annihilation, weapons that make any question concerning heroism illusory, the tension between heroes, hesitaters, and cowards enters into a completely chaotic phase. Defensive motives apparently gain the upper hand everywhere. Each of the nuclear superpowers openly includes the heroic, hesitating, and cowardly mo- tives of the other in its strategic calculations. Each has to accept that the opponent, in the last analysis, builds up its strategy on the other's cowardice, which is, of course, an armed cowardice having at its disposal a battle-ready hero apparatus. The world situation today has brought about a permanent military eye-contact be- tween two cowardly-heroic hesitaters who both arm themselves unrestrainedly to show the other side that being cowardly will remain the only sensible stance --and that it will never be able to be anything more than a hesitater. The position of the hero remains unoccupied. The world will not see any more victors. This implies a revolutionarily new kind of duel because duelers in the past regarded each other as potential heroes. Today, everyone knows about the opponent's realistic and even indispensable cowardice. The world still lives on because East and West think of each other as cowardly, highly armed Schweiks who, after all the loud- mouthed boasting has been vented, have only one thing in mind, namely, to live on this planet a little longer. But since the military process on the global level has arrived at this nadir of an heroic-cowardly hesitation, the previous system of values has been completely unhinged. The tension, at least theoretically, has dis-
228 D THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS
solved into an open equivalence of all temperaments. Heroism may be quite good, but hesitation is at least as good, and cowardice is perhaps even better. The old negative has become as positive as the old positive has become negative. On the summit of military escalation, then, has the real fight become superfluous? The military alone cannot answer this question, especially not in an age that every- where has proclaimed the (illusory) primacy of politics over the military.
The danger will continue to grow as long as political systems produce the means, ends, and ideas to come into a military, hegemonic, and annihilating con- test with one another. The dynamics of armament in the strategic and scientific area, as mad then as it is now, proves that this is still, undiminished, the case. Now as then, each side fantasizes that the ability to survive can only mean being able to defend oneself; that defensiveness as such has become the greatest threat to survival is perceived--not head-on, clearly, in a way demanding conse- quences, but only secondarily, obliquely, unclearly. Each side assumes that only a balance of progressive terror can secure so-called peace. This conviction is simultaneously realistic and absolutely paranoid; realistic because it is adapted to the interaction of paranoid systems; paranoid because in the long run and essen- tially, it is completely unrealistic. In this system of games it is thus realistic to be mistrustful to the point of a constant state of alert; at the same time, mistrust sustains the pressure to permanently continue the buildup of arms, more weapons could obviate mistrust. Modern politics has accustomed us to looking on a mas- sive folie a deux as the quintessence of realistic consciousness. The way in which two or more powers, in intricately thought-out interaction, drive each other crazy provides contemporary human beings with their model of reality. Those who ac- commodate themselves to this modern-day society, as it is, accommodate them- selves in the last instance to this paranoid realism. And because there is probably
9
no one who, at least subliminally and in "clear moments," does not understand
this, everyone is caught up in modern military cynicism --if they do not expressly and consciously resist it. Those who resist have to, today and probably for a good while longer, put up with being defamed as dreamers, as people who, although perhaps led by good intentions ("The Sermon on the Mount"), have nonetheless begun to flee from reality. But this is not true. The concept of "reality," like no other concept, is used falsely. We must first flee into reality out of the systema- tized paranoia of our everyday world.
Here, in the middle of military-political considerations, a therapeutic problem clearly emerges that possesses both political and spiritual dimensions. How can subjects of power, sick with mistrust but nonetheless realistic, break down their destructiveness and their projections of hostility as long as the interaction of these systems until now has proved that weakness in the face of the opponent has always been exploited as an opportunity to strike again? Each thinks of itself as an essen- tially defensive power and projects aggressive potentials onto the other. In such a structure, relaxation of tension is a priori impossible. Under the conditions of
THE CARDINAL CYNICISMS ? 229
the mania for making enemies it remains "realistic" to stay tense and ready for battle. Neither power can show any weakness without provoking the other's strength. With never-ending exertion the opponents must work for a small terrain on which something like self-limitation becomes possible, that is, a weakening of the consciousness of being strong, a relaxing of the feeling of being inflexible. This tiny terrain of self-limitation is, to date, the only bridgehead of reason in the military-cynical process. Everything will depend on its growth. For human be- ings it was difficult enough to learn how to fight, and everything they so far have achieved they have done so as fighters who have accepted challenges and through them developed into themselves (see Toynbee's concept of "challenge"). But to learn how not to fight would be even more difficult because it would be something completely new. Future military history will be written on a completely new front-there, where the struggle to desist struggling will be carried out. The deci- sive blows will be those that are not struck. Under them our strategic subjectivi- ties and our defensive identities will collapse.
The Cynicism of State and Hegemonic Power
Je n'ai rien, je dois beaucoup,
10
je donne le reste aux pauvres.
Testament of an aristocrat
Does an emperor go to the toilet? I think about the question a lot and run to mother. "You'll end up in prison," says mother. So, he doesn't go to the toilet.
Ernst Toller, Eine Jugend in Deutschland (1933)
War and preparation for war go together with: tricks of diplomacy, the suspension of moral concepts, holidays for truth and a field-day for cynicism.
Stanley Baldwin, British prime minister (1936)
The subjects of political reality, states and monarchical powers, can be com- pared with what the heroes were in military reality.
