6:20, 22),
"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice .
"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice .
Summa Theologica
Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and
directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of
view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter
is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of
contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after
careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their
neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors
do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the
presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when
those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they
withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things,
whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things
corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them
away. " Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms
whereby contemplation is hindered.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments
consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect
which is the quelling of the passions.
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Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love
of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now
the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our
neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life
also precedes the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "It should be
observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the
contemplative to the active life. " Therefore the active is not simply
prior to the contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any
order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the
active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;
for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to
contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when
pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are
killed by the sword of their inaction. "
I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life.
For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to
the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is
compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in
the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
[3746](A[1]; Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation,
disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
according to its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of
God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the
active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor.
Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech. ): "Without the contemplative
life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit
not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein
without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do. "
From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative
life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of
generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative
life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from
the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired
habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on
account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life
by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they
labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the
worse interior turmoil they have to bear. " Others, on the contrary,
have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for
contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action,
this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi,
37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any
hard work to do they give way at the very outset. " Yet, as he adds
further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and
fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation. " Consequently
those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves
for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none
the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take
upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more
apt for contemplation.
__________________________________________________________________
TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ[183]-189)
__________________________________________________________________
OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall
consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the
perfect in particular.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What constitutes a state among men?
(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?
(3) Of the diversity of duties;
(4) Of the diversity of states.
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Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a
condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from
"standing. " Now a person is said to stand on account of his being
upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking
harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness. " But a
man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;
wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says:
"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will. "
Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments
suffices alone for the notion of a state.
Objection 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast [stabiles] and immovable";
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech. ): "The stone is foursquare,
and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall. " Now
it is virtue that enables us "to act with immobility," according to
Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every
virtuous action.
Objection 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a
kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made
higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are
raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore
the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
difference of states.
On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or
state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own
person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude.
Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,
except that which refers to freedom or servitude.
I answer that, "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of position,
whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner
according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head
should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his
other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not
the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands
upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is
still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to
have stability [statum] in reference to its own disposition in the
point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters
which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state
among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low
rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law [*Dig. I, IX, De
Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is said that if a man
be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than
of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man's state, which
regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man
is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or
unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is
something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore
state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in
civil matters.
Reply to Objection 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the
notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the
addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to
stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again
are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they
be still.
Reply to Objection 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of
state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not
said to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote
an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility
in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties or
states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the
faithful of Christ are called to unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: "That
they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " Therefore there
should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one
suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the
working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining
to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so
that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the
Church.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly
in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . .
shall be with you. " Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace
would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every
beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit. vii, 5) that
"a little difference causes dissension in a state. " Therefore it would
seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in
the Church.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10) that
she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words says that
"the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the teaching of the
apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the
sorrowings of penitents. "
I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church
regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of
the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,
which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created
universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fulness
of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His
members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church.
This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11,12): "He gave
some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other
some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints. " Secondly,
it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church.
For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to
them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or
confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 12:4,5), "As in
one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same
office, so we being many are one body in Christ. " Thirdly, this belongs
to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain
order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that "when the queen of
Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his
servants, and the order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any
spirit in her. " Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great
house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood
and of earth. "
Reply to Objection 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an
obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of
faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely
by faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what
every joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where
one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are
required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? " Hence there
was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be
differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in the natural body the various members
are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and
are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too
in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by
the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as
stated in Jn. 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to keep
the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. " Now a man departs from
this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly
kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides,
the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better
preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the
greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 12:24,25) that "God hath tempered [the body] together that
there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually
careful one for another. "
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Whether duties differ according to their actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to their
actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot
be differentiated according to a difference of acts.
Objection 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
according to their acts, as stated above ([3747]Q[179], A[1]). But the
distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives.
Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.
Objection 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades
seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ
according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states
differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided
into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not
differ according to their acts.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "officium [duty]
takes its name from 'efficere' [to effect], as though it were instead
of 'efficium,' by the change of one letter for the sake of the sound. "
But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to
their acts.
I answer that, As stated above [3748](A[2]), difference among the
members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action,
and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold
distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some
persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards
action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to
have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third
distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we
distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one
person is above another. Hence according to a variant text [*The
Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God be
known. "
Reply to Objection 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite.
It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which
results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are
not infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely:
wherefore diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in
himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word "office" (as stated
above), denotes action tending to something else according to Metaph.
ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii, 8]. Hence offices differ properly in
respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is
said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "to have an office is to be
officious," i. e. harmful "to no one, but to be useful to all. "
Reply to Objection 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are
taken from different things, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Yet these
three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is
appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade,
and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of the
sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical
orders are particularly distinct according to divine offices. For
Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of offices; but the
foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things. "
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Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning,
progressing, or perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not apply
to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For "diverse
genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle, Categ. ii].
Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied
to the degrees of charity, as stated above ([3749]Q[24], A[9]), where
we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the
differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [3750](A[1]), state regards a
condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection
with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.
Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and
perfection seems to refer to "more" and "less," and this seemingly
implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs
from that of states, as we have said above ([3751]AA[2],3). Therefore
state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and
perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three
states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the
perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech. ): "Other is the beginning of
virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection. "
I answer that, As stated above [3752](A[1]) state regards freedom or
servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a
twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of
justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from
justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom.
6:20, 22),
"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice . . .
but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become servants to
God. "
Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil
by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in
like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination
to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for
the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is
inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it
follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is united to the
servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is
becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin,
which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby
hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become
the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle
declares (Rom. 6:16): "To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey,
his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or
of obedience unto justice. " Now in every human effort we can
distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the
state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to
these things, namely, the beginning---to which pertains the state of
beginners---the middle, to which pertains the state of the
proficient---and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom.
5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord
is, there is liberty. " Wherefore the same division applies to charity
as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.
Reply to Objection 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and
perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in
relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such
occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated
above [3753](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: As already observed (A[3], ad 3), nothing hinders
grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in
earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different
state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of
perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration
of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in
relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of
orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part [*XP, Q[34]].
Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration
presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things
relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the
perfection of religious.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?
(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?
(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing
the counsels or the commandments?
(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of
perfection?
(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?
(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?
(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and
archdeacons.
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Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life
does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect. " But charity
regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that
the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in
charity.
Objection 2: Further,'it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the
armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to
stand in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),
speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt
about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in
all things taking the shield of faith. " Therefore the perfection of the
Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their
acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect
work. " Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more
specially in patience.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have
charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it
were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.
I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it attains
its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now it is
charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human mind,
since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him" (1
Jn. 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists
radically in charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to
consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,
according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind
[sensu], and in the same judgment. " Now this is effected by charity
which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of the
senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways.
First, simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a
thing's nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when
it lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things
as are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected
with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or something
of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in charity whereby
the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He
that loveth not abideth in death. " Hence the perfection of the
Christian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues
relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount and greatest
in comparison with other things, it follows that the perfection of
charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in
relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of
charity that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,
"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall
tribulation? Or distress? " etc.
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Whether any one can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come,
that which is in part shall be done away. " Now in this life that which
is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are
in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys.
iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is
written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps. 138:16):
"Thy eyes did see my imperfect being. " Therefore none is perfect in
this life.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated
[3754](A[1]), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and
of our neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have
perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) "the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our
neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors actually,
even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect.
Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet
it prescribes perfection according to Mat. 5:48, "Be you . . . perfect,
as also your heavenly Father is perfect. " Therefore seemingly one can
be perfect in this life.
I answer that, As stated above [3755](A[1]), the perfection of the
Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain
universality because according to Phys. iii, 6, "the perfect is that
which lacks nothing. " Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One
is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the
lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved
as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to
any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and
essentially.
Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the
lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as
much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so
long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.
The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the
object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always
actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the
removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which
sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the
bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of
charity. " Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two
ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is
contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity
apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.
Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever is
contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's affections
from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this
perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who
are proficient.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly
perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to
"offend in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from
the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an
"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: As the conditions of the present life do not
allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow
of his tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices
for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each
individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind.
Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a
twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and
consisting in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary
to the love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible
to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.
First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his
friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for
as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect
children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is shown
by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake, through his
despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbor, but
also bodily hardships and even death, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater
love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his
friends. " Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will
surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself,
for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your
souls. "
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Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the
commandments or of the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in
the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our
Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. " Now
this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not
the precepts.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the
commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the
perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the
commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation,
and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged
according to charity, as stated above [3756](A[1]). Now the perfection
of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the
commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its
increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan.
Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance
of the commandments, since according to Jn. 14:23, "If any one love Me,
he will keep My word. " Therefore the perfection of life regards not the
commandments but the counsels.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor [Vulg. : 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the commandments
of which our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " Now the perfection of
charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect,
consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the
observance of the precepts.
I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in
one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and
accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian
life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God,
secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the
matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above.
Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded according to a
measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of
counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment,
pointing, as it does, to perfection---for instance in the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since "the whole" is
the same as "the perfect," according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6),
and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," since
every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that "the end of
the commandment is charity," according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and
the end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are
directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a
physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much
medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing.
Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the
observance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says (De Perf.
Justit. viii): "Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to
man, although no man has it in this life? "
Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the
observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are
directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,
other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of
things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is
incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of
things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to
charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so
forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God
commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and whatever
are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance,
'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done aright when
they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor for God's
sake, both in this world and in the world to come. " Hence it is that in
the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the abbot Moses
says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and
loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but means to
perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its
end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had already said
that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection of
charity. "
Reply to Objection 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated
as being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast,
and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection
consists, when He said, "And follow Me. " Hence Jerome in his commentary
on Mat. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter
added that which is perfect: 'And have followed Thee'"; and Ambrose,
commenting on Lk. 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He commands him to follow,
not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul, which is the
effect of charity. " Wherefore it is evident from the very way of
speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since
it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell," etc. , as
though He said: "By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end. "
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the
perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one
runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know
this if no commandment declares it to us? " And since that which is a
matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a
commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough
to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine love is
a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the
perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine
says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]), and one
escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to
the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to
love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God,
and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the
precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be
fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated above [3757](A[2]),
and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of
the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if
one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided
one attain to the lowest.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his
nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very
essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he
acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which
belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above
all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another
perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a
kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from
lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of
God.
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Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of
perfection. For, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), just as bodily
perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is
acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to
have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after
spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,
one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, according to Phys. v, 2, movement "from one
contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to
more. " Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to
change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the state
of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one
progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect
degree, one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from
servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to
be perfect on account of charity, as stated above [3758](A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has
the state of perfection.
On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly
lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious.
Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection
of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection.
I answer that, As stated above ([3759]Q[183], A[1]), state properly
regards a condition of freedom or servitude.
directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of
view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter
is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the fortress of
contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after
careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their
neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors
do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the
presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when
those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they
withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things,
whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things
corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them
away. " Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative,
by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms
whereby contemplation is hindered.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments
consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect
which is the quelling of the passions.
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Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love
of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now
the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our
neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life
also precedes the active life.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech. ): "It should be
observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the
contemplative to the active life. " Therefore the active is not simply
prior to the contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any
order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the
active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;
for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to
contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when
pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are
killed by the sword of their inaction. "
I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life.
For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to
the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is
compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).
Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in
the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
[3746](A[1]; Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation,
disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
according to its nature.
Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of
God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the
active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor.
Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech. ): "Without the contemplative
life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit
not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein
without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do. "
From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative
life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of
generation, that which is proper to the perfect.
Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative
life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from
the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired
habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.
Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on
account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life
by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they
labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the
worse interior turmoil they have to bear. " Others, on the contrary,
have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for
contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action,
this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi,
37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any
hard work to do they give way at the very outset. " Yet, as he adds
further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and
fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation. " Consequently
those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves
for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none
the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take
upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more
apt for contemplation.
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TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ[183]-189)
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OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall
consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the
perfect in particular.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What constitutes a state among men?
(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?
(3) Of the diversity of duties;
(4) Of the diversity of states.
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Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?
Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a
condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from
"standing. " Now a person is said to stand on account of his being
upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking
harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness. " But a
man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;
wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says:
"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's will. "
Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments
suffices alone for the notion of a state.
Objection 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast [stabiles] and immovable";
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech. ): "The stone is foursquare,
and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall. " Now
it is virtue that enables us "to act with immobility," according to
Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every
virtuous action.
Objection 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a
kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made
higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are
raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore
the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
difference of states.
On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or
state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own
person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude.
Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,
except that which refers to freedom or servitude.
I answer that, "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of position,
whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner
according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head
should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his
other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not
the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands
upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is
still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to
have stability [statum] in reference to its own disposition in the
point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters
which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state
among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low
rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law [*Dig. I, IX, De
Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is said that if a man
be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than
of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man's state, which
regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man
is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or
unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is
something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore
state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in
civil matters.
Reply to Objection 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the
notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the
addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to
stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again
are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they
be still.
Reply to Objection 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of
state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not
said to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote
an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility
in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
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Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?
Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties or
states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the
faithful of Christ are called to unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: "That
they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " Therefore there
should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.
Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one
suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the
working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining
to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so
that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the
Church.
Objection 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly
in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . .
shall be with you. " Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace
would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every
beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit. vii, 5) that
"a little difference causes dissension in a state. " Therefore it would
seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in
the Church.
On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10) that
she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words says that
"the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the teaching of the
apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the
sorrowings of penitents. "
I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church
regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of
the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,
which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created
universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fulness
of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His
members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church.
This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11,12): "He gave
some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other
some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints. " Secondly,
it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church.
For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to
them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or
confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 12:4,5), "As in
one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same
office, so we being many are one body in Christ. " Thirdly, this belongs
to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain
order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that "when the queen of
Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his
servants, and the order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any
spirit in her. " Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great
house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood
and of earth. "
Reply to Objection 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an
obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of
faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely
by faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what
every joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where
one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are
required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? " Hence there
was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be
differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in the natural body the various members
are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and
are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too
in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by
the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as
stated in Jn. 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to keep
the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. " Now a man departs from
this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly
kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides,
the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better
preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the
greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 12:24,25) that "God hath tempered [the body] together that
there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually
careful one for another. "
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Whether duties differ according to their actions?
Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to their
actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot
be differentiated according to a difference of acts.
Objection 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
according to their acts, as stated above ([3747]Q[179], A[1]). But the
distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives.
Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.
Objection 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades
seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ
according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states
differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided
into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not
differ according to their acts.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "officium [duty]
takes its name from 'efficere' [to effect], as though it were instead
of 'efficium,' by the change of one letter for the sake of the sound. "
But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to
their acts.
I answer that, As stated above [3748](A[2]), difference among the
members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action,
and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold
distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some
persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards
action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to
have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third
distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we
distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one
person is above another. Hence according to a variant text [*The
Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God be
known. "
Reply to Objection 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite.
It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which
results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are
not infinite.
Reply to Objection 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely:
wherefore diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in
himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word "office" (as stated
above), denotes action tending to something else according to Metaph.
ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii, 8]. Hence offices differ properly in
respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is
said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "to have an office is to be
officious," i. e. harmful "to no one, but to be useful to all. "
Reply to Objection 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are
taken from different things, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Yet these
three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is
appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade,
and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of the
sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical
orders are particularly distinct according to divine offices. For
Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of offices; but the
foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things. "
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Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning,
progressing, or perfect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not apply
to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For "diverse
genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle, Categ. ii].
Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied
to the degrees of charity, as stated above ([3749]Q[24], A[9]), where
we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the
differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.
Objection 2: Further, as stated above [3750](A[1]), state regards a
condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection
with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.
Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.
Objection 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and
perfection seems to refer to "more" and "less," and this seemingly
implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs
from that of states, as we have said above ([3751]AA[2],3). Therefore
state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and
perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three
states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the
perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech. ): "Other is the beginning of
virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection. "
I answer that, As stated above [3752](A[1]) state regards freedom or
servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a
twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of
justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from
justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom.
6:20, 22),
"When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice . . .
but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become servants to
God. "
Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil
by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in
like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination
to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for
the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is
inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it
follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is united to the
servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is
becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin,
which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby
hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become
the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle
declares (Rom. 6:16): "To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey,
his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or
of obedience unto justice. " Now in every human effort we can
distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the
state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to
these things, namely, the beginning---to which pertains the state of
beginners---the middle, to which pertains the state of the
proficient---and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.
Reply to Objection 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom.
5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord
is, there is liberty. " Wherefore the same division applies to charity
as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.
Reply to Objection 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and
perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in
relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such
occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated
above [3753](A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: As already observed (A[3], ad 3), nothing hinders
grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in
earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different
state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of
perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration
of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in
relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of
orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part [*XP, Q[34]].
Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration
presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things
relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the
perfection of religious.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?
(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?
(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing
the counsels or the commandments?
(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of
perfection?
(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?
(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?
(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and
archdeacons.
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Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life
does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect. " But charity
regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that
the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in
charity.
Objection 2: Further,'it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the
armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to
stand in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),
speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt
about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in
all things taking the shield of faith. " Therefore the perfection of the
Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their
acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect
work. " Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more
specially in patience.
On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have
charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it
were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.
I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it attains
its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now it is
charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human mind,
since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him" (1
Jn. 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists
radically in charity.
Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to
consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,
according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind
[sensu], and in the same judgment. " Now this is effected by charity
which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of the
senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways.
First, simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a
thing's nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when
it lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things
as are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected
with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or something
of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in charity whereby
the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He
that loveth not abideth in death. " Hence the perfection of the
Christian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues
relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount and greatest
in comparison with other things, it follows that the perfection of
charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the
other virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in
relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of
charity that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,
"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall
tribulation? Or distress? " etc.
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Whether any one can be perfect in this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come,
that which is in part shall be done away. " Now in this life that which
is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are
in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.
Objection 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys.
iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is
written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps. 138:16):
"Thy eyes did see my imperfect being. " Therefore none is perfect in
this life.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated
[3754](A[1]), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and
of our neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have
perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ) "the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our
neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors actually,
even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect.
Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.
On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet
it prescribes perfection according to Mat. 5:48, "Be you . . . perfect,
as also your heavenly Father is perfect. " Therefore seemingly one can
be perfect in this life.
I answer that, As stated above [3755](A[1]), the perfection of the
Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain
universality because according to Phys. iii, 6, "the perfect is that
which lacks nothing. " Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One
is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the
lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved
as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to
any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and
essentially.
Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the
lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as
much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so
long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.
The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the
object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always
actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the
removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which
sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the
bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of
charity. " Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two
ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is
contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity
apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.
Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever is
contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's affections
from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this
perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who
are proficient.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly
perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to
"offend in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from
the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an
"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.
Reply to Objection 3: As the conditions of the present life do not
allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow
of his tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices
for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each
individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind.
Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a
twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and
consisting in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary
to the love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible
to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.
First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his
friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for
as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect
children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is shown
by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake, through his
despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbor, but
also bodily hardships and even death, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater
love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his
friends. " Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will
surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself,
for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor.
12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your
souls. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the
commandments or of the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in
the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our
Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. " Now
this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not
the precepts.
Objection 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the
commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the
perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the
commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation,
and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false.
Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged
according to charity, as stated above [3756](A[1]). Now the perfection
of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the
commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its
increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan.
Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance
of the commandments, since according to Jn. 14:23, "If any one love Me,
he will keep My word. " Therefore the perfection of life regards not the
commandments but the counsels.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor [Vulg. : 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the commandments
of which our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): "On these two commandments
dependeth the whole law and the prophets. " Now the perfection of
charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect,
consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as
ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the
observance of the precepts.
I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in
one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and
accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian
life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God,
secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the
matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above.
Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded according to a
measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of
counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment,
pointing, as it does, to perfection---for instance in the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since "the whole" is
the same as "the perfect," according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6),
and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," since
every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that "the end of
the commandment is charity," according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and
the end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are
directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a
physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much
medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing.
Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the
observance of the commandments; wherefore Augustine says (De Perf.
Justit. viii): "Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to
man, although no man has it in this life? "
Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the
observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are
directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,
other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of
things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is
incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of
things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to
charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so
forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God
commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and whatever
are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance,
'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done aright when
they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor for God's
sake, both in this world and in the world to come. " Hence it is that in
the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the abbot Moses
says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and
loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but means to
perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its
end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had already said
that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection of
charity. "
Reply to Objection 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated
as being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast,
and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection
consists, when He said, "And follow Me. " Hence Jerome in his commentary
on Mat. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter
added that which is perfect: 'And have followed Thee'"; and Ambrose,
commenting on Lk. 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He commands him to follow,
not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul, which is the
effect of charity. " Wherefore it is evident from the very way of
speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since
it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell," etc. , as
though He said: "By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end. "
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the
perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one
runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know
this if no commandment declares it to us? " And since that which is a
matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a
commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough
to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine love is
a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the
perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine
says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]), and one
escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to
the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to
love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God,
and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the
precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be
fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated above [3757](A[2]),
and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of
the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if
one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided
one attain to the lowest.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his
nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very
essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he
acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which
belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above
all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another
perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a
kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from
lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of
God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of
perfection. For, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), just as bodily
perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is
acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to
have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after
spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,
one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, according to Phys. v, 2, movement "from one
contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to
more. " Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to
change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the state
of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one
progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect
degree, one is in the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from
servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to
be perfect on account of charity, as stated above [3758](A[1]).
Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has
the state of perfection.
On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly
lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious.
Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection
of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection.
I answer that, As stated above ([3759]Q[183], A[1]), state properly
regards a condition of freedom or servitude.
