- We cannot say what is the
absolute
truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
If one admits that even the fire particle has fuel, for fear of the conclusion that it would otherwise be causeless, it follows that there is no single- natured particle since the other elements are certainly present in each particle.
)
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining for singleness or plurality]
L6: [a. Refuting truly existent functional phenomena through the reason of being neither one nor many]
.
\ ###
\ 344.
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\ When different things are examined
\ None of them have singleness.
\ Because there is no singleness
\ There is no plurality either.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - a grouping of empty objects can only be an empty plurality: see also verse 332)
.
( -- When functional things like pots and woolen cloth are examined as to whether they are or are not truly existent, these various things, because they have parts, do not have truly existent singleness. Nor do they have truly existent plurality for the very reason by which they are not truly single, since plurality comes about through an accumulation of single units. External and internal phenomena are not truly existent because they are neither one nor many. They are like reflections. )
.
L6: [b. This fallacy equally applies to other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 345.
\ Though they assert that where there are none
\ Of those things there is singleness,
\ Singleness does not exist
\ Since everything is threefold.
.
(i. e. Even the smallest elementary component basis of the whole universe we can imagine is still composed of parts, has characteristics, has functions, is still part of a conceptual system, is still dependent on the mind conceiving it and labeling it, still dependent on accumulated karma, thus empty of inherent existence, like an illusion. )
.
( -- One may think this refutation applies to our own sectarians who assert that the elements and elemental derivatives occur simultaneously, but not to outsiders who assert that a small permanent earth particle which is a single unit exists where there are no functional things apart from the smallest particles such as earth particles and so forth. Yet even in their system the smallest earth particle is threefold in that it has substantial entity, singleness and existence. Attributes have attributiveness, singleness and existence. By virtue of the fact that everything is threefold even in their system, just unaccompanied singleness does not exist. Thus precisely the same fallacies apply to them. )
.
L5: [4. Applying reasoning which negates the four possibilities in [all] other cases [, with any duality. ]] .
\ ###
\ 346.
\ THE APPROACH OF EXISTENCE, NON-EXISTENCE,
\ BOTH EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE, AND NEITHER,
\ SHOULD ALWAYS BE APPLIED BY THOSE
\ WITH MASTERY TO ONENESS [I. E. EMPTINESS] AND SO FORTH.
.
(i. e. The Method: the Middle Way: staying away from the four extremes:
-- Tetralemma: To stay away from the four extreme conceptions of existence, non-existence, both, neither - that is away from thinking that those four, realism, idealism or nihilism, dualism, and monism, are the absolute truth, the final view. Because there is no absolute view, only adapted skillful means. Nirvana is not about doing something or not doing something, getting something or dropping something, seeing something or not seeing something. Nirvana is like space. -- Another way to present it would be: staying away from the four extremes: thinking causes and effects are the same (self-causation), different or separate (other causation), . . .
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking parts and whole are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking characteristics and the characterized are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking the world and the mind are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same . . . etc.
-- The same for the Two Truths, for dependent origination and emptiness, for appearances and emptiness, for body and mind, for stillness and occurrence, for samsara and Nirvana, . . . etc. The same for any duality. For all dualities, all
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opposites, all relations: one side doesn't assimilate the other (one being true and the other false), not are they different or separate (both being true), nor are they the same (both being false). They are all non-dual: not two, not one. They are interdependent, inseparable. - This is the method to apply to all problems.
-- All of these different form of presentation mean the same thing. All duality problems come down to the same problem of inherent existence. Resolving the problem of inherent existence (the perfection of the wisdom of emptiness) is solving the problem of all dualities, of all discriminations, of causality space and time, of the self vs the world, of the whole samsara (the perfection of the wisdom of dependent origination). And perfecting wisdom is to realize their inseparability. All problems comes from ignoring this real non-dual nature of everything. And Nirvana comes only from directly realizing this true non-dual nature of our own mind, and of everything, that is like luminous space - empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional, inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfect Union of The Two Truths. Realizing this emptiness, great compassion arises! )
.
(-- Those who have mastered the art of employing the meaning of suchness always refute oneness, otherness, both and neither by applying the kinds of reasoning which refute the assertions
-- of those like the Samkhyas who claim the effect exists at the time of the cause;
-- of the Sautrantikas who assert that cause and effect truly exist but that the effect does not exist at the time of the cause;
-- of the Nirgranthas who assert both existence and non-existence in that a thing is permanent in nature yet temporarily impermanent;
-- and of those who assert that though things are substantially existent, they neither exist nor do not exist since they cannot be said to be this nor that.
They apply the reasons previously explained in [stanza 265], "For those who assert effects exists . . . "; the reason of dependent arising, the lack of being one or many, the diamond fragments reason and so forth. )
.
L3: [II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 347.
\ When the continuum is misapprehended,
\ Things are said to be permanent.
\ Similarly when composites are
\ Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
.
(i. e. The problem: Because we do not fully understand dependent origination we think it means that there are absolute causes and effects, primary causes like elementary components (internal and external) and relations or absolute causality, space and time. That is the way it is presented in the Abhidharma. But their inherent existence is not necessary to explain karma, dependent origination, the cycle of samsara and the possibility of Liberation (or any conventional truths like morality, laws, sciences). On the contrary they would inhibit any possibility of change, and this mistake still creates subtle grasping and suffering, thus keeping us in samsara. Everything is dependently arisen (dependent on causes and conditions, on parts and characteristics, on the mind and karma perceiving it or labeling it) and thus empty of inherent existence; everything is like an illusion; like a figure on a cloud, like a swirl at the surface of the ocean, merely labeled by the mind, but not from the mind only. And there is no reason to fear this because it doesn't mean complete non-existence, or nihilism. But this is very subtle, hard to understand and usually not presented to beginners as discussed above. )
.
(-- Through inability to understand the continuum of things or the nature of composites correctly, they are thought to be permanent and truly existent. However their lack of true existence should not be confused with non-existence. Things are like magical illusions, in that they appear to exist and of themselves, but actually depend upon each other. Inherent existence implies permanence which precludes the coming into existence of things in dependence on other factors.
-- Question: if things therefore do not have the slightest inherent existence, for what reason do those opponents hold that they are truly existent?
-- Answer: Though there is no valid reason, in the case of a thing which lasts three days, they feel compelled to assert that whatever existed before must exist later. Functional things are said to be permanent when the continuum which is posited through imputation upon former, intermediate and later moments is misapprehended. Similarly when the composite is misapprehended, it is said that there are truly existent functional things. There seem to be even many adherents to the "Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition" who, through not knowing how to posit the composite and the continuum, follow outsiders. )
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L3: [III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 348.
\ ANYTHING THAT HAS DEPENDENT ARISING
\ IS NOT INDEPENDENT.
\ ALL THESE ARE NOT INDEPENDENT,
\ THEREFORE THERE IS NO SELF.
.
(i. e. In re? sume? : everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen. Everything is empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional. There is no exception. And this doesn't mean complete non-existence or nihilism. Dependent origination and emptiness are not in opposition; one implies the other. They are two complementary antidotes pointing toward transcendence, toward the Union of The Two Truths, toward non- duality. )
.
(The middle way, not truly existent, not non-existent:
-- Objection: Even if our view that things exist were wrong, your view is that things do not exist, since you do not accept functional things. It is unreasonable because it contradicts both what is seen and unseen.
-- Answer: We make no claim that things do not exist for we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: Do you assert that things are truly existent?
-- Answer: No, because we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: What does that mean?
-- Answer: It means that wile things are empty of inherent existence, like magical creations and mirages, they can produce effects.
-- Any relative thing which is found to arise and exist dependently is not found to exist independently. All these phenomena lack an independent mode of existence and thus there is no self of persons or of phenomena. The person and the aggregates do not exist inherently because they arise dependently. )
.
L3: [IV. Showing the need to understand absence of true existence] L4: [A. Inherently existent dependent arising is not seen by the Exalted]
.
\ ###
\ 349.
\ Things do not assemble
\ Unless there is an effect.
\ Aggregation for an effect
\ Is not included for the Exalted.
.
(i. e. The difference between Hinayana and Mahayana - the perfection of dependent origination: So the difference is that the Abhidharma teaches Dependent Origination assuming real causes, effects, causality, real characteristics and direct perception of those, real elementary components (internal and external), real space and time; only the self is not existent, merely conventional; -- while the Mahayana teaches Dependent Origination without any inherently existing dharma at all. It teaches that this is the only way to produce total Liberation, that grasping at the inherent existence of anything is still creating more causes for suffering. It teaches that cause and effect are interdependent; whole and parts are interdependent; characteristics and characterized are interdependent; even elementary particles are interdependent; that consciousnesses, sense organs, perception, and objects perceived are interdependent; that the whole world and the mind are interdependent; that everything is dependent on accumulated karma, and that ignoring this is the root cause of all suffering, while removing this ignorance is total Liberation. )
.
( -- Question: We too accept that effects are not independent, so what is the difference?
-- Answer: The difference is that you do not understand that dependent arising means mutual reliance.
-- Since nothing is produced by way of its own entity, things do not assemble and come together to produce an effect unless there is an effect to produce. Since anything inherently existent would be permanent, it could not rely on an effect. Aggregation for the sake of an effect is not included within the perception of the Exalted during meditative equipoise which sees suchness, because it directly perceives the lack of inherent existence of things. )
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L4: [B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness]
.
\ ###
\ 350.
\ THE AWARENESS THAT IS THE SEED OF EXISTENCE
\ HAS OBJECTS AS ITS SPHERE OF ACTIVITY.
\ WHEN SELFLESSNESS IS SEEN IN OBJECTS,
\ THE SEED OF EXISTENCE IS DESTROYED.
.
(i. e. One has to realize the emptiness of all dharmas, without any exception: To really remove completely all grasping to the self, that is the cause of all suffering, one has to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas
without exception. Realizing the three marks: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and no-self is not enough. If one follows only the teachings of the Hinayana, and still believe in the existence of some basic components as described in the Abhidharma, then there remains some subtle grasping, and there is no total definitive Liberation from samsara. Grasping at any absolute, any view, any method, any path, is still grasping. But that doesn't mean we should drop everything right now. )
.
(-- Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality. -- One gains release from cyclic existence when deluded ignorance which conceives things as truly existent ends. This depends on understanding emptiness of inherent existence.
-- The seed of worldly existence is the conception that phenomena are truly existent. Objects such as form are its sphere of activity. The seed of worldly existence is destroyed and one attains liberation by seeing that these objects lack an inherently existent self and by gaining familiarity with this. On becoming a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer or on reaching the eight ground, one achieves the complete elimination of conceptions of true existence. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ SHOULD UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS TO MEAN DEPENDENT ARISING.
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
.
(i. e. The perfection of wisdom: The Middle Way: while one should not take Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma as an absolute truth (with inherently existing elements in it), one should not fall into the other extreme and think emptiness is the absolute truth. - Those two, dependent origination and emptiness, form two poles of an apparent duality; so we could use the same treatment as for any duality as stated in verse 346. Dependently originated phenomena cannot exist and then be empty of inherent existence. Nor can something empty exist and then be dependently originated. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. Thus both dependent origination and emptiness itself are also empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. They are both conventional truths, even if emptiness is called the ultimate truth, or sacred truth. The real final truth is something else beyond any conceptualization. They are like two complementary antidotes, or skillful means. One fights nihilism or non-existence, the other fights realism or existence. This is the same thing as saying "we need both method and wisdom together all the time".
- We cannot say what is the absolute truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two. That is how we stay away from the four extremes conceptions. The final truth is beyond conceptualization, it cannot be described and has to be directly seen, but it is called the Union of the Two Truths, the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfection of dependent origination and of emptiness where one realize their non-duality: not two but still not one. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.
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.
This concludes the commentary on the fourteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2] L2: [Chapter 15 - Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] -
Production / origination, duration, cessation - P. 277]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF THAT WHICH CONSTITUTES PRODUCTS.
.
-- Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products.
-- One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective observation of their production, duration and disappearance. It may also be assumed that things change into something else.
-- But the exact link between the cause and conditions and the effect is not clear at all. They cannot overlap in time, nor be simultaneous in time. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other. So there is no stopping of the cause, and starting of the effect at all.
-- There is no real production, and so forth, otherwise we would have infinite regress.
-- When we say a thing is in the process of production; it is never absolute. Some conditions can change and there would be no final product as expected. So nothing is absolutely in the process of production; nothing is being produced. -- The process of production itself is unclear; it cannot be found.
-- So the exact time of production cannot be found. And the distinction between past, present and future become blur. Why? Because there is no real production and so forth; it is merely labeled by the mind.
-- So thing are not produced from other things, nor by themselves, nor from non-things, . . . And things do not change.
-- The three characteristics of impermanent things (the product) are not real characteristics either. They cannot exist independently of each other, and of the characterized. Nor are they all the same. Neither simultaneous, nor consecutive.
-- In general, the characteristics and the characterized are not different, not the same. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other.
-- So there is no real cause, production, product. There is no real impermanent things with origination, duration, cessation. Production cannot be used as an argument to prove the existence of things.
-- Nothing is before, during or after production / change.
-- There is no real past, present, future. Why? Because they are relative to the existence of something real, and nothing is real.
-- But, still, there is no effect without a cause. )
.
-- (Assumption: Things exist and change; they have origination, duration and cessation. Because there is this inherent production, things really exist. )
.
L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians's illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced] L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
.
\ ###
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the effect cannot be existing, nor non-existing at the time of its cause. Examining whether it exists or not at the time of its cause. If they, cause & effect, exist simultaneously then there is no need for production; if they exist sequentially then there is no causal link between the two. So there is no real cause and effect as we think they are, there is no real production as we think there is. It is much more subtle than this. )
.
(-- Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity.
-- Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.
-- Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is
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.
\ ###
\ 354.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
asserted to produce products, then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.
-- A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkey's horn and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exist at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity. )
.
L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
.
\ ###
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
.
(i. e. The cause and the effect cannot be sequential, not overlapping, because then there is no causal link between the two and it would mean that the effect is without any cause, that anything could be produced from anything else. The cause and the effect cannot overlap either because if the effect is already existing at the time of the cause what need is there to produce it again? )
.
(-- Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non- existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence.
-- ab: Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed. Thus something which does not exist at the time of the seed will not be produced by way of its own entity. In general, even though a sprout which is non-existent at the time of the seed is produced, it is incorrect to accept truly existent production, for then one must also accept production of rabbits' horns.
-- cd: Since something which is established at the time of its cause does not need anything to establish it, that which exists at the time of its cause will not be produced. )
.
L7: [(3) Refutation by examining the time of production]
.
\ ###
\ 353.
\ There is no production at that time,
\ Nor is there production at another.
\ If not produced at that time nor another,
\ When will there ever be production?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the exact time of production cannot be found: At the time of the cause there is no production yet; at the time of the effect there is no more production. And since those two cannot overlap or be separated, then when exactly is there production ? )
.
(-- A thing is not produced while it exists nor while it is non-existent. Since there is no other possibility, how can production be truly existent, for when analyzed nothing is findable.
-- At a time when the sprout itself exists there is no production, since it does not need to be produced. Other than that, when it does not exist there is no production, since it cannot be produced. If it is not produced at that time nor at the other, when will there ever be production? There cannot be a time of production. )
.
L7: [(4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and another thing]
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\ Just as there is no production
\ Of that as the thing it is,
\ Neither is it produced
\ As something else.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same, nor different. If they are the same there is no need for production; if they are different then they have no causal link. )
.
(-- Assertion: Milk turning into something which is curd constitutes production.
-- Answer: That is incorrect
-- Since something which exists as milk does not need to become milk, there is no production. Neither is that milk produced as something else, i. e. curd, for the two are different entities.
-- see Karikas 13 -- Nothing is being produced, and nothing is changing into something else. For example, when we say "milk changes into curds"; it is not milk that is curds, so milk has not changed. Like "milk becoming curd"; it is not "milk" existing as "curds". It is not the same continuing. It is about the duality "existence" vs "other-existence"; neither exist independently. )
.
L6: [b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end]
.
\ ###
\ 355.
\ The first, intermediate and last
\ Are not possible prior to production.
\ How can each begin
\ Without the other two?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because origination, duration and cessation are not independent - they cannot exist before a product, nor exist independently of each other: A product is defined as having those three absolute characteristics: origination, duration, cessation. To be inherently existing those three characteristics have to be able to exist independently, on their own. But they cannot exist before the product; they are dependent on a product. And they cannot exist independently of each other because a product need to have those three to be a product. They have no real existence on their own, they are empty of inherent existence because co-dependently arisen concepts. We would never be able to see them directly contrary to what the Abhidharma say the Yogis can do. )
.
(-- Do the three characteristics -- production, duration and disintegration -- occur sequentially? They cannot, for they are simultaneous aspects of an on-going process, dependent on one another. Unless a thing has all three of these features, it cannot be a product.
-- There is no inherent production for the following reason too:
-- ab: First production, then duration and lastly disintegration are not possible prior to production, because that which is unproduced cannot have production, duration and disintegration.
-- Assertion: Production while a thing is being produced, duration while it lasts and disintegration when it disintegrates exists consecutively by way of their own entity.
-- cd: How could each at its particular time begin without the other two? Duration and disintegration are impossible without production. The same applies to the other two. Moreover a product is not feasible without any one of these characteristics. )
.
L6: [c. Refutation by examining both self and other]
.
\ ###
\ 356.
\ The thing itself does not occur
\ Without other things.
\ Thus there is no coming into existence
\ Either from self or from other.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same (self-production), nor different (other production). Never has anything been seen to originate from self, from others, from both, or from neither. In the case of self there is no need for production. In the case of other, how could there be production; if that
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.
\ ###
\ 359.
\ A present thing does not
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
was the case anything would originate from anything else. )
.
(-- Moreover inherent production is impossible, since things are not produced from themselves, i. e. from that which has the same nature, nor from that which has a different nature, for neither have inherent existence.
-- For this reason too products cannot be inherently produced:
-- The thing itself, such as a clay pot, does not occur without other things, such as clay, since it depends upon clay. The clay does not exist by way of its own entity either, since it depends on pebbles. Thus the pot does not come into existence either from self or from other, for since neither self nor other exist by way of their own entity, there is no inherent production. )
.
L6: [d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 357.
\ It cannot be said to exist
\ Before, after or simultaneously.
\ Therefore production does not occur
\ Simultaneously with the pot.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because those three characteristics cannot exist before, during, or after the product. The product and its production are two co-dependently arisen concepts. .
.
L5: [3. Refutation by examining for singleness or plurality]
L6: [a. Refuting truly existent functional phenomena through the reason of being neither one nor many]
.
\ ###
\ 344.
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\ When different things are examined
\ None of them have singleness.
\ Because there is no singleness
\ There is no plurality either.
.
(i. e. Emptiness can only produce emptiness - a grouping of empty objects can only be an empty plurality: see also verse 332)
.
( -- When functional things like pots and woolen cloth are examined as to whether they are or are not truly existent, these various things, because they have parts, do not have truly existent singleness. Nor do they have truly existent plurality for the very reason by which they are not truly single, since plurality comes about through an accumulation of single units. External and internal phenomena are not truly existent because they are neither one nor many. They are like reflections. )
.
L6: [b. This fallacy equally applies to other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 345.
\ Though they assert that where there are none
\ Of those things there is singleness,
\ Singleness does not exist
\ Since everything is threefold.
.
(i. e. Even the smallest elementary component basis of the whole universe we can imagine is still composed of parts, has characteristics, has functions, is still part of a conceptual system, is still dependent on the mind conceiving it and labeling it, still dependent on accumulated karma, thus empty of inherent existence, like an illusion. )
.
( -- One may think this refutation applies to our own sectarians who assert that the elements and elemental derivatives occur simultaneously, but not to outsiders who assert that a small permanent earth particle which is a single unit exists where there are no functional things apart from the smallest particles such as earth particles and so forth. Yet even in their system the smallest earth particle is threefold in that it has substantial entity, singleness and existence. Attributes have attributiveness, singleness and existence. By virtue of the fact that everything is threefold even in their system, just unaccompanied singleness does not exist. Thus precisely the same fallacies apply to them. )
.
L5: [4. Applying reasoning which negates the four possibilities in [all] other cases [, with any duality. ]] .
\ ###
\ 346.
\ THE APPROACH OF EXISTENCE, NON-EXISTENCE,
\ BOTH EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE, AND NEITHER,
\ SHOULD ALWAYS BE APPLIED BY THOSE
\ WITH MASTERY TO ONENESS [I. E. EMPTINESS] AND SO FORTH.
.
(i. e. The Method: the Middle Way: staying away from the four extremes:
-- Tetralemma: To stay away from the four extreme conceptions of existence, non-existence, both, neither - that is away from thinking that those four, realism, idealism or nihilism, dualism, and monism, are the absolute truth, the final view. Because there is no absolute view, only adapted skillful means. Nirvana is not about doing something or not doing something, getting something or dropping something, seeing something or not seeing something. Nirvana is like space. -- Another way to present it would be: staying away from the four extremes: thinking causes and effects are the same (self-causation), different or separate (other causation), . . .
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking parts and whole are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking characteristics and the characterized are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same.
-- Another way to present it would be to say: staying away from the four extremes: thinking the world and the mind are the same, different or separate, both separate and the same, neither separate nor the same . . . etc.
-- The same for the Two Truths, for dependent origination and emptiness, for appearances and emptiness, for body and mind, for stillness and occurrence, for samsara and Nirvana, . . . etc. The same for any duality. For all dualities, all
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opposites, all relations: one side doesn't assimilate the other (one being true and the other false), not are they different or separate (both being true), nor are they the same (both being false). They are all non-dual: not two, not one. They are interdependent, inseparable. - This is the method to apply to all problems.
-- All of these different form of presentation mean the same thing. All duality problems come down to the same problem of inherent existence. Resolving the problem of inherent existence (the perfection of the wisdom of emptiness) is solving the problem of all dualities, of all discriminations, of causality space and time, of the self vs the world, of the whole samsara (the perfection of the wisdom of dependent origination). And perfecting wisdom is to realize their inseparability. All problems comes from ignoring this real non-dual nature of everything. And Nirvana comes only from directly realizing this true non-dual nature of our own mind, and of everything, that is like luminous space - empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional, inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfect Union of The Two Truths. Realizing this emptiness, great compassion arises! )
.
(-- Those who have mastered the art of employing the meaning of suchness always refute oneness, otherness, both and neither by applying the kinds of reasoning which refute the assertions
-- of those like the Samkhyas who claim the effect exists at the time of the cause;
-- of the Sautrantikas who assert that cause and effect truly exist but that the effect does not exist at the time of the cause;
-- of the Nirgranthas who assert both existence and non-existence in that a thing is permanent in nature yet temporarily impermanent;
-- and of those who assert that though things are substantially existent, they neither exist nor do not exist since they cannot be said to be this nor that.
They apply the reasons previously explained in [stanza 265], "For those who assert effects exists . . . "; the reason of dependent arising, the lack of being one or many, the diamond fragments reason and so forth. )
.
L3: [II. Showing the cause for mistaking functional things as permanent and truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 347.
\ When the continuum is misapprehended,
\ Things are said to be permanent.
\ Similarly when composites are
\ Misapprehended, things are said to exist.
.
(i. e. The problem: Because we do not fully understand dependent origination we think it means that there are absolute causes and effects, primary causes like elementary components (internal and external) and relations or absolute causality, space and time. That is the way it is presented in the Abhidharma. But their inherent existence is not necessary to explain karma, dependent origination, the cycle of samsara and the possibility of Liberation (or any conventional truths like morality, laws, sciences). On the contrary they would inhibit any possibility of change, and this mistake still creates subtle grasping and suffering, thus keeping us in samsara. Everything is dependently arisen (dependent on causes and conditions, on parts and characteristics, on the mind and karma perceiving it or labeling it) and thus empty of inherent existence; everything is like an illusion; like a figure on a cloud, like a swirl at the surface of the ocean, merely labeled by the mind, but not from the mind only. And there is no reason to fear this because it doesn't mean complete non-existence, or nihilism. But this is very subtle, hard to understand and usually not presented to beginners as discussed above. )
.
(-- Through inability to understand the continuum of things or the nature of composites correctly, they are thought to be permanent and truly existent. However their lack of true existence should not be confused with non-existence. Things are like magical illusions, in that they appear to exist and of themselves, but actually depend upon each other. Inherent existence implies permanence which precludes the coming into existence of things in dependence on other factors.
-- Question: if things therefore do not have the slightest inherent existence, for what reason do those opponents hold that they are truly existent?
-- Answer: Though there is no valid reason, in the case of a thing which lasts three days, they feel compelled to assert that whatever existed before must exist later. Functional things are said to be permanent when the continuum which is posited through imputation upon former, intermediate and later moments is misapprehended. Similarly when the composite is misapprehended, it is said that there are truly existent functional things. There seem to be even many adherents to the "Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition" who, through not knowing how to posit the composite and the continuum, follow outsiders. )
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L3: [III. Briefly showing the reasoning that establishes absence of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 348.
\ ANYTHING THAT HAS DEPENDENT ARISING
\ IS NOT INDEPENDENT.
\ ALL THESE ARE NOT INDEPENDENT,
\ THEREFORE THERE IS NO SELF.
.
(i. e. In re? sume? : everything is empty of inherent existence because everything is dependently arisen. Everything is empty of inherent existence but still dependently arisen and functional. There is no exception. And this doesn't mean complete non-existence or nihilism. Dependent origination and emptiness are not in opposition; one implies the other. They are two complementary antidotes pointing toward transcendence, toward the Union of The Two Truths, toward non- duality. )
.
(The middle way, not truly existent, not non-existent:
-- Objection: Even if our view that things exist were wrong, your view is that things do not exist, since you do not accept functional things. It is unreasonable because it contradicts both what is seen and unseen.
-- Answer: We make no claim that things do not exist for we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: Do you assert that things are truly existent?
-- Answer: No, because we are proponents of dependent arising.
-- Question: What does that mean?
-- Answer: It means that wile things are empty of inherent existence, like magical creations and mirages, they can produce effects.
-- Any relative thing which is found to arise and exist dependently is not found to exist independently. All these phenomena lack an independent mode of existence and thus there is no self of persons or of phenomena. The person and the aggregates do not exist inherently because they arise dependently. )
.
L3: [IV. Showing the need to understand absence of true existence] L4: [A. Inherently existent dependent arising is not seen by the Exalted]
.
\ ###
\ 349.
\ Things do not assemble
\ Unless there is an effect.
\ Aggregation for an effect
\ Is not included for the Exalted.
.
(i. e. The difference between Hinayana and Mahayana - the perfection of dependent origination: So the difference is that the Abhidharma teaches Dependent Origination assuming real causes, effects, causality, real characteristics and direct perception of those, real elementary components (internal and external), real space and time; only the self is not existent, merely conventional; -- while the Mahayana teaches Dependent Origination without any inherently existing dharma at all. It teaches that this is the only way to produce total Liberation, that grasping at the inherent existence of anything is still creating more causes for suffering. It teaches that cause and effect are interdependent; whole and parts are interdependent; characteristics and characterized are interdependent; even elementary particles are interdependent; that consciousnesses, sense organs, perception, and objects perceived are interdependent; that the whole world and the mind are interdependent; that everything is dependent on accumulated karma, and that ignoring this is the root cause of all suffering, while removing this ignorance is total Liberation. )
.
( -- Question: We too accept that effects are not independent, so what is the difference?
-- Answer: The difference is that you do not understand that dependent arising means mutual reliance.
-- Since nothing is produced by way of its own entity, things do not assemble and come together to produce an effect unless there is an effect to produce. Since anything inherently existent would be permanent, it could not rely on an effect. Aggregation for the sake of an effect is not included within the perception of the Exalted during meditative equipoise which sees suchness, because it directly perceives the lack of inherent existence of things. )
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L4: [B. Release from worldly existence is gained through understanding emptiness]
.
\ ###
\ 350.
\ THE AWARENESS THAT IS THE SEED OF EXISTENCE
\ HAS OBJECTS AS ITS SPHERE OF ACTIVITY.
\ WHEN SELFLESSNESS IS SEEN IN OBJECTS,
\ THE SEED OF EXISTENCE IS DESTROYED.
.
(i. e. One has to realize the emptiness of all dharmas, without any exception: To really remove completely all grasping to the self, that is the cause of all suffering, one has to realize the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas
without exception. Realizing the three marks: impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and no-self is not enough. If one follows only the teachings of the Hinayana, and still believe in the existence of some basic components as described in the Abhidharma, then there remains some subtle grasping, and there is no total definitive Liberation from samsara. Grasping at any absolute, any view, any method, any path, is still grasping. But that doesn't mean we should drop everything right now. )
.
(-- Only by understanding that things do not exist as perceived by conceptions of true or inherent existence can the seed of cyclic existence be destroyed. We should therefore make a great effort to develop a correct understanding of reality. -- One gains release from cyclic existence when deluded ignorance which conceives things as truly existent ends. This depends on understanding emptiness of inherent existence.
-- The seed of worldly existence is the conception that phenomena are truly existent. Objects such as form are its sphere of activity. The seed of worldly existence is destroyed and one attains liberation by seeing that these objects lack an inherently existent self and by gaining familiarity with this. On becoming a Hearer or Solitary Realizer Foe Destroyer or on reaching the eight ground, one achieves the complete elimination of conceptions of true existence. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ All who have gained a free and fortunate human body,
\ Following the reasoning of Nagarjuna and his son,
\ SHOULD UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS TO MEAN DEPENDENT ARISING.
\ Who would not make an effort to achieve this end?
.
(i. e. The perfection of wisdom: The Middle Way: while one should not take Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma as an absolute truth (with inherently existing elements in it), one should not fall into the other extreme and think emptiness is the absolute truth. - Those two, dependent origination and emptiness, form two poles of an apparent duality; so we could use the same treatment as for any duality as stated in verse 346. Dependently originated phenomena cannot exist and then be empty of inherent existence. Nor can something empty exist and then be dependently originated. Each of those two cannot exist without the other. But still they are not the same thing. One cannot possess the other. They are not different, not the same. They are interdependent. They are two co-dependently arisen concepts. Thus both dependent origination and emptiness itself are also empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. They are both conventional truths, even if emptiness is called the ultimate truth, or sacred truth. The real final truth is something else beyond any conceptualization. They are like two complementary antidotes, or skillful means. One fights nihilism or non-existence, the other fights realism or existence. This is the same thing as saying "we need both method and wisdom together all the time".
- We cannot say what is the absolute truth beyond conceptualization (so we say there is no absolute truth, only adapted skillful means), but we can say what it is not; and it is not Dependent Origination (conventional truths), not emptiness (ultimate truth), not both together, not neither or something else that those two. That is how we stay away from the four extremes conceptions. The final truth is beyond conceptualization, it cannot be described and has to be directly seen, but it is called the Union of the Two Truths, the inseparability of appearances and emptiness, the perfection of dependent origination and of emptiness where one realize their non-duality: not two but still not one. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the fourteenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions.
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This concludes the commentary on the fourteenth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of extreme conceptions, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2] L2: [Chapter 15 - Refuting Truly Existent Characteristics [of products] -
Production / origination, duration, cessation - P. 277]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF THAT WHICH CONSTITUTES PRODUCTS.
.
-- Refuting the inherent existence of production, duration and disintegration, the characteristics of products.
-- One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective observation of their production, duration and disappearance. It may also be assumed that things change into something else.
-- But the exact link between the cause and conditions and the effect is not clear at all. They cannot overlap in time, nor be simultaneous in time. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other. So there is no stopping of the cause, and starting of the effect at all.
-- There is no real production, and so forth, otherwise we would have infinite regress.
-- When we say a thing is in the process of production; it is never absolute. Some conditions can change and there would be no final product as expected. So nothing is absolutely in the process of production; nothing is being produced. -- The process of production itself is unclear; it cannot be found.
-- So the exact time of production cannot be found. And the distinction between past, present and future become blur. Why? Because there is no real production and so forth; it is merely labeled by the mind.
-- So thing are not produced from other things, nor by themselves, nor from non-things, . . . And things do not change.
-- The three characteristics of impermanent things (the product) are not real characteristics either. They cannot exist independently of each other, and of the characterized. Nor are they all the same. Neither simultaneous, nor consecutive.
-- In general, the characteristics and the characterized are not different, not the same. Why? Because they are both merely imputed by the mind. They are mental constructions, based on each other.
-- So there is no real cause, production, product. There is no real impermanent things with origination, duration, cessation. Production cannot be used as an argument to prove the existence of things.
-- Nothing is before, during or after production / change.
-- There is no real past, present, future. Why? Because they are relative to the existence of something real, and nothing is real.
-- But, still, there is no effect without a cause. )
.
-- (Assumption: Things exist and change; they have origination, duration and cessation. Because there is this inherent production, things really exist. )
.
L3: [I. Extensively establishing dependent arising which are not inherently produced as existing in the manner of a magicians's illusions]
L4: [A. Specific refutation of inherent production]
L5: [1. Extensive explanation]
L6: [a. Refutation by examining whether that which exists or does not exist is produced] L7: [(1) Reason refuting production of that which exists or does not exist]
.
\ ###
\ 351.
\ How can the non-existent be produced,
\ If what does not exist at the last is produced?
\ How can that which exists be produced,
\ If what exists from the outset is produced?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the effect cannot be existing, nor non-existing at the time of its cause. Examining whether it exists or not at the time of its cause. If they, cause & effect, exist simultaneously then there is no need for production; if they exist sequentially then there is no causal link between the two. So there is no real cause and effect as we think they are, there is no real production as we think there is. It is much more subtle than this. )
.
(-- Inherent production of a thing is impossible, for neither that which exists nor that which does not exist at the time of its causes is produced by way of its own entity.
-- Assertion: Products exist inherently because their characteristics such as production exist.
-- Answer: Products would exist if their characteristics existed, but these do not exist inherently. If production is
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.
\ ###
\ 354.
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asserted to produce products, then according to those who propound the non-existence of the effect, the sprout which does not exist at the time of the seed is produced after the final moment of a seed for which the necessary causes and conditions are assembled.
-- A sprout which does not exist during the last moment of the seed cannot be produced by way of its own entity, otherwise it follows that donkey's horn and so forth would also be produced. Thus how can anything which does not exist at the time of its cause be produced by way of its own entity? It cannot. How can anything which exist at the time of its cause be produced? It follows that it will not be produced, since anything existing at the time of its cause was produced from the outset, prior to being itself. The subject, a sprout, is not produced by way of its own entity, for neither that which exists at the time of its cause nor that which does not exist at the time of its cause is produced by way of its own entity. )
.
L7: [(2) Establishing its mode [of operation]]
.
\ ###
\ 352.
\ Since the effect destroys the cause,
\ That which does not exist will not be produced.
\ Nor will that which exists be produced
\ Since what is established needs no establisher.
.
(i. e. The cause and the effect cannot be sequential, not overlapping, because then there is no causal link between the two and it would mean that the effect is without any cause, that anything could be produced from anything else. The cause and the effect cannot overlap either because if the effect is already existing at the time of the cause what need is there to produce it again? )
.
(-- Something non-existent at the time of its causes cannot come into being in and of itself. If it could, even totally non- existent things like rabbits' horns could occur, since they would not depend on producing causes. On the other hand, neither would something already existent at the time of its causes require anything to bring it into existence.
-- ab: Since the sprout cannot be produced unless the seed undergoes change, the process which produces the resultant sprout destroys the causal seed. Thus something which does not exist at the time of the seed will not be produced by way of its own entity. In general, even though a sprout which is non-existent at the time of the seed is produced, it is incorrect to accept truly existent production, for then one must also accept production of rabbits' horns.
-- cd: Since something which is established at the time of its cause does not need anything to establish it, that which exists at the time of its cause will not be produced. )
.
L7: [(3) Refutation by examining the time of production]
.
\ ###
\ 353.
\ There is no production at that time,
\ Nor is there production at another.
\ If not produced at that time nor another,
\ When will there ever be production?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the exact time of production cannot be found: At the time of the cause there is no production yet; at the time of the effect there is no more production. And since those two cannot overlap or be separated, then when exactly is there production ? )
.
(-- A thing is not produced while it exists nor while it is non-existent. Since there is no other possibility, how can production be truly existent, for when analyzed nothing is findable.
-- At a time when the sprout itself exists there is no production, since it does not need to be produced. Other than that, when it does not exist there is no production, since it cannot be produced. If it is not produced at that time nor at the other, when will there ever be production? There cannot be a time of production. )
.
L7: [(4) Refutation by examining the thing itself and another thing]
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\ Just as there is no production
\ Of that as the thing it is,
\ Neither is it produced
\ As something else.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same, nor different. If they are the same there is no need for production; if they are different then they have no causal link. )
.
(-- Assertion: Milk turning into something which is curd constitutes production.
-- Answer: That is incorrect
-- Since something which exists as milk does not need to become milk, there is no production. Neither is that milk produced as something else, i. e. curd, for the two are different entities.
-- see Karikas 13 -- Nothing is being produced, and nothing is changing into something else. For example, when we say "milk changes into curds"; it is not milk that is curds, so milk has not changed. Like "milk becoming curd"; it is not "milk" existing as "curds". It is not the same continuing. It is about the duality "existence" vs "other-existence"; neither exist independently. )
.
L6: [b. Refutation by examining the beginning, middle and end]
.
\ ###
\ 355.
\ The first, intermediate and last
\ Are not possible prior to production.
\ How can each begin
\ Without the other two?
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because origination, duration and cessation are not independent - they cannot exist before a product, nor exist independently of each other: A product is defined as having those three absolute characteristics: origination, duration, cessation. To be inherently existing those three characteristics have to be able to exist independently, on their own. But they cannot exist before the product; they are dependent on a product. And they cannot exist independently of each other because a product need to have those three to be a product. They have no real existence on their own, they are empty of inherent existence because co-dependently arisen concepts. We would never be able to see them directly contrary to what the Abhidharma say the Yogis can do. )
.
(-- Do the three characteristics -- production, duration and disintegration -- occur sequentially? They cannot, for they are simultaneous aspects of an on-going process, dependent on one another. Unless a thing has all three of these features, it cannot be a product.
-- There is no inherent production for the following reason too:
-- ab: First production, then duration and lastly disintegration are not possible prior to production, because that which is unproduced cannot have production, duration and disintegration.
-- Assertion: Production while a thing is being produced, duration while it lasts and disintegration when it disintegrates exists consecutively by way of their own entity.
-- cd: How could each at its particular time begin without the other two? Duration and disintegration are impossible without production. The same applies to the other two. Moreover a product is not feasible without any one of these characteristics. )
.
L6: [c. Refutation by examining both self and other]
.
\ ###
\ 356.
\ The thing itself does not occur
\ Without other things.
\ Thus there is no coming into existence
\ Either from self or from other.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because the cause and the effect cannot be the same (self-production), nor different (other production). Never has anything been seen to originate from self, from others, from both, or from neither. In the case of self there is no need for production. In the case of other, how could there be production; if that
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.
\ ###
\ 359.
\ A present thing does not
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
was the case anything would originate from anything else. )
.
(-- Moreover inherent production is impossible, since things are not produced from themselves, i. e. from that which has the same nature, nor from that which has a different nature, for neither have inherent existence.
-- For this reason too products cannot be inherently produced:
-- The thing itself, such as a clay pot, does not occur without other things, such as clay, since it depends upon clay. The clay does not exist by way of its own entity either, since it depends on pebbles. Thus the pot does not come into existence either from self or from other, for since neither self nor other exist by way of their own entity, there is no inherent production. )
.
L6: [d. Refutation by examining sequentiality and simultaneity] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 357.
\ It cannot be said to exist
\ Before, after or simultaneously.
\ Therefore production does not occur
\ Simultaneously with the pot.
.
(i. e. There is no inherent production because those three characteristics cannot exist before, during, or after the product. The product and its production are two co-dependently arisen concepts. .
