Duarte joined the junta at a moment of severe crisis in March 1980, when all the progressive civilians had left and immediately after the murder of the Christian
Democratic
attorney-general, Mario Zamora, by the newly prospering death squads.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
S.
-organized and sup- plied contras.
?
1 Salvador was in the midst of a combination civil conflict and externally (U.
S.
) organized and funded counterinsurgency war.
Guatemala, as we noted earlier, had evolved into a counterinsur-
92 MASUFACTURING CONSENT
gency state, with permanent warfare to keep the majority of Indians and other peasants in their place, and violent repression was structured into the heart of the political system.
Despite the common feature of ongoing conflict, however, electoral conditions were far more favorable in Nicaragua than in El Salvador and Guatemala, for several reasons. First, and crucially important, in the latter countries, at the time of the elections the army was still engaged in mass slaughter ofthe civilian population, with the toll in the tens of thousands in each country and the killing often carried out with extreme sadism. Nothing remotely similar was true in Nicaragua. These facts, which are not controversial among people with a minimal concern for reality, immediately establish a fundamental distinction with regard to the electoral climate. In countries that are being subject to the terror of a rampaging murder machine, supported or run by a foreign power, electoral conditions are fatally compromised in advance, a point that the media would recognize at once if we were considering the sphere of influence of some official enemy. ll
A further-and related-distinction was that the ruling Sandinista government was a popular government, which strove to serve majority needs and could therefore afford to allow greater freedom ofspeech and organization. The LASA report on the Nicaraguan election notes that their program "implies redistribution of access to wealth and public services. The state will use its power to guarantee fulfillment of the basic needs of the majority population. " The "logic of the majority," the report continues, also implies the involvement of "very large num- bers of people in the decisions that affect their lives. "12 Qualified ob- servers conclude that the Nicaraguan government pursued this logic, although this fact is excluded from the free press. After citing the World Bank's observation that "Governrnents . . . vary greatly in the commitment of their political leadership to improving the condition of the people and encouraging their active participation in the develop- ment process," Dianna Melrose, of the charitable development agency Oxfam, states that "From Oxfam's experience of working in seventy-six developing countries, Nicaragua was to prove exceptional in the
strength of that Government commitment. "13 The Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments, by contrast, were ruled by elites that had been struggling desperately for decades to avoid the very kinds of reforms the Sandinistas were implementing. Extreme repression was the longstanding method of control of the majority in EI Salvador and Guatemala, with vigorous and unceasing U. S. support. The aim of this repression was to keep the populace apathetic and to destroy popular organizations that might lay the basis for meaningful democracy. The
LEGITlMIZl~G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 93
Sandinistas were engaged in mobilizing the majority and involving them in political life, which they could afford to do because their programs were intended to serve the general population.
A third factor affecting electoral conditions was that in El Salvador and Guatemala the conflict was internal, and violence against the ma- jority was integral to the struggle. In Nicaragua, the conflict was one involving an externally sponsored aggression that had very limited internal support. The Sandinistas could appeal to nationalist senti- ments, easily mobilized against Yankee-organized terrorism. The Sal- vadoran and Guatemalan governments could hardly do the same-the Salvadoran government especially had to contend with a negative na- tionalist reaction to obvious foreign (i. e. , U. S. ) domination and manipu- lation of its affairs, a fact that reached the level of absurdity when Duarte, visiting Washington in the fall of 1987, made himself an object of ridicule throughout Latin America by promptly kissing the American flag. While the Sandinistas did increasingly crack down on internal supporters of the contras as the conflict intensified, by the standards the United States usually applies to this region dissenters were dealt with remarkably benignly in Nicaragua. 14 In El Salvador and Guatemala, the ruling elites could not afford such toleration, and repression by large- scale terror had long been institutionalized in these states.
A fourth factor making for a more benign electoral environment in Nicaragua, paradoxically, was U. S. hostility and the power ofits propa- ganda machine. Every arrest or act of harassment in Nicaragua was publicized and transformed into evidence of the sinister quality of the Sandinista government in the free press of the United States. Mean- while, as we described in chapter 2, the Guatemalan and Salvadoran regimes could indulge in torture, rape, mutilation, and murder on a daily and massive basis without invoking remotely proportional atten- tion, indignation, or inferences about the quality of these regimes. In the context, the Nicaraguan government was under intense pressure to toe the mark, whereas the U. S. satellites were free to murder at will without serious political cost.
Let us examine briefly how El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua compared in the individual categories of conditions of a free election, before we turn to the media treatment of these issues.
3. 2. 1. Free speech and assembly.
In El Salvador, the right to free speech and free assembly was legally suspended under a state-of-siege order of March 7, 1980. Decree No.
94 MANUPACTURI~G CONSENT
507 of December 3, 1980, essentially destroyed the judicial system, permitting the armed forces to hold citizens without charge or evidence for 180 days. Under these rulings, in the thirty months before the March 198~ election, and prior to the 1984 elections, many thousands of civil- ians were seized, imprisoned, tortured, raped, and murdered outside of legal processes for alleged "subversive" actions and thoughts. The state of siege was lifted in early 1982 solely for the six parties contesting the election, and it was lifted entirely ten days before the election for all Salvadorans-although, unfortunately, the citizenry was not informed of this fact until after the election was over and state-of-siege condi- tions were reimposed. IS The practice of exposing mutilated bodies for the edification of the citizenry became institutionalized in the early 1980s in EI Salvador. We described in chapter 2 the difficulty the U. S. government had in getting underlings jailed, tried, and convicted for the murder offour American citizens, even under intense U. S. pressure. The people ofEl Salvador had no protection whatsoever from the state terrorists, apart from that afforded by the guerrilla army in the regions under their control. The threat of extreme violence by the state against dissident speech was acute in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, and was incompatible with a free election.
In Guatemala, similarly, during 1984 and 1985, and for many years before, the actions of the armed forces against alleged subversives was entirely outside the rule of law. Thousands were seized, tortured, and killed without warrant and without any individual right to hearing or trial. As in EI Salvador, mutilation and exposure of the tortured bodies became commonplace in the late 1970S and the 1980s. 16 The courts were dominated by the military, as the latter would simply not execute or obey a court order of which they disapproved, and the jUdges were not inclined to challenge the military for reasons of dependency or fear. Even Viscount Colville of Culross, the special rapporteur of the UN General Assembly who has been a notorious apologist for the Guatema- lan regime, after pointing out that over eighty members of the judiciary, court staff, and legal profession had been murdered in the early 1980s and that many others were threatened, says that "Such events make their mark and cannot quickly be mitigated. "17 Two illustrations of the lack of court autonomy may be noted here: in May 1983, Ricardo Sagastume Vidaure, then president of the supreme COUrt, was simply removed by military order for attempting to bring military personnel under the jurisdiction of the legal system. IS On July 19, 1984, Colonel Djalmi Dominguez, head of public relations for the army, told the newspaper Prensa Libre that the army wouldn't tolerate its members being taken to court on any chargesY~
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:';INGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlO:-lS 95
In the early 1980s, following the mass killings and village destruction of 1980-83, vast numbers of peasants were resettled in "model villages" and other places under army control, and over 800,000 males were made obligatory members of civil patrols with military functions under close army surveillance. According to the British parliamentary group that visited Guatemala in 1984, "The civilian patrol system is imple- mented by terror, and designed also to sow terror. . . . People who do anything out of the ordinary come under immediate suspicion and are taken by the patrols to the army's desracamienro. Interrogation will be done by the army, but the killing of murdered suspects [is] often by the civilian patrols. "2Q Bishops Taylor and O'Brien, representing the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conferences of Scotland and England-Wales respectively, reponed after their visit to Guatemala in 1984 that
The civilian population is under almost total control by a heavy army and police presence throughout the country, which we were able to observe. There is also a nationwide network ofcivil defense patrols, military commissioners and informers, and <<model vil- lages" serving in some cases as internment camps for the Indian population from the areas of conflict. Much of Guatemala resem- bles a country under military occupation. One of our informants summed up the situation by saying that the military had estab- lished a system of "structural control. "21
The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, following an on- site visit in May 1985, also found that freedom of speech and assembly did not exist in Guatemala:
The right of assembly and freedom of association, considered in Articles 15 and 16 of the American Convention, are also restricted and curtailed, because existing security measures in the Develop- ment Poles and the strict supervision of the Civil Defense Patrols inhibit residents from taking part in any social, ideological. cultu- ral or other assemblies or associations. All such meetings, when they do occur, are subject to surveillance, supervision and control by the authorities, so they do not enjoy the freedom implied by such rights. 22
Public demonstrations were permissible in Guatemala during the 1984-85 elections, with three days' advance notice and approval of the military authorities. In the Guatemalan context, however, this grant of rights was not meaningful. The delegation of the International Human
96 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America noted that whatever the election guarantees,
the military and civil defense patrols and the climate of fear also made it difficult for many Guatemalans to organize and assemble. One local observer said that years of terror and oppression against local organizations had demobilized the whole rural population: "Four CUC [peasant league] members were killed in this village alone. Now it would be very difficult to organize any kind of group. " Civil patrols, police and army checkpoints on highways, and the need for travel permits for residents of the model villages impeded free movement. In the rural areas the civil patrols dis- couraged gatherings because people feared being reported. 23
It was noted by many observers of the Guatemalan elections that although the big issues in that country were land distribution and reform and human rights, no political candidates discussed or ad- vocated either land reform, or restructuring the military and forcing an accounting of tens of thousands of "disappearances. " One Christian Democratic adviser explained to the law group that "We Christian Democrats haven't raised such issues because this isn't the moment to start a confrontation with either the army or the private sector. "24
In short, despite the "momentary improvement in the conditions of free speech" that occurred during the election campaign, Guatemala did not meet the first condition ofa free election. The rural masses were under army discipline and traumatized by mass killings and the absence of any vestige of rule of law, and the candidates were unable to raise openly the fundamental issues of the society.
Free speech and rights of assembly were constrained in Nicaragua in 1984 by social pressures and threats and by a state of siege that had been terminated some six months prior to the November 1984 election. Very important differences existed, however, between the Nicaraguan constraints and those prevailing in El Salvador and Guatemala. Most important, in Nicaragua the army and police did not regularly seize alleged subversives, and torture and murder them. Mutilated bodies have not been put on public display as a part of the system of public education. What the law group called the "constant, overt political terror" in Guatemala, based on "numerous documented massacres of whole villages," and what the former Salvadoran official Leonel Gomez called the state of "fearful passivity" prevalent in EI Salvador, did not apply to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, in 1984, dissidents were able to speak
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANI:-IGLESS THiRD WORLD ELECTIONS 97
freely without fear of murder, and the LASA group noted that "Every member of our delegation was approached at least once by an irate citizen as we walked around Managua and other cities. Several of these encounters turned into hea:ted arguments between the individual who had approached us and passers-by who joined the discussion. . . . These people did not feel intimidated. "25
Freedom of assembly in Nicaragua was somewhat limited by harass- ment, but, once again, it was not ruled out by state terror, as was the case in EI Salvador and Guatemala. The LASA delegation examined in detail the charges of Sandinista harassment of opposition-group meetings and found them largely unfounded, concluding that the con- testing parties "were able to hold the vast majority of their rallies unimpeded by pro~FSLN demonstrations. . . . "26
Our conclusion is that the first basic condition of a free election was- partially met in Nicaragua, but was not met at all in El Salvador and Guatemala.
3. 2. 2. Freedom of the press.
In ? 1 Salvador, the only substantial newspapers critical of the govern- ment, La Cronica del Pueblo and El Independiente-neither by any means radical papers-were closed in July 1980 and January 1981, re- spectively, the firSt because its top editor and two employees were murdered and mutilated by the security forces, the second because the army arrested its personnel and destroyed its plant. The church paper and radio station were repeatedly shut down by bombing attacks, No paper or station representing the principal opposition has been able to operate except clandestinely. Over thirty journalists have been mur- dered in ? 1 Salvador since the revolutionary junta took power, An intensified campaign against the press occurred just prior to the 1982 election. On March 10, a death list of thirty-five journalists was cir- culated by a "death squad," and on March 18 the mutilated bodies of four Dutch journalists were rel:overed. 27 None of the murders of jour- nalists in El Salvador was ever "solved"-they were essentially murders
carried out under the auspices of the state.
In Guatemala, forty-eight journalists were murdered between 1978
and 1985,28 and many others have been kidnapped and threatened. These -killings, kidnappings, and threats have been a primary means of control of the media. As in EI Salvador, nobody has yet been ap- prehended and tried for any of these crimes, which must be viewed as
I
?
98 M A N U F A C T U R IN G C O N S E N T
murders carried out by the state or with state approval. There are no papers or radio or television stations in Guatemala that express the views of the rebels or the majority Indian population or the lower classes in general. "At most, the variants reflect shades of strictly con- servative thinking. "29 Given the extreme climate of fear, and threats for stepping out of line, even the conservative press is cautious and engages in continuous self-censorship. All the central topics that should be debated in this terrorized society are carefully avoided. 30
In Nicaragua, once again, there have been no reported deaths of journalists by state terrorists, nor even threats of personal violence. In 1984, the majority of the fifty-odd radio stations were privately owned, and some of them provided their own news programs; four other inde- pendent producers supplied radio news programs without prior censor- ship. Foreign radio and television from commercial and U. S. propaganda sources broadcasting from Costa Rica, Honduras, and else- where were of growing importance in 1984. 31 Two of the three newspa- pers were privately owned, one supportive of the government but critical of specific programs and actions, the other violently hostile. The latter, La Prensa, which represented the small, ultraconservative mi- nority and supported the contras and a foreign-sponsored invasion of the country, was allowed to operate throughout the 1984 election, al- though it was censored. The censorship still allowed the paper to publish manifestos of opposition groups and a pastoral letter critical of the regime. No comparable paper has been allowed to exist above- ground, even briefly, in El Salvador and Guatemala.
There is no doubt that the media in Nicaragua have been under government constraint, with censorship and periodic emergency con- trols that seriously encroached on freedom of the press. 32 It should be noted, however, that Nicaragua is under foreign attack and in a state of serious warfare. John S. Nichols points out that under the U. S. Espionage Act of 1917, over one hundred publications were banned from the mails, and hundreds of people were jailed for allegedly inter- fering with military recruitment. Furthermore,
Given that the United States was a relatively mature and homoge- nous political system during World War I and was not particularly threatened by the fighting, the range of public discussion tolerated in Nicaragua during the first five years of the revolution was remarkable. Despite assertions by President Reagan, IAPA, and others that the control of the Nicaraguan media was virtually totalitarian, the diversity of ownership and opinion was unusual for a Third World country, particularly one at war. 33
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 99
Our conclusion is that the condition of freedom of the press necessary for a free election was clearly absent in El Salvador and Guatemala, and that it was partially met in Nicaragua.
3. 2. 3. Freedom of organization of intermediate groups.
Perhaps the most important fact about EI Salvador in the two years prior to the election of March 1982 was the decimation of popular and private organizations that could pose any kind of challenge to the army and oligarchy. As we noted in chapter 2, this was the main thrust of policy of the revolutionary junta from late 1979 onward, and thousands of leaders were murdered and numerous organizations were destroyed or driven underground. The teachers' union was decimated by several hundred murders; the university was occupied, looted, and closed down by the army; organized student and professional groups were destroyed by arrests and killings, and even the peasant union sponsored by the AFL-CIO (i. e. , supporters of the regime) had some one hundred of its organizers and leaders murdered between October 1979 and the elec- tion of March 1982. 34
In Guatemala, too, intermediate organizations such as peasant and trade unions, teacher and student groups, and professional organiza- tions have been regularly attacked by the armed forces since 1954. The process of demobilization of institutions threatening the dominant elites culminated in the early 1980s, when by government proclamation "illicit association" was made punishable by law. All groups "which follow, or are subordinated to, any totalitarian system of ideology" (evidently an exception is made of the Guatemalan armed forces and the national-security ideology) are illicit. Only the armed forces deter- mine when illicitness occurs. If General Mejia Victores finds the GAM mothers to be agents of subversion, they may be killed (see chapter 2). Unions, peasant groups, student and professional organizations have
J grown up periodically in Guatemala, only to be crushed by systematic murder as soon as their demands were pressed with any vigor. The 1984-85 elections followed the greatest era of mass murder in modern Guatemalan history-under the regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios Montt, and Mejia Victores. Union membership in 1985 was below its 1950 level, and other u,rban groups were decimated or inactive; the peasant major- ity was totally demobilized and under the tight control and surveillance of the military.
100 M ANUF ACTURIlI\G CONSENT
In Nicaragua, again the contrast with the two U. S. clients is marked. Under Sandinista management there was a spurt in union and peasant organization. A deliberate attempt was made to mobilize the population to participate in decision-making at the local level and to interact with higher-level leaders. Oxfam compliments the Nicaraguan government highly for this etfort, as we pointed out earlier.
There is legitimate debate over the extent to which the grass-roots and other organizations sponsored by the ruling FSLN are indepen- dent, and whether they might not be a vehicle for both state propaganda and coercion. Oxfam America and its parent organization in London clearly find them constructive. Luis Hector Serra contends that the grass-roots organizations are relatively autonomous, and that their close relationship to the leadership ofthe FSLN "did not obstruct their capacity to express the concerns of their members at the locallevel. "3~ He concludes that the popular organizations were "profoundly demo- cratic" in their effects of involving the populace in decision-making and educating them on the possibilities of participation in public life. 36 The difference with the organization of the Guatemalan peasantry in "poles of development," where the essence of the organization was, quite openly, military control by terror and enforced nonparticipation, is quite dramatic, whatever one's general assessment of the FSLN popu- lar organizations may be.
We conclude that on the third basic condition for a free election, El Salvador and Guatemala did not qualify in the years 1984-85; Nicara- gua did, at least to a significant degree. 37
3. . 2. 4. Freedom to organize parties, field candidates, and campaign for office
No party of the left could organize and present candidates in the 1982 and 1984 elections in El Salvador. The Democratic Front (FDR) had been quickly driven underground. Five of its top leaders were seized in EI Salvador in November 1980 by official and paramilitary forces, and were tortured, mutilated, and killed. A year before the March 1982 election, the army published a list of 138 "traitors," which included virtually all politicians of the left and left-center. Colonel Gutierrez, a powerful member of the junta, had stated forcefully that the FDR could not participate in the election because it was a "front" for the guerrillas. The invitation to the FDR and the FMLN to lay down their arms and
LEGITIMIZll'G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOl'S 101
compete in the election was thus fraudulent, a fact confirmed by the admission of the U. S. embassy that the FDR could not safely campaign in El Salvador, with the accompanying suggestion that they might do so by means of videotapes sent in from outside the country's bordersp8 Subsequently, even Duarte, the preferred candidate of the United States, was unable to campaign outside San Salvador in 1982 for fear of murder, and scores of Christian Democratic politicans were killed in the years 1980-84. 39 In short, not only radical but even pro-U. S. , mildly reformist parties could not escape decimation by political mur- der during those years.
It should also be emphasized that no party could organize and run candidates in EI Salvador that put high priority on terminating the war by negotiations with the rebels. What makes this especially important is that reporters and observers were unanimous in 1982 that the main thing the public wanted out of the election was peace. The propaganda formula for getting out the vote in 1982 was "ballots versus bullets," with the implication that ballots were a possible route to a reduction in the use of bullets. If, in fact, no peace candidate was eligible to run, the election was a fraud for this reason alone.
Defenders of these elections have argued that there was a substantial difference between the candidates, especially between D'Aubuisson and Duarte, so that VOters had a meaningful choice. 4o But D'Aubuisson and Duarte did not disagree on the central issue of interest to the Salvado- ran people-whether to fight to win, or to strive for a negotiated settle- ment with the rebels. Both were members of the war party, with only tactical differences. Although Duarte made occasional demagogic claims that he would talk with the rebels and bring about peace, he never spelled out a peace-making agenda, never went beyond suggest- ing "dialogue" (as opposed to "negotiations," which imply the possibil- ity of substantive concessions), and never departed from the position that the rebels should lay down their arms and participate in the new "democracy" that Duarte and the army had established.
Duarte joined the junta at a moment of severe crisis in March 1980, when all the progressive civilians had left and immediately after the murder of the Christian Democratic attorney-general, Mario Zamora, by the newly prospering death squads. It was clear that the army and affiliated death squads had embarked on a policy of large-scale massa- c? re. Duarte provided the fig leaf and apologetics that the army needed for the second mata;nza. 41 We believe that Duarte never would have received U. S. support and protection, and could not have survived in El Salvador, unless he had made it dear that he was in basic accord with the aims of the U. S. administration and the Salvadoran army. From
IOZ MANUFACTURING CONSENT
1980 onward, Duarte always accepted fully the pursuit of a military solution and no compromise with "the subversives" (a phrase that Duarte uses continually. just as do the army and death-squad leaders). As Raymond Bonner points out,
The repression in 1980 reached a magnitude surpassed only by the [first} malanza and was far worse than anything imagined under General Romero. . . . By the end of the year the number [mur- dered] had reached at least 9,000. Every day mutilated bodies, missing arms or heads, were found: behind shopping centers; stuffed in burlap bags and left 00 dusty rural roads; hurled over cliffs into ravines. 42
And through all of this, Duarte not only provided the facade of "re- form," he regularly complimeoted the army for its Joyal service. In a letter published in the Miami Herald on November 9. 1981, Duarte wrote that
The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a cruel and pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggres- sion. This goes parallel with armed aggression. . . . This would be one more prey in the conquest plan in the Central Ameri- can region that Moscow has designed to pursue. Immediately after that its greatest reward would be the North American na- tion. . . .
In brief, the Salvadoran public was never offered the option that the press itself acknowledged the voters craved.
In Guatemala. as in El Salvador, no parties of the left participated in the 1984 election for a constituent assembly, and only one crippled party made a tentative but wholly ineffectual foray in the 1985 presiden- tial election. 43 The main guerrilla movements were, of course, outside the electoral orbit. Their leaders would have been killed if ap- prehended, but they would not have participated anyway without a drastic alteration in basic social and electoral conditions. " Even a centrist party like the Christian Democrats had suffered scores of mur- ders in the years 1980-83, and the current president of Guatemala, the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo, survived three known assassina- tion attempts. No seriously left party could have qualified in 1984-85 under the laws of "illicit association" mentioned earlier.
The peasant majority was not represented or spoken for by any candidate. The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, an organiza-
I
LEGITUHZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 103
tion not able to function within Guatemala, has pointed out that na- tional political parties that speak for major groups like the working class or indigenous people "do not exist and . . . as a result, these sectors are institutionally excluded from the political system. "45 Americas Watch states that one of the civil-patrol system's functions is "to provide vigilance and control of the local population, preventing any form of independent political organization. "46 This exclusion of the peasantry from any political opportunity was reflected in two ways in the 1984-85 elections. One was that in registering for the election, only 3 percent of the electorate signed up as members of political parties. Another, more compelling, is that no candidate in the election urged land reform, although this was one of the two central issues in Guatemala (the other being unconstrained army murder, also not an issue in the election, given the understanding on all sides that the army will remain the ruling force, whoever gains office).
As with Duarte in ? 1 Salvador, the presence of Vinicio Cerezo as a candidate, and as the eventual winner in the 1985 election, raises the question of whether, despite the constraints on the left, Cerezo did not really offer a significant option to the voting public. Cerezo differen- tiated himself from his electoral rivals, especially toward the end of the campaign and the runoff, by expressing compassion for the masses and a determination to make changes in the human-rights picture and mass poverty. He occasionally mentioned the need for structural reform, although he was not specific and stressed that the first requirement was to reestablish civilian control. He was quite clear, however, that if he were elected, his power would be nominal at first and would have to be enlarged while he was in office:
The election will not bring automatic transfer of real power to the president. There will be a handover offormal power. What are my chances of consolidating that power? Fifty-fifty,47
During the election campaign, Cerezo never straightforwardly ad- dressed the question of land reform, and news reports in Guatemala suggested that he had promised the landowners' lobby that land reform was not on his agenda. 48 Similarly, he did not promise any legal action against those who had murdered thousands, nor did he say that he would dismantle the counterinsurgency state. There would seem to have been at least a tacit understanding between Cerezo and the mili- tary that he would protect them against prosecution and preserve their power and relative autonomy; in fact, he could not do otherwise and survive. 49 In the year and a half that has elapsed since he took office,
I04 M A NUF A CTURING CONSE"-T
Cerezo has made no meaningful move toward land reform, has sup- ported the army vigorously against any accounting, and has made no move to dismantle the civil patrols, the development poles, and other features of institutionalized terror. 50 The human-rights situation in Guatemala "remains terrible,"5I although improved (but partly because higher rates of killing are no longer deemed beneficial). The poor, for whom he expressed so much compassion during the electoral campaign, have suffered further losses in real income, as Cerezo's "reforms" have accommodated the demands of the army and oligarchy. He is on very poor terms with the Mutual Support Group. Thus, the postelection pattern shows that Cerezo, in part by prior agreement but more deci- sively by structural constraints, has been entirely unable to serve his mass constituency. In the 1984-85 elect;? :m, Cerezo gave the Guatema- lan people an opportunity to vote for a man of seeming goodwill and good intentions, but one unable to respond to democratic demands opposed by the real rulers of the state.
In Nicaragua, in 1984, the spectrum of candidates was much wider than in EI Salvador, Guatemala, or, for that matter, the United States. 52 The Conservative Democratic party and the Independent Liberal party both issued strong calls for respect for private property, reduced gov- ernment control of the economy, elimination of press and other con- trols, and a foreign policy of greater nonalignment and accommodation. Both were able to denounce the Sandinistas for the war and to call for depoliticization of the army and negotiations with the contras. Arturo Cruz, after lengthy negotiations with representatives of the govern- ment, chose not to run in the 1984 election. But this was a voluntary act of Cruz (albeit under heavy U. S. pressure),53 in contrast with the position of the left in El Salvador and Guatemala, and was not based
on physical threats to his person or limits on his access to the popu- lace. 54
The FSLN had a strong advantage over the opposition parties as the party in power, defending the country from foreign attack and having mobilized the population for their own projects of development. The LASA group felt that much of the incumbency advantage of the FSLN was characteristic of governments everywhere, and concluded:
It seems clear tha. t the FSLN took substantial advantage of its incumbent position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the abuses of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic; and neither the nature of the abuses n? )r their frequency was such as to cripple the opposition parties' ,,~mpaigns or to cast doubt on
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THlRD WORLD ELECTIONS IOS
the fundamental validity of the electoral process. . . . Generally speaking, in this campaign the FSLN did little more to take ad- vantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less than ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally have done. 55
We would conclude that the ability of candidates to qualify and run, and the range of options, was substantially greater in Nicaragua than in El Salvador and Guatemala. Furthermore. as all major political groups of the left were off the ballot by threat of violence in the latter two cases. those elections fail to meet still another basic electoral condi. tion.
3. 2. 5. Absence of state terror and a ~limate of fear
During the years 1980-84 the death squads worked freely in ? 1 Salva- dor. in close coordination with tbe army and security forces. Tbe average rate of killings of civilians in the thirty months prior to the 1982 election was approximately seven hundred per month. Many of these victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated. All of this was done with complete impunity, and only the murder of four American women elicited-by dint of congressional pressure-any kind of legal action. Even William Doherty of the American Institute for Free Labor Devel- opment-a longtime supporter of U. S. policy in El Salvador-asserted before a congressional committee that there was nO system of justice operative in that country. while Leonel Gomez, a former land-reform official in E1 Salvador. told the same committee a bit later that state
terror had put the population in a state of <<fearful passivity. "56
In Guatemala, too, the endemic fear based on years of unconstrained and continuing army violence was a dominant fact of national life.
According to Americas Watch, writing in early 1985,
Torture, killings, and disappearances continue at an extraordinary rate, and millions of peasants remain under the strict scrutiny and control of the government through the use of civil patrols and "model villages! ' Guatemala remains, in short, a nation of prison- ers. 57
106 MANUFACTURING CONSENT ,
The law group described Guatemala in 1985 as "a country where the greater part of the people live in permanent fear. "s8
In the case of Nicaragua, we repeat the central fact that differentiates it from the U. S. client states: in 1984 its government was not murdering civilians. 59 The main fear of ordinary citizens in Nicaragua was of violence by the contras and the United States.
Our conclusion is that the fifth condition for a free election was met in Nicaragua, but not in EI Salvador and Guatemala. And our overall finding is that neither Et Salvador nor Guatemala met any of the five basic conditions of a free election, whereas Nicaragua met some of them well, others to a lesser extent.
3. 3. THE COERCION PACKAGES IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND NICARAGUA
As we noted, in the U. S. government's sponsored elections, voter turn- out is interpreted as public support for the election and its sponsors. In disapproved elections (here, Nicaragua), this frame is abandoned, and voter turnout is either ignored or declared meaningless because of limited options or coercive threats by the authorities. But the question of coercive threats should clearly be raised in all cases where this is a potential problem. As we have just described, the elections in ? 1 Salva- dor were held under conditions of military rule where mass killings of "subversives" had taken place and a climate of fear had been estab- lished. I f the government then sponsors an election and the local mili- tary authorities urge people to vote, a significant part ofthe vote should be assumed to be a result of built-in coercion. A propaganda model would anticipate that the U. S. mass media make no such assumption, and they did not.
In El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, voting was also required by law. The law stipulated that failure to vote was to be penalized by a specific monetary assessment, and it also called on local authorities to check out whether voters did in fact vote. This could be done because at the time of voting one's identification card (ID, ddula) was stamped, acknowl- edging the casting of a vote. Anybody stopped by the army and police would have to show the ID card, which would quickly indicate whether the individual had carried out his or her patriotic duty. Just prior to the March 1982 election, Minister of Defense Garcia warned the popula- tion in the San Salvador newspapers that the failure to vote would be
LEGITIMIZI~G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THUD WORLD ELECTIONS 107
regarded as an act of treason. And in the 1984 election, "Advertising by the government and military prior to the elections stressed the obliga- tion to vote rather than the freedom to vote. "60 Given the climate of fear, the voting requirement, the ID stamp, the army warning, and the army record in handling "traitors," it is evident that the coercive ele- ment in generating turnout in Salvadoran elections has been large. This is supported by queries made by independent observers on the reasons why Salvadorans voted. 61
In Guatemala, as in ? 1 Salvador, voting was required by law; nonvot- ers were subject to a fine of five quetzales ($1. 25). Also, as in El Salvador, newspaper ads sponsored by the army assened that it was treasonous to fail to vote or to vote null or blank. 62 The law group reported that "many" people expressed fears that nonvoting would subject them to reprisals, and after the military threats in the week before the election there was "a widespread belief that failure to vote would be punishable by more than the five-quetzal fine stipulated by law. "63
In Nicaragua, while registration was obligatory, voting was not re- quired by law. Voter-registration cards presented on election day were retained by election officials, so that the failure to vote as evidenced by the lack of a validated voter credential could not be used as the basis of reprisals. 64 Most of the voters appeared to LASA observers to be voting under no coercive threat-they did not have to vote by law; they were urged to vote but not threatened with the designation of "traitors" for not voting; there were no obvious means of identifying nonvoters; and the government did not kill dissidents, in contrast to the normal practice in El Salvador and Guatemala.
In sum, Nicaragua did not have a potent coercion package at work to help get out the vote-as did the Salvadoran and Guatemalan gov- ernments.
3. 4. EL SALVADOR: HOW THE U. S. MEDIA TRANSFORMED A "DERANGED KILLING MACHINE" INTO THE
PROTECTOR OF AN INCIPIENT DEMOCRACY
In reporting on the 1982 Salvadoran election, the U. S. mass media closely followed the government agenda. The personalities of the can- didates, the long lines waiting to vote, alleged rebel disruption, and
L
lo8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
"tumout" were heavily featured. 6s As Jack Spence pointed out, "every media outlet, particularly the networks, cast the election-day story in a framework of voting in the midst of extensive guerrilla violence at polling places. "66 Warren Hoge and Richard Meislin, of the New York Times, repeated day after day that the rebels were threatening disrup- tion, Hoge asserting that "The elections have taken on a significance beyond their outcome because leftist guerrillas mounted a campaign to disrupt them and discourage voters from going to the polls. "67 This is a precise statement of the government's propaganda frame. But Hoge and Meislin never once cited a rebel source vowing disruption, and nobody else did, either. On election day no voters were killed or polling stations attacked, and the general level of rebel military activity was below average. In short, the disruption claims were falsifications of both plans and election-day results, but as they fit the patriotic agenda they were given prominence, repeated frequently, and used to establish the
contest between the forces of good and evil. 68 At the election-day dose, Dan Rather exclaimed, "A triumph! A million people to the polls. " Rather did not regard it as a triumph that the Sandinistas got 700,000 people to the polls-a higher proportion of the population, and without a voting requirement. The propaganda frame of the government gave turnout high importance in the Salvadoran election but none in the Nicaraguan election, and Rather followed like a good lap dog.
Neither Rather nor any other media analyst on or before March 30, 1982, noted that voting was required by law in E1 Salvador, and nQt Qne mentioned the warning by the defense minister, General Guillermo Garcia, in the San Salvador newspapers that nonvoting was treaso- nous. 69 The basic parameters were entirely off the media agenda. The destruction of La CTonica and El Independiente and the murder of twenty-six journalists prior to the election were unmentioned in dis- cussing the election's quality and meaning. 70 The army and its allies had been killing civilians on a massive scale in ? 1 Salvador, for many months before (and into) March 1982. Would this not create a climate of fear and, in conjunction with a state of siege, somewhat encumber free debate and free choice? The point was rarely even hinted at in the mass media.
Could candidates run freely and campaign without fear of murder? Could the rebels qualify and run? After all, if it was a civil war, the rebels were clearly the "main opposition. " Again, the mass media played dumb. They pretended that this exclusion was not important, or that it represented a willful boycott by the rebels rather than a refusal based on conditions unfavorable to a (ree election and a blatantly
t<
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANISGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIO:,,>'S 101}
stacked deCk. Neither the March 1981 death list nor the Gutierrez statement that the FDR would not be permitted to run were mentioned by the mass media in our sample. They never once suggested that the election plan was to create an electoral environment of extreme coer- cion and bias in which the rebels could not run, and then use this for the dramatic game of disruption and triumphant turnout. That the military agreed to the election because it couldn't lose was never sug- gested by these media.
The role of the army was summarized by Warren Hoge in the New York Times:
Is the military playing any role in the election? Members of the military are not allowed to vote, and the armed forces are pledged to protect voters from violence and to respect the outcome of the contest. 7 1
We may note that the army's mass killing of civilians and systematic destruction and demobilization of virtually all popular organizations in El Salvador over the preceding thirty months, which bears on what Secretary of State Shultz referred to as the "preliminary aspects that make an election mean something," is not part of the army's "role" for Hoge and the Times. Roge repeats the Salvadoran army's pledge, not only taking it at face value, hut never suggesting that it (and the election itself) was meaningless in a terror state where the "main opposition" was off the ballot and only the war parties were able to field candidates. In the propaganda framework, the security forces of client states "pro- tect elections";72 only those of enemy states interfere with the freedom of its citizens to vote without constraint.
As noted earlier, observers and reporters in El Salvador all agreed that the populace was most eager for an end to the war, and government propaganda even stressed that voting was an important vehicle to tbat end-the public was urged to substitute "ballots for bullets. " But no peace party was on the Salvadoran baUot. And after the election was over, the war went on, and the death squads continued to flourish. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that the real purpose of the elec- tion was to placate the home population of the United States and render them willing to fund more war and terror. It is a poor fit to the hypothe- sis that the people of EI Salvador had a free choice. An honest press would point up the failure of the election to substitute "ballots for bullets. " The mass media of the United States did nOt raise the issue.
Nor did the experience of 1982 and its aftermath affect the media's
110 M A lI;UF A CTURll'G CONSENT
willingness to follow the patriotic agenda once again in 1984. We will return to this below in a statistical comparison of the New York Times's coverage of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections.
3. 5. "FIRST STEP: GUATEMALA OPTS FOR MODERATION""
The U. S. government was less deeply involved in the Guatemalan elections of 1984 and 1985 than it was in those held in El Salvador, but, as we saw in chapter 2, the Reagan administration went to great pains to put a favorable gloss on the murderous regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios Monu, and Mejia Victores, and to attempt to reintegrate them fully into the free-world alliance. 74 It encouraged the 1984-85 elections, provided advisory and financial support for election management, and gave pub- lic-relations assistance and sent official observers to help put the elec- tion in a favorable light. There was little effort made to disguise the fact that the purpose of the election, from the standpoint of the Reagan administration and the ruling army, was to alter the international "image" of Guatemala in order to facilitate aid and loans.
With the administration supporting the new look, but without the intensity of commitment and propaganda backup brought to bear in El Salvador, and given the steady stream of reports of ongoing mass murder in Guatemala, a propaganda model would anticipate a media response that put the Guatemalan elections in a favorable light, but with qualifications. There was, in fact, far less coverage than of the Salvadoran election; what there was had a little more "balance," but the apologetic framework was still overwhelmingly dominant.
A telling manifestation of bias was the media's ready acceptance of the Guatemalan elections as meaningful, even though they were admit- tedly for image-malting, in a context of long-standing army rule and massacre, and despite new institutional arrangements in the country- side-the massive relocations of the population,. the "model villages," and the civil-defense patrols-that were, on their face, incompatible with a free election. In an enemy state where an election was held under comparable conditions, it would be designated a meaningless public- relations exercise. 75 In the case of Guatemala, however, the civil patrols and ongoing massacres were rarely mentioned, sources that addressed these matters were ignored, and the overall tone of the news was cautiously hopeful and optimistic. It was the consensus that the 1984
I
election for a constituent assembly was "encouraging" and an impor- tant first step, and that the 1985 presidential election <<ended [emphasis added] more than 30 years of military domination" (Newsweek, Jan. 17, 1986). Dan Rather, on CBS News, reported that Cerezo became Guatemala's "first civilian leader after thirty years of almost uninter- rupted military rule" (Dec. 9, 1985).
92 MASUFACTURING CONSENT
gency state, with permanent warfare to keep the majority of Indians and other peasants in their place, and violent repression was structured into the heart of the political system.
Despite the common feature of ongoing conflict, however, electoral conditions were far more favorable in Nicaragua than in El Salvador and Guatemala, for several reasons. First, and crucially important, in the latter countries, at the time of the elections the army was still engaged in mass slaughter ofthe civilian population, with the toll in the tens of thousands in each country and the killing often carried out with extreme sadism. Nothing remotely similar was true in Nicaragua. These facts, which are not controversial among people with a minimal concern for reality, immediately establish a fundamental distinction with regard to the electoral climate. In countries that are being subject to the terror of a rampaging murder machine, supported or run by a foreign power, electoral conditions are fatally compromised in advance, a point that the media would recognize at once if we were considering the sphere of influence of some official enemy. ll
A further-and related-distinction was that the ruling Sandinista government was a popular government, which strove to serve majority needs and could therefore afford to allow greater freedom ofspeech and organization. The LASA report on the Nicaraguan election notes that their program "implies redistribution of access to wealth and public services. The state will use its power to guarantee fulfillment of the basic needs of the majority population. " The "logic of the majority," the report continues, also implies the involvement of "very large num- bers of people in the decisions that affect their lives. "12 Qualified ob- servers conclude that the Nicaraguan government pursued this logic, although this fact is excluded from the free press. After citing the World Bank's observation that "Governrnents . . . vary greatly in the commitment of their political leadership to improving the condition of the people and encouraging their active participation in the develop- ment process," Dianna Melrose, of the charitable development agency Oxfam, states that "From Oxfam's experience of working in seventy-six developing countries, Nicaragua was to prove exceptional in the
strength of that Government commitment. "13 The Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments, by contrast, were ruled by elites that had been struggling desperately for decades to avoid the very kinds of reforms the Sandinistas were implementing. Extreme repression was the longstanding method of control of the majority in EI Salvador and Guatemala, with vigorous and unceasing U. S. support. The aim of this repression was to keep the populace apathetic and to destroy popular organizations that might lay the basis for meaningful democracy. The
LEGITlMIZl~G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 93
Sandinistas were engaged in mobilizing the majority and involving them in political life, which they could afford to do because their programs were intended to serve the general population.
A third factor affecting electoral conditions was that in El Salvador and Guatemala the conflict was internal, and violence against the ma- jority was integral to the struggle. In Nicaragua, the conflict was one involving an externally sponsored aggression that had very limited internal support. The Sandinistas could appeal to nationalist senti- ments, easily mobilized against Yankee-organized terrorism. The Sal- vadoran and Guatemalan governments could hardly do the same-the Salvadoran government especially had to contend with a negative na- tionalist reaction to obvious foreign (i. e. , U. S. ) domination and manipu- lation of its affairs, a fact that reached the level of absurdity when Duarte, visiting Washington in the fall of 1987, made himself an object of ridicule throughout Latin America by promptly kissing the American flag. While the Sandinistas did increasingly crack down on internal supporters of the contras as the conflict intensified, by the standards the United States usually applies to this region dissenters were dealt with remarkably benignly in Nicaragua. 14 In El Salvador and Guatemala, the ruling elites could not afford such toleration, and repression by large- scale terror had long been institutionalized in these states.
A fourth factor making for a more benign electoral environment in Nicaragua, paradoxically, was U. S. hostility and the power ofits propa- ganda machine. Every arrest or act of harassment in Nicaragua was publicized and transformed into evidence of the sinister quality of the Sandinista government in the free press of the United States. Mean- while, as we described in chapter 2, the Guatemalan and Salvadoran regimes could indulge in torture, rape, mutilation, and murder on a daily and massive basis without invoking remotely proportional atten- tion, indignation, or inferences about the quality of these regimes. In the context, the Nicaraguan government was under intense pressure to toe the mark, whereas the U. S. satellites were free to murder at will without serious political cost.
Let us examine briefly how El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua compared in the individual categories of conditions of a free election, before we turn to the media treatment of these issues.
3. 2. 1. Free speech and assembly.
In El Salvador, the right to free speech and free assembly was legally suspended under a state-of-siege order of March 7, 1980. Decree No.
94 MANUPACTURI~G CONSENT
507 of December 3, 1980, essentially destroyed the judicial system, permitting the armed forces to hold citizens without charge or evidence for 180 days. Under these rulings, in the thirty months before the March 198~ election, and prior to the 1984 elections, many thousands of civil- ians were seized, imprisoned, tortured, raped, and murdered outside of legal processes for alleged "subversive" actions and thoughts. The state of siege was lifted in early 1982 solely for the six parties contesting the election, and it was lifted entirely ten days before the election for all Salvadorans-although, unfortunately, the citizenry was not informed of this fact until after the election was over and state-of-siege condi- tions were reimposed. IS The practice of exposing mutilated bodies for the edification of the citizenry became institutionalized in the early 1980s in EI Salvador. We described in chapter 2 the difficulty the U. S. government had in getting underlings jailed, tried, and convicted for the murder offour American citizens, even under intense U. S. pressure. The people ofEl Salvador had no protection whatsoever from the state terrorists, apart from that afforded by the guerrilla army in the regions under their control. The threat of extreme violence by the state against dissident speech was acute in El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, and was incompatible with a free election.
In Guatemala, similarly, during 1984 and 1985, and for many years before, the actions of the armed forces against alleged subversives was entirely outside the rule of law. Thousands were seized, tortured, and killed without warrant and without any individual right to hearing or trial. As in EI Salvador, mutilation and exposure of the tortured bodies became commonplace in the late 1970S and the 1980s. 16 The courts were dominated by the military, as the latter would simply not execute or obey a court order of which they disapproved, and the jUdges were not inclined to challenge the military for reasons of dependency or fear. Even Viscount Colville of Culross, the special rapporteur of the UN General Assembly who has been a notorious apologist for the Guatema- lan regime, after pointing out that over eighty members of the judiciary, court staff, and legal profession had been murdered in the early 1980s and that many others were threatened, says that "Such events make their mark and cannot quickly be mitigated. "17 Two illustrations of the lack of court autonomy may be noted here: in May 1983, Ricardo Sagastume Vidaure, then president of the supreme COUrt, was simply removed by military order for attempting to bring military personnel under the jurisdiction of the legal system. IS On July 19, 1984, Colonel Djalmi Dominguez, head of public relations for the army, told the newspaper Prensa Libre that the army wouldn't tolerate its members being taken to court on any chargesY~
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEA:';INGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlO:-lS 95
In the early 1980s, following the mass killings and village destruction of 1980-83, vast numbers of peasants were resettled in "model villages" and other places under army control, and over 800,000 males were made obligatory members of civil patrols with military functions under close army surveillance. According to the British parliamentary group that visited Guatemala in 1984, "The civilian patrol system is imple- mented by terror, and designed also to sow terror. . . . People who do anything out of the ordinary come under immediate suspicion and are taken by the patrols to the army's desracamienro. Interrogation will be done by the army, but the killing of murdered suspects [is] often by the civilian patrols. "2Q Bishops Taylor and O'Brien, representing the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conferences of Scotland and England-Wales respectively, reponed after their visit to Guatemala in 1984 that
The civilian population is under almost total control by a heavy army and police presence throughout the country, which we were able to observe. There is also a nationwide network ofcivil defense patrols, military commissioners and informers, and <<model vil- lages" serving in some cases as internment camps for the Indian population from the areas of conflict. Much of Guatemala resem- bles a country under military occupation. One of our informants summed up the situation by saying that the military had estab- lished a system of "structural control. "21
The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, following an on- site visit in May 1985, also found that freedom of speech and assembly did not exist in Guatemala:
The right of assembly and freedom of association, considered in Articles 15 and 16 of the American Convention, are also restricted and curtailed, because existing security measures in the Develop- ment Poles and the strict supervision of the Civil Defense Patrols inhibit residents from taking part in any social, ideological. cultu- ral or other assemblies or associations. All such meetings, when they do occur, are subject to surveillance, supervision and control by the authorities, so they do not enjoy the freedom implied by such rights. 22
Public demonstrations were permissible in Guatemala during the 1984-85 elections, with three days' advance notice and approval of the military authorities. In the Guatemalan context, however, this grant of rights was not meaningful. The delegation of the International Human
96 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America noted that whatever the election guarantees,
the military and civil defense patrols and the climate of fear also made it difficult for many Guatemalans to organize and assemble. One local observer said that years of terror and oppression against local organizations had demobilized the whole rural population: "Four CUC [peasant league] members were killed in this village alone. Now it would be very difficult to organize any kind of group. " Civil patrols, police and army checkpoints on highways, and the need for travel permits for residents of the model villages impeded free movement. In the rural areas the civil patrols dis- couraged gatherings because people feared being reported. 23
It was noted by many observers of the Guatemalan elections that although the big issues in that country were land distribution and reform and human rights, no political candidates discussed or ad- vocated either land reform, or restructuring the military and forcing an accounting of tens of thousands of "disappearances. " One Christian Democratic adviser explained to the law group that "We Christian Democrats haven't raised such issues because this isn't the moment to start a confrontation with either the army or the private sector. "24
In short, despite the "momentary improvement in the conditions of free speech" that occurred during the election campaign, Guatemala did not meet the first condition ofa free election. The rural masses were under army discipline and traumatized by mass killings and the absence of any vestige of rule of law, and the candidates were unable to raise openly the fundamental issues of the society.
Free speech and rights of assembly were constrained in Nicaragua in 1984 by social pressures and threats and by a state of siege that had been terminated some six months prior to the November 1984 election. Very important differences existed, however, between the Nicaraguan constraints and those prevailing in El Salvador and Guatemala. Most important, in Nicaragua the army and police did not regularly seize alleged subversives, and torture and murder them. Mutilated bodies have not been put on public display as a part of the system of public education. What the law group called the "constant, overt political terror" in Guatemala, based on "numerous documented massacres of whole villages," and what the former Salvadoran official Leonel Gomez called the state of "fearful passivity" prevalent in EI Salvador, did not apply to Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, in 1984, dissidents were able to speak
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANI:-IGLESS THiRD WORLD ELECTIONS 97
freely without fear of murder, and the LASA group noted that "Every member of our delegation was approached at least once by an irate citizen as we walked around Managua and other cities. Several of these encounters turned into hea:ted arguments between the individual who had approached us and passers-by who joined the discussion. . . . These people did not feel intimidated. "25
Freedom of assembly in Nicaragua was somewhat limited by harass- ment, but, once again, it was not ruled out by state terror, as was the case in EI Salvador and Guatemala. The LASA delegation examined in detail the charges of Sandinista harassment of opposition-group meetings and found them largely unfounded, concluding that the con- testing parties "were able to hold the vast majority of their rallies unimpeded by pro~FSLN demonstrations. . . . "26
Our conclusion is that the first basic condition of a free election was- partially met in Nicaragua, but was not met at all in El Salvador and Guatemala.
3. 2. 2. Freedom of the press.
In ? 1 Salvador, the only substantial newspapers critical of the govern- ment, La Cronica del Pueblo and El Independiente-neither by any means radical papers-were closed in July 1980 and January 1981, re- spectively, the firSt because its top editor and two employees were murdered and mutilated by the security forces, the second because the army arrested its personnel and destroyed its plant. The church paper and radio station were repeatedly shut down by bombing attacks, No paper or station representing the principal opposition has been able to operate except clandestinely. Over thirty journalists have been mur- dered in ? 1 Salvador since the revolutionary junta took power, An intensified campaign against the press occurred just prior to the 1982 election. On March 10, a death list of thirty-five journalists was cir- culated by a "death squad," and on March 18 the mutilated bodies of four Dutch journalists were rel:overed. 27 None of the murders of jour- nalists in El Salvador was ever "solved"-they were essentially murders
carried out under the auspices of the state.
In Guatemala, forty-eight journalists were murdered between 1978
and 1985,28 and many others have been kidnapped and threatened. These -killings, kidnappings, and threats have been a primary means of control of the media. As in EI Salvador, nobody has yet been ap- prehended and tried for any of these crimes, which must be viewed as
I
?
98 M A N U F A C T U R IN G C O N S E N T
murders carried out by the state or with state approval. There are no papers or radio or television stations in Guatemala that express the views of the rebels or the majority Indian population or the lower classes in general. "At most, the variants reflect shades of strictly con- servative thinking. "29 Given the extreme climate of fear, and threats for stepping out of line, even the conservative press is cautious and engages in continuous self-censorship. All the central topics that should be debated in this terrorized society are carefully avoided. 30
In Nicaragua, once again, there have been no reported deaths of journalists by state terrorists, nor even threats of personal violence. In 1984, the majority of the fifty-odd radio stations were privately owned, and some of them provided their own news programs; four other inde- pendent producers supplied radio news programs without prior censor- ship. Foreign radio and television from commercial and U. S. propaganda sources broadcasting from Costa Rica, Honduras, and else- where were of growing importance in 1984. 31 Two of the three newspa- pers were privately owned, one supportive of the government but critical of specific programs and actions, the other violently hostile. The latter, La Prensa, which represented the small, ultraconservative mi- nority and supported the contras and a foreign-sponsored invasion of the country, was allowed to operate throughout the 1984 election, al- though it was censored. The censorship still allowed the paper to publish manifestos of opposition groups and a pastoral letter critical of the regime. No comparable paper has been allowed to exist above- ground, even briefly, in El Salvador and Guatemala.
There is no doubt that the media in Nicaragua have been under government constraint, with censorship and periodic emergency con- trols that seriously encroached on freedom of the press. 32 It should be noted, however, that Nicaragua is under foreign attack and in a state of serious warfare. John S. Nichols points out that under the U. S. Espionage Act of 1917, over one hundred publications were banned from the mails, and hundreds of people were jailed for allegedly inter- fering with military recruitment. Furthermore,
Given that the United States was a relatively mature and homoge- nous political system during World War I and was not particularly threatened by the fighting, the range of public discussion tolerated in Nicaragua during the first five years of the revolution was remarkable. Despite assertions by President Reagan, IAPA, and others that the control of the Nicaraguan media was virtually totalitarian, the diversity of ownership and opinion was unusual for a Third World country, particularly one at war. 33
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 99
Our conclusion is that the condition of freedom of the press necessary for a free election was clearly absent in El Salvador and Guatemala, and that it was partially met in Nicaragua.
3. 2. 3. Freedom of organization of intermediate groups.
Perhaps the most important fact about EI Salvador in the two years prior to the election of March 1982 was the decimation of popular and private organizations that could pose any kind of challenge to the army and oligarchy. As we noted in chapter 2, this was the main thrust of policy of the revolutionary junta from late 1979 onward, and thousands of leaders were murdered and numerous organizations were destroyed or driven underground. The teachers' union was decimated by several hundred murders; the university was occupied, looted, and closed down by the army; organized student and professional groups were destroyed by arrests and killings, and even the peasant union sponsored by the AFL-CIO (i. e. , supporters of the regime) had some one hundred of its organizers and leaders murdered between October 1979 and the elec- tion of March 1982. 34
In Guatemala, too, intermediate organizations such as peasant and trade unions, teacher and student groups, and professional organiza- tions have been regularly attacked by the armed forces since 1954. The process of demobilization of institutions threatening the dominant elites culminated in the early 1980s, when by government proclamation "illicit association" was made punishable by law. All groups "which follow, or are subordinated to, any totalitarian system of ideology" (evidently an exception is made of the Guatemalan armed forces and the national-security ideology) are illicit. Only the armed forces deter- mine when illicitness occurs. If General Mejia Victores finds the GAM mothers to be agents of subversion, they may be killed (see chapter 2). Unions, peasant groups, student and professional organizations have
J grown up periodically in Guatemala, only to be crushed by systematic murder as soon as their demands were pressed with any vigor. The 1984-85 elections followed the greatest era of mass murder in modern Guatemalan history-under the regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios Montt, and Mejia Victores. Union membership in 1985 was below its 1950 level, and other u,rban groups were decimated or inactive; the peasant major- ity was totally demobilized and under the tight control and surveillance of the military.
100 M ANUF ACTURIlI\G CONSENT
In Nicaragua, again the contrast with the two U. S. clients is marked. Under Sandinista management there was a spurt in union and peasant organization. A deliberate attempt was made to mobilize the population to participate in decision-making at the local level and to interact with higher-level leaders. Oxfam compliments the Nicaraguan government highly for this etfort, as we pointed out earlier.
There is legitimate debate over the extent to which the grass-roots and other organizations sponsored by the ruling FSLN are indepen- dent, and whether they might not be a vehicle for both state propaganda and coercion. Oxfam America and its parent organization in London clearly find them constructive. Luis Hector Serra contends that the grass-roots organizations are relatively autonomous, and that their close relationship to the leadership ofthe FSLN "did not obstruct their capacity to express the concerns of their members at the locallevel. "3~ He concludes that the popular organizations were "profoundly demo- cratic" in their effects of involving the populace in decision-making and educating them on the possibilities of participation in public life. 36 The difference with the organization of the Guatemalan peasantry in "poles of development," where the essence of the organization was, quite openly, military control by terror and enforced nonparticipation, is quite dramatic, whatever one's general assessment of the FSLN popu- lar organizations may be.
We conclude that on the third basic condition for a free election, El Salvador and Guatemala did not qualify in the years 1984-85; Nicara- gua did, at least to a significant degree. 37
3. . 2. 4. Freedom to organize parties, field candidates, and campaign for office
No party of the left could organize and present candidates in the 1982 and 1984 elections in El Salvador. The Democratic Front (FDR) had been quickly driven underground. Five of its top leaders were seized in EI Salvador in November 1980 by official and paramilitary forces, and were tortured, mutilated, and killed. A year before the March 1982 election, the army published a list of 138 "traitors," which included virtually all politicians of the left and left-center. Colonel Gutierrez, a powerful member of the junta, had stated forcefully that the FDR could not participate in the election because it was a "front" for the guerrillas. The invitation to the FDR and the FMLN to lay down their arms and
LEGITIMIZll'G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTlOl'S 101
compete in the election was thus fraudulent, a fact confirmed by the admission of the U. S. embassy that the FDR could not safely campaign in El Salvador, with the accompanying suggestion that they might do so by means of videotapes sent in from outside the country's bordersp8 Subsequently, even Duarte, the preferred candidate of the United States, was unable to campaign outside San Salvador in 1982 for fear of murder, and scores of Christian Democratic politicans were killed in the years 1980-84. 39 In short, not only radical but even pro-U. S. , mildly reformist parties could not escape decimation by political mur- der during those years.
It should also be emphasized that no party could organize and run candidates in EI Salvador that put high priority on terminating the war by negotiations with the rebels. What makes this especially important is that reporters and observers were unanimous in 1982 that the main thing the public wanted out of the election was peace. The propaganda formula for getting out the vote in 1982 was "ballots versus bullets," with the implication that ballots were a possible route to a reduction in the use of bullets. If, in fact, no peace candidate was eligible to run, the election was a fraud for this reason alone.
Defenders of these elections have argued that there was a substantial difference between the candidates, especially between D'Aubuisson and Duarte, so that VOters had a meaningful choice. 4o But D'Aubuisson and Duarte did not disagree on the central issue of interest to the Salvado- ran people-whether to fight to win, or to strive for a negotiated settle- ment with the rebels. Both were members of the war party, with only tactical differences. Although Duarte made occasional demagogic claims that he would talk with the rebels and bring about peace, he never spelled out a peace-making agenda, never went beyond suggest- ing "dialogue" (as opposed to "negotiations," which imply the possibil- ity of substantive concessions), and never departed from the position that the rebels should lay down their arms and participate in the new "democracy" that Duarte and the army had established.
Duarte joined the junta at a moment of severe crisis in March 1980, when all the progressive civilians had left and immediately after the murder of the Christian Democratic attorney-general, Mario Zamora, by the newly prospering death squads. It was clear that the army and affiliated death squads had embarked on a policy of large-scale massa- c? re. Duarte provided the fig leaf and apologetics that the army needed for the second mata;nza. 41 We believe that Duarte never would have received U. S. support and protection, and could not have survived in El Salvador, unless he had made it dear that he was in basic accord with the aims of the U. S. administration and the Salvadoran army. From
IOZ MANUFACTURING CONSENT
1980 onward, Duarte always accepted fully the pursuit of a military solution and no compromise with "the subversives" (a phrase that Duarte uses continually. just as do the army and death-squad leaders). As Raymond Bonner points out,
The repression in 1980 reached a magnitude surpassed only by the [first} malanza and was far worse than anything imagined under General Romero. . . . By the end of the year the number [mur- dered] had reached at least 9,000. Every day mutilated bodies, missing arms or heads, were found: behind shopping centers; stuffed in burlap bags and left 00 dusty rural roads; hurled over cliffs into ravines. 42
And through all of this, Duarte not only provided the facade of "re- form," he regularly complimeoted the army for its Joyal service. In a letter published in the Miami Herald on November 9. 1981, Duarte wrote that
The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a cruel and pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggres- sion. This goes parallel with armed aggression. . . . This would be one more prey in the conquest plan in the Central Ameri- can region that Moscow has designed to pursue. Immediately after that its greatest reward would be the North American na- tion. . . .
In brief, the Salvadoran public was never offered the option that the press itself acknowledged the voters craved.
In Guatemala. as in El Salvador, no parties of the left participated in the 1984 election for a constituent assembly, and only one crippled party made a tentative but wholly ineffectual foray in the 1985 presiden- tial election. 43 The main guerrilla movements were, of course, outside the electoral orbit. Their leaders would have been killed if ap- prehended, but they would not have participated anyway without a drastic alteration in basic social and electoral conditions. " Even a centrist party like the Christian Democrats had suffered scores of mur- ders in the years 1980-83, and the current president of Guatemala, the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo, survived three known assassina- tion attempts. No seriously left party could have qualified in 1984-85 under the laws of "illicit association" mentioned earlier.
The peasant majority was not represented or spoken for by any candidate. The Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, an organiza-
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LEGITUHZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIONS 103
tion not able to function within Guatemala, has pointed out that na- tional political parties that speak for major groups like the working class or indigenous people "do not exist and . . . as a result, these sectors are institutionally excluded from the political system. "45 Americas Watch states that one of the civil-patrol system's functions is "to provide vigilance and control of the local population, preventing any form of independent political organization. "46 This exclusion of the peasantry from any political opportunity was reflected in two ways in the 1984-85 elections. One was that in registering for the election, only 3 percent of the electorate signed up as members of political parties. Another, more compelling, is that no candidate in the election urged land reform, although this was one of the two central issues in Guatemala (the other being unconstrained army murder, also not an issue in the election, given the understanding on all sides that the army will remain the ruling force, whoever gains office).
As with Duarte in ? 1 Salvador, the presence of Vinicio Cerezo as a candidate, and as the eventual winner in the 1985 election, raises the question of whether, despite the constraints on the left, Cerezo did not really offer a significant option to the voting public. Cerezo differen- tiated himself from his electoral rivals, especially toward the end of the campaign and the runoff, by expressing compassion for the masses and a determination to make changes in the human-rights picture and mass poverty. He occasionally mentioned the need for structural reform, although he was not specific and stressed that the first requirement was to reestablish civilian control. He was quite clear, however, that if he were elected, his power would be nominal at first and would have to be enlarged while he was in office:
The election will not bring automatic transfer of real power to the president. There will be a handover offormal power. What are my chances of consolidating that power? Fifty-fifty,47
During the election campaign, Cerezo never straightforwardly ad- dressed the question of land reform, and news reports in Guatemala suggested that he had promised the landowners' lobby that land reform was not on his agenda. 48 Similarly, he did not promise any legal action against those who had murdered thousands, nor did he say that he would dismantle the counterinsurgency state. There would seem to have been at least a tacit understanding between Cerezo and the mili- tary that he would protect them against prosecution and preserve their power and relative autonomy; in fact, he could not do otherwise and survive. 49 In the year and a half that has elapsed since he took office,
I04 M A NUF A CTURING CONSE"-T
Cerezo has made no meaningful move toward land reform, has sup- ported the army vigorously against any accounting, and has made no move to dismantle the civil patrols, the development poles, and other features of institutionalized terror. 50 The human-rights situation in Guatemala "remains terrible,"5I although improved (but partly because higher rates of killing are no longer deemed beneficial). The poor, for whom he expressed so much compassion during the electoral campaign, have suffered further losses in real income, as Cerezo's "reforms" have accommodated the demands of the army and oligarchy. He is on very poor terms with the Mutual Support Group. Thus, the postelection pattern shows that Cerezo, in part by prior agreement but more deci- sively by structural constraints, has been entirely unable to serve his mass constituency. In the 1984-85 elect;? :m, Cerezo gave the Guatema- lan people an opportunity to vote for a man of seeming goodwill and good intentions, but one unable to respond to democratic demands opposed by the real rulers of the state.
In Nicaragua, in 1984, the spectrum of candidates was much wider than in EI Salvador, Guatemala, or, for that matter, the United States. 52 The Conservative Democratic party and the Independent Liberal party both issued strong calls for respect for private property, reduced gov- ernment control of the economy, elimination of press and other con- trols, and a foreign policy of greater nonalignment and accommodation. Both were able to denounce the Sandinistas for the war and to call for depoliticization of the army and negotiations with the contras. Arturo Cruz, after lengthy negotiations with representatives of the govern- ment, chose not to run in the 1984 election. But this was a voluntary act of Cruz (albeit under heavy U. S. pressure),53 in contrast with the position of the left in El Salvador and Guatemala, and was not based
on physical threats to his person or limits on his access to the popu- lace. 54
The FSLN had a strong advantage over the opposition parties as the party in power, defending the country from foreign attack and having mobilized the population for their own projects of development. The LASA group felt that much of the incumbency advantage of the FSLN was characteristic of governments everywhere, and concluded:
It seems clear tha. t the FSLN took substantial advantage of its incumbent position and, in some ways, abused it. However, the abuses of incumbency do not appear to have been systematic; and neither the nature of the abuses n? )r their frequency was such as to cripple the opposition parties' ,,~mpaigns or to cast doubt on
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANINGLESS THlRD WORLD ELECTIONS IOS
the fundamental validity of the electoral process. . . . Generally speaking, in this campaign the FSLN did little more to take ad- vantage of its incumbency than incumbent parties everywhere (including the United States) routinely do, and considerably less than ruling parties in other Latin American countries traditionally have done. 55
We would conclude that the ability of candidates to qualify and run, and the range of options, was substantially greater in Nicaragua than in El Salvador and Guatemala. Furthermore. as all major political groups of the left were off the ballot by threat of violence in the latter two cases. those elections fail to meet still another basic electoral condi. tion.
3. 2. 5. Absence of state terror and a ~limate of fear
During the years 1980-84 the death squads worked freely in ? 1 Salva- dor. in close coordination with tbe army and security forces. Tbe average rate of killings of civilians in the thirty months prior to the 1982 election was approximately seven hundred per month. Many of these victims were raped, tortured, and mutilated. All of this was done with complete impunity, and only the murder of four American women elicited-by dint of congressional pressure-any kind of legal action. Even William Doherty of the American Institute for Free Labor Devel- opment-a longtime supporter of U. S. policy in El Salvador-asserted before a congressional committee that there was nO system of justice operative in that country. while Leonel Gomez, a former land-reform official in E1 Salvador. told the same committee a bit later that state
terror had put the population in a state of <<fearful passivity. "56
In Guatemala, too, the endemic fear based on years of unconstrained and continuing army violence was a dominant fact of national life.
According to Americas Watch, writing in early 1985,
Torture, killings, and disappearances continue at an extraordinary rate, and millions of peasants remain under the strict scrutiny and control of the government through the use of civil patrols and "model villages! ' Guatemala remains, in short, a nation of prison- ers. 57
106 MANUFACTURING CONSENT ,
The law group described Guatemala in 1985 as "a country where the greater part of the people live in permanent fear. "s8
In the case of Nicaragua, we repeat the central fact that differentiates it from the U. S. client states: in 1984 its government was not murdering civilians. 59 The main fear of ordinary citizens in Nicaragua was of violence by the contras and the United States.
Our conclusion is that the fifth condition for a free election was met in Nicaragua, but not in EI Salvador and Guatemala. And our overall finding is that neither Et Salvador nor Guatemala met any of the five basic conditions of a free election, whereas Nicaragua met some of them well, others to a lesser extent.
3. 3. THE COERCION PACKAGES IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND NICARAGUA
As we noted, in the U. S. government's sponsored elections, voter turn- out is interpreted as public support for the election and its sponsors. In disapproved elections (here, Nicaragua), this frame is abandoned, and voter turnout is either ignored or declared meaningless because of limited options or coercive threats by the authorities. But the question of coercive threats should clearly be raised in all cases where this is a potential problem. As we have just described, the elections in ? 1 Salva- dor were held under conditions of military rule where mass killings of "subversives" had taken place and a climate of fear had been estab- lished. I f the government then sponsors an election and the local mili- tary authorities urge people to vote, a significant part ofthe vote should be assumed to be a result of built-in coercion. A propaganda model would anticipate that the U. S. mass media make no such assumption, and they did not.
In El Salvador in 1982 and 1984, voting was also required by law. The law stipulated that failure to vote was to be penalized by a specific monetary assessment, and it also called on local authorities to check out whether voters did in fact vote. This could be done because at the time of voting one's identification card (ID, ddula) was stamped, acknowl- edging the casting of a vote. Anybody stopped by the army and police would have to show the ID card, which would quickly indicate whether the individual had carried out his or her patriotic duty. Just prior to the March 1982 election, Minister of Defense Garcia warned the popula- tion in the San Salvador newspapers that the failure to vote would be
LEGITIMIZI~G VERSUS MEANINGLESS THUD WORLD ELECTIONS 107
regarded as an act of treason. And in the 1984 election, "Advertising by the government and military prior to the elections stressed the obliga- tion to vote rather than the freedom to vote. "60 Given the climate of fear, the voting requirement, the ID stamp, the army warning, and the army record in handling "traitors," it is evident that the coercive ele- ment in generating turnout in Salvadoran elections has been large. This is supported by queries made by independent observers on the reasons why Salvadorans voted. 61
In Guatemala, as in ? 1 Salvador, voting was required by law; nonvot- ers were subject to a fine of five quetzales ($1. 25). Also, as in El Salvador, newspaper ads sponsored by the army assened that it was treasonous to fail to vote or to vote null or blank. 62 The law group reported that "many" people expressed fears that nonvoting would subject them to reprisals, and after the military threats in the week before the election there was "a widespread belief that failure to vote would be punishable by more than the five-quetzal fine stipulated by law. "63
In Nicaragua, while registration was obligatory, voting was not re- quired by law. Voter-registration cards presented on election day were retained by election officials, so that the failure to vote as evidenced by the lack of a validated voter credential could not be used as the basis of reprisals. 64 Most of the voters appeared to LASA observers to be voting under no coercive threat-they did not have to vote by law; they were urged to vote but not threatened with the designation of "traitors" for not voting; there were no obvious means of identifying nonvoters; and the government did not kill dissidents, in contrast to the normal practice in El Salvador and Guatemala.
In sum, Nicaragua did not have a potent coercion package at work to help get out the vote-as did the Salvadoran and Guatemalan gov- ernments.
3. 4. EL SALVADOR: HOW THE U. S. MEDIA TRANSFORMED A "DERANGED KILLING MACHINE" INTO THE
PROTECTOR OF AN INCIPIENT DEMOCRACY
In reporting on the 1982 Salvadoran election, the U. S. mass media closely followed the government agenda. The personalities of the can- didates, the long lines waiting to vote, alleged rebel disruption, and
L
lo8 MANUFACTURING CONSENT
"tumout" were heavily featured. 6s As Jack Spence pointed out, "every media outlet, particularly the networks, cast the election-day story in a framework of voting in the midst of extensive guerrilla violence at polling places. "66 Warren Hoge and Richard Meislin, of the New York Times, repeated day after day that the rebels were threatening disrup- tion, Hoge asserting that "The elections have taken on a significance beyond their outcome because leftist guerrillas mounted a campaign to disrupt them and discourage voters from going to the polls. "67 This is a precise statement of the government's propaganda frame. But Hoge and Meislin never once cited a rebel source vowing disruption, and nobody else did, either. On election day no voters were killed or polling stations attacked, and the general level of rebel military activity was below average. In short, the disruption claims were falsifications of both plans and election-day results, but as they fit the patriotic agenda they were given prominence, repeated frequently, and used to establish the
contest between the forces of good and evil. 68 At the election-day dose, Dan Rather exclaimed, "A triumph! A million people to the polls. " Rather did not regard it as a triumph that the Sandinistas got 700,000 people to the polls-a higher proportion of the population, and without a voting requirement. The propaganda frame of the government gave turnout high importance in the Salvadoran election but none in the Nicaraguan election, and Rather followed like a good lap dog.
Neither Rather nor any other media analyst on or before March 30, 1982, noted that voting was required by law in E1 Salvador, and nQt Qne mentioned the warning by the defense minister, General Guillermo Garcia, in the San Salvador newspapers that nonvoting was treaso- nous. 69 The basic parameters were entirely off the media agenda. The destruction of La CTonica and El Independiente and the murder of twenty-six journalists prior to the election were unmentioned in dis- cussing the election's quality and meaning. 70 The army and its allies had been killing civilians on a massive scale in ? 1 Salvador, for many months before (and into) March 1982. Would this not create a climate of fear and, in conjunction with a state of siege, somewhat encumber free debate and free choice? The point was rarely even hinted at in the mass media.
Could candidates run freely and campaign without fear of murder? Could the rebels qualify and run? After all, if it was a civil war, the rebels were clearly the "main opposition. " Again, the mass media played dumb. They pretended that this exclusion was not important, or that it represented a willful boycott by the rebels rather than a refusal based on conditions unfavorable to a (ree election and a blatantly
t<
LEGITIMIZING VERSUS MEANISGLESS THIRD WORLD ELECTIO:,,>'S 101}
stacked deCk. Neither the March 1981 death list nor the Gutierrez statement that the FDR would not be permitted to run were mentioned by the mass media in our sample. They never once suggested that the election plan was to create an electoral environment of extreme coer- cion and bias in which the rebels could not run, and then use this for the dramatic game of disruption and triumphant turnout. That the military agreed to the election because it couldn't lose was never sug- gested by these media.
The role of the army was summarized by Warren Hoge in the New York Times:
Is the military playing any role in the election? Members of the military are not allowed to vote, and the armed forces are pledged to protect voters from violence and to respect the outcome of the contest. 7 1
We may note that the army's mass killing of civilians and systematic destruction and demobilization of virtually all popular organizations in El Salvador over the preceding thirty months, which bears on what Secretary of State Shultz referred to as the "preliminary aspects that make an election mean something," is not part of the army's "role" for Hoge and the Times. Roge repeats the Salvadoran army's pledge, not only taking it at face value, hut never suggesting that it (and the election itself) was meaningless in a terror state where the "main opposition" was off the ballot and only the war parties were able to field candidates. In the propaganda framework, the security forces of client states "pro- tect elections";72 only those of enemy states interfere with the freedom of its citizens to vote without constraint.
As noted earlier, observers and reporters in El Salvador all agreed that the populace was most eager for an end to the war, and government propaganda even stressed that voting was an important vehicle to tbat end-the public was urged to substitute "ballots for bullets. " But no peace party was on the Salvadoran baUot. And after the election was over, the war went on, and the death squads continued to flourish. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that the real purpose of the elec- tion was to placate the home population of the United States and render them willing to fund more war and terror. It is a poor fit to the hypothe- sis that the people of EI Salvador had a free choice. An honest press would point up the failure of the election to substitute "ballots for bullets. " The mass media of the United States did nOt raise the issue.
Nor did the experience of 1982 and its aftermath affect the media's
110 M A lI;UF A CTURll'G CONSENT
willingness to follow the patriotic agenda once again in 1984. We will return to this below in a statistical comparison of the New York Times's coverage of the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan elections.
3. 5. "FIRST STEP: GUATEMALA OPTS FOR MODERATION""
The U. S. government was less deeply involved in the Guatemalan elections of 1984 and 1985 than it was in those held in El Salvador, but, as we saw in chapter 2, the Reagan administration went to great pains to put a favorable gloss on the murderous regimes of Lucas Garcia, Rios Monu, and Mejia Victores, and to attempt to reintegrate them fully into the free-world alliance. 74 It encouraged the 1984-85 elections, provided advisory and financial support for election management, and gave pub- lic-relations assistance and sent official observers to help put the elec- tion in a favorable light. There was little effort made to disguise the fact that the purpose of the election, from the standpoint of the Reagan administration and the ruling army, was to alter the international "image" of Guatemala in order to facilitate aid and loans.
With the administration supporting the new look, but without the intensity of commitment and propaganda backup brought to bear in El Salvador, and given the steady stream of reports of ongoing mass murder in Guatemala, a propaganda model would anticipate a media response that put the Guatemalan elections in a favorable light, but with qualifications. There was, in fact, far less coverage than of the Salvadoran election; what there was had a little more "balance," but the apologetic framework was still overwhelmingly dominant.
A telling manifestation of bias was the media's ready acceptance of the Guatemalan elections as meaningful, even though they were admit- tedly for image-malting, in a context of long-standing army rule and massacre, and despite new institutional arrangements in the country- side-the massive relocations of the population,. the "model villages," and the civil-defense patrols-that were, on their face, incompatible with a free election. In an enemy state where an election was held under comparable conditions, it would be designated a meaningless public- relations exercise. 75 In the case of Guatemala, however, the civil patrols and ongoing massacres were rarely mentioned, sources that addressed these matters were ignored, and the overall tone of the news was cautiously hopeful and optimistic. It was the consensus that the 1984
I
election for a constituent assembly was "encouraging" and an impor- tant first step, and that the 1985 presidential election <<ended [emphasis added] more than 30 years of military domination" (Newsweek, Jan. 17, 1986). Dan Rather, on CBS News, reported that Cerezo became Guatemala's "first civilian leader after thirty years of almost uninter- rupted military rule" (Dec. 9, 1985).
