No More Learning

the great source of peril to Greece. There were still
rumours flying about 'as to the gigantic preparations
which the King was said to be making against them to
revenge the defeats of Marathon and Salamis. Possibly
such reports were stimulated by Philip himself. Next
there were those who were, in fact, Philip's paid agents,
now, no doubt, a considerable class in several Greek
states. And, last of all, there was incredulity and
apathy among the Athenians themselves. All these
adverse influences were too strong for Demosthenes,
and his appeal to the patriotism of his countrymen
was made in vain.
In the speech we have been describing, Demosthenes
dwelt on the duty of Athens _to put herself forward as
the champion of Greece and of its free states. In a
speech delivered some months or perhaps a year after-
wards, he reminds her that she ought to be the cham-
pion of democracy and of popular government. From
this point of view, the oration entitled " On the
freedom of the people of Rhodes " has much interest.
We rather gather, from the general tone of the speech,
that Philip's restlessness had ceased for a time, or at
all events that he had something else to do than to
threaten the possessions and the commerce of Athens.
It was made on the occasion of a deputation from the
democratic party in Rhodes, who wished the island to
pass again under Athenian control.
' Rhodes had more than once been in alliance with
Athens--a connection which practically implied a cer-
tain degree of subjection and dependence. With the
close of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of
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? FIRST SPEECH AGAINST PHILIP. 67
Sparta, it was put under an oligarchy, which meant
Spartan control. About the year 396 no. the Athenian
general Conon, who had a powerful fleet in the ZEgean,
again forced the Rhodians to become the allies of
Athens. Four years afterwards a Spartan fleet appeared,
and this was the signal for another revolution in the
government. There was, it seems, one of those horrible
incidents with which Greek history is so often dis-
figured--a massacre of the democratic leaders and of
the adherents of Athens. But the oligarchy now im-
posed on the island did not last long. The Spartan
fleet was defeated, and Rhodes and most of the islands
of the i/Egean returned to the Athenian alliance. We
may take for granted that democracy was re-established.
Then came, in 358 B. 0. , the Social War, the war between
Athens and her allies, which broke up the second
Athenian empire. Of this, Rhodes was the orig:'n.
Chares, the Athenian general, of whom we have
already had occasion to speak, provoked and disgusted
the Rhodians by plunder and extortion. Cos and
Chios had similar grievances ; and the three islands
threw off their connection with Athens, and began the
Social War--Rhodes being the prime mover. They
were helped by Mausolus, king of Caria and a vassal
prince of the Persian empire. He was a man of con-
siderable ambition, and his idea was to annex Rhodes,
which was adjacent to his own territories. It was first
necessary to detach it from the Athenian alliance ; and
Mausolus contrived, by intrigues with the oligarchical
party in the island, to introduce a Carian garrison ; and
once more the government was revolutionised. The
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? 68 DEMOSTHENES.
people and their leaders found themselves in a hopeless
plight, now that they had renounced their connection
with Athens, while the oligarchy was supported by
Persian influence through Mausolus. When that
king died and his queen Artemisia succeeded, the
government became so intolerably oppressive that the
popular party ventured to send an embassy to Athens',
and humbly to implore relief. It was hardly to be
expected that the embassy would be well received.
The Athenians felt that Rhodes had inflicted a grievous
injury on them by plunging them in a disastrous war,
which had ended in dissolving their confederacy. They
were in no mood to listen to the present petition.
Nevertheless it was supported by Demosthenes.
It is a hard matter to soothe the temper of people
when they feel, as the Athenians now did, that they
have suffered much from ingratitude. Popular as-
semblies, under such circumstances, are apt to be
peculiarly angry and excited. All that Demosthenes
could do was to appeal to the better and more generous
sentiments of his countrymen. They ought not, he
argued, to brood over the wrongs done to them by
these insignificant islanders, but to think only of what
was due to Athens and to Greece. It was alike their
duty and interest to vindicate the freedom of an op-
pressed Greek people, and to stand by the policy of
supporting popular and democratic government against
oligarchs and tyrants. 'Unless they resolved to act
thus, the political constitution of Athens would itself
be imperilled. If all democracies were put down, their
own would fall at last. Demosthenes, we see, was
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 69
heartily in sympathy with democracy, and regarded it
as the special glory of Athens to be its champion and
upholder. If at times he felt its weak side, and its
tendency to vacillation and irresolution, still he never
seems to have doubted that it was on the whole the
best and most manly type of government.
Such were his reasons for counselling the assembly
to listen favourably to the request for aid from the
Rhodians. In the following passage these views are
clearly expressed :---
"Observe, men of Athens, that you have waged
many wars both against democracies and against
oligarchies. This you know without my telling; but
for what causes you have been at war with either,
perhaps not one of you considers. What are the
causes' ! Against democratioal states your wars have
been either for private grievances, when you could not
make public satisfaction, or for territory or bound-
aries, or a point of honour, or for the leadership of
Greece. Against oligarchies you fought, not for such
things, but for your constitution and for freedom.
Therefore I would not hesitate to say that I think it
better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with
a popular government than your friends under an oli-
gar-chicaL For with free men I consider you would
have no dilficulty in making peace when you chose;
but with people under an oligarchy, even friendship I
hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can
be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the
lovers of constitutional equality. I marvel none of
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? 70 _ DEAIOSTHENEB.
you consider that, when the Rhodians and nearly all
people are drawn into this slavery, our constitution
must be in the same peril. If all other governments
are oligarchical, it is impossible that they will let your
democracy alone. They know too well that no other
people will bring things back to freedom; therefore
they will wish to destroy a government from which
they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary
wrong-doers you may regard as enemies to the suffer-
ers ; while they who subvert constitutions and transform
them into oligarchies must be looked upon as the com-
mon enemies of all lovers of freedom. "
In the opinion of Demosthenes it thus appears
that oligarchy was in fact slavery, and wholly alien
to the Greek genius. The memory of the Athens of
Pericles was deeply impressed on his mind. But
he felt he was now addressing a people singularly
prone to be misled. He hints plainly in this speech
at the existence of an unpatriotic faction in the
State.
"It is difficult for you," he says, "to adopt right
measures. All other men have one battle to fight--
namely, against their open and avowed enemies. You
have a double contest--that which the rest have, and
also a prior and a more arduous one. You must in
counsel overcome a faction which acts among you in
systematic opposition to the State. Men who desert
the politics handed down to them by their ancestors,
and support oligarchical measures, should be degraded
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? SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF RHODES. 71
and deprived of constitutional privileges, and disquali-
fied from being your political advisers. "
Again Demosthenes failed. The bitterness of Athe-
nian feeling towards the ungrateful islanders made the
people blind to higher considerations, and Rhodes re-
mained in the hands of an oligarchy. It was still
subject to Caria, and was thus really a Persian de-
pendcncy. '
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? CHAPTER VII.
PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS--SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES ON
BEHALF OF THE OLYNTHIANS.
WHEN Demosthenes, some time in the year 352 13. 0. ,
made his first speech against Philip, there were good
grounds for an uneasy feeling throughout the Greek
world as to the king's possible movements and designs.
He had already raised Macedon to a position it had
never before held. It had become a distinct power
in the politics of Greece. For a while, however, the
usually active Philip seemed to be really resting from
his labours, and next to nothing was heard of him.
Demosthenes does not so much as allude to him in his
speech "for the freedom of the people of Rhodes. " We
may fairly infer from his silence that anything like
serious apprehensions at Athens of peril from "the
barbarian," as Philip was called, had died away. The
peace party, always strong, and able to make out a
plausible ease for itself, would thus be strengthened;
and it would not be easy, even in the face of manifest
danger, thoroughly to reuse the Athenians to a sense of
the dutywhich they owed both to themselves and to
Greece.
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS. 73
Philip was by this time a powerful prince; but still
he was as yet barely a match for Athens, had she
chosen to put forth her full strength. He had an
efficient army and a good revenue, and he also had
the luck to have other collateral advantages. He had
tools and agerits in several Greek states; and he had
practically on his side at Athens very many of the rich
and well-to-do citizens, who shrank from the idea of
a war which required personal service and exertion.
It was perfectly clear that a contest with him would
have been a serious undertaking. At the same time,
his position, though strong, was not altogether secure.
He had, as we have seen, possessed himself of some of
the coast towns, and he had a fleet in the 1Egean.
Athens should never have allowed him to advance to
this point. She had flung away opportunities; but
even now it was not too late to check him with the
help of a seasonable alliance. As yet he had no hold
on the district known as Chalcidice, which juts out
with its three peninsulas into the north-west of the
! Egean. It was a valuable and commanding strip of
country; and it contained thirty Greek towns, of
which the chief was the city Olynthus, at the
head of the Toronaean gulf. Some of these towns
regarded themselves as dependencies of Olynthus,
and formed what was known as the Olynthian
confederacy. There was a time when even Pella,
now the capital of Macedonia, was included in their
number. Olynthus, indeed, had been quite the most
powerful city in the north of the 1Egean, and far too
proud to submit to the supremacy of either Sparta or
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? 74 DEMOSTHENES.
Athens. Sparta with much difliculty forced it, in
379 B. 0. , into the Lacedaemonian confederacy; and
Athens, about ten years later, very much weakened its
influence by taking from it some of its territory and
of its subject-towns. Still, however, it was prosperous
and flourishing; and it could, at an extremity, bring
into the field a considerable military force, especially
of cavalry. Although it owed Athens a grudge, it had,
as we have seen, proposed alliance when it saw its
neighbour, Amphipolis, pass into the hands of Philip.
Athens declined the offer, and Philip was clever enough
temporarily to conciliate the goodwill of the Olynth-
ians by a trifling concession of territory,--intending, no
doubt, at the first convenient moment, to pick a quar-
rel with them and annex the whole district. It must
have been easy for him, in the case of a city immedi-
ately in his own neighbourhood, to have his partisans
among the citizens; and it was to this that he was in-
debted for his ultimate success. The towns, too, which
were connected with Olynthus by the loose tie of feder-
ation, were no doubt singularly open to his intrigues.
Still, there was the feeling that he might become a
dangerous aggressor; and accordingly Olynthus decided
on a change of policy, and, in 352 13. 0. , withdrew itself
from the Macedonian alliance. The next step was to
conclude peace with Athens, and even to show a wish
for a yet closer union with that state. Athens, too,
new saw the advantage of such a union, and, indeed,
actually made overtures to that effect; but Olynthus
was not- quite prepared to commit itself definitely
to an Athenian alliance, which it well knew' would
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS. 75
be equivalent to a declaration of hostility against
Philip. '
Before long, however,--in the year 13. 0. 350, as it
seems,--Philip left the Olynthians no alternative but
that of seeking powerful support. He made them feel
that they were in imminent danger by a sudden and
unprovoked attack on one of those cities of Chalcidice
which would naturally look to Olynthus for sympathy
and protection. Their eyes were now completely
opened, and they instantly sent off an embassy to
Athens. Philip, indeed, tried to persuade them by
envoys that he had no intention of making war on
them; but he could not blind them. They felt sure
that they might count on a favourable reception for
their envoys at Athens, and on the prospect of assist-
ance. Nor were they disappointed. It was impossible
for the Athenians to neglect such an opportunity.
They had themselves lately proposed such an alliance,
and now it was offered them. There could be no mis-
take as to the critical nature of the situation. Philip
had attacked and taken a Greek city, and it was hardly
possible to doubt that he was feeling his way to the
conquest and annexation of the entire peninsula of
Chalcidice, with its thirty towns. Were he to be suc-
cessful, it was clear that his power would be immensely
increased. Equally clear was it that Olynthus, if well
supported, might effectually stop his further progress.
Indeed, so sanguine were the Athenians, that the gen-
eral talk now was about punishing Philip for his per-
fidy. Only one statesman and orator of any note,
Demades, who was rarely to be found on the patriotic
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? 76 DEMOSTHENES.
side, and was subsequently in all probability a mere
creature of Philip's, spoke against the proposed alli-
ance.
It was on this occasion that Demosthenes, in the
latter half probably of the year 350 13. 0. , delivered
three memorable speeches, commonly known as the
" Olynthiacs. " He must have felt that the convictions
of the people were with him; and yet at the same time
he lets us see, by his general tone, that he almost de-
spaired of being able to stir them to decisive action.
All that they could be persuaded to do was to send
thirty galleys and 2000 mercenaries. This poor little
force could not stop Philip from continuing his
attacks on the Greek towns of Chalcidice. He had
not yet entered Olynthian territory, or even declared
war against the city; but Olynthus was sufficiently
alarmed to send a second embassy to Athens, begging
for more effectual help. A large force was now de-
spatched ; but it consisted of mercenaries, and, unfor-
tunately for Athens, it was under the command of a
man who, though he had some military talent, was so
disreputable in his life that he utterly disgusted the
Olynthians.
In the speech which was probably first delivered,
Demosthenes seeks to encourage his countrymen to
take a hopeful view of affairs by pointing out to them
how it really was that Philip had risen to power, and
how numerous were the elements of weakness in his
kingdom and government.
" He has risen by conciliating and cajoling the sim-
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? PHILIP AND OL YNTH vs. 77
plicity of every people which knew him not. When
one has grown strong, as he has, by rqpaqity and
artifice,' on the first pretext, the slightest reasbn, all
is/()%rturned and broken up. If you will per-
form your duties properly, not only will it appear
that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but
the poor state of his native empire and power will be
revealed. To speak roundly, the Macedonian power
is very well as a help, as it was for you in the time of
Timotheus against the Olynthians. For them, too,
against Potidaea, it was an important alliance. Lately,
as you know, it aided the Thessalians in their broils
and troubles against the regnant house ; and indeed the
accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly
useful. But of itself Macedon is feeble, and has num-
berless deficiencies. The very operations which seem
to constitute Philip's greatness--his wars and his ex-
peditions--have made it moreinsecure than it was
originally. Do not iniaginetliat Philip and his subjects
have 'the same likings. He craves glory--makes that
his passion ; is ready for any consequence of adventure
and peril--preferring, as he does, to a life of safety, the
honour of achieving what no Macedonian king ever
did before. They have no share in the glorious result:
ever harassed by these excursions, they suffer and toil
without ceasing ; they have no leisure for their employ-
ments or private affairs, and cannot so much as dispose
of their hard earnings, the markets of the country
being closed on account of the war. We may easily
infer from all this what is the general Macedonian feel-
ing towards Philip. His mercenaries and guards, in-
/>
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? 78 DEMOSTHENES.
deed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained
soldiers ; but, as I heard from one who had been born
in the country, they are no better than others. If some
of them are experienced in battles and campaigns,
Philip is jealous of such men, and drives them away---
so my informant tells me--wishing to keep the glory of
all action to himself. Or again, if a man is generally
good and virtuous, unable tobear Philip's daily intem-
perance, drunkenness, and indecency, he is pushed
aside and accounted as nobody. The rest about him
are brigands and parasites, and men of that character
who will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple
to name before you. My information is undoubtedly
true ; for persons whom all scouted here as worse rascals
than mountebanks,--Callias, the town-slave, and the
like of him--antic-jesters and composers of ribald songs
to lampoon their companions,--such persons Philip car-
esses and keeps about him. Small matters these may
be thought, but to the wise they are strong indications
of his character and wrongheadedness. Success per-
haps throws a shade over them now; prosperity is a .
famous hider of such blemishes; but on any miscarriage
they will be fully exposed. "
Though in the above passage Demosthenes speaks
contemptuously of Philip, describing him as little better
than a savage and barbarian, he warns his hearers that
if they let Olynthus fall into his hands, he will soon
carry the war into Attica itself. The third and last
of his three speeches was delivered when the Olyn-
thians entreated Athens to send out a force of her own
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS. 79
citizens, instead of mercenaries commanded by men of
the type of the officer whose misconduct, as we have
seen, had given them so much offence. Of all the
political orations of Demosthenes, this is perhaps the
most stirring and impressive. It is, in the opinion of
Mr Grote, one of the most splendid harangues ever
spoken. It seems that people at Athens still talked
about punishing Philip; and there were orators, no
doubt, who flattered them into the notion that they
could do so whenever they chose. " Such talk," says
Demosthenes, " is founded on a false basis. The facts
of the case teach us a different lesson. They bid us
look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves
the sufferers, and that we preserve our QIES. There
'was, indeed, a time--and that, too, within my own
remembrance--when we might have held our own, and
punished Philip besides ; but now our first care must be
to preserve our own allies. " In this speech he ventures
on a bold proposal, which would be sure to provoke
bitter opposition from the peace party of Eubulus.
"Repeal such of the existing laws as are injurious at
the present crisis--I mean those which regard the public
entertainments fund. I speak this out plainly. The
same Rh who proposed such a law ought also to take
upon them to propose its repeal. " In speaking thus,
Demosthenes knew that he was fighting against a most
powerful Athenian sentiment. It would cost them a
painful struggle to sacrifice the fund in question to the
exigencies of a war which also demanded personal
service. They could hardly become like the men who
won Marathon and Salamis. There was the broadest
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? 80 zwuosrnawns
contrast between them, as Demosthenes elaborately
points out in the following passage :---
" Mark, Athenians, what a summary contrast may be
drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours.
It is a tale brief and familiar to all. Our forefathers
for forty-five years took the leadership of Greece by
general consent, and brought as much as ten thousand
talents into the citadel; and the king of Macedonia
Was submissive to them, as a barbarian should be to
Greeks. Many glorious trophies they erected for
victories won by their own fighting on land and sea,
and they are the sole people in the world who have
bequeathed a renown which envy cannot hurt. Such
were their merits in the affairs of Greece; now see
what they were at home, both as citizens and men.
Their public works are edifices and ornaments of such
beauty and grandeur in temples and their consecrated
furniture, that posterity has not the power to surpass
them. In private they were so modest, and so attached
to the principles of our constitution, that whoever
knows the style of house which Aristides had or Mil-
tiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to
be no grander than those of their neighbours. Their
politics were not for money-making; each felt it his
duty to exalt the commonwealth. By a conduct
honourable among the Greeks, pious to the gods, brother-
like among themselves, they justly attained a high
prosperity.
" So fared matters with them under the statesmen I
have named. How fare they with you under the
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? fP1II1;IP AND OLYNTHUS. ' 81
worthies of our time? Is there anylikeness or resem-
blance? I pass over other topics on which I could
expatiate. But observe. In the utter absence of com-
petitors (Lacedaemonians depressed, Thebans employed,
none of the rest capable of disputing the supremacy
with us), when we might hold our own securely and
arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived
of our rightful territory, and spent above 1500 talents
to no purpose. The allies whom we gained in war we
have lost in peace, and we have trained up against
ourselves an enemy thus formidable. For by whose
eontrivance but our own has Philip grown strong'!
This looks bad, you will say, but things at home are
better. What proof is there of this'! The parapets
that are whitewashed, the roads that are repaired, the
fountains, and such trumpery things! Look at the
men of whose statesmanship these are the fruits. They
h_2Tve risen from beggary to opulence, from obscurity to
honour. Some have made their private homes more
splendid than the public buildings, and as the State has
declined, their fortunes have been exalted. "
At last Athens roused herself to a real effort, and
sent to the relief of her ally a force of more than 2000
native Athenian citzens. Olynthus might yet have
been saved had the Olynthians been on their guard
against traitors within, and the history of Greece, per-
haps of the world, might have been different. Philip,
meanwhile, was on the frontier of its territory, after
having captured most of the towns in the peninsula.
At the siege of one of them, an arrow from an Olynthian
A. 0. S. S. vol. iv. 1? '
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? 82 DEMOSTHENES.
archer deprived him of an eye. But early in the year
348 13. 0. he attacked Olynthus itself, after a sudden
declaration of war. The Olynthians, he said, must
quit their city, or he must quit Macedonia. But he
did not overcome them by fair fighting. They were
betrayed by a party among their fellow-citizens. It
was by bribery, as Horace says,* that "the man of
Macedon" opened the gates of Olynthus as of other
cities. It was to be expected that he would show no
mercy. The fair city was razed to the ground, and
its population, with all the women and children, sold
into slavery. .
= This awful calamity sent a shudder through the
Greek world. The like of it had never been seen since
the great Persian invasion of Xerxes. As many as
thirty-two free Greek cities had utterly perished in a
period of less than two years at the hands of a bar-
barian. Divided as the Greeks were among themselves,
they would have all heartily responded to the sentiment
of Demosthenes that " a barbarian should be submissive
to Greeks. " It must have shocked and shamed them to
see with their own eyes troops of poor enslaved crea-
tures, of both sexes and of Greek blood, passing through
the streets of their cities. And all this was the work of
a Macedonian, a man of inferior race, whom Greeks had
thought it almost a condescension to notice and patron-
ise. How could they expect that he would much longer'
stay his hand from the destruction of the Greek cities-
on the Hellespont and the Propontis, and from the'
conquest of the rich corn-producing Chersonesei How
* Odes, iii. 16, 13.
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? PHILIP AND OLYNTH US. 83
could they rest in peace till they saw their way to an
alliance of all the states of Greece against him' ! It is
natural for us to reason thus. But even the proximity
of manifest danger will not always banish mutual
jealousy and distrust. Nor is it in general easy to per-
suade people that a power they have been accustomed
to 'disregard and despise, though its progress may
seem at times alarming, can ever become seriously
formidable to themselves. So it appears to have been
with the Greeks. After the fall of Olynthus and its
confederate cities, they still clung to their false con-
fidence. ' '
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:56 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER VIII.
DEMOSTHENEB AND MEIDIAS.
AN incident about this time in the life of Demosthenes,
which gave occasion 'to one of his well-known speeches,
illustrates rather strikingly some of the less agreeable
phases of Athenian society. There was, of course, refine-
ment and polish of a high degree, and, on the whole,
the tone and temper of the citizens seem to have been
humane and generous. But still, even at Athens, the
scandals and breaches of good taste and manners, which
one would fear are all but inseparable from democracy,
now and then made their appearance. Political rancour
and party violence reached an outrageous length, and
under their shelter the grossest acts of wrong were from
time to time committed with impunity. A rich man,
if he chose, might have plenty of influence in the State;
and along with this he would have at his command
many opportunities of injuring and oppressing those
whom he personally disliked. It appears that there
'were several such men at Athens--men who no doubt
aspired to imitate the grand airs and fashionable ex-
travagance of Alcibiades, who, clever and accomplished
as he was, at last made himself intolerable to the citi-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:56 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? DEMOSIHENES AND HEIDIAS. 85
zens of a free state.