The alternative presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, called for such cuts, but the media denied him a voice on the issues, some of them explicitly defending his exclusion from the presidential debates on the grounds that the options
afforded
by the two parties sufficed.
Manufacturing Consent - Chomsky
U.
S.
leaders have opposed the use of chemical warfare- by enemy states-but it is a different maner when they choose to use such weapomy themselves, or when a client state does the same.
74
Rewriting Vietnam War History
There have been thousands of books written on the Vietnam War,7S and that war has been a brooding omnipresence in the U. S. culture since its end in 1975. For the dominant elite the war represents an era in which resistance to national policy and the associated rise of formerly apathetic sectors of society caused a "crisis of democracy. ,,7fj Those unruly sectors and the dissidents are seen as having damaged the cultural and political framework and imposed unreasonable impediments to the use of force, the laner referred to as the "Vietnam syndrome. " Within the umuly sec- tors and among the dissidents, of course, the "Sixties" are viewed as an era of liberation, of cultural and moral advance, and a temporary surge of democratization.
The propaganda model would lead us to expect mainstream media retrospectives on the war to reflect elite perspectives, portraying the 1960s as a dark age and the U. S. role in the war as, at worst, a case of good intentions gone awry. Focusing here on their treatment of the war
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
xxxiv INTRODUCTION
over the past decade, we see that the media have mainly repeated and elaborated several apologetic themes already entrenched by the end of the war.
One theme has been that the U. S. intervention was justified by the fact of "communism on the march" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30, 2000). It was argued from the beginning that the Communist advance in Vietnam was part of a global communist conspiracy, a position main- tained in the face of the split and hostility between China and the Soviet Union, tension between China and North Vietnam, and the absence of any evidence that North Viemam was anybody's tool. In his book In Ret- rospect,77 former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara admits that he and his colleagues made a serious error on this point. But neither he nor the other establishment figures who have used this argument have ever questioned the U. S. right to intervene by force to stop the "march of communism" in a country where the Communists had led a nationalist revolution, were recognized by all official and nonofficial authorities to command the suPPOrt of a large majority of the population, and where their defeat would require open aggression, mass killing, and the virtual destruction of a distant society.
Closely related was the theme that we were protecting "South Viet- nam" and the "South Vietnamese," who "let the Americans take over the fighting" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30, 1995). A subtheme ofthis line is that we "let down" the South Vietnamese. But as noted earlier, South Vietnam as a political entity was a U. S. concoction and the U. S. war managers recognized that most of the southern population sup- ported the side the United States was fighting. This explains why the main thrust of U. S. violence was directed to the South, where napalm, B-S2 bombing raids, chemical warfare, the institutionalized killing of civilians, and a scorched-earth policy were used to destroy the base of the popular movement. 78 We also noted earlier that this ferocious U. S. assault on the South-which contradicted the claim that we were pro- tecting South Vietnamese-remains invisible in the U. S. media.
Another important theme in the mainstream media for many years has been the notion that the United States was the victim in the Vietnam war, the Vietnamese the cruel villains. This remark. able inversion of reality has been accomplished by two processes: first, by a massive suppression of evidence on the consequences of the war for the Vietnamese; and second, by demonizing the victims, based in large measure on "the national beat- ification of POWs [prisoners of war] and the myth of POWs. as. martyrs. s. till being tortured byVietnam. "19
The onlyVietnamese allowed modest attention in the media have been those mobilized to fight the U. S. war and who were "let down";8o the vast
INTRODUCTION XXXV
numbers killed or damaged by the U. S. assault have been treated as "unworthy victims. " The overwhelming preoccupation of officials, jour- nalists, pundits, and intellectuals with media outreach has been on U. S. victims and the effects of the war on this country. Robert McNamara's widely publicized book, supposedly a mea culpa and moral tract, is no- table for the fact that his notion of the war's "high costs," and the error and guilt he feels, extend only to U. S. lives and the effects of the war on "the political unity of our society. "81 He offers neither regrets, moral reflections, nor apologies for his country having invaded, mercilessly bombed, ravaged the land, and killed and wounded millions of innocent people in a small distant peasant society in pursuit of its own political ends.
In a remarkable cultural process, also, the victims have been turned into the villains. As we describe in chapter 5, in an attempt to prolong the war President Richard Nixon seized on the question of the adequacy of Vietnamese accounting for our military personnel who were captured (POWs) and those missing in action (MIAs). He succeeded in keeping the war going, and some 16,000 more U. S. soldiers and untold numbers ofVietnamese died in the further fighting in the purported interest of missing paws. But although there has never been any credible evidence that a single POW was hidden by the North Vietnamese, this claim be- came an article of faith and cult that dominated U. S. policy toward Viet- nam for many years. 82
The mYth also became the basis ofpopular culture accounts in movies such as The Deer Hunter, Uncommon Jizlor, Ro. W: The Escape, and Missing in Action, in which Rambo-like heroes slaughter evil Vietnamese as they save our betrayed and tormented POWs. These movies turned history on its head. As Vietnam war historian H. Bruce Franklin points out, "America's vision of the war was being transformed. The actual photographs and TV footage ofmassacred villagers, napalmed children, Vietnamese prisoners being tortured and murdered, wounded GI's screaming in agony, and body bags being loaded by the dozen for ship- ment back home were being repJaced by simulated images of American POWs in the savage hands of Asian communists. "83 The powerful cul- tural myth of abused POWs as the central feature of the Vietnam war not only allowed the war to be extended; it helped justify the U. S. failure to aid its victim in accord with end-of-war promises and it provided the basis for an eighteen-year economic war against the victim country. It also functioned as a potent agent of militarization and force weakening the "Vietnam syndrome. "
In his recent book Vietnam and Other Ameman Fantasies, H. Bruce Franklin, who had previously exposed the fallacies and cult qualities of
xxxvi INTRODUCTION
the POW-MIA myth, addressed this issue once again, as well as other fantasies (such as the claim that the antiwar activists often spit at return- ing veterans). 84 Franklin's book was reviewed in the Los Angeles Times but was otherwise only twice mentioned in passing in the U. S. main- stream press. On the other hand, a book by Michael Lind, Vietnamj The Necessary Wilr,85 which explains that the war was justifiable because com~ munism was on the march, U. S. "credibility" was at stake, and the Viet- namese communists were cruel and ruthless-demonstrated in part by their refusal to surrender and consequent responsibility for those killed by U. S. bombs! -was treated differently. It received forty-four reviews and was mentioned twenty-seven other times in the mainstream media, and Lind was given Op-Ed space in both the New 'YOrk Times and the Wilshingwn Post, among other opportunities.
i "
l ,
In his review of Lind's book, Vietnam War historian Uoyd Gardner
noted that any U. S. "credibility" problem that arose in connection with
me Vietnam war was a creation of the war managers themselves and
flowed from their own decisions; and Gardner also comments, after ana-
lyzing a series of Lind arguments in defense of the war, that "the evidence j simply washes away his positions like a sand castle on the beach. "86 But
Lind was saying what the elite wants said, and Franklin was not, so that j mainstream media treatment followed accordingly.
1 1 1
Laos
j
I
t
Laos's Plain of Jars was subjected to some of the heaviest bombings of civilian targets in history, especially after 1968, when Washington was compelled under domestic pressure ro enter negotiations with North Vietnam and had ro terminate its bombing there. It turned to Laos, although that small peasant country was a marginal facror in the wars; but Nixon and Kissinger could hardly leave U. S. bombers inactive. Over- all, some 2 million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos. These raids wiped out 353 villages and killed thousands of civilians, and they con- tinue ro kill now, as the Plain was saturated with hundreds of millions of "bombies"-tiny antipersonnel weapons specifically designed to kill and maim. With their 20-ro-30 percent failure-to-explode rate, they re- mained as potential killers, and their casualty rate is still high, estimates running from hundreds ro 20,000 or more per year, half of them deaths and half of the victims children. 87
There have been efforts to deal with this humanitarian catastrophe. The British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been trying ro remove the lethal objects, but the British press reports that the United
States is "conspicuously missing from the handful of western organiza- tions that have followed . \1AG," though it has finally agreed to train some Laotian civilians. 58 The British press also reports, with some annoyance, that the United States has refused to provide. \1AG specialists with "ren- der harmless procedures," still treated as a state secret for weapons three decades old. 59 The U. S. mainstream media have treated in very low key the continuing human toll suffered in Laos and have maintained almost complete silence concerning the U. S. non-cooperativeness in attempts to alleviate a crisis dating back to the "secret war" against Laos, which again was "secret" only by tacit propaganda service of the mainstream media (see chapter 6).
C a m b o d ia
Important changes have occurred in Cambodia since 1988, including Vietnam's withdrawal from that country, elections held under UN aus- pices, and the death of Pol Pot. We noted in chapter 7 that, after the Viet- namese had ousted Pol Pot in December 1978, although the United States and its allies had denounced Pol POt as "another Hitler" commit- ting "genocide," they quickly became his supporter, allowing him to re- tain Cambodia's UN. seat and otherwise aiding and protecting him in his Thailand refuge. Vietnam was severely punished-by harsh sanctions and by U. S. support for a Chinese invasion to teach Vietnam a lesson- fOt having terminated Pol Pot's atrocities! President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in 1979 that "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help D. K. [Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot's forces]. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could. "9o In the late 1980s and early 1990$, as the Vietnamese sought to end their isolation by exiting from Cambodia, but insisted as a condition for withdrawal that Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge be excluded from returning to power, the United States objected, and insisted, with eventual success, that the Khmer Rouge be included as a contestant party in the post-occupation settle- ment. 91
\Xlhat dominated U. S. policy and led to its support of Pol Pot was the classic rule that the enemy ofmy enemy (Vietnam) is my friend, and per- haps also the new tilt toward China, also hostile toward Vietnam. The support of Pol Pot was awkward, given the prior denunciations of his pOlicies, but the mainstream media handled it with aplomb, and the U. S. public was almost surely completely unaware that the United States had become his ally and supporter. (The explicit statement of support by
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
xxxviii INTRODCCTION
Brzezinski quoted above was never mentioned in the New 1{lrk Times, the Washington Post, or Newsweek; it was quoted once in both the Los Angeles Times and Time. )
However, in the late 1990S, afterVietnam had left Cambodia and US. officials' anti-Vietnam passions had subsided, and Pol Pot was no longer a useful instrument of anti-Vietnam policy, U. S. officials and pundits rediscovered Pol Pot's and the Khmer Rouge's villainy and candidacy for war crimes trials. The media handled the previous "tilt" toward Pol Pot mainly by evasion, essentially blacking out the years 1979-95, or vaguely intimating that the US. had supported him for reasons of "realpolitik," but avoiding both details on the nature and magnitude of support as well as any reflections on the morality of backing "another Hitler. " The New 10rk Times's summary of "Pol Pot's Rise and Fall" (April 17, 1998) lists for "1979-1990: Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge are given refuge at Thai bor- der where they fight back against theVietnamese. " "Given refuge" is mis- leading: they were given economic and military aid and political support by the United States and its allies. The Times's main reporter on Cambo- dia in early 1998, Seth Mydans, repeatedly blacked out mention ofUS. support, referring to "the decade-long civil war that followed" Pol Pot's ouster (April 13), and a nineteen-year "guerilla insurgency in the jungles of western and northern Cambodia" (April 17).
The Boston Globe, New 10rk Times, W&shington Post, and Los Angeles Times, editorializing on the death of Pol Pot on April 17,1998, were uni- formly indignant over his crimes and regretful at his escape from justice, but all avoided mentioning the long US. support ofthe criminal-as well as the U. S. contribution to the first phase of a "Decade of Genocide. "92
The washington Post blacked out the inconvenient fifteen-year period of support of Pol Pot with this summary: "After the nightmare of Khmer Rouge rule and genocide, the United States and its allies pumped mil- lions of donars into Cambodia to help rebuild and to hold elections. "9~
It is enlightening to compare the media's treatment of Pol Pot and Indonesian leader Suharto, who was also in the news in 1998, as Indone- sia suffered a financial crisis that-along with popular resistance to the dictatorship---eventually led to his ouster. Pol Pot was described in the editorials and news columns of April 1998 as "crazed," a "killer," "war criminal," "mass murderer," "blood-soaked," and as having engineered a "reign of terror" and "genocide. " But in 1998 and 1999, and in earlier years as well, while Suharto was occasionally referred to as a "dictator" and running an "authoritarian" regime, he was never a "killer" or "mass murderer" or one responsible for "genocide. " The terminological double standard is maintained reliably throughout the mainstream media. 94
Less obvious but equally interesting is the difference in willingness
to identify the responsible parties for the killings of Pol Pot and Suharto. In the case of Pol Pot, there is no uncertainty or complexity: editorials and news articles uniformly make him and the Khmer Rouge leadership clearly and unambiguously responsible for all deaths in Cambodia dur- ing the period 1975-78. He was the "man who slaughtered two million" (USA 1Oday), "the executioner" (Boston Glebe) who "presided over the deaths" of his victims (washington Post), "the man who drove Cambodia to ruin" (New Thrk Times).
But in Suhano's case, we move to an ambiguous responsibility, which means none at all: in the New Thrk Times, for example, "a 1965 coup led to the massacres of hundreds of thousands of supposed communists" (edi- torial, Aug. 23, 1996), where we have no agent doing the killing; or "a wave ofviolence that took up to 500,000 lives and led Suharto to seize power from Sukarno in a military coup" (Seth Mydans, Aug. 7, 1996), where the massacre not only has no agent, but is falseLy situated before the takeover of power by Suharto. In a latcr piece, Mydans states that "more than 500,000 Indonesians are estimated to have died in a purge of leftists in 1965, the year Mr. Suharto came to power" (April 8, 1997). Note the passive voice, never used in connection with Pol Pot, the word "purge" instead of "slaughter" or "massacre," and the continued faillU'e to identify the agent.
In the case of East Timor, also, the Times is uncertain about the source of the killing: "This is one of the world's sadder places, where 100,000 to 200,000 people died from 1974 in a brutal civil war and the consequent invasion through combat, execution, disease and starvation. . . . " (Steven Erlanger, Oct. 2I, 1990). In addition to the lack ofa clear agent, this sen- tence seriously misrepresents the facts-the civil war was shorr and left small numbers dead; and the invasion was not "consequent" to a brutal civil war, except in Indonesian propaganda.
Another important difference in the treatment of the "worthy" victims of Pol Pot and the "unworthy" victims of Suharto is in the willingness to explain away the killings. With Pol Pot, as we describe in chapter 7, the background of the first phase of the genocide was completely blacked out in the mainstream account-there is no qualification to Pol Pot's respon- sibility as a killer because his forces had undergone terrible damage and sought vengeance for the crimes they had suffered; nor are any deaths in Pol Pot's years of rule to be explained by the starvation and disease already pervasive in April 1975. No, the only mentionable background is his Paris training and Communist fanaticism.
But with Suharto we encounter a whole new world of contextualized apologetics. For many years the main protective formula was that the 1965--66 killings were "a result of a failed coup," which "touched off
INTRODUCTION xxxix
xl INTRODUCTION
a wave of violence," or followed an "onslaught from the left. "95 This formula, invoked repeatedly, suggests that the mass killings were pro- voked and thus maybe justified by a prior "onslaught. " The v. rriters never explain why a failed coup could possibly justify a large-scale slaughter, but the hint is left hanging. In more recent years, usually in connection with the explanation and rationalization of the continuation of a dicta- torship, the media regularly juxtaposed political repression with "stabil- ity" and "growth": "the signs of his success are everywhere," although Suharto has brought these gains "by maintaining a tight grip on power and suppressing public criticism and political opposition. "96 These state- ments, from the New 1Vrk Times, offer a kind of context that the paper never gives to Castro, let alone a Pol Pot, and it shows an apologetic that runs deep.
This apologetic extends to the Suharto invasion and occupation of East Timor. For years, New Thrk Times reporters have claimed that In- donesia invaded in the midst of a civil war,97 when in fact that civil war was over well before the invasion. The paper's news coverage of East Timor actually fell to zero as the Indonesian attacks and killings in East Timor reached a deadly peak in 1977-78, a slaughter that elsewhere would be called "genocidal. " And although Indonesia occupied East Timor in violation of standing UN. rulings till its induced exit in 1999, the paper's reporters repeatedly referred to East Timor as a "disputed province" and East Timorese resistance as "separatist," thereby internal- izing and explicitly legitimizing the aggression and occupation. 98
The bias and gentle treatment of Suharto and the Indonesian govern- ment in the media is once again correlated with US. policy support that dates back to the military coup and slaughters of 1965. These were greeted with enthusiasm by US. officials-then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara referred to the events as one of the "dividends" of U. S. support for the Indonesian military-and the "boiling bloodbath" (Time) and "staggering mass slaughter" (New Thrk Times) were also seen in the media as a "gleam of light" Games Reston in the New Thrk Times). 99 U. S. military and economic aid and diplomatic protection continued throughout the years of the Suharto dictatorship, and the media's finding him a good genocidist followed accordingly.
New YOrk Times reporter David Sanger differentiated Suharto and post- 1990 Saddam Hussein-before 1990 he was a U. S. ally-saying "Mr. Suharto is not hoarding anthrax or threatening to invade Australia. "loo That is, Suharto's invasion, mass killing, and long illegal occupation of East Timor is given zero weight, and his slaughter of somewhere between 500,000 and 2 million people within Indonesia some years back is also
not mentioned. This tells us all we need to know about how good and bad genocidists fare in the Western propaganda system.
FURTHER APPLICATIONS
In his book Golden Rule, political scientist Thomas Ferguson argues that where the major investors in political parties and elections agree on an issue, the parties will not compete on that issue, no matter how strongly the public might want an alternative. He contends that for ordinary vot- ers to influence electoral choices they would have to have "strong chan- nels that directly facilitate mass deliberation and expression. "IOI These would include unions and other intermediate organizations that might, through their collective power, cause the interests of ordinary voters to be given greater weight in the political system.
The propaganda model, and the institutional arrangements that it re- flects, suggests that the same forces that preclude competition among the parties on issues on which the major investors agree, will also dominate media choices and rule OUt "mass deliberation and expression" on those issues. For example, polls regularly indicate that, except in periods of war and intense war propaganda, the public wants a smaller defense budget and favors a spending shift from defense to education and other civil functions. 102 But because the major investors agree that a large defense budget is desirable, the two dominant parties compete only on whether the one or the other is st. inting on military expenditures, with both prom- ising to enlarge it (as both George W. Bush and AI Gore did in the presi- dential election campaign of 2000). And the mainstream media do the same, limiting debate to the terms defined by the two parties and exclud- ing deliberation and expression of the position that large cuts are desir- able.
The alternative presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, called for such cuts, but the media denied him a voice on the issues, some of them explicitly defending his exclusion from the presidential debates on the grounds that the options afforded by the two parties sufficed. 103
The U. S. corporate community has favored an immense defense budget. . -----eurrently more than five times the size of that of a steadily weak- ening Russia, the second biggest spender-because of the great benefits its members derive from military spending. These include weapons and other contracting business, direct and indirect subsidies in research,104 and the role played by military power in supporting the global economic expansion in which many U. S. transnational corporations are active
INTRODUCYlON xli
xlii INTRODUCTION
participants and beneficiaries. Business also benefits from the market- opening actions of trade agreements and from the supportive operations of the \VTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. But these trade agreements and the activities ofthe international fmancial institutions have generated controversy and political struggle, because while their benefits to busi- ness are dear, their costs are borne heavily by workers forced to compete in a global job market. Furthermore, globalization and trade agreements strengthen the political as well as the economic power of the corporate community, in part because they shift decision-making authority from democratic polities to bankers and technocrats who more reliably serve the transnational corporate interest. Here also, as in the case of defense- versus civilian-oriented budgets, polls show a sharp dichotomy between corporate and public preferences, with the latter generally hostile to the agreements and institutional arrangements favored by business. lOS
The propaganda model fits well the media's treatment of this range of issues. Consider, for example, their coverage of the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the subsequent Mexican financial crisis and meltdown of 1994--95. Polls taken before its enactment consistently showed substantial majorities opposed to N A FrA -and later to r. ""Ie bailout of investors in Mexican securities-but the elite in favor. Media editorials, news coverage, and selection of "experts" in opinion columns were heavily skewed toward the elite pref- erence; their judgment was that the benefits of NAFTA were obvious, were agreed to by all qualified authorities, and that only demagogues and "special interests" were opposed. 106 The "special interests" who might be the "losers" included women, minorities, and a majority of the work- force. 107 The media dealt with the awkward fact that poUs showed steady majority opposition to the agreement mainly by ignoring it, but occasion- ally they suggested that the public was uninformed and didn't recognize its own true interests. 108 The effort of labor to influence the outcome of the NAFTA debates was sharply attacked in both the lV. 'ew YOrk Times and the washington Post, with no comparable criticism of corporate or govern- mental (U. S. and Mexican) lobbying and propaganda. And while labor was attacked for its alleged position on these issues, the press refused to allow the actual position to be expressed. 10Q
In December 1994, only eleven months after NAFrA went into effect, Mexico suffered a major financial crisis, induding a massive flight of cap- ital, a devaluation ofthe currency, and a subsequent bailout by the IMF that required Mexico to carry out painful deflationary measures. Despite the fact that the meltdown occurred within a year of the introduction of NAFTA, which the media had portrayed as ushering in a prospective
golden age of economic advance, they were unanimous that NAFTA was not to blame. And in virtual lock-step they supported the Mexican (investor) bailout, despite poll reports of general public opposition in the United States. Experts and media pundits and editorialists repeatedly explained that one great merit ofNAFT A was that it had "locked Mexico in" so that it couldn't alter its overall policy direction or resort to controls to protect itself from severe deflation and unemployment. They were oblivious to the profoundly undemocratic nature of this lock-in, made more questionable by the fact that it had been negotiated by a Mexican government that ruled as a result of electoral fraud. 11o
More recently, when the growing global opposition to the policies of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank led to mass protests at the WTO conference in Seattle in November and December 1999, and then at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, D. C. , in April 2000, media coverage ofthese events was derisive and hostile to the protesters and almost uniformly failed to deal with the substantive issues that drove the protests. The media portrayed the Seanle protesters as "all- purpose agitators" (U:S. Neu's & WOrld Report), "terminally aggrieved" (Philadelphia Inquirer), simply "against world trade" (ABC News), and making "much ado about nothing" (CNN), but the bases of the protest- ers' grievances were almost entirely unexplored. lll Similarly, in the case of the Washington, D. C. , protests, the media repeatedly reported on activists' attire, looks, body odors, fadism, and claimed a lack of "any- thing that can coherently be called a cause" (Michael Kelly, journalist,
W&shington Post), and they continued their refusal to address issues. 112 There were many informed protesters with coherent agendas at Seanle and Washington-including reputable economists, social theorists, and veteran organizers from around the worldl13_but the media did not seek them out, preferring to stereotype antiglobalization activists as ignorant troublemakers. On op-ed pages, there was a major imbalance hostile to the protesters. TV bias was at least as great, and often misleading on the facts. In his November 29, t999, backgrounder on the WTO, Dan Rather explained that the organization had ruled on many environmental issues, implying that those rulings were protective of the environment when in fact they generally privileged trade rights over environmental needs.
Another notable feature of media reporting on both the Seattle and Washington, D. c. , protests, and a throwback to their biased treatment of the protests of the Vietnam War era (1965-75),114 was their exaggera- tion of protester violence, their downplaying of police provocations and violence, and their complaisance at illegal police tactics designed to limit all protestor actions, peaceable or otherwise. IIS Although the Seattle
INTRODUCTION xliii
xliv INTRODUCTION
police resorted to force and used chemical agents against many nonvio- lent protesters well before a handful of individuals began brealting win- dows, both then and later the media reversed this chronology, stating that the police violence was a response to protester violence. In fact, the van- dals were largely ignored by the police, while peaceful protesters were targeted for beatings, tear g:1S, torture with pepper spray, and arrest. 1I6 One New 10Tk Times anic1e went so far as to claim that the Seattle pro- testers had thrown excrement, rocks, and Molotov cocktails at delegates and police officers; the Times later issued a correction acknowledging that these claims were false. ll7 Dan Rather, who had falsely alleged that the protesters had "brought on today's crackdown" at Seattle, later suggested that the \);Tashington protesters were possibly "hoping for a replay of last year's violence in Seattle," setting this off against "those charged with keeping the peace" who "have other ideas. "118
In their eighty-seven-page report, Out of Control: Seattle's Flawed Re-
sponse to Protests Against the WOrld Trade Organization, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stated that "demonstrators [in Seattle] were overwhelmingly peaceful. Not so the police. " The response of the Seattle
police to the protests was characterized by "draconian" violations of civil liberties, including widespread use of <" chemical weapons, rubber bullets
and clubs against peaceful protesters and bystanders alike. " But NBC, 1 ABC, CBS, CNN, and the New 10rk Times and washington Post all ig- I nored the release ofthe ACLU's fmding<3, which ran counter to their own uniformly pro-police and ami-protester line.
The media's reversal of chronology and inflation of the threat of ac- tivist violence, and their low-keyed treatment of numerous illegal police actions designed to instill fear in those wanting to protest peaceably,ll9 provided the enabling ground for both police violence and serious restrictions on free speech. These increased in scope and sophistication between Seattle and Washington, and were then applied TO squelch pro- test at the Republican and Democratic conventions in Philadelphia and Los Angeles in July and August 2 0 0 0 . 120 The corporate media's hostility to the goals of the protests, closely aligned with that of the rest of the cor- porate establishment, caused their devotion to the First Amendment to flag in a way it never has when their own rights and privileges have been at stake.
As is suggested by the media's treatment of NAFT A and of labor's right to participate in its debates, as well as the media coverage ofWater- gate, COINTELPRO, and major events in the earlier history of labor- management conflict (the Haymarket affair, the Homestead strike, the post-World War I "red scare"),l2l the propaganda model applies to do-
mestic as well as foreign policy issues. Labor has been under renewed siege in the United States for the past several decades, its condition adversely affected by the deflationary policies of the early 1980s, corpo- rate downsizing, globalization, a vigorous business campaign to defeat unions, and government support of, or indifference to, the damage being inflicted on unions and workers. There was a major drop in union mem- bership from the beginning of the Reagan era, with union density falling from 25 percent in 1980 to J4-5 percent in J996 (and only JO_2 percent in the private sector). This reflected weakened labor bargaining power and was accompanied by significant concessions in wages and benefits, more onerous working conditions, and greater worker insecurity.
President Reagan's firing of ! I,OOO striking air? controllers in 1981 "put the government seal of approval on strike-breaking and a new era of industrial relations opened. "I22 But you would hardly know this from reading or listening to the mainstream media. An exceptional t994 Busi- ness week article noted that "over the past dozen years . . . U. S. industry has conducted one of the most successful union wars ever," helped by "illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their right to organ- ize," with unlawful firings occurring in "one-third of all representation elections in the late '80S. "123 But this successful war was carried out quietly, with media cooperation. The decertification of unions, use of replacement workers, and long, debilitating strikes like that involving Caterpillar were treated in a very low key manner. In a notable illustra- tion of the applicability of the propaganda model, the nine-month-long Pittston miners' strike that began in April 1989 was accorded much less attention, and less friendly treatment, than the Soviet miners' strikes of the summer of that same year,124
From 1977 through 1999, while the incomes of the top 1 percent of households grew by 84. 8 percent and the top 10 percent by 44. 6 percent, the bottom 60 percent lost ground and the income of the lowest 20 percent fell by 12. 5 percent. 125 Real hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees (i. e. , the 80 percent of the workforce that holds working-class jobs) fell by 4. 8 percent between 1973 and 1999. 226 This, along with the adverse trend of social indicators in the same period,127 suggests that the welfare of the majority declined in this era of high employment, a "new economy," and a spectacular upswing in the stock market. In its euphoria phase, which ended abruptly with the col- lapse of the dot. com market in 1999 and 2000, the mainstream media hardly noticed that only a minority had been the beneficiaries;128 they briefly discovered this issue only under the impetus of Pat Buchanan's right-wing populist outcries during the 1996 presidential election cam-
INTRODUCTION xlv
xlvi IN,RODucnON
paign. In the 2000 electoral campaign, once again the twO major party candidates said nothing about the failure of the majority to be lifted in the supposed "rising tide" that would benefit everybody; only Ralph Nader and other marginalized candidates did, and as noted, the domi- nant media found that the agenda of the major parties was all that they could ask for.
Another strilcing application of the propaganda model can be seen in the media's treatment of the chemical industry and its regulation. Be- cause of the industry's power, as well as the media's receptivity to the demands of the business community, the media have normalized a system described by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring as "deliberately poi- soning us, then policing the results. "lZ9 Industry is permitted to produce and sell chemicals (and during the 1990s, bioengineered foods) without independent and prior proof of safety, and the "policing" by the Environ- mental Protection Agency (EPA) has been badly compromised by under- funding and political limits on both law enforcement and testing. no A major National Research Council study of 1984 found that there was no health hazard data available for 78 percent ofthe chemicals in commerce, and an Environmental Defense Fund update found little change had occurred a dozen years laler. The federal government's National Toxicol- ogy Program tests about ten to twenty chemicals a year for carcinogenic- ity (but not for the numerous other possible adverse effects ofchemicals); but meanwhile five hundred to a thousand new chemicals enter com- merce annually, so our knowledge base steadily declines. 131
This system works well for industry, however, as it wants to sell with- out interference, and leaving virtually aU of the research and testing for safety in its hands, with its members to decide when the results are worthy of transmission to the EP A, is a classic "fox guarding the chick- ens" arrangement. The system has worked poorly for the public, and its inadequacy has been reinforced by the industry's power to influence, sometimes even capture, the EPA. 132 Nevertheless, the industry often contends that the safety of chemicals is assured by EP A (or FDA) regula- tion, 133 which industry does its best to keep weak and which, as noted, has failed to deal in any way with the great majority of chemicals in the marker.
With the media's help, the chemical industry has also gained wide acceptance of its view that chemicals should be evaluated individually on the basis of an analysis of their risks to individuals and individual tolerances. But it is very hard to measure such risks and tolerances for humans----controlled experiments are not possible, damage may show up only after many years, the forms of damage are hard to know in advance, chemicals may interact with others in the environment, they may be bio-
accumulative, and the breakdown products of chemicals may have their own dangers. Furthermore, if thousands of chemicals enter the environ- ment, many long-lasting, bioaccumulative, and interacting with other chemicals, a public policy that ignores their additive and interactive ef- fects on people and the environment is deeply flawed and irresponsible.
Policy based on the "precautionary principle," bitterly opposed by the chemical industry, with the support of the U. S. government,134 would nor allow chemicals to enter the environment without full tesring, would prohibit the use of chemicals that accumulate in human tissues and whose breakdown products are threatening or unknown, and would compel the use of nonthreatening alternatives for untested and known- to-be-risky chemicals where such alternatives can be found or developed at reasonable cOSt. l35
In successfully avoiding application of the precautionary principle, industry spokespersons have argued that the existing system is based on "sound science. " But science does not tell us that industry has any right to put chemicals into the environment that have any risk at all, let alone telling us what risks are acceptable-these are political decisions. Fur- thermore, if the chemicals in the environment have not been tested for all the variables that are relevant to social choices, such as their long-term effects on immune systems and reproduction as well as any cancer threat, and the effects of their breakdown products on the environment-and none of them have been so tested-the political, not scientific, basis of "sound science" is evident.
The chemical industry has produced, and long denied any harm from, innumerable products-from tetraethyl lead in gasoline and PCBs in batteries to asbestos, DDT, and Agent Orange-that are now well estab- lished as seriously harmful, only withdrawing them (often only from domestic use) under overwhelming legal and regulatory pressure. For the products they have wanted to sell, they have always found scientists who would testify to their harmlessness (or that claims of harm were not scientifically proven). There has been a consistent sharp difference bet\Veen the results of industry-sponsored science and those of inde- pendent researchers working the same terrain. l3o And there have been numerous cases of fraud in industry testing, industry use of testing labs that arranged the data to find industry products acceptable, and political manipulation to weaken regulatory standards. 137
Despite these industry abuses of science, the media have largely ac- cepted the industry's claim that it supports "sound science," in contrast with its critics' use of "junk. science. " From 1996 through September 1998, 258 articles in mainstream newspapers used the phrase "junk sci- ence"; but only 21, or 8 percent, used it to refer to corporate abuses of
INTRODUCTION xlvii
xlviii INTRODUCTION
science, whereas 160, or 62 percent, applied it to science used by envi- ronmentalists, other corporate critics, or tort lawyers suing corporations (77, or 30 percent, didn't fit either of these categories). 138 In short, the media have internalized industry's self-legitimizing usage, just as they have normalized a status quo of caveat emptor (buyer beware) rather than of safety first.
The media have also regularly gotten on board in dismissing concerns about chemical threats as unwarranted "scares," such as the alleged scares over dioxin and the danger of Alar on apples. But these and other scares often turn out to be based on genuine health hazards. J3Q Meanwhile, the media rarely report and examine in any depth the frequent evidence of the inadequacy of regulation and testing and of the real costS of chemical- ization of the environmenr. J4O For example, the International Joint Com- mission (lIC), a joint Canadian-U. S. venture dating back to 1978, was given the formidable task oftrying to halt the flow oftoxic chemicals into the Great Lakes. It reports each year that it is failing, and since t992 has called for the ending of the manufacture of chlorine as essential to fulfill- ing its task. The national media virtually ignore this appeal, and the IJC's US. cochairman Gordon Durnil has remarked that "we have a societal problem about how to deal with this, but 90 percent of the population doesn't even know there is anything to worry about. "J41 We believe that the propaganda model helps understand this lack ofknowledge.
In the health insurance controversy of 1992-93, the media's refusal to take the single-payer option seriously, despite apparent widespread public support and the effectiveness of the system in Canada, served well the interests of the insurance and medical service complex. 142 The un- critical media reponing and commentary on the alleged urgency of fiscal restraint and a balanced budget in the years 1992-96 fit well the business community's desire to reduce the social budget and weaken reguls- tion. 143 The media's gullibiliry in accepting the claim of a Social Security system "crisis," which would require policy action some thirty-seven years ahead if certain conservative guesses were true and a number of easy corrections were ruled out, served the interests ofconservative ideo- logues anxious to weaken a highly successful government program and a security industry eager to benefit from the partial or full privatization of Social Security. 144 The applicability of the propaganda model in these and other cases, including the media's handling of the "drug wars," seems clear. \45
i
CONCLUDING NOTE
The propaganda model remains a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the workings of the mainstream media-perhaps even more so than in 1988. As we noted above, the changes in structural con- ditions that underlie the model, and that we believe strongly and often decisively influence media behavior and performance, have tended to increase the model's salience. We noted in the Preface to the first edition and in chapters 2 and 3, in reference to the media's coverage of the wars and elections in Central America in the I980s, that the media's perform- ance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government propaganda demands. This was at least equally true of their performance in covering the 1991 war against Iraq and NATO's war against Yugo- slavia in 1999, as we have described earlier and briefly in regard to Yugoslavia and in detail elsewhere. 146
In our conclusion to the first edition, we emphasized that, as the nega- tive performance effects of the media result primarily from their struc- ture and objectives, real change in performance calls for substantial changes in underlying media organization and goals. In the years since 1988, structural changes have not been favorable to improved perform- ance, but it remains a central truth that democratic politics requires a democratization of information sources and a more democratic media. Along with trying to contain and reverse the growing centralization of the mainstream media, grassroots movements and intermediate groups that represent large numbers of ordinary citizens should put much more energy and money into creating and supporting their own media-as they did with the Independent Media Centers brought into existence during the Seattle and Washington, D. C. , protests of 1999 and 2000. These, and other nonprofit community-based broadcasting stations and networks, and a better use of public-access channels, the Internet, and independent print media, will be essential for the achievement of major democratic social and political successes.
Notes to Introduction
1. On a number of issues, such as trade agreements, health care, and the appropriate size of the military budget, there is a sharp division between media personnel and the elite on the one hand and the general population on the other hand, as we discuss below under "Further Applications. "
INTRa Due T ION xlix
INTRODUCTION
2. This was even true in the Soviet Union, where the media's disclosure of inconvenient facts on the Afghan war caused the Soviet defense minister to denounce the press as unpatriotic; see Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press Harms Army," lv. Tew YOrk Times, January 21, 1988.
3. For an accounr of critiques, and the present writers' replies, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989), appendix I; Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," in The Myth of the Liberal Media (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
4- Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. xxi.
5. Ibid.
6. Edward S. Herman and Robert McChesney, The Global Media (London: Cassell, 1997).
7. Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 108.
8. Ibid. , p. 109.
9. James Ledbetter, "Public Broadcasting Sells; (Out? )," The Nation, Decem- ber I, 1997.
10. Ibid.
II. Stephanie Strom, "Japanese Sites for Women Aim for Empowerment," New "York Times, December 25, 2000.
12. J\1ark Fineman, "Military Can't Outflank Rebels in War of Words," Los
Angeles Times, February 21, 1995; Leonard Doyle, "Rebels Try to Advance via Internet," The Indepemknt, March 7, 1995.
13. Jim Shultz, "Bolivia's Water War Victory," Earth Island Journal, Septem- ber 22, 2000; "Bolivia-The Last Word," April 13, 2000, JShultz@democra- cyar. org; "How the Internet Helped Activists," Straits Times (Singapore), May 25, 1998; Marshall Clark, "Cleansing the Earth," Inside Indonesia (Octo- ber-December 1998).
14. Madelaine Drohan, "How the Net Killed the . MAl," Globe and Mail, April 29,1998.
IS. Kayte Van Scoy, "How Green Was My Silicon Valley," PC/Computing, March I, 2000; Keith Perine, "Power to the (\Veb-Enabled) People," Industry Standard, April 1 0 , 2000. See also "Further Applications" below.
16. James Ledbetter, "Some Pitfalls in Portals," Columbia Journalism Review . ~ (November-December 1999)? 1 17. Quoted in ibid.
18. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of DemoCTa<:y (Urbana: University ofIlli~ . . nois Press, 1997); John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good 1
for "You. ' (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995); Stuart Ewen, PR'
A Social History ofSpin (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
19. Mark Dowie, "Introduction," Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge. ? 20. See Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade:America and the Tragedy of Posr-Com- 1 munist Russia (New York: Norton, 2000). See also Thomas Frank, One Mar-
ker Under God (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
21. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technocu1ture (London: Routledge, I999), p. 127.
22. Patricia Aufderheide, "Journalism and Public Life Seen Through the
'Net,'" in Aufderheide, The Daily Planet (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2000); Joseph Turow, Breaking Up Amen'ca (Chicago: Univer- siryofChicago Press, 1997).
23. Herman and McChesney, Global Media, chapter 5.
24. On the ideological messages borne in commercials, see Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 2, chapter t.
25. See Robert McChesney, 'Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy (New York: Oxford, 1993).
Rewriting Vietnam War History
There have been thousands of books written on the Vietnam War,7S and that war has been a brooding omnipresence in the U. S. culture since its end in 1975. For the dominant elite the war represents an era in which resistance to national policy and the associated rise of formerly apathetic sectors of society caused a "crisis of democracy. ,,7fj Those unruly sectors and the dissidents are seen as having damaged the cultural and political framework and imposed unreasonable impediments to the use of force, the laner referred to as the "Vietnam syndrome. " Within the umuly sec- tors and among the dissidents, of course, the "Sixties" are viewed as an era of liberation, of cultural and moral advance, and a temporary surge of democratization.
The propaganda model would lead us to expect mainstream media retrospectives on the war to reflect elite perspectives, portraying the 1960s as a dark age and the U. S. role in the war as, at worst, a case of good intentions gone awry. Focusing here on their treatment of the war
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
xxxiv INTRODUCTION
over the past decade, we see that the media have mainly repeated and elaborated several apologetic themes already entrenched by the end of the war.
One theme has been that the U. S. intervention was justified by the fact of "communism on the march" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30, 2000). It was argued from the beginning that the Communist advance in Vietnam was part of a global communist conspiracy, a position main- tained in the face of the split and hostility between China and the Soviet Union, tension between China and North Vietnam, and the absence of any evidence that North Viemam was anybody's tool. In his book In Ret- rospect,77 former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara admits that he and his colleagues made a serious error on this point. But neither he nor the other establishment figures who have used this argument have ever questioned the U. S. right to intervene by force to stop the "march of communism" in a country where the Communists had led a nationalist revolution, were recognized by all official and nonofficial authorities to command the suPPOrt of a large majority of the population, and where their defeat would require open aggression, mass killing, and the virtual destruction of a distant society.
Closely related was the theme that we were protecting "South Viet- nam" and the "South Vietnamese," who "let the Americans take over the fighting" (editorial, Washington Post, April 30, 1995). A subtheme ofthis line is that we "let down" the South Vietnamese. But as noted earlier, South Vietnam as a political entity was a U. S. concoction and the U. S. war managers recognized that most of the southern population sup- ported the side the United States was fighting. This explains why the main thrust of U. S. violence was directed to the South, where napalm, B-S2 bombing raids, chemical warfare, the institutionalized killing of civilians, and a scorched-earth policy were used to destroy the base of the popular movement. 78 We also noted earlier that this ferocious U. S. assault on the South-which contradicted the claim that we were pro- tecting South Vietnamese-remains invisible in the U. S. media.
Another important theme in the mainstream media for many years has been the notion that the United States was the victim in the Vietnam war, the Vietnamese the cruel villains. This remark. able inversion of reality has been accomplished by two processes: first, by a massive suppression of evidence on the consequences of the war for the Vietnamese; and second, by demonizing the victims, based in large measure on "the national beat- ification of POWs [prisoners of war] and the myth of POWs. as. martyrs. s. till being tortured byVietnam. "19
The onlyVietnamese allowed modest attention in the media have been those mobilized to fight the U. S. war and who were "let down";8o the vast
INTRODUCTION XXXV
numbers killed or damaged by the U. S. assault have been treated as "unworthy victims. " The overwhelming preoccupation of officials, jour- nalists, pundits, and intellectuals with media outreach has been on U. S. victims and the effects of the war on this country. Robert McNamara's widely publicized book, supposedly a mea culpa and moral tract, is no- table for the fact that his notion of the war's "high costs," and the error and guilt he feels, extend only to U. S. lives and the effects of the war on "the political unity of our society. "81 He offers neither regrets, moral reflections, nor apologies for his country having invaded, mercilessly bombed, ravaged the land, and killed and wounded millions of innocent people in a small distant peasant society in pursuit of its own political ends.
In a remarkable cultural process, also, the victims have been turned into the villains. As we describe in chapter 5, in an attempt to prolong the war President Richard Nixon seized on the question of the adequacy of Vietnamese accounting for our military personnel who were captured (POWs) and those missing in action (MIAs). He succeeded in keeping the war going, and some 16,000 more U. S. soldiers and untold numbers ofVietnamese died in the further fighting in the purported interest of missing paws. But although there has never been any credible evidence that a single POW was hidden by the North Vietnamese, this claim be- came an article of faith and cult that dominated U. S. policy toward Viet- nam for many years. 82
The mYth also became the basis ofpopular culture accounts in movies such as The Deer Hunter, Uncommon Jizlor, Ro. W: The Escape, and Missing in Action, in which Rambo-like heroes slaughter evil Vietnamese as they save our betrayed and tormented POWs. These movies turned history on its head. As Vietnam war historian H. Bruce Franklin points out, "America's vision of the war was being transformed. The actual photographs and TV footage ofmassacred villagers, napalmed children, Vietnamese prisoners being tortured and murdered, wounded GI's screaming in agony, and body bags being loaded by the dozen for ship- ment back home were being repJaced by simulated images of American POWs in the savage hands of Asian communists. "83 The powerful cul- tural myth of abused POWs as the central feature of the Vietnam war not only allowed the war to be extended; it helped justify the U. S. failure to aid its victim in accord with end-of-war promises and it provided the basis for an eighteen-year economic war against the victim country. It also functioned as a potent agent of militarization and force weakening the "Vietnam syndrome. "
In his recent book Vietnam and Other Ameman Fantasies, H. Bruce Franklin, who had previously exposed the fallacies and cult qualities of
xxxvi INTRODUCTION
the POW-MIA myth, addressed this issue once again, as well as other fantasies (such as the claim that the antiwar activists often spit at return- ing veterans). 84 Franklin's book was reviewed in the Los Angeles Times but was otherwise only twice mentioned in passing in the U. S. main- stream press. On the other hand, a book by Michael Lind, Vietnamj The Necessary Wilr,85 which explains that the war was justifiable because com~ munism was on the march, U. S. "credibility" was at stake, and the Viet- namese communists were cruel and ruthless-demonstrated in part by their refusal to surrender and consequent responsibility for those killed by U. S. bombs! -was treated differently. It received forty-four reviews and was mentioned twenty-seven other times in the mainstream media, and Lind was given Op-Ed space in both the New 'YOrk Times and the Wilshingwn Post, among other opportunities.
i "
l ,
In his review of Lind's book, Vietnam War historian Uoyd Gardner
noted that any U. S. "credibility" problem that arose in connection with
me Vietnam war was a creation of the war managers themselves and
flowed from their own decisions; and Gardner also comments, after ana-
lyzing a series of Lind arguments in defense of the war, that "the evidence j simply washes away his positions like a sand castle on the beach. "86 But
Lind was saying what the elite wants said, and Franklin was not, so that j mainstream media treatment followed accordingly.
1 1 1
Laos
j
I
t
Laos's Plain of Jars was subjected to some of the heaviest bombings of civilian targets in history, especially after 1968, when Washington was compelled under domestic pressure ro enter negotiations with North Vietnam and had ro terminate its bombing there. It turned to Laos, although that small peasant country was a marginal facror in the wars; but Nixon and Kissinger could hardly leave U. S. bombers inactive. Over- all, some 2 million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos. These raids wiped out 353 villages and killed thousands of civilians, and they con- tinue ro kill now, as the Plain was saturated with hundreds of millions of "bombies"-tiny antipersonnel weapons specifically designed to kill and maim. With their 20-ro-30 percent failure-to-explode rate, they re- mained as potential killers, and their casualty rate is still high, estimates running from hundreds ro 20,000 or more per year, half of them deaths and half of the victims children. 87
There have been efforts to deal with this humanitarian catastrophe. The British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been trying ro remove the lethal objects, but the British press reports that the United
States is "conspicuously missing from the handful of western organiza- tions that have followed . \1AG," though it has finally agreed to train some Laotian civilians. 58 The British press also reports, with some annoyance, that the United States has refused to provide. \1AG specialists with "ren- der harmless procedures," still treated as a state secret for weapons three decades old. 59 The U. S. mainstream media have treated in very low key the continuing human toll suffered in Laos and have maintained almost complete silence concerning the U. S. non-cooperativeness in attempts to alleviate a crisis dating back to the "secret war" against Laos, which again was "secret" only by tacit propaganda service of the mainstream media (see chapter 6).
C a m b o d ia
Important changes have occurred in Cambodia since 1988, including Vietnam's withdrawal from that country, elections held under UN aus- pices, and the death of Pol Pot. We noted in chapter 7 that, after the Viet- namese had ousted Pol Pot in December 1978, although the United States and its allies had denounced Pol POt as "another Hitler" commit- ting "genocide," they quickly became his supporter, allowing him to re- tain Cambodia's UN. seat and otherwise aiding and protecting him in his Thailand refuge. Vietnam was severely punished-by harsh sanctions and by U. S. support for a Chinese invasion to teach Vietnam a lesson- fOt having terminated Pol Pot's atrocities! President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated in 1979 that "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help D. K. [Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot's forces]. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could. "9o In the late 1980s and early 1990$, as the Vietnamese sought to end their isolation by exiting from Cambodia, but insisted as a condition for withdrawal that Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge be excluded from returning to power, the United States objected, and insisted, with eventual success, that the Khmer Rouge be included as a contestant party in the post-occupation settle- ment. 91
\Xlhat dominated U. S. policy and led to its support of Pol Pot was the classic rule that the enemy ofmy enemy (Vietnam) is my friend, and per- haps also the new tilt toward China, also hostile toward Vietnam. The support of Pol Pot was awkward, given the prior denunciations of his pOlicies, but the mainstream media handled it with aplomb, and the U. S. public was almost surely completely unaware that the United States had become his ally and supporter. (The explicit statement of support by
INTRODUCTION xxxvii
xxxviii INTRODCCTION
Brzezinski quoted above was never mentioned in the New 1{lrk Times, the Washington Post, or Newsweek; it was quoted once in both the Los Angeles Times and Time. )
However, in the late 1990S, afterVietnam had left Cambodia and US. officials' anti-Vietnam passions had subsided, and Pol Pot was no longer a useful instrument of anti-Vietnam policy, U. S. officials and pundits rediscovered Pol Pot's and the Khmer Rouge's villainy and candidacy for war crimes trials. The media handled the previous "tilt" toward Pol Pot mainly by evasion, essentially blacking out the years 1979-95, or vaguely intimating that the US. had supported him for reasons of "realpolitik," but avoiding both details on the nature and magnitude of support as well as any reflections on the morality of backing "another Hitler. " The New 10rk Times's summary of "Pol Pot's Rise and Fall" (April 17, 1998) lists for "1979-1990: Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge are given refuge at Thai bor- der where they fight back against theVietnamese. " "Given refuge" is mis- leading: they were given economic and military aid and political support by the United States and its allies. The Times's main reporter on Cambo- dia in early 1998, Seth Mydans, repeatedly blacked out mention ofUS. support, referring to "the decade-long civil war that followed" Pol Pot's ouster (April 13), and a nineteen-year "guerilla insurgency in the jungles of western and northern Cambodia" (April 17).
The Boston Globe, New 10rk Times, W&shington Post, and Los Angeles Times, editorializing on the death of Pol Pot on April 17,1998, were uni- formly indignant over his crimes and regretful at his escape from justice, but all avoided mentioning the long US. support ofthe criminal-as well as the U. S. contribution to the first phase of a "Decade of Genocide. "92
The washington Post blacked out the inconvenient fifteen-year period of support of Pol Pot with this summary: "After the nightmare of Khmer Rouge rule and genocide, the United States and its allies pumped mil- lions of donars into Cambodia to help rebuild and to hold elections. "9~
It is enlightening to compare the media's treatment of Pol Pot and Indonesian leader Suharto, who was also in the news in 1998, as Indone- sia suffered a financial crisis that-along with popular resistance to the dictatorship---eventually led to his ouster. Pol Pot was described in the editorials and news columns of April 1998 as "crazed," a "killer," "war criminal," "mass murderer," "blood-soaked," and as having engineered a "reign of terror" and "genocide. " But in 1998 and 1999, and in earlier years as well, while Suharto was occasionally referred to as a "dictator" and running an "authoritarian" regime, he was never a "killer" or "mass murderer" or one responsible for "genocide. " The terminological double standard is maintained reliably throughout the mainstream media. 94
Less obvious but equally interesting is the difference in willingness
to identify the responsible parties for the killings of Pol Pot and Suharto. In the case of Pol Pot, there is no uncertainty or complexity: editorials and news articles uniformly make him and the Khmer Rouge leadership clearly and unambiguously responsible for all deaths in Cambodia dur- ing the period 1975-78. He was the "man who slaughtered two million" (USA 1Oday), "the executioner" (Boston Glebe) who "presided over the deaths" of his victims (washington Post), "the man who drove Cambodia to ruin" (New Thrk Times).
But in Suhano's case, we move to an ambiguous responsibility, which means none at all: in the New Thrk Times, for example, "a 1965 coup led to the massacres of hundreds of thousands of supposed communists" (edi- torial, Aug. 23, 1996), where we have no agent doing the killing; or "a wave ofviolence that took up to 500,000 lives and led Suharto to seize power from Sukarno in a military coup" (Seth Mydans, Aug. 7, 1996), where the massacre not only has no agent, but is falseLy situated before the takeover of power by Suharto. In a latcr piece, Mydans states that "more than 500,000 Indonesians are estimated to have died in a purge of leftists in 1965, the year Mr. Suharto came to power" (April 8, 1997). Note the passive voice, never used in connection with Pol Pot, the word "purge" instead of "slaughter" or "massacre," and the continued faillU'e to identify the agent.
In the case of East Timor, also, the Times is uncertain about the source of the killing: "This is one of the world's sadder places, where 100,000 to 200,000 people died from 1974 in a brutal civil war and the consequent invasion through combat, execution, disease and starvation. . . . " (Steven Erlanger, Oct. 2I, 1990). In addition to the lack ofa clear agent, this sen- tence seriously misrepresents the facts-the civil war was shorr and left small numbers dead; and the invasion was not "consequent" to a brutal civil war, except in Indonesian propaganda.
Another important difference in the treatment of the "worthy" victims of Pol Pot and the "unworthy" victims of Suharto is in the willingness to explain away the killings. With Pol Pot, as we describe in chapter 7, the background of the first phase of the genocide was completely blacked out in the mainstream account-there is no qualification to Pol Pot's respon- sibility as a killer because his forces had undergone terrible damage and sought vengeance for the crimes they had suffered; nor are any deaths in Pol Pot's years of rule to be explained by the starvation and disease already pervasive in April 1975. No, the only mentionable background is his Paris training and Communist fanaticism.
But with Suharto we encounter a whole new world of contextualized apologetics. For many years the main protective formula was that the 1965--66 killings were "a result of a failed coup," which "touched off
INTRODUCTION xxxix
xl INTRODUCTION
a wave of violence," or followed an "onslaught from the left. "95 This formula, invoked repeatedly, suggests that the mass killings were pro- voked and thus maybe justified by a prior "onslaught. " The v. rriters never explain why a failed coup could possibly justify a large-scale slaughter, but the hint is left hanging. In more recent years, usually in connection with the explanation and rationalization of the continuation of a dicta- torship, the media regularly juxtaposed political repression with "stabil- ity" and "growth": "the signs of his success are everywhere," although Suharto has brought these gains "by maintaining a tight grip on power and suppressing public criticism and political opposition. "96 These state- ments, from the New 1Vrk Times, offer a kind of context that the paper never gives to Castro, let alone a Pol Pot, and it shows an apologetic that runs deep.
This apologetic extends to the Suharto invasion and occupation of East Timor. For years, New Thrk Times reporters have claimed that In- donesia invaded in the midst of a civil war,97 when in fact that civil war was over well before the invasion. The paper's news coverage of East Timor actually fell to zero as the Indonesian attacks and killings in East Timor reached a deadly peak in 1977-78, a slaughter that elsewhere would be called "genocidal. " And although Indonesia occupied East Timor in violation of standing UN. rulings till its induced exit in 1999, the paper's reporters repeatedly referred to East Timor as a "disputed province" and East Timorese resistance as "separatist," thereby internal- izing and explicitly legitimizing the aggression and occupation. 98
The bias and gentle treatment of Suharto and the Indonesian govern- ment in the media is once again correlated with US. policy support that dates back to the military coup and slaughters of 1965. These were greeted with enthusiasm by US. officials-then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara referred to the events as one of the "dividends" of U. S. support for the Indonesian military-and the "boiling bloodbath" (Time) and "staggering mass slaughter" (New Thrk Times) were also seen in the media as a "gleam of light" Games Reston in the New Thrk Times). 99 U. S. military and economic aid and diplomatic protection continued throughout the years of the Suharto dictatorship, and the media's finding him a good genocidist followed accordingly.
New YOrk Times reporter David Sanger differentiated Suharto and post- 1990 Saddam Hussein-before 1990 he was a U. S. ally-saying "Mr. Suharto is not hoarding anthrax or threatening to invade Australia. "loo That is, Suharto's invasion, mass killing, and long illegal occupation of East Timor is given zero weight, and his slaughter of somewhere between 500,000 and 2 million people within Indonesia some years back is also
not mentioned. This tells us all we need to know about how good and bad genocidists fare in the Western propaganda system.
FURTHER APPLICATIONS
In his book Golden Rule, political scientist Thomas Ferguson argues that where the major investors in political parties and elections agree on an issue, the parties will not compete on that issue, no matter how strongly the public might want an alternative. He contends that for ordinary vot- ers to influence electoral choices they would have to have "strong chan- nels that directly facilitate mass deliberation and expression. "IOI These would include unions and other intermediate organizations that might, through their collective power, cause the interests of ordinary voters to be given greater weight in the political system.
The propaganda model, and the institutional arrangements that it re- flects, suggests that the same forces that preclude competition among the parties on issues on which the major investors agree, will also dominate media choices and rule OUt "mass deliberation and expression" on those issues. For example, polls regularly indicate that, except in periods of war and intense war propaganda, the public wants a smaller defense budget and favors a spending shift from defense to education and other civil functions. 102 But because the major investors agree that a large defense budget is desirable, the two dominant parties compete only on whether the one or the other is st. inting on military expenditures, with both prom- ising to enlarge it (as both George W. Bush and AI Gore did in the presi- dential election campaign of 2000). And the mainstream media do the same, limiting debate to the terms defined by the two parties and exclud- ing deliberation and expression of the position that large cuts are desir- able.
The alternative presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, called for such cuts, but the media denied him a voice on the issues, some of them explicitly defending his exclusion from the presidential debates on the grounds that the options afforded by the two parties sufficed. 103
The U. S. corporate community has favored an immense defense budget. . -----eurrently more than five times the size of that of a steadily weak- ening Russia, the second biggest spender-because of the great benefits its members derive from military spending. These include weapons and other contracting business, direct and indirect subsidies in research,104 and the role played by military power in supporting the global economic expansion in which many U. S. transnational corporations are active
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participants and beneficiaries. Business also benefits from the market- opening actions of trade agreements and from the supportive operations of the \VTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. But these trade agreements and the activities ofthe international fmancial institutions have generated controversy and political struggle, because while their benefits to busi- ness are dear, their costs are borne heavily by workers forced to compete in a global job market. Furthermore, globalization and trade agreements strengthen the political as well as the economic power of the corporate community, in part because they shift decision-making authority from democratic polities to bankers and technocrats who more reliably serve the transnational corporate interest. Here also, as in the case of defense- versus civilian-oriented budgets, polls show a sharp dichotomy between corporate and public preferences, with the latter generally hostile to the agreements and institutional arrangements favored by business. lOS
The propaganda model fits well the media's treatment of this range of issues. Consider, for example, their coverage of the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the subsequent Mexican financial crisis and meltdown of 1994--95. Polls taken before its enactment consistently showed substantial majorities opposed to N A FrA -and later to r. ""Ie bailout of investors in Mexican securities-but the elite in favor. Media editorials, news coverage, and selection of "experts" in opinion columns were heavily skewed toward the elite pref- erence; their judgment was that the benefits of NAFTA were obvious, were agreed to by all qualified authorities, and that only demagogues and "special interests" were opposed. 106 The "special interests" who might be the "losers" included women, minorities, and a majority of the work- force. 107 The media dealt with the awkward fact that poUs showed steady majority opposition to the agreement mainly by ignoring it, but occasion- ally they suggested that the public was uninformed and didn't recognize its own true interests. 108 The effort of labor to influence the outcome of the NAFTA debates was sharply attacked in both the lV. 'ew YOrk Times and the washington Post, with no comparable criticism of corporate or govern- mental (U. S. and Mexican) lobbying and propaganda. And while labor was attacked for its alleged position on these issues, the press refused to allow the actual position to be expressed. 10Q
In December 1994, only eleven months after NAFrA went into effect, Mexico suffered a major financial crisis, induding a massive flight of cap- ital, a devaluation ofthe currency, and a subsequent bailout by the IMF that required Mexico to carry out painful deflationary measures. Despite the fact that the meltdown occurred within a year of the introduction of NAFTA, which the media had portrayed as ushering in a prospective
golden age of economic advance, they were unanimous that NAFTA was not to blame. And in virtual lock-step they supported the Mexican (investor) bailout, despite poll reports of general public opposition in the United States. Experts and media pundits and editorialists repeatedly explained that one great merit ofNAFT A was that it had "locked Mexico in" so that it couldn't alter its overall policy direction or resort to controls to protect itself from severe deflation and unemployment. They were oblivious to the profoundly undemocratic nature of this lock-in, made more questionable by the fact that it had been negotiated by a Mexican government that ruled as a result of electoral fraud. 11o
More recently, when the growing global opposition to the policies of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank led to mass protests at the WTO conference in Seattle in November and December 1999, and then at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, D. C. , in April 2000, media coverage ofthese events was derisive and hostile to the protesters and almost uniformly failed to deal with the substantive issues that drove the protests. The media portrayed the Seanle protesters as "all- purpose agitators" (U:S. Neu's & WOrld Report), "terminally aggrieved" (Philadelphia Inquirer), simply "against world trade" (ABC News), and making "much ado about nothing" (CNN), but the bases of the protest- ers' grievances were almost entirely unexplored. lll Similarly, in the case of the Washington, D. C. , protests, the media repeatedly reported on activists' attire, looks, body odors, fadism, and claimed a lack of "any- thing that can coherently be called a cause" (Michael Kelly, journalist,
W&shington Post), and they continued their refusal to address issues. 112 There were many informed protesters with coherent agendas at Seanle and Washington-including reputable economists, social theorists, and veteran organizers from around the worldl13_but the media did not seek them out, preferring to stereotype antiglobalization activists as ignorant troublemakers. On op-ed pages, there was a major imbalance hostile to the protesters. TV bias was at least as great, and often misleading on the facts. In his November 29, t999, backgrounder on the WTO, Dan Rather explained that the organization had ruled on many environmental issues, implying that those rulings were protective of the environment when in fact they generally privileged trade rights over environmental needs.
Another notable feature of media reporting on both the Seattle and Washington, D. c. , protests, and a throwback to their biased treatment of the protests of the Vietnam War era (1965-75),114 was their exaggera- tion of protester violence, their downplaying of police provocations and violence, and their complaisance at illegal police tactics designed to limit all protestor actions, peaceable or otherwise. IIS Although the Seattle
INTRODUCTION xliii
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police resorted to force and used chemical agents against many nonvio- lent protesters well before a handful of individuals began brealting win- dows, both then and later the media reversed this chronology, stating that the police violence was a response to protester violence. In fact, the van- dals were largely ignored by the police, while peaceful protesters were targeted for beatings, tear g:1S, torture with pepper spray, and arrest. 1I6 One New 10Tk Times anic1e went so far as to claim that the Seattle pro- testers had thrown excrement, rocks, and Molotov cocktails at delegates and police officers; the Times later issued a correction acknowledging that these claims were false. ll7 Dan Rather, who had falsely alleged that the protesters had "brought on today's crackdown" at Seattle, later suggested that the \);Tashington protesters were possibly "hoping for a replay of last year's violence in Seattle," setting this off against "those charged with keeping the peace" who "have other ideas. "118
In their eighty-seven-page report, Out of Control: Seattle's Flawed Re-
sponse to Protests Against the WOrld Trade Organization, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stated that "demonstrators [in Seattle] were overwhelmingly peaceful. Not so the police. " The response of the Seattle
police to the protests was characterized by "draconian" violations of civil liberties, including widespread use of <" chemical weapons, rubber bullets
and clubs against peaceful protesters and bystanders alike. " But NBC, 1 ABC, CBS, CNN, and the New 10rk Times and washington Post all ig- I nored the release ofthe ACLU's fmding<3, which ran counter to their own uniformly pro-police and ami-protester line.
The media's reversal of chronology and inflation of the threat of ac- tivist violence, and their low-keyed treatment of numerous illegal police actions designed to instill fear in those wanting to protest peaceably,ll9 provided the enabling ground for both police violence and serious restrictions on free speech. These increased in scope and sophistication between Seattle and Washington, and were then applied TO squelch pro- test at the Republican and Democratic conventions in Philadelphia and Los Angeles in July and August 2 0 0 0 . 120 The corporate media's hostility to the goals of the protests, closely aligned with that of the rest of the cor- porate establishment, caused their devotion to the First Amendment to flag in a way it never has when their own rights and privileges have been at stake.
As is suggested by the media's treatment of NAFT A and of labor's right to participate in its debates, as well as the media coverage ofWater- gate, COINTELPRO, and major events in the earlier history of labor- management conflict (the Haymarket affair, the Homestead strike, the post-World War I "red scare"),l2l the propaganda model applies to do-
mestic as well as foreign policy issues. Labor has been under renewed siege in the United States for the past several decades, its condition adversely affected by the deflationary policies of the early 1980s, corpo- rate downsizing, globalization, a vigorous business campaign to defeat unions, and government support of, or indifference to, the damage being inflicted on unions and workers. There was a major drop in union mem- bership from the beginning of the Reagan era, with union density falling from 25 percent in 1980 to J4-5 percent in J996 (and only JO_2 percent in the private sector). This reflected weakened labor bargaining power and was accompanied by significant concessions in wages and benefits, more onerous working conditions, and greater worker insecurity.
President Reagan's firing of ! I,OOO striking air? controllers in 1981 "put the government seal of approval on strike-breaking and a new era of industrial relations opened. "I22 But you would hardly know this from reading or listening to the mainstream media. An exceptional t994 Busi- ness week article noted that "over the past dozen years . . . U. S. industry has conducted one of the most successful union wars ever," helped by "illegally firing thousands of workers for exercising their right to organ- ize," with unlawful firings occurring in "one-third of all representation elections in the late '80S. "123 But this successful war was carried out quietly, with media cooperation. The decertification of unions, use of replacement workers, and long, debilitating strikes like that involving Caterpillar were treated in a very low key manner. In a notable illustra- tion of the applicability of the propaganda model, the nine-month-long Pittston miners' strike that began in April 1989 was accorded much less attention, and less friendly treatment, than the Soviet miners' strikes of the summer of that same year,124
From 1977 through 1999, while the incomes of the top 1 percent of households grew by 84. 8 percent and the top 10 percent by 44. 6 percent, the bottom 60 percent lost ground and the income of the lowest 20 percent fell by 12. 5 percent. 125 Real hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees (i. e. , the 80 percent of the workforce that holds working-class jobs) fell by 4. 8 percent between 1973 and 1999. 226 This, along with the adverse trend of social indicators in the same period,127 suggests that the welfare of the majority declined in this era of high employment, a "new economy," and a spectacular upswing in the stock market. In its euphoria phase, which ended abruptly with the col- lapse of the dot. com market in 1999 and 2000, the mainstream media hardly noticed that only a minority had been the beneficiaries;128 they briefly discovered this issue only under the impetus of Pat Buchanan's right-wing populist outcries during the 1996 presidential election cam-
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xlvi IN,RODucnON
paign. In the 2000 electoral campaign, once again the twO major party candidates said nothing about the failure of the majority to be lifted in the supposed "rising tide" that would benefit everybody; only Ralph Nader and other marginalized candidates did, and as noted, the domi- nant media found that the agenda of the major parties was all that they could ask for.
Another strilcing application of the propaganda model can be seen in the media's treatment of the chemical industry and its regulation. Be- cause of the industry's power, as well as the media's receptivity to the demands of the business community, the media have normalized a system described by Rachel Carson in Silent Spring as "deliberately poi- soning us, then policing the results. "lZ9 Industry is permitted to produce and sell chemicals (and during the 1990s, bioengineered foods) without independent and prior proof of safety, and the "policing" by the Environ- mental Protection Agency (EPA) has been badly compromised by under- funding and political limits on both law enforcement and testing. no A major National Research Council study of 1984 found that there was no health hazard data available for 78 percent ofthe chemicals in commerce, and an Environmental Defense Fund update found little change had occurred a dozen years laler. The federal government's National Toxicol- ogy Program tests about ten to twenty chemicals a year for carcinogenic- ity (but not for the numerous other possible adverse effects ofchemicals); but meanwhile five hundred to a thousand new chemicals enter com- merce annually, so our knowledge base steadily declines. 131
This system works well for industry, however, as it wants to sell with- out interference, and leaving virtually aU of the research and testing for safety in its hands, with its members to decide when the results are worthy of transmission to the EP A, is a classic "fox guarding the chick- ens" arrangement. The system has worked poorly for the public, and its inadequacy has been reinforced by the industry's power to influence, sometimes even capture, the EPA. 132 Nevertheless, the industry often contends that the safety of chemicals is assured by EP A (or FDA) regula- tion, 133 which industry does its best to keep weak and which, as noted, has failed to deal in any way with the great majority of chemicals in the marker.
With the media's help, the chemical industry has also gained wide acceptance of its view that chemicals should be evaluated individually on the basis of an analysis of their risks to individuals and individual tolerances. But it is very hard to measure such risks and tolerances for humans----controlled experiments are not possible, damage may show up only after many years, the forms of damage are hard to know in advance, chemicals may interact with others in the environment, they may be bio-
accumulative, and the breakdown products of chemicals may have their own dangers. Furthermore, if thousands of chemicals enter the environ- ment, many long-lasting, bioaccumulative, and interacting with other chemicals, a public policy that ignores their additive and interactive ef- fects on people and the environment is deeply flawed and irresponsible.
Policy based on the "precautionary principle," bitterly opposed by the chemical industry, with the support of the U. S. government,134 would nor allow chemicals to enter the environment without full tesring, would prohibit the use of chemicals that accumulate in human tissues and whose breakdown products are threatening or unknown, and would compel the use of nonthreatening alternatives for untested and known- to-be-risky chemicals where such alternatives can be found or developed at reasonable cOSt. l35
In successfully avoiding application of the precautionary principle, industry spokespersons have argued that the existing system is based on "sound science. " But science does not tell us that industry has any right to put chemicals into the environment that have any risk at all, let alone telling us what risks are acceptable-these are political decisions. Fur- thermore, if the chemicals in the environment have not been tested for all the variables that are relevant to social choices, such as their long-term effects on immune systems and reproduction as well as any cancer threat, and the effects of their breakdown products on the environment-and none of them have been so tested-the political, not scientific, basis of "sound science" is evident.
The chemical industry has produced, and long denied any harm from, innumerable products-from tetraethyl lead in gasoline and PCBs in batteries to asbestos, DDT, and Agent Orange-that are now well estab- lished as seriously harmful, only withdrawing them (often only from domestic use) under overwhelming legal and regulatory pressure. For the products they have wanted to sell, they have always found scientists who would testify to their harmlessness (or that claims of harm were not scientifically proven). There has been a consistent sharp difference bet\Veen the results of industry-sponsored science and those of inde- pendent researchers working the same terrain. l3o And there have been numerous cases of fraud in industry testing, industry use of testing labs that arranged the data to find industry products acceptable, and political manipulation to weaken regulatory standards. 137
Despite these industry abuses of science, the media have largely ac- cepted the industry's claim that it supports "sound science," in contrast with its critics' use of "junk. science. " From 1996 through September 1998, 258 articles in mainstream newspapers used the phrase "junk sci- ence"; but only 21, or 8 percent, used it to refer to corporate abuses of
INTRODUCTION xlvii
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science, whereas 160, or 62 percent, applied it to science used by envi- ronmentalists, other corporate critics, or tort lawyers suing corporations (77, or 30 percent, didn't fit either of these categories). 138 In short, the media have internalized industry's self-legitimizing usage, just as they have normalized a status quo of caveat emptor (buyer beware) rather than of safety first.
The media have also regularly gotten on board in dismissing concerns about chemical threats as unwarranted "scares," such as the alleged scares over dioxin and the danger of Alar on apples. But these and other scares often turn out to be based on genuine health hazards. J3Q Meanwhile, the media rarely report and examine in any depth the frequent evidence of the inadequacy of regulation and testing and of the real costS of chemical- ization of the environmenr. J4O For example, the International Joint Com- mission (lIC), a joint Canadian-U. S. venture dating back to 1978, was given the formidable task oftrying to halt the flow oftoxic chemicals into the Great Lakes. It reports each year that it is failing, and since t992 has called for the ending of the manufacture of chlorine as essential to fulfill- ing its task. The national media virtually ignore this appeal, and the IJC's US. cochairman Gordon Durnil has remarked that "we have a societal problem about how to deal with this, but 90 percent of the population doesn't even know there is anything to worry about. "J41 We believe that the propaganda model helps understand this lack ofknowledge.
In the health insurance controversy of 1992-93, the media's refusal to take the single-payer option seriously, despite apparent widespread public support and the effectiveness of the system in Canada, served well the interests of the insurance and medical service complex. 142 The un- critical media reponing and commentary on the alleged urgency of fiscal restraint and a balanced budget in the years 1992-96 fit well the business community's desire to reduce the social budget and weaken reguls- tion. 143 The media's gullibiliry in accepting the claim of a Social Security system "crisis," which would require policy action some thirty-seven years ahead if certain conservative guesses were true and a number of easy corrections were ruled out, served the interests ofconservative ideo- logues anxious to weaken a highly successful government program and a security industry eager to benefit from the partial or full privatization of Social Security. 144 The applicability of the propaganda model in these and other cases, including the media's handling of the "drug wars," seems clear. \45
i
CONCLUDING NOTE
The propaganda model remains a useful framework for analyzing and understanding the workings of the mainstream media-perhaps even more so than in 1988. As we noted above, the changes in structural con- ditions that underlie the model, and that we believe strongly and often decisively influence media behavior and performance, have tended to increase the model's salience. We noted in the Preface to the first edition and in chapters 2 and 3, in reference to the media's coverage of the wars and elections in Central America in the I980s, that the media's perform- ance often surpassed expectations of media subservience to government propaganda demands. This was at least equally true of their performance in covering the 1991 war against Iraq and NATO's war against Yugo- slavia in 1999, as we have described earlier and briefly in regard to Yugoslavia and in detail elsewhere. 146
In our conclusion to the first edition, we emphasized that, as the nega- tive performance effects of the media result primarily from their struc- ture and objectives, real change in performance calls for substantial changes in underlying media organization and goals. In the years since 1988, structural changes have not been favorable to improved perform- ance, but it remains a central truth that democratic politics requires a democratization of information sources and a more democratic media. Along with trying to contain and reverse the growing centralization of the mainstream media, grassroots movements and intermediate groups that represent large numbers of ordinary citizens should put much more energy and money into creating and supporting their own media-as they did with the Independent Media Centers brought into existence during the Seattle and Washington, D. C. , protests of 1999 and 2000. These, and other nonprofit community-based broadcasting stations and networks, and a better use of public-access channels, the Internet, and independent print media, will be essential for the achievement of major democratic social and political successes.
Notes to Introduction
1. On a number of issues, such as trade agreements, health care, and the appropriate size of the military budget, there is a sharp division between media personnel and the elite on the one hand and the general population on the other hand, as we discuss below under "Further Applications. "
INTRa Due T ION xlix
INTRODUCTION
2. This was even true in the Soviet Union, where the media's disclosure of inconvenient facts on the Afghan war caused the Soviet defense minister to denounce the press as unpatriotic; see Bill Keller, "Soviet Official Says Press Harms Army," lv. Tew YOrk Times, January 21, 1988.
3. For an accounr of critiques, and the present writers' replies, see Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions (Boston: South End Press, 1989), appendix I; Edward S. Herman, "The Propaganda Model Revisited," in The Myth of the Liberal Media (New York: Peter Lang, 1999).
4- Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, 6th ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), p. xxi.
5. Ibid.
6. Edward S. Herman and Robert McChesney, The Global Media (London: Cassell, 1997).
7. Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), p. 108.
8. Ibid. , p. 109.
9. James Ledbetter, "Public Broadcasting Sells; (Out? )," The Nation, Decem- ber I, 1997.
10. Ibid.
II. Stephanie Strom, "Japanese Sites for Women Aim for Empowerment," New "York Times, December 25, 2000.
12. J\1ark Fineman, "Military Can't Outflank Rebels in War of Words," Los
Angeles Times, February 21, 1995; Leonard Doyle, "Rebels Try to Advance via Internet," The Indepemknt, March 7, 1995.
13. Jim Shultz, "Bolivia's Water War Victory," Earth Island Journal, Septem- ber 22, 2000; "Bolivia-The Last Word," April 13, 2000, JShultz@democra- cyar. org; "How the Internet Helped Activists," Straits Times (Singapore), May 25, 1998; Marshall Clark, "Cleansing the Earth," Inside Indonesia (Octo- ber-December 1998).
14. Madelaine Drohan, "How the Net Killed the . MAl," Globe and Mail, April 29,1998.
IS. Kayte Van Scoy, "How Green Was My Silicon Valley," PC/Computing, March I, 2000; Keith Perine, "Power to the (\Veb-Enabled) People," Industry Standard, April 1 0 , 2000. See also "Further Applications" below.
16. James Ledbetter, "Some Pitfalls in Portals," Columbia Journalism Review . ~ (November-December 1999)? 1 17. Quoted in ibid.
18. Alex Carey, Taking the Risk out of DemoCTa<:y (Urbana: University ofIlli~ . . nois Press, 1997); John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good 1
for "You. ' (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995); Stuart Ewen, PR'
A Social History ofSpin (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
19. Mark Dowie, "Introduction," Stauber and Rampton, Toxic Sludge. ? 20. See Stephen Cohen, Failed Crusade:America and the Tragedy of Posr-Com- 1 munist Russia (New York: Norton, 2000). See also Thomas Frank, One Mar-
ker Under God (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
21. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technocu1ture (London: Routledge, I999), p. 127.
22. Patricia Aufderheide, "Journalism and Public Life Seen Through the
'Net,'" in Aufderheide, The Daily Planet (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2000); Joseph Turow, Breaking Up Amen'ca (Chicago: Univer- siryofChicago Press, 1997).
23. Herman and McChesney, Global Media, chapter 5.
24. On the ideological messages borne in commercials, see Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 2, chapter t.
25. See Robert McChesney, 'Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy (New York: Oxford, 1993).
