Who would obey the
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated !
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated !
Thomas Carlyle
74): Les cours de parlement qui
anciennement estoyent pardessus les
Rois, et s'opposoient avec grande
integrite? a leur puissanoes absolues,
aujourd'hui se laschent servilement aux
commandements de tous ceux dont ils
esperent prouflt. "
? Cf. pp. 219 225.
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? 336
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
a loyal subject, to tell the prince that sovereigns are not
bound by the Laws. On the contrary, they are bound
to govern by them, for they have sworn to maintain and
to protect them. 1 In a later passage of the same work we
find a good illustration of the circumstances under which
the Huguenots thus appealed to the supremacy of the
Law. The author admits that subjects have not the right
to force their lord to change the order of the State in matters
of religion, but must submit to persecution, if the laws com-
mand it, for their religion. It is, however, wholly different
if by public edicts, lawfully issued and confirmed by public
authority, they have been permitted to exercise their religion.
In that case the prince is bound to obey them, or by the
same authority to revoke them. Otherwise he is exercising
a manifest tyranny, and it is lawful, under proper conditions,
to resist. 2
The same conceptions are restated and further developed in
the treatise called 'La Politique, Dialogue de l'authorite? des
Princes, et de la liberte? des peuples,' generally cited as 'Archon
et Politie. ' Tyranny, Politie says, in an hereditary kingdom,
is when a legitimate prince is not content with what he has
1 "Du Droit des Magistrats" (in
'Me? moires de l'estat de France,' Ed.
1576), vol. ii. p. 750: "Car, pour
certain, c'est une parole tres fausse,
et non poinet d'un loyal sujet a` son
Prince, mais d'un de? testable flatteur,
de dire que les souverains ne sont
astraints a` nulles loix. Car, au con-
traire, il n'y en a pas une, par laquelle
il ne doyve et soit tenu de regler
son gouvernement, puis qu'il a jure?
d'estre le mainteneur et protecteur de
toutes. "
1 Id. id. (p. 788): "En tel cas, donc-
ques, assavoir, si on veut forcer les
consciences d'idolatrer, que ferons les
sujets? Certainement, de vouloir
contraindre leurs seigneur a` changer
l'estat publio il n'y auroit ordre: et
pourtant il faut que tous endurent
patiemment la persecution, ce neant-
moins servans a` Dieu, ou bien qu'ils
se retirent d'ailleurs.
Mais, les Edits, estans legitimement
dresses et emologuez par authorite?
publique, par lesquels sera permis
d'exercer la vraye Religion: je dis
que le prince est d'autant plus tonu
de les observer, que nuls autre, que
l'estat de la Religion est de plus grande
consequence que nul autre: ou bien
par mosme ordre, et telle connaissance
de cause qu'il appartient, les revoquer.
Sinon, je dis, qu'il use de manifeste
tyrannie, a` laquelle il est permis de
s'opposer, avec les distinctions ci-
dessus mentionnees; voire par raison
d'autant meilleure, que nos ames et
nos consciences nous doyvent estre
plus cheres que tous les biens de ce
monde. "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OP LAW.
337
lawfully acquired, but violates the ancient laws and customs
of his country. 1
Archon protests that this is to put the king under the
law, but there is a sentence in the Pandects which says that
he is not under the law, though " par honnestete? " he should
carry it out. For it is he who makes the law, and he does
not submit to it except so far as he pleases, otherwise his
power is not sovereign but bridled and restrained. 2
To this contention Politie replies by considering the real
source of laws. He cites the definitions of law by Papinian,
Demosthenes, and Chrysippus (' Dig. ,' i. 3. 1, and 2), and
the opinion of Cicero that the deliberation and consent of the
commonwealth are implied in the laws, and that the prince
must therefore be subject to them. 3
When Archon contends that the Civil Law is composed of
the ordinances of princes, and that in all its parts it is subject
to their power, Politie replies that in general terms the Law
includes all ordinances which are just; these have been
formed by the people in their customs. If they are not suit-
able, the prince can adjust them to the needs of particular
times and persons, but must not usurp the power to do this
without the consent of those who are most concerned* Archon
objects that this is very far indeed from the opinion of many
kings, who consider that their subjects, their lives, and
property are completely under their power. Politie agrees
that they are under their jurisdiction, but only by process of
1 "Archon et Politie," in (' Me-
moiros do l'etat do Franco,' Ed. 1576),
vol. iii. p. 102: "Politie. Mais celle
(tyrannie) qui survient en una royaume
qui est tenu pour hereditaire, est,
quand un prince, le? gitimement pour-
venu, no se contente pas de ce qu'il
trouve de droit equitable luy estre
acquis, ains pour dominer plus seig-
neurialement viole les anciennes loix
et ooutumes do ses pays. "
? Id. id. (p. 110): "Archon. Tout
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL. VI.
loi, combien que par honneetete? , il
s'y doit ranger. Par ainsi, puis que
e'est lui qui la donne, il ne s'y subniet
pas s'il ne luy plait; ou autrement
on ne doit pas nommer sa puissance,
souveraine, mais bridee et restrainte. "
? Id. (p. 110): "Politie. Ciceron
. . . dit quo l'entrotenement et con-
soil de la re? publique estans situoz
dans les loix, faut nocessairement que
le prince y soit sujet: d'autant que
son autorito soit de la, et se maintient
par la conservation de justice qui i-. t
descrite en icello. "
* Id. (p. 117).
T
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? 338 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
law,1 and he adds a reminiscence of the Feudal Law, that the
Lord owes the same faith and love to his vassal as the vassal
to him, and loses his lordship for the same causes and crimes
as the vassal loses his fief. 2
In another place the author of this treatise, like the author
of the 'Droit des Magistrats,' appeals to the supremacy of
the Law as justifying the resistance of the Huguenots to
persecution, when the exercise of their religion had been
granted them by formal laws and edicts; and he extends
this principle to the general legal rights of the people, for,
as he says, there are few kingdoms or principalities where
the chief rulers are not restrained by many laws to which
they have sworn, when they were accepted, and which they
have promised to the sovereign power to obey--that is, to
the estates which are formed by the whole body of the people. 3
(We shall have much more to say later of the conception of the
sovereign power which is represented in these words. )
The best known of these Huguenot works is the ' Vindiciae
Contra Tyrannos,' published in 1579. There has been much
discussion of its authorship, but we are not here concerned
with this but with the judgment of the author on the origin
of law and its relation to the prince. His judgment is very
clearly expressed. Men would have been satisfied to have
received law from one good and just man, but the judgment
1 Id. (p. 120): "Archon. Quoy, les
roys n'ont-ila pas puissance sur la
mort et sur la vie de leurs sujets?
"Politie. Oui bien, mais avec con-
nsissance de cause et informations
valables, et non autrement. "
1 Id. id.
>> Id. (p. 128): "Politie: Et si par
lois et edits solennels, le peuple a obtenu
de ses princes l'exercice de la vraye
Religion; et puis apres par mauvais
conseil, le prince se veut desdire et
oster tyranniquement ce qu'il avait
sainctement accorde? , les sujets ont
double raison de ne luy obeyr en cest
endroit, et de conserver leur vraye
liborte? , par les moyeus le? gitimes sus
declarez, dont nous parlerons encore
apre`s.
Gela se doit estendre aussi aux
autres droits du peuple, lesquels ne
peuvent estre abolis sans manifeste
confusion et aneantissement des Estats,
et a` plus forte raison quand les lois
reiglont des longtemps la grandeur des
princes et magistrats souverains:
comme il se trouvera bien peu de
royaumes et principautez, dont les
principaux gouverneurs ne soyent liez
et retenus en limites par beauooup de
lois, queux mesmes jurent a` leur
reception, et promettent a` la souver-
ainete? (c'est a` dire aux Estats com-
posez du corps de tout le peuple) de
garder inviolablement. "
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? chap. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
339
of kings was too uncertain and variable. Laws were therefore
made by the wise men and the magistrates. The principal
function of the king is to keep and maintain the law. It is
better to obey the law than the king; the law is the soul
of the king, while the king is the instrument of the law. The
law represents the combined reason and wisdom of the many,
for the many see and understand more than the one. It
has thus come about that while in the earliest times kings
reigned absolutely and their will was law, this now only
continues among barbarians, while the more polite and
civilised people are bound by laws. We do not accept the
saying of Caracalla that the emperor makes laws but does
not receive them; rather in all well-ordered kingdoms the
king receives the law from the people, and does not obtain
the kingdom until he has promised to give every man his
right (jus) according to the laws of the country. He can
only amend or add to the laws when this has been approved
by the people, or the chief men of the people, formally or
informally, called together. 1
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos ' (Ed.
Edinburgh, 1579), Q. ILT. (p. 114):
"Carte cum populus jus aequabile
quereret, id si ab uno jus to et bono
viro consequebatur, eo contentus erat.
At quia vix id fieri poterat, et raro
contingobat; saepe vero, dum arbitria
Regum, legum instar osscnt, evoniebat,
ut alia aliis loquerentur. Leges tum
quae cum omnibus una oademque voce
loquuntur, a prudentioribus et ceteris
magistratibus proximo inventn<< fuer-
unt. Regibus vero id procipua munoris
commendatur, ut legum custodes,
ministri et conservatores ossent. Inter -
dum etiam, quia lex in omnem eventum
prospicero non potuerat, quaedam ex
eadem aequitate naturali supplerent.
. . . (p. 115) Quia vero ambigat, quin
legi, quam regi parere, id est homini,
utilius et honestius sit? Lex est boni
regis anima: per hanc movetur, sentit,
vivit. Rex legis organum est, et
quasi corpus, per quod ilia suas vires
exerit, sua munora obit, sua sensa
eloquitur. Animae vero, quam corpori
parere justius est.
Lex est multorum prudentum in
unum collecta ratio et sapientia. Plures
autem oculatiores et perspicaciores
sunt quam unus. . . . (p. 117) Inde
vero pactum est, inquit idem, ut
quum primis temporibus reges absolute
imperarent, quorum arbitrium lex
erat, paulo post inter politiores et
civiliores passim legitimi fioront, id est,
legibus servandia oustodiendisque obli-
garentur; absoluta vero ilia potestas,
ponos barbarorum regee tantum man-
eret. . . . (p. 119) Non denique quod
ipse Caracalla, Imperatores leges daro,
non accipere. Quin potius in omnibus
regnis bene constitutis, regem a populo
leges, quas tueatur quasque intueatur,
accipere. . . . (p. 121) Neque enim
Imperator, Rex Franciae, Regos His-
paniae, Angliae, Poloniae, Hungariae et
? ? omnes legitimi principes . . . prius in
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? 340
[PART IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The author of the ' Vindiciae ' adds some important observa-
tions on the actual or traditional practice of some of the
more important countries of Western Europe. In the empire
the emperor " rogat in concilio," and, if they approve, the
princes, barons, and representatives of the cities sign the
decree, and only then is the law valid; the emperor swears
to observe the laws which have been thus made, and not
to make other laws except with the common consent. In
France, where the authority of the king is commonly thought
to be higher than elsewhere, laws were formerly made in the
Assembly of the three Orders, and all commands of the king
were void, unless the Senate (i. e. , the Parlement) ratified
them. In England, Spain, and Hungary the custom is the
same as it always was. He concludes that if it is true that
the laws are greater than the king, if kings must obey the
law as the slave does his master, who would not prefer to
obey the law rather than the king?
Who would obey the
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated ! 1
These writers are agreed in maintaining that the king
was under the law and not over it, for his authority was
derived from the law, and the law proceeds ultimately from
principatum rocipiuntur, quam . . . se
secundum leges patriae jus ouique
suum roddituros promiserint. . . . (p.
122) In summa, principes legitimi,
leges a populo accipiunt, diadema vero
honoris, sceptrum potestatis, insigne,
ut et acceptas tueatur et ex earum
praecipua tutela gloriam sibi quaerant.
. . . Si quid abrogandum, surrogan-
dum, derogandum, putabit, populum,
populive optimatos, aut ordinarios,
aut extra ordine convocatos, admonebit
legemque rogabit. At sane non prius
jubebit, quam ab iisdem rite expensa
comprobataque fuerit. "
1 Id. (p. 123): "Imperator rogat pri-
mum in Comitiis. Si probatur, Prin-
cipes, Barones, civitatum legati sub-
signent ac demum lex rata esse solet.
Jurat vero se leges (p. 124) latns serva-
turum, et novas non nisi de communi
consensu, ullas laturum. . . In Francia,
ubi tamen amplissima vulgo censetur
regum auctoritas, ferebantur olim
leges in trium ordinum conventu,
regiove consilio ambulatorio. Ex quo
vero Parlamentum statarium est,
frustra sunt omnia regum edicta, ni
senatus ilia comprobet, cum tamen
senatus seu Parlamenti aresta, si lex
desit, legis vim passim obtinesnt.
Et in Anglico, Hispanico, Hungarico,
et caeteris idem juris est, ut et in
antiquis quoque fuit. . . . Quod si
vero, ut ostendimus, leges regibus
potiores sunt, si reges legibus, ut servi
dominis, parero tenentur; quis non
legi, quam regi parere malit? quia
regi legem violanti obsequatur. Quis
violatae auxilium fcrro recuset? "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 341
the community. They admit that, in the earliest stages of
human life, men may have submitted to the authority of
rulers, uncontrolled by law; but they found long ago that it
was impossible to submit to the arbitrary and capricious
rule of one man, and this only now survives among barbarous
and uncivilised people; and, as we have just seen, the author
of the 'Vindiciae ' asserts this principle of the supremacy of
the Law of the community as representing the normal con-
ception of the greater European countries.
It may be suggested that these writers were Protestants,
though, as we have observed, there is nothing in these con-
tentions which represents an appeal to distinctively Pro-
testant opinions. We turn, therefore, to a group of writers
who belonged to the Order of the Jesuits.
We begin with Molina, an important Spanish Jesuit, whose
work, 'De Justitia et Jure,' was published in 1592. He
maintains that the light of nature teaches that it is in the
power of the commonwealth to entrust authority over itself
to one or more persons, as it judges best. This authority is
greater or less according to its judgment, and if the ruler
endeavours to exercise more authority than is given to him,
he acts tyrannically. 1
Having thus set out clearly the source and limits of the
authority of the ruler, Molina approaches the subject with
which we are here immediately concerned--that is, the con-
ditions of the legislative authority.
One of the functions of the king is to make laws, but the
question must be considered whether the people gave him
the power to make laws only with their approval, or without
1 Molina, 'De Justitia et Jure,'
vol. i. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23: "Lumen
ipsum naturae docet, in reipublicae
arbitrio esse positum, committere
alicui, vel aliquibus, regimen et potes-
tfttem supra se ipsum, prout voluerit,
expedireque judicaverit. . . . (3) Cum
autem potestas a republica in rectores
derivetur, pro ipsius reipublicae arbi-
tratu, poterit sane in unaquaque
reipublicae specie, derivari amplior, et
minus ample, neque est maior in
reipublicae rectoribus quam a republica
fuerit illis concessa. Quin potius, si
rec tores eam extendant, maioremque
sibi usurpant, in tyrannidem per in-
justitiam, quam ea in parte committunt,
degenerant. "
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? 342
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it; and Molina thinks that if it is the custom that laws have
no force unless they are approved by the people, it must be
assumed that the commonwealth only granted to the king
the legislative power, subject to this condition; for it is more
probable that the king increased his power, the subjects not
venturing to resist, than that they had diminished the power
which they had given him. If, as Castro suggested, the
custom was that the commonwealth should obey all the laws
of the prince which were not actually unjust, it would have
to be concluded that it had granted all its authority to the
king, but it could scarcely be believed that any commonwealth
had done this. 1 Molina's principle seems to be clear, that
it is almost incredible that the commonwealth should have
completely surrendered all that authority, which originally
belonged to it, to the ruler.
It must not indeed be supposed that Molina was an enemy
of monarchy; indeed, he clearly holds that it is the best
form of government, for it tends more to internal peace than
any other form,2 and he maintains that the authority of the
monarch is greater, not merely than that of individuals in
the commonwealth, but than that of the whole commonwealth
--that is, within the limits of the authority which has been
granted to him. 3 But again, it must be observed that this
authority is limited, and if the king attempts to take more
'Id. id. id. , Traot ii. , Disp. 23, 6:
"Cum potestate regia ad rempublicam
moderandam coniuncta est potestas
ferendi leges, quibus gubernetur. . . .
Si namque usus habeat, ut tales leges
vim non habeant, nisi a populo appro-
bentur, oensendum est rempublicam
non maiorem potestatem regibus con-
nsssisse, quam condendi eas leges de-
pendentes ab approbatione populi.
Verisimilo osto, si populi ad id adver-
terunt, non maiorom potestatem regibus
concessisse; imo esto non adverterent,
haec videtur fuisse reipublicao intentio,
sibi regem constituents, quando aliud
non expressit, semperque est potius
presumendum regem per potentiam
ampliasse suam potestatem, subditis
non audentibus resistere, quam sub-
ditos restrinxisse illi potestatem semel
concessam. Quare fas erit reipublicae
non acceptare leges, quae ipsam nota-
biliter gravent, quando ad commune
bonum necessariae omnino non sunt.
Quod si princops ad id eam cogit, in-
justitiam committet. Si vero, inquit
Castrus, usus recoptus habeat, ut legi-
bus principum non iniquis omnino
parcatur, censondum est, rempublicam
omnom omnino suam potestatem regi
concessisso, quod vix de aliqua credi
potest. "
1 Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 14.
? Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 8.
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 343
than had been granted to him, the commonwealth is entitled
to resist him as a tyrant. 1
Molina very emphatically maintains that the royal power,
or any other supreme civil power which the commonwealth
may create, is derived immediately from the commonwealth,
and only "mediately" from God. For it is by the natural
light and the authority which God has granted to the common-
wealth that it should choose that form of civil power which
it thinks most expedient. 2 He adds that there always remain
two powers: one in the king, the other in the commonwealth.
The latter is indeed restrained in action, so long as the former
continues, but restrained only as far as the commonwealth
has granted power to the king. If this power is abolished,
the commonwealth resumes its whole power; and even while
it continues, the commonwealth can resist the king if he
behaves unjustly or exceeds the power granted to him. 3
It is clear that Molina does not acknowledge any absolute
"Divine Eight," or indeed any form of absolutism. His
language is grave and measured, but his conclusions are
1 Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 10:
"Si tamen rex potestatem sibi non
conceesam, vellet assumore, posset
quidem reepublica ei tanquam tyranno
ea in parte, resistere, perinde ac
cuivis alteri extraneo, qui reipublicae
injuriam vellet inferre. Ratio vera est,
quia neque rex ea in parte est reipub-
licae superior, neque reepublica est
illo inferior: sed manet, ut se habeat,
antequam illi unam concederet potes-
tatem. "
2 Id. id. id. , Traot ii. , Disp. 23, 4:
"Dicendum est tamen cum Durando.
. . . Tum regiam tum quamvis aliam
supremam civilem potestatem, quam
pro arbitratu respublica sibi elegerit,
esse immediate a republica, et mediate
a Deo, per lumen naturale et potes-
tatem quam reipublicae concessit, ut
sibi deligeret civilem potestatem prout
vellet, expedireque judicaret. Quare
descendit a jure naturali, est tamen
simpliciter de jure humano reipublicae,
pro arbitratu sibi deligentis, non
solum personam aut personas quibus
tribuit potestatem, sed otiam modum,
quantitatem, ac durationem talis potes-
tatis. ''
? Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 26, 6:
"Nihilominus negandum non est
manere duas potestates, unam in
Rege, alteram vero quasi habitualem
in republica, impeditam ab actu,
interim dum ilia alia potestas perdurat,
et tantum praecise impeditam, quan-
tum respublica independenter in pos-
terum a se Regi illi eam concessit.
Abolita vero ea potestate potest res-
publica integre uti sua potestate.
Praeterea, ilia perdurante, potest
respublica illi resistere, si aliquid
injuste in rempublicam committal,
limitesve potestatis sibi concessae ex-
cedat. Potest etiam respublica exer-
cere immediate quemcunque usum suae
? ? potestatis quem sibi roservaverit. "
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? 344
[PAST IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
clear. He does not indeed refer directly to the constitutional
traditions of Spain, as we shall presently see, that Mariana
does, but it is at least probable that he has them in mind.
He believes in monarchy, but a monarchy of limited powers--
limited by the conditions imposed by the commonwealth;
and that these limitations can be enforced by the action of
the commonwealth. The terms in which he states his argu-
ments and conclusions are, no doubt, much more restrained
than those of George Buchanan, or of the French Huguenot
pamphlets, but the principles are the same. The community
is the immediate source of all political and legislative authority,
and the king has only a limited authority which is determined
by the conditions under which the community has granted it.
From Molina we turn to Suarez, one of the most famous
Jesuit writers of that time. The most important of his works
for our purpose, 'De Legibus ac De Legislatore,' was indeed
only published in 1613, but it appears to us that it may
reasonably be put alongside the work of Molina.
The authority to make law, he says, from its very nature,
resides not in one man but in the community, for all men
are by nature born free, and no man therefore has by nature
jurisdiction or lordship over other men, and he repudiates
the conception that political authority was bestowed im-
mediately by God. 1 He is careful indeed to point out that
it is not any chance body of men without order or definite
purpose which has this authority, but a community united
by the common consent and special intention to form a
political and mystical body and to pursue one political end. 2
1 Suarez, 'De Legibus ac De Legis- andi seu regendi politico homines,
latore,' iii. 2, 3: "Dicendum ergo nulli homini in particulari data est
est, hano potestatem (condendi legis), immediate a Deo . . . (1). Hinc facile
ex sola rei natura in nullo singulari concluditur altera pars assertionis,
homine oxistere, sed in hominum nimirum, potestatem hano ex solius
collectione" (he cites St Thomas juris natura esse in hominum com-
Aquinas, i. 2. 90, 3, and i. 2. 97, 3) . . . munitate. "
"Ratio prions partis evidens est, * Id. id. , iii. 2, 4: "Alio ergo modo
quae in principio est tacta, quia ex consideranda est hominum multitude
natura rei omnes homines nascuntur quatenus speciali voluntate seu com-
liberi, et ideo nullus habet jurisdic- muni consensu in unum corpus politi-
tionem politicam in alium, sicut nec cum congregantur uno societatis vin-
dominium. . . . Potestas ergo domin- culo, et ut mutuo se juvent in online
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 345
This community has the power to transfer its jurisdiction
to one person, but the nature and form of the authority thus
created is created by human will. Suarez seems to prefer
monarchy, but he seems to think that this may often be
combined with other forms of political authority; and he
adds a little later that while a monarchy may be strictly
hereditary, it also has first been derived from the community,
and is subject to those conditions under which it was first
created. 1
He had already said that political authority was not given
by God to any one man directly; he corrects this by
saying that God had only done this in rare cases, but that
generally when the Scriptures say that God gave the kingdom
to some definite person, this only meant that the Divine
Providence had so ordered or permitted, and this did not
exclude human action.
anciennement estoyent pardessus les
Rois, et s'opposoient avec grande
integrite? a leur puissanoes absolues,
aujourd'hui se laschent servilement aux
commandements de tous ceux dont ils
esperent prouflt. "
? Cf. pp. 219 225.
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? 336
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PART IV.
a loyal subject, to tell the prince that sovereigns are not
bound by the Laws. On the contrary, they are bound
to govern by them, for they have sworn to maintain and
to protect them. 1 In a later passage of the same work we
find a good illustration of the circumstances under which
the Huguenots thus appealed to the supremacy of the
Law. The author admits that subjects have not the right
to force their lord to change the order of the State in matters
of religion, but must submit to persecution, if the laws com-
mand it, for their religion. It is, however, wholly different
if by public edicts, lawfully issued and confirmed by public
authority, they have been permitted to exercise their religion.
In that case the prince is bound to obey them, or by the
same authority to revoke them. Otherwise he is exercising
a manifest tyranny, and it is lawful, under proper conditions,
to resist. 2
The same conceptions are restated and further developed in
the treatise called 'La Politique, Dialogue de l'authorite? des
Princes, et de la liberte? des peuples,' generally cited as 'Archon
et Politie. ' Tyranny, Politie says, in an hereditary kingdom,
is when a legitimate prince is not content with what he has
1 "Du Droit des Magistrats" (in
'Me? moires de l'estat de France,' Ed.
1576), vol. ii. p. 750: "Car, pour
certain, c'est une parole tres fausse,
et non poinet d'un loyal sujet a` son
Prince, mais d'un de? testable flatteur,
de dire que les souverains ne sont
astraints a` nulles loix. Car, au con-
traire, il n'y en a pas une, par laquelle
il ne doyve et soit tenu de regler
son gouvernement, puis qu'il a jure?
d'estre le mainteneur et protecteur de
toutes. "
1 Id. id. (p. 788): "En tel cas, donc-
ques, assavoir, si on veut forcer les
consciences d'idolatrer, que ferons les
sujets? Certainement, de vouloir
contraindre leurs seigneur a` changer
l'estat publio il n'y auroit ordre: et
pourtant il faut que tous endurent
patiemment la persecution, ce neant-
moins servans a` Dieu, ou bien qu'ils
se retirent d'ailleurs.
Mais, les Edits, estans legitimement
dresses et emologuez par authorite?
publique, par lesquels sera permis
d'exercer la vraye Religion: je dis
que le prince est d'autant plus tonu
de les observer, que nuls autre, que
l'estat de la Religion est de plus grande
consequence que nul autre: ou bien
par mosme ordre, et telle connaissance
de cause qu'il appartient, les revoquer.
Sinon, je dis, qu'il use de manifeste
tyrannie, a` laquelle il est permis de
s'opposer, avec les distinctions ci-
dessus mentionnees; voire par raison
d'autant meilleure, que nos ames et
nos consciences nous doyvent estre
plus cheres que tous les biens de ce
monde. "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OP LAW.
337
lawfully acquired, but violates the ancient laws and customs
of his country. 1
Archon protests that this is to put the king under the
law, but there is a sentence in the Pandects which says that
he is not under the law, though " par honnestete? " he should
carry it out. For it is he who makes the law, and he does
not submit to it except so far as he pleases, otherwise his
power is not sovereign but bridled and restrained. 2
To this contention Politie replies by considering the real
source of laws. He cites the definitions of law by Papinian,
Demosthenes, and Chrysippus (' Dig. ,' i. 3. 1, and 2), and
the opinion of Cicero that the deliberation and consent of the
commonwealth are implied in the laws, and that the prince
must therefore be subject to them. 3
When Archon contends that the Civil Law is composed of
the ordinances of princes, and that in all its parts it is subject
to their power, Politie replies that in general terms the Law
includes all ordinances which are just; these have been
formed by the people in their customs. If they are not suit-
able, the prince can adjust them to the needs of particular
times and persons, but must not usurp the power to do this
without the consent of those who are most concerned* Archon
objects that this is very far indeed from the opinion of many
kings, who consider that their subjects, their lives, and
property are completely under their power. Politie agrees
that they are under their jurisdiction, but only by process of
1 "Archon et Politie," in (' Me-
moiros do l'etat do Franco,' Ed. 1576),
vol. iii. p. 102: "Politie. Mais celle
(tyrannie) qui survient en una royaume
qui est tenu pour hereditaire, est,
quand un prince, le? gitimement pour-
venu, no se contente pas de ce qu'il
trouve de droit equitable luy estre
acquis, ains pour dominer plus seig-
neurialement viole les anciennes loix
et ooutumes do ses pays. "
? Id. id. (p. 110): "Archon. Tout
cocy tend a mettre le Roi sous la
loi, touteffois il y a un axiomo aux
Paudoctes, qui dit qu'il n'est sous la
VOL. VI.
loi, combien que par honneetete? , il
s'y doit ranger. Par ainsi, puis que
e'est lui qui la donne, il ne s'y subniet
pas s'il ne luy plait; ou autrement
on ne doit pas nommer sa puissance,
souveraine, mais bridee et restrainte. "
? Id. (p. 110): "Politie. Ciceron
. . . dit quo l'entrotenement et con-
soil de la re? publique estans situoz
dans les loix, faut nocessairement que
le prince y soit sujet: d'autant que
son autorito soit de la, et se maintient
par la conservation de justice qui i-. t
descrite en icello. "
* Id. (p. 117).
T
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? 338 THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY. [PABT IV.
law,1 and he adds a reminiscence of the Feudal Law, that the
Lord owes the same faith and love to his vassal as the vassal
to him, and loses his lordship for the same causes and crimes
as the vassal loses his fief. 2
In another place the author of this treatise, like the author
of the 'Droit des Magistrats,' appeals to the supremacy of
the Law as justifying the resistance of the Huguenots to
persecution, when the exercise of their religion had been
granted them by formal laws and edicts; and he extends
this principle to the general legal rights of the people, for,
as he says, there are few kingdoms or principalities where
the chief rulers are not restrained by many laws to which
they have sworn, when they were accepted, and which they
have promised to the sovereign power to obey--that is, to
the estates which are formed by the whole body of the people. 3
(We shall have much more to say later of the conception of the
sovereign power which is represented in these words. )
The best known of these Huguenot works is the ' Vindiciae
Contra Tyrannos,' published in 1579. There has been much
discussion of its authorship, but we are not here concerned
with this but with the judgment of the author on the origin
of law and its relation to the prince. His judgment is very
clearly expressed. Men would have been satisfied to have
received law from one good and just man, but the judgment
1 Id. (p. 120): "Archon. Quoy, les
roys n'ont-ila pas puissance sur la
mort et sur la vie de leurs sujets?
"Politie. Oui bien, mais avec con-
nsissance de cause et informations
valables, et non autrement. "
1 Id. id.
>> Id. (p. 128): "Politie: Et si par
lois et edits solennels, le peuple a obtenu
de ses princes l'exercice de la vraye
Religion; et puis apres par mauvais
conseil, le prince se veut desdire et
oster tyranniquement ce qu'il avait
sainctement accorde? , les sujets ont
double raison de ne luy obeyr en cest
endroit, et de conserver leur vraye
liborte? , par les moyeus le? gitimes sus
declarez, dont nous parlerons encore
apre`s.
Gela se doit estendre aussi aux
autres droits du peuple, lesquels ne
peuvent estre abolis sans manifeste
confusion et aneantissement des Estats,
et a` plus forte raison quand les lois
reiglont des longtemps la grandeur des
princes et magistrats souverains:
comme il se trouvera bien peu de
royaumes et principautez, dont les
principaux gouverneurs ne soyent liez
et retenus en limites par beauooup de
lois, queux mesmes jurent a` leur
reception, et promettent a` la souver-
ainete? (c'est a` dire aux Estats com-
posez du corps de tout le peuple) de
garder inviolablement. "
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? chap. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW.
339
of kings was too uncertain and variable. Laws were therefore
made by the wise men and the magistrates. The principal
function of the king is to keep and maintain the law. It is
better to obey the law than the king; the law is the soul
of the king, while the king is the instrument of the law. The
law represents the combined reason and wisdom of the many,
for the many see and understand more than the one. It
has thus come about that while in the earliest times kings
reigned absolutely and their will was law, this now only
continues among barbarians, while the more polite and
civilised people are bound by laws. We do not accept the
saying of Caracalla that the emperor makes laws but does
not receive them; rather in all well-ordered kingdoms the
king receives the law from the people, and does not obtain
the kingdom until he has promised to give every man his
right (jus) according to the laws of the country. He can
only amend or add to the laws when this has been approved
by the people, or the chief men of the people, formally or
informally, called together. 1
1 'Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos ' (Ed.
Edinburgh, 1579), Q. ILT. (p. 114):
"Carte cum populus jus aequabile
quereret, id si ab uno jus to et bono
viro consequebatur, eo contentus erat.
At quia vix id fieri poterat, et raro
contingobat; saepe vero, dum arbitria
Regum, legum instar osscnt, evoniebat,
ut alia aliis loquerentur. Leges tum
quae cum omnibus una oademque voce
loquuntur, a prudentioribus et ceteris
magistratibus proximo inventn<< fuer-
unt. Regibus vero id procipua munoris
commendatur, ut legum custodes,
ministri et conservatores ossent. Inter -
dum etiam, quia lex in omnem eventum
prospicero non potuerat, quaedam ex
eadem aequitate naturali supplerent.
. . . (p. 115) Quia vero ambigat, quin
legi, quam regi parere, id est homini,
utilius et honestius sit? Lex est boni
regis anima: per hanc movetur, sentit,
vivit. Rex legis organum est, et
quasi corpus, per quod ilia suas vires
exerit, sua munora obit, sua sensa
eloquitur. Animae vero, quam corpori
parere justius est.
Lex est multorum prudentum in
unum collecta ratio et sapientia. Plures
autem oculatiores et perspicaciores
sunt quam unus. . . . (p. 117) Inde
vero pactum est, inquit idem, ut
quum primis temporibus reges absolute
imperarent, quorum arbitrium lex
erat, paulo post inter politiores et
civiliores passim legitimi fioront, id est,
legibus servandia oustodiendisque obli-
garentur; absoluta vero ilia potestas,
ponos barbarorum regee tantum man-
eret. . . . (p. 119) Non denique quod
ipse Caracalla, Imperatores leges daro,
non accipere. Quin potius in omnibus
regnis bene constitutis, regem a populo
leges, quas tueatur quasque intueatur,
accipere. . . . (p. 121) Neque enim
Imperator, Rex Franciae, Regos His-
paniae, Angliae, Poloniae, Hungariae et
? ? omnes legitimi principes . . . prius in
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? 340
[PART IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The author of the ' Vindiciae ' adds some important observa-
tions on the actual or traditional practice of some of the
more important countries of Western Europe. In the empire
the emperor " rogat in concilio," and, if they approve, the
princes, barons, and representatives of the cities sign the
decree, and only then is the law valid; the emperor swears
to observe the laws which have been thus made, and not
to make other laws except with the common consent. In
France, where the authority of the king is commonly thought
to be higher than elsewhere, laws were formerly made in the
Assembly of the three Orders, and all commands of the king
were void, unless the Senate (i. e. , the Parlement) ratified
them. In England, Spain, and Hungary the custom is the
same as it always was. He concludes that if it is true that
the laws are greater than the king, if kings must obey the
law as the slave does his master, who would not prefer to
obey the law rather than the king?
Who would obey the
king if he violated the law, or would refuse to defend the
law which had been violated ! 1
These writers are agreed in maintaining that the king
was under the law and not over it, for his authority was
derived from the law, and the law proceeds ultimately from
principatum rocipiuntur, quam . . . se
secundum leges patriae jus ouique
suum roddituros promiserint. . . . (p.
122) In summa, principes legitimi,
leges a populo accipiunt, diadema vero
honoris, sceptrum potestatis, insigne,
ut et acceptas tueatur et ex earum
praecipua tutela gloriam sibi quaerant.
. . . Si quid abrogandum, surrogan-
dum, derogandum, putabit, populum,
populive optimatos, aut ordinarios,
aut extra ordine convocatos, admonebit
legemque rogabit. At sane non prius
jubebit, quam ab iisdem rite expensa
comprobataque fuerit. "
1 Id. (p. 123): "Imperator rogat pri-
mum in Comitiis. Si probatur, Prin-
cipes, Barones, civitatum legati sub-
signent ac demum lex rata esse solet.
Jurat vero se leges (p. 124) latns serva-
turum, et novas non nisi de communi
consensu, ullas laturum. . . In Francia,
ubi tamen amplissima vulgo censetur
regum auctoritas, ferebantur olim
leges in trium ordinum conventu,
regiove consilio ambulatorio. Ex quo
vero Parlamentum statarium est,
frustra sunt omnia regum edicta, ni
senatus ilia comprobet, cum tamen
senatus seu Parlamenti aresta, si lex
desit, legis vim passim obtinesnt.
Et in Anglico, Hispanico, Hungarico,
et caeteris idem juris est, ut et in
antiquis quoque fuit. . . . Quod si
vero, ut ostendimus, leges regibus
potiores sunt, si reges legibus, ut servi
dominis, parero tenentur; quis non
legi, quam regi parere malit? quia
regi legem violanti obsequatur. Quis
violatae auxilium fcrro recuset? "
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 341
the community. They admit that, in the earliest stages of
human life, men may have submitted to the authority of
rulers, uncontrolled by law; but they found long ago that it
was impossible to submit to the arbitrary and capricious
rule of one man, and this only now survives among barbarous
and uncivilised people; and, as we have just seen, the author
of the 'Vindiciae ' asserts this principle of the supremacy of
the Law of the community as representing the normal con-
ception of the greater European countries.
It may be suggested that these writers were Protestants,
though, as we have observed, there is nothing in these con-
tentions which represents an appeal to distinctively Pro-
testant opinions. We turn, therefore, to a group of writers
who belonged to the Order of the Jesuits.
We begin with Molina, an important Spanish Jesuit, whose
work, 'De Justitia et Jure,' was published in 1592. He
maintains that the light of nature teaches that it is in the
power of the commonwealth to entrust authority over itself
to one or more persons, as it judges best. This authority is
greater or less according to its judgment, and if the ruler
endeavours to exercise more authority than is given to him,
he acts tyrannically. 1
Having thus set out clearly the source and limits of the
authority of the ruler, Molina approaches the subject with
which we are here immediately concerned--that is, the con-
ditions of the legislative authority.
One of the functions of the king is to make laws, but the
question must be considered whether the people gave him
the power to make laws only with their approval, or without
1 Molina, 'De Justitia et Jure,'
vol. i. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23: "Lumen
ipsum naturae docet, in reipublicae
arbitrio esse positum, committere
alicui, vel aliquibus, regimen et potes-
tfttem supra se ipsum, prout voluerit,
expedireque judicaverit. . . . (3) Cum
autem potestas a republica in rectores
derivetur, pro ipsius reipublicae arbi-
tratu, poterit sane in unaquaque
reipublicae specie, derivari amplior, et
minus ample, neque est maior in
reipublicae rectoribus quam a republica
fuerit illis concessa. Quin potius, si
rec tores eam extendant, maioremque
sibi usurpant, in tyrannidem per in-
justitiam, quam ea in parte committunt,
degenerant. "
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? 342
[past rv.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
it; and Molina thinks that if it is the custom that laws have
no force unless they are approved by the people, it must be
assumed that the commonwealth only granted to the king
the legislative power, subject to this condition; for it is more
probable that the king increased his power, the subjects not
venturing to resist, than that they had diminished the power
which they had given him. If, as Castro suggested, the
custom was that the commonwealth should obey all the laws
of the prince which were not actually unjust, it would have
to be concluded that it had granted all its authority to the
king, but it could scarcely be believed that any commonwealth
had done this. 1 Molina's principle seems to be clear, that
it is almost incredible that the commonwealth should have
completely surrendered all that authority, which originally
belonged to it, to the ruler.
It must not indeed be supposed that Molina was an enemy
of monarchy; indeed, he clearly holds that it is the best
form of government, for it tends more to internal peace than
any other form,2 and he maintains that the authority of the
monarch is greater, not merely than that of individuals in
the commonwealth, but than that of the whole commonwealth
--that is, within the limits of the authority which has been
granted to him. 3 But again, it must be observed that this
authority is limited, and if the king attempts to take more
'Id. id. id. , Traot ii. , Disp. 23, 6:
"Cum potestate regia ad rempublicam
moderandam coniuncta est potestas
ferendi leges, quibus gubernetur. . . .
Si namque usus habeat, ut tales leges
vim non habeant, nisi a populo appro-
bentur, oensendum est rempublicam
non maiorem potestatem regibus con-
nsssisse, quam condendi eas leges de-
pendentes ab approbatione populi.
Verisimilo osto, si populi ad id adver-
terunt, non maiorom potestatem regibus
concessisse; imo esto non adverterent,
haec videtur fuisse reipublicao intentio,
sibi regem constituents, quando aliud
non expressit, semperque est potius
presumendum regem per potentiam
ampliasse suam potestatem, subditis
non audentibus resistere, quam sub-
ditos restrinxisse illi potestatem semel
concessam. Quare fas erit reipublicae
non acceptare leges, quae ipsam nota-
biliter gravent, quando ad commune
bonum necessariae omnino non sunt.
Quod si princops ad id eam cogit, in-
justitiam committet. Si vero, inquit
Castrus, usus recoptus habeat, ut legi-
bus principum non iniquis omnino
parcatur, censondum est, rempublicam
omnom omnino suam potestatem regi
concessisso, quod vix de aliqua credi
potest. "
1 Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 14.
? Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 8.
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? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 343
than had been granted to him, the commonwealth is entitled
to resist him as a tyrant. 1
Molina very emphatically maintains that the royal power,
or any other supreme civil power which the commonwealth
may create, is derived immediately from the commonwealth,
and only "mediately" from God. For it is by the natural
light and the authority which God has granted to the common-
wealth that it should choose that form of civil power which
it thinks most expedient. 2 He adds that there always remain
two powers: one in the king, the other in the commonwealth.
The latter is indeed restrained in action, so long as the former
continues, but restrained only as far as the commonwealth
has granted power to the king. If this power is abolished,
the commonwealth resumes its whole power; and even while
it continues, the commonwealth can resist the king if he
behaves unjustly or exceeds the power granted to him. 3
It is clear that Molina does not acknowledge any absolute
"Divine Eight," or indeed any form of absolutism. His
language is grave and measured, but his conclusions are
1 Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 23, 10:
"Si tamen rex potestatem sibi non
conceesam, vellet assumore, posset
quidem reepublica ei tanquam tyranno
ea in parte, resistere, perinde ac
cuivis alteri extraneo, qui reipublicae
injuriam vellet inferre. Ratio vera est,
quia neque rex ea in parte est reipub-
licae superior, neque reepublica est
illo inferior: sed manet, ut se habeat,
antequam illi unam concederet potes-
tatem. "
2 Id. id. id. , Traot ii. , Disp. 23, 4:
"Dicendum est tamen cum Durando.
. . . Tum regiam tum quamvis aliam
supremam civilem potestatem, quam
pro arbitratu respublica sibi elegerit,
esse immediate a republica, et mediate
a Deo, per lumen naturale et potes-
tatem quam reipublicae concessit, ut
sibi deligeret civilem potestatem prout
vellet, expedireque judicaret. Quare
descendit a jure naturali, est tamen
simpliciter de jure humano reipublicae,
pro arbitratu sibi deligentis, non
solum personam aut personas quibus
tribuit potestatem, sed otiam modum,
quantitatem, ac durationem talis potes-
tatis. ''
? Id. id. id. , Tract ii. , Disp. 26, 6:
"Nihilominus negandum non est
manere duas potestates, unam in
Rege, alteram vero quasi habitualem
in republica, impeditam ab actu,
interim dum ilia alia potestas perdurat,
et tantum praecise impeditam, quan-
tum respublica independenter in pos-
terum a se Regi illi eam concessit.
Abolita vero ea potestate potest res-
publica integre uti sua potestate.
Praeterea, ilia perdurante, potest
respublica illi resistere, si aliquid
injuste in rempublicam committal,
limitesve potestatis sibi concessae ex-
cedat. Potest etiam respublica exer-
cere immediate quemcunque usum suae
? ? potestatis quem sibi roservaverit. "
Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 344
[PAST IV.
THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
clear. He does not indeed refer directly to the constitutional
traditions of Spain, as we shall presently see, that Mariana
does, but it is at least probable that he has them in mind.
He believes in monarchy, but a monarchy of limited powers--
limited by the conditions imposed by the commonwealth;
and that these limitations can be enforced by the action of
the commonwealth. The terms in which he states his argu-
ments and conclusions are, no doubt, much more restrained
than those of George Buchanan, or of the French Huguenot
pamphlets, but the principles are the same. The community
is the immediate source of all political and legislative authority,
and the king has only a limited authority which is determined
by the conditions under which the community has granted it.
From Molina we turn to Suarez, one of the most famous
Jesuit writers of that time. The most important of his works
for our purpose, 'De Legibus ac De Legislatore,' was indeed
only published in 1613, but it appears to us that it may
reasonably be put alongside the work of Molina.
The authority to make law, he says, from its very nature,
resides not in one man but in the community, for all men
are by nature born free, and no man therefore has by nature
jurisdiction or lordship over other men, and he repudiates
the conception that political authority was bestowed im-
mediately by God. 1 He is careful indeed to point out that
it is not any chance body of men without order or definite
purpose which has this authority, but a community united
by the common consent and special intention to form a
political and mystical body and to pursue one political end. 2
1 Suarez, 'De Legibus ac De Legis- andi seu regendi politico homines,
latore,' iii. 2, 3: "Dicendum ergo nulli homini in particulari data est
est, hano potestatem (condendi legis), immediate a Deo . . . (1). Hinc facile
ex sola rei natura in nullo singulari concluditur altera pars assertionis,
homine oxistere, sed in hominum nimirum, potestatem hano ex solius
collectione" (he cites St Thomas juris natura esse in hominum com-
Aquinas, i. 2. 90, 3, and i. 2. 97, 3) . . . munitate. "
"Ratio prions partis evidens est, * Id. id. , iii. 2, 4: "Alio ergo modo
quae in principio est tacta, quia ex consideranda est hominum multitude
natura rei omnes homines nascuntur quatenus speciali voluntate seu com-
liberi, et ideo nullus habet jurisdic- muni consensu in unum corpus politi-
tionem politicam in alium, sicut nec cum congregantur uno societatis vin-
dominium. . . . Potestas ergo domin- culo, et ut mutuo se juvent in online
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-19 10:34 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 39015002404211 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? CHAP. I. ] THE SOURCE AND AUTHORITY OF LAW. 345
This community has the power to transfer its jurisdiction
to one person, but the nature and form of the authority thus
created is created by human will. Suarez seems to prefer
monarchy, but he seems to think that this may often be
combined with other forms of political authority; and he
adds a little later that while a monarchy may be strictly
hereditary, it also has first been derived from the community,
and is subject to those conditions under which it was first
created. 1
He had already said that political authority was not given
by God to any one man directly; he corrects this by
saying that God had only done this in rare cases, but that
generally when the Scriptures say that God gave the kingdom
to some definite person, this only meant that the Divine
Providence had so ordered or permitted, and this did not
exclude human action.
