No More Learning

2. The town of Sukkur, with such arrondissement as shall be deemed
necessary by Major-General Sir Charles Napier, and the Islands of Bakkur
and the adjoining islets, and the town of Roree, with such arrondissement as
may be deemed necessary by Major-General Sir Charles Napier, are ceded in
perpetuity to the British Government.
Here again the currency was to be managed by the British Govern-
ment, and arrangements were made for the necessary adjustments
as between the various amirs. A provision was inserted making it
clear that the amirs of Khairpur, in the same measure as those of
Hyderabad by the treaty of 1839, were to promote the freedom of
navigation of the Indus. Subject to these provisos the British Gov-
ernment renounced all claim to tribute. Oddly enough, the amir of
Mirpur; as Napier pointed out in a letter of 8 December, 1842, seems
to have escaped notice, though by no means friendly to the British.
Napier suggested that he might go on paying his old tribute of half
a lakh annually, and Lord Ellenborough said that he had designedly
left him under the older treaty.
Lord Ellenborough threw the responsibility for the decision as to
the guilt of the amirs on to the local authorities. This is distinctly
stated in his letter to Sir Charles Napier of 4 November; 2 and indeed,
after the previous correspondence, he could hardly do otherwise.
Napier in his diary takes another view of the matter and says, that
1 Aitchison, op. cit. VII, 374.
2 Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 496. Cf. Idem, 1844, XXXVI, 611, and
Law, op. cit. pp. 72-3.


## p. 533 (#561) ############################################

THE KHAIRPUR SUCCESSION
533
given the proof of treason Lord Ellenborough ought to decide. On
18 November he says that the amirs had collected in various places
about 20,000 men, and on the 30th, in answer to a definite enquiry
from Lord Ellenborough, he says that he is convinced of the guiit
of the amirs. Napier now knew, and Lord Ellenborough knew, for
he offered more troops, that there would be fighting, but the treaty
had to be considered first. On 2 December, 1842, it was sent to the
amirs of Hyderabad and on the 4th it was sent to Khairpur. Just
before this, on 1 December, Napier issued a proclamation to the
amirs of Upper and Lower Sind. It ran :
I have received the draft of a treaty between the Ameers of Khyrpore
(and Hyderabad) and the British Government, signed by His Excellency the
Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, whose
commands I have to present it to your Highnesses, for your Highnesses' accepta-
tion and guidance.
In obedience to the commands of the Governor-General of India I shall
proceed to occupy Roree, and the left bank of the Indus, from the latter town
up to the Bhawulpore frontier, including the whole of the districts of Bhong
Bara and Subzulkote, as set forth in the said Treaty. 1
It is not necessary to go into a minute description of the various
intrigues which were in progress, but it may be well to touch on one
that was the subject of much comment at the time. The amir of
Khairpur was, as has been seen, a very old man. Once inclined to
throw in his lot with the English, he had long since joined the other
amirs, and the misfortunes of our troops in Afghanistan had affected
him as they, had affected them. He had given evidence of this by
taking part in various schemes directed against the English, and the
new treaty was one of the results. But the question of the moment
was that of his successor. The choice lay between his brother 'Ali
Murad, who professed attachment to the English interest, and his son.
The claims of the former to the "Turban", as it was termed, had
been placed before the governor-general by Outram on 21 April,
1842, and again by him to Napier on 30 October. On 23 November
Napier had an interview with 'Ali Murad and promised him, provided
he continued to act loyally towards the British Government, that the
governor-general would prevent the nomination of old Mir Rustam's
son, Mir Muhammad Husam, either during Mir Rustam's life or at
his death. His reasons for this step are worth recording :
1. It is just. Ali Moorad has the right to the “Turban” for his own life,
after the death of Meer Rustim, and it promises to protect him in this right.
2. It detaches Ali Moorad from any league among the Ameers, and, con-
sequently, diminishes the chance of bloodshed.
3. It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be urged, viz. ,
that we should treat with one Ameer, instead of a number. This will simplify
our political dealings with these princes, and gradually reduce them to the
class of rich noblemen, and their chief will be perfectly dependent on the
Government of India, living as he will do so close to this large station (Sukkur)
and I have no doubt that it will quickly be a large town. 2
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, 518.
* Idem, p. 613.


## p. 534 (#562) ############################################

534
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
Napier's letters nuw breathe the calm confidence of the experi-
enced soldier. He writes on 1 December, 1842 : "I am perfectly
confident in the troops under my command being equal to any
emergency'. On the 4th the governor-general wrote:
As long as you have six regiments ready to support your just demands, I
am inclined to think they will be acceded to, as they have been in this instance
(a case of tolls on the Indus]; and I am willing to hope that, with these aids
to your negotiation, you may be able to make a settlement now without the use
of force; but I very much fear that, until our force has been actually felt,
there will be no permanent observance of the existing treaty, or of any new
treaty we may make. 1
The various amirs now agreed verbally to be bound by the new
treaty, but they continued to collect troops. The British could only
count upon the support of 'Ali Murad at Khairpur, and Mir Subudar
Khan and Mir Husain 'Ali at Hyderabad. The chiefs of Khairpur
decided at the end of November that Mir Rustam Khan should
abdicate in favour of his son on 5 December. Napier now began
pushing his troops across the Indus to take possession of Rohri, and
the plan was that Brigadier Wallace was to march towards the ceded
districts on 20 December, 1842, whilst Napier moved on Khairpur.
On 18 December he wrote to Mir Rustam :
My own belief is that personally you have ever been the friend of the
English. But you are helpless among your ill-judging family. I send this by
your brother His Highness Ali Moorad; listen to his advice; trust yourself to
his care; you are too old for war; and if war begins how can I protect you? ?
We know that Mir Rustam, who wished, or pretended to wish, to
come to Napier's camp, went to his brother for a short time, and thus
Murad 'Ali became the chief in reality if not in name. Napier wrote
on 23 December :
The whole of Upper Sinde is now in the hands of Meer Ali Moorad. There
are no armed bands but his, and his interest is synonymous with our friend-
ship. I consider therefore that Upper Sinde is perfectly settled. 3
Wallace now started for Firozpur, taking possession of and
han over to Bahawalpur the ceded districts en route, and Napier
proceeded in force to Mangni. But he now found that many of the
family and followers of Rustam had fled to Imam Garh, a desert
fortress some way to the eastward beyond the Nara river about half
way between Khairpur and Hyderabad. Here Napier resolved to
follow them and so he told 'Ali Murad on 26 December; his decision
was in no way altered by 'Ali Murad's wishing to go against the fort-
ress himself, and by the fact that there had been no declaration of
war. On 23 December, 1842, Napier advised 'Ali Murad not to assume
the turban, but, when he heard of the flight of Mir Rustam, which
took place on the 28th, he at once (1 January, 1843) issued a procla-
mation mentioning the facts, and stating that he would now support
i Parliamentary Papers, ut supra, p. 519.
2 Idem, 1844, XXXVI, 518.
3 Idem, 1843, XXXIX, 535.


## p. 535 (#563) ############################################

IMAM GARH
535
'Ali Murad. as chief in his various rights. Napier, however, thought
that the flight was either due to fear or that 'Ali Murad drove him
to it so as to strengthen his own position. Lord Ellenborough, while
he approved of what Napier was doing, saw difficulties in the way of
making one of the amirs responsible for the others, which would, he
felt, mean taking the rule into British hands. Napier's letter, how-
ever, to 'Ali Murad of 14 January’ shows that the governor-general
considered 'Ali Murad as the legitimate possessor of "the Turban".
What Napier was really anxious to effect was the striking of a con-
vincing blow; he saw that the amirs were merely trifling with him,
seeking to gain time. Imam Garh was said to be the Sind Gibraltar,
and he would show that he could march across the desert, and take
it. So, though detained near Khairpur by rain, he reached Daji,
a strong fortress, on 4 January, 1843; near there on the 6th he heard
of Mir Rustam whom Outram, who had now rejoined Napier,
visited and found submissive. At Daji he left the main body of the
force and mounting 350 men of the Queen's ‘Regiment on camels
and adding 200 horse and a couple of howitzers he set off on his
memorable expedition. At the end of the first march there was so
little fodder that he had to send back 150 of the horse, but he pushed
on and camped near Imam Garh on the 12th. The fortress which
was surrounded by walls forty feet high offered no resistance, and
Outram with the consent of 'Ali Murad blew it up. This desert march
of Napier's, however irregular it might be, had no greater admirer
than the Duke of Wellington, who spoke of it as one of the most
curious military operations he had ever heard of.
Napier now sent off Outram to Khairpur where he was to meet
the amirs of Upper and Lower Sind or their representatives, and
arrange with them the details connected with the new treaty. He
carried a letter dated 15 January to Mir Rustam, saying that the past
was all forgotten, and with regard to the amirs he was given con-
siderable latitude, at all events so far as suggestion was concerned,
prcvided that the spirit and the principle of the treaty were preser-
ved. The amirs were ordered to attend, and threatened with the
occupation of their territories if they did not. But though Outram
fixed a date, the 20th, for the meeting at Khairpur, only the amirs of
Hyderabad sent vakils, and the odd thing is that Outram, as we see
from his letters to Napier of 22 January, had no idea of what was
going on. He wrote to Napier objecting to the retention of Tatta,
whrre Napier agreed with him, and also wished to modify the coinage
clause, which Napier had no power to alter, but he did not see how
unreal the whole business was. Napier, who now moved near to
the Indus, sent a strong proclamation to the amirs of Upper Sind on
the 27th giving them till 1 February to come in. 8
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, p. 849.
2 Idem, 1844, XXXVI, 530.
3Idem, 1843, XXXIX, 566.


## p. 536 (#564) ############################################

636
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
At Outram's request also he, on the 28th, ordered that officer to
move to Hyderabad where Outram thought that all could be satisfac-
torily arranged by personal influence. Napier read the East far more
correctly than Outram, and knew how little words counted in a
country filled with armed men who were stirred by the fear that
their national independence was at stake. Napier also saw that.
whatever the amirs might say, they had but little control over the
bands who were moving rapidly about the country near the capital.
Nor was the fact that Wallace towards the end of January handed
over Sabzalkot and Bhung Bara to the nawab of Bahawalpur likely
to make for peace.
While Outram was dreaming and talking, the two sides were
acting. The amirs were collecting large masses of troops; of this
Napier knew, and he prepared accordingly, although he extended
the period of peace till the 6th. On that date he wrote to Outram,
ordering him to tell the amir of Khairpur that he was directed to
disperse their troops and would do so. Outram had also to tell the
amirs of Hyderabad not to allow troops from Khairpur to come into
Lower Sind. Outram reached Hyderabad on the 8th and managed
before the end to get all the amirs but one to sign. He thought more
of this willingness than it deserved. He wrote to Napier that he did
not believe that the amirs would begin hostilities; on two occasions
he urged Napier not to bring his troops any nearer; he said that there
was not an armed man in Hyderabad, and on the 12th added the
crowning absurdity of suggesting that Napier should come alone to
the capital. That evening Outram was insulted in the streets and
wrote, simply enough, that he did not think Napier would wish to
come now. The general had no intention of doing so and wrote on
the 15th from Hala ordering Outram not to pledge himself to any-
thing, and telling him that he was marching on Hyderabad. The
same day Outram was attacked in the Residency, and, after a gallant
defence against several thousand armed Balochis, took refuge on a
steamer and rejoined his commanding officer. He ceased henceforth
to count in Napier's calculations, and the great controversy between
them is best left in obscurity. Those who wish to enter further into
the question of the negotiations with the amirs between the 8th to
the 13th will find an interesting criticism of Outram's notes by Lord
Ellenborough in a letter to the Secret Committee of 23 June, 1843. 1
Napier knew that the amirs were at Miani with over 20,000 men;
he had but 2800 himself with twelve pieces of artillery. But he was
ready, even anxious to fight, and the thought of the odds only stimu-
lated him. At 4 a. m. on the morning of 17 February, 1843, he
marched, and at 9 o'clock he attacked. The great mass of the enemy
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1844, XXXVI, 609. Cf. Holmes, Sir Charles Napier,
pp. . 43 syg.


## p. 537 (#565) ############################################

MIANI
637
were in the dry bed of the Fulaili river, and the scene, as described
by Sir William Napier from his brother's accounts, has rarely been
equalled for picturesque detail :
Then rose the British shout, the English guns were run forward into posi-
tion, the infantry closed upon the Fullailee with a run, and rushed up the
sloping bank. The Beloochs, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along
the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their
volley was delivered; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the
slope on the inside deceived their aim, and the execution was not great; the
next moment the 22nd were on the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all
before them, but they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords
waving in their front! Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of
flowers, stood the Beloochs in their many coloured garments and turbans; they
Alled the broad deep bed of the Fullailee, they clustered on both banks, and
covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields,
they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolled like a
peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they rushed forwards, and full against
the front of the 22nd dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. . . . Now
the Beloochs closed their dense masses, and again the shouts and the rolling
fire of musketry and the dreadful rush of the swordsmen were heard and seen
along the whole line, and such a fight ensued as has seldom been known or told
of in the records of war. For ever those wild warriors came close up, sword
and shield in advance, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break
into the opposing ranks; no fire of small arms, no push of bayonets, no sweep-
ing discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one mass on the
right, could drive the gallant fellows back; they gave their breasts to the shot,
they leaped upon the guns and were blown away by twenties at a time, their
dead went down the steep slope by hundreds; but the gaps in their masses were
continually filled up from the rear, the survivors of the front rank still pressed
forward, with unabated fury, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full
and frequent conflict.
Such was the fierce battle of Miani in which Napier gained, a
victory-a victory important out of all proportion to the loss of life.
5000 Balochis fell as against 256 of the British force. Six of the amirs
at once came into camp and surrendered, giving up Hyderabad which
was immediately occupied. But crushing though the blow was, Sinci
was not yet conquered, for the Lion of Mirpur, Shir Muhammad,
was still in command of considerable forces, and Napier's little army,
wasted by sickness, was surrounded by hostile tribesmen. Lord
Ellenborough sent prompt reinforcements, but Napier wisely waited,
entrenching himself, and hoping that he would be attacked in a
position of his own choosing. In March, hearing that the Balochis
were concentrating, he prepared to move, though in great difficulties,
owing to the heat of the weather and the intrigues of the captive
amirs. So that he was glad to be able to strike a final blow at Dabo,
six miles from Hyderabad, where on 24 March, 1843, he defeated Shir
Muhammad. The victory was not achieved without difficulty, and
Shir Muhammad fled to the desert. Hurrying onwards it was a race
against summer. Napier secured Mirpur on 27 March, and Umarkot
on 4 April, movements through a desert country which prove capacity
and resolution of no comnion order. The annexation of Sind had


## p. 538 (#566) ############################################

538
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
>
been decided upon as early as 13 March (dispatch of 26 June, 18434)
and Napier was made its first governor. Khairpur, however, was as
a reward handed over to 'Ali Murad. The next four and a half years
were occupied in the organisation and development of this important
addition to the British Empire. There was still fighting to be done,
but when Jacob on 14 June, 1843, defeated Shir Muhammad finally
and drove him out of Sind, the main war was at an end.
Napier's own view of the conquest of Sind has been perhaps best
expressed in a letter to Outram of January, 1843, of which a few
sentences may be quoted :
Lord Auckland began by a great act of injustice, political injustice, which
produced the treaties. Lord Ellenborough then came and had his line of policy,
viz. , to abandon ali beyond and maintain all on the Indian side of the Indus. He
found existing treaties with Scinde to maintain, but the only part of his prede-
cessor's policy in which he appears to agree is the maintenance of free traffic
on the Indus, with possession of certain towns on its banks, the seizure of
which was Lord Auckland's act; to keep them has been Lord Ellenborough's in
compliance with treaties which no man of sense will say were well drawn up
. Now I do not agree with you in thinking the Amirs are fools. I think them
cunning rascals to a man if measured by our standard of honesty; but assuredly
Lord Auckland's policy was not calculated to make them form a higher esti-
mate of us. Well, they saw our defeat and that encouraged them to break
existing treaties, it gave them heart, and that they hoped to have a second
Cabool affair is as clear to me as the sun now shining. . . . Now what is to be
done? That which is best for the advancement of good government and well-
being of the populatior; and we must not sacrifice all this to a minute endea-
vour, utterly hopeless, I may say impossible, to give to these tyrannical, drunken,
debauched, cheating, intriguing, contemptible Ameers, a due portion of the
plunder they have amassed from the ruined people they conquered sixty years
ago. They are fortunate robbers one and all, and though I most decidedly con-
demn the way we entered this country (just as honest, however, as that by
which the Talpoors got it from the Kalloras) I would equally condemn any
policy that allowed these rascals to go on plundering the country to supply
their debaucheries after we had raised the hopes of every respectable man
in the country. This I consider to be Lord E. 's view and in that sense I act.
If I thought Lord E. was acting on an unjust plan I would of course obey my
orders, but should deeply regret my position. But I do no such thing: the
whole injustice was committed by Lord Auckland, and such a course of in-
justice cannot be closed without hardship on someone. It is likely to fall on
the Ameers, and on a crew more deserving to bear it hardly could it alight. It
falls heaviest on Roostum, an old worn debauchee, a man drunk every day of
his life, breaking his own religious ordinances, and even the habits and customs
of his country. ?
The judgment that has held the field hitherto has been hostile;
from 1844 when a writer in the Calcutta Review said : "The real cause
a
of this chastisement of the Ameers consisted in the chastisement
which the British had received from the Afghans", till the recent
verdict in the Cambridge Modern History. But the truer view will be
more like that of Outram's great apologist: "In the light of subse-
quent history it may even be argued that Outram's policy of trust
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 68 sqq. Napier, Conquest of Scinde, 334.
2 Napier, Life. . . . of Sir C. J. Napier, II, 300


## p. 539 (#567) ############################################

THE SIKHS
539
in the Ameers would have proved less wise than Napier's policy of
vigilant coercion”: assuming for the moment that such were the
respective policies of the two men.
The conquest of Sind, however, cannot be said to be the fault of
any one man. Lord Auckland looking on the country as a portion
of the older Afghanistan treated its liberties or rather the liberties
of its conquerors—as subsidiary to the general Afghan policy, for
which again he can hardly be held altogether responsible. He left
the Sind problem in a desperate condition to his successor, but neither
of them seems to have wished to annex the country; circumstances
were too strong for both of them. As to Sir Charles Napier, who
came fresh to the country, he acted a soldier's part and acted it
extraordinarily well. He illustrated the extreme value of common-
sense and directness, and there is an element of profound, as well as
kindly, truth in his remark that "Outram is a clever fellow, but he
seems to have been so long accustomed to Indian tricks that he thinks
them of real importance". In any estimate of Napier's conduct the
instructions he received must always be remembered; and in parti-
cular those of 26 August, 1842 :
It may be convenient that you should at once be informed that, if the
Ameers or any one of them, should act hostilely or evince hostile designs
against our army, it is my fixed resolution never to forgive the breach of faith
and to exact a penalty which shall be a warning to every chief in India. 1
And yet the whole transaction has been thought to bear a colour of
injustice which may rightly be ascribed to some of its parts, and the
plea of the happiness of the people, who gained enormously by the
change, has not been held sufficient to justify what happened.
II. THE PANJAB
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Ranjit Singh, the
greatest of the Sikh rulers, had consolidated a powerful kingdom
north-west of the Satlej, and seemed likely to extend his empire as
far as the Jumna; he was aided on the one hand by the weakness of
the Afghans and on the other by the policy of the English, who
seemed disinclined at first to interfere owing to the more serious
responsibilities of their great struggle with the Marathas. Lake, it
will be einembered, and Wellesley defeated Sindhia and Holkar in a
series of great battles the result of which was to increase the import-
ance of the English in the north-west, and so to make the relations
between them and the Sikhs more vital. The Cis-Satlej chiefs fought
against the English in the battle of Delhi, and in 1805 Holkar fled to
Amritsar. Ranjit Singh was too clever to help him against Lake, and
the resulting treaty of Lahore of 1 January, 1806, kept the Marathas
out of the Panjab, secured the friendship of the English, and left the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, 408.


## p. 540 (#568) ############################################

510
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
>
Sikhs free from English interference for the time being north of the
Satlej. This state of affairs, however, was not to last.
The Cis-Satlej states had risen to virtual independence owing to
the gradual decline of the Muhammadan power, but they were
engaged in constant strife, and the unsettled state of the country they
inhabited invited the ambition of any freebooting adventurer. A
quarrel between the chiefs of Nabha and Patiala gave Ranjit Singh
an excuse to cross the Satlej (26 July, 1806) and to capture Ludhiana
which was at once transferred to his uncle Bhag Singh of Jind. The
English, under Lord Lake, had had considerable connection with
Sirhind and it was natural that the idea of the establishment of
Ranjit Singh's power in this wild and desolate country, for such it
was then, was viewed with some concern. And when he had crossed
the river a second time in 1807, the chiefs of Sirhind became suffi-
ciently alarmed to send and ask for British protection.
This was in
1808, at a time when the possibility of a French invasion of India
was much discussed, and though there was no definite answer at
once, the result was the sending in September of that year of Metcalfe
to Ranjit Singh with the purpose of arranging a treaty; at the same
time assurances of protection were given to the frightened chiefs.
For the moment it seemed likely that the negotiation would fall
through; Ranjit Singh crossed the Satlej for the third time, seized
Faridkot and Ambala, and would have taken Patiala had he not
feared English intervention. But the advance of Ochterlony with a
detachment, the adroitness of the young diplomatist who is said to
hava assured the Sikh chieftain that he could make conquests in other
directions without British interference, and it has been conjectured
the weakening of the danger from the West owing to the improved
relations between England and Mahmud II, the new sultan of Turkey,
caused Ranjit Singh to pause. On 9 February, 1809, Ochterlony
issued a warning proclamation to the effect that any further aggres-
sions south of the Satlej would be forcibly resisted; and this coupled,
as Cunningham suggests, with the fear that some of the Panjab chiefs
might also seek British protection, brought the great Sikh to terms.
He therefore signed the treaty of 25 April, 1809. This guaranteed
him against interference on the part of the English north of the
Satlej, and as to the left bank, it was stated in the second article)
that the raja would never maintain, in the territory which he occu-
pied there, more troops than were necessary for the internal duties
of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the
possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity. The transaction
was completed by a proclamation of 3 May, 1809, of which the
important articles ran as follows:
1. The country of the chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind having entered under
the British protection, they shall in future be secured from the authority and
influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, conformably to the terms of the treaty.
1 Aitchison, op. cit. vwa, 144.
. .


## p. 541 (#569) ############################################

RANJIT SINGH'S CONQUESTS
541
.
2. All the country of the chiefs thus taken under protection shall be
exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.
3. The chiefs shall remain in the full exercise of the same rights and
authority in their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were re-
ceived under the British protection.
4. Should a British army on purposes of general welfare, be required to
march through the country of the said chiefs, it is necessary and incumbent
that every chief shall, within his own possessions, assist and furnish, to the full
of his power, such force with supplies of grain and other necessaries which
may be demanded.
5. Should an enemy approach from any quarter, for the purpose of con-
quering this country, friendship and mutual interest require that the chiefs
join the British army with all their force, and, exerting themselves in expelling
the enemy, act under discipline and proper obedience. 1
The idea was that Ranjit Singh's Cis-Satlej conquests made before
the last campaign were to remain his, but that he was to have no
claim to allegiance from Cis-Satlej chiefs. Still, this was a very
important negotiation. On the one hand it directed Ranjit Singh's
energies elsewhere than southwards; he gave up. Faridkot and Ambala.
On the other it has been said to have moved the British frontier from
the Jumna to the Satlej. The relations of the protected chiefs among
themselves took a good deal of arranging. It was necessary to protect
the weak against the strong, when the fear of Ranjit Singh was
removed, and a proclamation had to be issued on 22 August, 1811,
to the effect that while the independence of the chiefs would be
respected nd their states duly protected, they would not be allowed
to usurp the rights of others. But it was long before all the various
claims were settled and rights established.
Ranjit Singh was thus free to devote his attention elsewhere. He
got the better of the Gurkhas from 1809 to 1811, taking the Kangra
district, and when the English war in 1814-15 with the same people
brought the English and Sikhs together in the mountains, there was
excellent reason for their remaining friends. Another similar reason
was supplied by the Afghan question. Shah Shuja had been driven
from Afghanistan in 1809-10. Ranjit Singh sought to prevent him
from getting aid from the English, in view of his own project against
Multan which he unsuccessfully endeavoured to seize in February,
1810. However, Shuja was soon carried off to Kashmir, and after
various adventures in the course of which Ranjit Singh secured the
Koh-i-nur from him, he returned to Ludhiana in 1816. Meanwhile
the Sikhs, though they secured Attock, defeating the Afghans at
Haidaru in 1813, did not manage to secure Kashmir. More important
during this period was their reduction of the northern plains and
lower hills by which they gradually strengthened themselves for
further efforts. The first of such was the capture of Multan, which
had been attempted more than once before, and which was effected
in 1818. In the same year, by taking advantage of the troubles which
followed Fath Khan's death, kanjit Singh entered Peshawar, though
1 Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (ed. 1918), p. 382. 2 Idem, p. 383.


## p. 542 (#570) ############################################

642
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
he relinquished it to the Barakzai governor Yar Muhammad Khan.
1819 saw him master of Kashmir. In 1823 he again took Peshawar,
and this time he left Yar Muhammad Khan to rule in his name. Thus
by 1824 he had added to his dominions the three Muhammadan states
of Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar. A small Sikh minority ruled
a vast kingdom almost equally divided as regards inhabitants bet-
ween Hindus and Muhammadans, the latter more numerous towards
the north-west. The older organisation of the misls or confederacies
each following a chief or group of chiefs had given place to an
organised military despotism although the phrases used by Ranjit
Singh disguised the fact. The whole strength of the state was devoted
to war. The system suited the Sikh people who were excellent
soldiers and it was not disliked by the military Muhammadans of the
Panjab whom Ranjit Singh slowly reduced to obedience. The mate-
rial at his disposal, recruits obtained by the feudal system of land
tenure, was rendered more formidable by the European methods of
discipline which he adopted; he used men who had deserted from
the British service to train his troops and soon Frenchmen and other
European officers like Allard, Court, Ventura and Avitabile joined his
service.
Sir Lepel Griffin has truly said that the conquest of the frontier
was a matter beyond the Sikh strength; it was inevitable that the
subjection of so much territory in the Himalayan region should
involve constant struggles and constant loss. The events of Ranjit
Singh's later years often made him wish that he had not had the
trouble of maintaining such expensive conquests. With the English
he became more friendly, especially as his relations with them were
in the hands of Captain Wade at Ludhiana. In the discussions as to
the districts south of the Satlej, the English gave way on some points
but secured Firozpur. But it required all Wade's skill until the end
of the Burmese War and the capture of Bharatpur to keep the Sikhs
quiet. After a troublesome religious revolt under Saiyid Ahmad
Shah Ghazi, who for a time (1830) held Peshawar, had been sup-
pressed, Ranjit Singh's position in India was very strong. It was now,
therefore, when the idea of counteracting Russian influence by the
forination of buffer states was in favour, that Lord William Bentinck
arranged the famous meeting with the Sikh ruler at Rupar on the
Satlej in October, 1831, when an assurance of friendship with the
English was given which satisfied both parties for different reasons.
Much discussion took place about Sind and about the navigation of
the Indus, Ranjit Singh agreeing that that river and the Satlej should
be open to commerce. He also gave up for the time being his designs
on Shikarpur (1832) on which he had fixed his mind.
Hence the attitude of the English in regard to Shah Shuja in these
years is easily understood. They looked upon his efforts to regain the
Afghan throne with benevolent neutrality, and left him to make his
own bargain with the Sikhs and the amirs of Sind. But the Sikhs got


## p. 543 (#571) ############################################

CAPTURE OF PESHAWAR
543
>
the advantage. The negotiations fluctuated from time to time. The
amirs feared the approach of the English, and in 1832 they offered
help if Shah Shuja would give up his claims on their country. He
agreed in case he succeeded. But he reopened the question with the
maharaja, and, finding that he was the only potentạte whom he had
to conciliate, he entered into an alliance with him in August, 1833.
This treaty was the basis of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838, and provided
that the districts beyond the Indus in possession of the Sikhs should
be formally ceded to them. The Sindians were abandoned and Shah
Shuja was allowed to proceed towards his native land by way of
Shikarpur where he defeated the Sindians, who had finally decided
to oppose him, on 9 January, 1834. He then passed on towards
Kandahar, near which city he was routed by Dost Muhammad and
his brothers: on 1 July, 1834, and later after much wandering and
various attempts to secure aid he reached Ludhiana again. Ranjit
Singh resolved to make what he could out of the affair, and accord-
ingly he sent Hari Singh, his general, and Nao Nihal Singh, his
grandson, who secured the town and citadel of Peshawar on 6 May,
1834, thus finally establishing Sikh power there. Dost Muhammad,
who had been so perplexed when Shah Shuja entered Afghanistan
that he had offered his submission to the government officials as a
dependent on Great Britain, now plucked up courage, calling himself
ghazi as well as amir, and advanced as he thought to retake Peshawar.
He still wished to secure English help, and tried to do so through his
nephew Abdul Ghiyas Khan, who was at Ludhiana. The English,
however, who had their attention still directed to the question of the
navigation of the Indus, declined to interfere. The result was that
Dost Muhammad came to the eastern end of the Khaibar and having,
on 11 May, 1835, been almost surrounded by the Sikhs, was glad to
retreat hurriedly enough with considerable loss of prestige. About
September in the same year he commenced negotiations with Persia
though still hoping for English aid. Hearing, however, that the Sikhs
had sent home some of their forces, he sent Muhammad Akbar Khan,
his son, who, though he failed to secure the Sikh position, won a
doubtful battle near Jamrud on 30 April, 1837, Hari Singh the great
Sikh leader being killed. Reinforcements, however, arriving,
Muhammad Akbar Khan had to retire without having taken either
Peshawar or Jamrud.
The defeat of the amirs of Sind by Shah Shuja frightened them
and they would probably have gladly allowed Ranjit Singh to have
taken Shikarpur if he would have protected them against further
attempts of the same kind. This did not please the English who, as
Cunningham points out were beginning to have political as well as
commercial schemes in those directions. Ranjit Singh did not really
wish to be friendly with the amirs, and kept a representative of the
exiled Kaloras in his state; he even began negotiating with Shah Shuje
once more. There was a good deal of local friction and the fortress
>


## p. 544 (#572) ############################################

544
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
of Rojhan, the stronghold of a robber tribe called Mazaris, who indecd
gave trouble to the Sikhs but could hardly be termed subjects of the
amirs, was taken by the governor of Multan in August, 1836. Soon
afterwards the Sikhs went south to Ken. As there seemed every
likelihood of further aggression, 'Lord Auckland decided to mediate,
especially as both parties were ready to declare open war.
December, 1836, Ranjit Singh yielded, though unwillingly, and agreed
to let things be on their own footing, retaining however Rojhan
and Mazari territory while he destroyed the fortress of Ken. It was
on this occasion that he asked the famous question of those who were
trying to dissuade him from peace what had become of the 200,000
spears of the Marathas.
There was then a feeling of intense hostility at this time between
the Afghans and the Sikhs. Both had considerable dread of the
English and the last thing they wished for was British interference.
Unfortunately this state of feelirig, which might otherwise have
passed naturally away, occurred at a time when the fear of the
Russians was the mainspring of Indian foreign politics. There were
also numerous French designs, and the story of Allard's diplomatic
character at the court of Lahore aroused suspicion; Wellington
afterwards (4 February, 1843) warned Lord Ellenborough of the
French connection. In such circumstances the English could please
no one. Ranjit Singh did not like to be restrained from action in
Sind and elsewhere; and Dost Muhammad would have gladly wel-
comed English aid against the Sikhs. The English chose perhaps
the worst possible way out of their difficulties.
The weakness of the scheme of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838 was
obvious. The English could not trust Shah Shuja to the Sikhs for
fear that the war of restoration should become a war of aggressioni
on their part. Ranjit Singh disliked the final passing of all hopes of
gaining Shikarpur, and although the march of a Sikh force through
the Khaibar with Shah Shuja's son was decided upon, the Sikhs not
altogether unnaturally decided to do as little as they could and to
gain the utmost advantage. At the end of 1838 Ranjit Singh met
Lord Auckland at Firozpur, where the British force was assembled,
but his health had failed. He heard of the fall of Kandahar, and died
on 27 June, 1839.
Ranjit Singh's power was personal and as he founded no perma-
nent institutions which could live apart from himself his death was
the signal for the beginning of anarchy. Cunningham, the sympathetic
historian of the Sikhs, has thus estimated his claims to greatness :
Ranjit Singh found the Punjab a waning confederacy, a prey to the factions
of its chiefs, pressed by the Afghans and the Marathas and ready to submit to
English supremacy. He consolidated the numerous petty states into a kingdom,
he wrested from Kabul the fairest of its provinces, and he gave the potent
English no cause for interference. He found the military array of his country
a mass of horsemen, brave indeed but ignorant of war as an Art, and he left it
mustering fifty thousand disciplined soldiers, fifty thousand well armed
>


## p. 545 (#573) ############################################

RANJIT SINGH'S CHARACTER
545
yeomanry and militia, and more than three hundred pieces of cannon for the
field. His rule was founded on the feelings of a people, but it involved the
joint action of the necessary principles of military order and territorial exten-
sion; and when a limit had been set to Sikh dominion, and his own commanding
genius was no more, the vital spirit of his race began to consume itself in
domestic contentions. 1
Sir Lepel Griffin admits his private vices :
"He was selfish, false and avaricious; grossly superstitious, shamelessly
and openly drunken and debauched”, and continues : “We only succeed in
establishing him as a hero, as a ruler of men, and as worthy of a pedestal in
that innermost shrine where history honours the few human beings to whom
may be indisputably assigned the palm of greatness, if we free our minds of
prejudice and, discounting conventional virtue, only regard the rare qualities
of force which raise a man supreme above his fellows. Then we shall at once
allow that, although sharing in full measure the commonplace and coarse vices
of his time and education, he yet ruled the country which his military genius
had conquered with a vigour of will and an ability which placed him in the
front rank of the statesmen of the century. " 2
Ranjit Singh when dying was said to have declared his imbecile
son Kharak Singh, his successor; but, though acknowledged in the
main, his claims were disputed by Shir Singh, a reputed child of
Ranjit Singh; while his own son, Nao Nihal Singh, a bold but vicious
youth of eighteen, wished to obtain the ascendancy. The wazir,
Dhian Singh, hated the able Resident, Wade, who supported Kharak
Singh, and Dhian Singh and Nao Nihal Singh both hated the imbecile
monarch's favourite, Chet Singh. Chet Singh was murdered on
8 October, 1839. Wade was replaced by Clerk as British agent at the
beginning of April, 1840, Wade's Sikh enemies persuading Auckland
that this step would secure easier communication between British
India and the forces in Afghanistan; Lord Auckland further imagined
that the long-cherished schemes for the opening of a valuable com-
merce with Afghanistan by way of the Indus were now about to take
shape. The only real and tangible result of these intrigues was the
increase of the power of Nao Nihal Singh who hoped by the reduction
in the strength of the rajas of Jammu, and then probably by the
destruction of Raja Dhian Singh, to make himself supreme. He was,
however, interrupted in his ambitious schemes by disputes with the
English as to the favouring by the Sikhs of Afghan rebels against
Shah Shuja and even treacherous communication with Dost Muham-
mad himself; and there was a very strong feeling on the part of men
like Macnaghten in favour of taking away of the Sikh territory, that
part of it at all events which had once been held by Afghanistan.
Kharak Singh died on 5 November, 1840, and on the same day his
more brilliant son, passing homewards from the funeral rites, was
crushed by the fall of the gateway in the Lahore fort, and so seriously
injured that he died the same night. How far his death was acci-
1 Cunningham, op. cit. p. 222.
? Griffin, Ranjit Singh, p. 95.
35


## p. 546 (#574) ############################################

546
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
dental was disputed; the rajas of Jammu had every reason to wish
for it.
The question now was as to the succession. Shir Singh was
preferred by the British agent, but he was not certainly legitimate.
After much intrigue the widow of Kharak Singh, Mai Chand Kaur,
who was supported by various Sikh chiefs, notably the Sindhianwala
family, which included men of note such as Atar and Ajit Singh
Sindhianwala, and like many other Sikh families of importance was
opposed to the rajas of Jammu, came forward and secured the reg-
ency. She was to hold it till it was seen whether Nao Nihal's widow
bore a son. Shir Singh was to be a kind of viceroy, and Dhian Singh
the wazir. This temporary arrangement was nominally in force when
Dost Muhammad surrendered, but the factions soon came to blows.
Shir Singh attacked Lahore in January, 1841, and was proclaimed
maharaja on the 18th of that month, the Sindhianwala family taking
refuge in flight. Shir Singh, however, though he might like to be king,
could not rule, and the obvious result followed that the army became
all powerful. The discussion of projects for armed intervention on
the part of the British Government, while it did not make things
easier for what authority there was in the country, enabled the Sikh
army to regard itself more and more as the representative body of
the Sikh people; its position resembled that of the Ironsides of the
seventeenth century without there being any Cromwell in control.
Another source of difficulty lay in the activity of Zorawar Singh who,
as deputy of the rajas of Jammu, after taking Skardu, seized Garo,
and seemed likely to conquer much of Chinese Tibet. When, however,
the English found him established near Almora they decided to
interfere, and ordered Garo to be restored by 10 December, 1841.
By this time the Chinese arrived and defeated the Sikhs in a wonder-
ful campaign in the mountains, one of the most awful perhaps in the
history of warfare, and peace was made in the autumn of 1842,
matters between China and the Sikhs being placed on their old foot-
ing. About the same time the English managed to prevent Gulab
Singh, the brother of Dhian Singh, from being made governor of the
Afghan province, which would have placed an enemy of the British
at Peshawar instead of the Italian Avitabile.
During the troubles connected with and following the insurrec-
tion at Kabul in November, 1841, the English were in the unpleasant
position of distrusting the Sikhs, and yet not being able to do without
their aid; this was added to the fact that the English had no decided
policy. They could claim help under the Tripartite Treaty, but the
Sikhs, as has been seen, helped but grudgingly, rather because the
authorities had little control over the army than for other reasons,
though such reasons were doubtless present. Some part, however,
they took, and it was suggested to give Jallalabad to them. But its
destruction by Pollock relieved them from taking what they really
did not want. That Ellenborough at this time viewed the prospect


## p. 547 (#575) ############################################

INTRIGUE AND MURDER
517
of a Sikh war with disfavour can be seen from his dispatch of 15
May, 1842.
In June, 1842, the murder of Mai Chand Kaur altered the state
of things at the court, but it did not relieve the difficulties of Shir
Singh, and, when the Sindhianwala chiefs came to an agreement with
the rajas of Jammu, his fate was sealed. On 15 September, 1843, he
was assassinated by Ajit Singh, who proceeded to kill his son Pertab
Singh also. But Dhian Singh also reaped the reward of his treachery,
and was murdered by his Sindhianwala allies. He left, however, a son,
Hira Singh, who, in spite of the hatred of the people for his family
and the Jammu rajas, managed to raise enough troops to kill Ajit
and Lahna Singh, the two Sindhianwalas, and to proclaim Dalip
Singh, a supposed son of Ranjit Singh by a woman afterwards
notorious enough, Rani Jindan. Hira himself took the post of wazir
much to the vexation of Suchet Singh, youngest of the Jammu rajas,
who now becomes prominent.
These struggles were intricate and not very important, the one
fact that mattered being that as they became more and more intense
they brought the army into ever greater prominence and importance.
Clerk had given way as Resident to Colonel Richmond, whose letters
have furnished the world with an account of what happened. The
maternal uncle of Dilip Singh, Jawahir Singh, having tried con-
clusions with the Jammu rajas in 1843, was cast into prison. Then
Kashmira Singh and Peshawara Singh, adopted sons of Ranjit Singh,
seized Sialkot, possibly with the connivance of Raja Suchet Singh,
who may also have procured the release of Jawahir Singh about the
same time, and who was killed while attempting an insurrection against
his nephew in March, 1844. The same fate overtook Atar Singh
Sindhianwala in the following May; he had fled to British territory
the year before and now returned, joined a religious fanatic, Bhai
Bir Singh, of some popularity, and managed to gain Kashmira Singh
to his cause. It is noteworthy that Hira Singh managed to secure the
adherence of the army by telling them that the Sindhianwalas were
relying upon English help. Kashmira Singh and Bhai Bir Singh both
shared Atar Singh's fate. This same feeling of resentment against the
English Hira Singh made use of about the same time when he preten.
ded that the English reliefs for Sind were directed against the Sikhs.
Serious grounds of dispute between the two peoples were bound
to arise. The central government of the Sikhs was no doubt a scene
of confusion and crime, but the nation was strong enough. Gilgit had
been annexed to Kashmir towards the end of 1843, and the Sikh army
was at once anxious for active service and also intensely supersti-
tious. "Our position", wrote Lord Ellenborough on 11 February, 1844,
“with respect to the Punjab. can now be viewed only in the light of
an armed truce. ”? The comparatively recent events in Afghanistan
1 Ellenborough Papers, 102.
? Law, India under Ellenborough, p. 11),


## p. 548 (#576) ############################################

848
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
and the news of a mutinous disposition in some of the Sepoy regi-
ments had lessened their respect for their powerful neighbour, whom
also they believed to be preparing to annex their territory. There
was a dispute as to a village in the Nabha state where both had
interests, and the action of the English in retaining the treasure of
Suchet Singh, which had been brought by him to Firozpur before his
death, was neither liked nor understood. Colonel Richmond too was
succeeded by Major Broadfoot as Resident on 1 November, 1844, and,
as he was suspected by the Sikhs, his appointment did not ease
matters:
When things were in rather a critical state, another revolution
took place by which Hira Singh was overthrown and slain on 21
December, 1844. With him fell his tutor, Pandit Jalla, who had acquired
much influence over him. For some time there was confusion, but
the power was secured by Jawahir Singh, the brother, and Lal Singh
the lover of Rani Jindan; Lal Singh, a Brahmin, had once been an
adherent of the Jammu rajas. They had, however, to reckon with
Gulab Singh, and sent the army against Jammu early in 1845. Gulab
saw that there was nothing for it but submission, so he parted with
vast sums of money and much territory and came to Lahore with
the army, with whom he became more or less a favourite. Jawahir
Singh became wazir on 14 May, 1845, and Gulab Singh retired to the
mountains again. In the same way Mulraj, who had succeeded to
the governorship of Multan when his father was assassinated in 1844,
anci who had shown some vigour, was forced to pay a fine and to
promise to surrender territory, when he heard that the army had
agreed to march against him. Peshawara Singh, who had taken refuge
in British territory the year before, also rebelled and was put to death
at Attock in September of this same eventful year. But Jawahir's
time was at hand. The all-powerful army distrusted him as a friend
of the English, even when he talked of making war against them.
The regimental panchayats, therefore, decided that he must die, and
he was shot on 21 September, 1845. Lal Singh now became wazir,
an unworthy ruler, but the power was not with him but with Sardar
Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, and the panchayats of the army.
The direct causes of the Sikh war with the English are obscure.
The English seeing the confusion which followed the death of Ranjit
Singh no doubt made preparations of a defensive kind; as the event
showed they would have been very foolish if they had not done so,
though there was some point in the words of a hostile critic: "To
be prepared is one thing; to be always making preparations another”.
The Sikhs, seeing more men placed in the neighbourhood of their
frontier, at a time when they knew that their own power was weaker
than before, drew the natural but erroneous inference that the English
wanted their country. And this impression was strengthened by the
fact that they knew that some of the Sikh chiefs would gladly have


## p. 549 (#577) ############################################

OUTBREAK OF WAR
649
seen the English come. There was the object lesson of Sind before
their eyes; they had always been an aggressive people themselves,
and they could not understand that a powerful nation could be
otherwise. They remembered, long after the English had ceased to
think about such matters, projects for sending troops to Lahore and
for handing Peshawar over to the Afghans; men had talked, too, in
the days of the Afghan occupation of "macadamising" the Panjab.
The actual changes in recent years, so far as troops are concerned,
have been summarised thus :
Up to 1838 the troops on the frontier amounted to one regiment at Sabatha,
and two at Ludhiana, with six pieces of artillery, equalling in all little more
than 2500 men. Lord Auckland made the total about 8000, by increasing
Ludhiana and creating Ferozepore. Lord Ellenborough formed further new
stations at Ambala, Kasauli and Simla, and placed in all about 14,000 men and
48 field guns on the frontier. Lord Hardinge increased the aggregate force to
about 32,000 men, with 68 field guns, besides having 100,00 men with artillery
at Meerut. After 1843, however, the station of Karnal, on the Jumna, was aban-
doned, which in 1838 and preceding years may have mustered about 4000 men.
But Lord Hardinge has shown that his father deserved even greater
credit than this account, believed to be from the pen of Lawrence,
would allow. The strength on the frontier, exclusive of hill stations
which remained the same, at the departure of Lord Ellenborough
was 17,612 men and sixty-six guns : at the outbreak of war it was
40,523 men and ninety-four guns. This comprises the garrisons of
Firozpur, Ludhiana, Ambala and Meerut. 1
Cunningham thinks that the Sikhs distrusted Major Broadfoot
because of angry proceedings on his part when passing through their
territory with Shah Shuja's family in 1841, and because of the
strong line he took when British agent with regard to the relations
between the Cis-Satlej states and the British Government.