(on his later philosophical
literary
activity, cf.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Brit.
, by Sorley ; Eng.
tr.
of Imp.
Phil.
Wonts, by G.
M.
Duncan, New
(Hanover, 1869); O. Caspari, L. 's Philosophit (Leips. 1870) ;
Haven, 1890 ; of the Sew Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N. Y. 1893]. Among the most influential " Enlighteners " in Germany was Leibniz's con
temporary and fellow-countryman, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728; Einlei- tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausfuhrung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; F. inl. znr Sittenlfhre, 1692 ; Ausfuhrung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenla Juris Xatutvt et Gentium ex Sensu Communi Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden. C. Th. , Berlin, 1805).
The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was born, 1679. in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ; he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there until bis death in 1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text books ; the latter all bear the title VernSnftige Gedanken [" Rational Thoughts," treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, ethics, politics, etc. ] ; in detail: von den Kraflen des menschlichen Verstander, 1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch alien Dingen uber- haupt, 1719; von der Menschen Thunund Lassen, 1720; torn gesellnchafllichen Leben der Menschen, 1721 ; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723 ; von den Absichten der natiirlichen Dinge, 1724; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiert und Pfianzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. 1718; Philosophia Piima sive Ontologia, 1728; Cosmologia, 1731; Psychnlo- gia Empirica, 1732 ; Rationalis, 1734 ; Theologia Xaturalis, 1736 ; Philosophia Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Xaturm, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo sophia Moralis, posthumously pub. , 1756. — Cf. K. G. Ludovici, Ausfiihrlicher Entwurfeiner vollstandigen Historieder Wolf schen Philosophic (Leips. 1736 ff. ). Also W. L. G. v. Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799).
Among the Wolffians may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfiiiger (1693-1750, Dilucidationes Philosophies de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc. , 1725) ; M. Knutzen (died 1751 ; Systema Causarum Efficientium, 1746 ; cf. B. Erd- mann, M. Kn. und seine, Zeit. Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Oottsched (1700-1766; Erste Grunde der yesammten Weltweissheit, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714- 1762; Metaphysica, 1739; ^Esthetica, 1750-58).
As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansen (1683- 1762; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790; cf. A. F. Bock, Summlung von Schriften, toelche dem logisrhen Calciil des Hernn P. bttreffen, Frankfort and Leips. 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crouaas (1663- 1748; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehre vom Schiinen, 1712), Andreas Rudiger (1071-1731 ; De Sensu Vert el Falsi, 1709; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) ami Chr. A. Croatua (1712-1775 ; Enttcurf der nothwendigen Vernunfticahrheiten,
1745 ; Wey zur Geioissheit und Zuverlassiykeit der menschlichen Erkenntnist,
1747. )
An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fi\,Budde (1667-1729;.
Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 445
Institution** Pkilo*ophioz Eclectics, 1706) and by the historians of philosophy, J. J. Bracket and D. Tiodmann, and also by Joh. Lossius (Die physiehen Ursachen des Wahren, 1776) ami A. Platner (1744-1818; Philoiophische Aphorismen, 1776 and 1782).
Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728. at Miil- hausen. died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmologische Britfe, 1761 ; Neue* Organon, 1764; Arehitektonik, 1771) and Nic. Tetena (17. 36M806; Philotophisehe Ver- ntrhe iiber die Mentchliche A'atur und ihre Entwicklung, 1776 f. ; cf. Fr. Harms,
Ueber die Ptycholoyie dee N. T, Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec tion with Kant (cf. l'art VI. ch. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like wise in this setting ; these are principally Allgemeine Saturgetehiehte und
Theorir de* Himmel*, 1766 ; Principiorum Primortim Cognitioni* Melaphysicoz Xora Dilueidatio, 1765 ; Mohndologia Phytiea, 1756 ; Die falsehe Spitzfindig- keit der virr syllogistischen Figvren, 1762 ; Der einzig mogliche, Beieeitgrund zu einer Demonstration det Daseins Oottes, 1763 ; Versiteh. den Begriff der nega- tiren Griissen in die Welticeisheit einzufuhren, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturliehen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobaehtungen iiber
da* fiefnhl de* Schtinen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; TrSume eine* Geistersehere, ertnutert durch TrSume der Metaphysik, 1766; De Mundi Sensibilis atque iHtelligibili* Forma et Principiis, 1770. CI. R. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor- gUnger Kant'*, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. Riehl, Der philoso- phiM-he Kritirirmut, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, K. Caird, The Critical Philonophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. 1889. Fischer's Kant; Cohen, Die *y*temati*chen Begriffe in Kant'* vorkrit- iachen Sehriften, and the works cited in first par. , p. 636. ]
Deism found a vigorous and instnictive support in Germany anions numer ous Wolffian*, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler
The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn hy Samuel Reimarua (1699-1768; Abhamllungen eon den vornehmsten M'ahr- kriten der nnOirlirhen Religion, 1754 ; Brtrachtitng iiber die Triebe der Thiere, 1760, especially his Sehutzerhrift fur die verniinftigen Verehrrr (fotte*, 1767 [not pub. ], from which Leasing' edited the " Wolfenbiittler Fragmente," and, wi more recent time, Dav. Fr. Strauss edited an extract, Leipe. 1862). Joh. Chr. Rdelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Monckeberg, Ilrimaru* und Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867).
The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was begun by Spener (1635-1706), and carried forward with organising energy by Aug. Herm. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated members of mystic sect* such as Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Conrad
IMppel (1673-1734).
Eaxtpixical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh
teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and •pecial investigations. There are C'asimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl. Kruger ( Vertueh einer erperimentalen Seelenlehre, 1766), J. J. Hentsch ( Ver- eweit fiber die Folge der Veranderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De Satura Animi et Poti**imum Cordis Humani, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen mnd UnUrturhuwjen liber den Mentrhen, 1777 ff. ) et of. The " Magazin zur ErfnhrungiwerlrnUhrr," edited by Morlts (1785-1793), formed a place for col lating contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage, Syttem der ftyehologie, I. 42 f.
A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum- garten's pupil, O. K'r. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Bal sas (1720-1779; Theorie der angenehmen Empfindungen, 17(li ; Ycrmitthte
Srhriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der trhSnen Kiinnte, 1771-1774, s
lexicon of aesthetics).
<>f the Popular Philoaophera may be mentioned Mom's Mendelssohn
<1720-1786; Briefe iiber die Empjlndungen, 1765; Ueber die Eridens in den i/etaphyiisrnen Winsenthaften, 1764; Pha-don, 1767; M<>rgen*lunden, 1785; Werke, ed. by Branch, Leips. 1881). the bnok-dcale* Fr. Nlcolai (17X1-1811), who published successively the Bibliothek der wrhi'men H'itsentcnaften, the
(1726-1791).
446 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Question*. [Part V.
Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgtmeine deutsche Biblio- thek, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek; further J. Aug. Eberhaxd (1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-1766), Joh. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph fur die Welt), J. J. H. Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Oarve (1742-1798).
A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf. Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Gr. als. Philosoph (Berlin, 1886).
Of Lessing's writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy are the Hamburger Dramaturgie, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechts. the Wolfenbiittler Fragmenle, and the theological controversial writings. Cf. Rob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Leasing (Studien und Kritiken, I. 126 ff. ) ; E. Zirngiebl, Der . 1acobi- Mendelssohn' sche Streit fiber Lessing's Spinozismus
(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Leasing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey {Prevss. Jahrb. 1879). [Eng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Race in Bohn Lib. ; of Laoccoon, by Phillimorc, Loud. 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Lond.
1873, 1879. ]
Among Herder's writings belong in this period, Ueber den Ursprung der
Sprache, 1772 ; Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774 ; Vom Erkennen und Empftnden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr. , Lond. 1800]; Gott, Gesprdche fiber Spinoza's System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beforderung der Humanitat, 1793 ff.
(on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part
VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seineh Werken (Berlin, 1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. ate Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen- berg, H. 's Philosophie (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit, by J. Sully].
Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880).
CHAPTER I.
THE THEORETICAL
QUESTIONS.
"The proper study of mankind is man. " This word of Pope's is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate end of all scientific investigation to be always man's "happiness," but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy, as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the principle,1 that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro versies the general question must be decided of how far human insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the course of development by which it is brought about, — from that time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the
front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas
should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time the instrument of mediation between science and general literature. As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both Englishmen and Germans was that of depicting minds and reflect ing or viewing one's self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con sciousness. Societies for the " observation of man " were founded, all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar nered in large "magazines," and the government of the French Republic in its official system of instruction,1 replaced "philoso phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de l'entendeinent humain. "
1 Introduction to the Essay. CI. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorlaufer Kant's (ZeiUehr. f. exaete Philosophic, 1861).
; Cl. the highly summing Stances de* f! coles Normal, first year. 447
448 Tlie Enlightenment: Theoretical Question*. [Part V
While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics, viz. that of notice realism. There, " without," is a world of things, of bodies or of who knows what else, — and here is a mind which is to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke, made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop ment, and one full of character in Descartes' important disciples, were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind.
In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the surface ; the qualitative " separation of the content and forms of consciousness from the outer world," to which alone they were nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence in Humes positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of adherence to the truths of sound common sense.
Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the
Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Ideat: Cambridge Platonists. 449
metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical domain.
§ 33. Innate Ideas.
With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and nationalism.
1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man, in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body. All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses, and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and
that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ; in his combating of atheism ' he had Hobbes in mind as one of his main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind, he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can say is that they resemble them. 1 In treating the conception of God, on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus gentium, and carries it out* in most extensive manner to show that this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitioz.
The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ ent sense by Descartes * and his disciples. Here the psychological question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations (Med. III. ) received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon his creature; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be
1 In the Sytrmn ItUetlertuale, especially at the close, V. 6, 28 tt.
*Il>. V. 1, 108 (I. (p. H0. 1 B. M<wh. ).
' The whole fourth chapter la devoted to this task.
* Cf. B. Grimm, Descartes' Lehre rondtn angtbortnen Idttn, Jena, 1873.
450 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V.
longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idea innatoe to all that lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of innate ideas. 1
2. Locke's polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into the world with and finds this question deserving of negative answer. 2 In consequence of this the development of the thesis "No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke's Essay directed less against Descartes than against the English Neo-Platonists. s It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology finds that neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally known or acknowledged. Nor does except from this demonstra tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God, since this not only very different among different men, but is even entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion
suggested by Henry More,4 that innate ideas might be contained in the soul not actually, but implicitly this could only mean, accord ing to Locke, that the soul capable of forming and approving them, — mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract truths, just where wanted and where this immediate assent
found rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time. *
Thus the soul again stripped of all its original possessions at birth like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), — white paper void of all characters. 6 In order to prove this positively, Locke then pledges himself to show that all our "ideas "'arise from experience Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption that the latter arise out of the former for the simple ideas, how-
De Veritate (1656), p. 76.
In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for was Des cartes' opinion also that was not to be assumed that the mind of the child pursues metaphysics in its mother's womb. Op. (C. ) VIII. 269.
Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhangigkeit Locke's von Descartes (Strassburg, 1887).
H. More, Antidot. adv. Ath. and and Locke, 22. Cf. Geil, op.
cit. , p. 49.
Locke, " 23 " The term idea
lb. II.
had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism
and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever Vorstellung).
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Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Idea* : Locke. 451
ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and rejtection, outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process. Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for reflection, — as regards their matter or content the relation is, that all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in connection with this content.
3. To these functions, however, belonged also all those by means of which the combination of the elements of consciousness into complex ideas takes place, i. e. all processes of thought. And here
Locke left the relation ^of the intellectual activities to their original sensuous contents in a popular indefiniteness which gave occasion to the most various re-shapings of his teaching soon after. For, on the one hand, those activities appear as the "faculties '' of the mind, which in reflection becomes conscious of these its own modes of
functioning (as for example, the capacity of having ideas itself,1 "perception," is treated as the most original fact of reflection, to understand which every one is sent to his own experience) ; on the other hand, the mind, even in these relating activities, such as recollecting, distinguishing, comparing, connecting, etc. , is regarded throughout as passive and bound to the content of the sensation. Hence it was possible for the most various views to develop out of Locke's doctrine, according to the varying degree of self-activity which was ascribed to the mind in its process of connecting its ideas.
Of particular interest in this connection, by reason of the problems of epistemology and metaphysics derived from the Middle Ages, was the development of the abstract ideas out of the data of sensation. Like the greater part of English philosophers, Locke was an ad herent of Nominalism, which professed to see in general concepts nothing but internal, intellectual structures. In explaining these general ideas, however, Locke made more account of the co-opera tion of "signs," and in particular of language. Signs or words, when attached more or less arbitrarily to particular parts of ideas, make it possible to lay special stress upon these parts and bring them out from their original complexes, and thereby render possible the farther functions by which such isolated and fixed contents of
1 Essay, II. 0, 1 t
462 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Pa*t V
consciousness are put into logical relations to one another. 1 Hence for Locke, as formerly for the Epicureans, and then for the Ter- minists, logic was coincident with the science of signs, semiotics. 1 By this means room was gained for a demonstrative science of con ceptions and for all abstract operations of the knowing mind, quite in the spirit of Occam, in spite of the sensualistic basis upon which all content of ideas was held to rest. None of these determinations were philosophically new, nor has their exposition in Locke any originality or independent power of thought : it is, however, smooth and simple, of agreeable transparency and easy to understand; it despises all scholastic form and learned terminology, glides skilfully over and away from all deeper problems, and thus made its author one of the most extensively read and influential writers in the history of philosophy.
4. Strongly as Locke had emphasised the independent existence of inner experience by the side of the outer (as followed from his metaphysical attachment to Descartes, on which see below, § 34, 1), he yet made the dependence of reflection upon sensation, as regards origin and content, so strong that it proved the decisive factor in the development of his doctrine. This transformation to complete sensualism proceeded along different paths.
In the epistemological and metaphysical development of Nomi nalism this transformation led with Locke's English successors to extreme consequences. Berkeley * not only declared the doctrine of the Reality of abstract conceptions to be the most extraordinary of all errors in metaphysics, but also — like the extreme Nominalists of the Middle Ages — denied the existence of abstract ideas within the mind itself. The illusory appearance of such ideas arises from the use of words as general terms ; but in truth, even in connection with such a word, we always think merely the sensuous idea, or the group of sensuous ideas, which at the beginning gave rise to that term. Every attempt to think the abstract alone shatters upon the sensuous idea, which always remains as the sole content of intellectual activity. For even the remembered ideas and partial ideas which can be separated out, have no other content than the original sense
1 The development of these logical relations between the ideational content* which have been singled out and fixed by means of the verbal signs, appears with Locke, under the name of the lumen naturale. Descartes had understood by this as well intuitive as also demonstrative knowledge, and had set all this natural knowing activity over against revelation ; Locke, who treats the intuitive with terministic reserve (cf. § 34, 1), restricts the signification of the "light of nature" to the logical operations and to the consciousness of the principles which obtain in these, according to the nature of the thinking faculty.
■' Essay, IV. 21, 4.
* Prinr. nf Human Knowledge, 5 ff.
Chap. 1, $ 33. ] Innate Ideas : Berkeley, Hume. 453
impressions, because an idea can never copy anything else than auother idea. Abstract ideas, therefore, are a fiction of the schools ; in the actual activity of thought none but sensuous particular ideas exist, and some of these can stand for or represent others similar to the in, on account of being designated by the same term.
David Hume adopted this doctrine in its full extent, and on the ground of this substituted for Locke's distiuction of outer and inner perception another antithesis with altered terminology, viz. that of the original and the copied. A content of consciousness is either original or the copy of an original, — either an '•impression" or an " idea. " All ideas, therefore, are copies of impressions, and there is no idea that has come into existence otherwise than by being a copy of an impression, or that has any other content than that which it has received from its corresponding impression. It ap peared, therefore, to be the task of philosophy to seek out the orig inal for even the apparently most abstract conceptions in some impression, and thereby to estimate the value for knowledge which the abstract conception has. To be sure, Hume understood by im
pressions by no means merely the elements of outer experience; he meant also those of inner experience. It was, therefore, accord ing to Locke's mode of expression, the simple ideas of sensation and reflection which he declared to be impressions, and the wide vision of a great thinker prevented him from falling into a short sighted sensualism.
5. A development of another sort, which yet led to a related goal, took place in connection with the aid of physiological psychology. Ix>cke had only thought of sensation as dependent upon the activity of the bodily senses, but had regarded the elaboration of seusation in the functions underlying reflection as a work of the mind; and though he avoided the question as to immaterial substance, he had throughout treated the intellectual activities in the narrower sense as something incorporeal and independent of the body. That this should be otherwise regarded, that thinkers should begin to consider the physical organism as the bearer or agent not only of the simple ideas, but also of their combination, was easily possible in view of the indecisive ambiguity of the Lockian doctrines, but was still more called out by one-sided conclusions drawn from Cartesian and Spimotistic theories.
Descartes, namely, had treated the whole psychical life of the animal as a mechanical process of the nervous system, while he had ascribed the human psychical life to the immaterial substance, the res cogitans. The more evident the completely sensuous nature of human ideation now seemed in consequence of Locke's investigation,
454 The EnliylUenment : Theoretical Question*. [Pajit V.
the nearer lay the question whether it was possible to maintain the position, that the same processes which in the animal seemed capa ble of being understood as nervous processes, should be traced back in the case of man to the activity of an immaterial psychical sub stance. — From another side, Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes worked in the same direction (cf. above, § 31, 9). According to this view a process in the bodily life corresponds to every process of the psychical life, without either process being the cause of th«
other, or one process being the original and the other the derived. (Such, at least, was the thought of the philosopher himself. ) This had now been conceived of at first by its opponents as materialism, as if Spinoza meant that the fundamental process was the bodik. and the psychical process only its accompanying phenomenon. But
scientists,
It is interesting that the consequences of these combinations of thought appeared in literary form first in Germany. Here as earlv as 1697 a physician named Pancratius Wolff taught in his Cogita- tiones Medico-legales that thoughts are mechanical activities of the human body, especially of the brain, and in the year 1713 appeared the anonymous Correspondence concerning the Nature of the Soul
( Briefwechsel vom Wesen der Seele),1 in which, screened by pious refutations, the doctrines of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes are car ried out to an anthropological materialism. A distinction of degree only is recognised between the psychical life of the animal and that of man ; ideas and activities of the will are without exception re garded as functions of excited nerve-fibres, and practice and educa tion are given as the means by which the higher position of man is reached and maintained.
In England the procedure was more cautious. In a way similar to that in which Locke had carried out the Baconian programme, men now studied primarily the internal mechanism of the psychical activ ities, and the development of the higher out of the elementary states according to purely psychological laws : such was the work of Peter Brown in the epistemological field, and that of others upon the domain of the activities of the will. In the same manner proceeded
1 Of which Lange gives an account, Qesrh. det Mat. , I. 319 ff. (3d ed. [Eng. tr. , History of Materialism, IL 37 £LJ ).
among its adherents also, both physicians and natural
such as the influential Boerhave of Leyden, a mode of thought in clining strongly toward materialism soon substituted itself for the master's doctrine.
(Hanover, 1869); O. Caspari, L. 's Philosophit (Leips. 1870) ;
Haven, 1890 ; of the Sew Essays, by A. G. Langley, Lond. and N. Y. 1893]. Among the most influential " Enlighteners " in Germany was Leibniz's con
temporary and fellow-countryman, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728; Einlei- tung zur Vernunftlehre, Ausfuhrung der Vernunftlehre, both in 1691 ; F. inl. znr Sittenlfhre, 1692 ; Ausfuhrung d. Sittenlehre, 1696 ; Fundamenla Juris Xatutvt et Gentium ex Sensu Communi Deducta, 1705 ; cf. A. Luden. C. Th. , Berlin, 1805).
The centre of scientific life in Germany during the eighteenth century was formed by the teaching and school of Christian Wolff. He was born, 1679. in Breslau, studied at Jena, was Privat-docent at Leipsic, and taught in Halle until he was driven away in 1723 at the instigation of his orthodox opponents ; he then became Professor at Marburg. In 1740 Frederick the Great called him back to Halle with great honour, and he was active there until bis death in 1754. He treated the entire compass of philosophy in Latin and German text books ; the latter all bear the title VernSnftige Gedanken [" Rational Thoughts," treating psychology, metaphysics, physics, physiology, botany, astronomy, ethics, politics, etc. ] ; in detail: von den Kraflen des menschlichen Verstander, 1712 ; von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch alien Dingen uber- haupt, 1719; von der Menschen Thunund Lassen, 1720; torn gesellnchafllichen Leben der Menschen, 1721 ; von den Wirkungen der Natur, 1723 ; von den Absichten der natiirlichen Dinge, 1724; von den Theilen der Menschen, Thiert und Pfianzen, 1725. The Latin works, Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. 1718; Philosophia Piima sive Ontologia, 1728; Cosmologia, 1731; Psychnlo- gia Empirica, 1732 ; Rationalis, 1734 ; Theologia Xaturalis, 1736 ; Philosophia Practica Universalis, 1738 ; Jus Xaturm, 1740 ff. ; Jus Gentium, 1749 ; Philo sophia Moralis, posthumously pub. , 1756. — Cf. K. G. Ludovici, Ausfiihrlicher Entwurfeiner vollstandigen Historieder Wolf schen Philosophic (Leips. 1736 ff. ). Also W. L. G. v. Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik bei den Deutschen von Leibniz an (Halle, 1799).
Among the Wolffians may be named, perhaps, G. B. Bilfiiiger (1693-1750, Dilucidationes Philosophies de Deo, Anima Humana, Mundo, etc. , 1725) ; M. Knutzen (died 1751 ; Systema Causarum Efficientium, 1746 ; cf. B. Erd- mann, M. Kn. und seine, Zeit. Leips. 1876) ; J. Chr. Oottsched (1700-1766; Erste Grunde der yesammten Weltweissheit, 1734) ; Alex. Baumgarten (1714- 1762; Metaphysica, 1739; ^Esthetica, 1750-58).
As representatives of the geometrical method appear M. G. Hansen (1683- 1762; Ars Inveniendi, 1727) and G. Ploucquet (1716-1790; cf. A. F. Bock, Summlung von Schriften, toelche dem logisrhen Calciil des Hernn P. bttreffen, Frankfort and Leips. 1766) ; as opponents of the same, Pierre Crouaas (1663- 1748; Logik, 1712 and 1724; Lehre vom Schiinen, 1712), Andreas Rudiger (1071-1731 ; De Sensu Vert el Falsi, 1709; Philosophia Synthetica, 1707) ami Chr. A. Croatua (1712-1775 ; Enttcurf der nothwendigen Vernunfticahrheiten,
1745 ; Wey zur Geioissheit und Zuverlassiykeit der menschlichen Erkenntnist,
1747. )
An eclectic intermediate position is taken by J. Fi\,Budde (1667-1729;.
Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 445
Institution** Pkilo*ophioz Eclectics, 1706) and by the historians of philosophy, J. J. Bracket and D. Tiodmann, and also by Joh. Lossius (Die physiehen Ursachen des Wahren, 1776) ami A. Platner (1744-1818; Philoiophische Aphorismen, 1776 and 1782).
Of more independent importance are J. H. Lambert (born, 1728. at Miil- hausen. died, 1777, in Berlin ; Kosmologische Britfe, 1761 ; Neue* Organon, 1764; Arehitektonik, 1771) and Nic. Tetena (17. 36M806; Philotophisehe Ver- ntrhe iiber die Mentchliche A'atur und ihre Entwicklung, 1776 f. ; cf. Fr. Harms,
Ueber die Ptycholoyie dee N. T, Berlin, 1887). Both stand in literary connec tion with Kant (cf. l'art VI. ch. 1), whose pre-critical writings belong like wise in this setting ; these are principally Allgemeine Saturgetehiehte und
Theorir de* Himmel*, 1766 ; Principiorum Primortim Cognitioni* Melaphysicoz Xora Dilueidatio, 1765 ; Mohndologia Phytiea, 1756 ; Die falsehe Spitzfindig- keit der virr syllogistischen Figvren, 1762 ; Der einzig mogliche, Beieeitgrund zu einer Demonstration det Daseins Oottes, 1763 ; Versiteh. den Begriff der nega- tiren Griissen in die Welticeisheit einzufuhren, 1763 ; Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturliehen Theologie und Moral, 1764 ; Beobaehtungen iiber
da* fiefnhl de* Schtinen und Erhabenen, 1764 ; TrSume eine* Geistersehere, ertnutert durch TrSume der Metaphysik, 1766; De Mundi Sensibilis atque iHtelligibili* Forma et Principiis, 1770. CI. R. Zimmerman, Lambert der Vor- gUnger Kant'*, 1879. [On Lambert and Tetens, cf. A. Riehl, Der philoso- phiM-he Kritirirmut, Leips. 1876. For the pre-critical writings of Kant, K. Caird, The Critical Philonophy of Immanuel Kant, Glasgow, Lond. , and N. Y. 1889. Fischer's Kant; Cohen, Die *y*temati*chen Begriffe in Kant'* vorkrit- iachen Sehriften, and the works cited in first par. , p. 636. ]
Deism found a vigorous and instnictive support in Germany anions numer ous Wolffian*, though nothing new in principle was added. Characteristic of this was the translation of the Bible by Lorens Schmidt. The standpoint of historical criticism of the biblical writings was maintained by Salomon Semler
The sharpest consequences of the deistic criticism were drawn hy Samuel Reimarua (1699-1768; Abhamllungen eon den vornehmsten M'ahr- kriten der nnOirlirhen Religion, 1754 ; Brtrachtitng iiber die Triebe der Thiere, 1760, especially his Sehutzerhrift fur die verniinftigen Verehrrr (fotte*, 1767 [not pub. ], from which Leasing' edited the " Wolfenbiittler Fragmente," and, wi more recent time, Dav. Fr. Strauss edited an extract, Leipe. 1862). Joh. Chr. Rdelmann was a Spinozistic free-thinker (1698-1767). Cf. K. Monckeberg, Ilrimaru* und Edelmann (Hamburg, 1867).
The movement of the so-called Pietism, allied to Mysticism, which was begun by Spener (1635-1706), and carried forward with organising energy by Aug. Herm. Francke (1663-1727), had only an indirect influence upon phil osophy during this period ; at a still farther distance stand the more isolated members of mystic sect* such as Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714) and Conrad
IMppel (1673-1734).
Eaxtpixical psychology was represented among the Germans in the eigh
teenth century by numerous names, comprehensive collections, text-books, and •pecial investigations. There are C'asimir von Creuz (1724-1770), Joh. Gottl. Kruger ( Vertueh einer erperimentalen Seelenlehre, 1766), J. J. Hentsch ( Ver- eweit fiber die Folge der Veranderung der Seele, 1726), J. Fr. Weiss (De Satura Animi et Poti**imum Cordis Humani, 1761), Fr. v. Irwing (Erfahrungen mnd UnUrturhuwjen liber den Mentrhen, 1777 ff. ) et of. The " Magazin zur ErfnhrungiwerlrnUhrr," edited by Morlts (1785-1793), formed a place for col lating contributions to this favourite science. Further literature in K. Fortlage, Syttem der ftyehologie, I. 42 f.
A theory of art upon the basis of empirical psychology is found in Baum- garten's pupil, O. K'r. Meier (1718-1777), and especially in Joh. Georg Bal sas (1720-1779; Theorie der angenehmen Empfindungen, 17(li ; Ycrmitthte
Srhriften, 1773 ff. ; Allgemeine Theorie der trhSnen Kiinnte, 1771-1774, s
lexicon of aesthetics).
<>f the Popular Philoaophera may be mentioned Mom's Mendelssohn
<1720-1786; Briefe iiber die Empjlndungen, 1765; Ueber die Eridens in den i/etaphyiisrnen Winsenthaften, 1764; Pha-don, 1767; M<>rgen*lunden, 1785; Werke, ed. by Branch, Leips. 1881). the bnok-dcale* Fr. Nlcolai (17X1-1811), who published successively the Bibliothek der wrhi'men H'itsentcnaften, the
(1726-1791).
446 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Question*. [Part V.
Briefe die neueste deutsche Literatur betreffend, the Allgtmeine deutsche Biblio- thek, and the Neue Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek; further J. Aug. Eberhaxd (1738-1809), Joh. Bernh. Basedow (1723-1790), Thomas Abbt (1738-1766), Joh. Jac. Engel (1741-1802; editor of the Philosoph fur die Welt), J. J. H. Feder (1740-1821), Chr. Meiners (1747-1810), Chr. Oarve (1742-1798).
A highly interesting position personally is occupied by Frederick the Great the Philosopher of Sanssouci. On him, cf. Ed. Zeller, Fr. d. Gr. als. Philosoph (Berlin, 1886).
Of Lessing's writings those of chief importance for the history of philosophy are the Hamburger Dramaturgie, the Erziehung des menschen Geschlechts. the Wolfenbiittler Fragmenle, and the theological controversial writings. Cf. Rob. Zimmerman, Leibniz und Leasing (Studien und Kritiken, I. 126 ff. ) ; E. Zirngiebl, Der . 1acobi- Mendelssohn' sche Streit fiber Lessing's Spinozismus
(Munich, 1861) ; C. Hebler, Leasing- Studien (Bern, 1862) ; W. Dilthey {Prevss. Jahrb. 1879). [Eng. tr. of the Ham. Dram, and Education of Human Race in Bohn Lib. ; of Laoccoon, by Phillimorc, Loud. 1875 ; cf. Sime, Lessing, Lond.
1873, 1879. ]
Among Herder's writings belong in this period, Ueber den Ursprung der
Sprache, 1772 ; Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1774 ; Vom Erkennen und Empftnden der menschlichen Seele, 1778 ; Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 1784 ff. [Eng. tr. , Lond. 1800]; Gott, Gesprdche fiber Spinoza's System, 1787 ; Briefe zur Beforderung der Humanitat, 1793 ff.
(on his later philosophical literary activity, cf. below, Part
VI. ch. 2). Cf. R. Haym, H. nach seinem Leben und seineh Werken (Berlin, 1877-85) ; E. Melzer, H. ate Geschichtsphilosoph (Neisse, 1872) ; M. Kronen- berg, H. 's Philosophie (Heidi. 1889) [art. Herder in Enc. Brit, by J. Sully].
Cf. also J. Witte, Die Philosophie unserer Dichterheroen (Bonn, 1880).
CHAPTER I.
THE THEORETICAL
QUESTIONS.
"The proper study of mankind is man. " This word of Pope's is characteristic of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, not only in the practical sense that this philosophy finds the ultimate end of all scientific investigation to be always man's "happiness," but also, in the theoretical point of view, in so far as this philosophy, as a whole, aims to base all knowledge upon the observation of the actual processes of the psychical life. After Locke had set up the principle,1 that prior to all metaphysical considerations and contro versies the general question must be decided of how far human insight reaches, and that this in turn is possible only by exact exhi bition of the sources from which knowledge derives, and of the course of development by which it is brought about, — from that time epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was brought into the
front rank of philosophical interests, and at the same time empirical psychology was recognised as the authoritative and decisive court of last resort for epistemology. The legitimate reach of human ideas
should be judged by the way in which they arise. Thus experiential psychology with all the tacit assumptions which are customary in it becomes at once the basis of the whole philosophical view of the world, and the favourite science of the age, and is at the same time the instrument of mediation between science and general literature. As in this latter field, the predominant characteristic among both Englishmen and Germans was that of depicting minds and reflect ing or viewing one's self in the literary looking-glass, so philosophy should draw only the image of man and of the activities of his con sciousness. Societies for the " observation of man " were founded, all sorts of dilettante accounts of remarkable experiences were gar nered in large "magazines," and the government of the French Republic in its official system of instruction,1 replaced "philoso phy " by the sounding title, "Analyse de l'entendeinent humain. "
1 Introduction to the Essay. CI. M. Drobisch, Locke, Der Vorlaufer Kant's (ZeiUehr. f. exaete Philosophic, 1861).
; Cl. the highly summing Stances de* f! coles Normal, first year. 447
448 Tlie Enlightenment: Theoretical Question*. [Part V
While accordingly among the theoretical questions of the Enlight enment philosophy, those as to the origin, development, and know ing power of human ideas stood uppermost, these were from the beginning placed beneath the presupposition of popular metaphysics, viz. that of notice realism. There, " without," is a world of things, of bodies or of who knows what else, — and here is a mind which is to know them. How do the ideas, which reproduce within the mind that world of things, get into it ? This way of stating the problem of knowledge, which is like that of the ancient Greeks, controls the theoretical philosophy of the eighteenth century completely, and attains in it both most perfect formulation and decisive disintegra tion. Just in this respect the Cartesian metaphysics with its dualism of conscious and corporeal substances takes a controlling position through the entire age of the Enlightenment, and the popular empirical mode of expression in which it was presented by Locke, made this author the leader of the new movement. The methodical and metaphysical considerations which had reached a great develop ment, and one full of character in Descartes' important disciples, were now translated into the language of empirical psychology, and so arranged for the comprehension of the ordinary mind.
In connection with this, however, the terminism which was in herent in all modern philosophy, and which had been fostered especially in England (Hobbes), forced its way victoriously to the surface ; the qualitative " separation of the content and forms of consciousness from the outer world," to which alone they were nevertheless held to relate, was carried farther and deeper, step by step, until it at last reached its extreme consequence in Humes positivism. To the scientific dissolution which metaphysics thus experienced, corresponded in turn a popularly practical and preten tiously modest turning away from all speculation of more than ordinary refinement, or an all the more express profession of adherence to the truths of sound common sense.
Whatever metaphysical interest remained vigorous in the En lightenment literature attached itself to the religious consciousness and to those endeavours which hoped to attain out of the strife of religious Confessions to a universal and rational conviction. In the deism which extended over Europe from the English free-thinking movement, the positive views of the world and of life of the En lightenment period became concentrated, and while these convic tions at the outset developed out of the connection with the natural science metaphysics of the preceding century, and in consequence of this devoted an especially lively interest to the problems of teleology, they became shifted with time more and more from the
Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Ideat: Cambridge Platonists. 449
metaphysical to the moral, from the theoretical to the practical domain.
§ 33. Innate Ideas.
With regard to the question as to the origin of ideas the philoso phy of the Enlightenment found already in the field the sharply pronounced antithesis of Sensualism and nationalism.
1. The first of these had been defended by Hobbes on the theo retical as also upon the practical domain, inasmuch as he held man, in so far as he is an object of scientific knowledge, to be an entirely sensuous being, bound to the sensations and impulses of the body. All ideas, in his view, have their origin in the activity of the senses, and the mechanism of association was held to explain the arising of all other psychical structures from these beginnings. Such doctrines seemed to bring in question the super-sensuous dignity of man, and
that not only in the eyes of the orthodox opponents of Hobbes ; the same motive determined the Neo-Platonists also to lively opposi tion. Cudworth especially had distinguished himself in this respect ; in his combating of atheism ' he had Hobbes in mind as one of his main opponents, and in opposition to the doctrine that all human ideas arise from the operation of the outer world upon the mind, he appeals especially to mathematical conceptions. The corporeal phenomena never completely correspond to these ; the most we can say is that they resemble them. 1 In treating the conception of God, on the other hand, he lays claim to the argument of the consensus gentium, and carries it out* in most extensive manner to show that this idea is innate. In like manner, Herbert of Cherbury had already grounded all the main doctrines of natural religion and morals by the aid of the Stoic and Ciceronian doctrine of the communes notitioz.
The doctrine of innate ideas was conceived in a somewhat differ ent sense by Descartes * and his disciples. Here the psychological question as to the origin of ideas was less in mind, although this question, too, at a decisive passage in the Meditations (Med. III. ) received the answer that the innateness of the idea of God was to be conceived of as a sign which the creator had imprinted upon his creature; but on the whole the great metaphysician had laid more weight upon the point that the criterion of innateness consists in immediate evidence or certainty. Hence he had finally extended the designation (almost stripped of the psychological meaning be
1 In the Sytrmn ItUetlertuale, especially at the close, V. 6, 28 tt.
*Il>. V. 1, 108 (I. (p. H0. 1 B. M<wh. ).
' The whole fourth chapter la devoted to this task.
* Cf. B. Grimm, Descartes' Lehre rondtn angtbortnen Idttn, Jena, 1873.
450 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Part V.
longing to it at the outset) of the Latin idea innatoe to all that lumine naturali dare et distincte percipitur. Direct assent had been adduced by Herbert of Cherbury also as the characteristic mark of innate ideas. 1
2. Locke's polemical attitude toward the maintenance of innate ideas has, indeed, an epistemological purpose, but is really deter mined only by the psycho-genetic point of view. He asks primarily only whether the soul at its birth brings complete knowledge into the world with and finds this question deserving of negative answer. 2 In consequence of this the development of the thesis "No innate principles in the mind" in the first book of Locke's Essay directed less against Descartes than against the English Neo-Platonists. s It combats first of all the consensus gentium, by an appeal to the experience of the nursery and of ethnology finds that neither theoretical nor practical principles are universally known or acknowledged. Nor does except from this demonstra tion (with an express turn against Herbert) even the idea of God, since this not only very different among different men, but is even entirely lacking with some. Nor does Locke allow the evasion
suggested by Henry More,4 that innate ideas might be contained in the soul not actually, but implicitly this could only mean, accord ing to Locke, that the soul capable of forming and approving them, — mark which would then hold for all ideas. The imme diate assent, finally, which was held to characterise that which innate, does not apply in the case of the most general abstract truths, just where wanted and where this immediate assent
found rests upon the fact that the meaning of the words and of their connection has been already apprehended at an earlier time. *
Thus the soul again stripped of all its original possessions at birth like an unwritten sheet (cf. p. 203), — white paper void of all characters. 6 In order to prove this positively, Locke then pledges himself to show that all our "ideas "'arise from experience Here he distinguishes simple and complex ideas in the assumption that the latter arise out of the former for the simple ideas, how-
De Veritate (1656), p. 76.
In which, moreover, Descartes completely agreed with him, for was Des cartes' opinion also that was not to be assumed that the mind of the child pursues metaphysics in its mother's womb. Op. (C. ) VIII. 269.
Cf. (and also for the following) G. Geil, Die Abhangigkeit Locke's von Descartes (Strassburg, 1887).
H. More, Antidot. adv. Ath. and and Locke, 22. Cf. Geil, op.
cit. , p. 49.
Locke, " 23 " The term idea
lb. II.
had lost its Platonic sense already in later Scholasticism
and taken on the more general meaning of any mental modification whatever Vorstellung).
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Chap. 1, § 33. ] Innate Idea* : Locke. 451
ever, he announces two different sources : sensation and rejtection, outer and inner perception. Under sensation he understands the ideas of the corporeal world, brought about by the medium of the bodily senses ; under reflection, on the other hand, the knowledge of the activities of the soul itself called out by the above process. Psycho-genetically, therefore, these two kinds of perception are so related that sensation is the occasion and the presupposition for reflection, — as regards their matter or content the relation is, that all content of ideas arises from sensation, while reflection, on the contrary, contains the consciousness of the functions performed in connection with this content.
3. To these functions, however, belonged also all those by means of which the combination of the elements of consciousness into complex ideas takes place, i. e. all processes of thought. And here
Locke left the relation ^of the intellectual activities to their original sensuous contents in a popular indefiniteness which gave occasion to the most various re-shapings of his teaching soon after. For, on the one hand, those activities appear as the "faculties '' of the mind, which in reflection becomes conscious of these its own modes of
functioning (as for example, the capacity of having ideas itself,1 "perception," is treated as the most original fact of reflection, to understand which every one is sent to his own experience) ; on the other hand, the mind, even in these relating activities, such as recollecting, distinguishing, comparing, connecting, etc. , is regarded throughout as passive and bound to the content of the sensation. Hence it was possible for the most various views to develop out of Locke's doctrine, according to the varying degree of self-activity which was ascribed to the mind in its process of connecting its ideas.
Of particular interest in this connection, by reason of the problems of epistemology and metaphysics derived from the Middle Ages, was the development of the abstract ideas out of the data of sensation. Like the greater part of English philosophers, Locke was an ad herent of Nominalism, which professed to see in general concepts nothing but internal, intellectual structures. In explaining these general ideas, however, Locke made more account of the co-opera tion of "signs," and in particular of language. Signs or words, when attached more or less arbitrarily to particular parts of ideas, make it possible to lay special stress upon these parts and bring them out from their original complexes, and thereby render possible the farther functions by which such isolated and fixed contents of
1 Essay, II. 0, 1 t
462 The Enlightenment : Theoretical Questions. [Pa*t V
consciousness are put into logical relations to one another. 1 Hence for Locke, as formerly for the Epicureans, and then for the Ter- minists, logic was coincident with the science of signs, semiotics. 1 By this means room was gained for a demonstrative science of con ceptions and for all abstract operations of the knowing mind, quite in the spirit of Occam, in spite of the sensualistic basis upon which all content of ideas was held to rest. None of these determinations were philosophically new, nor has their exposition in Locke any originality or independent power of thought : it is, however, smooth and simple, of agreeable transparency and easy to understand; it despises all scholastic form and learned terminology, glides skilfully over and away from all deeper problems, and thus made its author one of the most extensively read and influential writers in the history of philosophy.
4. Strongly as Locke had emphasised the independent existence of inner experience by the side of the outer (as followed from his metaphysical attachment to Descartes, on which see below, § 34, 1), he yet made the dependence of reflection upon sensation, as regards origin and content, so strong that it proved the decisive factor in the development of his doctrine. This transformation to complete sensualism proceeded along different paths.
In the epistemological and metaphysical development of Nomi nalism this transformation led with Locke's English successors to extreme consequences. Berkeley * not only declared the doctrine of the Reality of abstract conceptions to be the most extraordinary of all errors in metaphysics, but also — like the extreme Nominalists of the Middle Ages — denied the existence of abstract ideas within the mind itself. The illusory appearance of such ideas arises from the use of words as general terms ; but in truth, even in connection with such a word, we always think merely the sensuous idea, or the group of sensuous ideas, which at the beginning gave rise to that term. Every attempt to think the abstract alone shatters upon the sensuous idea, which always remains as the sole content of intellectual activity. For even the remembered ideas and partial ideas which can be separated out, have no other content than the original sense
1 The development of these logical relations between the ideational content* which have been singled out and fixed by means of the verbal signs, appears with Locke, under the name of the lumen naturale. Descartes had understood by this as well intuitive as also demonstrative knowledge, and had set all this natural knowing activity over against revelation ; Locke, who treats the intuitive with terministic reserve (cf. § 34, 1), restricts the signification of the "light of nature" to the logical operations and to the consciousness of the principles which obtain in these, according to the nature of the thinking faculty.
■' Essay, IV. 21, 4.
* Prinr. nf Human Knowledge, 5 ff.
Chap. 1, $ 33. ] Innate Ideas : Berkeley, Hume. 453
impressions, because an idea can never copy anything else than auother idea. Abstract ideas, therefore, are a fiction of the schools ; in the actual activity of thought none but sensuous particular ideas exist, and some of these can stand for or represent others similar to the in, on account of being designated by the same term.
David Hume adopted this doctrine in its full extent, and on the ground of this substituted for Locke's distiuction of outer and inner perception another antithesis with altered terminology, viz. that of the original and the copied. A content of consciousness is either original or the copy of an original, — either an '•impression" or an " idea. " All ideas, therefore, are copies of impressions, and there is no idea that has come into existence otherwise than by being a copy of an impression, or that has any other content than that which it has received from its corresponding impression. It ap peared, therefore, to be the task of philosophy to seek out the orig inal for even the apparently most abstract conceptions in some impression, and thereby to estimate the value for knowledge which the abstract conception has. To be sure, Hume understood by im
pressions by no means merely the elements of outer experience; he meant also those of inner experience. It was, therefore, accord ing to Locke's mode of expression, the simple ideas of sensation and reflection which he declared to be impressions, and the wide vision of a great thinker prevented him from falling into a short sighted sensualism.
5. A development of another sort, which yet led to a related goal, took place in connection with the aid of physiological psychology. Ix>cke had only thought of sensation as dependent upon the activity of the bodily senses, but had regarded the elaboration of seusation in the functions underlying reflection as a work of the mind; and though he avoided the question as to immaterial substance, he had throughout treated the intellectual activities in the narrower sense as something incorporeal and independent of the body. That this should be otherwise regarded, that thinkers should begin to consider the physical organism as the bearer or agent not only of the simple ideas, but also of their combination, was easily possible in view of the indecisive ambiguity of the Lockian doctrines, but was still more called out by one-sided conclusions drawn from Cartesian and Spimotistic theories.
Descartes, namely, had treated the whole psychical life of the animal as a mechanical process of the nervous system, while he had ascribed the human psychical life to the immaterial substance, the res cogitans. The more evident the completely sensuous nature of human ideation now seemed in consequence of Locke's investigation,
454 The EnliylUenment : Theoretical Question*. [Pajit V.
the nearer lay the question whether it was possible to maintain the position, that the same processes which in the animal seemed capa ble of being understood as nervous processes, should be traced back in the case of man to the activity of an immaterial psychical sub stance. — From another side, Spinoza's parallelism of the attributes worked in the same direction (cf. above, § 31, 9). According to this view a process in the bodily life corresponds to every process of the psychical life, without either process being the cause of th«
other, or one process being the original and the other the derived. (Such, at least, was the thought of the philosopher himself. ) This had now been conceived of at first by its opponents as materialism, as if Spinoza meant that the fundamental process was the bodik. and the psychical process only its accompanying phenomenon. But
scientists,
It is interesting that the consequences of these combinations of thought appeared in literary form first in Germany. Here as earlv as 1697 a physician named Pancratius Wolff taught in his Cogita- tiones Medico-legales that thoughts are mechanical activities of the human body, especially of the brain, and in the year 1713 appeared the anonymous Correspondence concerning the Nature of the Soul
( Briefwechsel vom Wesen der Seele),1 in which, screened by pious refutations, the doctrines of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes are car ried out to an anthropological materialism. A distinction of degree only is recognised between the psychical life of the animal and that of man ; ideas and activities of the will are without exception re garded as functions of excited nerve-fibres, and practice and educa tion are given as the means by which the higher position of man is reached and maintained.
In England the procedure was more cautious. In a way similar to that in which Locke had carried out the Baconian programme, men now studied primarily the internal mechanism of the psychical activ ities, and the development of the higher out of the elementary states according to purely psychological laws : such was the work of Peter Brown in the epistemological field, and that of others upon the domain of the activities of the will. In the same manner proceeded
1 Of which Lange gives an account, Qesrh. det Mat. , I. 319 ff. (3d ed. [Eng. tr. , History of Materialism, IL 37 £LJ ).
among its adherents also, both physicians and natural
such as the influential Boerhave of Leyden, a mode of thought in clining strongly toward materialism soon substituted itself for the master's doctrine.
