On the contrary,
Augustine
[*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief.
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief.
Summa Theologica
By origin of contrition I mean the process
of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit
not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term
of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace.
Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be
contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term,
it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because
then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding
dispositions.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Although all mortal sins agree in turning man
away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and
in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different
ways in which they turn us to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had
infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins
one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of
Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond
to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.
It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas
Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of
spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the
generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that
all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the
accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation:
whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary
to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner,
one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life;
whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to
each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to
confess each sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
(2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
(3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible
sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some
hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e. g. the hurt of a
wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now
the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite
person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for
the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that
contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary,
the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable
admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in
the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is
very slight.
Objection 4: Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of
displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite
than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of
hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all
manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "all
sorrow is based on love. " Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow
of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of
contrition is the greatest sorrow.
Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the
greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its
punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses
all other sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above ([4828]Q[1], A[2], ad 1), there is a
twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very
essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin,
and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the
more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the
last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us
away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The
other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former
sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers
follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a
penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of
these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the
lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through
redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation
of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the
more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently
there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible
hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason;
and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates
on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the
reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which
results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is
not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the
subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed
voluntarily greater than other sorrows---both because the lower
appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the
lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of
such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain---and because the
passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a
certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does
not observe, but exceeds.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the
sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of
something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived
by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt
by the interior sense or reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Affections of the body are the immediate result
of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the
higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from
sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from
the spiritual sorrow of contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does
not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but
increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight
which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in
learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who
rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it
may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the
reason in the sensitive part.
Reply to Objection 4: The degree of displeasure at a thing should be
proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin
is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is
offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to
him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he
should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful
to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him
from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a
punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing
this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less
hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among
all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to
the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt,
inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest
of all punishments will be separation from God.
Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that
there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present
and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the
character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from
suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he
shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul
corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present
evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the
mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater
effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater
effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And,
since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the
effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly
remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest
than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed,
sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his
past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over
again rather than commit the same sin.
We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some
punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e. g. separation from
God; and some also are everlasting, e. g. the punishment of hell.
Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be
shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is
simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these
punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of
punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an
offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.
We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus
disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because
man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least
seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some
sensible hurt, which is more known to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys
its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to
cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says
(Orat. lii): "Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as
to dry up the marrow of my body"; and Augustine [*De Contritione
Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that "he deserves to blind
his eyes with tears. " Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great.
Objection 2: Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of
charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither,
therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.
Objection 3: On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess
and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz.
penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can
be too great.
I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i. e.
the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an
offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love
of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid
displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow,
contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may
be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding
of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the
fulfillment of one's duties; hence it is written (Rom. 12:1): "Let your
sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg. : 'Present your bodies . . . a
reasonable sacrifice']. "
Reply to Objection 1: Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried
up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor,
but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although
Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily
eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only
eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be
blinded.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers the sorrow which is in
the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater
than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that "she
deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones. " Therefore one need
not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
Objection 2: Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now
one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and
more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than
for another.
Objection 3: Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away
from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since
they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God.
Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of
the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be. " Now, in contrition,
the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition
is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition
should be for one sin more than for another.
Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have
avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin
is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other.
Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the
more grievous, than for the other.
I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far
as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow
in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more
grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense
against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate
the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater
sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive
part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the
punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But
in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the
impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the
disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from
the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.
Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all
one's sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition
arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus
although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains
virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of
each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for
another.
Reply to Objection 1: Paula is commended, not for deploring all her
sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as
though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who
grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much
more.
Reply to Objection 2: In that instantaneous movement of contrition,
although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in
respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained
above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general
contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of
sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against
God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not
actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in
proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a
community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their
respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry
for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in
different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Although each mortal sin turns us away from God
and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than
others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out
of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?
(3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the
whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so
should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's
life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is forgiven
has nothing to be ashamed of. " Therefore it seems that neither should
contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity
casteth out fear, because fear hath pain. " But sorrow also has pain.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of
perfect charity.
Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it
is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as
something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this
life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a
past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment.
Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:28) that "to them that love
God all things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares
[*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat. ]. Therefore there is no need for them
to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with
satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases,
penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains. " Therefore,
since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been
granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin
forgiven. " Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be
forgiven him.
I answer that, As stated above ([4829]Q[3], A[1]), there is a twofold
sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the
sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the
former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of
the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one
detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end
of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life
towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course
cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains
during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin.
The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the
will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting
punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting
punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain
during the whole of man's eternity, i. e. during the whole of the state
of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St.
Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man
from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal
detestation of sin. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act;
wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no
further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow,
which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but
also as having a hurt connected with it.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed
to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the
punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as
stated above ([4830]Q[3], A[2]): wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his
former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he
never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something
always remains from his past sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may
come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that
good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or
providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods;
rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man
should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed,
which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that
there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is
proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature
whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of
contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it
derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue
always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when
that which follows is taken away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin
continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident
from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord
always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice. " Now it is not possible
to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient
to grieve for sin continually.
Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to
be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is
necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or
cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is
written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the
reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): "For sadness hath killed many, and
there is no profit in it. " Moreover the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any
longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already
blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not
expedient to grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant. ): "Sorrow is a
good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood. " Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief. "
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as
is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn. "
Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to
its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act
of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the
more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better
it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he
ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both
in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow,
which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long,
man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy:
and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we
should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is
assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even
after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and
as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away. " Therefore the
displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition,
remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for
punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible
punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they
grieve for the sins they committed.
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.
Therefore contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
contrition.
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition,
it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted
through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered
from their sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first,
its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious
and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly
country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by
reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which
quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for
their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for
they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these
three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those
who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes
all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have
charity, they have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but
their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of
contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory,
cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction
demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the
punishment due may be called satisfaction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the
effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore
contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue
follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the
Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to
confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of
their sins.
On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which
sins are loosed. "
Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same
causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the
heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by
the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.
I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part
of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as
part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the
forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments
(cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an
act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For
a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification,
and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to
denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise
in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced
to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the
forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words
uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby
sins are forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the
infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far
as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the
ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion
until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church,
although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of
punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for
man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so
perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.
Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt
of punishment.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way
compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that
"by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis.
11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be
remitted by contrition.
Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an
infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore
contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God
than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the
heart's affections, such as contrition is.
Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said
(Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account
of his one act of repentance.
As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by
contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv,
D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question
was raised with regard to Penance.
I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways.
First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in
this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the
contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt,
but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the
sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this
sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice
for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices
for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound
to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition
would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing
united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on
account of the precept given concerning confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward
parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior
members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit
drieth up the bones. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in
its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet
it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so
it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to
blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily
remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal
a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out
very great sins.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for
greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does
not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions.
Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin,
because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all
sins.
I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835]
Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow.
One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can
be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e. g. if a sin were
less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to
be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity.
The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no
hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong
essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor
again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow,
however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots
out all sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from
the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which
suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin.
This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same
applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more
for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant
to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of
sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would
suffice for the remission of the sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for
our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3)
Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of
confession.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
(3) Whether all are bound to confession?
(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for
salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of
grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for
one's sins.
Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without
confession, e. g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits
sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is
it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.
Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should
receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has
committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man
himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
confession is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence,
in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense.
Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even
that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems
that confession is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the
physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known
to him. " But it is necessary for salvation that man should take
medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man
should make his disease known by means of confession.
Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused.
Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge,
but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to
him.
I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original
nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.
Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a
sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at
least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually,
through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is
incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just
as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for
salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man
through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church,
to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by
confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that,
through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the
pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless
he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the
penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the
salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission
of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a
debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are
ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and
before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does
not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies
to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the
keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the
priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in
confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for
salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins,
because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission
of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open,
without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to
its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it
may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded
in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the
sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz.
original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the
case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself,
cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself,
though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on
the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner
returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives
infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from
someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is
first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin
also must needs take its remedy from another.
Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation
of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which
is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the
sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be
imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently
confession is necessary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is according to the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural
law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.
Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and
New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast
anything to justify thyself. " Therefore it is according to the natural
law.
Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he
confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a
man, I have hid my sin. " Therefore confession is according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. ) that the natural law is the
same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it
is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one
who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of
the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they
ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the
sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but
a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet.
ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but
of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is
sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from
its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things
are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature.
But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these
are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of
miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of
the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin
before God: because the confession which is made to God by the
acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas
here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made
voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of
one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same
way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a
kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same
manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law
of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before
God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare
his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the
fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not
necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed,
or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by
denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may
gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck.
of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit
not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term
of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace.
Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be
contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term,
it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because
then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding
dispositions.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Although all mortal sins agree in turning man
away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and
in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different
ways in which they turn us to creatures.
Reply to Objection 3: Baptism acts in virtue of Christ's merit, Who had
infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins
one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of
Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond
to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.
It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas
Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of
spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the
generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that
all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the
accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation:
whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary
to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner,
one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life;
whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to
each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to
confess each sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
(2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
(3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible
sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some
hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e. g. the hurt of a
wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now
the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite
person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for
the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that
contrition is not the greatest sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary,
the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable
admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in
the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is
very slight.
Objection 4: Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of
displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite
than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of
hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all
manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "all
sorrow is based on love. " Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow
of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of
contrition is the greatest sorrow.
Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the
greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its
punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses
all other sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above ([4828]Q[1], A[2], ad 1), there is a
twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very
essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin,
and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the
more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the
last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us
away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The
other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former
sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers
follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a
penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of
these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the
lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through
redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation
of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the
more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently
there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible
hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason;
and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates
on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the
reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which
results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is
not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the
subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed
voluntarily greater than other sorrows---both because the lower
appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the
lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of
such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain---and because the
passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a
certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does
not observe, but exceeds.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the
sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of
something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived
by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt
by the interior sense or reason.
Reply to Objection 2: Affections of the body are the immediate result
of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the
higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from
sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from
the spiritual sorrow of contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does
not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but
increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight
which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in
learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who
rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it
may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the
reason in the sensitive part.
Reply to Objection 4: The degree of displeasure at a thing should be
proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin
is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is
offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to
him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he
should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful
to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him
from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a
punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing
this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less
hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among
all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to
the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt,
inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest
of all punishments will be separation from God.
Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that
there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present
and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the
character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from
suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he
shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul
corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present
evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the
mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater
effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater
effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And,
since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the
effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly
remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest
than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed,
sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his
past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over
again rather than commit the same sin.
We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some
punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e. g. separation from
God; and some also are everlasting, e. g. the punishment of hell.
Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be
shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is
simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these
punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of
punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an
offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.
We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus
disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because
man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least
seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some
sensible hurt, which is more known to us.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys
its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to
cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says
(Orat. lii): "Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as
to dry up the marrow of my body"; and Augustine [*De Contritione
Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that "he deserves to blind
his eyes with tears. " Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too
great.
Objection 2: Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of
charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither,
therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.
Objection 3: On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess
and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz.
penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can
be too great.
I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i. e.
the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an
offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love
of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid
displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow,
contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may
be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding
of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the
fulfillment of one's duties; hence it is written (Rom. 12:1): "Let your
sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg. : 'Present your bodies . . . a
reasonable sacrifice']. "
Reply to Objection 1: Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried
up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor,
but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although
Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily
eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only
eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be
blinded.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers the sorrow which is in
the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater
than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that "she
deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones. " Therefore one need
not be more sorry for one sin than for another.
Objection 2: Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now
one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and
more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than
for another.
Objection 3: Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away
from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since
they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God.
Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of
the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be. " Now, in contrition,
the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition
is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition
should be for one sin more than for another.
Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have
avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin
is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other.
Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the
more grievous, than for the other.
I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far
as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow
in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more
grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense
against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate
the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater
sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive
part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the
punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But
in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the
impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the
disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from
the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.
Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all
one's sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition
arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus
although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains
virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of
each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for
another.
Reply to Objection 1: Paula is commended, not for deploring all her
sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as
though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who
grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much
more.
Reply to Objection 2: In that instantaneous movement of contrition,
although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in
respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained
above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general
contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of
sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against
God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not
actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in
proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a
community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their
respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry
for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in
different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.
Reply to Objection 3: Although each mortal sin turns us away from God
and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than
others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out
of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?
(3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the
whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so
should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one's
life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that "he whose sin is forgiven
has nothing to be ashamed of. " Therefore it seems that neither should
contrition last all one's life, since it is sorrow for sin.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity
casteth out fear, because fear hath pain. " But sorrow also has pain.
Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of
perfect charity.
Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it
is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as
something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this
life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a
past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment.
Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:28) that "to them that love
God all things work together unto good," even sins as a gloss declares
[*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat. ]. Therefore there is no need for them
to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.
Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with
satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction.
Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.
On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa
Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that "when sorrow ceases,
penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains. " Therefore,
since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been
granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one's sins.
Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin
forgiven. " Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be
forgiven him.
I answer that, As stated above ([4829]Q[3], A[1]), there is a twofold
sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the
sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the
former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of
the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one
detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end
of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life
towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course
cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains
during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin.
The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the
will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting
punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting
punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain
during the whole of man's eternity, i. e. during the whole of the state
of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St.
Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man
from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal
detestation of sin. "
Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act;
wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no
further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow,
which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but
also as having a hurt connected with it.
Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed
to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the
punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as
stated above ([4830]Q[3], A[2]): wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his
former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he
never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something
always remains from his past sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may
come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that
good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or
providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods;
rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man
should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.
Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed,
which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that
there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is
proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature
whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of
contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it
derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue
always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when
that which follows is taken away.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin
continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident
from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, "Rejoice in the Lord
always," says that "it is necessary to rejoice. " Now it is not possible
to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient
to grieve for sin continually.
Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to
be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is
necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or
cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is
written (Ecclus. 30:24): "Drive away sadness far from thee," and the
reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): "For sadness hath killed many, and
there is no profit in it. " Moreover the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any
longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already
blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not
expedient to grieve any longer.
Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant. ): "Sorrow is a
good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with
wormwood. " Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve
continually.
On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an
unknown author] says: "The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice
in his grief. "
Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible,
those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as
is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, "Blessed are they that mourn. "
Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.
I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that
in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii,
6,7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure
seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance,
there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to
its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act
of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the
more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better
it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he
ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both
in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow,
which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so
ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long,
man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to
worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has
sorrow itself for object.
Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy:
and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we
should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is
assumed, demands.
Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even
after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin.
Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and
as to its habit, since "charity never falleth away. " Therefore the
displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition,
remains.
Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for
punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible
punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they
grieve for the sins they committed.
Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But
satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition.
Therefore contrition remains after this life.
On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But
the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does
contrition.
Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and
punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition,
it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted
through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered
from their sensible pain, which is false.
I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first,
its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue
quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious
and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory.
Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly
country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by
reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no
contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which
quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for
their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for
they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these
three can be found.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those
who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes
all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have
charity, they have no contrition.
Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but
their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of
contrition.
Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory,
cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction
demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the
punishment due may be called satisfaction.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there
are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?
(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the
effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat
the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore
contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.
Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue
follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together
in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness
of sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the
Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to
confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of
their sins.
On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to God is an
afflicted spirit," says: "A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which
sins are loosed. "
Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same
causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the
heart's inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by
the heart's ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.
I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part
of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the
cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as
part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the
forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments
(cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an
act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin's forgiveness. For
a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification,
and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to
denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise
in the case of an agent's disposition to act, because this is reduced
to the genus of efficient cause.
Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the
forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and
likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words
uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby
sins are forgiven.
Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the
infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far
as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the
forgiveness of sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the
ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion
until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church,
although his sin may be forgiven him before God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of
punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for
man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so
perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction.
Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt
of punishment.
Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way
compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of
the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that
"by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis.
11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be
remitted by contrition.
Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an
infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore
contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.
On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God
than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt
by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the
heart's affections, such as contrition is.
Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said
(Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account
of his one act of repentance.
As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by
contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv,
D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question
was raised with regard to Penance.
I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways.
First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in
this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the
contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt,
but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the
sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this
sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice
for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices
for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound
to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition
would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing
united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on
account of the precept given concerning confession.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward
parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior
members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): "A sorrowful spirit
drieth up the bones. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in
its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet
it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so
it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to
blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily
remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal
a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out
very great sins.
Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for
greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does
not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions.
Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.
On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin,
because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened
by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all
sins.
I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835]
Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow.
One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can
be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e. g. if a sin were
less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to
be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity.
The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no
hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong
essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor
again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow,
however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots
out all sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from
the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which
suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin.
This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same
applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.
Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more
for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant
to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of
sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would
suffice for the remission of the sin.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for
our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3)
Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of
confession.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?
(3) Whether all are bound to confession?
(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?
(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?
(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for
salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the
remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of
grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for
one's sins.
Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without
confession, e. g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits
sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is
it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.
Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should
receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has
committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man
himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore
confession is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence,
in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense.
Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even
that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems
that confession is not necessary for salvation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): "If you want the
physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known
to him. " But it is necessary for salvation that man should take
medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man
should make his disease known by means of confession.
Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused.
Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge,
but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to
him.
I answer that, Christ's Passion, without whose power, neither original
nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the
reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it.
Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a
sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at
least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually,
through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently
those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is
incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation: and so just
as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for
salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man
through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church,
to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by
confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that,
through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the
pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless
he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the
penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the
salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission
of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a
debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are
ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and
before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does
not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies
to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal
punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the
keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the
priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in
confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for
salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins,
because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission
of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open,
without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to
its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it
may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded
in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the
sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament
without using the things which belong to the sacrament.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz.
original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the
case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself,
cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner.
Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself,
though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on
the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner
returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives
infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from
someone else, because "that which is last in order of generation is
first in the order of intention" (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin
also must needs take its remedy from another.
Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation
of sin's punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which
is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the
sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be
imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently
confession is necessary.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether confession is according to the natural law?
Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural
law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the
natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin.
Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.
Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and
New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed
in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: "Tell, if thou hast
anything to justify thyself. " Therefore it is according to the natural
law.
Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he
confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) "If, as a
man, I have hid my sin. " Therefore confession is according to the
natural law.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v. ) that the natural law is the
same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it
is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one
who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of
the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.
I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they
ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge
of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the
sacraments. And since "the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but
a product of a certain innate power," as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet.
ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but
of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is
sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from
its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things
are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature.
But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these
are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of
miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of
the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is
according to Divine, but not according to natural law.
Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin
before God: because the confession which is made to God by the
acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas
here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply
that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural
law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court
of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his
sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made
voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of
one's sins, is not according to the natural law.
Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same
way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a
kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same
manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law
of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before
God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare
his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the
fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not
necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed,
or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.
Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by
denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may
gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all are bound to confession?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for
Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin,"
etc. : "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck.
