No More Learning

We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the
Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we
suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of
which we are now going to enter.


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle
of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions--the 10th, which
he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and
9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and
12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have
been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only
begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and
volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The
number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised
in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000
auxiliaries,[196] we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not
including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the
baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not
count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost
one-fourth near the Saône.

In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two
legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the
retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the
youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout,
doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it
impossible for it to act.




CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.

(Year of Rome 696. )

(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes. ]

I. On the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of
nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for
having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered
their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit
to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters
previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly.
Cæsar gave his consent.

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in
tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of
their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine,
from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied
the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most
warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of
which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men
for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers
fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the
property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong
his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly
lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and
drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these
failed, they were fed upon grass. [197] Masters of themselves from
infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons,
bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of
their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of
prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign
horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses,
though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through
exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle,
often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought
on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving. [198] The
belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them
the contempt for life. [199] They boasted of being surrounded by immense
solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of
their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported,
indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded,
for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they
bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the
German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed
them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the
Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners. [200]

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from
west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis
forests. (_See Plate 2. _) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and
the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube
and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the
east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is,
the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians.
It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march. [201]
The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of
Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and
that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula
from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries
situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and
the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of
Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of
Wurtemberg. [202] To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (_partly in
Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria_);[203] to the north,
the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the
west, the Marcomanni (_the upper and middle course of the Maine_) and
the Sedusii (_between the Maine and the Neckar_); to the south, the
Harudes (_on the north of the Lake of Constance_), the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges (_the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden_).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (_the territory of Bâle
and part of the Brisgau_); the Triboces (_part of Alsace and of the
Grand Duchy of Baden_): on the right bank were the Nemetes (_opposite
Spire_); the Vangiones (_opposite Worms_); the Ubii, from the Odenwald
to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were
the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe.
Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north,
towards the mouth of the Rhine. (_See Plate 2. _)


[Sidenote: The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance. ]

II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made
the following complaints against Ariovistus:--“The German king,” they
said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different
peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he
had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in
consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating
conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani
themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are
now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a
third of their territory;[204] another third is on the point of being
given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some
months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the
Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the
invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent
it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his
arms, and by the fame of his recent victory. ”

Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw
herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny,
and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised
them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these
complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought
under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the
Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once
masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and
Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy.
Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with
Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the
Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards
Strasburg),[205] as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as
to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized.
Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s
consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would
encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing
to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar
sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If
Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for
all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him
bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he
rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in
virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M.
Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that
which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to
defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people. ”

By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law,
enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors
to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely
appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor
of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required
exceptional laws. [206] The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:--

“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits
no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has
himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence
diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui;
the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little
service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved
Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the
valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter
under a roof. ”[207]


[Sidenote: March of Cæsar upon Besançon. ]

III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened
Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the
devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the
Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing
to cross the Rhine. [208] Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of
these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the
collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced
marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of
July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the
neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar
followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges
are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey,
and Dancevoir, led to Langres. [209] (_See Plate 4. _) After three long
days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that
Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most
considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three
days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of
urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with
everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march
towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day
and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of
it, and placed a garrison there. [210]

The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still
applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature,
that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a
circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred
feet,[211] which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high
mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the
river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and
connects it with the _oppidum_. ”[212]

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had
advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he
was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of
taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from
his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to
pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of
Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous
cavalry.


[Sidenote: Panic in the Roman Army. ]

IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of
August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took
possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men
of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect.
Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in
war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the
hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help
receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who
wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the
innumerable solicitations of influential people. [213] This panic had
begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one
made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the
difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of
provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the
illegality of the enterprise. [214]

Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he
admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the
assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek
information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He
reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the
Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated
the German race in the revolt of the slaves;[215] that the Helvetii had
often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten
the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the
difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent
in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to
pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the
Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is
already ripe in the fields (_jamque esse in agris frumenta matura_). As
to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them
themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns
(_signa laturi_). [216] Words like these would not shake him; the soldier
despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own
fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As
to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii
affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without
delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient
to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty.
If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the
10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had
always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the
greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of
discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at
the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise
and of those whose services he affected to disdain,--this proud
assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the
minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for
fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for
the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they
were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their
tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and
fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the
war, as that appertained only to the general. [217]


[Sidenote: March towards the Valley of the Rhine. ]

V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information
concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired
him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from
Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army
had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is
composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of
the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and
the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered
with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more
difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold
elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened
undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains
of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier
communications. (_See Plate 4. _)

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on
which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting
his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and
difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than
fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),[218] which is represented by a
semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from
Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul
as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and
Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then
he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine
by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he
learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of
not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have
travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on
the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from
Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres. ) At this moment,
Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to
the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he
consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and
that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him. ” Cæsar did
not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more
reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following. [219] In the
interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus,
who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that
Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides,
they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter,
unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not
daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted
on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular
saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to
make us prætorians, and he makes us knights. ”[220]


[Sidenote: Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus. ]

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed
by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly
equal distance from either camp. [221] This was the place of meeting of
the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from
the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The
latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and
that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen.
When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the
Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that
constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the
abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated
his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He
had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which
he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had
subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has
sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of
benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if
he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety;
the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans
belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the
Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is
only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard
him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the
gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages
in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price,
he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free
possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may
undertake. ”

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one
of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not
consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman
people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the
Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor
imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked,
the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if
it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free,
since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her
own laws. ”

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the
cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing
stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the
conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the
attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in
order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that
he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an
interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal
attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon
known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the
conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants.
Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had
again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus
his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the
barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius
Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke
the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and
M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of
hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he
ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were
spies. [222]


[Sidenote: Movements of the two Armies. ]

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another
position at the foot of the Vosges (_sub monte_), at a distance of 6,000
paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the
Lauch. (_See Plate 6. _) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its
confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the
Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three
kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut
off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he
left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the
Lingones. [223] (_See the Map of Gaul, 2. _) The two armies thus encamped
at a short distance from each other. During the five following days,
Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle
at the head of his camp (_pro castris suas copias produxit_), but was
not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to
cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000
horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom
each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to
circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter
advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up
with the horses, running and holding by the mane. [224]

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his
camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them,
chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that
occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three
lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third
on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is
perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of
Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops
and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works.
Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled
the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a
part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal
camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and
backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his
tactics (_instituto suo_) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he
drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and
placed them in order of battle (_paulum a majoribus castris progressus,
aciem instruxit_). In spite of this advanced position (_ne tum
quidem_), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army
re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops
immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till
evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing
that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general
battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons
charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not
be conquerors if they fought before the new moon. [225]


[Sidenote: Battle against the Germans. ]

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar
placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the
smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the
Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by
displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for
the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by
the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then
Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he
led them up to the enemy’s camp (_usque ad castra hostium accessit_).
This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of
avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,[226]
drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals--Harudes,
Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to
deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on
the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which
they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the
warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery
to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the
German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly
covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch. [227]

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them
witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion
either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor. [228] He led the attack in
person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed
weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his
side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great
that the Romans, not having time to use the _pilum_, throw it away, and
fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their
custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of
three or four hundred men,[229] and cover their bare heads with their
bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they
still remain standing. [230] Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that
many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and
striking the enemies from above. [231] The short and sharp-pointed swords
of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the
Germans. [232] Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their
victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness
with which they kept their ranks.
[233] Ariovistus’s left did not resist
long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming
in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of
the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and
better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third
line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat.
Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout
then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they
reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle. [234] They
descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus
retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (_See Plate 4. _)
Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to
pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in
boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a
boat[235] he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and
Appian,[236] 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit.
Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a
Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and
the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the
enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by
victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain,
and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be
burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we
have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the
Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt
near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable
number of the fugitives.

Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed
his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the
season required--at the beginning of September--and left them under the
command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in
Cisalpine Gaul. [237]


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign:--

1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and
thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches
to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into
cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (_alarii_),
by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a
greater number of legions.

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves
as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P.
Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the
following manner:--

Rendezvous of the Helvetii on the
banks of the Rhone (the day of the
equinox) March 24.

Cæsar refuses them a passage through
the province April 8.

Arrival at the confluence of the Rhone
and the Saône of the legions from
Italy and Illyria June 7.

Defeat of the Tigurini on the Saône June 10.

Passage of the Saône by Cæsar June 12.

About fifteen days’ march (_De Bello
Gallico_, I. 15) From June 13 to June 27.

Manœuvre of Labienus to surprise the
Helvetii June 28.

Battle of Bibracte June 29.

Cæsar remains three days interring the
dead; marches on the fourth; employs
six days in his march from
the field of battle to the country of
the Lingones, and there overtakes
the Helvetii in their retreat,
From June 30 to July 8.

Negotiations with Ariovistus (a month),
From July 8 to August 8.

Departure of Cæsar (from Tonnerre,
to meet Ariovistus) August 10.

Arrival of Cæsar at Besançon August 16.

Abode of Cæsar at Besançon,
From August 16 to August 22.

Departure from Besançon (“the harvest
is ripe,” _De Bello Gallico_, I. 40) August 22.

March of seven days from Besançon
to the Rhine From August 22 to August 28.

Interview (five days afterwards) September 2.

Manœuvres (about eight days),
From September 3 to September 10.

Battle of the Thur (fought before the
new moon, which took place on the
18th of September) September 10.




CHAPTER V.

WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ.

(Year of Rome 697. )

(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: League of the Belgæ. Cæsar advances from Besançon to the
Aisne. ]

I. The brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the
Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the
same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the
nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which
were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania.
The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their
turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to
peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood
that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining
possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul
entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.

Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public
rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two
legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of
spring,[238] sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant
Q. Pedius. [239] It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania
promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of
the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount
Pœrinus (_Great St. Bernard_), after having traversed the country of
the Salassi (_Valley of Aosta_), and that this latter people offered at
first to assist Cæsar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads
and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing
their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged
their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that,
towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent
Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their
perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy. [240]

As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person,
probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in
winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts
who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform
him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and
an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering
into campaign.

His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches
and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of
5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding
to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and
Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was,
in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the
command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least
60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines,
drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius,
amounted to a very considerable number. [241]

After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the
second fortnight in May, passed the Saône at Seveux (_see Plate 4_),
crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at
Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory
of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the
distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François. [242]

The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (_qui
proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt_). Astonished at his sudden appearance,
they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of
their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every
kind of succour. They informed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms,
and that the Germans on that side of the Rhine had joined the coalition;
for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the
excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from
their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with
them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgæ,” they
added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who
preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri,
had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly,
each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents:--The
Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they
have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of
the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile
territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they
have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the
allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and
the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii,
7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000;
the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and
Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000;
in all, about 296,000 men. ”[243]


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Camp at Berry-au-Bac. ]

II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the formidable character
of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to
divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus,
in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with
the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the
Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his
presence, and the children of the _principes_ to be brought to him as
hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him,
he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the
extremity of the territory of the Remi (_quod est in extremis Remorum
finibus_),[244] and encamp there in a strong position, to await the
enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the
Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the
village of Berry-au-Bac. (_See Plate 7. _) He marched in great haste
towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the
right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the
Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that
river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (_See Plate 8. _) This hill,
called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the
valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents
sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to
the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side
which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks
of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne
defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and
the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the
countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work
to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of
the bridge, where he established a post (_see Plates 8 and 9_),[245] and
he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius
Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment
twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide. [246]

Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the
country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the
territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman
camp (_see Plate 7_), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax
(_Vieux-Laon_). [247] The Belgæ attacked it vigorously, and it was
defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts,
attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants,
throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the
defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced
against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the
attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar
that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour.
Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and
Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides.
This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the
enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time
round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses,
they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his
camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a
front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).

The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led
the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in
his eyes an incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to
ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of
Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of
the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated
plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not
yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a
general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of
ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This
commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes
of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might
have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the
stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To
meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a
fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres)
in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second
joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established
redoubts, in which were placed military machines. [248]


[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne. ]

III. Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two
newly-raised legions to serve as a reserve in case of need, Cæsar placed
the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the
retrenchments. The enemy also drew out his troops and deployed them in
face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting
till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment
for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry
were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Cæsar,
perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes,
withdrew his legions. The Belgæ immediately left their position to move
towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their
object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where
there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could,
the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut
the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and
ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the
Romans drew their supplies.

The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus
perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac;[249] he immediately
gave information to Cæsar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed
Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and,
descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place
threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the
Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage,
the Belgæ, after having experienced considerable loss, advance
intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a
shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded
by the cavalry and massacred. [250]


[Sidenote: Retreat of the Belgæ. ]

IV. The Belgæ having failed in taking the _oppidum_ of Bibrax, in
drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river,
and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home,
to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be
first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision
was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci
by Divitiacus and the Ædui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single
instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths. Towards ten o’clock
in the evening, the Belgæ withdrew in such disorder that their departure
resembled a flight. Cæsar was informed immediately by his spies, but,
fearing that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his
legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better
informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the
lieutenants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,[251] and ordered
Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the
fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At
sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they
had received, returned to the camp. [252]

The coalition of the Belgæ, so renowned for their valour, was thus
dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of importance to the Roman general, in
order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to
subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league
against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered
upon that of the Remi.


[Sidenote: Capture of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium. ]

V. The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from
their fright, Cæsar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its
left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long
day’s march (45 kilomètres) before Noviodunum (_Soissons_) (_see Plate
7_), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the
same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the
fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered
covered galleries to be advanced (_vineas agere_),[253] and all things
necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of
fugitive Suessiones threw themselves into the town during the following
night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the
foundations of a terrace[254] to pass the fosse (_aggere jacto_) were
established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the
greatness and novelty of these works, so promptly executed, offered to
surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.

Cæsar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even
the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and
accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army
into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all
they possessed, in the _oppidum_ of Bratuspantium (_Breteuil_). [255] The
army was only at about five miles’ distance from it, when all the aged
men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the
generosity of the Roman general; when he had arrived under the walls of
the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and
children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.

Divitiacus, in the name of the Ædui, interceded in their favour. After
the retreat of the Belgæ and the disbanding of his troops, he had
returned to the presence of Cæsar. The latter, who had, at the prayer
of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones,
displayed, at the solicitation of the Ædui, the same indulgence towards
the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among
the Belgæ the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them;
but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required
from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that
the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon
their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.

It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch
between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the
“Commentaries,” that a certain Divitiacus, an Æduan chieftain, the most
powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of
Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle
against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.

Cæsar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who
surrendered without resistance. [256]


[Sidenote: March against the Nervii. ]

VI. The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The
Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon
that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached
the other Belgæ for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the
virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to
accept peace on any condition. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of
the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two
neighbouring peoples, the Atrebates and the Veromandui, whom they had
persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were
already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose
age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a
spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at
Mons. [257]

After the submission of the Ambiani, Cæsar left Amiens to proceed to the
country of the Nervii; and after three days’ march on their territory,
he arrived probably at Bavay (_Bagacum_), which is considered to have
been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no
more than ten miles (fifteen kilomètres) distant from the Sambre, and
that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the
river. [258] He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were
assembled on the right bank. [259] (_See Plate 7. _)

In accordance with the informations he had received, Cæsar sent out a
reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection
of a spot favourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number
of the Belgæ, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him,
and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known
subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days
the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the
Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a
long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp
being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to
attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (_sarcinæ_); that
this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not
dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily
embraced by the Belgæ, as the nature of the locality favoured its
execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole
force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede
more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend
horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and
mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable
wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the
eye. [260] As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of
the Roman army, the Nervii resolved to hide themselves in the woods
which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment
when it would debouch on the opposite heights of the Sambre, to wait
till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush
upon the troops which preceded. [261] (_See Plate 10. _)


[Sidenote: Battle on the Sambre. ]

VII. The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the
establishment of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a
uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to
which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently
bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen
mètres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little
lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was
no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of
Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle
and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they
were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 mètres), reckoning
from the Sambre; and then the woods began, which covered the upper
parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgæ
remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the
right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the
Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open
part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry. (_See
Plate 10. _)

Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped,
directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry
preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had
been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the
enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed
the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two
legions recently raised, who closed the march.

The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the
cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at
another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open
ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched.