Two plus two equals four is a truth that was formulated many more centuries ago and no one
questions
it.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
On what grounds does the observer affirm that many movements constitute only one behavior and not many?
For instance, how could we know in a banquet if I had one or several behaviors? If I drank one glass of wine in five sips, did I have one be- havior or five? If the rat ceases to eat while eating, would we say that it carried out as many behaviors as the times it stopped moving?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 243
Two extreme behaviorists, Tolman and Guthrie, addressed this sub- ject, but they displayed an astounding lack of reflection while dealing with the epistemological problem that it entails. Winfred Hill describes this very accurately:
Walking a city block, for example, is a molar act made up of an enormous number of molecular movements --expansions and contractions of the various muscles of the legs and other parts of the body. Guthrie is an exam- ple of a theorist who puts a good deal of emphasis on molecular analysis. Tolman, on the other hand, states explicitly that he is concerned only with molar behavior. The ways in which molecular movements work together to produce molar acts are of no concern to his system. (1983, 133)
We must say something in regard of the tastes and preferences on account of these investigators:
First, Guthrie himself falls short in his analytic preference. For instance, biologist Frank Brown speaks of "This is well illustrated by the complex movements of swallowing in mammals; in the dog, for example, 11 sepa- rate muscles or muscular systems are found to discharge one after the other, precisely timed to a matter of milliseconds". (EB 14, 636, 2). Accord- ing to the preferences of Tolman, one behavior would comprise a long series of events. On the contrary, Guthrie would say that each single move- ment is a behavior. Furthermore: if one tries to reduce behavior --doing without its genuine meaning-- to physical movements, why should one exclude the atomic movements of each muscle from our analysis?
Second, if it depends on the taste of the observer the number of behaviors we are dealing with, it follows that the object of study of be- haviorism is not an empirical data. The criterion by means of which the investigator builds up a behavior is not extracted by empirical data but from his own understanding and self-consciousness. Therefore, behaviorism is no other thing that a reloaded mentalism.
Against the above mentioned decree, we would like to pose a di- lemma which seems to us to be definitive. And this, of course, has to do with still behaviors. But before we formulate it, let us see some other problems first.
Will behaviorism deny that a paralytic has a behavior? Should we say that a disabled person that pays us attention does not have any behavior at all? Is hearing not a behavior? Is looking carefully instead of being distracted not a behavior? If I stay still during five minutes
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 244 Hegel was right
while listening a sonata with attention, could someone say that I am not behaving myself somehow? Is listening to a sonata not a behavior? These still behaviors can have tangible effects. For instance, a forester can contemplate attentively a fire during five minutes in certain direc- tion, and then make a phone call in which he says that there is no fire at the place he has to watch. If it has some undeniable empirical effects,
would the behaviorists deny that such still behavior existed?
And let us go now to our dilemma. Against the behaviors we have
mentioned previously, behaviorism can assume two positions:
First, behaviorism can acknowledge that there are in fact behaviors. In order to do so, it would appeal to the (supposed) movements of the neurons inside the head of the agent. But then the circulation of blood would be a conduct which, by the way, is not motivated by an exte- rior stimulus. That would be a decisive proof against the behaviorist theory, for it pretends to explain any conduct by exterior stimuli, and ignore the mentalist entities. The recourse it could employ is to distin- guish the behaviors of the paralytic and the forester in one hand and in the other the circulation of the blood pointing out that the firsts are in terms of voluntarism, and the second don't. However, if that happens, the will would be an essential element of conduct, and few things are
as introspective and mental as that!
Second, behaviorism could stubbornly affirm that the allegedly
still behaviors are not behaviors because they are not exterior move- ments of an organism. If that were the case, the salivary and gastric secretion of the Pavlov dogs would not be a behavior. We should not forget that the entire behaviorism originated in the observation of that very fact as some kind of paradigmatic behaviorism. To be sure, behaviorism could try to escape from that reductio ad absurdum by de- creeing that we are dealing with a behavior when we consider the en- tire organism as a whole, but the salivary secretion is evidently not a movement of the organism as a whole. Furthermore, there would not be any conduct at all, since not even eating is a movement of the organ- ism as a whole; my Saint Bernard dog i. e. does not rise from his place to eat when I bring near him his plate; during his meal, most of his body continues exactly as it was before.
Each and every one of the above mentioned alternatives means the fall of behaviorism, unless it relinquishes the thesis of behavior as a physical movement. But then behavior is an introspective concept, and that would also mean the fall of this theory.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 245
We have not talked about the word stimulus. It is obvious that this word is meaningless if does not refer to different impulses or instincts, or needs, or to pleasures or pains, being all of them metaphysic entities.
In order to avoid the proper meaning of the term stimulus, behav- iorism would have to arbitrarily decree that 'stimulus is every empiri- cal fact that explains the existence of a behavior', for the epistemological status of behaviorism is eminently explanatory. Its primary intention is to formulate laws (cf. v. 4). Let us not bring into consideration what we said before in regard of unempirical terms like 'always' or 'every', without which no law can be formulated. The sole reflection upon the matter would show how frustrated their attempts are. What is specifi- cally important to point out is that without the consideration of an inte- rior impulse or a pleasure, the definition of stimulus above mentioned would not explain the existence of a given conduct nor make it exists. We are not witnessing a behavior when we apply the same stimulus to a brick. Therefore, the stimulus taken alone does not make that behavior exist. Something more is required in the body we are observing: some instinct, necessity or pain: all those things are mental. In spite of the arbitrary recourses it employs, this arbitrary definition cannot avoid the internal.
To make matters worse, behaviorists themselves cannot deny that be- havior can occur without the stimulus whose effectiveness they study. It is very well known, for instance, that the movements of the mouth of an infant or a chimpanzee who want milk while asleep are a behavior without the belonging stimulus. Then what is missing is to reflect on the epistemological status of behaviorism, and this would make its existence to be justified. For example, (and we could talk of many others): It is not the stimulus that brings behavior into existence. But, if behaviorism is not explanatory, what would be then its status? It is not descriptive, because terms like reasoning and stimulus, just to mention a few, are evidently explanatory.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter vi
The Man and the State
? ? All fundamental mistakes in political philosophy and in the so- cial and human sciences (including the legal theory of Kelsen) stem either from one or two of the following assumptions: the first one is to believe that man is naturally good or even that he is man by nature; the second one is to consider the studied entities as empiri- cal data. I am referring to entities such as society, state, freedom, lack of freedom, language, equality among man, the Right, The Law, humanity itself, customs, behavior, the authority or government, property, pro- duction mode, etcetera.
Since we have previously demonstrated several important theses about man, we strongly advise against reading these chapters without reading the previous ones. Following our analysis, it is of primal im- portance to consider that not even the entities of Physics and Biology can be discovered by appealing to empirical perception. After this meticulous study, it would be childish to affirm the equality among men --in the belief that it is an empirical data-- without previously demonstrating it. The empirical data is the inequality of men: some are bigger and others are smaller, some are fat and others are thin, some are active and others are passive, etcetera. Nevertheless, if equal- ity is not demonstrated, our unavoidable demand of democracy is not justified either, and anyone who defends it would have as much
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 248 Hegel was right
reasonableness --or unreasonableness-- as those who defend autocracy. This subject will become a question of 'taste' outside the margins of rationality. The dispute among men about political theories will cease when the truth of them become an obligation to be demonstrated.
And if we are talking about demonstrations in politics, surely Hegel's political theses have a lot to say to us. What we have been saying does not pertain only to the problems themselves but also to the interpretation of Hegel. He takes off from the fact that he is making science and not simply boasting esthetical caprices. He states that ex- plicitly in his prologue to his Philosophy of Right. If we are dealing with science, we must first define and then demonstrate. It is very funny, for instance, that people who accuse Hegel of worshipping the State are those who do not even define that concept. Those persons inevita- bly confuse the State with the government, despite that Hegel eagerly demonstrates they are different things. Those persons believe to be the champions of the civil society against the State, but they are incapable of defining both. They are incapable, therefore, of supposing that per- haps both things are the same, and that does not depend on the arbi- trary definitions that each author has the whim of writing. If the civic society is not a physical object proved by empirical means, then it is constituted by rights and obligations. Only in that, and just in that, does the State consist.
In this present subject would be very artificial to deal with interpre- tative questions separately, dealing with specific matters in indepen- dent sections as we have done so far. Our exposition will be from this point onwards more discursive, except in cases like Hegel's iusnatural- ism, which has been put into question by some.
One unequivocally notices that Hegel's message about man and the State, insofar it is a demonstrated truth, acquires the importance of a revelation. This is the reason why we must deal with theologians in our study too, for we are speaking about the end of man and the meaning of the entire human history.
1. naturaL goodneSS?
Any thinking person can see that men of letters and poets attributed natural goodness to farmers and countrymen in order to idealize pas- toral life. Without this element, they did not consider this landscape
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 249
'beautiful' enough to be treated by the arts. Obviously, this assumption of natural goodness is an apriorism. Unfortunately, the political left nowadays moves entirely within this apriorism. In order to be sup- portive with the oppressed, the indigenes and the proletariat, the left has blindly assumed that each one of its members is truthful, honest and moral. The leftist reacts with indignation when someone demon- strates him that all the felonies and crimes that the poor commit against each other are deeds as perverted as those which the working class suffers under the hands of the wealthy class. Although the rational and moral justification of the struggle in favor of the exploded ones does not need at all such romantic assumptions --which, in fact, only hinder us from constructing a world that is truly just and good--, it is very understandable that the left has felt the psychological need of employ- ing them. The left has given much more importance to this objection than what it actually has: why should one commit oneself with a class that is not morally better than the other class? As an objection against the just revolutionary class this is useless; however, as a scientific question that demands and answer, it has a tremendous power and depth from which the left has in vain tried to escape.
Neither political struggle nor science can be grounded on vulgar, romantic reveries and argumentations. A clear example of this is rude kind of reasoning is the opinion according to which the Christian thesis of the natural evilness of man is 'outdated', only because it was formu- lated many centuries ago.
Two plus two equals four is a truth that was formulated many more centuries ago and no one questions it.
The Christian teaching according to which man is evil by nature is superior to that which affirms man is good by nature; it is necessary to understand its philosophical meaning. As a spirit man is a free being whose destiny is not to be determined by his natural impulses. Therefore, in conditions of immediacy and ignorance, man is in a situation in which he should not to be and from which he must free himself. This is the meaning of the doctrine of the original sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom (Rph 18 Z).
I believe that no honest intelligence can consider as a 'matter of theologians' something which in our century made Einstein say: "it is easier to denature plutonium than it is to denature the evil spirit of men" (Schilpp II 1970, 655). These words of Einstein (Conacyt revue,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 250 Hegel was right
february 1983, p. 32) are extremely eloquent as well: "The true measure of a man is the degree to which he has managed to subjugate his ego". Sigmund Freud was not a theologian but a very convinced atheist. Despite of that, however, he went against his deepest philosophical convictions when he discovered that every child around the age of four is a "polymorphic universal criminal". The romanticism we were speaking about has to include the child, for one understands by natu- ral man someone who has not yet been modified by education, society or culture. Now, this apriorism collides painfully against the fact --which can be witnessed by anybody who does not idealize things-- that children are consummate egoists who are capable of all imagin-
able cruelties.
Against the opinions and wishes of a sick philanthropy who wanted to draw men back to original innocence is opposed the reality itself, and even the very nature of this matter, namely, that man is not destined to such na- ture. And in regard of children, it is in this period where their egoism and cruelty are displayed (PR II, I 33n).
In this context, there are few testimonies as evident as Rousseaunian one we mentioned before. He is the champion of the natural goodness of man: "Let us lay it down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart" (Emile, II). Rousseau is the author that spread widely this prejudice. In an apparent innocuous note of that very book, however, we find the following thesis:
So there is only one of the child's desires which should never be com- plied with, the desire to make himself obeyed. From which it follows that in whatever they ask for it is the motive behind their asking that must be paid attention to. As far as possible give them everything they ask for pro- vided it can really give them a real pleasure; always refuse what they ask for out of fantasy or simply to wield authority (Emile, II)
If Rousseau had studied history carefully, or if he had lived in the times of Nazism, he would have known that the desire of domination has caused much more cruelties and atrocities than any other; and if that impulse is something natural in man, as Rousseau himself recog- nizes in that note, then his thesis about the natural goodness of man falls immediately apart.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 251 In another apparently inoffensive note, we read this as well:
I have seen silly women inciting children to rebellion, encouraging them to hit people, allowing themselves to be beaten, and laughing at the harm- less blows, never thinking that those blows were in intention the blows of a murderer, and that the child who desires to hit people now will desire to kill when he is grown up (Emile, II).
Whenever it comes about dealing with reality --instead of recklessly blurting apriorisms to the world-- Rousseau hits always the mark. If it were within his power, the child would kill. And Hobbes is absolutely right when he says that the savage man is simply a puer robustus.
In regard to the savage man, Rousseau himself refutes his principal thesis, the one that gave him worldwide appraisal, when he says that "All savages are cruel". However, the vegetarian explanation he pro- vides for this is laughable at its very best: "it is not their customs that tend in this direction; their cruelty is the result of their food" (Emile, II). This explanation is entirely futile. What matters is the Rousseaunian testimony of a very concise fact: cruelty is something natural to man. The time has come in which we must say --regardless of those who accuse us of 'misanthropy'-- that considering the savage as guilty is the only way of regarding him as a person. The sick and 'understanding' anthro- pology that makes pleas for him treats him as an animal, an irresponsible baby or a mentally disabled individual. Moreover, those who pamper man and make him believe that he should live 'carelessly' actually de- spise him. The best there is in man --an impulse towards authentic solidarity-- is not given to him by nature, and one does need to live care- lessly in order to follow it. It only demands that one overcomes egoism and a selfish calculus of loss and gain --things which are indeed natural.
I insist on this point: quoting Rousseau is a confrontation test and a cross-examination. Such means proves to be effective because it refutes his principal thesis.
The proverbial optimism of the Greek culture in regard to man --a culture one would never say was biased by Christianity-- can provide us with another indisputable testimony. Hegel says of that culture the following:
it originally contains joy and harmony. The Christian religion is not as joy- ful as this one; rather, it provokes the lack of joy; it begins with pain; it
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 252 Hegel was right
wakens one up and tears apart the natural unity of the spirit, it destroys natural peace. Here we have an original sin: man is evil in his origin; there- fore, in the more internal realm, he is something negative in regard to him- self (PR I 23).
I quoted Einstein and Freud before because they were very reluc- tant with Christianity. Now I will quote Plato, a true exponent of the optimistic Greek culture, in which the Christian influx is automatical- ly ruled out. One should not believe that natural evilness is a Christian invention. It is the ascertainment of a fact whose importance cannot be neglected anymore by true science. We read the following in the book X of the Republic: "This description has carried us too far, but the point we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed must respectable, a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep" (Republic, IX 572 B)
Aristotle, another key figure of Greek culture, who possesses the same intellectual honesty as Plato, expressively warns against "the evil that exists in each and every one of men" (Politics 1319 a 1).
The most ancient testimonial of this fact dates back to the tenth cen- tury before Christ. It is contained in the first book of the Bible: Genesis 2, 4b; 3, 24. Hegel devoted many pages to analyze this passage and we can only do the same. First, because its depth is bigger than that of all the other testimonies we have seen before. Second, because, even though this narration originated the Christian thesis with which we are dealing, it has been and continues to be completely misinterpreted by systematic theology, as we already said in our first chapter. In this context, it is important to say that the specialization in theology does not correspond at all to the specialization in Biblical sciences, nor is it a good preparation for their study because it commonly predisposes one to read certain theses of systematic theology in Biblical passages that state other kind of things.
The first thing that our public --Christian and non-Christians-- should know about the passage we referred to above is that it does not speak of an individual man called Adam. All the modern exegetists and translators know this. I cannot explain myself why the Churches refrain from telling this explicitly to the wider audience. As Hegel mar- velously interpreted it-- before the exegetical science had done it--, the passage does not speak of an individual man, but of all man.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 253
Hegel says: "the expression 'first man' is tantamount to say 'man as such', not someone individual, fortuitous, or someone among many" (PR III 127).
"Therefore, we could say: it is the eternal history of the freedom of man the fact that he awakes from the slumber he is in during his first years and gets to the light of awareness, more precisely and in absolute terms, the fact that good and evil start to exist for him" (PR II, I 32).
The Hebrew expression ha^'a^da^m with the article means: 'the man'. On the contrary, the expression a^da^m without the article means a proper name like John or Robert. A similar case is found in our language in names like pearl or Pearl, rose and Rose, etcetera. That difference in Hebrew --which is expressed by the article-- is the one we express by the capital letters. Now, in our passage we never find the expression ha^ a^da^m. It follows that the author wants to say something about man, about every man, about the initial processes that we all go through as human beings. This is of course some powerful evidence, something that really makes a great noise. If we analyze this with a rigorous meth- od, we will see that it is not a sin committed by some other person, something hereditary or something that God attributes to everybody for unknown reasons. The Biblical story does not speak of a personal individual but of all men. J. Blinzer, a Catholic who is not a scientific exegetist, shows this: "We do not find anywhere some determined statement which says that the first of the first father was transmitted to their descendents" (LTK III 965).
The worst thing of all is not the mistaken interpretation that sys- tematic theology has made, but the fact that this distraction has hin- dered people from understanding what the Biblical author has to say about all men. He makes two affirmations of such depth that not even the exegetists have acknowledged it; they say they are as busy as they were before in dissipating the mistakes of dogmatic theology.
First, the author, who is called the Yahwist by the exegetists, says that man makes himself, that he does not come to be a man but only by means of his own deeds and activities.
One should notice that, in order to know this, the Yahwist did not need any special revelation whatsoever: he only needed to think -- just like Aristotle did six centuries afterwards-- upon the fact that "the mind is nothing before it thinks" (De anima 429b 32), "it does not have actual existence before thinking" (ibid. 429a 24).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 254 Hegel was right
Where does the Yahwist say that man becomes by his own work to be man? In Genesis 3, 5 and 3, 22.
Furthermore, the priestly narrative of the same fact (1, 1-2, 4a) is much more abstract. It tells us that God make man in his image but he does not tell us how. That led the readers to think that God made man with the same deficient characteristics he nowadays has. The last complier or priestly writer wanted by all means to avoid that kind of interpretation; for that purpose, he simply juxtaposed the narrative of the Genesis, 2, 4b- 3, 24, which was written precisely with the intention of correcting and refuting the widespread idea according to which man was made by God as he is today; savage, egoist, etcetera.
It is not the case that the Yahwist author knew or had before him the priestly narrative that has come down to us. Although it was written at a later time, what cannot be denied is that Genesis 1, 1-2, 4a contains that creational conception which was tremendously wide spread, even if it was written in a latter period. Modern investigators are positive in saying that these ancient beliefs were not only part of an oral tradition but of a written tradition as well. They hold that the priestly writer remade some ancient document in which we have variants like 'God made' instead of 'God said', the latter being now a monotonous repeti- tion that characterizes many rituals. Much more likely, the ancient writ- ings did not set in a time sequence the creational activity of God within seven days. That was rather a major concern for the priestly writer, who had to justify the sabbatical rest by saying that God himself rested in the seventh day.
We can appreciate both in the final compiler and the Yahwist the intention of changing that original conception of the Creation. Many particular features reveal that purpose. For instance, according to the priestly narrative, God made the animals before man (Genesis 1, 24-25). The Yahwist narrative, on the contrary, with a highly interesting etio- logical purpose, says that the creation of the animals came after the creation of man. Likewise, according to the priestly narrative, God cre- ated woman and man simultaneously (Ge? nesis 1,27); while the Yahwist narrative says " the man said: this one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh" (Genesis 2, 23), taking the creation of the animals as an intermediate stage. God did not obtain the material from the ground but from the body of man himself.
If the intention of the Yahwist --as all modern exegetists recognize-- is to amend the archaic conception which came down to us through
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 255
the priestly narrative, it becomes obvious that the 'resemblance with God', which makes man to be what he is, does not exist from the very beginning as the priestly narrative suggests (Genesis 1, 26-27), but only after man knows good and evil: "Then Yahweh God said, 'Now that the man has become like one of us in knowing good from the evil" (Genesis 3, 22).
Before he ate from "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" (Genesis 2, 17), that means to say, when he came out from the very hands of God, he was not yet a man. He was simply a 'living being', an expression that the whole Bible employs to denote animals. The Yahwist says with great accuracy about this very first moment: "Yahweh God shaped man from the soil of the ground and blew the breath of life into his nostrils, and man became a living being" (Genesis 2, 7) --a passage which is in clear contrast with "now that the man has become like one of us" (Genesis 3, 22).
This expression 'living soul' is employed in the entire Bible in rela- tion to animals, just as it can be seen in the same priestly narrative a few passages before (Genesis 1, 20). The examples of this are innumerable. The Ecclesiastes explicitly says that, in having a living soul, man is no different than the animals: "they have all one breath" (Ecclesiastes 3:19).
According to the Yahwist, in order to become truly a man --in other words, in order to resemble God-- man must exercise his own activity and decision in regard to good and evil. In fact, we saw (III, 7) that conscience is the cause of self-consciousness, and that being a man is to have self-consciousness (III, 1). To interiorize the moral imperative has the effect upon man of giving rise to a self which is made account- able for his actions by the preexisting intersubjectivity around him that makes him responsible. The response to that self --whether it is positive or negative-- is the act by which man makes himself. As we have said before, the Yahwist only needed to reflect by himself upon the difference between humans and animals in order to discover that. We cannot project upon the first moment a kind of being different to that which we confirmed now as its characteristic way of existing and being.
For instance, how could we know in a banquet if I had one or several behaviors? If I drank one glass of wine in five sips, did I have one be- havior or five? If the rat ceases to eat while eating, would we say that it carried out as many behaviors as the times it stopped moving?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 243
Two extreme behaviorists, Tolman and Guthrie, addressed this sub- ject, but they displayed an astounding lack of reflection while dealing with the epistemological problem that it entails. Winfred Hill describes this very accurately:
Walking a city block, for example, is a molar act made up of an enormous number of molecular movements --expansions and contractions of the various muscles of the legs and other parts of the body. Guthrie is an exam- ple of a theorist who puts a good deal of emphasis on molecular analysis. Tolman, on the other hand, states explicitly that he is concerned only with molar behavior. The ways in which molecular movements work together to produce molar acts are of no concern to his system. (1983, 133)
We must say something in regard of the tastes and preferences on account of these investigators:
First, Guthrie himself falls short in his analytic preference. For instance, biologist Frank Brown speaks of "This is well illustrated by the complex movements of swallowing in mammals; in the dog, for example, 11 sepa- rate muscles or muscular systems are found to discharge one after the other, precisely timed to a matter of milliseconds". (EB 14, 636, 2). Accord- ing to the preferences of Tolman, one behavior would comprise a long series of events. On the contrary, Guthrie would say that each single move- ment is a behavior. Furthermore: if one tries to reduce behavior --doing without its genuine meaning-- to physical movements, why should one exclude the atomic movements of each muscle from our analysis?
Second, if it depends on the taste of the observer the number of behaviors we are dealing with, it follows that the object of study of be- haviorism is not an empirical data. The criterion by means of which the investigator builds up a behavior is not extracted by empirical data but from his own understanding and self-consciousness. Therefore, behaviorism is no other thing that a reloaded mentalism.
Against the above mentioned decree, we would like to pose a di- lemma which seems to us to be definitive. And this, of course, has to do with still behaviors. But before we formulate it, let us see some other problems first.
Will behaviorism deny that a paralytic has a behavior? Should we say that a disabled person that pays us attention does not have any behavior at all? Is hearing not a behavior? Is looking carefully instead of being distracted not a behavior? If I stay still during five minutes
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 244 Hegel was right
while listening a sonata with attention, could someone say that I am not behaving myself somehow? Is listening to a sonata not a behavior? These still behaviors can have tangible effects. For instance, a forester can contemplate attentively a fire during five minutes in certain direc- tion, and then make a phone call in which he says that there is no fire at the place he has to watch. If it has some undeniable empirical effects,
would the behaviorists deny that such still behavior existed?
And let us go now to our dilemma. Against the behaviors we have
mentioned previously, behaviorism can assume two positions:
First, behaviorism can acknowledge that there are in fact behaviors. In order to do so, it would appeal to the (supposed) movements of the neurons inside the head of the agent. But then the circulation of blood would be a conduct which, by the way, is not motivated by an exte- rior stimulus. That would be a decisive proof against the behaviorist theory, for it pretends to explain any conduct by exterior stimuli, and ignore the mentalist entities. The recourse it could employ is to distin- guish the behaviors of the paralytic and the forester in one hand and in the other the circulation of the blood pointing out that the firsts are in terms of voluntarism, and the second don't. However, if that happens, the will would be an essential element of conduct, and few things are
as introspective and mental as that!
Second, behaviorism could stubbornly affirm that the allegedly
still behaviors are not behaviors because they are not exterior move- ments of an organism. If that were the case, the salivary and gastric secretion of the Pavlov dogs would not be a behavior. We should not forget that the entire behaviorism originated in the observation of that very fact as some kind of paradigmatic behaviorism. To be sure, behaviorism could try to escape from that reductio ad absurdum by de- creeing that we are dealing with a behavior when we consider the en- tire organism as a whole, but the salivary secretion is evidently not a movement of the organism as a whole. Furthermore, there would not be any conduct at all, since not even eating is a movement of the organ- ism as a whole; my Saint Bernard dog i. e. does not rise from his place to eat when I bring near him his plate; during his meal, most of his body continues exactly as it was before.
Each and every one of the above mentioned alternatives means the fall of behaviorism, unless it relinquishes the thesis of behavior as a physical movement. But then behavior is an introspective concept, and that would also mean the fall of this theory.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 245
We have not talked about the word stimulus. It is obvious that this word is meaningless if does not refer to different impulses or instincts, or needs, or to pleasures or pains, being all of them metaphysic entities.
In order to avoid the proper meaning of the term stimulus, behav- iorism would have to arbitrarily decree that 'stimulus is every empiri- cal fact that explains the existence of a behavior', for the epistemological status of behaviorism is eminently explanatory. Its primary intention is to formulate laws (cf. v. 4). Let us not bring into consideration what we said before in regard of unempirical terms like 'always' or 'every', without which no law can be formulated. The sole reflection upon the matter would show how frustrated their attempts are. What is specifi- cally important to point out is that without the consideration of an inte- rior impulse or a pleasure, the definition of stimulus above mentioned would not explain the existence of a given conduct nor make it exists. We are not witnessing a behavior when we apply the same stimulus to a brick. Therefore, the stimulus taken alone does not make that behavior exist. Something more is required in the body we are observing: some instinct, necessity or pain: all those things are mental. In spite of the arbitrary recourses it employs, this arbitrary definition cannot avoid the internal.
To make matters worse, behaviorists themselves cannot deny that be- havior can occur without the stimulus whose effectiveness they study. It is very well known, for instance, that the movements of the mouth of an infant or a chimpanzee who want milk while asleep are a behavior without the belonging stimulus. Then what is missing is to reflect on the epistemological status of behaviorism, and this would make its existence to be justified. For example, (and we could talk of many others): It is not the stimulus that brings behavior into existence. But, if behaviorism is not explanatory, what would be then its status? It is not descriptive, because terms like reasoning and stimulus, just to mention a few, are evidently explanatory.
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The Man and the State
? ? All fundamental mistakes in political philosophy and in the so- cial and human sciences (including the legal theory of Kelsen) stem either from one or two of the following assumptions: the first one is to believe that man is naturally good or even that he is man by nature; the second one is to consider the studied entities as empiri- cal data. I am referring to entities such as society, state, freedom, lack of freedom, language, equality among man, the Right, The Law, humanity itself, customs, behavior, the authority or government, property, pro- duction mode, etcetera.
Since we have previously demonstrated several important theses about man, we strongly advise against reading these chapters without reading the previous ones. Following our analysis, it is of primal im- portance to consider that not even the entities of Physics and Biology can be discovered by appealing to empirical perception. After this meticulous study, it would be childish to affirm the equality among men --in the belief that it is an empirical data-- without previously demonstrating it. The empirical data is the inequality of men: some are bigger and others are smaller, some are fat and others are thin, some are active and others are passive, etcetera. Nevertheless, if equal- ity is not demonstrated, our unavoidable demand of democracy is not justified either, and anyone who defends it would have as much
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reasonableness --or unreasonableness-- as those who defend autocracy. This subject will become a question of 'taste' outside the margins of rationality. The dispute among men about political theories will cease when the truth of them become an obligation to be demonstrated.
And if we are talking about demonstrations in politics, surely Hegel's political theses have a lot to say to us. What we have been saying does not pertain only to the problems themselves but also to the interpretation of Hegel. He takes off from the fact that he is making science and not simply boasting esthetical caprices. He states that ex- plicitly in his prologue to his Philosophy of Right. If we are dealing with science, we must first define and then demonstrate. It is very funny, for instance, that people who accuse Hegel of worshipping the State are those who do not even define that concept. Those persons inevita- bly confuse the State with the government, despite that Hegel eagerly demonstrates they are different things. Those persons believe to be the champions of the civil society against the State, but they are incapable of defining both. They are incapable, therefore, of supposing that per- haps both things are the same, and that does not depend on the arbi- trary definitions that each author has the whim of writing. If the civic society is not a physical object proved by empirical means, then it is constituted by rights and obligations. Only in that, and just in that, does the State consist.
In this present subject would be very artificial to deal with interpre- tative questions separately, dealing with specific matters in indepen- dent sections as we have done so far. Our exposition will be from this point onwards more discursive, except in cases like Hegel's iusnatural- ism, which has been put into question by some.
One unequivocally notices that Hegel's message about man and the State, insofar it is a demonstrated truth, acquires the importance of a revelation. This is the reason why we must deal with theologians in our study too, for we are speaking about the end of man and the meaning of the entire human history.
1. naturaL goodneSS?
Any thinking person can see that men of letters and poets attributed natural goodness to farmers and countrymen in order to idealize pas- toral life. Without this element, they did not consider this landscape
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'beautiful' enough to be treated by the arts. Obviously, this assumption of natural goodness is an apriorism. Unfortunately, the political left nowadays moves entirely within this apriorism. In order to be sup- portive with the oppressed, the indigenes and the proletariat, the left has blindly assumed that each one of its members is truthful, honest and moral. The leftist reacts with indignation when someone demon- strates him that all the felonies and crimes that the poor commit against each other are deeds as perverted as those which the working class suffers under the hands of the wealthy class. Although the rational and moral justification of the struggle in favor of the exploded ones does not need at all such romantic assumptions --which, in fact, only hinder us from constructing a world that is truly just and good--, it is very understandable that the left has felt the psychological need of employ- ing them. The left has given much more importance to this objection than what it actually has: why should one commit oneself with a class that is not morally better than the other class? As an objection against the just revolutionary class this is useless; however, as a scientific question that demands and answer, it has a tremendous power and depth from which the left has in vain tried to escape.
Neither political struggle nor science can be grounded on vulgar, romantic reveries and argumentations. A clear example of this is rude kind of reasoning is the opinion according to which the Christian thesis of the natural evilness of man is 'outdated', only because it was formu- lated many centuries ago.
Two plus two equals four is a truth that was formulated many more centuries ago and no one questions it.
The Christian teaching according to which man is evil by nature is superior to that which affirms man is good by nature; it is necessary to understand its philosophical meaning. As a spirit man is a free being whose destiny is not to be determined by his natural impulses. Therefore, in conditions of immediacy and ignorance, man is in a situation in which he should not to be and from which he must free himself. This is the meaning of the doctrine of the original sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom (Rph 18 Z).
I believe that no honest intelligence can consider as a 'matter of theologians' something which in our century made Einstein say: "it is easier to denature plutonium than it is to denature the evil spirit of men" (Schilpp II 1970, 655). These words of Einstein (Conacyt revue,
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february 1983, p. 32) are extremely eloquent as well: "The true measure of a man is the degree to which he has managed to subjugate his ego". Sigmund Freud was not a theologian but a very convinced atheist. Despite of that, however, he went against his deepest philosophical convictions when he discovered that every child around the age of four is a "polymorphic universal criminal". The romanticism we were speaking about has to include the child, for one understands by natu- ral man someone who has not yet been modified by education, society or culture. Now, this apriorism collides painfully against the fact --which can be witnessed by anybody who does not idealize things-- that children are consummate egoists who are capable of all imagin-
able cruelties.
Against the opinions and wishes of a sick philanthropy who wanted to draw men back to original innocence is opposed the reality itself, and even the very nature of this matter, namely, that man is not destined to such na- ture. And in regard of children, it is in this period where their egoism and cruelty are displayed (PR II, I 33n).
In this context, there are few testimonies as evident as Rousseaunian one we mentioned before. He is the champion of the natural goodness of man: "Let us lay it down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart" (Emile, II). Rousseau is the author that spread widely this prejudice. In an apparent innocuous note of that very book, however, we find the following thesis:
So there is only one of the child's desires which should never be com- plied with, the desire to make himself obeyed. From which it follows that in whatever they ask for it is the motive behind their asking that must be paid attention to. As far as possible give them everything they ask for pro- vided it can really give them a real pleasure; always refuse what they ask for out of fantasy or simply to wield authority (Emile, II)
If Rousseau had studied history carefully, or if he had lived in the times of Nazism, he would have known that the desire of domination has caused much more cruelties and atrocities than any other; and if that impulse is something natural in man, as Rousseau himself recog- nizes in that note, then his thesis about the natural goodness of man falls immediately apart.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Science and Literature 251 In another apparently inoffensive note, we read this as well:
I have seen silly women inciting children to rebellion, encouraging them to hit people, allowing themselves to be beaten, and laughing at the harm- less blows, never thinking that those blows were in intention the blows of a murderer, and that the child who desires to hit people now will desire to kill when he is grown up (Emile, II).
Whenever it comes about dealing with reality --instead of recklessly blurting apriorisms to the world-- Rousseau hits always the mark. If it were within his power, the child would kill. And Hobbes is absolutely right when he says that the savage man is simply a puer robustus.
In regard to the savage man, Rousseau himself refutes his principal thesis, the one that gave him worldwide appraisal, when he says that "All savages are cruel". However, the vegetarian explanation he pro- vides for this is laughable at its very best: "it is not their customs that tend in this direction; their cruelty is the result of their food" (Emile, II). This explanation is entirely futile. What matters is the Rousseaunian testimony of a very concise fact: cruelty is something natural to man. The time has come in which we must say --regardless of those who accuse us of 'misanthropy'-- that considering the savage as guilty is the only way of regarding him as a person. The sick and 'understanding' anthro- pology that makes pleas for him treats him as an animal, an irresponsible baby or a mentally disabled individual. Moreover, those who pamper man and make him believe that he should live 'carelessly' actually de- spise him. The best there is in man --an impulse towards authentic solidarity-- is not given to him by nature, and one does need to live care- lessly in order to follow it. It only demands that one overcomes egoism and a selfish calculus of loss and gain --things which are indeed natural.
I insist on this point: quoting Rousseau is a confrontation test and a cross-examination. Such means proves to be effective because it refutes his principal thesis.
The proverbial optimism of the Greek culture in regard to man --a culture one would never say was biased by Christianity-- can provide us with another indisputable testimony. Hegel says of that culture the following:
it originally contains joy and harmony. The Christian religion is not as joy- ful as this one; rather, it provokes the lack of joy; it begins with pain; it
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wakens one up and tears apart the natural unity of the spirit, it destroys natural peace. Here we have an original sin: man is evil in his origin; there- fore, in the more internal realm, he is something negative in regard to him- self (PR I 23).
I quoted Einstein and Freud before because they were very reluc- tant with Christianity. Now I will quote Plato, a true exponent of the optimistic Greek culture, in which the Christian influx is automatical- ly ruled out. One should not believe that natural evilness is a Christian invention. It is the ascertainment of a fact whose importance cannot be neglected anymore by true science. We read the following in the book X of the Republic: "This description has carried us too far, but the point we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed must respectable, a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep" (Republic, IX 572 B)
Aristotle, another key figure of Greek culture, who possesses the same intellectual honesty as Plato, expressively warns against "the evil that exists in each and every one of men" (Politics 1319 a 1).
The most ancient testimonial of this fact dates back to the tenth cen- tury before Christ. It is contained in the first book of the Bible: Genesis 2, 4b; 3, 24. Hegel devoted many pages to analyze this passage and we can only do the same. First, because its depth is bigger than that of all the other testimonies we have seen before. Second, because, even though this narration originated the Christian thesis with which we are dealing, it has been and continues to be completely misinterpreted by systematic theology, as we already said in our first chapter. In this context, it is important to say that the specialization in theology does not correspond at all to the specialization in Biblical sciences, nor is it a good preparation for their study because it commonly predisposes one to read certain theses of systematic theology in Biblical passages that state other kind of things.
The first thing that our public --Christian and non-Christians-- should know about the passage we referred to above is that it does not speak of an individual man called Adam. All the modern exegetists and translators know this. I cannot explain myself why the Churches refrain from telling this explicitly to the wider audience. As Hegel mar- velously interpreted it-- before the exegetical science had done it--, the passage does not speak of an individual man, but of all man.
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Hegel says: "the expression 'first man' is tantamount to say 'man as such', not someone individual, fortuitous, or someone among many" (PR III 127).
"Therefore, we could say: it is the eternal history of the freedom of man the fact that he awakes from the slumber he is in during his first years and gets to the light of awareness, more precisely and in absolute terms, the fact that good and evil start to exist for him" (PR II, I 32).
The Hebrew expression ha^'a^da^m with the article means: 'the man'. On the contrary, the expression a^da^m without the article means a proper name like John or Robert. A similar case is found in our language in names like pearl or Pearl, rose and Rose, etcetera. That difference in Hebrew --which is expressed by the article-- is the one we express by the capital letters. Now, in our passage we never find the expression ha^ a^da^m. It follows that the author wants to say something about man, about every man, about the initial processes that we all go through as human beings. This is of course some powerful evidence, something that really makes a great noise. If we analyze this with a rigorous meth- od, we will see that it is not a sin committed by some other person, something hereditary or something that God attributes to everybody for unknown reasons. The Biblical story does not speak of a personal individual but of all men. J. Blinzer, a Catholic who is not a scientific exegetist, shows this: "We do not find anywhere some determined statement which says that the first of the first father was transmitted to their descendents" (LTK III 965).
The worst thing of all is not the mistaken interpretation that sys- tematic theology has made, but the fact that this distraction has hin- dered people from understanding what the Biblical author has to say about all men. He makes two affirmations of such depth that not even the exegetists have acknowledged it; they say they are as busy as they were before in dissipating the mistakes of dogmatic theology.
First, the author, who is called the Yahwist by the exegetists, says that man makes himself, that he does not come to be a man but only by means of his own deeds and activities.
One should notice that, in order to know this, the Yahwist did not need any special revelation whatsoever: he only needed to think -- just like Aristotle did six centuries afterwards-- upon the fact that "the mind is nothing before it thinks" (De anima 429b 32), "it does not have actual existence before thinking" (ibid. 429a 24).
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Where does the Yahwist say that man becomes by his own work to be man? In Genesis 3, 5 and 3, 22.
Furthermore, the priestly narrative of the same fact (1, 1-2, 4a) is much more abstract. It tells us that God make man in his image but he does not tell us how. That led the readers to think that God made man with the same deficient characteristics he nowadays has. The last complier or priestly writer wanted by all means to avoid that kind of interpretation; for that purpose, he simply juxtaposed the narrative of the Genesis, 2, 4b- 3, 24, which was written precisely with the intention of correcting and refuting the widespread idea according to which man was made by God as he is today; savage, egoist, etcetera.
It is not the case that the Yahwist author knew or had before him the priestly narrative that has come down to us. Although it was written at a later time, what cannot be denied is that Genesis 1, 1-2, 4a contains that creational conception which was tremendously wide spread, even if it was written in a latter period. Modern investigators are positive in saying that these ancient beliefs were not only part of an oral tradition but of a written tradition as well. They hold that the priestly writer remade some ancient document in which we have variants like 'God made' instead of 'God said', the latter being now a monotonous repeti- tion that characterizes many rituals. Much more likely, the ancient writ- ings did not set in a time sequence the creational activity of God within seven days. That was rather a major concern for the priestly writer, who had to justify the sabbatical rest by saying that God himself rested in the seventh day.
We can appreciate both in the final compiler and the Yahwist the intention of changing that original conception of the Creation. Many particular features reveal that purpose. For instance, according to the priestly narrative, God made the animals before man (Genesis 1, 24-25). The Yahwist narrative, on the contrary, with a highly interesting etio- logical purpose, says that the creation of the animals came after the creation of man. Likewise, according to the priestly narrative, God cre- ated woman and man simultaneously (Ge? nesis 1,27); while the Yahwist narrative says " the man said: this one at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh" (Genesis 2, 23), taking the creation of the animals as an intermediate stage. God did not obtain the material from the ground but from the body of man himself.
If the intention of the Yahwist --as all modern exegetists recognize-- is to amend the archaic conception which came down to us through
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the priestly narrative, it becomes obvious that the 'resemblance with God', which makes man to be what he is, does not exist from the very beginning as the priestly narrative suggests (Genesis 1, 26-27), but only after man knows good and evil: "Then Yahweh God said, 'Now that the man has become like one of us in knowing good from the evil" (Genesis 3, 22).
Before he ate from "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" (Genesis 2, 17), that means to say, when he came out from the very hands of God, he was not yet a man. He was simply a 'living being', an expression that the whole Bible employs to denote animals. The Yahwist says with great accuracy about this very first moment: "Yahweh God shaped man from the soil of the ground and blew the breath of life into his nostrils, and man became a living being" (Genesis 2, 7) --a passage which is in clear contrast with "now that the man has become like one of us" (Genesis 3, 22).
This expression 'living soul' is employed in the entire Bible in rela- tion to animals, just as it can be seen in the same priestly narrative a few passages before (Genesis 1, 20). The examples of this are innumerable. The Ecclesiastes explicitly says that, in having a living soul, man is no different than the animals: "they have all one breath" (Ecclesiastes 3:19).
According to the Yahwist, in order to become truly a man --in other words, in order to resemble God-- man must exercise his own activity and decision in regard to good and evil. In fact, we saw (III, 7) that conscience is the cause of self-consciousness, and that being a man is to have self-consciousness (III, 1). To interiorize the moral imperative has the effect upon man of giving rise to a self which is made account- able for his actions by the preexisting intersubjectivity around him that makes him responsible. The response to that self --whether it is positive or negative-- is the act by which man makes himself. As we have said before, the Yahwist only needed to reflect by himself upon the difference between humans and animals in order to discover that. We cannot project upon the first moment a kind of being different to that which we confirmed now as its characteristic way of existing and being.
