ve' (or felt)
lutheran
view.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
in doing so, it comes to an apory: if god is the truth, then theology has the only object of truth, but in as far as truth also comes from other (discursive) forms of knowing, theology is dependent on just such a doctrine of truth-claims (like logic), in which there is no place (or no exclusive place) for god.
if, on the other hand, a religion is only a particularity (one narrative among others), then it can have no further claim on universal recognisability and has destroyed its own claims on truth.
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nence as 'Jenseits' (or 'beyond'). the trinity could be a 'Jenseits', if it were not already related to our religious Christian knowledge, knowledge being the only possible topic of philosophy! in as far as an entity can be com- pleted without being known (as is the case for every content containing knowledge that is not philosophical), theology and religious conscious- ness can claim, within their own form or domain (i. e. religion) that there is such independent, infinite thing. 40 However, insofar as this thinking claims to be true (in Hegel's sense), even the trinity cannot remain on the other side of actuality. truth requires the determination of its own concept. it must appear as (religiously knowable) spirit. 41
the second moment is the creation of the son as an earthly person,42 through whom the oppositions between Heaven and earth, god and man, good and bad, are instantiated. really appearing and developing, god reveals himself in the suffering and death of the temporalised, eternal son, through which this son becomes spirit. to grasp this sensuous actuality as spiritual and religious actuality, finite spirit must intuit and remem- ber the birth and death of the reconciler, so that finite spirit can iden- tify itself with this reconciliation and the community may constitute the actual presence of spirit (for itself ). in the death of the reconciler, which is, at the same time, the death of god as merely abstract or immanent (in itself ) it is shown that man takes up the true religion, so that, through the reconciler, the eternal history of god has arisen into consciousness. in this way, god is the process of giving up his immanence to deliver himself to
40 in itself or immanent (trinity/Father) is only the opposite phenomenon (the 'eco- nomic' trinity/son), but neither are explicated as concrete (Parousia/spirit); that, at least, is Hegel's critical version of the Kantian argument. only metaphysical (and not so much theological) statements stress the so-called transcendence of god. However, such a god is not a trinitarian god!
41 With this thesis, a Christian theologian could see a difficulty or danger; god 'should' be free not to manifest himself, but for Hegel such a freedom is empty, and is demonstrated to be empty, in as far as god has created, and has manifested himself. even though the trinity seems to indicate some conceptual moments, Hegel's logic is not god, (as seems to be desmond's point, W. desmond, Hegel's God, aldershot: ashgate 2003, p. 130), but rather all definitions of the (metaphysical) absolute are contained in the logic (H. F. Fulda, 'spekulative logik als die eigentliche metaphysik', in: d. Pa? tzold & a. Vanderjagt, Hrsg. ), Hegels Transformation der Metaphysik, Ko? ln: dinter 1991, pp. 9-27). Without their (own) speculative methodical generation, however, which is the very contribution of the theory or doctrine of rationality, Hegel's logic has also taken up (and replaced) the philosophical importance of what was the religious (and mistakenly metaphysical) concept of god. this is really the core of every (logical) concept, which is insofar as it is an objective concept; and god is--therefore--a concept, even the main example of the logical concept, that the idea is such a truth, is therefore also a logical exposition (Darstellung).
42 Within a mythological representation, this is the first adam.
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the resurrection in spirit. on this point, there are no differences between Christian denominations, in as far as the title of 'son of god' is not inter- preted in borrowed, metaphysical terms. every Christian church accepts the basic form of Jesus as (the) Christ.
the third element of Hegel's concept of religion is the community, inspired by the Holy spirit. it is the Kingdom of god, where god is spirit. this community includes all the people who have faith in the spiritual history of god, as well as those who elaborate the spiritual development of the kingdom of god, of which they are members. the community is existing spirit and is believed in by spirit in its concreteness and reality. the religious moments present just this transformation of every spirit that manifests itself in the trinitarian way, the passing away from the senses of the singular subject, and the resurrection as universal spirit, by giving its testimony of truth. in the existent community, the doctrine of faith is grasped as valid truth. this truth of spirit is, in Christian religion, true for all people. individual members are born into it through Baptism and are educated to its truth; the church teaches freedom and educates non- spiritual people to freedom. they receive absolution within the commu- nity of reconciliation and they enjoy the presence of god in the eucharist. the process of the community is, furthermore, the whole divine process, in and through which the subject is spiritualised.
Hegel's Protestantism is apparent in his discussion of the sacraments. in both the courses of 1827 and 1831, he restricts the sacraments to just two, Baptism and the eucharist. on forgiveness or absolution, the remark about the Catholic sacrament of Confession (1821, V5, 89) is left out; it may be open to discussion, which person can, as spirit, 'undo the past' ('das Geschehene ungeschehen machen'). 43 such an action is included within the church in the form of education (1821, V5, 260). in fact, such an act is vis- ible as the real and legal power of the king.
more important, however, is Baptism, where the child learns that it will be educated toward the freedom of its own good actions, and in which it is confirmed that evil is subdued so that the subject can do good in such a reconciled world. the subsistence of the community is fully realised through participation in the eucharist. specifically for the philosophy of religion, the differences on the eucharist are presented. 44 the eucharist
43 see my 'das geschehene ungeschehen machen', in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel-Forschung 4/5, 2000, pp. 221-230.
44 For m. Westphal (Hegel and Protestantism, in: r. Perkins (ed. ), History and System, albany, 1985, p. 82 as well for Jonkers (in this volume) the basic difference between Cathol-
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(or lord's supper) is the participation in the resurrection of Christ by the religious subject. Here, Hegel stresses how lutheranism accepts the spiri- tual transubstantiation in spirit and faith: god as Christ is present in acts of the eating and drinking themselves, not independently in the bread and wine (Catholicism) or only in memory (Calvinism). in this Communion, the individual, Christian subject enjoys ('geniesst') the presence of god.
However, in as far as it is only the Christian individual or the particular community who enjoys the reconciliation, this reconciliation is not yet actual. such a community has a further task: it is insufficient to produce only an abstract reconciliation in opposition to the actuality proper. With the subject's purification to spirit, the grace of reconciliation for all men is discovered and may be realised in a free world. such a grace is not in opposition to freedom, as was discussed in traditional Protestantism (1821, V5, 302), but it is the grace of freedom itself (V5: 262; 288). so it becomes clear: it is not the cult that is the realisation of community, but rather a universal ethicity in a free world that is the realisation of the spiritual- ity of the community, and thus, of a spirituality available to everyone. 45 ethical life, which is the form of universal law justifiable for everybody, is in fact the divestment by the Christian community of its particular form in view of the full realisation of spirit. it is a giving up, by the Christian community, of its own particularity, for the sake of the redemption of the world (i. e. of everyone). as such, this realisation is not the promotion of a particularly Protestant way of life or of a 'Protestant' state, but rather of a really free community, which is aware that the form of the community itself is itself rationally good. in this case, it is not holiness or (Catholic) sanctity, which is abstract and retired from the word, which is important, but rather the justification and sanctification of the rational ethical world. For Hegel, it is not celibacy, poverty, or the servitude to others (priests) that is holy, but rather marriage, work, and political freedom under the self-given law that are sanctified (e3 ? 552 a). 46 in this way, true religiosity can appear
icism and Protestantism is their respective understandings of eucharist. this, however, is only an inner theological discussion. the point Hegel emphasises is not as such a theologi- cal one, but a basic concept, fully linked with Christianity, of the constitutive concept of freedom, where only the Protestants are not restoring spiritual servitude and make no fatal contradiction. this point is completely missed by m. lilla, Hegel and the Political Theology of reconciliation, in: The Review of Metaphysics 54, 2001, pp. 859-900; esp. 885 ff.
45 see the review of the end of the four courses, st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london, 1995, pp. 166-176.
46 in german, Hegel can play with the words 'geistlich' and 'geistig', both rooted in spirit (Geist), (Vie, 191); the perversion in the roman-Catholic church consists for Hegel in the
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as true ethicity, in which the structures of an objective (and not subjective) world, that is reconciled as such or (minimally) in itself, are justified. 47 the modern secular world, based on Protestantism, substitutes ('ersetzt') the church as the spiritual realm in which reconciled spirit actualises itself.
in other words: in Hegel's view on Protestantism, there are two cleri- cal or confessional sacraments and there is the actual (sacrament of the) salvation of the world, in which grace is visible and acts as freedom, which is the task of all spirits, recognised as spirit, and not only of a particular confessional church.
the contribution of 'religion' to man is first and foremost that he be conscious of this gracious freedom of the world itself and to justify it (in Protestant religion or in philosophy). With this actualized reconciliation, to which consciousness has no opposition--as would be the case if there were another, separate holiness through which the actual justified world itself--the religious consciousness proposes itself in an ideal way as the consciousness of truth. this religious knowing that the subject is recon- ciled with god, has different forms; it may be 'naive', (and, for such critics, the church remains subsistent), but this knowing has become for itself also thinking (enlightenment rationalism); in reaction against enlighten- ment, religious knowing appears as immediate feeling (pietism V: 266) or even it remains in an unfree way within the claimed and confessed recon- ciliation (Catholicism V5: 267). none of these forms of knowing is aware in itself of what is actual. that is the task of philosophy. Philosophy as such (within the Protestant world) therefore replaces the form of cult. e3 restates this: philosophy is the definite form of religious content; it is the religious content developed in the free manner of spirit as such (e3 ? 552 a, and ? 573). there, philosophy posits this reconciliation as the peace of god which is not higher than all reason, but which is known by reason as the truth (V5, p. 269).
3. Protestantism is lutheranism
is the lutheran or Protestant version of Christianity indeed important for Hegel's philosophy, and if so, why? it is neither the eucharist as
replacement of 'geistig' with 'geistlich', in as far as all spiritual people (geistig) become servants of the clergy (geistlich).
47 it is a sin against the Holy spirit to deny the possibility of salvation or reconciliation (or the possibility of overcoming evil (besiegten Bo? sen (V5: 288). this is entailed in the assertion that there is evil as (radical) evil, as an entity or as an event, like auschwitz.
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participation or as prolepsis of the eschaton, where there is only a theo- logical difference (which is the basic form of lutheranism), nor the reduc- tion of the content of Christianity to the Bible alone (sola scriptura) that is interesting to Hegel. rather, what is important for Hegel is the purifi- cation of the singular heart (through education and action) in the ethi- cal, free life of a spiritual community. only this community may be seen as actual: just such an active spirit for the salvation of all is, for Hegel, the philosophically significant discovery of Protestantism. spirit is active in constituting what it is in itself (i. e. real love or real freedom), a spirit which lives through the community.
a. Why Protestantism?
Protestantism is characterised by a community of equally spiritual, free members, which is realised in and for salvation. this community is reli- gious, consists of a church that teaches and has a cult. this church has no priests, no members of another status, but rather fully equal mem- bers. thus, it demonstrates a real freedom, in which conscience is not bound again (and therefore in servitude) to any 'superiors' (e3 ? 503a or Grundlinien ? 66a). While Hegel's Protestantism seems to be an anti- Catholic mentality, in taking up not-insightful, unequal exteriority as the distinguishing feature of Catholicism (in the Catholic eucharist, in the dif- ference between the holy priests and worldly layman, and in the prayers only performed by the priests, in the name of the other people, e3 ? 552a), it is in fact a very reflective position, as we will see.
Hegel's philosophical view is not a cultivated Protestantism or a cul- tural Protestantism, but seems more inspired in its Protestantism by his anti-Catholic education (out of historical and familial motives),48 and his personal aversion to the Catholic faith. on the other hand, his philosophy is not interested in a (particular) church, but in a non-confessional, non- denominational presentation of Christian religion. in this philosophical position, it is not the independence of a church in view of the Kingdom of god (nor of the priests, nor of the cultic practices done in a particular church) that is important, but rather the view that the salvation given in that Kingdom itself is stressed as actual. in as far as the form of a church is exclusively particular, the living spirit (and with spirit, it is also my spirit who is at the foreground) discovers and actualises the salvation of the
48 see the contribution on Hegel's opposition to Catholicism by Peter Jonkers (in this volume).
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world, which is reconciled in itself (i. e. the world has to bring about itself this form of reconciliation). spirit is thus the spirit of the people itself; its substance and authority do not lie in some particular, external entity, but rather in the testimony that spirit is itself the autonomy of all people.
For Hegel, the point here is that, to an unfree particularisation of reli- gion, there can only correspond a particularised (and exclusive, only external) freedom, in which the true universality of freedom (as children of god) is excluded. insofar as it is learned and proclaimed by an hierar- chy of specific (also particular) people, the priests, and is not spiritually performed by the people as a whole, and there is no universality. 49 only if there is no particular class, one above another, can there be an emphasis on the sanctification of all in freedom. this Protestantism is Protestantism in the sense of spirit as living in a community, but not that of a singular spirit. 50 From this point, it follows that for the individual, only a Protestant conscience has no problem of a double consciousness, insofar as it can adopt communal laws as laws given by the authority of god, in as far as there is no other object or subject for these laws (e3 ? 552 a). it is just this sort of merely atomistic individualism that will be promoted by Protestant liberalism of the United states. However, it remains for Hegel a real prob- lem, how this liberal individualism can be linked with a rational state. 51
What is not brought to the foreground, but must be added, is the self- destruction of Christian churches antagonistic to one another: if there are two churches, who each claim the same freedom and love, but who each deny of the freedom the other (see V3: 357-8, on the wars of religion), then the message itself has a fundamental problem. as far as the war of religions was devastating to persons and communities, it put an end to
49 this may be observed in, for example, church history after Vatican ii. Where Vatican ii defined the church as 'people of children of god' and 'service of the world', the hierarchy has (from John-Paul ii on) since returned to the speaking about the church as the totality of specific clergymen.
50 insofar as Hegel stressing this kind of Protestantism, he is neither subjectivist, nor interpreting that as (moral or political) autonomy, nor conflating the two, as Westphal suggests, m. Westphal, art. cit. , p. 77. Cf. also a. shanks, Hegel's Political Theology, Cam- bridge: Cambridge UP 1991, pp. 116-122. Hegel, on the contrary, has problems with the inte- gration of american Protestantism and their liberal opinions (Vie, 59 ff. ) For an account of Protestantism around 1800, see Fr. schlegel, Vom Charakter der Protestanten (1804), in: Fr. schlegel, Schriften zur Kritischen Philosophie, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2007, p. 181, where he stresses the audacity to have faith by autonomous thinking alone.
51 With this thesis, the principle of subjectivism is not accepted, for, the subject must give up its particular aspects (its heart) in view of his universal, rule-governed custom. autonomy, on the contrary, is accepted, insofar as the freedom of the spirit in all its forms has the structure of autonomy or has integrated it.
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any absolute claims for the Christian message in relation to the commu- nity. Following these events, the freedom and reconciliation of all appear practicable (and sanctified) with thinking, where a rational ethicity is (more) recognised, neither by luther nor by the Catholic Church (which returns to absolute and universal claims in respect to the concrete world), but in the evolution of some forms of 19th century Protestantism.
b. How Protestant?
Hegel is lutheran insofar as he is a child of his time. 52 therefore, he offers a very reflected Protestantism, that has learned to avoid the nonsensical (metaphysical) versions of (pre-enlightened) Christianity. if we now look at lutheran Protestantism in relation to three common topics, the three 'sola-principles' of luther, we can try to discern how and in what way Hegel is reacting on them.
does Hegel's philosophy accept 'sola fide'? For Hegel, faith is necessary in relation to Christ's death and resurrection, (V5: 284) to begin a reli- gious Christian community. But faith is only one of the religious expres- sions and is one-sided, although Hegel also accepts devotion as a kind of practical faith. Hegel presents specific theological topics from Christian faith, such as the trinity, the son of man, and spirit. spirit is considered the basic notion of religion, as well as of the philosophical doctrine of religion. For, in the pietist Protestantism of his day, there is the minimal form of immediate knowledge, where god is given in consciousness as spirit. it is just this form that is interesting to Hegel, so that he can link that consciousness with philosophy, which justifies it.
is there a philosophical understanding of 'sola scriptura'? Hegel accepts the Bible as the basis of Christian faith and as a book of the people (in their own language). However, such a Biblical basis is not sufficient. Hegel is aware of the problems of reading the Bible and of translation, and exegetical, (rationalistic) ways of reading the text,53 and that, in modern times, a lot of problems have arisen for which 'the letter' alone has no solution. thus, only 'the spirit' could provide a solution, but it must be inspired spirit, and that inspiration is only certain by the witness of that spirit; and the highest witness is for him: philosophical thinking.
52 insofar as he is not taking into account the eastern churches (deliberately, in his manuscript V5: 89).
53 Hegel is here alluding to the discussion between lessing and goeze, as well as to schleiermacher.
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is there a philosophical justification of 'sola gratia'? Hegel remarks in his courses54 that there seems to be a theological opposition between grace and freedom. He himself, however, interprets the enjoyment ('Genuss'), that i am in the grace of god, or that his spirit is living in me, as the conscious union of reconciliation. it is just this reconciliation for all (not just for individuals or particular communities) that provides a conceptual solution to the problem. if everyone can use his own freedom (or spirit) to realise spirit, then grace is present for everybody. Perhaps here, this strange sort of philosophical interpretation is not bound to a particular church but is really aware of the Christian sense of salvation. it is in fact not the church that is the aim of the Christian message, but the salvation of the world (by Christ himself and not some church or another), sublated in spirit as such. For the sake of participation in this reconciliation, Hegel is interested in the sacrifice of the heart, not through a symbolic cultic act, but in reality, so that the subject attains an "absolute conviction" ('Gesin- nung') (V5, p. 284), which is at the same time the Christian (Protestant) inspiration for (and the guarantee of ) worldly institutions! such a convic- tion instantiates the morally active subjectivity (of everybody), the result of the freedom of history, within ethical institutions, insofar as these are absolutely guaranteed by god. such a conviction is not the same as Prot- estant-theological moralism, or the (felt) claim of absolute moral 'ought's' about families or states. Hegel's critique of such forms is the critique of a (in Hegel's view) sectarian (or traditionally understood) Protestantism (as the case of de Wette has shown). the same philosophical argument is valid against Catholicism: neither a church, nor theologians (as semi- priests) has the authority to render binding decisions (or to criticise in a sermon legally discussed decisions), for, in that case, they repeat the servitude of the laymen by prescribing what is valid for, and also the valid insight of, everybody!
Hegel's philosophical view of the Protestant position is thus not a tra- ditional, 'nai?
ve' (or felt) lutheran view. Very specifically, and against com- mon Protestant inspiration, it consists only of three main views. these topics are indeed taken from the Christian tradition, but are worked out in such a way that they are rationally understood (but not of course in the sense of simply being de-mythologized and reduced to preconceived
54 in both courses, there are no further remarks about the teleologically difficult prob- lem that the activity of grace could present difficulties in relation to freedom (V3: 249, 1824).
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scientific results) and elevated to a rational core available to everybody, which is the task of philosophy itself.
First of all, God as spirit is a philosophical interpretation, although spirit is a topic common to both the theology of spirit and the philosophy of spirit. spirit is not a simple topic, nor only one of faith (fide), but is instead linked with reason and knowledge in such a way that the empty, rationalistic (i. e. enlightenment) result is avoided. 55 the move from 'god' to 'spirit' can be explained by Hegel's aversion to theology, in as far as it has borrowed determinations from metaphysical ontology without inquir- ing into their validity. if, on the contrary, spirit is really the topic of the Christian or Christian-inspired community, then--according to Hegel's argument--everybody can accept that content containing (absolute) spirit. such a spirit is never a being that is fully independent of subjective and objective spirit, for, only in developing its notion, does spirit show how far it can take up the concept and thus being, in consciousness, also the full singularisation of its concept.
secondly, although Hegel accepts the doctrine of immortality as a specifically Christian one, he gives a philosophical interpretation of it; immortality must be interpreted as (its) own knowledge and thus as eter- nal (V5, 227 or also 140). this knowledge accepts the right of the subject to perform its action with insight. that is, morality does not imply strange or universalistic (or even Christian) commands, but the subjective version of a freedom (of infinite value) in conformity with a common freedom. in this way, it would be possible (in principle) for everybody to accept this philosophical reconstruction. However, such an account or interpretation seems not to be in conformity with scripture, according to a fundamental- ist reading of the Bible.
thirdly, Hegel offers a very specific interpretation of 'grace': it is not specifically only grace for some (as in the doctrine of predestination), but rather a task (in or of freedom) for everybody, insofar as grace is the recon- ciliation performed in and through spirit. according to this doctrine, evil is (after Christ) reconciled (not only for particular religious people, but also for everybody). evil is (according to Christianity) not an ontological
55 on this point, t. guz makes a difficult statement; his overall thesis is that Hegel's logic and philosophy is only a development of lutheran theology; but at least on one point he himself gives the counterexample: faith for luther is not ex ratione, whereas Hegel accepts the rationality of every religion and of faith. see t. guz, Zum Gottesbegriff G. W. F. Hegels im Ru? ckblick auf das Gottesversta? ndnis Martin Luthers: eine metaphysische Untersu- chung, Frankfurt am main: P. lang 1998, p. 230, note 193!
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category (that would be a return to manichaeism or to the religion of the Pharisees)56 (V5, 226-7), but a thought (linked with consciousness) and a moral one (with implications for ethicity--in the relation of the subjec- tive part in ethical relations, or insofar as it may not concretise its duty in the right way). evil is just a moral category, and indicates in its communal form a 'bad existence', that may happen to exist ('Daseyn'), as there are bad states (e. g. tyranny), bad religions (for Hegel, this includes the roman Catholic version of Christianity), bad sciences (e. g. phrenology), (16: 261), but it does not have actuality ('Wirklichkeit') in a philosophical sense, insofar as a merely bad existence is an existence that will end at a certain moment without achieving its own purpose and without concep- tual result. 57 the claim valid for everybody, however, is to realise the rec- onciliation, in as far as everybody presents him- or herself as spirit. 58 even if this is contrary to specific (Protestant) doctrines of particular grace, it makes sense in terms of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation of, and salvation for all people of 'good willing', i. e. for all those who are acting in a really free way. in this interpretation, it is only the Protestant thematic principle of grace that enables, in its radical (philosophical) account, for everybody, the independence of the law of the community from specific Christian doctrine, so that there historically arises inner justice and ethic- ity of the state (see 18: 173).
c. Protestantism is Not Only a Religious, but also an Historical Principle59 Protestantism is not only a distinct theology, not only a doctrine of sal-
vation in the development of cult, but it also has, as such a doctrine, an
56 accordingly, no historical event is such a bad 'in itself '. the only event of such impor- tance could be the crucifixion of Jesus out of which (o felix culpa) he has appeared for the community as Christ.
57 even the genocides of the 20th century (of Hitler, stalin, Pol Pot, etc. ) have had--too late--an end: the result is, at least in one case, a resurrection of common freedom.
58 even in history, there is no theodicy-problem of evil. Bad and evil events are not pro- duced by a world spirit, but are produced by spirits, the sense of which is to be reconciled by considering, that--even with such elements--there may be a progression of freedom and of consciousness thereof. For a discussion of history as theodicy of freedom and not of god, see W. Hu? ffer, Theodizee der Freiheit. (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 46), Hamburg: Bouvier Verlag 2002. that there is no notion of god who could be the object of protest for what humans themselves do in history, see W. Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch, stuttgart & Weimar: J. B. metzler 2003, pp. 412-414.
59 see J. dierken, Hegels 'protestantisches Prinzip', in: Hegels Vorlesungen u? ber die Philoso- phie der Weltgeschichte (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 38), Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1998, pp. 123-146. For a composite view, see r. gascoigne, Religion, Rationality and Community, dordrecht: martinus nijhoff Publishers 1985, pp. 266-7.
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historical principle out of cult (see specifically V3, 340 as well as V5, 269). With this specific insight into the structure of history in Christian times, we come to Hegel's most specific (later) insight, that the Protestant world is that world in which Christian freedom appears in actuality ('Wirklich- keit') for everybody, insofar as only therein is rational ethicity (which is attainable in principle for everyone) the realised, free goal of the devel- opment of Protestant Christianity, in opposition to the 'Catholic' non- realisation.
this claim in principle, on the political and historical differences between the Christian churches, is given by Hegel on the occasion of a festival in the Oratio in Sacris Saecularibus tertiis Traditae Confessio- nis Augustanae (Speech for the Celebration of the Jubilee of the Confessio Augustana, 1830). 60 this Oratio (speech) has a negative thesis: against Catholicism, Hegel posits that faith and doctrine are no longer the pur- view of a commission of scholars nor of a spiritual-clerical ('geistliche') authority. Furthermore, there is no need for a separate holiness, because it is just such a view on holiness that makes impossible any real reconcili- ation among Catholic states, either as ethicity or in their constitution. .
the positive doctrine of the Oratio amounts to one main point. reli- gion is not merely a private affair, but rather, the (Christian) religion is the womb of real freedom. 61 Because Christian religion teaches freedom, there can be no possible separation of religion and state. therefore, only some specific state can be with some corresponding religion. religion and ethicity have the same character, which is also the case in the soul of the individual. this elaboration is seen in the philosophy of history: the (reli- gious) spirit is the basis of all other forms; it is one individuality, whose essence can be represented as god, and venerated and enjoyed within religion. the german nations are educated in and through Christianity, being taught that man is free (18: 153). this acceptance of Christian reli- gion is only the beginning, not the full realisation of freedom. there is a difference between the Christian principle (for all german nations) and the evolution thereof. thus, history shows differences of level in the elabo- ration of freedom.
60 see J. ritter, Hegel und die Reformation (1968), in: J. ritter, Metaphysik und Politik, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1969, pp. 310-317 (first edition in: Unbefangenes Christen- tum, mu? nchen, 1968, pp. 89-99).
61 Freedom is not restricted to Christianity, but, for the first time in history, it is Christi- anity that learns that everybody (and not only a citizen, nor a specific person) is free.
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Protestantism is the destruction of the obedience (to the clergy) of all free Christian people. such servitude, within the form of free religion, con- tains its own contradiction. Crucial in Hegel's account are the events of the 16th century. the historical reaction to the 'Catholic' middle ages can be found in the position of the lutheran or evangelical doctrines. Karl V had been content, according to Hegel, with the pillage of rome, and not achieving liberation from the Pope. in augsburg, it was the Holy spirit, which 'seized the moment' and went further in initiating a spiritual free- dom, a step the emperor was not able to take. What is sacred ('heilig') is not strictly the purview of the priests (or the theologians), but is also given to laymen (16: 249). the so-called laymen have their own judgment and authority to speak about religion, which is confirmed by the testimony of spirit. everybody performs and perfects his or her own relation to god in spirit, which is consciousness of reason, or of god himself. the state can become, through the will of god, an implicitly (in itself ) independent, worldly, instantiated ethical form, which is the basis for the government of all justly governed states. the rights of the community as well as the ethical duties of all persons are in this way recognised by god.
if both government and church have the same inspiration, it is impos- sible for a government to have foreign, external (e. g. Catholic) influence. the principles of religion and state come together in the truth of all free- dom. man cannot have confidence in a law if he is not convinced that religion is not in contradiction with it, as is the case in Catholicism, where the rules of sanctity are proscribed by the roman church. Family, prop- erty and freedom in the state are necessary prerequisites for a free com- munity. in this sense, the Catholic religion does not give rise to the inner justice and ethicity of the state, which is present in the inwardness of the Protestant principle. only the reformation reveals the total divine and spiritual process in man; this free man exists as free insofar as he wills the true and lawfully ethical, and knows it as the universal.
after the treaty of Westphalia, the Protestant principle, sanctified free- dom, is taken up by Friedrich ii, on the worldly side. 62 such Protestantism is the basis and origin of the constitution of the state. in other words, without Christian reconciliation in the Protestant church (which sanctifies freedom), there is no authentic conviction of loyalty to the constitution of
62 see e. Weisser-lohmann, "reformation" und "Friedrich ii" in den geschichtsphilo- sophischen Vorlesungen Hegels, in: Hegels Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Weltge- schichte (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 38), Bonn, Bouvier Verlag 1998, pp. 95-121.
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a state. While there is a good result in Prussia and other german nations (but not in austria), this is only a partial reconciliation, as long as other countries are not reconciled in this manner. the remaining differences between them, the failures to renew the civil law in France, and the influ- ence of Protestantism itself are at the foreground of Hegel's last course on history (Vie, 59 ff ). thus, there remain difficulties of content, within his- tory! in north america, there was an atomistic, individualised liberal Prot- estantism, that--for Hegel--remained merely at the level of the market (i. e. civil society), and did not arrive at a real constitutional state. in south america, the negative influence of Catholicism was still dominant, so that in the known world of Hegel's time, the reconciliation of Protestantism is only fully realized in (constitutionally interpreted) Prussia (Vie, 240-1).
at this point, the state is reconciled with god and god with state. Civil freedom and justice are the fruits of this attained freedom in god, because religious and philosophical consciousness of the will of god are no longer distinct from consciousness of that which is true and lawful: an ethic- ity, which promotes and fulfils even the sensuous character of the body within its sublated form as free member of the community, in as far a he may marry and fulfil his economic necessities. For the human spirit, the knowledge of god is the origin or most certain principle of all ethical action. What cannot be deduced from god and is not sanctified by him, is not able to move in joyful obedience to the law. 63
4. Philosophy of religion or of History?
is Hegel's philosophy, which combines rational interpretations of religion with views on history in order to conceive what is actual, criticisable as insufficiently religious or insufficiently Protestant, or is it criticisable as insufficiently philosophical?
in all texts cited here, Hegel claims to demonstrate the rationality of the definitive, consummate religion or to indicate that the historical Christian religion corresponds to the concept of what is rational (and not, importantly, the other way around). With Hegel's emphasis on spirit, his presentation of religion and Christian religion in particular, is made ratio- nally, in the same sense in which he presents a rational view of history.
63 this sanctification is not a second world of holiness (like 'in Catholicism'), but it is the final, not immediately arising, justification of what is done spiritually in ethicity (i. e. the consciousness of the truth), not a justification on a case-by-case basis.
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His philosophy of religion (and also of history) is, first and foremost, phi- losophy. it is not dependent on the truth-claims of religion in general or any denomination in particular. His philosophy of religion exposes the form of conceptual knowledge about religion, in which religion (or abso- lute spirit) (and also history) is the topic (i. e. the content) of the discus- sion, not its premise. such a Hegelian project is not dependent upon the theology of Christianity, nor does it wish to be. on the contrary, insofar as religion and Christianity have rationality, it is philosophy that can dem- onstrate the intelligibility in the historical evolution from religious com- munity to its political, historical shape. For Hegel, the realisation of truth in spirit is performed, in its ultimate instance, by the concept. For the task of philosophy is to conceive the present, even a divided actuality, as an actuality, which only conceals its own reconciliation if people remain at the level of their own subjective (nai? ve) impression, but which may be understood as reconciled, if they try to conceive it as rational (and within the search of rationality).
How far can religion be transformed and yet still recognised by religious people? if the salvation of all is the goal, then every discussion about reli- gion has to be conducted in a manner that is understandable for all. Hegel, at the very least, tries to formulate his claims in such a way. He presents the topics of Christian religion as such: god, creation, incarnation, death and resurrection in or as spirit. as with other topics presented in other philosophical disciplines, these topics are treated without (presupposed) metaphysical notions. in other words, these 'metaphysical concepts' are presented in their (negatively reformulated) speculative form. in this way, religion is not taken up as the final word, certainly not as theology or as the clergy would have it, but rather only as a (particular) religious claim. even in criticizing and opposing such a philosophy of religion, the people and theologians can contribute to a more complex elaboration of what reli- gion is for thinking, and for the thinking of thinking itself.
in the philosophically rational sense in which the philosophy of reli- gion is presented, the philosophical topics are therefore actually the con- cept and the idea. therein a number of specific problems has risen for a speculative philosophy of religion. in what sense is 'god' indeed the best example of the concept of the idea? in what sense does the logical- speculative concept indeed structure the Christian religion? neither with logic as such, nor with specific parts, is a 'specific' relation or parallelism immediately given. such questions are difficult exegetical and systematic problems, which could not be taken up in this treatment of Hegel's view
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on Protestantism. However, answers to these questions are needed for a minimal understanding of the consistency of Hegel's actual philosophy of religion, and certainly for any rational critique of it.
Conclusion
is it really necessary to ask, as most interpreters do, as a philosophical question, whether Hegel is a (good) Christian,64 or, more specifically, an orthodox, or a heterodox one? 65 Philosophically speaking, the question would rather seem to be whether Hegel has sufficiently demonstrated the rationality and intelligibility of Protestant Christian religion, and its impact in history, insofar as this impact is not limited to aspects of (a given, subjective) faith.
neither the atheistic claim that god is not elevated above of all the rest (god is indeed, for Hegel, the truth of nature and history), nor the irreli- gious claim that there is no spiritualisation of the world, are Hegel's fun- damental positions. it is rather, the claim that god cannot be thought of as independent of every (religious) thought (in this formulation, it is clear that such a claim of independency is contradictory). this claim means there could not be a valuable ontology of religion anymore, since ontol- ogy is based on having contents, rather than being elaborated in concepts. accordingly, for Hegel, god must be presented as spirit in religion as well as in philosophy.
the philosophical point, however, is the following: has Hegel suffi- ciently grounded the rational insight that Christianity, in its Protestant expression and in its historical evolution, is valid as a good, consummated religion of reconciled freedom? moreover, has he shown for everybody (whether or not he or she is a philosopher) that such a religion has basi- cally contributed, to the real, lived, historical freedom of us all?
64 J. Burbidge, 'is Hegel a Christian? ', in: J. Burbidge, Hegel on Logic and Religion, albany: state University of new York Press 1992, pp. 141-153.
65 see Hodgson, o. c. , 100, who gives a catalogue of theological questions, as if either a theologian or anyone else could decide what orthodoxy is; nobody has 'Unfehlbarkeit', with exception of the self-given claim of the Pope. For a Catholic discussion see H. Ku? ng, Unfehlbar? Eine Anfrage, Zu? rich: Benziger Verlag 1998. asking such questions (which takes over the role of the (Catholic) Holy see, or even of every inquisition) seems to be the affair of god, who is--in the event that he would be interested in such questions? not Hegel's rational living spirit of community.
? Contributors
Paul Cobben is Professor of Philosophy at tilburg university (the nether- lands) and chairman of Dutch-Flemish Centre for German idealism (www . cvdi. eu). His publications focus on practical philosophy, combining a sys- tematic and historical approach. Among his books: Das endliche Selbst. Identita? t und Differenz zwischen Hegels >>Pha? nomenologie des Geistes<< und Heideggers >>Sein und Zeit<<, Wu? rzburg: Ko? nigshausen und neumann 1999; Das Gesetz der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Eine Aktualisierung von Hegels >>Grundlinien der Philosphie des Rechts<<, Wu? rzburg: Ko?
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nence as 'Jenseits' (or 'beyond'). the trinity could be a 'Jenseits', if it were not already related to our religious Christian knowledge, knowledge being the only possible topic of philosophy! in as far as an entity can be com- pleted without being known (as is the case for every content containing knowledge that is not philosophical), theology and religious conscious- ness can claim, within their own form or domain (i. e. religion) that there is such independent, infinite thing. 40 However, insofar as this thinking claims to be true (in Hegel's sense), even the trinity cannot remain on the other side of actuality. truth requires the determination of its own concept. it must appear as (religiously knowable) spirit. 41
the second moment is the creation of the son as an earthly person,42 through whom the oppositions between Heaven and earth, god and man, good and bad, are instantiated. really appearing and developing, god reveals himself in the suffering and death of the temporalised, eternal son, through which this son becomes spirit. to grasp this sensuous actuality as spiritual and religious actuality, finite spirit must intuit and remem- ber the birth and death of the reconciler, so that finite spirit can iden- tify itself with this reconciliation and the community may constitute the actual presence of spirit (for itself ). in the death of the reconciler, which is, at the same time, the death of god as merely abstract or immanent (in itself ) it is shown that man takes up the true religion, so that, through the reconciler, the eternal history of god has arisen into consciousness. in this way, god is the process of giving up his immanence to deliver himself to
40 in itself or immanent (trinity/Father) is only the opposite phenomenon (the 'eco- nomic' trinity/son), but neither are explicated as concrete (Parousia/spirit); that, at least, is Hegel's critical version of the Kantian argument. only metaphysical (and not so much theological) statements stress the so-called transcendence of god. However, such a god is not a trinitarian god!
41 With this thesis, a Christian theologian could see a difficulty or danger; god 'should' be free not to manifest himself, but for Hegel such a freedom is empty, and is demonstrated to be empty, in as far as god has created, and has manifested himself. even though the trinity seems to indicate some conceptual moments, Hegel's logic is not god, (as seems to be desmond's point, W. desmond, Hegel's God, aldershot: ashgate 2003, p. 130), but rather all definitions of the (metaphysical) absolute are contained in the logic (H. F. Fulda, 'spekulative logik als die eigentliche metaphysik', in: d. Pa? tzold & a. Vanderjagt, Hrsg. ), Hegels Transformation der Metaphysik, Ko? ln: dinter 1991, pp. 9-27). Without their (own) speculative methodical generation, however, which is the very contribution of the theory or doctrine of rationality, Hegel's logic has also taken up (and replaced) the philosophical importance of what was the religious (and mistakenly metaphysical) concept of god. this is really the core of every (logical) concept, which is insofar as it is an objective concept; and god is--therefore--a concept, even the main example of the logical concept, that the idea is such a truth, is therefore also a logical exposition (Darstellung).
42 Within a mythological representation, this is the first adam.
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the resurrection in spirit. on this point, there are no differences between Christian denominations, in as far as the title of 'son of god' is not inter- preted in borrowed, metaphysical terms. every Christian church accepts the basic form of Jesus as (the) Christ.
the third element of Hegel's concept of religion is the community, inspired by the Holy spirit. it is the Kingdom of god, where god is spirit. this community includes all the people who have faith in the spiritual history of god, as well as those who elaborate the spiritual development of the kingdom of god, of which they are members. the community is existing spirit and is believed in by spirit in its concreteness and reality. the religious moments present just this transformation of every spirit that manifests itself in the trinitarian way, the passing away from the senses of the singular subject, and the resurrection as universal spirit, by giving its testimony of truth. in the existent community, the doctrine of faith is grasped as valid truth. this truth of spirit is, in Christian religion, true for all people. individual members are born into it through Baptism and are educated to its truth; the church teaches freedom and educates non- spiritual people to freedom. they receive absolution within the commu- nity of reconciliation and they enjoy the presence of god in the eucharist. the process of the community is, furthermore, the whole divine process, in and through which the subject is spiritualised.
Hegel's Protestantism is apparent in his discussion of the sacraments. in both the courses of 1827 and 1831, he restricts the sacraments to just two, Baptism and the eucharist. on forgiveness or absolution, the remark about the Catholic sacrament of Confession (1821, V5, 89) is left out; it may be open to discussion, which person can, as spirit, 'undo the past' ('das Geschehene ungeschehen machen'). 43 such an action is included within the church in the form of education (1821, V5, 260). in fact, such an act is vis- ible as the real and legal power of the king.
more important, however, is Baptism, where the child learns that it will be educated toward the freedom of its own good actions, and in which it is confirmed that evil is subdued so that the subject can do good in such a reconciled world. the subsistence of the community is fully realised through participation in the eucharist. specifically for the philosophy of religion, the differences on the eucharist are presented. 44 the eucharist
43 see my 'das geschehene ungeschehen machen', in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel-Forschung 4/5, 2000, pp. 221-230.
44 For m. Westphal (Hegel and Protestantism, in: r. Perkins (ed. ), History and System, albany, 1985, p. 82 as well for Jonkers (in this volume) the basic difference between Cathol-
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(or lord's supper) is the participation in the resurrection of Christ by the religious subject. Here, Hegel stresses how lutheranism accepts the spiri- tual transubstantiation in spirit and faith: god as Christ is present in acts of the eating and drinking themselves, not independently in the bread and wine (Catholicism) or only in memory (Calvinism). in this Communion, the individual, Christian subject enjoys ('geniesst') the presence of god.
However, in as far as it is only the Christian individual or the particular community who enjoys the reconciliation, this reconciliation is not yet actual. such a community has a further task: it is insufficient to produce only an abstract reconciliation in opposition to the actuality proper. With the subject's purification to spirit, the grace of reconciliation for all men is discovered and may be realised in a free world. such a grace is not in opposition to freedom, as was discussed in traditional Protestantism (1821, V5, 302), but it is the grace of freedom itself (V5: 262; 288). so it becomes clear: it is not the cult that is the realisation of community, but rather a universal ethicity in a free world that is the realisation of the spiritual- ity of the community, and thus, of a spirituality available to everyone. 45 ethical life, which is the form of universal law justifiable for everybody, is in fact the divestment by the Christian community of its particular form in view of the full realisation of spirit. it is a giving up, by the Christian community, of its own particularity, for the sake of the redemption of the world (i. e. of everyone). as such, this realisation is not the promotion of a particularly Protestant way of life or of a 'Protestant' state, but rather of a really free community, which is aware that the form of the community itself is itself rationally good. in this case, it is not holiness or (Catholic) sanctity, which is abstract and retired from the word, which is important, but rather the justification and sanctification of the rational ethical world. For Hegel, it is not celibacy, poverty, or the servitude to others (priests) that is holy, but rather marriage, work, and political freedom under the self-given law that are sanctified (e3 ? 552 a). 46 in this way, true religiosity can appear
icism and Protestantism is their respective understandings of eucharist. this, however, is only an inner theological discussion. the point Hegel emphasises is not as such a theologi- cal one, but a basic concept, fully linked with Christianity, of the constitutive concept of freedom, where only the Protestants are not restoring spiritual servitude and make no fatal contradiction. this point is completely missed by m. lilla, Hegel and the Political Theology of reconciliation, in: The Review of Metaphysics 54, 2001, pp. 859-900; esp. 885 ff.
45 see the review of the end of the four courses, st. rocker, Hegel's Rational Religion, madison & london, 1995, pp. 166-176.
46 in german, Hegel can play with the words 'geistlich' and 'geistig', both rooted in spirit (Geist), (Vie, 191); the perversion in the roman-Catholic church consists for Hegel in the
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as true ethicity, in which the structures of an objective (and not subjective) world, that is reconciled as such or (minimally) in itself, are justified. 47 the modern secular world, based on Protestantism, substitutes ('ersetzt') the church as the spiritual realm in which reconciled spirit actualises itself.
in other words: in Hegel's view on Protestantism, there are two cleri- cal or confessional sacraments and there is the actual (sacrament of the) salvation of the world, in which grace is visible and acts as freedom, which is the task of all spirits, recognised as spirit, and not only of a particular confessional church.
the contribution of 'religion' to man is first and foremost that he be conscious of this gracious freedom of the world itself and to justify it (in Protestant religion or in philosophy). With this actualized reconciliation, to which consciousness has no opposition--as would be the case if there were another, separate holiness through which the actual justified world itself--the religious consciousness proposes itself in an ideal way as the consciousness of truth. this religious knowing that the subject is recon- ciled with god, has different forms; it may be 'naive', (and, for such critics, the church remains subsistent), but this knowing has become for itself also thinking (enlightenment rationalism); in reaction against enlighten- ment, religious knowing appears as immediate feeling (pietism V: 266) or even it remains in an unfree way within the claimed and confessed recon- ciliation (Catholicism V5: 267). none of these forms of knowing is aware in itself of what is actual. that is the task of philosophy. Philosophy as such (within the Protestant world) therefore replaces the form of cult. e3 restates this: philosophy is the definite form of religious content; it is the religious content developed in the free manner of spirit as such (e3 ? 552 a, and ? 573). there, philosophy posits this reconciliation as the peace of god which is not higher than all reason, but which is known by reason as the truth (V5, p. 269).
3. Protestantism is lutheranism
is the lutheran or Protestant version of Christianity indeed important for Hegel's philosophy, and if so, why? it is neither the eucharist as
replacement of 'geistig' with 'geistlich', in as far as all spiritual people (geistig) become servants of the clergy (geistlich).
47 it is a sin against the Holy spirit to deny the possibility of salvation or reconciliation (or the possibility of overcoming evil (besiegten Bo? sen (V5: 288). this is entailed in the assertion that there is evil as (radical) evil, as an entity or as an event, like auschwitz.
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participation or as prolepsis of the eschaton, where there is only a theo- logical difference (which is the basic form of lutheranism), nor the reduc- tion of the content of Christianity to the Bible alone (sola scriptura) that is interesting to Hegel. rather, what is important for Hegel is the purifi- cation of the singular heart (through education and action) in the ethi- cal, free life of a spiritual community. only this community may be seen as actual: just such an active spirit for the salvation of all is, for Hegel, the philosophically significant discovery of Protestantism. spirit is active in constituting what it is in itself (i. e. real love or real freedom), a spirit which lives through the community.
a. Why Protestantism?
Protestantism is characterised by a community of equally spiritual, free members, which is realised in and for salvation. this community is reli- gious, consists of a church that teaches and has a cult. this church has no priests, no members of another status, but rather fully equal mem- bers. thus, it demonstrates a real freedom, in which conscience is not bound again (and therefore in servitude) to any 'superiors' (e3 ? 503a or Grundlinien ? 66a). While Hegel's Protestantism seems to be an anti- Catholic mentality, in taking up not-insightful, unequal exteriority as the distinguishing feature of Catholicism (in the Catholic eucharist, in the dif- ference between the holy priests and worldly layman, and in the prayers only performed by the priests, in the name of the other people, e3 ? 552a), it is in fact a very reflective position, as we will see.
Hegel's philosophical view is not a cultivated Protestantism or a cul- tural Protestantism, but seems more inspired in its Protestantism by his anti-Catholic education (out of historical and familial motives),48 and his personal aversion to the Catholic faith. on the other hand, his philosophy is not interested in a (particular) church, but in a non-confessional, non- denominational presentation of Christian religion. in this philosophical position, it is not the independence of a church in view of the Kingdom of god (nor of the priests, nor of the cultic practices done in a particular church) that is important, but rather the view that the salvation given in that Kingdom itself is stressed as actual. in as far as the form of a church is exclusively particular, the living spirit (and with spirit, it is also my spirit who is at the foreground) discovers and actualises the salvation of the
48 see the contribution on Hegel's opposition to Catholicism by Peter Jonkers (in this volume).
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world, which is reconciled in itself (i. e. the world has to bring about itself this form of reconciliation). spirit is thus the spirit of the people itself; its substance and authority do not lie in some particular, external entity, but rather in the testimony that spirit is itself the autonomy of all people.
For Hegel, the point here is that, to an unfree particularisation of reli- gion, there can only correspond a particularised (and exclusive, only external) freedom, in which the true universality of freedom (as children of god) is excluded. insofar as it is learned and proclaimed by an hierar- chy of specific (also particular) people, the priests, and is not spiritually performed by the people as a whole, and there is no universality. 49 only if there is no particular class, one above another, can there be an emphasis on the sanctification of all in freedom. this Protestantism is Protestantism in the sense of spirit as living in a community, but not that of a singular spirit. 50 From this point, it follows that for the individual, only a Protestant conscience has no problem of a double consciousness, insofar as it can adopt communal laws as laws given by the authority of god, in as far as there is no other object or subject for these laws (e3 ? 552 a). it is just this sort of merely atomistic individualism that will be promoted by Protestant liberalism of the United states. However, it remains for Hegel a real prob- lem, how this liberal individualism can be linked with a rational state. 51
What is not brought to the foreground, but must be added, is the self- destruction of Christian churches antagonistic to one another: if there are two churches, who each claim the same freedom and love, but who each deny of the freedom the other (see V3: 357-8, on the wars of religion), then the message itself has a fundamental problem. as far as the war of religions was devastating to persons and communities, it put an end to
49 this may be observed in, for example, church history after Vatican ii. Where Vatican ii defined the church as 'people of children of god' and 'service of the world', the hierarchy has (from John-Paul ii on) since returned to the speaking about the church as the totality of specific clergymen.
50 insofar as Hegel stressing this kind of Protestantism, he is neither subjectivist, nor interpreting that as (moral or political) autonomy, nor conflating the two, as Westphal suggests, m. Westphal, art. cit. , p. 77. Cf. also a. shanks, Hegel's Political Theology, Cam- bridge: Cambridge UP 1991, pp. 116-122. Hegel, on the contrary, has problems with the inte- gration of american Protestantism and their liberal opinions (Vie, 59 ff. ) For an account of Protestantism around 1800, see Fr. schlegel, Vom Charakter der Protestanten (1804), in: Fr. schlegel, Schriften zur Kritischen Philosophie, Hamburg: meiner Verlag 2007, p. 181, where he stresses the audacity to have faith by autonomous thinking alone.
51 With this thesis, the principle of subjectivism is not accepted, for, the subject must give up its particular aspects (its heart) in view of his universal, rule-governed custom. autonomy, on the contrary, is accepted, insofar as the freedom of the spirit in all its forms has the structure of autonomy or has integrated it.
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any absolute claims for the Christian message in relation to the commu- nity. Following these events, the freedom and reconciliation of all appear practicable (and sanctified) with thinking, where a rational ethicity is (more) recognised, neither by luther nor by the Catholic Church (which returns to absolute and universal claims in respect to the concrete world), but in the evolution of some forms of 19th century Protestantism.
b. How Protestant?
Hegel is lutheran insofar as he is a child of his time. 52 therefore, he offers a very reflected Protestantism, that has learned to avoid the nonsensical (metaphysical) versions of (pre-enlightened) Christianity. if we now look at lutheran Protestantism in relation to three common topics, the three 'sola-principles' of luther, we can try to discern how and in what way Hegel is reacting on them.
does Hegel's philosophy accept 'sola fide'? For Hegel, faith is necessary in relation to Christ's death and resurrection, (V5: 284) to begin a reli- gious Christian community. But faith is only one of the religious expres- sions and is one-sided, although Hegel also accepts devotion as a kind of practical faith. Hegel presents specific theological topics from Christian faith, such as the trinity, the son of man, and spirit. spirit is considered the basic notion of religion, as well as of the philosophical doctrine of religion. For, in the pietist Protestantism of his day, there is the minimal form of immediate knowledge, where god is given in consciousness as spirit. it is just this form that is interesting to Hegel, so that he can link that consciousness with philosophy, which justifies it.
is there a philosophical understanding of 'sola scriptura'? Hegel accepts the Bible as the basis of Christian faith and as a book of the people (in their own language). However, such a Biblical basis is not sufficient. Hegel is aware of the problems of reading the Bible and of translation, and exegetical, (rationalistic) ways of reading the text,53 and that, in modern times, a lot of problems have arisen for which 'the letter' alone has no solution. thus, only 'the spirit' could provide a solution, but it must be inspired spirit, and that inspiration is only certain by the witness of that spirit; and the highest witness is for him: philosophical thinking.
52 insofar as he is not taking into account the eastern churches (deliberately, in his manuscript V5: 89).
53 Hegel is here alluding to the discussion between lessing and goeze, as well as to schleiermacher.
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is there a philosophical justification of 'sola gratia'? Hegel remarks in his courses54 that there seems to be a theological opposition between grace and freedom. He himself, however, interprets the enjoyment ('Genuss'), that i am in the grace of god, or that his spirit is living in me, as the conscious union of reconciliation. it is just this reconciliation for all (not just for individuals or particular communities) that provides a conceptual solution to the problem. if everyone can use his own freedom (or spirit) to realise spirit, then grace is present for everybody. Perhaps here, this strange sort of philosophical interpretation is not bound to a particular church but is really aware of the Christian sense of salvation. it is in fact not the church that is the aim of the Christian message, but the salvation of the world (by Christ himself and not some church or another), sublated in spirit as such. For the sake of participation in this reconciliation, Hegel is interested in the sacrifice of the heart, not through a symbolic cultic act, but in reality, so that the subject attains an "absolute conviction" ('Gesin- nung') (V5, p. 284), which is at the same time the Christian (Protestant) inspiration for (and the guarantee of ) worldly institutions! such a convic- tion instantiates the morally active subjectivity (of everybody), the result of the freedom of history, within ethical institutions, insofar as these are absolutely guaranteed by god. such a conviction is not the same as Prot- estant-theological moralism, or the (felt) claim of absolute moral 'ought's' about families or states. Hegel's critique of such forms is the critique of a (in Hegel's view) sectarian (or traditionally understood) Protestantism (as the case of de Wette has shown). the same philosophical argument is valid against Catholicism: neither a church, nor theologians (as semi- priests) has the authority to render binding decisions (or to criticise in a sermon legally discussed decisions), for, in that case, they repeat the servitude of the laymen by prescribing what is valid for, and also the valid insight of, everybody!
Hegel's philosophical view of the Protestant position is thus not a tra- ditional, 'nai?
ve' (or felt) lutheran view. Very specifically, and against com- mon Protestant inspiration, it consists only of three main views. these topics are indeed taken from the Christian tradition, but are worked out in such a way that they are rationally understood (but not of course in the sense of simply being de-mythologized and reduced to preconceived
54 in both courses, there are no further remarks about the teleologically difficult prob- lem that the activity of grace could present difficulties in relation to freedom (V3: 249, 1824).
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scientific results) and elevated to a rational core available to everybody, which is the task of philosophy itself.
First of all, God as spirit is a philosophical interpretation, although spirit is a topic common to both the theology of spirit and the philosophy of spirit. spirit is not a simple topic, nor only one of faith (fide), but is instead linked with reason and knowledge in such a way that the empty, rationalistic (i. e. enlightenment) result is avoided. 55 the move from 'god' to 'spirit' can be explained by Hegel's aversion to theology, in as far as it has borrowed determinations from metaphysical ontology without inquir- ing into their validity. if, on the contrary, spirit is really the topic of the Christian or Christian-inspired community, then--according to Hegel's argument--everybody can accept that content containing (absolute) spirit. such a spirit is never a being that is fully independent of subjective and objective spirit, for, only in developing its notion, does spirit show how far it can take up the concept and thus being, in consciousness, also the full singularisation of its concept.
secondly, although Hegel accepts the doctrine of immortality as a specifically Christian one, he gives a philosophical interpretation of it; immortality must be interpreted as (its) own knowledge and thus as eter- nal (V5, 227 or also 140). this knowledge accepts the right of the subject to perform its action with insight. that is, morality does not imply strange or universalistic (or even Christian) commands, but the subjective version of a freedom (of infinite value) in conformity with a common freedom. in this way, it would be possible (in principle) for everybody to accept this philosophical reconstruction. However, such an account or interpretation seems not to be in conformity with scripture, according to a fundamental- ist reading of the Bible.
thirdly, Hegel offers a very specific interpretation of 'grace': it is not specifically only grace for some (as in the doctrine of predestination), but rather a task (in or of freedom) for everybody, insofar as grace is the recon- ciliation performed in and through spirit. according to this doctrine, evil is (after Christ) reconciled (not only for particular religious people, but also for everybody). evil is (according to Christianity) not an ontological
55 on this point, t. guz makes a difficult statement; his overall thesis is that Hegel's logic and philosophy is only a development of lutheran theology; but at least on one point he himself gives the counterexample: faith for luther is not ex ratione, whereas Hegel accepts the rationality of every religion and of faith. see t. guz, Zum Gottesbegriff G. W. F. Hegels im Ru? ckblick auf das Gottesversta? ndnis Martin Luthers: eine metaphysische Untersu- chung, Frankfurt am main: P. lang 1998, p. 230, note 193!
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category (that would be a return to manichaeism or to the religion of the Pharisees)56 (V5, 226-7), but a thought (linked with consciousness) and a moral one (with implications for ethicity--in the relation of the subjec- tive part in ethical relations, or insofar as it may not concretise its duty in the right way). evil is just a moral category, and indicates in its communal form a 'bad existence', that may happen to exist ('Daseyn'), as there are bad states (e. g. tyranny), bad religions (for Hegel, this includes the roman Catholic version of Christianity), bad sciences (e. g. phrenology), (16: 261), but it does not have actuality ('Wirklichkeit') in a philosophical sense, insofar as a merely bad existence is an existence that will end at a certain moment without achieving its own purpose and without concep- tual result. 57 the claim valid for everybody, however, is to realise the rec- onciliation, in as far as everybody presents him- or herself as spirit. 58 even if this is contrary to specific (Protestant) doctrines of particular grace, it makes sense in terms of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation of, and salvation for all people of 'good willing', i. e. for all those who are acting in a really free way. in this interpretation, it is only the Protestant thematic principle of grace that enables, in its radical (philosophical) account, for everybody, the independence of the law of the community from specific Christian doctrine, so that there historically arises inner justice and ethic- ity of the state (see 18: 173).
c. Protestantism is Not Only a Religious, but also an Historical Principle59 Protestantism is not only a distinct theology, not only a doctrine of sal-
vation in the development of cult, but it also has, as such a doctrine, an
56 accordingly, no historical event is such a bad 'in itself '. the only event of such impor- tance could be the crucifixion of Jesus out of which (o felix culpa) he has appeared for the community as Christ.
57 even the genocides of the 20th century (of Hitler, stalin, Pol Pot, etc. ) have had--too late--an end: the result is, at least in one case, a resurrection of common freedom.
58 even in history, there is no theodicy-problem of evil. Bad and evil events are not pro- duced by a world spirit, but are produced by spirits, the sense of which is to be reconciled by considering, that--even with such elements--there may be a progression of freedom and of consciousness thereof. For a discussion of history as theodicy of freedom and not of god, see W. Hu? ffer, Theodizee der Freiheit. (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 46), Hamburg: Bouvier Verlag 2002. that there is no notion of god who could be the object of protest for what humans themselves do in history, see W. Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch, stuttgart & Weimar: J. B. metzler 2003, pp. 412-414.
59 see J. dierken, Hegels 'protestantisches Prinzip', in: Hegels Vorlesungen u? ber die Philoso- phie der Weltgeschichte (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 38), Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1998, pp. 123-146. For a composite view, see r. gascoigne, Religion, Rationality and Community, dordrecht: martinus nijhoff Publishers 1985, pp. 266-7.
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historical principle out of cult (see specifically V3, 340 as well as V5, 269). With this specific insight into the structure of history in Christian times, we come to Hegel's most specific (later) insight, that the Protestant world is that world in which Christian freedom appears in actuality ('Wirklich- keit') for everybody, insofar as only therein is rational ethicity (which is attainable in principle for everyone) the realised, free goal of the devel- opment of Protestant Christianity, in opposition to the 'Catholic' non- realisation.
this claim in principle, on the political and historical differences between the Christian churches, is given by Hegel on the occasion of a festival in the Oratio in Sacris Saecularibus tertiis Traditae Confessio- nis Augustanae (Speech for the Celebration of the Jubilee of the Confessio Augustana, 1830). 60 this Oratio (speech) has a negative thesis: against Catholicism, Hegel posits that faith and doctrine are no longer the pur- view of a commission of scholars nor of a spiritual-clerical ('geistliche') authority. Furthermore, there is no need for a separate holiness, because it is just such a view on holiness that makes impossible any real reconcili- ation among Catholic states, either as ethicity or in their constitution. .
the positive doctrine of the Oratio amounts to one main point. reli- gion is not merely a private affair, but rather, the (Christian) religion is the womb of real freedom. 61 Because Christian religion teaches freedom, there can be no possible separation of religion and state. therefore, only some specific state can be with some corresponding religion. religion and ethicity have the same character, which is also the case in the soul of the individual. this elaboration is seen in the philosophy of history: the (reli- gious) spirit is the basis of all other forms; it is one individuality, whose essence can be represented as god, and venerated and enjoyed within religion. the german nations are educated in and through Christianity, being taught that man is free (18: 153). this acceptance of Christian reli- gion is only the beginning, not the full realisation of freedom. there is a difference between the Christian principle (for all german nations) and the evolution thereof. thus, history shows differences of level in the elabo- ration of freedom.
60 see J. ritter, Hegel und die Reformation (1968), in: J. ritter, Metaphysik und Politik, Frankfurt am main: suhrkamp 1969, pp. 310-317 (first edition in: Unbefangenes Christen- tum, mu? nchen, 1968, pp. 89-99).
61 Freedom is not restricted to Christianity, but, for the first time in history, it is Christi- anity that learns that everybody (and not only a citizen, nor a specific person) is free.
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Protestantism is the destruction of the obedience (to the clergy) of all free Christian people. such servitude, within the form of free religion, con- tains its own contradiction. Crucial in Hegel's account are the events of the 16th century. the historical reaction to the 'Catholic' middle ages can be found in the position of the lutheran or evangelical doctrines. Karl V had been content, according to Hegel, with the pillage of rome, and not achieving liberation from the Pope. in augsburg, it was the Holy spirit, which 'seized the moment' and went further in initiating a spiritual free- dom, a step the emperor was not able to take. What is sacred ('heilig') is not strictly the purview of the priests (or the theologians), but is also given to laymen (16: 249). the so-called laymen have their own judgment and authority to speak about religion, which is confirmed by the testimony of spirit. everybody performs and perfects his or her own relation to god in spirit, which is consciousness of reason, or of god himself. the state can become, through the will of god, an implicitly (in itself ) independent, worldly, instantiated ethical form, which is the basis for the government of all justly governed states. the rights of the community as well as the ethical duties of all persons are in this way recognised by god.
if both government and church have the same inspiration, it is impos- sible for a government to have foreign, external (e. g. Catholic) influence. the principles of religion and state come together in the truth of all free- dom. man cannot have confidence in a law if he is not convinced that religion is not in contradiction with it, as is the case in Catholicism, where the rules of sanctity are proscribed by the roman church. Family, prop- erty and freedom in the state are necessary prerequisites for a free com- munity. in this sense, the Catholic religion does not give rise to the inner justice and ethicity of the state, which is present in the inwardness of the Protestant principle. only the reformation reveals the total divine and spiritual process in man; this free man exists as free insofar as he wills the true and lawfully ethical, and knows it as the universal.
after the treaty of Westphalia, the Protestant principle, sanctified free- dom, is taken up by Friedrich ii, on the worldly side. 62 such Protestantism is the basis and origin of the constitution of the state. in other words, without Christian reconciliation in the Protestant church (which sanctifies freedom), there is no authentic conviction of loyalty to the constitution of
62 see e. Weisser-lohmann, "reformation" und "Friedrich ii" in den geschichtsphilo- sophischen Vorlesungen Hegels, in: Hegels Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Weltge- schichte (Hegel-studien. Beiheft 38), Bonn, Bouvier Verlag 1998, pp. 95-121.
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a state. While there is a good result in Prussia and other german nations (but not in austria), this is only a partial reconciliation, as long as other countries are not reconciled in this manner. the remaining differences between them, the failures to renew the civil law in France, and the influ- ence of Protestantism itself are at the foreground of Hegel's last course on history (Vie, 59 ff ). thus, there remain difficulties of content, within his- tory! in north america, there was an atomistic, individualised liberal Prot- estantism, that--for Hegel--remained merely at the level of the market (i. e. civil society), and did not arrive at a real constitutional state. in south america, the negative influence of Catholicism was still dominant, so that in the known world of Hegel's time, the reconciliation of Protestantism is only fully realized in (constitutionally interpreted) Prussia (Vie, 240-1).
at this point, the state is reconciled with god and god with state. Civil freedom and justice are the fruits of this attained freedom in god, because religious and philosophical consciousness of the will of god are no longer distinct from consciousness of that which is true and lawful: an ethic- ity, which promotes and fulfils even the sensuous character of the body within its sublated form as free member of the community, in as far a he may marry and fulfil his economic necessities. For the human spirit, the knowledge of god is the origin or most certain principle of all ethical action. What cannot be deduced from god and is not sanctified by him, is not able to move in joyful obedience to the law. 63
4. Philosophy of religion or of History?
is Hegel's philosophy, which combines rational interpretations of religion with views on history in order to conceive what is actual, criticisable as insufficiently religious or insufficiently Protestant, or is it criticisable as insufficiently philosophical?
in all texts cited here, Hegel claims to demonstrate the rationality of the definitive, consummate religion or to indicate that the historical Christian religion corresponds to the concept of what is rational (and not, importantly, the other way around). With Hegel's emphasis on spirit, his presentation of religion and Christian religion in particular, is made ratio- nally, in the same sense in which he presents a rational view of history.
63 this sanctification is not a second world of holiness (like 'in Catholicism'), but it is the final, not immediately arising, justification of what is done spiritually in ethicity (i. e. the consciousness of the truth), not a justification on a case-by-case basis.
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His philosophy of religion (and also of history) is, first and foremost, phi- losophy. it is not dependent on the truth-claims of religion in general or any denomination in particular. His philosophy of religion exposes the form of conceptual knowledge about religion, in which religion (or abso- lute spirit) (and also history) is the topic (i. e. the content) of the discus- sion, not its premise. such a Hegelian project is not dependent upon the theology of Christianity, nor does it wish to be. on the contrary, insofar as religion and Christianity have rationality, it is philosophy that can dem- onstrate the intelligibility in the historical evolution from religious com- munity to its political, historical shape. For Hegel, the realisation of truth in spirit is performed, in its ultimate instance, by the concept. For the task of philosophy is to conceive the present, even a divided actuality, as an actuality, which only conceals its own reconciliation if people remain at the level of their own subjective (nai? ve) impression, but which may be understood as reconciled, if they try to conceive it as rational (and within the search of rationality).
How far can religion be transformed and yet still recognised by religious people? if the salvation of all is the goal, then every discussion about reli- gion has to be conducted in a manner that is understandable for all. Hegel, at the very least, tries to formulate his claims in such a way. He presents the topics of Christian religion as such: god, creation, incarnation, death and resurrection in or as spirit. as with other topics presented in other philosophical disciplines, these topics are treated without (presupposed) metaphysical notions. in other words, these 'metaphysical concepts' are presented in their (negatively reformulated) speculative form. in this way, religion is not taken up as the final word, certainly not as theology or as the clergy would have it, but rather only as a (particular) religious claim. even in criticizing and opposing such a philosophy of religion, the people and theologians can contribute to a more complex elaboration of what reli- gion is for thinking, and for the thinking of thinking itself.
in the philosophically rational sense in which the philosophy of reli- gion is presented, the philosophical topics are therefore actually the con- cept and the idea. therein a number of specific problems has risen for a speculative philosophy of religion. in what sense is 'god' indeed the best example of the concept of the idea? in what sense does the logical- speculative concept indeed structure the Christian religion? neither with logic as such, nor with specific parts, is a 'specific' relation or parallelism immediately given. such questions are difficult exegetical and systematic problems, which could not be taken up in this treatment of Hegel's view
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on Protestantism. However, answers to these questions are needed for a minimal understanding of the consistency of Hegel's actual philosophy of religion, and certainly for any rational critique of it.
Conclusion
is it really necessary to ask, as most interpreters do, as a philosophical question, whether Hegel is a (good) Christian,64 or, more specifically, an orthodox, or a heterodox one? 65 Philosophically speaking, the question would rather seem to be whether Hegel has sufficiently demonstrated the rationality and intelligibility of Protestant Christian religion, and its impact in history, insofar as this impact is not limited to aspects of (a given, subjective) faith.
neither the atheistic claim that god is not elevated above of all the rest (god is indeed, for Hegel, the truth of nature and history), nor the irreli- gious claim that there is no spiritualisation of the world, are Hegel's fun- damental positions. it is rather, the claim that god cannot be thought of as independent of every (religious) thought (in this formulation, it is clear that such a claim of independency is contradictory). this claim means there could not be a valuable ontology of religion anymore, since ontol- ogy is based on having contents, rather than being elaborated in concepts. accordingly, for Hegel, god must be presented as spirit in religion as well as in philosophy.
the philosophical point, however, is the following: has Hegel suffi- ciently grounded the rational insight that Christianity, in its Protestant expression and in its historical evolution, is valid as a good, consummated religion of reconciled freedom? moreover, has he shown for everybody (whether or not he or she is a philosopher) that such a religion has basi- cally contributed, to the real, lived, historical freedom of us all?
64 J. Burbidge, 'is Hegel a Christian? ', in: J. Burbidge, Hegel on Logic and Religion, albany: state University of new York Press 1992, pp. 141-153.
65 see Hodgson, o. c. , 100, who gives a catalogue of theological questions, as if either a theologian or anyone else could decide what orthodoxy is; nobody has 'Unfehlbarkeit', with exception of the self-given claim of the Pope. For a Catholic discussion see H. Ku? ng, Unfehlbar? Eine Anfrage, Zu? rich: Benziger Verlag 1998. asking such questions (which takes over the role of the (Catholic) Holy see, or even of every inquisition) seems to be the affair of god, who is--in the event that he would be interested in such questions? not Hegel's rational living spirit of community.
? Contributors
Paul Cobben is Professor of Philosophy at tilburg university (the nether- lands) and chairman of Dutch-Flemish Centre for German idealism (www . cvdi. eu). His publications focus on practical philosophy, combining a sys- tematic and historical approach. Among his books: Das endliche Selbst. Identita? t und Differenz zwischen Hegels >>Pha? nomenologie des Geistes<< und Heideggers >>Sein und Zeit<<, Wu? rzburg: Ko? nigshausen und neumann 1999; Das Gesetz der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Eine Aktualisierung von Hegels >>Grundlinien der Philosphie des Rechts<<, Wu? rzburg: Ko?
