No More Learning

The subject of our present inquiry has been completely
exhausted in our last lecture, so far as it can be here ex-
hausted; and it only remains for me to point out its general
practical application,--respecting, of course, those limits
which are imposed upon me by good manners, and by that
free and liberal relation which these Lectures have estab-
lished between you and me, and which this day brings to a
close.
It was my desire to establish between us the fullest pos-
sible understanding; as it were, to penetrate you with
myself and in turn to be penetrated by you. I believe that
I have actually expressed the ideas which were here to be
clothed in words, with a clearness that at least had not pre-
viously been attained, and also that I have succeeded in
setting forth these ideas in their natural connexion. But
even after the clearest exposition of such ideas, and after a
very accurate comprehension of them, there may yet remain
a great gulf fixed between the giver and the receiver; and
much may be awanting to a complete understanding after
exhausting all possible means of communication. In this
Age of ours, we have to calculate upon this defect as the
rule ;--the opposite is the exception.
There are two chief causes that give rise to this want of a
thorough reception of proffered instruction in this Age.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 550
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
In the first place, the hearer does not give himself up, as
he ought to do, with his whole mind, to the instruction pre-
sented to him; but he may perhaps approach it only with
the understanding, or with the fancy. In the first case, he
regards it merely with curiosity, or with the desire of know-
ing what shape and form it may assume;--but is otherwise
indifferent about its substance, whether it may prove to be
this, that, or the other thing. In the second case, he merely
amuses himself with the succession of pictures, phenomena,
pleasing words, and modes of speech that may be passed in
review before his fancy, but is otherwise indifferent to the
substance. He represents it to himself as something out of
and separate from himself; and thus places it at a distance
from himself, instead of trying it honestly by his own Love,
as he ought to do, and seeing how it may answer to that.
He then attributes this same disposition to the speaker, be-
lieving that he too has no other motive than that of specu-
lating how he may pass the time in an agreeable way, letting
his ingenuity and dialectic art be admired, producing fine
phrases, and such like. But were he to put the question,
even although it were only to his own heart, whether the
speaker is himself earnestly and vitally penetrated by what
he says, and even to suppose that he wished so to penetrate
others if he were able to do so,--he would fear thereby to
transgress the limits of individual right, insult the speaker,
perhaps even make him out to be a fanatic. Should this
supposition not be made, where nevertheless it both could
and should be made, then indeed no harm is done to the
speaker, since he can easily disregard this foreign judgment
which falls so far short of his true meaning; but harm is
assuredly done to the hearer himself, for to him the impart-
ed instruction is no more than what he takes it to be, and
for him it contains no application to Life if he himself does
not give it this applicatioa This cold and indifferent con-
templation by the Understanding alone is the characteristic
of the scientific mode of thought, and all actual develop-
ment of Science commences with this indifference towards
the Substance and interest only in the correctness of the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XT.
551
Form;--remaining in this indifference until it has attained
its completion; but, as soon as it is thus completed, flow-
ing back into Life, to which all things are at last related.
Our aim in the present lectures was not in the first instance
Scientific,--notwithstanding that, in passing, I have fre-
quently taken notice of the scientific wants of my hearers,
so far as they were known to me,--but it was Practical.
Now therefore, at their close, we must at once declare that
we have nothing to say against the supposition being made
that what we have said in these lectures has been said by
us with entire and perfect earnestness ;--that the principles
we have asserted have, in our own case, arisen from Life
and flowed back upon Life;--that we have certainly desired
that these principles should also influence the Love and
Life of our hearers;--and that only in the event of such an
influence having been actually exerted should we consider
our object perfectly accomplished, and believe that our com-
munication has been as complete as it ought to have been.
A second obstacle to thorough communication in our Age
is the prevalent maxim, that we ought to embrace no party,
and decide neither for nor against;--a mode of thought
which is called Scepticism, and assumes also many other
distinguished names. We have already spoken of this
mode of thought in the course of these lectures. It is
founded upon an absolute want of Love, even in its most
common form--that of Self-love;--and this is the lowest
grade of that vagrancy of mind which we have already de-
scribed, in which man cannot trouble himself even concern-
ing his own destiny;--or it is the wholly brutish opinion
that Truth is of no value, and that no advantage can be had
from the knowledge of it. In order to escape from this
treacherous Scepticism,--which is by no means acuteness,
but, on the contrary, the lowest degree of stupidity,--we
must at least make up our minds as to whether there is any
Truth at all, whether it is attainable by man, and whether,
when attained, it possesses any value for him . Now at the
conclusion of these discourses I must confess, that should
any man not yet have attained to certainty on these points,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 552
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
--should he even find it necessary to ask time for considera-
tion before resolving on a decisive yes or no with reference
to the results we have announced,--and perhaps, admitting
the expertness of the statement, yet profess that he has not
arrived at any judgment on the matter itself,--I must, I
say, confess that the communication and mutual influence
between such an one and myself has proved to be of the
shallowest sort; and that he has received only an addition
to his existing store of possible opinions, whilst I intended
something much better for him. To me it is--not so cer-
tain as the sun in heaven or as this feeling of my own body,
--but infinitely more certain, that there is Truth, that it
is attainable by man, and clearly conceivable by him. I am
also firmly convinced that I, for my part, have seized upon
this Truth from a certain point of view peculiar to myself
and with a certain degree of clearness; for otherwise I would
assuredly have kept silence, and abstained from teaching it
either by speech or writing. Finally, I am also firmly con-
vinced that what I have declared, here as elsewhere, is that
same Eternal, Unchangeable Truth, which makes every-
thing that is opposed to it Untruth; for otherwise assured-
ly I would not have thus taught it, but rather have taught
whatever else I held to be Truth. For a long time it has
been attempted, in and out of rhyme, among the great read-
ing and writing public, to bring upon me the suspicion that I
hold this last-mentioned singular opinion; and I have fre-
quently pled guilty to the charge in print. But printed letters
do not blush,--thus do my accusers seem to think,--and they
continue to entertain good hope of me that I shall, one day
or other, become ashamed of this charge, which, for that pur-
pose, they still continue to repeat;--and I have therefore de-
sired once for all, by word of mouth, in the presence of a nu-
merous and honourable assembly, and looking them in the
face, to confess the truth of this accusation against me. In
all my attempts at communication with my fellow-men, and
consequently in these discourses also, it has ever been, in
the first place, my earnest purpose and aim, by every means
in my power, to make that which I myself have perceived,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XI.
553
clear and intelligible to others, and, in so far as it lay with
me, to force them to such comprehension; being well as-
sured that a conviction of the truth and justice of what I
had taught would then follow of itself;--and thus it has cer-
tainly been my aim, at all times, and consequently at this
time, to"disseminate my convictions," to "make proselytes," or
by whatever other phrase they who hate this design, which
I thus candidly avow, may choose to describe it. That mo-
desty which is so frequently, and in so many ways, recom-
mended to me, which says :--" See, here is my opinion, and
how I for my part regard the matter, although I am like-
wise of opinion that this opinion of mine is no better than
all the other opinions that have arisen since the beginning
of the world, or those that will arise even till its end"
such modesty, I say, I cannot assume, for reasons which I
have already adduced, and likewise for this reason:--that I
consider such modesty to be the greatest immodesty; and
even hold it to be a frightful arrogance, and worthy of all
abhorrence, to suppose that any one should desire to know
how we personally regard the matter; or to open our mouth
to teach, so long as we are not conscious of Knowledge but
only of Opinion. When it has happened that my hearers
have not understood me, and for that reason have not been
convinced, I have then had no alternative but submission;
for there are no outward logical means of compelling under-
standing, since understanding and conviction arise only from
the inmost depths of Life and its Love;--but to submit
beforehand to this want of understanding, and to reckon
upon it, even during instruction, as upon a necessary result,
--this I cannot do, and have never done, either at any pre-
vious time or in these lectures.
These obstacles to a more intimate and fruitful communi-
cation upon subjects of earnest thought are constantly
maintained and renewed, even in those who possess both
the desire and the power of rising superior to them, by
means of the daily influences that surround us in this Age.
When my meaning shall appear more distinctly, you will
perceive that I have hitherto neither directly mentioned
Bc
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 554
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
these things, nor indirectly hinted at them ;--now, however,
after mature reflexion and consideration, I have determined
to explore the nature of these influences, to try them by
their own principles; and, by means of this deeper investi-
gation, to arm you against them for the future, so far as I,
or any other foreign power, can do so.
I shall not be withheld from doing this by the almost
universal hatred which, as I am well aware, is entertained
against what is called polemics; for this hatred itself pro-
ceeds from that very influence which I undertake to com-
bat, and is indeed one of its chief elements. Where this
hatred has not yet become something still more worthless
and contemptible,--of which more hereafter,--it is at least
a diseased aversion to all that strict distinction and dis-
crimination which is necessarily produced by controversy;
and the unconquerable love of that confusion and vagrancy
of spirit, in which the most opposite things are confounded,
and which we have already sufficiently described.
As little shall I be withheld from this investigation by
the admonition which one hears so frequently:--that we
should rise superior to such things and despise them. It is
surely not to be expected that, in our Age, any man of cha-
racter who is possessed of clear Knowledge should fail to
despise the supposition that he could, in his own person, be
hurt or degraded by a judgment proceeding from such in-
fluences; and such admonishers perhaps do not consider
what fulness of contempt they themselves deserve, and often
indeed receive, through their first reminding us of the con-
tempt which is due from us to such things.
I shall not be withheld from this investigation by the
common supposition that we wrangle and dispute only in
order to gratify personal feelings, and to retaliate upon those
who have injured us in some way;--by which supposition
weak men, who are ignorant of any certain Truth and of its
value, think they have obtained a creditable ground for
hating and despising, with seeming justice, those polemics
which otherwise would drive them from their propriety.
That any one should believe that we could set ourselves in
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XI.
opposition to anything upon mere personal grounds, proves
nothing more than that such an one, for his part, would
himself do so merely upon such grounds; and that, should
he at any time enter into controversy, mere personal ill-will
would certainly be his motive for doing so; and here theD
we willingly accept the counsel given to us above to despise
such things: for that such an one should, without farther
proof, set us down as his fellow, is an insult which can only
be repaid with contempt, and will be so requited by every
honest man.
Neither shall I be withheld from this investigation by its
being said that there are but few who speak or think thus;
for this assertion is simply a falsehood, with which the culp-
able timidity of better men imposes upon itself. At a mo-
derate calculation, ninety-nine out of every hundred among
the cultivated classes in Germany think thus; and in the
highest circles, which give the tone to all the others, this
Scepticism is most virulent; and therefore the party we
have indicated cannot at present decrease but must in-
crease. And even if there are but few speakers belonging
to it, and but few who publish its sentiments through the
press, this arises only from the speakers being always, and
in every case, the fewer in number; while the portion who
do not print anything read, and refresh themselves in the
secret silence of their minds with the published expression
of their own sentiments. That this is indeed the case with
the last-mentioned section of this party, and that we do no
injustice to the public by this accusation, however carefully
they may watch over their expressions so long as they pre-
serve their composure, becomes indisputably manifest so
soon as they get into a passion;--which always ensues when
any one attacks one of their speakers and mouthpieces.
Then they all arise, man by man, and unite against the
common enemy, as if each individual thought himself at-
tacked in his own dearest possessions.
Thus although we may set aside and disregard the indi-
vidual persons composing this party who are known to us,
yet we ought not to dismiss the thing itself with mere con-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 556
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
tempt; since it is the cause of the decisive majority of the
age;--nay, carries with it almost universal consent, and will
long continue to do so. The careful avoidance of any con-
tact with such things, under the pretext of being superior to
them, is not unlike cowardice; and it seems as if one was
afraid of soiling one's fingers in those dim corners;--while,
on the contrary, the potent sun-light must be able to dis-
perse the darkness of these dens, without necessarily ab-
sorbing any part of it. It cannot indeed open the eyes of
the blind inhabitants of the dens, but it may enable the
seeing to perceive what goes on there.
In our former lectures* we have shown, adverting to it
also from time to time in these, that the mode of thought
prevalent in this Age precisely reverses the ideas of Hon-
our and Shame,--regarding what is in truth dishonourable
as its real glory, and the truly honourable as its shame.
Thus, as must be immediately evident to every one who has
listened to us with calm attention, the above-mentioned
Scepticism, which the Age is accustomed to honour under
the name of acuteness, is obvious stupidity, shallowness, and
weakness of understanding. Most especially and preemi-
nently, however, this total perversity of the Age is exhibited
in its judgment of Religion. I must have altogether wasted
my words if I have not made this much at least evident to
you,--that all Irreligion goes no further than the surface of
things and mere empty show;--that it therefore presup-
poses a want of strength and energy of mind, and conse-
quently betrays weakness both of intellect and character;--
that Religion, on the contrary, raising itself above mere
appearance, and penetrating to the very nature of things,
necessarily exhibits the most felicitous use of the spiritual
powers, the greatest depth and acuteness of thought, and
the highest strength of character, which is indeed insepar-
able from these;--that, therefore, according to the princi-
ples by which we pass judgment upon Honour, the Irreli-
* " Characteristics of the Present Age. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XI.
557
gious Man must be held in light esteem and despised;--the
Religious Man, on the contrary, highly honoured. The
mode of thought prevalent in this Age completely reverses
all this. With the majority of the men of our day, nothing
causes more immediate and certain disgrace than when any
one allows himself to be penetrated by a religious thought
or sentiment; consequently nothing can more surely bring
honour to a man than to keep himself free from such
thoughts or sentiments. What appears to furnish some
excuse to the Age for holding such an opinion, is this:--
that it can conceive of Religion only as Superstition, and
that it thinks it has a right to despise this Superstition as
something to which it is vastly superior; and, since this
Superstition and Religion are identical, therefore to despise
all Religion. Herein, its total want of understanding, and
the immeasurable ignorance arising therefrom, plays it two
mischievous tricks at once. For, in the first place, it is not
true that the Age is superior to Superstition;--the Age, as
one may plainly see at every turn, is yet essentially filled
with Superstition, for it trembles with terror whenever the
root of its Superstition is even touched by any powerful
hand. Besides, and this is the chief thing, Superstition is
itself the absolute antipodes of Religion; it is even Irreli-
gion merely in another form;--it is the melancholy form of
Irreligion, while that which the Age would willingly assume
if it could, merely as a liberation from that melancholy, is
the gay form of Irreligion. Now, we can easily understand
how a man may enjoy a more comfortable frame of mind in
the latter state than in the former,--and one cannot grudge
men this little improvement in their condition;--but how
Irreligion, which, notwithstanding this change in the nature
of its outward form, still remains essentially the same, can
by such change become reasonable and worthy of honour,
no man of understanding will ever comprehend.
Thus the majority of the Age unconditionally scorn and
despise Religion. How then do they find it practicable to
give outward expression to this scorn? Do they assail
Religion with argument? How could that be, since they
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 55S
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
know nothing whatever about Religion? Or perhaps with
derision? How could that be, since even derision neces-
sarily presupposes some conception of that which is derided,
which they have not? No ! ? they only repeat by rote that,
here or there, such or such things have been said, which
may perhaps refer to Religion; and then without adding
anything of their own, they laugh, and of course every polite
person laughs with them for company;--not, by any means
as if the first or any of his followers were actually moved to
laughter by a really comical representation in his own mind,
--which indeed is wholly impossible without a similar con-
ception,--but only in accordance with the general agree-
ment; and so, by and by, the whole company laugh together
without any single individual among them being conscious
of any ground for laughter, although each one supposes that
his neighbour perchance may have some such ground.
To continue our illustration by reference to present cir-
cumstances, and indeed to our immediate occupation:--for
the narrative of how I was first induced to deliver courses
of popular-philosophical lectures to a mixed audience in this
city would carry us too far. This, however, once got over,
every one who has any acquaintance whatever with the
subject will immediately understand, that if the purely
scientific purpose be laid aside, there is nothing left in Phi-
losophy, generally interesting or generally intelligible to a
mixed audience, but Religion. That the awakening of reli-
gious sentiment would be the true and proper purpose of
these addresses, I distinctly announced at the conclusion of
my lectures of last winter,* which are now in print, and in
print for this same purpose;--and I added by way of ex-
planation, that those lectures were but a preparation for
this purpose, and that in them we had traversed only the
principal sphere of the Religion of the Understanding, while
we had left altogether untouched the whole sphere of the
Religion of Reason. It was to be expected of me that, if I
"Characteristics of the Present Age. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LKCTURE XT.
559
should ever resume these discourses, I should resume them
where I had left off. Further, it was requisite that I should
describe the subject of such popular lectures in a popular
way; and I found that the title "The Way towards the
Blessed Life " would completely and truly characterize these
lectures. I still believe that I have not erred in this; and
you yourselves can determine, now that you have heard the
matter to an end, whether you have heard me point out the
Way towards the Blessed Life, and whether you have heard
anything else than this. And thus it came to pass that an
announcement to that effect was made in the public jour-
nals, which to this moment seems to me quite fitting and
natural.
It could not, however, be unexpected on my part, and in-
deed it seemed to me quite as natural as my announcement
itself, that to a majority such as we have described, my an-
nouncement and my whole undertaking should seem pre-
eminently comic, and that they should discover in it a rich
source of laughter. I should have found it quite natural that publishers of newspapers and editors of pamphlets would
place regular reporters in my lecture-hall in order to guide
into their own channels the fountain of the ridiculous which
was here expected to flow forth in such abundance, and thus
employ it for the amusement of their readers. "The Way
towards the Blessed Life! --We do not know indeed what the
man may mean by Life, or by Blessed Life, but it is a
strange collocation of words which have never before reached
our ears in this connexion: it is easy to see that nothing
will come of this but things which no well-bred man would
choose to mention in good society; and, in any case, could
not the man have foreseen that we should laugh at him ? --
and since, if he were a reasonable man, he would have
desired to avoid this at all hazards, his unpolished stupidity
is manifest. We shall have a laugh beforehand, in accord-
ance with the general agreement; and then during this
operation some idea may perchance occur to one of us by
which to justify our laughter. "
Nor is it altogether impossible that such an idea might
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 560 THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
be discovered. For example, might it not be said :--" How
blessed ought we to esteem the man himself who seeks to
show others the Way towards the Blessed Life! " At first
glance the sally seems witty; but let us take patience to cast
a second glance upon it . Suppose the case that he who is
spoken of rests calm and tranquil in clear possession of his
own principles;--have you not done him an unmerited in-
sult by thus speaking of him ? --" Yes, but then to speak so
of himself,--is not that shameless self-praise? " To have
spoken directly of himself,--that surely he could not do; for
a grave man must have other topics besides himself on which
to speak, if he will speak. But suppose that in the asser-
tion that there is a certain mode of thought by which peace
and tranquillity are spread over Life, and in the promise to
communicate this mode of thought to others, there is neces-
sarily contained the assumption that one does himself pos-
sess it; and, since nothing but peace can thereby arise, that
he has likewise, by means of it, attained this peace and
tranquillity; and also that it is impossible to declare the
first of these in a rational way without at the same time
tacitly recognising the other; then we must let the result
be as it will. And would it then be such gross presumption,
and give room for such inextinguishable laughter, if such
an one, compelled by the connexion of his subject, had re-
marked that he did not regard himself either as a block-
head, or as a bad and miserable man?
And this, indeed, is precisely the peculiar impudence and
peculiar absurdity of the majority of whom we now speak;
and in what we have just said we have brought to light the
innermost principle of their Life. According to the princi-
ples which, although they may perhaps be unperceived by
this majority, yet lie at the bottom of all their judgments,
all intercourse among men ought to be founded on the tacit
assumption that we are all in the same way miserable sin-
ners; he who regards others as anything better than this is
a fool, and he who represents himself to be anything better
is a presumptuous coxcomb:--both should be laughed at.
Miserable sinners in Art and Science:--none of us indeed
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XI.
561
can either know or do anything; we shall, nevertheless, en-
ter into a tacit agreement modestly to acknowledge each
other, and talk among ourselves about each other's merits;
--but he who misinterprets this bargain and conducts
himself in real earnest, as if he actually knew and could do
something, acts in opposition to the agreement and is a pre-
sumptuous fool. Miserable sinners in Life:--the ultimate
purpose of all our emotions and endeavours is to improve
our outward circumstances,--who does not know that ? --the
conventional mode of life indeed requires that this should
not exactly be said to others in so many words, for then
others would be compelled to admit it in words, and to
avoid this certain conventional pretexts have been set up;
but each one must be supposed tacitly to assume it, and he
who sets himself in opposition to this tacit assumption
is not only a presumptuous fool but a hypocrite into the
bargain.
From the principle to which we have adverted arises the
well-known complaint which is made against the few in the
nation who are animated by better principles--a complaint
which we hear everywhere, and everywhere may read; the
complaint:--" What! the man will speak to us of the Beau-
tiful and the Noble! How little does he know us! Let
him give us, in insipid jests, the true picture of our own
trivial and frivolous life;--that pleases us, and then he is
our man and has a knowledge of his Age. We indeed see
well enough that that which we do not desire is excellent,
and that that which pleases us is bad and miserable; but yet we desire only the latter, for--such indeed we are. "
From this principle also proceed all the accusations of ar-
rogance and presumption which the authors make against
each other in print, and the men of the world against each
other in words; and the whole amount of the recognised
coinage of wit which passes current among the public. I
pledge myself, if the problem should be proposed, to trace
back the whole store of ridicule in the world, setting aside
at most a mere fraction for other causes, either to this prin-
ciple :--" He knows not yet that men are miserable sin-
cc
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 5G2
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
ners," or to this other:--" He thinks himself something
better than all of us besides,"--or to both of these principles
put together. Usually the two principles are found united.
Thus, to the mind of the majority, the ridiculousness of at-
tempting to point out the " Way towards the Blessed Life"
did not consist merely in my believing that I could point
out such a way, but also in my assuming that I should
find hearers, and especially hearers who should return to a
second lecture with the intention of having this way pointed
out to them; and, in case I should find such, in their believ-
ing that they should find here anything which they could
carry away with them.
In this supposition of the common sinfulness of all men
the majority live on;--this supposition they require every
one to make; and he who on the contrary rejects it, him
they laugh at if they are in a good humour, or get angry
with if they are irritated;--which latter is usually the case
when they encounter such searching investigations into
their true nature as the present has been. Through this
very supposition they thus become bad, profane, irreligious,
and all the more so the longer they abide in it. On the
contrary, the good and honest man, although he acknow-
ledges his defects and unweariedly labours to amend them,
yet does not esteem himself radically bad and essentially
a sinner; for he who recognizes himself as such in his own
nature is thereby reconciled to it, and consequently is so
and remains so. Besides what is deficient in him, the good
man also recognizes what he is possessed of, and must recog-
nize it, for he has to make use of it. That he does not give
the honour to himself is understood; for he who still has a
self,--in him assuredly there is nothing good. Just as little
does he assume men to be bad, and to be miserable sinners,
in his actual intercourse with them, whatever he may think
theoretically of the society around him; but he assumes
them on the contrary to be good. With the sinfulness that
is in them he has nothing to do, and to that he does not
address himself; but he addresses himself to the good that
is assuredly in them, although it may be concealed. With
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? LECTURE XI.
563
respect to whatever ought not to be in them, he does not
even assume its existence, but acts towards them as if it
were not there; while, on the contrary, he calculates with
confidence on everything that, according to existing circum-
stances, ought to be in them, as upon something that must
be, something that is to be assumed, and from which they
can on no account be released. For example:--should he
teach, it is not by mere listless vagrancy that he will be
understood, but only by earnest attention; for such listless
vagrancy ought not to be, and besides it is of far more im-
portance that a man should learn to be attentive than that
he should learn particular doctrines. He will not spare nor
conciliate the aversion to ascertained Truth, but he will defy
it;--for this aversion ought not to exist, and he who cannot
endure Truth ought not to receive it at his hands;--firmness
of character is of far higher value than any positive truth,
and without the former no one is capable of appropriating
anything resembling the latter. But will he not then
seek to delight and influence others? Ccrtainby:--but only
by means of what is just and right, and only in the way of
the Divine Order;--in any other way than this he will as-
suredly neither influence nor delight them. It is a very
complacent supposition indulged in by that majority, that
there is many an excellent man, in art, in doctrine, or in
life, who is most anxious to please them; only that he does
not know how to set about it rightly because he is not
sufficiently versed in the depths of their character, and that
therefore they must tell him how they would wish to have
it done. What if he understood them far more deeply than
they themselves shall ever be able to do, but did not desire
to make this knowledge apparent in his intercourse with
them, only because he cared not to live after their fashion,
and would not accommodate himself to them until they
themselves had first become pure in his sight?
And thus, with the delineation of what we usually see around us in this Age, I have also pointed out the means
by which we may rise superior to it and separate ourselves
from it. Let a man only not be ashamed of being wise,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 564
THE DOCTRINE OF RELIGION.
even if he alone be wise in a world of fools! As to their
ridicule:--let him but have courage not to join in the
laugh, but to keep his earnestness for a moment and look
the thing in the face;--he shall not thereby lose his laugh,
for in such cases true wit lies in the background, and be-
longs to us; and just in as far as the good man transcends
the bad, in so far does his wit also transcend that of the
bad. As to their love and their approbation:--let him but
have courage resolutely to cast it from him, for otherwise
he can never obtain it without becoming bad himself;--and
it is this alone that so cripples and weakens even the better
men of our day, and so hinders their mutual recognition of
each other and their union among themselves, that they
will not give up the attempt to unite two things that never
can be united,--their own uprightness and the applause of
the crowd,--and cannot determine to know the bad only as
bad. If a man has once raised himself above this hope and
this want, then he has nothing more to fear:--Life pro-
ceeds in its accustomed course; and though the world may
hate it cannot harm him ;--nay, after it has abandoned the
hope of making us like itself, its ill-will decreases, and it
becomes more disposed to accept and use us as we are :--or,
in the worst case, a good man, if he be but resolute and
consistent, is stronger than a hundred bad men.
And now I believe that I have said everything to you
that I intended to say,--and here I close these lectures;--
not unconditionally desiring your approval, but, should it be
accorded to me, then so desiring it that it may do honour
both to you and to me.
PM1HTK1I UI HUBERT HARHIK 1U OUHVAHY,
ROSE STREKT, EDINBURGH.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? ? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? B89090378035A
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-27 00:12 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/wu. 89090378035 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust.