INSTITUTIONS
OF THE REPUBLIC 31
III.
III.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - a
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Title: History of Julius Caesar Vol. 1 of 2
Author: Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, 1808-1873.
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HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
VOL. I.
The Publishers hereby announce that all rights of translation and
reproduction abroad are reserved.
This volume was entered at the office of the Minister of the Interior
(_déposé au Ministère de l’Intérieur_) in March, 1865.
The only Editions and Translations sanctioned by the Author are the
following:
_French. _--HENRI PLON, Printer and Publisher of the “_History of Julius
Cæsar_,” 8 Rue Garancière, Paris.
_English. _--CASSELL, PETTER, and GALPIN, Publishers, La Belle Sauvage
Yard, Ludgate Hill, London, E. C.
_American. _--HARPER and BROTHERS, Franklin Square, New York. (Authorized
by the English Publishers. )
_German. _--CHARLES GEROLD, FILS, Printers and Publishers, Vienna.
_Italian. _--LEMONNIER, Printer and Publisher, Florence.
_Portuguese. _--V. AILLAUD, GUILLARD, and Co. , Paris, Publishers, and
Agents for Portugal and Brazil.
_Russian. _--B. M. WOLFF, Bookseller and Publisher, St. Petersburg.
_Danish_, _Norwegian_, _Swedish. _--CARL B. LORCK, Consul General for
Denmark, Bookseller and Publisher, Leipsic.
_Hungarian. _--MAURICE RATH, Bookseller and Publisher, Pesth.
[Illustration: CAIVS JVLIVS CÆSAR
New York: Harper & Brothers. ]
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
VOL. I.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.
CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
ROMAN HISTORY BEFORE CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
ROME UNDER THE KINGS.
PAGE
I. THE KINGS FOUND THE ROMAN INSTITUTIONS 1
II. SOCIAL ORGANISATION 3
III. POLITICAL ORGANISATION 6
IV. RELIGION 15
V. RESULTS OBTAINED BY ROYALTY 20
CHAPTER II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULAR REPUBLIC (244-416).
I. ADVANTAGE OF THE REPUBLIC 25
II. INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 31
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARISTOCRACY 36
IV. ELEMENTS OF DISSOLUTION 42
V. RÉSUMÉ 53
CHAPTER III.
CONQUEST OF ITALY (416-488).
I. DESCRIPTION OF ITALY 62
II. DISPOSITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF ITALY IN REGARD TO ROME 65
III. TREATMENT OF THE VANQUISHED PEOPLES 68
IV. SUBMISSION OF LATIUM AFTER THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR 75
V. SECOND SAMNITE WAR 78
VI. THIRD SAMNITE WAR--COALITION OF SAMNITES, ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS,
AND HERNICI (443-449) 82
VII. FOURTH SAMNITE WAR--SECOND COALITION OF THE SAMNITES,
ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS, AND GAULS (456-464) 85
VIII. THIRD COALITION OF THE ETRUSCANS, GAULS, LUCANIANS, AND
TARENTUM (469-474) 88
IX. PYRRHUS IN ITALY--SUBMISSION OF TARENTUM (474-488) 89
X. PREPONDERANCE OF ROME 92
XI. STRENGTH OF THE INSTITUTIONS 97
CHAPTER IV.
PROSPERITY OF THE BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS.
I. COMMERCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 104
II. NORTHERN AFRICA 105
III. SPAIN 110
IV. SOUTHERN GAUL 114
V. LIGURIA, CISALPINE GAUL, VENETIA, AND ILLYRIA 115
VI. EPIRUS 118
VII. GREECE 119
VIII. MACEDONIA 124
IX. ASIA MINOR 126
X. KINGDOM OF PONTUS 127
XI. BITHYNIA 130
XII. CAPPADOCIA 131
XIII. KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS 132
XIV. CARIA, LYCIA, AND CILICIA 135
XV. SYRIA 137
XVI. EGYPT 143
XVII. CYRENAICA 146
XVIII. CYPRUS 147
XIX. CRETE 148
XX. RHODES 148
XXI. SARDINIA 151
XXII. CORSICA 152
XXIII. SICILY 152
CHAPTER V.
PUNIC WARS AND WARS OF MACEDONIA AND ASIA (488-621).
I. COMPARISON BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE 155
II. FIRST PUNIC WAR (490-513) 158
III. WAR OF ILLYRIA (525) 165
IV. INVASION OF THE CISALPINES (528) 167
V. SECOND PUNIC WAR (536-552) 169
VI. RESULTS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 182
VII. THE MACEDONIAN WAR (554) 189
VIII. WAR AGAINST ANTIOCHUS (563) 194
IX. THE WAR IN THE CISALPINE (558-579) 196
X. WAR AGAINST PERSIA (583) 199
XI. MODIFICATION OF ROMAN POLICY 204
XII. THIRD PUNIC WAR (605-608) 212
XIII. GREECE, MACEDONIA, NUMANTIA, AND PERGAMUS REDUCED TO PROVINCES 215
XIV. SUMMARY 219
CHAPTER VI.
THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SYLLA (621-676).
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC 224
II. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (621) 232
III. CAIUS GRACCHUS (631) 238
IV. WAR OF JUGURTHA (637) 246
V. MARIUS (647) 249
VI. WARS OF THE ALLIES 256
VII. SYLLA (666) 262
VIII. EFFECTS OF SYLLA’S DICTATORSHIP 278
* * * * *
BOOK II.
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
(654-684. )
I. FIRST YEARS OF CÆSAR 281
II. CÆSAR PERSECUTED BY SYLLA (672) 290
III. CÆSAR IN ASIA (673, 674) 293
IV. CÆSAR ON HIS RETURN TO ROME (676) 296
V. CÆSAR GOES TO RHODES (678-680) 299
VI. CÆSAR PONTIFF AND MILITARY TRIBUNE (680-684) 302
CHAPTER II.
(684-691. )
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC (684) 307
II. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS 316
III. CÆSAR QUESTOR (686) 323
IV. THE GABINIAN LAW (687) 327
V. THE MANILIAN LAW (688) 330
VI. CÆSAR CURULE ÆDILE (689) 334
VII. CÆSAR _Judex Quæstionis_ (660) 339
VIII. CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE SENATE (690) 340
IX. THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTING A NEW PARTY 342
CHAPTER III.
(691-695. )
I. CICERO AND ANTONIUS CONSULS (691) 345
II. AGRARIAN LAW OF RULLUS 347
III. TRIAL OF RABIRIUS (691) 352
IV. CÆSAR GRAND PONTIFF (691) 354
V. CATILINE’S CONSPIRACY 357
VI. ERROR OF CICERO 379
VII. CÆSAR PRÆTOR (692) 381
VIII. ATTEMPT OF CLODIUS (692) 386
IX. POMPEY’S TRIUMPHAL RETURN (692) 388
X. DESTINY REGULATES EVENTS 397
CHAPTER IV.
(693-695. )
I. CÆSAR PROPRÆTOR IN SPAIN (693) 402
II. CÆSAR DEMANDS A TRIUMPH AND THE CONSULSHIP (694) 409
III. ALLIANCE OF CÆSAR, POMPEY, AND CRASSUS 413
IV. CÆSAR’S ELECTION 418
CHAPTER V.
CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS (695).
I. ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION 421
II. AGRARIAN LAWS 424
III. CÆSAR’S VARIOUS LAWS 432
IV. CÆSAR RECEIVES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAULS 445
V. OPPOSITION OF THE PATRICIANS 448
VI. LAW OF CLODIUS--EXILE OF CICERO 456
VII. THE EXPLANATION OF CÆSAR’S CONDUCT 460
PREFACE.
Historic truth ought to be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts
of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons
of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and
the just, and the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the
progress of humanity. These lessons, to be profitable, require certain
conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous
exactness, that the changes political or social be analysed
philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives
of public men should not divert attention from the political part they
played, or cause us to forget their providential mission.
Too often the writer represents the different phases of history as
spontaneous events, without seeking in preceding facts their true origin
and their natural deduction; like the painter who, in re-producing the
characteristics of Nature, only seizes their picturesque effect, without
being able, in his picture, to give their scientific demonstration. The
historian ought to be more than a painter; he ought, like the
geologist, who explains the phenomena of the globe, to unfold the
secret of the transformation of societies.
But, in writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By
following the rules of logic. Let us first take for granted that a great
effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other
words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to
important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this
slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a
vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously
collected. Montesquieu thus confirms this idea: “It is not fortune,” he
says, “which rules the world. . . . There are general causes, whether moral
or physical, which act in every monarchy, raising, maintaining, or
overthrowing it; all accidents are subject to these causes, and if the
fortune of a battle--that is to say, a particular cause--has ruined a
state, there was a general cause which made it necessary that that state
should perish through a single battle: in a word, the principal cause
drags with it all the particular accidents. ”[1]
If during nearly a thousand years the Romans always came triumphant out
of the severest trials and greatest perils, it is because there existed
a general cause which made them always superior to their enemies, and
which did not permit partial defeats and misfortunes to entail the fall
of the empire. If the Romans, after giving an example to the world of a
people constituting itself and growing great by liberty, seemed, after
Cæsar, to throw themselves blindly into slavery, it is because there
existed a general reason which by fatality prevented the Republic from
returning to the purity of its ancient institutions; it is because the
new wants and interests of a society in labour required other means to
satisfy them. Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important
events is imperious, in like manner we must recognise in the long
duration of an institution the proof of its goodness, and in the
incontestable influence of a man upon his age the proof of his genius.
The task, then, consists in seeking the vital element which constituted
the strength of the institution, as the predominant idea which caused
man to act. In following this rule, we shall avoid the errors of those
historians who gather facts transmitted by preceding ages, without
properly arranging them according to their philosophical importance;
thus glorifying that which merits blame, and leaving in the shade that
which calls for the light. It is not a minute analysis of the Roman
organisation which will enable us to understand the duration of so great
an empire, but the profound examination of the spirit of its
institutions; no more is it the detailed recital of the most trivial
actions of a superior man which will reveal the secret of his
ascendency, but the attentive investigation of the elevated motives of
his conduct.
When extraordinary facts attest an eminent genius, what is more contrary
to good sense than to ascribe to him all the passions and sentiments of
mediocrity?
INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 31
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARISTOCRACY 36
IV. ELEMENTS OF DISSOLUTION 42
V. RÉSUMÉ 53
CHAPTER III.
CONQUEST OF ITALY (416-488).
I. DESCRIPTION OF ITALY 62
II. DISPOSITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF ITALY IN REGARD TO ROME 65
III. TREATMENT OF THE VANQUISHED PEOPLES 68
IV. SUBMISSION OF LATIUM AFTER THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR 75
V. SECOND SAMNITE WAR 78
VI. THIRD SAMNITE WAR--COALITION OF SAMNITES, ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS,
AND HERNICI (443-449) 82
VII. FOURTH SAMNITE WAR--SECOND COALITION OF THE SAMNITES,
ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS, AND GAULS (456-464) 85
VIII. THIRD COALITION OF THE ETRUSCANS, GAULS, LUCANIANS, AND
TARENTUM (469-474) 88
IX. PYRRHUS IN ITALY--SUBMISSION OF TARENTUM (474-488) 89
X. PREPONDERANCE OF ROME 92
XI. STRENGTH OF THE INSTITUTIONS 97
CHAPTER IV.
PROSPERITY OF THE BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS.
I. COMMERCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 104
II. NORTHERN AFRICA 105
III. SPAIN 110
IV. SOUTHERN GAUL 114
V. LIGURIA, CISALPINE GAUL, VENETIA, AND ILLYRIA 115
VI. EPIRUS 118
VII. GREECE 119
VIII. MACEDONIA 124
IX. ASIA MINOR 126
X. KINGDOM OF PONTUS 127
XI. BITHYNIA 130
XII. CAPPADOCIA 131
XIII. KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS 132
XIV. CARIA, LYCIA, AND CILICIA 135
XV. SYRIA 137
XVI. EGYPT 143
XVII. CYRENAICA 146
XVIII. CYPRUS 147
XIX. CRETE 148
XX. RHODES 148
XXI. SARDINIA 151
XXII. CORSICA 152
XXIII. SICILY 152
CHAPTER V.
PUNIC WARS AND WARS OF MACEDONIA AND ASIA (488-621).
I. COMPARISON BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE 155
II. FIRST PUNIC WAR (490-513) 158
III. WAR OF ILLYRIA (525) 165
IV. INVASION OF THE CISALPINES (528) 167
V. SECOND PUNIC WAR (536-552) 169
VI. RESULTS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 182
VII. THE MACEDONIAN WAR (554) 189
VIII. WAR AGAINST ANTIOCHUS (563) 194
IX. THE WAR IN THE CISALPINE (558-579) 196
X. WAR AGAINST PERSIA (583) 199
XI. MODIFICATION OF ROMAN POLICY 204
XII. THIRD PUNIC WAR (605-608) 212
XIII. GREECE, MACEDONIA, NUMANTIA, AND PERGAMUS REDUCED TO PROVINCES 215
XIV. SUMMARY 219
CHAPTER VI.
THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SYLLA (621-676).
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC 224
II. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (621) 232
III. CAIUS GRACCHUS (631) 238
IV. WAR OF JUGURTHA (637) 246
V. MARIUS (647) 249
VI. WARS OF THE ALLIES 256
VII. SYLLA (666) 262
VIII. EFFECTS OF SYLLA’S DICTATORSHIP 278
* * * * *
BOOK II.
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
(654-684. )
I. FIRST YEARS OF CÆSAR 281
II. CÆSAR PERSECUTED BY SYLLA (672) 290
III. CÆSAR IN ASIA (673, 674) 293
IV. CÆSAR ON HIS RETURN TO ROME (676) 296
V. CÆSAR GOES TO RHODES (678-680) 299
VI. CÆSAR PONTIFF AND MILITARY TRIBUNE (680-684) 302
CHAPTER II.
(684-691. )
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC (684) 307
II. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS 316
III. CÆSAR QUESTOR (686) 323
IV. THE GABINIAN LAW (687) 327
V. THE MANILIAN LAW (688) 330
VI. CÆSAR CURULE ÆDILE (689) 334
VII. CÆSAR _Judex Quæstionis_ (660) 339
VIII. CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE SENATE (690) 340
IX. THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTING A NEW PARTY 342
CHAPTER III.
(691-695. )
I. CICERO AND ANTONIUS CONSULS (691) 345
II. AGRARIAN LAW OF RULLUS 347
III. TRIAL OF RABIRIUS (691) 352
IV. CÆSAR GRAND PONTIFF (691) 354
V. CATILINE’S CONSPIRACY 357
VI. ERROR OF CICERO 379
VII. CÆSAR PRÆTOR (692) 381
VIII. ATTEMPT OF CLODIUS (692) 386
IX. POMPEY’S TRIUMPHAL RETURN (692) 388
X. DESTINY REGULATES EVENTS 397
CHAPTER IV.
(693-695. )
I. CÆSAR PROPRÆTOR IN SPAIN (693) 402
II. CÆSAR DEMANDS A TRIUMPH AND THE CONSULSHIP (694) 409
III. ALLIANCE OF CÆSAR, POMPEY, AND CRASSUS 413
IV. CÆSAR’S ELECTION 418
CHAPTER V.
CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS (695).
I. ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION 421
II. AGRARIAN LAWS 424
III. CÆSAR’S VARIOUS LAWS 432
IV. CÆSAR RECEIVES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAULS 445
V. OPPOSITION OF THE PATRICIANS 448
VI. LAW OF CLODIUS--EXILE OF CICERO 456
VII. THE EXPLANATION OF CÆSAR’S CONDUCT 460
PREFACE.
Historic truth ought to be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts
of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons
of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and
the just, and the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the
progress of humanity. These lessons, to be profitable, require certain
conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous
exactness, that the changes political or social be analysed
philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives
of public men should not divert attention from the political part they
played, or cause us to forget their providential mission.
Too often the writer represents the different phases of history as
spontaneous events, without seeking in preceding facts their true origin
and their natural deduction; like the painter who, in re-producing the
characteristics of Nature, only seizes their picturesque effect, without
being able, in his picture, to give their scientific demonstration. The
historian ought to be more than a painter; he ought, like the
geologist, who explains the phenomena of the globe, to unfold the
secret of the transformation of societies.
But, in writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By
following the rules of logic. Let us first take for granted that a great
effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other
words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to
important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this
slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a
vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously
collected. Montesquieu thus confirms this idea: “It is not fortune,” he
says, “which rules the world. . . . There are general causes, whether moral
or physical, which act in every monarchy, raising, maintaining, or
overthrowing it; all accidents are subject to these causes, and if the
fortune of a battle--that is to say, a particular cause--has ruined a
state, there was a general cause which made it necessary that that state
should perish through a single battle: in a word, the principal cause
drags with it all the particular accidents. ”[1]
If during nearly a thousand years the Romans always came triumphant out
of the severest trials and greatest perils, it is because there existed
a general cause which made them always superior to their enemies, and
which did not permit partial defeats and misfortunes to entail the fall
of the empire. If the Romans, after giving an example to the world of a
people constituting itself and growing great by liberty, seemed, after
Cæsar, to throw themselves blindly into slavery, it is because there
existed a general reason which by fatality prevented the Republic from
returning to the purity of its ancient institutions; it is because the
new wants and interests of a society in labour required other means to
satisfy them. Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important
events is imperious, in like manner we must recognise in the long
duration of an institution the proof of its goodness, and in the
incontestable influence of a man upon his age the proof of his genius.
The task, then, consists in seeking the vital element which constituted
the strength of the institution, as the predominant idea which caused
man to act. In following this rule, we shall avoid the errors of those
historians who gather facts transmitted by preceding ages, without
properly arranging them according to their philosophical importance;
thus glorifying that which merits blame, and leaving in the shade that
which calls for the light. It is not a minute analysis of the Roman
organisation which will enable us to understand the duration of so great
an empire, but the profound examination of the spirit of its
institutions; no more is it the detailed recital of the most trivial
actions of a superior man which will reveal the secret of his
ascendency, but the attentive investigation of the elevated motives of
his conduct.
When extraordinary facts attest an eminent genius, what is more contrary
to good sense than to ascribe to him all the passions and sentiments of
mediocrity? What more erroneous than not to recognise the pre-eminence
of those privileged beings who appear in history from time to time like
luminous beacons, dissipating the darkness of their epoch, and throwing
light into the future? To deny this pre-eminence would, indeed, be to
insult humanity, by believing it capable of submitting, long and
voluntarily, to a domination which did not rest on true greatness and
incontestable utility. Let us be logical, and we shall be just.
Too many historians find it easier to lower men of genius, than, with a
generous inspiration, to raise them to their due height, by penetrating
their vast designs. Thus, as regards Cæsar, instead of showing us Rome,
torn to pieces by civil wars and corrupted by riches, trampling under
foot her ancient institutions, threatened by powerful peoples, such as
Gauls, Germans, and Parthians, incapable of sustaining herself without a
central power stronger, more stable, and more just; instead, I say, of
tracing this faithful picture, Cæsar is represented, from an early age,
as already aspiring to the supreme power. If he opposes Sylla, if he
disagrees with Cicero, if he allies himself with Pompey, it is the
result of that far-sighted astuteness which divined everything with a
view to bring everything under subjection. If he throws himself into
Gaul, it is to acquire riches by pillage[2] or soldiers devoted to his
projects; if he crosses the sea to carry the Roman eagles into an
unknown country, but the conquest of which will strengthen that of
Gaul,[3] it is to seek there pearls which were believed to exist in the
seas of Great Britain. [4] If, after having vanquished the formidable
enemies of Italy on the other side of the Alps, he meditates an
expedition against the Parthians, to avenge the defeat of Crassus, it
is, as certain historians say, because activity was a part of his
nature, and that his health was better when he was campaigning. [5] If he
accepts from the Senate with thankfulness a crown of laurel, and wears
it with pride, it is to conceal his bald head. If, lastly, he is
assassinated by those whom he had loaded with benefits, it is because he
sought to make himself king; as though he were to his contemporaries, as
well as for posterity, the greatest of all kings. Since Suetonius and
Plutarch, such are the paltry interpretations which it has pleased
people to give to the noblest actions. But by what sign are we to
recognise a man’s greatness? By the empire of his ideas, when his
principles and his system triumph in spite of his death or defeat. Is it
not, in fact, the peculiarity of genius to survive destruction, and to
extend its empire over future generations? Cæsar disappeared, and his
influence predominates still more than during his life. Cicero, his
adversary, is compelled to exclaim: “All the acts of Cæsar, his
writings, his words, his promises, his thoughts, have more force since
his death, than if he were still alive. ”[6] For ages it was enough to
tell the world that such was the will of Cæsar, for the world to obey
it.
The preceding remarks sufficiently explain the aim I have in view in
writing this history. This aim is to prove that, when Providence raises
up such men as Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, it is to trace out to
peoples the path they ought to follow; to stamp with the seal of their
genius a new era; and to accomplish in a few years the labour of many
centuries. Happy the peoples who comprehend and follow them! woe to
those who misunderstand and combat them! They do as the Jews did, they
crucify their Messiah; they are blind and culpable: blind, for they do
not see the impotence of their efforts to suspend the definitive triumph
of good; culpable, for they only retard progress, by impeding its
prompt and fruitful application.
In fact, neither the murder of Cæsar, nor the captivity of St. Helena,
have been able to destroy irrevocably two popular causes overthrown by a
league which disguised itself under the mask of liberty. Brutus, by
slaying Cæsar, plunged Rome into the horrors of civil war; he did not
prevent the reign of Augustus, but he rendered possible those of Nero
and Caligula. The ostracism of Napoleon by confederated Europe has been
no more successful in preventing the Empire from being resuscitated;
and, nevertheless, how far are we from the great questions solved, the
passions calmed, and the legitimate satisfactions given to peoples by
the first Empire!
Thus every day since 1815 has verified the prophecy of the captive of
St. Helena:
“How many struggles, how much blood, how many years will it not require
to realise the good which I intended to do for mankind! ”[7]
_Palace of the Tuileries, March 20th, 1862. _
NAPOLEON.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE ROMAN TERRITORY AND OF THE STATES SUBMITTED TO
ITS DOMINION OR IN ALLIANCE WITH IT AT THE TIME OF THE EXPULSION OF
TARQUINUS SUPERBUS 510 years before Christ the year 244 from the
foundation of Rome drawn by M^R. PIETRO ROSA. ]
JULIUS CÆSAR.
BOOK I.
ROMAN HISTORY BEFORE CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
ROME UNDER THE KINGS.
[Sidenote: The Kings found the Roman Institutions. ]
I. “In the birth of societies,” says Montesquieu, “it is the chiefs of
the republics who form the institution, and in the sequel it is the
institution which forms the chiefs of the republics. ” And he adds, “One
of the causes of the prosperity of Rome was the fact that its kings were
all great men. We find nowhere else in history an uninterrupted series
of such statesmen and such military commanders. ”[8]
The story, more or less fabulous, of the foundation of Rome does not
come within the limits of our design; and with no intention of clearing
up whatever degree of fiction these earliest ages of history may
contain, we purpose only to remind our readers that the kings laid the
foundations of those institutions to which Rome owed her greatness, and
so many extraordinary men who astonished the world by their virtues and
exploits.
The kingly power lasted a hundred and forty-four years, and at its fall
Rome had become the most powerful state in Latium. The town was of vast
extent, for, even at that epoch, the seven hills were nearly all
inclosed within a wall protected internally and externally by a
consecrated space called the _Pomœrium_. [9]
This line of inclosure remained long the same, although the increase of
the population had led to the establishment of immense suburbs, which
finally inclosed the Pomœrium itself. [10]
The Roman territory properly so called was circumscribed, but that of
the subjects and allies of Rome was already rather considerable. Some
colonies had been founded. The kings, by a skilful policy, had succeeded
in drawing into their dependence a great number of neighbouring states,
and, when Tarquinius Superbus assembled the Hernici, the Latins, and the
Volsci, for a ceremony destined to seal his alliance with them,
forty-seven different petty states took part in the inauguration of the
temple of Jupiter Latialis. [11]
The foundation of Ostia, by Ancus Martius, at the mouth of the Tiber,
shows that already the political and commercial importance of
facilitating communication with the sea was understood; while the treaty
of commerce concluded with Carthage at the time of the fall of the
kingly power, the details of which are preserved by Polybius, indicates
more extensive foreign relations than we might have supposed. [12]
[Sidenote: Social Organisation. ]
II. The Roman social body, which originated probably in ancient
transformations of society, consisted, from the earliest ages, of a
certain number of aggregations, called _gentes_, formed of the families
of the conquerors, and bearing some resemblance to the clans of Scotland
or to the Arabian tribes. The heads of families (_patresfamilias_) and
their members (_patricii_) were united among themselves, not only by
kindred, but also by political and religious ties. Hence arose an
hereditary nobility having for distinctive marks family names, special
costume,[13] and waxen images of their ancestors (_jus imaginum_).
The plebeians, perhaps a race who had been conquered at an earlier
period, were, in regard to the dominant race, in a situation similar to
that of the Anglo-Saxons in regard to the Normans in the eleventh
century of our era, after the invasion of England. They were generally
agriculturists, excluded originally from all military and civil
office. [14]
The patrician families had gathered round them, under the name of
_clients_, either foreigners, or a great portion of the plebeians.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus even pretends that Romulus had required that
each of these last should choose himself a patron. [15] The clients
cultivated the fields and formed part of the family. [16] The relation of
patronage had created such reciprocal obligations as amounted almost to
the ties of kindred. For the patrons, they consisted in giving
assistance to their clients in affairs public and private; and for the
latter, in aiding constantly the patrons with their person and purse,
and in preserving towards them an inviolable fidelity: they could not
cite each other reciprocally in law, or bear witness one against the
other, and it would have been a scandal to see them take different sides
in a political question. It was a state of things which had some
analogy to feudalism; the great protected the little, and the little
paid for protection by rents and services; yet there was this essential
difference, that the clients were not serfs, but free men.
Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, 1808-1873.
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
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Title: History of Julius Caesar Vol. 1 of 2
Author: Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, 1808-1873.
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HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
VOL. I.
The Publishers hereby announce that all rights of translation and
reproduction abroad are reserved.
This volume was entered at the office of the Minister of the Interior
(_déposé au Ministère de l’Intérieur_) in March, 1865.
The only Editions and Translations sanctioned by the Author are the
following:
_French. _--HENRI PLON, Printer and Publisher of the “_History of Julius
Cæsar_,” 8 Rue Garancière, Paris.
_English. _--CASSELL, PETTER, and GALPIN, Publishers, La Belle Sauvage
Yard, Ludgate Hill, London, E. C.
_American. _--HARPER and BROTHERS, Franklin Square, New York. (Authorized
by the English Publishers. )
_German. _--CHARLES GEROLD, FILS, Printers and Publishers, Vienna.
_Italian. _--LEMONNIER, Printer and Publisher, Florence.
_Portuguese. _--V. AILLAUD, GUILLARD, and Co. , Paris, Publishers, and
Agents for Portugal and Brazil.
_Russian. _--B. M. WOLFF, Bookseller and Publisher, St. Petersburg.
_Danish_, _Norwegian_, _Swedish. _--CARL B. LORCK, Consul General for
Denmark, Bookseller and Publisher, Leipsic.
_Hungarian. _--MAURICE RATH, Bookseller and Publisher, Pesth.
[Illustration: CAIVS JVLIVS CÆSAR
New York: Harper & Brothers. ]
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
VOL. I.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.
CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
ROMAN HISTORY BEFORE CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
ROME UNDER THE KINGS.
PAGE
I. THE KINGS FOUND THE ROMAN INSTITUTIONS 1
II. SOCIAL ORGANISATION 3
III. POLITICAL ORGANISATION 6
IV. RELIGION 15
V. RESULTS OBTAINED BY ROYALTY 20
CHAPTER II.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULAR REPUBLIC (244-416).
I. ADVANTAGE OF THE REPUBLIC 25
II. INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 31
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARISTOCRACY 36
IV. ELEMENTS OF DISSOLUTION 42
V. RÉSUMÉ 53
CHAPTER III.
CONQUEST OF ITALY (416-488).
I. DESCRIPTION OF ITALY 62
II. DISPOSITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF ITALY IN REGARD TO ROME 65
III. TREATMENT OF THE VANQUISHED PEOPLES 68
IV. SUBMISSION OF LATIUM AFTER THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR 75
V. SECOND SAMNITE WAR 78
VI. THIRD SAMNITE WAR--COALITION OF SAMNITES, ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS,
AND HERNICI (443-449) 82
VII. FOURTH SAMNITE WAR--SECOND COALITION OF THE SAMNITES,
ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS, AND GAULS (456-464) 85
VIII. THIRD COALITION OF THE ETRUSCANS, GAULS, LUCANIANS, AND
TARENTUM (469-474) 88
IX. PYRRHUS IN ITALY--SUBMISSION OF TARENTUM (474-488) 89
X. PREPONDERANCE OF ROME 92
XI. STRENGTH OF THE INSTITUTIONS 97
CHAPTER IV.
PROSPERITY OF THE BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS.
I. COMMERCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 104
II. NORTHERN AFRICA 105
III. SPAIN 110
IV. SOUTHERN GAUL 114
V. LIGURIA, CISALPINE GAUL, VENETIA, AND ILLYRIA 115
VI. EPIRUS 118
VII. GREECE 119
VIII. MACEDONIA 124
IX. ASIA MINOR 126
X. KINGDOM OF PONTUS 127
XI. BITHYNIA 130
XII. CAPPADOCIA 131
XIII. KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS 132
XIV. CARIA, LYCIA, AND CILICIA 135
XV. SYRIA 137
XVI. EGYPT 143
XVII. CYRENAICA 146
XVIII. CYPRUS 147
XIX. CRETE 148
XX. RHODES 148
XXI. SARDINIA 151
XXII. CORSICA 152
XXIII. SICILY 152
CHAPTER V.
PUNIC WARS AND WARS OF MACEDONIA AND ASIA (488-621).
I. COMPARISON BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE 155
II. FIRST PUNIC WAR (490-513) 158
III. WAR OF ILLYRIA (525) 165
IV. INVASION OF THE CISALPINES (528) 167
V. SECOND PUNIC WAR (536-552) 169
VI. RESULTS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 182
VII. THE MACEDONIAN WAR (554) 189
VIII. WAR AGAINST ANTIOCHUS (563) 194
IX. THE WAR IN THE CISALPINE (558-579) 196
X. WAR AGAINST PERSIA (583) 199
XI. MODIFICATION OF ROMAN POLICY 204
XII. THIRD PUNIC WAR (605-608) 212
XIII. GREECE, MACEDONIA, NUMANTIA, AND PERGAMUS REDUCED TO PROVINCES 215
XIV. SUMMARY 219
CHAPTER VI.
THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SYLLA (621-676).
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC 224
II. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (621) 232
III. CAIUS GRACCHUS (631) 238
IV. WAR OF JUGURTHA (637) 246
V. MARIUS (647) 249
VI. WARS OF THE ALLIES 256
VII. SYLLA (666) 262
VIII. EFFECTS OF SYLLA’S DICTATORSHIP 278
* * * * *
BOOK II.
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
(654-684. )
I. FIRST YEARS OF CÆSAR 281
II. CÆSAR PERSECUTED BY SYLLA (672) 290
III. CÆSAR IN ASIA (673, 674) 293
IV. CÆSAR ON HIS RETURN TO ROME (676) 296
V. CÆSAR GOES TO RHODES (678-680) 299
VI. CÆSAR PONTIFF AND MILITARY TRIBUNE (680-684) 302
CHAPTER II.
(684-691. )
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC (684) 307
II. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS 316
III. CÆSAR QUESTOR (686) 323
IV. THE GABINIAN LAW (687) 327
V. THE MANILIAN LAW (688) 330
VI. CÆSAR CURULE ÆDILE (689) 334
VII. CÆSAR _Judex Quæstionis_ (660) 339
VIII. CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE SENATE (690) 340
IX. THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTING A NEW PARTY 342
CHAPTER III.
(691-695. )
I. CICERO AND ANTONIUS CONSULS (691) 345
II. AGRARIAN LAW OF RULLUS 347
III. TRIAL OF RABIRIUS (691) 352
IV. CÆSAR GRAND PONTIFF (691) 354
V. CATILINE’S CONSPIRACY 357
VI. ERROR OF CICERO 379
VII. CÆSAR PRÆTOR (692) 381
VIII. ATTEMPT OF CLODIUS (692) 386
IX. POMPEY’S TRIUMPHAL RETURN (692) 388
X. DESTINY REGULATES EVENTS 397
CHAPTER IV.
(693-695. )
I. CÆSAR PROPRÆTOR IN SPAIN (693) 402
II. CÆSAR DEMANDS A TRIUMPH AND THE CONSULSHIP (694) 409
III. ALLIANCE OF CÆSAR, POMPEY, AND CRASSUS 413
IV. CÆSAR’S ELECTION 418
CHAPTER V.
CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS (695).
I. ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION 421
II. AGRARIAN LAWS 424
III. CÆSAR’S VARIOUS LAWS 432
IV. CÆSAR RECEIVES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAULS 445
V. OPPOSITION OF THE PATRICIANS 448
VI. LAW OF CLODIUS--EXILE OF CICERO 456
VII. THE EXPLANATION OF CÆSAR’S CONDUCT 460
PREFACE.
Historic truth ought to be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts
of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons
of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and
the just, and the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the
progress of humanity. These lessons, to be profitable, require certain
conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous
exactness, that the changes political or social be analysed
philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives
of public men should not divert attention from the political part they
played, or cause us to forget their providential mission.
Too often the writer represents the different phases of history as
spontaneous events, without seeking in preceding facts their true origin
and their natural deduction; like the painter who, in re-producing the
characteristics of Nature, only seizes their picturesque effect, without
being able, in his picture, to give their scientific demonstration. The
historian ought to be more than a painter; he ought, like the
geologist, who explains the phenomena of the globe, to unfold the
secret of the transformation of societies.
But, in writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By
following the rules of logic. Let us first take for granted that a great
effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other
words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to
important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this
slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a
vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously
collected. Montesquieu thus confirms this idea: “It is not fortune,” he
says, “which rules the world. . . . There are general causes, whether moral
or physical, which act in every monarchy, raising, maintaining, or
overthrowing it; all accidents are subject to these causes, and if the
fortune of a battle--that is to say, a particular cause--has ruined a
state, there was a general cause which made it necessary that that state
should perish through a single battle: in a word, the principal cause
drags with it all the particular accidents. ”[1]
If during nearly a thousand years the Romans always came triumphant out
of the severest trials and greatest perils, it is because there existed
a general cause which made them always superior to their enemies, and
which did not permit partial defeats and misfortunes to entail the fall
of the empire. If the Romans, after giving an example to the world of a
people constituting itself and growing great by liberty, seemed, after
Cæsar, to throw themselves blindly into slavery, it is because there
existed a general reason which by fatality prevented the Republic from
returning to the purity of its ancient institutions; it is because the
new wants and interests of a society in labour required other means to
satisfy them. Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important
events is imperious, in like manner we must recognise in the long
duration of an institution the proof of its goodness, and in the
incontestable influence of a man upon his age the proof of his genius.
The task, then, consists in seeking the vital element which constituted
the strength of the institution, as the predominant idea which caused
man to act. In following this rule, we shall avoid the errors of those
historians who gather facts transmitted by preceding ages, without
properly arranging them according to their philosophical importance;
thus glorifying that which merits blame, and leaving in the shade that
which calls for the light. It is not a minute analysis of the Roman
organisation which will enable us to understand the duration of so great
an empire, but the profound examination of the spirit of its
institutions; no more is it the detailed recital of the most trivial
actions of a superior man which will reveal the secret of his
ascendency, but the attentive investigation of the elevated motives of
his conduct.
When extraordinary facts attest an eminent genius, what is more contrary
to good sense than to ascribe to him all the passions and sentiments of
mediocrity?
INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 31
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ARISTOCRACY 36
IV. ELEMENTS OF DISSOLUTION 42
V. RÉSUMÉ 53
CHAPTER III.
CONQUEST OF ITALY (416-488).
I. DESCRIPTION OF ITALY 62
II. DISPOSITIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF ITALY IN REGARD TO ROME 65
III. TREATMENT OF THE VANQUISHED PEOPLES 68
IV. SUBMISSION OF LATIUM AFTER THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR 75
V. SECOND SAMNITE WAR 78
VI. THIRD SAMNITE WAR--COALITION OF SAMNITES, ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS,
AND HERNICI (443-449) 82
VII. FOURTH SAMNITE WAR--SECOND COALITION OF THE SAMNITES,
ETRUSCANS, UMBRIANS, AND GAULS (456-464) 85
VIII. THIRD COALITION OF THE ETRUSCANS, GAULS, LUCANIANS, AND
TARENTUM (469-474) 88
IX. PYRRHUS IN ITALY--SUBMISSION OF TARENTUM (474-488) 89
X. PREPONDERANCE OF ROME 92
XI. STRENGTH OF THE INSTITUTIONS 97
CHAPTER IV.
PROSPERITY OF THE BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS.
I. COMMERCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN 104
II. NORTHERN AFRICA 105
III. SPAIN 110
IV. SOUTHERN GAUL 114
V. LIGURIA, CISALPINE GAUL, VENETIA, AND ILLYRIA 115
VI. EPIRUS 118
VII. GREECE 119
VIII. MACEDONIA 124
IX. ASIA MINOR 126
X. KINGDOM OF PONTUS 127
XI. BITHYNIA 130
XII. CAPPADOCIA 131
XIII. KINGDOM OF PERGAMUS 132
XIV. CARIA, LYCIA, AND CILICIA 135
XV. SYRIA 137
XVI. EGYPT 143
XVII. CYRENAICA 146
XVIII. CYPRUS 147
XIX. CRETE 148
XX. RHODES 148
XXI. SARDINIA 151
XXII. CORSICA 152
XXIII. SICILY 152
CHAPTER V.
PUNIC WARS AND WARS OF MACEDONIA AND ASIA (488-621).
I. COMPARISON BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE 155
II. FIRST PUNIC WAR (490-513) 158
III. WAR OF ILLYRIA (525) 165
IV. INVASION OF THE CISALPINES (528) 167
V. SECOND PUNIC WAR (536-552) 169
VI. RESULTS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 182
VII. THE MACEDONIAN WAR (554) 189
VIII. WAR AGAINST ANTIOCHUS (563) 194
IX. THE WAR IN THE CISALPINE (558-579) 196
X. WAR AGAINST PERSIA (583) 199
XI. MODIFICATION OF ROMAN POLICY 204
XII. THIRD PUNIC WAR (605-608) 212
XIII. GREECE, MACEDONIA, NUMANTIA, AND PERGAMUS REDUCED TO PROVINCES 215
XIV. SUMMARY 219
CHAPTER VI.
THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SYLLA (621-676).
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC 224
II. TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (621) 232
III. CAIUS GRACCHUS (631) 238
IV. WAR OF JUGURTHA (637) 246
V. MARIUS (647) 249
VI. WARS OF THE ALLIES 256
VII. SYLLA (666) 262
VIII. EFFECTS OF SYLLA’S DICTATORSHIP 278
* * * * *
BOOK II.
HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
(654-684. )
I. FIRST YEARS OF CÆSAR 281
II. CÆSAR PERSECUTED BY SYLLA (672) 290
III. CÆSAR IN ASIA (673, 674) 293
IV. CÆSAR ON HIS RETURN TO ROME (676) 296
V. CÆSAR GOES TO RHODES (678-680) 299
VI. CÆSAR PONTIFF AND MILITARY TRIBUNE (680-684) 302
CHAPTER II.
(684-691. )
I. STATE OF THE REPUBLIC (684) 307
II. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS 316
III. CÆSAR QUESTOR (686) 323
IV. THE GABINIAN LAW (687) 327
V. THE MANILIAN LAW (688) 330
VI. CÆSAR CURULE ÆDILE (689) 334
VII. CÆSAR _Judex Quæstionis_ (660) 339
VIII. CONSPIRACIES AGAINST THE SENATE (690) 340
IX. THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTING A NEW PARTY 342
CHAPTER III.
(691-695. )
I. CICERO AND ANTONIUS CONSULS (691) 345
II. AGRARIAN LAW OF RULLUS 347
III. TRIAL OF RABIRIUS (691) 352
IV. CÆSAR GRAND PONTIFF (691) 354
V. CATILINE’S CONSPIRACY 357
VI. ERROR OF CICERO 379
VII. CÆSAR PRÆTOR (692) 381
VIII. ATTEMPT OF CLODIUS (692) 386
IX. POMPEY’S TRIUMPHAL RETURN (692) 388
X. DESTINY REGULATES EVENTS 397
CHAPTER IV.
(693-695. )
I. CÆSAR PROPRÆTOR IN SPAIN (693) 402
II. CÆSAR DEMANDS A TRIUMPH AND THE CONSULSHIP (694) 409
III. ALLIANCE OF CÆSAR, POMPEY, AND CRASSUS 413
IV. CÆSAR’S ELECTION 418
CHAPTER V.
CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS (695).
I. ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION 421
II. AGRARIAN LAWS 424
III. CÆSAR’S VARIOUS LAWS 432
IV. CÆSAR RECEIVES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAULS 445
V. OPPOSITION OF THE PATRICIANS 448
VI. LAW OF CLODIUS--EXILE OF CICERO 456
VII. THE EXPLANATION OF CÆSAR’S CONDUCT 460
PREFACE.
Historic truth ought to be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts
of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons
of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and
the just, and the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the
progress of humanity. These lessons, to be profitable, require certain
conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous
exactness, that the changes political or social be analysed
philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives
of public men should not divert attention from the political part they
played, or cause us to forget their providential mission.
Too often the writer represents the different phases of history as
spontaneous events, without seeking in preceding facts their true origin
and their natural deduction; like the painter who, in re-producing the
characteristics of Nature, only seizes their picturesque effect, without
being able, in his picture, to give their scientific demonstration. The
historian ought to be more than a painter; he ought, like the
geologist, who explains the phenomena of the globe, to unfold the
secret of the transformation of societies.
But, in writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By
following the rules of logic. Let us first take for granted that a great
effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other
words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to
important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this
slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a
vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously
collected. Montesquieu thus confirms this idea: “It is not fortune,” he
says, “which rules the world. . . . There are general causes, whether moral
or physical, which act in every monarchy, raising, maintaining, or
overthrowing it; all accidents are subject to these causes, and if the
fortune of a battle--that is to say, a particular cause--has ruined a
state, there was a general cause which made it necessary that that state
should perish through a single battle: in a word, the principal cause
drags with it all the particular accidents. ”[1]
If during nearly a thousand years the Romans always came triumphant out
of the severest trials and greatest perils, it is because there existed
a general cause which made them always superior to their enemies, and
which did not permit partial defeats and misfortunes to entail the fall
of the empire. If the Romans, after giving an example to the world of a
people constituting itself and growing great by liberty, seemed, after
Cæsar, to throw themselves blindly into slavery, it is because there
existed a general reason which by fatality prevented the Republic from
returning to the purity of its ancient institutions; it is because the
new wants and interests of a society in labour required other means to
satisfy them. Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important
events is imperious, in like manner we must recognise in the long
duration of an institution the proof of its goodness, and in the
incontestable influence of a man upon his age the proof of his genius.
The task, then, consists in seeking the vital element which constituted
the strength of the institution, as the predominant idea which caused
man to act. In following this rule, we shall avoid the errors of those
historians who gather facts transmitted by preceding ages, without
properly arranging them according to their philosophical importance;
thus glorifying that which merits blame, and leaving in the shade that
which calls for the light. It is not a minute analysis of the Roman
organisation which will enable us to understand the duration of so great
an empire, but the profound examination of the spirit of its
institutions; no more is it the detailed recital of the most trivial
actions of a superior man which will reveal the secret of his
ascendency, but the attentive investigation of the elevated motives of
his conduct.
When extraordinary facts attest an eminent genius, what is more contrary
to good sense than to ascribe to him all the passions and sentiments of
mediocrity? What more erroneous than not to recognise the pre-eminence
of those privileged beings who appear in history from time to time like
luminous beacons, dissipating the darkness of their epoch, and throwing
light into the future? To deny this pre-eminence would, indeed, be to
insult humanity, by believing it capable of submitting, long and
voluntarily, to a domination which did not rest on true greatness and
incontestable utility. Let us be logical, and we shall be just.
Too many historians find it easier to lower men of genius, than, with a
generous inspiration, to raise them to their due height, by penetrating
their vast designs. Thus, as regards Cæsar, instead of showing us Rome,
torn to pieces by civil wars and corrupted by riches, trampling under
foot her ancient institutions, threatened by powerful peoples, such as
Gauls, Germans, and Parthians, incapable of sustaining herself without a
central power stronger, more stable, and more just; instead, I say, of
tracing this faithful picture, Cæsar is represented, from an early age,
as already aspiring to the supreme power. If he opposes Sylla, if he
disagrees with Cicero, if he allies himself with Pompey, it is the
result of that far-sighted astuteness which divined everything with a
view to bring everything under subjection. If he throws himself into
Gaul, it is to acquire riches by pillage[2] or soldiers devoted to his
projects; if he crosses the sea to carry the Roman eagles into an
unknown country, but the conquest of which will strengthen that of
Gaul,[3] it is to seek there pearls which were believed to exist in the
seas of Great Britain. [4] If, after having vanquished the formidable
enemies of Italy on the other side of the Alps, he meditates an
expedition against the Parthians, to avenge the defeat of Crassus, it
is, as certain historians say, because activity was a part of his
nature, and that his health was better when he was campaigning. [5] If he
accepts from the Senate with thankfulness a crown of laurel, and wears
it with pride, it is to conceal his bald head. If, lastly, he is
assassinated by those whom he had loaded with benefits, it is because he
sought to make himself king; as though he were to his contemporaries, as
well as for posterity, the greatest of all kings. Since Suetonius and
Plutarch, such are the paltry interpretations which it has pleased
people to give to the noblest actions. But by what sign are we to
recognise a man’s greatness? By the empire of his ideas, when his
principles and his system triumph in spite of his death or defeat. Is it
not, in fact, the peculiarity of genius to survive destruction, and to
extend its empire over future generations? Cæsar disappeared, and his
influence predominates still more than during his life. Cicero, his
adversary, is compelled to exclaim: “All the acts of Cæsar, his
writings, his words, his promises, his thoughts, have more force since
his death, than if he were still alive. ”[6] For ages it was enough to
tell the world that such was the will of Cæsar, for the world to obey
it.
The preceding remarks sufficiently explain the aim I have in view in
writing this history. This aim is to prove that, when Providence raises
up such men as Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, it is to trace out to
peoples the path they ought to follow; to stamp with the seal of their
genius a new era; and to accomplish in a few years the labour of many
centuries. Happy the peoples who comprehend and follow them! woe to
those who misunderstand and combat them! They do as the Jews did, they
crucify their Messiah; they are blind and culpable: blind, for they do
not see the impotence of their efforts to suspend the definitive triumph
of good; culpable, for they only retard progress, by impeding its
prompt and fruitful application.
In fact, neither the murder of Cæsar, nor the captivity of St. Helena,
have been able to destroy irrevocably two popular causes overthrown by a
league which disguised itself under the mask of liberty. Brutus, by
slaying Cæsar, plunged Rome into the horrors of civil war; he did not
prevent the reign of Augustus, but he rendered possible those of Nero
and Caligula. The ostracism of Napoleon by confederated Europe has been
no more successful in preventing the Empire from being resuscitated;
and, nevertheless, how far are we from the great questions solved, the
passions calmed, and the legitimate satisfactions given to peoples by
the first Empire!
Thus every day since 1815 has verified the prophecy of the captive of
St. Helena:
“How many struggles, how much blood, how many years will it not require
to realise the good which I intended to do for mankind! ”[7]
_Palace of the Tuileries, March 20th, 1862. _
NAPOLEON.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE ROMAN TERRITORY AND OF THE STATES SUBMITTED TO
ITS DOMINION OR IN ALLIANCE WITH IT AT THE TIME OF THE EXPULSION OF
TARQUINUS SUPERBUS 510 years before Christ the year 244 from the
foundation of Rome drawn by M^R. PIETRO ROSA. ]
JULIUS CÆSAR.
BOOK I.
ROMAN HISTORY BEFORE CÆSAR.
CHAPTER I.
ROME UNDER THE KINGS.
[Sidenote: The Kings found the Roman Institutions. ]
I. “In the birth of societies,” says Montesquieu, “it is the chiefs of
the republics who form the institution, and in the sequel it is the
institution which forms the chiefs of the republics. ” And he adds, “One
of the causes of the prosperity of Rome was the fact that its kings were
all great men. We find nowhere else in history an uninterrupted series
of such statesmen and such military commanders. ”[8]
The story, more or less fabulous, of the foundation of Rome does not
come within the limits of our design; and with no intention of clearing
up whatever degree of fiction these earliest ages of history may
contain, we purpose only to remind our readers that the kings laid the
foundations of those institutions to which Rome owed her greatness, and
so many extraordinary men who astonished the world by their virtues and
exploits.
The kingly power lasted a hundred and forty-four years, and at its fall
Rome had become the most powerful state in Latium. The town was of vast
extent, for, even at that epoch, the seven hills were nearly all
inclosed within a wall protected internally and externally by a
consecrated space called the _Pomœrium_. [9]
This line of inclosure remained long the same, although the increase of
the population had led to the establishment of immense suburbs, which
finally inclosed the Pomœrium itself. [10]
The Roman territory properly so called was circumscribed, but that of
the subjects and allies of Rome was already rather considerable. Some
colonies had been founded. The kings, by a skilful policy, had succeeded
in drawing into their dependence a great number of neighbouring states,
and, when Tarquinius Superbus assembled the Hernici, the Latins, and the
Volsci, for a ceremony destined to seal his alliance with them,
forty-seven different petty states took part in the inauguration of the
temple of Jupiter Latialis. [11]
The foundation of Ostia, by Ancus Martius, at the mouth of the Tiber,
shows that already the political and commercial importance of
facilitating communication with the sea was understood; while the treaty
of commerce concluded with Carthage at the time of the fall of the
kingly power, the details of which are preserved by Polybius, indicates
more extensive foreign relations than we might have supposed. [12]
[Sidenote: Social Organisation. ]
II. The Roman social body, which originated probably in ancient
transformations of society, consisted, from the earliest ages, of a
certain number of aggregations, called _gentes_, formed of the families
of the conquerors, and bearing some resemblance to the clans of Scotland
or to the Arabian tribes. The heads of families (_patresfamilias_) and
their members (_patricii_) were united among themselves, not only by
kindred, but also by political and religious ties. Hence arose an
hereditary nobility having for distinctive marks family names, special
costume,[13] and waxen images of their ancestors (_jus imaginum_).
The plebeians, perhaps a race who had been conquered at an earlier
period, were, in regard to the dominant race, in a situation similar to
that of the Anglo-Saxons in regard to the Normans in the eleventh
century of our era, after the invasion of England. They were generally
agriculturists, excluded originally from all military and civil
office. [14]
The patrician families had gathered round them, under the name of
_clients_, either foreigners, or a great portion of the plebeians.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus even pretends that Romulus had required that
each of these last should choose himself a patron. [15] The clients
cultivated the fields and formed part of the family. [16] The relation of
patronage had created such reciprocal obligations as amounted almost to
the ties of kindred. For the patrons, they consisted in giving
assistance to their clients in affairs public and private; and for the
latter, in aiding constantly the patrons with their person and purse,
and in preserving towards them an inviolable fidelity: they could not
cite each other reciprocally in law, or bear witness one against the
other, and it would have been a scandal to see them take different sides
in a political question. It was a state of things which had some
analogy to feudalism; the great protected the little, and the little
paid for protection by rents and services; yet there was this essential
difference, that the clients were not serfs, but free men.
