Lansing, the two houses appear to have
thought there was no force in it, and I am persuaded there
can be no reason to apply a different rule to Mr.
thought there was no force in it, and I am persuaded there
can be no reason to apply a different rule to Mr.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
It fully
met the objection to the act, which was drawn from
that great principle of the social compact, that the
chief object of government is to protect the rights of indi-
viduals by the united strength of the community; insisting
that the efforts of a state were to be " proportioned to its
abilities, warranted by a reasonable expectation of a
favourable issue, and compatible with its eventual security;
but that it was not bound to enter into or prosecute enter-
prises of a manifest rashness and folly, or which in the
event of success would be productive of more mischief
than good. " He then reviewed the pretensions of Ver-
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? HAMILTON.
445
mont, and contrasted her power to resist with that of
New-York to enforce these territorial claims.
From this topic he passed on to an examination of the
constitutionality of the bill, asserting that the power of
dismembering the state, under certain circumstances, was
a necessary appendage of its sovereignty. Instances of
such dismemberments were referred to, and the writers on
international law were quoted to establish the right "to
lop off a limb for the good of the body. " From an exposi-
tion of the right, he proceeded to a review of the policy
of this measure; in the course of which, he adduced facts
to show that Vermont had borne such relations to Great
Britain during the revolution as to justify the belief, that,
should a collision arise, she would receive aid from their
recent enemy.
The remaining questions were, how far New-York had
a right to acknowledge the independence of Vermont, and
how far she was bound to make compensation to the own-
ers of the disputed territory. He urged the actual inde-
pendence of Vermont as an answer to the first inquiry;
stated, that as to territorial claims, the confederacy pro-
vided a tribunal for their adjustment; and insisted that the
state was not under a strict obligation to make compensa-
tion to the losing proprietors. "The distinction," he said,
"is this--if a government voluntarily bargains away the
rights, or dispossesses itself of the property of its citizens
in their enjoyments, possessions, or power, it is bound to
make compensation for that of which it has deprived them;
but if they are actually dispossessed of those rights or that
property by the casualties of war, or by revolution, the
state, if the public good requires it, may abandon them to
the loss without being obliged to make reparation. "
"In wars between states, the sovereign is never supposed
to be bound to make good the losses which the subject
sustains by the captures or ravages of the enemy, though
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? 446
THE LIFE OF
they should amount to the destruction of his whole pro-
perty; and yet nothing can be more agreeable to natural
equity than that those who happen to be the unlucky vic-
tims of the war should be indemnified by the community. "--
"But in practice such a principle would be found attended
with endless difficulties and inconveniences; and there-
fore the reverse of it has been adopted as a general rule.
The true reason is, the resources of nations are not ade-
quate to the reparation of such extensive losses as those
which are commonly occasioned by wars and revolutions,
and it would, therefore, be contrary to the general good
of society to establish it as a rule that there is a strict ob-
ligation to repay such losses. It is better there should be
individual sufferings, than to admit a rule which would
fetter the operations of government, and distress the affairs
of the community. Generosity and policy may, in parti-
cular instances, dictate such compensations. Sometimes
they have been made by nations, but much oftener. omitted.
The propriety of doing the one or the other must depend
on circumstances in which the ability of the public will
always be a primary consideration. "
As to the examples derived from Roman magnanimity,
he remarked:--" Neither the manner nor the genius of
Rome are suited to the republic or age we live in. All
her maxims and habits were military--her government
was constituted for war. Ours is unfit for it; and our situa-
tion, still less than our constitution, invites us to emulate
the conduct of Rome, or to attempt a display of unprofita-
ble heroism. "--" One more observation will," he said, " con-
clude what I have to say. The present situation of our
national affairs appears to me peculiarly critical. I know
not what may be the result of the disordered state of gov-
ernment. I am, therefore, the more solicitous to guard
against danger from abroad. Gentlemen who view our
public affairs in the same light in which they present them-
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? HAMILTON.
447
selves to my mind, will, I trust, vote with me upon the
present occasion. Those, on the contrary, who think all is
well, who suppose our government is full of energy, our
credit high, our trade and finances flourishing, will proba-
bly see no room for any anxiety about the matter, and
may be disposed to leave Vermont in its present state. If
the bill should fail, I hope they never will have occasion
to regret the opportunity they have lost. "
At the end of this speech, the question was taken, and
the bill recognising the independence of Vermont, on the
condition of her entering into the confederacy, passed.
By this well-timed measure a civil war was prevented, and
another state soon after became a member of the union.
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? 448
THE LIFE OF
CHAPTER XXIII.
[1787. ]
The vote of the New-York legislature on the impost
decided the fate of the confederation. The only hope of
preserving an union of the states rested upon the issue of
the contemplated convention.
The assembly of Virginia being the first state legisla-
ture in session after the adjournment of the commissioners
at Annapolis, passed an act in October for the appoint-
ment of seven commissioners to meet at Philadelphia, and
to join with the deputies of the other states, " in devising
and discussing such alterations as may be necessary to
render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies
of the times. " New-Jersey was the second to act on this
subject, appointing commissioners on the twenty-third of
November, with powers similar to those previously grant-
ed by her. Pennsylvania chose delegates with like pow-
ers on the thirtieth of the succeeding month.
The report from Annapolis was submitted to congress
soon after its date; but a determined opposition being
made to the proposed convention, on the ground of its
illegality, it was not acted upon: thus, tenacity of power
grows with conscious weakness. When the legislature
of Massachusetts assembled, Governor Bowdoin, still zeal-
ous for this great measure, sent them a message, in which,
after a mention of the reasons that had induced the meeting
at Annapolis to adjourn, he again declared his conviction
of the importance of amending the confederation. Its
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? HAMILTON.
449
delegates to congress then appeared, and explained the mo-
tives by which they had been actuated.
King observed--" that the report of the commercial
convention was before congress. Doubts had arisen as
to the mode of agreeing upon commercial regulations.
The confederation was the act of the people. No part
could be altered but by consent of congress and confirma-
tion of the several legislatures. Congress, therefore, ought
to make the examination first; because, if it was done by
a convention, no legislature could have a right to confirm
it. Did any legislature sit for such a purpose? No. It
must be referred to the people, and then what degree of
assent was necessary to make it an article of the confede-
ration? Whereas if it was conducted agreeably to the con-
federation, no such difficulty could exist. Besides, if con-
gress should not agree upon a report of a convention, the
most fatal consequences might follow. Congress were,
therefore, the proper body to make alterations. "
After adverting to the efforts of the several states, he
remarked, that not more than half a million of dollars had
been received from them in the last two years; that "it
had become a subject of admiration how government ex-
isted; that so melancholy was the state of the federal
treasury, that all men seemed to turn away from it as an
evil which admitted of no remedy. If all the states could
be brought into the continental impost, this resource might
be anticipated, and the national credit strengthened in that
way; but there remained two states which had not acced-
ed to it--Pennsylvania and New-York. The situation
of the former was known, and should that state comply,
as there were some grounds to hope and expect, the dan-
ger of the union, and the love which New-York must enter-
tain for the confederation, must induce their accession to
the system. " He closed his observations with a strong
comment on the existing commotions in Massachusetts,
57
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? 450 THE LIFE OF
suggesting the probability that congress would make exer-
tions to suppress them. Dana, another delegate, concur-
red in these views. Their speeches were published, and
as no measures were taken for the appointment of a dele-
gation to Philadelphia, great apprehensions were enter-
tained by the advocates of a general convention, that their
efforts would be rendered fruitless by the dissent of this
leading member of the confederacy.
The hesitation of Massachusetts lent a sanction to the
policy of the governor of New-York. There was in the
constitution of that state an energy the more imposing, as
contrasted with the weakness of the confederacy. This
energy had been increased by a perverted construction of
his powers, which concentrated the whole disposal of office
in the chief magistrate.
The new congress met in the city of New-York on the
second of February, three months of its term having ex-
pired, and elected General St. Clair as their president.
Though without prerogative or patronage, that officer was
understood to represent in his person the majesty of the
nation. The appropriations and the ceremonial of his
household all indicated such to have been the intention of
congress.
In the same public hall was seen Clinton, exhibiting all
the authority of his office and his influence over an obedi-
ent legislature. The effect on the common mind of with-
holding those observances which custom has connected
with high station, was well understood by Clinton: a
marked and studied neglect was manifested by him towards
congress, as though he wished them to be regarded rather
as intruders upon a sovereign state, than as the Council
of the Nation. Yet he at the same time avowed the
opinion, that the articles of the confederation were equal
to the objects of the union, or with little alteration could
be made so, and that the deputies to Annapolis ought to
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? HAMILTON. 451
have confined themselves to the expressed purpose of their
errand.
New-York gave the most prominent adversary and ad-
vocate of the union. The more obstinate the opposition
of Clinton to enlarged views of the interests of the Ameri-
can people, the more zealous and determined were the ex-
ertions of Hamilton. All the influence of his attractive
manners and generous hospitality was now seen. He min-
gled daily with the members of the federal government;
his house was their constant resort; his conversation was
full of the great theme of a more perfect union; and with
earnest argument and wit he exposed the inconsistency of
men who refused to confer upon congress an adequate
fiscal power, for the reason that it was a single body with-
out checks, and yet would seek to thwart every effort to
constitute it differently. Having thus prepared the minds
of that assembly,* he hoped that their sanction of the pro-
posed convention, so long withheld, might be obtained.
Though a president had been elected, nine states were
not represented in congress until the fourteenth of Feb-
ruary. The next day Hamilton delivered his speech upon
the impost, in the presence of many of its members, who
saw the mute vote rejecting it recorded.
It is the part of genius to select the moment to achieve
its high purposes; and the day after this vote, notice was
given of an intended motion for an instruction to congress
to recommend the call of a convention. Its object was
stated to be that " of revising the articles of confederation
and perpetual union, by such alterations and amendments
as a majority of the representatives shall judge proper and
necessary, to render them adequate to the preservation
and government of the union. "
* Speaking subsequently of a leading individual, who. commenced his ca-
reer as an earnest opponent of a national system, Hamilton remarked to a
friend--" I revolutionized his mind. " .
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? 452
THE LIFE OF
This motion was brought forward on the seventeenth,
and being so modified, at the instance of the leader of
Clinton's party in the assembly, as to omit the words, " a
majority," and to substitute that of " support" for " govern-
ment," was agreed to. After the interval of a day, this
instruction was laid before the senate, and it was ordered
to be postponed. Of Clinton's majority in that branch, the
most prominent persons were Haring and Yates. * Gen-
eral Schuyler led the opposition. His weight of character
would have been insufficient to carry this important reso-
lution, but for the urgent circumstances of the moment.
Some of the leaders of the rebellion in Massachusetts had
taken refuge in New-York. On the day this resolution
was laid before the senate, Schuyler moved that a procla-
mation should be issued for their apprehension. The fears
of congress were also aroused, and on the same day a re-
port then in progress, deferring the enlistment of federal
troops, was postponed. Alarmed for the quiet of the state,
the senate on the following day," after considerable debate,
by a majority of one vote, concurred in the proposed in-
struction. "
To anticipate intrigue and gain the advantage of this
momentary alarm, Hamilton's report from Annapolis was
called up in congress the next day. That body was yet
undecided. By some, their sanction of the convention, it
was supposed, might stimulate, by others it was alleged
that it would impede, the action of the states. Some looked
with jealousy at a body so formed; others doubted its con-
stitutionality. Amid this perplexity, the instruction of
New-York was presented to them. Though supported by
the votes of Massachusetts and Virginia, the recommen-
dation it urged failed, and a resolution of a member from
Massachusetts, after being amended, was passed. It re-
* Abraham Yates.
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? HAMILTON.
453
ferred, as a justification for the proceeding, to the provision
in the articles of the confederation for their alteration by
congress, with the assent of the state legislatures, and to
the recent instruction from New-York, and declaring that
it was " the most probable mean of establishing in these
states a firm national government," sanctioned the contem-
plated convention. *
Having exerted the influence of New-York upon con-
gress, Hamilton was eager to derive the benefit of the in-
fluence of congress upon that state. Five days after, he
offered a resolution in the assembly, conforming to the re-
commendation of congress, for the appointment of five
commissioners to meet in convention at Annapolis. This
resolution being agreed to, was laid before the senate by
Schuyler. That body did not dare to reject it; but, on
motion of Haring, the number was reduced from five to
three.
Yates then proposed to insert a proviso, that the alter-
ations and provisions to the articles of confederation
"should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the con-
stitution of this stale. " This amendment, so decisive of
the views of Clinton, was opposed, and was lost by the vote
of the presiding officer. f
The resolution then passed the senate, was immediately
concurred in by the house, and on the eighth of March,
three commissioners, Yates, Hamilton, and Lansing, were
appointed--Chief Justice Yates unanimously, Hamilton
with two, Lansing with many dissenting voices. As the
rule of the confederation of voting by states might be adopt-
ed, and as his colleagues were in the views of Clinton,
Hamilton proposed, near the end of the session, to add two
delegates. He observed, "I think it proper to apprise the
? February 21,1787.
t Senate Journal of New-York, p. 44-5, February 28,1787.
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? 454
THE LIFE OF
house, of the gentlemen on some of whom I wish their
choice to fall, and with a view to which I bring forward
the present motion. Their abilities and^ experience in the
general affairs of the country cannot but be useful on such
an occasion. I mean Mr. Chancellor Livingston, Mr. Du-
ane, Mr. Benson, and Mr. Jay; the particular situation of
the latter, may require an observation. His being a ser-
vant of congress might seem an objection to the appoint-
ment; but surely this objection, if it had any weight, would
apply with equal force to a member of that body. In the
case of Mr.
Lansing, the two houses appear to have
thought there was no force in it, and I am persuaded there
can be no reason to apply a different rule to Mr. Jay. His
knowledge, abilities, tried integrity, and abundant experi-
ence in the affairs of the country, foreign and domestic,
will not permit us to allow any weight to any objection
which would imply a want of confidence in a character that
has every title to the fullest confidence. "
This motion prevailed in the assembly, but was defeated
in the senate.
Hamilton soon after proposed to fix, by law, the sessions
of the legislature alternately at Albany and New-York,
hoping thus to counterpoise thoir local influences, and to
have it in his power to retain a seat in the assembly. It
being known that his professional engagements would not
permit nim to sojourn at Poughkeepsie, that place was se-
lected for the meeting of the next legislature, and he de-
clined a re-election.
The states of Delaware, the Carolinas, and Georgia,
either not alive to, or disregarding the supposed constitu-
tional difficulty, had elected delegates without waiting the
action of congress. The address of the Annapolis con-
vention was again submitted to the legislature of Massa-
chusetts, and it was referred to a committee, whose report,
from the pen of Samuel Adams, was accepted on the same
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? HAMILTON.
455
day upon which the instructions of New-York were pro-
posed to congress. The delegates were authorized to
"consider the trade and commerce of the United States,
and how far a uniform system in their commercial inter-
course and regulations may be necessary for their com-
mon interest and permanent harmony; and also to consider
how far it may be necessary to alter any of the articles
of the present confederation, so as to render the constitu-
tion of the federal government more adequate to the exi-
gencies of the union; and what further powers may be
necessary to be vested in congress for the common wel-
fare and security, and with them to form a report for that
purpose: such alterations and additions as may be made,
to be, however, consistent with the republican spirit and
genius of the present articles of confederation, provided
that the said commissioners on the part of this common-
wealth are hereby particularly instructed by no means
to interfere with the fifth article of the confederation,
which provides for the annual election of delegates in
congress, with a power reserved to each state to recall its
delegates, or any of them, within the year; and which also
provides that no person shall be capable of being a dele-
gate for more than three years in any term of six years,
or, being a delegate, shall be capable of holding any office
under the United States, for which he, or any other for
his benefit, should receive any salary, fees, or emoluments
of any kind. " This embarrassing restriction was removed
in consequence of the recent resolution of congress, and,
on the ninth of April, five deputies were commissioned
with powers conforming to that resolution. *
* On the 7th of January, 1787, King, after speaking of the calamitous
events which threatened the country, wrote to Gerry from New-York: "You
hare seen the Virginia law for the appointment of delegates to a convention
in Philadelphia in May.
"General Washington, Wythe, Randolph, Madison, and others, are ap.
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? 456
THE LIFE OF
The legislature of Connecticut assembled in May. The
proposition for a convention was warmly opposed, but was
sustained with ability, and prevailed. Late in June, New-
Hampshire also chose delegates, and thus all the states
were represented with one exception, Rhode Island having
refused to co-operate in this great measure.
As the constitution of the United States was a deliberate
act of the people, and was formed in reference to their ex-
perience of the evils of a mere college of states, it may be
interesting to advert briefly to the progress of American
experiment in its advances towards that result.
The confederation of the New-England colonies, of the
year sixteen hundred and forty-three, was the first effort
towards an union of the provinces. It was a league offen-
sive and defensive to provide against impending wars,
committing to an annual congress of two delegates from
each colony the duty of deliberating upon all matters of
peace and common concern; the results of which delibera-
tions were binding upon the confederacy, if three-fourths
of its members concurred.
This compact continued forty years; after its dissolu-
pointed for that convention. Pennsylvania has appointed Mifflin, the two
Morris's, Fit/simmons, and three others, on the part of that state. Hamil-
ton, who is a member of the assembly of this state, will exert himself to in-
duce them to send members; Jay, and others, are opposed to the measure,
not alone because it is unauthorized, but from an opinion that the result will
prove inefficacious. General Washington will not attend. * * * * If Mas-
sachusetts should send deputies, for God's sake be careful who are the men;
the times are becoming critical; a movement of this nature ought to be care-
fully observed by every member of the community. " He subsequently
wrote: "Do you attend the legislature? How will they stand on the plan
of a convention at Philadelphia? For a number of reasons, although my
sentiments are the same as to the legality of this measure, I think we ought
not to oppose, but to coincide with this project. Let the appointments be
numerous, and, if possible, let the men have a good knowledge of the con-
stitutions and various interests of the several states, and of the good and bad
qualities of the confederation. "--Feb. 11, 1787. Life of Gerry.
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? HAMILTON.
457
tion, congresses were held at different times to consult
upon measures of common interest, the most important of
which, was that of seventeen hundred and fifty-four, con-
vened at the instance of the parent country, to prepare for
the contingencies of a war with France.
This congress, having more enlarged views than its pre-
decessors, resolved "that an union of the colonies was ab-
solutely necessary for their preservation," and proposed a
plan of federal government, consisting of a general coun-
cil of delegates to be tri-annually chosen by the provincial
assemblies, and a president-general to be appointed by the
crown. In this council were to be invested, subject to
the ultimate negative of the king, the rights of war and
peace with the Indian tribes, the power of raising troops,
building forts, equipping vessels of war, and of making
laws and laying and levying general duties, imposts, and
taxes for those purposes. This projected union was dis-
approved, not only by the crown, but by each colonial
assembly, from mutual jealousy.
A congress for the purpose of resisting Great Britain,
assembled, at the instance of Massachusetts, in seventeen
hundred and sixty-five, and digested a bill of rights, in
which the sole power of taxation was declared to reside in
their own colonial legislatures. This assemblage was the
precursor of that of seventeen hundred and seventy-four,
which concerted the opposition that terminated in the in-
dependence of the United States. Its authority was dis-
cretionary and unlimited, until defined by the articles of
confederation, which have formed so prominent a topic as
to render a further exposition of them unnecessary.
This succinct statement shows that, with the exception
of the plan of seventeen hundred and fifty-four, which, had
it been carried into effect, might have terminated in a sys-
tem modelled upon that of Great Britain, no approxima-
tion to a general government had been made. Nothing
58
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? 458
THE LIFE OF
more had been contemplated beyond the delegation of au-
thority for purposes of common defence, under a joint
commission, to a general deputation of the colonies.
The first elective governments, in their proper accepta-
tion, were those formed in each colony under the recom-
mendation of congress; and of these, the earliest was that
of New-Hampshire, established in January, seventeen hun-
dred and seventy-six; and the latest, that of Massachu-
setts, in seventeen hundred and eighty.
Though these state constitutions varied in many particu-
lars, they show a general concurrence of opinion through-
out America, in some essential points. Most of them di-
vided the legislature into two branches, and established a
judiciary, to hold during good behaviour. The most pro-
minent defect, was the constitution of the executive de-
partment, he being, with few exceptions, a mere pageant
and creature of the legislature, often only forming part of
a council.
The weakness of this department was probably the re-
sult of two causes; the colonial governors appointed by
the crown, having been the obnoxious instruments of its
usurpations, and these constitutions being formed at a time
when the congress had indefinite powers, before the colo-
nies aspired, as states, to a rival sovereignty.
The association of a revisionary council with the execu-
tive, while it diminished the responsibility, lessened the
energy, dignity, and independence of the office; and as the
check of a second branch of the legislature was rather
nominal than real, the democratic influence acquired a
large ascendency.
The effect of this on the general councils of the nation
has been indicated. In the local government of such states
as had fulfilled their federal duties, the inequality caused
by the imperfect machinery of their fiscal systems had
induced a repugnance to the laws. In the delinquent
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? HAMILTON.
459
states, this feeling had been increased by their relaxed
policy.
The momentous problem was now to be solved, whether
the affairs of this extensive confederacy were to be carried
on by a halting compromise between public duties and ab-
stract state rights, until the union should cease, or whether
its humiliation and sufferings had prepared the public mind
for the establishment of a vigorous and stable national
government.
As it may be interesting hereafter to advert to the opin-
ions of leading individuals at this eventful crisis, they are
succinctly given.
Jay was the advocate of a government of proper depart-
ments: a governor-general, limited in his prerogatives and
duration) an upper and a lower house--the former ap-
pointed for life, the latter annually; the governor-general,
(to preserve the balance)--with the advice of a council,
formed for that only purpose of the great judicial officers--
to have a negative on their acts. "Our government," he
said," should, in some degree, be suited to our manners and
circumstances, and they, you know, are not strictly demo-
cratical. " He thought " the more power that was granted
to this government, the better," the states retaining only
so much as may be necessary for domestic purposes; all
their principal officers, civil and military, being commission-
ed and removable by the national government, which was
to derive its authority from the people, the only source of
just authority. "*
Knox was in favour of a government of three depart-
ments: an assembly, chosen for one, two, or three years;
a senate for five, six, or seven; the executive to be chosen
by the legislature for seven years, liable to impeachment and
trial by the senate: all national objects to be designed and
* Jay to Washington, January 7,1787.
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? THE LIFE OF
executed by the general government, without any refer-
ence to the local governments, and its laws to be enforced
upon these governments by a body of armed men. *
It was the opinion of Madison, that it would be well to
retain as much as possible of the old confederation, though
he doubted whether it might not be better to work the
valuable articles into the new system, instead of engrafting
the latter on the former. He proposed, as the ground-work,
a change in the principle of representation, abolishing the
equality of suffrage in the national councils. In addition
to the present federal powers, he would have armed the
national government with positive and complete authority
in all cases which require uniformity, and with a negative
in all cases on the legislative acts of the states, as hereto-
fore exercised by the kingly prerogative. This fie regard-
ed as absolutely necessary, and as the least possible en-
croachment on the state jurisdictions. The national su-
premacy also to be extended to the judiciary department.
The officers administering the executive departments, ap-
pointable by the supreme government. The legislature to
consist of two branches: one eligible by the people at large,
or by the legislatures, for a limited period; the other, of
fewer members, for a longer term, ceasing in rotation.
He thought, as a further check, that a council of revision
might be superadded, including the great ministerial officers,
and that a national executive will also be necessary, but
said that he had "scarcely ventured to form his own opin-
ion yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be con-
stituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be
clothed. "f The right of coercion, he further stated, should
be expressly declared. To obviate its exertion, he hoped
the negative on the state laws might be sufficient, or per-
haps some defined objects of taxation might be submitted
* Knox to Washington, January 14, 1787.
t Madison to Washington, April 16,1767.
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? HAMILTON. 461
along with commerce to the general authority. The sys-
tem to be ratified by the people.
In the sketch of Hamilton's early life, his progressive
opinions on this subject have been shown. In his anony-
mous letter to Robert Morris, written in seventeen hun-
dred and seventy-nine, he is seen to have first proposed the
instituting a good scheme of administration, throwing " the
public business into proper executive departments. By a
plan of this kind," he remarked, " we should blend the ad-
vantages of a monarchy and a republic in a happy and
beneficial union. " His letter to Duane of the following
year, gives a fuller development of his views.
He there states that "the fundamental defect is a want
of power in congress," and that "the idea of an uncon-
trollable sovereignty in each state over its internal police,
will defeat the other powers given to congress, and make
our union feeble and precarious. "
His fear was of partial combinations among the states
subversive of the general one. "There is a wide difference,"
he observed, "between our situation, and that of an em-
pire under one simple form of government, distributed into
counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures,
but merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a
common sovereign. There the danger is, that the sovereign
will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which
it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed
of confederative states, each with a government com-
pletely organized within itself, having all the means to
draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself, the dan-
ger is directly the reverse. " After indicating the neces-
sity of giving to the confederacy perpetual funds, he
mentions " the want of a proper executive," that " congress
is properly a deliberative corps, and forgets itself when it
attempts to play the executive. " His remedy was a con-
vention of all the states, with full authority to conclude
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? 462
THE LIFE OF
finally upon a general confederation. This confederation
to have complete sovereignty, except "as to that part of
the internal police which relates to the rights of property
and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal
taxes. "--," It is necessary," he said," that every thing belong-
ing to this, should be regulated by the state legislatures. "
The project of appointing a supreme dictator and vice-
dictator, evidently excited his apprehensions. He then
saw the necessity of a radical change in the political struc-
ture, and in his letter to Morris of the following year, re-
newing his suggestion of a convention, he states the ne-
cessity of a final and irrevocable amendment "of the pres-
ent futile and senseless confederation. " The numbers of
the Continentalist of the same period, indicate similar
views. He there proposes to give to congress the collec-
tion and appropriation of a national revenue.
The next. though not fully developed exposition of his
opinions, is seen in his resolutions of seventeen hundred
and eighty-three. These contemplated "a federal govern-
ment, with efficacious authority in all matters of general
concern," having its legislative, executive, and judicial au-
thorities deposited in distinct and separate hands--" a fed-
eral judicature," with appellate jurisdiction, " taking cog-
nizance of all matters of general concern in the last resort,
especially those in which foreign nations and their subjects
are interested. "
Though these resolutions were abandoned for want of
support in congress, they could not be without influence
on some of its members. That they had such an influ-
ence, is to be inferred from the fact that Higginson was
prominent in urging Massachusetts to meet in general con-
vention, and that Madison, though restrained by an appre-
hension of the influence of some powerful opponent in
Virginia, individually wished that no objections should be
presupposed there.
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? HAMILTON.
463
Washington would have vested congress with absolute
powers in all matters relative to the great purposes of war
and of general concern, reserving to the states only those
of local and internal polity. * "I do not conceive," he
said, " that we can exist long as a nation, without having
lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole
union in as energetic a manner as the authority of the
state governments extend over the several states. The
commotions in the eastern states exhibit a melancholy
proof of what our transatlantic foe has predicted; and of
another thing, which is still more to be regretted, and is
yet more unaccountable, that mankind, when left to them-
selves, are unfit for their own government. Influence is
not government. Thirteen governments, pulling against
each other, and all tugging at the federal head, will soon
bring ruin on the whole; whereas, a liberal and energetic
constitution, well checked, and well watched, to prevent
encroachments, might restore us to that degree of re-
spectability and consequence to which we had the fairest
prospect of attaining. "--"I confess that my opinion of
public virtue is so far changed, that I have my doubts
whether any system, without means of coercion in the
sovereign, will enforce due obedience to the ordinances
of a general government; without which, every thing
else fails.
"Persuaded I am, that the primary cause of all our dis-
orders lies in the different state governments, and in the
tenacity of that power which pervades their whole sys-
tems. "
These sentiments of Washington and Hamilton were
those of men familiar with the practical operation of the
existing system, in war and in peace: who had seen and
felt the evil of conflicting sovereignties, and whose re-
? AugUst 15, 1786.
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THE LIFE OF
searches and reflections had compelled them to distrust
federate institutions. * Though the opinions which have
been quoted were those of men of great weight in the
most important members of the union, yet they were not
general. The smaller states, while they sought the pro-
tection of a more efficient general government, would re-
pel any proposal to relinquish that equal suffrage in the
public councils, which they had extorted from their asso-
ciates amid the pressure of the revolution. In the large
states, leading individuals, who did not desire a dissolution
of the confederacy, would prefer an increase of the rela-
tive influence of their states, but were embarrassed as to
the quantity of power to be conferred. Both would in-
cline, as a middle point, to a constitution of enumerated
powers, limited to those primary objects, trade and reve-
nue, to which they had found their separate legislation in-
competent.
With such models, and amid a great diversity of opinions
and interests, the federal convention met at Philadelphia
on the fourteenth of May, seventeen hundred and eighty-
seven, when, a majority of states not being represented, it
adjourned to the twenty-fifth of that month.
On that day, nine states having appeared, General Wash-
ington was, on motion of Robert Morris, chosen to pre-
side, and Major Jackson, at the instance of Hamilton, was
elected secretary. A committee, of Wythe, of Virginia,
Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, and Hamilton, were
appointed to frame the standing rules for its proceedings.
These required seven states to constitute a quorum; that
all questions were to be decided by the greater number of
states fully represented, and that all committees were to be
appointed by ballot. It is to be remarked, that no pro-
vision was made in the first instance for secrecy of debate:
* See Washington's Writings, vol. ix. Appendix, No. to.
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met the objection to the act, which was drawn from
that great principle of the social compact, that the
chief object of government is to protect the rights of indi-
viduals by the united strength of the community; insisting
that the efforts of a state were to be " proportioned to its
abilities, warranted by a reasonable expectation of a
favourable issue, and compatible with its eventual security;
but that it was not bound to enter into or prosecute enter-
prises of a manifest rashness and folly, or which in the
event of success would be productive of more mischief
than good. " He then reviewed the pretensions of Ver-
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? HAMILTON.
445
mont, and contrasted her power to resist with that of
New-York to enforce these territorial claims.
From this topic he passed on to an examination of the
constitutionality of the bill, asserting that the power of
dismembering the state, under certain circumstances, was
a necessary appendage of its sovereignty. Instances of
such dismemberments were referred to, and the writers on
international law were quoted to establish the right "to
lop off a limb for the good of the body. " From an exposi-
tion of the right, he proceeded to a review of the policy
of this measure; in the course of which, he adduced facts
to show that Vermont had borne such relations to Great
Britain during the revolution as to justify the belief, that,
should a collision arise, she would receive aid from their
recent enemy.
The remaining questions were, how far New-York had
a right to acknowledge the independence of Vermont, and
how far she was bound to make compensation to the own-
ers of the disputed territory. He urged the actual inde-
pendence of Vermont as an answer to the first inquiry;
stated, that as to territorial claims, the confederacy pro-
vided a tribunal for their adjustment; and insisted that the
state was not under a strict obligation to make compensa-
tion to the losing proprietors. "The distinction," he said,
"is this--if a government voluntarily bargains away the
rights, or dispossesses itself of the property of its citizens
in their enjoyments, possessions, or power, it is bound to
make compensation for that of which it has deprived them;
but if they are actually dispossessed of those rights or that
property by the casualties of war, or by revolution, the
state, if the public good requires it, may abandon them to
the loss without being obliged to make reparation. "
"In wars between states, the sovereign is never supposed
to be bound to make good the losses which the subject
sustains by the captures or ravages of the enemy, though
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? 446
THE LIFE OF
they should amount to the destruction of his whole pro-
perty; and yet nothing can be more agreeable to natural
equity than that those who happen to be the unlucky vic-
tims of the war should be indemnified by the community. "--
"But in practice such a principle would be found attended
with endless difficulties and inconveniences; and there-
fore the reverse of it has been adopted as a general rule.
The true reason is, the resources of nations are not ade-
quate to the reparation of such extensive losses as those
which are commonly occasioned by wars and revolutions,
and it would, therefore, be contrary to the general good
of society to establish it as a rule that there is a strict ob-
ligation to repay such losses. It is better there should be
individual sufferings, than to admit a rule which would
fetter the operations of government, and distress the affairs
of the community. Generosity and policy may, in parti-
cular instances, dictate such compensations. Sometimes
they have been made by nations, but much oftener. omitted.
The propriety of doing the one or the other must depend
on circumstances in which the ability of the public will
always be a primary consideration. "
As to the examples derived from Roman magnanimity,
he remarked:--" Neither the manner nor the genius of
Rome are suited to the republic or age we live in. All
her maxims and habits were military--her government
was constituted for war. Ours is unfit for it; and our situa-
tion, still less than our constitution, invites us to emulate
the conduct of Rome, or to attempt a display of unprofita-
ble heroism. "--" One more observation will," he said, " con-
clude what I have to say. The present situation of our
national affairs appears to me peculiarly critical. I know
not what may be the result of the disordered state of gov-
ernment. I am, therefore, the more solicitous to guard
against danger from abroad. Gentlemen who view our
public affairs in the same light in which they present them-
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? HAMILTON.
447
selves to my mind, will, I trust, vote with me upon the
present occasion. Those, on the contrary, who think all is
well, who suppose our government is full of energy, our
credit high, our trade and finances flourishing, will proba-
bly see no room for any anxiety about the matter, and
may be disposed to leave Vermont in its present state. If
the bill should fail, I hope they never will have occasion
to regret the opportunity they have lost. "
At the end of this speech, the question was taken, and
the bill recognising the independence of Vermont, on the
condition of her entering into the confederacy, passed.
By this well-timed measure a civil war was prevented, and
another state soon after became a member of the union.
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? 448
THE LIFE OF
CHAPTER XXIII.
[1787. ]
The vote of the New-York legislature on the impost
decided the fate of the confederation. The only hope of
preserving an union of the states rested upon the issue of
the contemplated convention.
The assembly of Virginia being the first state legisla-
ture in session after the adjournment of the commissioners
at Annapolis, passed an act in October for the appoint-
ment of seven commissioners to meet at Philadelphia, and
to join with the deputies of the other states, " in devising
and discussing such alterations as may be necessary to
render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies
of the times. " New-Jersey was the second to act on this
subject, appointing commissioners on the twenty-third of
November, with powers similar to those previously grant-
ed by her. Pennsylvania chose delegates with like pow-
ers on the thirtieth of the succeeding month.
The report from Annapolis was submitted to congress
soon after its date; but a determined opposition being
made to the proposed convention, on the ground of its
illegality, it was not acted upon: thus, tenacity of power
grows with conscious weakness. When the legislature
of Massachusetts assembled, Governor Bowdoin, still zeal-
ous for this great measure, sent them a message, in which,
after a mention of the reasons that had induced the meeting
at Annapolis to adjourn, he again declared his conviction
of the importance of amending the confederation. Its
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? HAMILTON.
449
delegates to congress then appeared, and explained the mo-
tives by which they had been actuated.
King observed--" that the report of the commercial
convention was before congress. Doubts had arisen as
to the mode of agreeing upon commercial regulations.
The confederation was the act of the people. No part
could be altered but by consent of congress and confirma-
tion of the several legislatures. Congress, therefore, ought
to make the examination first; because, if it was done by
a convention, no legislature could have a right to confirm
it. Did any legislature sit for such a purpose? No. It
must be referred to the people, and then what degree of
assent was necessary to make it an article of the confede-
ration? Whereas if it was conducted agreeably to the con-
federation, no such difficulty could exist. Besides, if con-
gress should not agree upon a report of a convention, the
most fatal consequences might follow. Congress were,
therefore, the proper body to make alterations. "
After adverting to the efforts of the several states, he
remarked, that not more than half a million of dollars had
been received from them in the last two years; that "it
had become a subject of admiration how government ex-
isted; that so melancholy was the state of the federal
treasury, that all men seemed to turn away from it as an
evil which admitted of no remedy. If all the states could
be brought into the continental impost, this resource might
be anticipated, and the national credit strengthened in that
way; but there remained two states which had not acced-
ed to it--Pennsylvania and New-York. The situation
of the former was known, and should that state comply,
as there were some grounds to hope and expect, the dan-
ger of the union, and the love which New-York must enter-
tain for the confederation, must induce their accession to
the system. " He closed his observations with a strong
comment on the existing commotions in Massachusetts,
57
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? 450 THE LIFE OF
suggesting the probability that congress would make exer-
tions to suppress them. Dana, another delegate, concur-
red in these views. Their speeches were published, and
as no measures were taken for the appointment of a dele-
gation to Philadelphia, great apprehensions were enter-
tained by the advocates of a general convention, that their
efforts would be rendered fruitless by the dissent of this
leading member of the confederacy.
The hesitation of Massachusetts lent a sanction to the
policy of the governor of New-York. There was in the
constitution of that state an energy the more imposing, as
contrasted with the weakness of the confederacy. This
energy had been increased by a perverted construction of
his powers, which concentrated the whole disposal of office
in the chief magistrate.
The new congress met in the city of New-York on the
second of February, three months of its term having ex-
pired, and elected General St. Clair as their president.
Though without prerogative or patronage, that officer was
understood to represent in his person the majesty of the
nation. The appropriations and the ceremonial of his
household all indicated such to have been the intention of
congress.
In the same public hall was seen Clinton, exhibiting all
the authority of his office and his influence over an obedi-
ent legislature. The effect on the common mind of with-
holding those observances which custom has connected
with high station, was well understood by Clinton: a
marked and studied neglect was manifested by him towards
congress, as though he wished them to be regarded rather
as intruders upon a sovereign state, than as the Council
of the Nation. Yet he at the same time avowed the
opinion, that the articles of the confederation were equal
to the objects of the union, or with little alteration could
be made so, and that the deputies to Annapolis ought to
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? HAMILTON. 451
have confined themselves to the expressed purpose of their
errand.
New-York gave the most prominent adversary and ad-
vocate of the union. The more obstinate the opposition
of Clinton to enlarged views of the interests of the Ameri-
can people, the more zealous and determined were the ex-
ertions of Hamilton. All the influence of his attractive
manners and generous hospitality was now seen. He min-
gled daily with the members of the federal government;
his house was their constant resort; his conversation was
full of the great theme of a more perfect union; and with
earnest argument and wit he exposed the inconsistency of
men who refused to confer upon congress an adequate
fiscal power, for the reason that it was a single body with-
out checks, and yet would seek to thwart every effort to
constitute it differently. Having thus prepared the minds
of that assembly,* he hoped that their sanction of the pro-
posed convention, so long withheld, might be obtained.
Though a president had been elected, nine states were
not represented in congress until the fourteenth of Feb-
ruary. The next day Hamilton delivered his speech upon
the impost, in the presence of many of its members, who
saw the mute vote rejecting it recorded.
It is the part of genius to select the moment to achieve
its high purposes; and the day after this vote, notice was
given of an intended motion for an instruction to congress
to recommend the call of a convention. Its object was
stated to be that " of revising the articles of confederation
and perpetual union, by such alterations and amendments
as a majority of the representatives shall judge proper and
necessary, to render them adequate to the preservation
and government of the union. "
* Speaking subsequently of a leading individual, who. commenced his ca-
reer as an earnest opponent of a national system, Hamilton remarked to a
friend--" I revolutionized his mind. " .
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? 452
THE LIFE OF
This motion was brought forward on the seventeenth,
and being so modified, at the instance of the leader of
Clinton's party in the assembly, as to omit the words, " a
majority," and to substitute that of " support" for " govern-
ment," was agreed to. After the interval of a day, this
instruction was laid before the senate, and it was ordered
to be postponed. Of Clinton's majority in that branch, the
most prominent persons were Haring and Yates. * Gen-
eral Schuyler led the opposition. His weight of character
would have been insufficient to carry this important reso-
lution, but for the urgent circumstances of the moment.
Some of the leaders of the rebellion in Massachusetts had
taken refuge in New-York. On the day this resolution
was laid before the senate, Schuyler moved that a procla-
mation should be issued for their apprehension. The fears
of congress were also aroused, and on the same day a re-
port then in progress, deferring the enlistment of federal
troops, was postponed. Alarmed for the quiet of the state,
the senate on the following day," after considerable debate,
by a majority of one vote, concurred in the proposed in-
struction. "
To anticipate intrigue and gain the advantage of this
momentary alarm, Hamilton's report from Annapolis was
called up in congress the next day. That body was yet
undecided. By some, their sanction of the convention, it
was supposed, might stimulate, by others it was alleged
that it would impede, the action of the states. Some looked
with jealousy at a body so formed; others doubted its con-
stitutionality. Amid this perplexity, the instruction of
New-York was presented to them. Though supported by
the votes of Massachusetts and Virginia, the recommen-
dation it urged failed, and a resolution of a member from
Massachusetts, after being amended, was passed. It re-
* Abraham Yates.
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? HAMILTON.
453
ferred, as a justification for the proceeding, to the provision
in the articles of the confederation for their alteration by
congress, with the assent of the state legislatures, and to
the recent instruction from New-York, and declaring that
it was " the most probable mean of establishing in these
states a firm national government," sanctioned the contem-
plated convention. *
Having exerted the influence of New-York upon con-
gress, Hamilton was eager to derive the benefit of the in-
fluence of congress upon that state. Five days after, he
offered a resolution in the assembly, conforming to the re-
commendation of congress, for the appointment of five
commissioners to meet in convention at Annapolis. This
resolution being agreed to, was laid before the senate by
Schuyler. That body did not dare to reject it; but, on
motion of Haring, the number was reduced from five to
three.
Yates then proposed to insert a proviso, that the alter-
ations and provisions to the articles of confederation
"should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the con-
stitution of this stale. " This amendment, so decisive of
the views of Clinton, was opposed, and was lost by the vote
of the presiding officer. f
The resolution then passed the senate, was immediately
concurred in by the house, and on the eighth of March,
three commissioners, Yates, Hamilton, and Lansing, were
appointed--Chief Justice Yates unanimously, Hamilton
with two, Lansing with many dissenting voices. As the
rule of the confederation of voting by states might be adopt-
ed, and as his colleagues were in the views of Clinton,
Hamilton proposed, near the end of the session, to add two
delegates. He observed, "I think it proper to apprise the
? February 21,1787.
t Senate Journal of New-York, p. 44-5, February 28,1787.
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? 454
THE LIFE OF
house, of the gentlemen on some of whom I wish their
choice to fall, and with a view to which I bring forward
the present motion. Their abilities and^ experience in the
general affairs of the country cannot but be useful on such
an occasion. I mean Mr. Chancellor Livingston, Mr. Du-
ane, Mr. Benson, and Mr. Jay; the particular situation of
the latter, may require an observation. His being a ser-
vant of congress might seem an objection to the appoint-
ment; but surely this objection, if it had any weight, would
apply with equal force to a member of that body. In the
case of Mr.
Lansing, the two houses appear to have
thought there was no force in it, and I am persuaded there
can be no reason to apply a different rule to Mr. Jay. His
knowledge, abilities, tried integrity, and abundant experi-
ence in the affairs of the country, foreign and domestic,
will not permit us to allow any weight to any objection
which would imply a want of confidence in a character that
has every title to the fullest confidence. "
This motion prevailed in the assembly, but was defeated
in the senate.
Hamilton soon after proposed to fix, by law, the sessions
of the legislature alternately at Albany and New-York,
hoping thus to counterpoise thoir local influences, and to
have it in his power to retain a seat in the assembly. It
being known that his professional engagements would not
permit nim to sojourn at Poughkeepsie, that place was se-
lected for the meeting of the next legislature, and he de-
clined a re-election.
The states of Delaware, the Carolinas, and Georgia,
either not alive to, or disregarding the supposed constitu-
tional difficulty, had elected delegates without waiting the
action of congress. The address of the Annapolis con-
vention was again submitted to the legislature of Massa-
chusetts, and it was referred to a committee, whose report,
from the pen of Samuel Adams, was accepted on the same
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? HAMILTON.
455
day upon which the instructions of New-York were pro-
posed to congress. The delegates were authorized to
"consider the trade and commerce of the United States,
and how far a uniform system in their commercial inter-
course and regulations may be necessary for their com-
mon interest and permanent harmony; and also to consider
how far it may be necessary to alter any of the articles
of the present confederation, so as to render the constitu-
tion of the federal government more adequate to the exi-
gencies of the union; and what further powers may be
necessary to be vested in congress for the common wel-
fare and security, and with them to form a report for that
purpose: such alterations and additions as may be made,
to be, however, consistent with the republican spirit and
genius of the present articles of confederation, provided
that the said commissioners on the part of this common-
wealth are hereby particularly instructed by no means
to interfere with the fifth article of the confederation,
which provides for the annual election of delegates in
congress, with a power reserved to each state to recall its
delegates, or any of them, within the year; and which also
provides that no person shall be capable of being a dele-
gate for more than three years in any term of six years,
or, being a delegate, shall be capable of holding any office
under the United States, for which he, or any other for
his benefit, should receive any salary, fees, or emoluments
of any kind. " This embarrassing restriction was removed
in consequence of the recent resolution of congress, and,
on the ninth of April, five deputies were commissioned
with powers conforming to that resolution. *
* On the 7th of January, 1787, King, after speaking of the calamitous
events which threatened the country, wrote to Gerry from New-York: "You
hare seen the Virginia law for the appointment of delegates to a convention
in Philadelphia in May.
"General Washington, Wythe, Randolph, Madison, and others, are ap.
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? 456
THE LIFE OF
The legislature of Connecticut assembled in May. The
proposition for a convention was warmly opposed, but was
sustained with ability, and prevailed. Late in June, New-
Hampshire also chose delegates, and thus all the states
were represented with one exception, Rhode Island having
refused to co-operate in this great measure.
As the constitution of the United States was a deliberate
act of the people, and was formed in reference to their ex-
perience of the evils of a mere college of states, it may be
interesting to advert briefly to the progress of American
experiment in its advances towards that result.
The confederation of the New-England colonies, of the
year sixteen hundred and forty-three, was the first effort
towards an union of the provinces. It was a league offen-
sive and defensive to provide against impending wars,
committing to an annual congress of two delegates from
each colony the duty of deliberating upon all matters of
peace and common concern; the results of which delibera-
tions were binding upon the confederacy, if three-fourths
of its members concurred.
This compact continued forty years; after its dissolu-
pointed for that convention. Pennsylvania has appointed Mifflin, the two
Morris's, Fit/simmons, and three others, on the part of that state. Hamil-
ton, who is a member of the assembly of this state, will exert himself to in-
duce them to send members; Jay, and others, are opposed to the measure,
not alone because it is unauthorized, but from an opinion that the result will
prove inefficacious. General Washington will not attend. * * * * If Mas-
sachusetts should send deputies, for God's sake be careful who are the men;
the times are becoming critical; a movement of this nature ought to be care-
fully observed by every member of the community. " He subsequently
wrote: "Do you attend the legislature? How will they stand on the plan
of a convention at Philadelphia? For a number of reasons, although my
sentiments are the same as to the legality of this measure, I think we ought
not to oppose, but to coincide with this project. Let the appointments be
numerous, and, if possible, let the men have a good knowledge of the con-
stitutions and various interests of the several states, and of the good and bad
qualities of the confederation. "--Feb. 11, 1787. Life of Gerry.
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? HAMILTON.
457
tion, congresses were held at different times to consult
upon measures of common interest, the most important of
which, was that of seventeen hundred and fifty-four, con-
vened at the instance of the parent country, to prepare for
the contingencies of a war with France.
This congress, having more enlarged views than its pre-
decessors, resolved "that an union of the colonies was ab-
solutely necessary for their preservation," and proposed a
plan of federal government, consisting of a general coun-
cil of delegates to be tri-annually chosen by the provincial
assemblies, and a president-general to be appointed by the
crown. In this council were to be invested, subject to
the ultimate negative of the king, the rights of war and
peace with the Indian tribes, the power of raising troops,
building forts, equipping vessels of war, and of making
laws and laying and levying general duties, imposts, and
taxes for those purposes. This projected union was dis-
approved, not only by the crown, but by each colonial
assembly, from mutual jealousy.
A congress for the purpose of resisting Great Britain,
assembled, at the instance of Massachusetts, in seventeen
hundred and sixty-five, and digested a bill of rights, in
which the sole power of taxation was declared to reside in
their own colonial legislatures. This assemblage was the
precursor of that of seventeen hundred and seventy-four,
which concerted the opposition that terminated in the in-
dependence of the United States. Its authority was dis-
cretionary and unlimited, until defined by the articles of
confederation, which have formed so prominent a topic as
to render a further exposition of them unnecessary.
This succinct statement shows that, with the exception
of the plan of seventeen hundred and fifty-four, which, had
it been carried into effect, might have terminated in a sys-
tem modelled upon that of Great Britain, no approxima-
tion to a general government had been made. Nothing
58
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? 458
THE LIFE OF
more had been contemplated beyond the delegation of au-
thority for purposes of common defence, under a joint
commission, to a general deputation of the colonies.
The first elective governments, in their proper accepta-
tion, were those formed in each colony under the recom-
mendation of congress; and of these, the earliest was that
of New-Hampshire, established in January, seventeen hun-
dred and seventy-six; and the latest, that of Massachu-
setts, in seventeen hundred and eighty.
Though these state constitutions varied in many particu-
lars, they show a general concurrence of opinion through-
out America, in some essential points. Most of them di-
vided the legislature into two branches, and established a
judiciary, to hold during good behaviour. The most pro-
minent defect, was the constitution of the executive de-
partment, he being, with few exceptions, a mere pageant
and creature of the legislature, often only forming part of
a council.
The weakness of this department was probably the re-
sult of two causes; the colonial governors appointed by
the crown, having been the obnoxious instruments of its
usurpations, and these constitutions being formed at a time
when the congress had indefinite powers, before the colo-
nies aspired, as states, to a rival sovereignty.
The association of a revisionary council with the execu-
tive, while it diminished the responsibility, lessened the
energy, dignity, and independence of the office; and as the
check of a second branch of the legislature was rather
nominal than real, the democratic influence acquired a
large ascendency.
The effect of this on the general councils of the nation
has been indicated. In the local government of such states
as had fulfilled their federal duties, the inequality caused
by the imperfect machinery of their fiscal systems had
induced a repugnance to the laws. In the delinquent
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? HAMILTON.
459
states, this feeling had been increased by their relaxed
policy.
The momentous problem was now to be solved, whether
the affairs of this extensive confederacy were to be carried
on by a halting compromise between public duties and ab-
stract state rights, until the union should cease, or whether
its humiliation and sufferings had prepared the public mind
for the establishment of a vigorous and stable national
government.
As it may be interesting hereafter to advert to the opin-
ions of leading individuals at this eventful crisis, they are
succinctly given.
Jay was the advocate of a government of proper depart-
ments: a governor-general, limited in his prerogatives and
duration) an upper and a lower house--the former ap-
pointed for life, the latter annually; the governor-general,
(to preserve the balance)--with the advice of a council,
formed for that only purpose of the great judicial officers--
to have a negative on their acts. "Our government," he
said," should, in some degree, be suited to our manners and
circumstances, and they, you know, are not strictly demo-
cratical. " He thought " the more power that was granted
to this government, the better," the states retaining only
so much as may be necessary for domestic purposes; all
their principal officers, civil and military, being commission-
ed and removable by the national government, which was
to derive its authority from the people, the only source of
just authority. "*
Knox was in favour of a government of three depart-
ments: an assembly, chosen for one, two, or three years;
a senate for five, six, or seven; the executive to be chosen
by the legislature for seven years, liable to impeachment and
trial by the senate: all national objects to be designed and
* Jay to Washington, January 7,1787.
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? THE LIFE OF
executed by the general government, without any refer-
ence to the local governments, and its laws to be enforced
upon these governments by a body of armed men. *
It was the opinion of Madison, that it would be well to
retain as much as possible of the old confederation, though
he doubted whether it might not be better to work the
valuable articles into the new system, instead of engrafting
the latter on the former. He proposed, as the ground-work,
a change in the principle of representation, abolishing the
equality of suffrage in the national councils. In addition
to the present federal powers, he would have armed the
national government with positive and complete authority
in all cases which require uniformity, and with a negative
in all cases on the legislative acts of the states, as hereto-
fore exercised by the kingly prerogative. This fie regard-
ed as absolutely necessary, and as the least possible en-
croachment on the state jurisdictions. The national su-
premacy also to be extended to the judiciary department.
The officers administering the executive departments, ap-
pointable by the supreme government. The legislature to
consist of two branches: one eligible by the people at large,
or by the legislatures, for a limited period; the other, of
fewer members, for a longer term, ceasing in rotation.
He thought, as a further check, that a council of revision
might be superadded, including the great ministerial officers,
and that a national executive will also be necessary, but
said that he had "scarcely ventured to form his own opin-
ion yet, either of the manner in which it ought to be con-
stituted, or of the authorities with which it ought to be
clothed. "f The right of coercion, he further stated, should
be expressly declared. To obviate its exertion, he hoped
the negative on the state laws might be sufficient, or per-
haps some defined objects of taxation might be submitted
* Knox to Washington, January 14, 1787.
t Madison to Washington, April 16,1767.
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? HAMILTON. 461
along with commerce to the general authority. The sys-
tem to be ratified by the people.
In the sketch of Hamilton's early life, his progressive
opinions on this subject have been shown. In his anony-
mous letter to Robert Morris, written in seventeen hun-
dred and seventy-nine, he is seen to have first proposed the
instituting a good scheme of administration, throwing " the
public business into proper executive departments. By a
plan of this kind," he remarked, " we should blend the ad-
vantages of a monarchy and a republic in a happy and
beneficial union. " His letter to Duane of the following
year, gives a fuller development of his views.
He there states that "the fundamental defect is a want
of power in congress," and that "the idea of an uncon-
trollable sovereignty in each state over its internal police,
will defeat the other powers given to congress, and make
our union feeble and precarious. "
His fear was of partial combinations among the states
subversive of the general one. "There is a wide difference,"
he observed, "between our situation, and that of an em-
pire under one simple form of government, distributed into
counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures,
but merely magistratical bodies to execute the laws of a
common sovereign. There the danger is, that the sovereign
will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which
it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed
of confederative states, each with a government com-
pletely organized within itself, having all the means to
draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself, the dan-
ger is directly the reverse. " After indicating the neces-
sity of giving to the confederacy perpetual funds, he
mentions " the want of a proper executive," that " congress
is properly a deliberative corps, and forgets itself when it
attempts to play the executive. " His remedy was a con-
vention of all the states, with full authority to conclude
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? 462
THE LIFE OF
finally upon a general confederation. This confederation
to have complete sovereignty, except "as to that part of
the internal police which relates to the rights of property
and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal
taxes. "--," It is necessary," he said," that every thing belong-
ing to this, should be regulated by the state legislatures. "
The project of appointing a supreme dictator and vice-
dictator, evidently excited his apprehensions. He then
saw the necessity of a radical change in the political struc-
ture, and in his letter to Morris of the following year, re-
newing his suggestion of a convention, he states the ne-
cessity of a final and irrevocable amendment "of the pres-
ent futile and senseless confederation. " The numbers of
the Continentalist of the same period, indicate similar
views. He there proposes to give to congress the collec-
tion and appropriation of a national revenue.
The next. though not fully developed exposition of his
opinions, is seen in his resolutions of seventeen hundred
and eighty-three. These contemplated "a federal govern-
ment, with efficacious authority in all matters of general
concern," having its legislative, executive, and judicial au-
thorities deposited in distinct and separate hands--" a fed-
eral judicature," with appellate jurisdiction, " taking cog-
nizance of all matters of general concern in the last resort,
especially those in which foreign nations and their subjects
are interested. "
Though these resolutions were abandoned for want of
support in congress, they could not be without influence
on some of its members. That they had such an influ-
ence, is to be inferred from the fact that Higginson was
prominent in urging Massachusetts to meet in general con-
vention, and that Madison, though restrained by an appre-
hension of the influence of some powerful opponent in
Virginia, individually wished that no objections should be
presupposed there.
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? HAMILTON.
463
Washington would have vested congress with absolute
powers in all matters relative to the great purposes of war
and of general concern, reserving to the states only those
of local and internal polity. * "I do not conceive," he
said, " that we can exist long as a nation, without having
lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole
union in as energetic a manner as the authority of the
state governments extend over the several states. The
commotions in the eastern states exhibit a melancholy
proof of what our transatlantic foe has predicted; and of
another thing, which is still more to be regretted, and is
yet more unaccountable, that mankind, when left to them-
selves, are unfit for their own government. Influence is
not government. Thirteen governments, pulling against
each other, and all tugging at the federal head, will soon
bring ruin on the whole; whereas, a liberal and energetic
constitution, well checked, and well watched, to prevent
encroachments, might restore us to that degree of re-
spectability and consequence to which we had the fairest
prospect of attaining. "--"I confess that my opinion of
public virtue is so far changed, that I have my doubts
whether any system, without means of coercion in the
sovereign, will enforce due obedience to the ordinances
of a general government; without which, every thing
else fails.
"Persuaded I am, that the primary cause of all our dis-
orders lies in the different state governments, and in the
tenacity of that power which pervades their whole sys-
tems. "
These sentiments of Washington and Hamilton were
those of men familiar with the practical operation of the
existing system, in war and in peace: who had seen and
felt the evil of conflicting sovereignties, and whose re-
? AugUst 15, 1786.
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? 461
THE LIFE OF
searches and reflections had compelled them to distrust
federate institutions. * Though the opinions which have
been quoted were those of men of great weight in the
most important members of the union, yet they were not
general. The smaller states, while they sought the pro-
tection of a more efficient general government, would re-
pel any proposal to relinquish that equal suffrage in the
public councils, which they had extorted from their asso-
ciates amid the pressure of the revolution. In the large
states, leading individuals, who did not desire a dissolution
of the confederacy, would prefer an increase of the rela-
tive influence of their states, but were embarrassed as to
the quantity of power to be conferred. Both would in-
cline, as a middle point, to a constitution of enumerated
powers, limited to those primary objects, trade and reve-
nue, to which they had found their separate legislation in-
competent.
With such models, and amid a great diversity of opinions
and interests, the federal convention met at Philadelphia
on the fourteenth of May, seventeen hundred and eighty-
seven, when, a majority of states not being represented, it
adjourned to the twenty-fifth of that month.
On that day, nine states having appeared, General Wash-
ington was, on motion of Robert Morris, chosen to pre-
side, and Major Jackson, at the instance of Hamilton, was
elected secretary. A committee, of Wythe, of Virginia,
Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, and Hamilton, were
appointed to frame the standing rules for its proceedings.
These required seven states to constitute a quorum; that
all questions were to be decided by the greater number of
states fully represented, and that all committees were to be
appointed by ballot. It is to be remarked, that no pro-
vision was made in the first instance for secrecy of debate:
* See Washington's Writings, vol. ix. Appendix, No. to.
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