The demand for ethical teaching' and for political and social efficiency had a still
stronger
life within him.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Science is the free spirit which casts off all fetters and recognises nothing above itself: but she is such only when she makes the " real " man free, placing him on his ownc feet, independent of everything that is above the senses or apart from the senses.
This science which Nietzsche would now make the bearer of the essence of culture is positive science.
— no meta
physics, not even the metaphysics of the will ; hence he dedicates his book "for free spirits'' to the memory of Voltaire, and while he had earlier turned Wagner from Feuerbach to Schopenhauer, now he himself goes the reverse way. He comes into agreement with the utilitarian ethics of Paul Ree; he believes in the possi bility of the purely scientific culture. He even goes so far as to see in knowledge the highest and best aim of life. Knowledge is for him the true joy, and the whole freshness of delight in the joys of the world and of life which is found in 6twpia (contemplation) — an enjoyment of the present actual world which is at once aesthetic and theoretical — is the fundamental note of this period, the most fortunate period which was granted to him.
Then the Dionysus element of passion came to expression as an uncontrollable longing for strong, masterful, unsympathetic living out of personality, which throws down all that would stand in its path. The strongest impulse of man is the will for power. It is for him to assert this. But this unconditional assertion bursts the system of values in which our civilisation, up" to this time, has enmeshed itself ; the new ideal is in this sense beyond good and bad. " ' The will for power knows no bonds which prescribe what is "permitted"; for everything good which springs from power and increases power; everything bad which springs from weak ness and weakens power. So also in our judgments, in knowledge
JtnttUt von Out und Boat, the title of one of Nietzsche's books, translated by A. Tille.
1
is is
it,
S 4«. J Problem of Valuet : Nietz$che. 679
And in conviction, the important thing is not whether they arei ** true," but whether they help us, whether they further our life and I strengthen our mind. They have worth only if they make us strong.
Hence, conviction also may and must change as life unfolds its changes (as was the case in part with Nietzsche himself). Man chooses what he needs ; the value of knowing also lies beyond true and false. Here begins, therefore, the overturning and re-valuation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). Here the philosopher be comes a reformer of morals, the legislator the creator of a new civili
sation. In the third period of his development Nietzsche was full of the consciousness of this task.
From this standpoint he sets up the ideal of the over-man (Ueber- meiueA) in contrast with the ordinary, everyday man of the com mon herd. Will for power is will for mastery, and the most important mastery is that of man over man. Hegel once said that of all great things which the world's history shows, the greatest is
the mastery of one free will over others. It recalls this saying when Nietzsche develops his uew idea of civilisation from the antithesis between the " morals of masters " and " morals of slaves. " All the brutality of trampling down those who may be in the way, all the unfettering of the primitive beast in human nature, appear here as the right and duty of the strong. The strong man unfolds and defends the energy of living as against the scantiness and meagreness of renunciation and humility. The morality of slaves, therefore, coincides essentially with the ascetic nature of the super- naturalism which Nietzsche had formerly combated, and the positive connection of the transition period with his third period consists in
poetic dimness and indetiniteness. According to the original ten dency, the over-man is the great individuality which asserts its primitive rights over against the mass. The common herd of the
" far too many " ( Viel-zuViele) exists only to the end that out of it as rare instances of fortune may rise the over-men. These, from century to century, recognize each other as bearers of all the meaning and worth that is to be found in all this confused driving of disordered forces. The genius is the end and aim of history, and it is in this that his right of mastery as over against the Philistine has its root. But according to another tendency the over-man appears as a higher type of the human race, who is to be bred and trained — as the strong race which enjoys its strength of mastery in the powerful unfolding of life, free from the restraints and self-disturbing ten dencies of the slavish morality. In both cases Nietzsche's ideal of
the "joyous " assertion of a world-conquering thirst for living. Nevertheless the ideal for the "over-man" remains veiled in
680 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. £ Part VII
the over-man is alike aristocratic and exclusive, and it is a si penalty for the poetic indefiniteness and symbolic ambiguity of Lii
that his combating of "slavish morality" and of its foundations has made him popular with just the very ones who would be the first to strike from the over-man the head by
which he towers above, the common herd of the " too many. " Between the two lines along which the ideal of the over-man
develops, the author has not come to a clear decision. Zarathustn
mingles them together, with wavering lines of transition. It is clear ( that the one form is an echo of the romantic ideal of the genius as the other borrows from sociological evolution. But the thought of an elevation of the human type through the agency of philosophy
reminds us of the postulates of German idealism.
The remark is quite just that from this conception of the doctrine
of the over-man the step to Fichte would not have been a long one. That Nietzsche could not take it was due to the fact that he bad in his nature too much of Schlegel's " genius," which treats all expe riences from the standpoint of irony (p. 605). This made him unable to find his way back from the individual mind to the " universal ego" — to the conception of values which assert their validity over all.
7. The revolt of boundless individualism culminates in the claim that all values are relative. Only the powerful will of the over-man persists as the absolute value, and sanctions every means which it brings into service. For the " higher " man there is no longer any form or standard, either logical or ethical. The arbitrary will of the over-man has superseded the " autonomy of reason " — this is the course from Kant to Nietzsche which the nineteenth century has described.
Just this determines the problem of the future. Relativism the dismissal and death of philosophy. Philosophy can live only as the science of values which are universally valid. It will no longer force its way into the work of the particular sciences, where psychology also now belongs. Philosophy has neither the craving to know over again from her standpoint what the special sciences have already known from theirs, nor the desire to compile and patch together generalisations from the "more general results" of the separate disciplines. Philosophy has its own field and its own problem in those values of universal validity which are the organising principle for all the functions of culture and civili sation and for all the particular values of life. But will de
scribe and explain these values only that may give an account of their validity; treats them not as facts but as norms. Hence
aphorisms supernatural
it
it
it
it>
J4«. ] The Problem of Value i. 681
it will have to develop its task as a " giving of laws " — not laws of arbitrary caprice which it dictates, but rather laws of the reason, which it discovers and comprehends. By following the path toward this goal it seems to be the aim of the present movement, divided within itself as it often is, to win back the important conquests of the great period of Gerinau philosophy. Since Lotze raised the con ception of value to a place of prominence, and set it at the summit of logic and metaphysics as well as of ethics, many suggestions toward a " theory of values," as a new foundation science in philosophy, have arisen. It can do no harm if these move in part in the psychologi cal and sociological realm, provided it is not forgotten that in estab lishing facts and making genetic explanations we have only gained the material upon which philosophy itself must perform its task of criticism.
But a no less valuable foundation for this central work is formed by the history of philosophy, which, as Hegel first recognised, must be regarded in this sense as an integrant part of philosophy itself. For it presents the process in which European humanity has embodied in scientific conceptions its view of the world and judg ment of human life.
In this process particular experiences have furnished the occasions, and special problems of knowledge have been the instrumentalities, through which step by step reflection has advanced to greater clear ness and certainty respecting the ultimate values of culture and civilisation. In setting forth this process, therefore, the history of philosophy presents to our view the gradual attainment of clearness and certainty respecting those values whose universal validity forms the problem and field of philosophy itself.
APPENDIX.
P. 12. Line 15. Add : —
On the pragmatic factor, cf. C. Herrmann, Der pragmatiscke Zusammenhang in der QetchichU der Philosophic (Dresden, 1863).
P. 12. Line 10 from foot of the text. Add as foot-note, affixed to the word " positive " : —
A similar, but quite mistaken attempt has been recently made in this direc tion by Fr. Brenta. no, Die vier Phasen in der Philosophie und ihr gegenwdrtiger Stand (Vienna, 1895). Here belong also the analogies, always more or less artificial, which have been attempted between the course of development in the ancient and that in the modern philosophy. Cf. e. g. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, Der
Parallelismus der alien und neueren Philosophie (Leips. and Heidelb. 1866).
P. 16. Line 6 from foot of text, add : —
In all previous expositions of the history of philosophy, whether upon a larger or smaller scale, a chronological arrangement has been adopted, following the order and succession of the more important philosophies and schools. These various arrangements have differed only in details, and these not always impor tant. Among the most recent might be named in addition, that of J. Bergmann, whose treatment shows taste and insight (2 vols. , Berlin, 1892). A treatment marked by originality and fineness of thought, in which the usual scheme has been happily broken through by emphasis upon the great movements and inter relations of the world's history, is presented by K. Eucken, Die Lebensansehau- ungen der grossen Denker (2d ed. , Leips. 1898).
P. 23. To the foot-note, add : —
Windischmann, earlier {Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgesehichte, Bonn. 1827-1834), and recently P. Deussen (Allgemeine Getchichte der Philoso
phie, I. 1, Leips. 1894) have made a beginning toward the work of relating this Oriental thought to the whole history of philosophy.
P. 24. Line 8. Affix as foot-note: —
E. Rohde has set forth with great insight and discrimination the rich sugges. tiona for philosophy in the following period, which grew out of the transforma tions of the religious ideas (Psyche, 2d ed. , 1897).
P. 27. To the lit. on the Period, add : —
A. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece, N. Y. 1898.
P. 30. Line 30. To the notice of Heraclitus, add : —
He was apparently the first who, from the standpoint of scientific insight, undertook to reform the public life and combat the dangers of anarchy. Him self an austere and rigorous personality, he preached the law of order, which ought to prevail in human life as in nature.
. ■:■ . 688- ;
684
Appendix.
P. 30. Line 19 from the foot. To the notice of Anaxagoras, add : —
His scientific employments were essentially astronomical in their nature. Neglecting earthly interests, he is said to have declared the heavens to be his fatherland, and the observation of the stars to be his life work. Metrodorus and Archelausi are named as his disciples.
P. 42. Foot-note 1. Relating to the vow of Anaxagoras, add : — Cf. , however, M. Heinze in the Ben d. Sachs. Ges. d. Wiss. , 1890.
P. 46. Last line of text. To the word " curved," affix as foot
note : —
■' '
The tradition (Arist. , foe. cit. ) shows this collocation; whereas, from the cosmology of the Pythagoreans and likewise from that of Plato and Aristotle, we should expect the reverse order.
P. 55. To the notice of Diogenes of Apollonia, add : —
He was the most important of the eclectics of the fifth century. So little is known as to his life that it is even doubtful whether Apollonia was his home. Of his writings, even Simplicius had only the xtpl 4>iatut before him (Phyt. , S2 V. 151, 24 D).
P. 62. Add to foot-note 1 : —
because in this phase of Greek thought they run along as yet unrelated lines of thought, side, by side with the theories of natural science. Only the Pythago reans seem as yet to have begun the combination between theology and phi losophy, which later became through Plato a controlling influence.
P. 68. Prefix to par. 4, which begins with "But while," the following sentence:— ■*■
. A preparation for this transition was made by the circumstance that even in the investigation of nature, interest in fundamental principles had grown weaker after the first creative development, and science had begun to scatter her labours over special fields.
P. 71. To the personal notice of Socrates, add : '—■
He considered this enlightenment of himself and fellow-citizens a divine voca tion (Plato's Apology), giving this work precedence even over. his care of his family ( Xanthippe), lie gathered about him the. noblest youth of Athens, such as Alcibiades, who honoured in him the ideal and the teacher of virtue. He appeared thus as leader of an intellectual aristocracy, and just by this means came into opposition to the dominant democracy. £K. JoSl, Der ec. hle. «. d. Xenophontische Sokrates, Vol. I. , Berlin, 1893. Vol. ' II. in 2 pts. , 1901. Kralik,
Senates; -1888-] - ■ . -. . -■ . .
' P'. ' 96. ' "Line 23. Insert after Plato : —
And of their materialism which he so vigorously opposed.
P. 102. At close of par. 4, insert : —
This personal influence 'he' himself regarded as the most important part of his activity. For scientific investigation was only one side of his rich nature.
The demand for ethical teaching' and for political and social efficiency had a still stronger life within him. He had an open vision for the evils of his time. He united an 'adherence to the aristocratic party with an activity in the direction indicated hy Socrates, and never quite gave up the hope of reforming the life of his time through his science. To this was added as a third element in his per sonality that pre-eminent artistic disposition which could clothe Ms ideals with poetic exposition in the most splendid language.
. /
.
,. . . -. -. -'
Appendix.
P. 103. To references on Plato, add : —
P. Lutowslawski, Origin and Growth of Plato3 i Logic (1807).
[ R. L. Nettleship, Philos. Lecture*, ed. by Bradley and Benson, 1807. W.
Witidelband. Plato, Stuttgart, 1900. ]
P. 104. After first par. , insert : —
In comparison with the high flight of Platb, the personality and life-work of Aristotle appear throughout of cooler and soberer type. But if he lacks the impulse toward an active influence in public life, and also the poetic charm of diction and composition, he has, instead, all the more effective a substitute in the power of thought with which he surveys and masters his Held, in the clarity sum! purity of his scientific temper, in the certainty and power with which he disposes and moulds the results gathered from the intellectual labours of many contributors. Aristotle is an incarnation of the spirit of science such as the
world has never seen again, and in this direction his incomparable influence has lain. He will always remain the leading thinker In the realm of investigation which seeks to comprehend reality with keen look, unbiassed by any interest
derived from feeling.
P. 104. Line 10. After " knowledge," insert : —
*-
The recently discovered main fragment of bis rioXirria ri» 'AArnUwr is a valu able example of the completeness of this pan, also, of his literary work. In the main only his scientific, etc.
P. 104. (Especially valuable in the recent literature upon Aristotle are r H. Meier, Die Syllooittik de$ Arirtoteles. Vol. I. , 1896, Vol. II. in 2 pts. , 1900 ; G. Rodier, Arittote, Traiti de VAme, trad, et annotte. a vols. , Paris, 1900. Cf. also W. A. Hammond, A. 't Psychology: The De Anima and Parva Xat. ,tr. with int. and Nulet, Lond. and N. Y. 1901 ; H. Siebeck, A. , Stuttgart, 1899. ]
P. 112. As note to close of first par. , attached to words " in the middle": —
Cf. , however, on this, A. Ooedeke-Meyer, Die Naturphilotophie Spikur't in ikretn Verhdltniu xu Demokrit, Strassburg, 1897.
P. 119. Line 17. After "back," insert: —
according to the general laws of association and reproduction (Phaedo, 72 ff. ).
P. 123. Insert after the first par. under 6, the following par. : —
This completely new attempt on Plato's part was supported by the theological doctrines which he was able to take from the Mysteries of Dionysus. Here the individual soul was regarded as a " daimon " or spirit which had journeyed or been banished from another world into the body, and during its earthly life maintained mysterious emo tional relations to its original home. Such theological ideas were brought by the philosopher into his scientific system, not without serious difficulties.
P. 135. Note attached to the word "not" in line 11
foot) : —
685
For Aristotle means nothing else, even where, as is frequently the case In the Analytics, be expresses the relation by saying that the question is whether the one concept Is affirmed or predicated (»«rir>»ptr») of the other.
(from
686 Appendix.
P. 142. After the first sentence in the last par. , insert : —
" The subordination of the single thing under the general concept is for him too, not an arbitrary act of the intellect in its work of comparison; it is an act of knowledge which takes us into the nature of things and reproduces the actual relations which obtain there. "
P. 148. Line 3. After " world," insert : —
Every element has thus its " natural " motion in a certain direc tion and its " natural " place in the universe. Only by collision with others (/ftp) is it turned aside or crowded out.
P. 162. Before second par. , insert : —
" In the history of the Stoa we have to distinguish an older period which was predominantly ethical, a middle period which was eclectic, and a later period which was religious. "
P. 162. To references on Stoicism, add : — A. Schmekel, Die mittlere Stoa (Berlin, 1892).
P. 162. Line 6 from foot. To references on Lucretius, add : — R. Heinze's Com. on 3d Book (Leips. 1877).
P. 163. Line 20. Add : —
Cf. E. Pappenheim (Berlin, 1874 f. , Leips. 1877 and 1881).
P. 163. To references on Scepticism, add: —
V. Brochard, Let Sceptiques Orecs (Paris, 1887). [M. M. Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism (contains trans, of the " Pyrrhonic Sketches," Camb. and Lond. 1899). ]
P. 163. Line 35. After " principle," insert : —
Cicero stands nearest to the position of Probabilism as maintained by the Academy. See below, § 17, 7.
P. 163. To the material before § 14, add : —
A popular moral eclecticism was represented by certain preachers of morals who were more or less closely related to the principles of the Cynics. These scourged the social and moral conditions of the Hellenistic and later of the Roman world with harsh and outspoken criticism. Among them were Teles (cf. v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Philologische Untemuchungen, IV. , 292 ff. ; Frag ments, ed. by O. Hense, Freiburg, 1899), Bion of Borysthenes (cf. R. Heinze, de Horatio Bionis Imitalore, Bonn, 1889) of a later period, Demetrius, Oeno- maos, and Demonax. Cf. J. Bernays, Lukian ivid die Kyniker (Berlin, 1879). In this connection Dio Chrysostomos is also to be named. Cf. H. v. Arnim (Berlin, 1898).
P 174. Line 8. Add to this paragraph : —
In many cases, however, notably in the Imperial age of Rome, this maxim appears as the easily intelligible principle of the honour able man who finds himself repelled by the corruption and partisan self-seeking of political life, and can have nothing to do with it.
Appendix.
P. 181. Add to the second par. the following (in part new) : —
Nevertheless, inasmuch as they, like Heraclitus, treated the neces- :*s». ry course of events and providence as equivalent termii, the Stoic
formulation of the principle of sufficient reason (i. e. that everything which comes to be has a ground or reason) may also be expressed in
the form that not even the least thing in the world can be otherwise than in accord with the decree of Zeus.
P. 186. Line 8 from foot of text, after "Heraclitus" insert: —
•" and in part to the later philosophy of nature as influenced by nim. (Pseudo-Hippoc. vtpl SWrip ; cf. above p. 67, note 1. )
P. 189. Line 12 from foot, add the following: —
Finally this web of syncretistic theology received the metaphysi cal strand, to which the Older Academy with Pythagorean tenden cies (especially Xenocrates) had begun to attach the hierarchy of
mythical fonns (cf. § 11, 5). The combination of all these theo logical tendencies was completed in the middle, eclectic Stoa, espe cially through Posidonius.
P. 204. Note 4, add : —
Hence Epicurus did not regard it necessary to decide on theoretical grounds between different modes of explaining particular phenomena : the one mode waa no more valid (o4 paXXor) than the other, to use the sceptical phrase.
P. 210. Line 20. Add : —
trans, as H&rnack's Hittory of Doctrine, by N. Buchanan, Lond. 1894.
P. 210. Add to references : —
Fr. Susemihl, Qeiehichte der griechUcken Litteratur in der Alezandrinerteit (2 vols. , Leips. 1891).
P. 216. Line 26. To the lit, add : —
H. v. A num. Dion von Pruta (Leips. 1898), pp. 4-114.
P. 216.
physics, not even the metaphysics of the will ; hence he dedicates his book "for free spirits'' to the memory of Voltaire, and while he had earlier turned Wagner from Feuerbach to Schopenhauer, now he himself goes the reverse way. He comes into agreement with the utilitarian ethics of Paul Ree; he believes in the possi bility of the purely scientific culture. He even goes so far as to see in knowledge the highest and best aim of life. Knowledge is for him the true joy, and the whole freshness of delight in the joys of the world and of life which is found in 6twpia (contemplation) — an enjoyment of the present actual world which is at once aesthetic and theoretical — is the fundamental note of this period, the most fortunate period which was granted to him.
Then the Dionysus element of passion came to expression as an uncontrollable longing for strong, masterful, unsympathetic living out of personality, which throws down all that would stand in its path. The strongest impulse of man is the will for power. It is for him to assert this. But this unconditional assertion bursts the system of values in which our civilisation, up" to this time, has enmeshed itself ; the new ideal is in this sense beyond good and bad. " ' The will for power knows no bonds which prescribe what is "permitted"; for everything good which springs from power and increases power; everything bad which springs from weak ness and weakens power. So also in our judgments, in knowledge
JtnttUt von Out und Boat, the title of one of Nietzsche's books, translated by A. Tille.
1
is is
it,
S 4«. J Problem of Valuet : Nietz$che. 679
And in conviction, the important thing is not whether they arei ** true," but whether they help us, whether they further our life and I strengthen our mind. They have worth only if they make us strong.
Hence, conviction also may and must change as life unfolds its changes (as was the case in part with Nietzsche himself). Man chooses what he needs ; the value of knowing also lies beyond true and false. Here begins, therefore, the overturning and re-valuation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe). Here the philosopher be comes a reformer of morals, the legislator the creator of a new civili
sation. In the third period of his development Nietzsche was full of the consciousness of this task.
From this standpoint he sets up the ideal of the over-man (Ueber- meiueA) in contrast with the ordinary, everyday man of the com mon herd. Will for power is will for mastery, and the most important mastery is that of man over man. Hegel once said that of all great things which the world's history shows, the greatest is
the mastery of one free will over others. It recalls this saying when Nietzsche develops his uew idea of civilisation from the antithesis between the " morals of masters " and " morals of slaves. " All the brutality of trampling down those who may be in the way, all the unfettering of the primitive beast in human nature, appear here as the right and duty of the strong. The strong man unfolds and defends the energy of living as against the scantiness and meagreness of renunciation and humility. The morality of slaves, therefore, coincides essentially with the ascetic nature of the super- naturalism which Nietzsche had formerly combated, and the positive connection of the transition period with his third period consists in
poetic dimness and indetiniteness. According to the original ten dency, the over-man is the great individuality which asserts its primitive rights over against the mass. The common herd of the
" far too many " ( Viel-zuViele) exists only to the end that out of it as rare instances of fortune may rise the over-men. These, from century to century, recognize each other as bearers of all the meaning and worth that is to be found in all this confused driving of disordered forces. The genius is the end and aim of history, and it is in this that his right of mastery as over against the Philistine has its root. But according to another tendency the over-man appears as a higher type of the human race, who is to be bred and trained — as the strong race which enjoys its strength of mastery in the powerful unfolding of life, free from the restraints and self-disturbing ten dencies of the slavish morality. In both cases Nietzsche's ideal of
the "joyous " assertion of a world-conquering thirst for living. Nevertheless the ideal for the "over-man" remains veiled in
680 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. £ Part VII
the over-man is alike aristocratic and exclusive, and it is a si penalty for the poetic indefiniteness and symbolic ambiguity of Lii
that his combating of "slavish morality" and of its foundations has made him popular with just the very ones who would be the first to strike from the over-man the head by
which he towers above, the common herd of the " too many. " Between the two lines along which the ideal of the over-man
develops, the author has not come to a clear decision. Zarathustn
mingles them together, with wavering lines of transition. It is clear ( that the one form is an echo of the romantic ideal of the genius as the other borrows from sociological evolution. But the thought of an elevation of the human type through the agency of philosophy
reminds us of the postulates of German idealism.
The remark is quite just that from this conception of the doctrine
of the over-man the step to Fichte would not have been a long one. That Nietzsche could not take it was due to the fact that he bad in his nature too much of Schlegel's " genius," which treats all expe riences from the standpoint of irony (p. 605). This made him unable to find his way back from the individual mind to the " universal ego" — to the conception of values which assert their validity over all.
7. The revolt of boundless individualism culminates in the claim that all values are relative. Only the powerful will of the over-man persists as the absolute value, and sanctions every means which it brings into service. For the " higher " man there is no longer any form or standard, either logical or ethical. The arbitrary will of the over-man has superseded the " autonomy of reason " — this is the course from Kant to Nietzsche which the nineteenth century has described.
Just this determines the problem of the future. Relativism the dismissal and death of philosophy. Philosophy can live only as the science of values which are universally valid. It will no longer force its way into the work of the particular sciences, where psychology also now belongs. Philosophy has neither the craving to know over again from her standpoint what the special sciences have already known from theirs, nor the desire to compile and patch together generalisations from the "more general results" of the separate disciplines. Philosophy has its own field and its own problem in those values of universal validity which are the organising principle for all the functions of culture and civili sation and for all the particular values of life. But will de
scribe and explain these values only that may give an account of their validity; treats them not as facts but as norms. Hence
aphorisms supernatural
it
it
it
it>
J4«. ] The Problem of Value i. 681
it will have to develop its task as a " giving of laws " — not laws of arbitrary caprice which it dictates, but rather laws of the reason, which it discovers and comprehends. By following the path toward this goal it seems to be the aim of the present movement, divided within itself as it often is, to win back the important conquests of the great period of Gerinau philosophy. Since Lotze raised the con ception of value to a place of prominence, and set it at the summit of logic and metaphysics as well as of ethics, many suggestions toward a " theory of values," as a new foundation science in philosophy, have arisen. It can do no harm if these move in part in the psychologi cal and sociological realm, provided it is not forgotten that in estab lishing facts and making genetic explanations we have only gained the material upon which philosophy itself must perform its task of criticism.
But a no less valuable foundation for this central work is formed by the history of philosophy, which, as Hegel first recognised, must be regarded in this sense as an integrant part of philosophy itself. For it presents the process in which European humanity has embodied in scientific conceptions its view of the world and judg ment of human life.
In this process particular experiences have furnished the occasions, and special problems of knowledge have been the instrumentalities, through which step by step reflection has advanced to greater clear ness and certainty respecting the ultimate values of culture and civilisation. In setting forth this process, therefore, the history of philosophy presents to our view the gradual attainment of clearness and certainty respecting those values whose universal validity forms the problem and field of philosophy itself.
APPENDIX.
P. 12. Line 15. Add : —
On the pragmatic factor, cf. C. Herrmann, Der pragmatiscke Zusammenhang in der QetchichU der Philosophic (Dresden, 1863).
P. 12. Line 10 from foot of the text. Add as foot-note, affixed to the word " positive " : —
A similar, but quite mistaken attempt has been recently made in this direc tion by Fr. Brenta. no, Die vier Phasen in der Philosophie und ihr gegenwdrtiger Stand (Vienna, 1895). Here belong also the analogies, always more or less artificial, which have been attempted between the course of development in the ancient and that in the modern philosophy. Cf. e. g. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, Der
Parallelismus der alien und neueren Philosophie (Leips. and Heidelb. 1866).
P. 16. Line 6 from foot of text, add : —
In all previous expositions of the history of philosophy, whether upon a larger or smaller scale, a chronological arrangement has been adopted, following the order and succession of the more important philosophies and schools. These various arrangements have differed only in details, and these not always impor tant. Among the most recent might be named in addition, that of J. Bergmann, whose treatment shows taste and insight (2 vols. , Berlin, 1892). A treatment marked by originality and fineness of thought, in which the usual scheme has been happily broken through by emphasis upon the great movements and inter relations of the world's history, is presented by K. Eucken, Die Lebensansehau- ungen der grossen Denker (2d ed. , Leips. 1898).
P. 23. To the foot-note, add : —
Windischmann, earlier {Die Philosophie im Fortgang der Weltgesehichte, Bonn. 1827-1834), and recently P. Deussen (Allgemeine Getchichte der Philoso
phie, I. 1, Leips. 1894) have made a beginning toward the work of relating this Oriental thought to the whole history of philosophy.
P. 24. Line 8. Affix as foot-note: —
E. Rohde has set forth with great insight and discrimination the rich sugges. tiona for philosophy in the following period, which grew out of the transforma tions of the religious ideas (Psyche, 2d ed. , 1897).
P. 27. To the lit. on the Period, add : —
A. Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece, N. Y. 1898.
P. 30. Line 30. To the notice of Heraclitus, add : —
He was apparently the first who, from the standpoint of scientific insight, undertook to reform the public life and combat the dangers of anarchy. Him self an austere and rigorous personality, he preached the law of order, which ought to prevail in human life as in nature.
. ■:■ . 688- ;
684
Appendix.
P. 30. Line 19 from the foot. To the notice of Anaxagoras, add : —
His scientific employments were essentially astronomical in their nature. Neglecting earthly interests, he is said to have declared the heavens to be his fatherland, and the observation of the stars to be his life work. Metrodorus and Archelausi are named as his disciples.
P. 42. Foot-note 1. Relating to the vow of Anaxagoras, add : — Cf. , however, M. Heinze in the Ben d. Sachs. Ges. d. Wiss. , 1890.
P. 46. Last line of text. To the word " curved," affix as foot
note : —
■' '
The tradition (Arist. , foe. cit. ) shows this collocation; whereas, from the cosmology of the Pythagoreans and likewise from that of Plato and Aristotle, we should expect the reverse order.
P. 55. To the notice of Diogenes of Apollonia, add : —
He was the most important of the eclectics of the fifth century. So little is known as to his life that it is even doubtful whether Apollonia was his home. Of his writings, even Simplicius had only the xtpl 4>iatut before him (Phyt. , S2 V. 151, 24 D).
P. 62. Add to foot-note 1 : —
because in this phase of Greek thought they run along as yet unrelated lines of thought, side, by side with the theories of natural science. Only the Pythago reans seem as yet to have begun the combination between theology and phi losophy, which later became through Plato a controlling influence.
P. 68. Prefix to par. 4, which begins with "But while," the following sentence:— ■*■
. A preparation for this transition was made by the circumstance that even in the investigation of nature, interest in fundamental principles had grown weaker after the first creative development, and science had begun to scatter her labours over special fields.
P. 71. To the personal notice of Socrates, add : '—■
He considered this enlightenment of himself and fellow-citizens a divine voca tion (Plato's Apology), giving this work precedence even over. his care of his family ( Xanthippe), lie gathered about him the. noblest youth of Athens, such as Alcibiades, who honoured in him the ideal and the teacher of virtue. He appeared thus as leader of an intellectual aristocracy, and just by this means came into opposition to the dominant democracy. £K. JoSl, Der ec. hle. «. d. Xenophontische Sokrates, Vol. I. , Berlin, 1893. Vol. ' II. in 2 pts. , 1901. Kralik,
Senates; -1888-] - ■ . -. . -■ . .
' P'. ' 96. ' "Line 23. Insert after Plato : —
And of their materialism which he so vigorously opposed.
P. 102. At close of par. 4, insert : —
This personal influence 'he' himself regarded as the most important part of his activity. For scientific investigation was only one side of his rich nature.
The demand for ethical teaching' and for political and social efficiency had a still stronger life within him. He had an open vision for the evils of his time. He united an 'adherence to the aristocratic party with an activity in the direction indicated hy Socrates, and never quite gave up the hope of reforming the life of his time through his science. To this was added as a third element in his per sonality that pre-eminent artistic disposition which could clothe Ms ideals with poetic exposition in the most splendid language.
. /
.
,. . . -. -. -'
Appendix.
P. 103. To references on Plato, add : —
P. Lutowslawski, Origin and Growth of Plato3 i Logic (1807).
[ R. L. Nettleship, Philos. Lecture*, ed. by Bradley and Benson, 1807. W.
Witidelband. Plato, Stuttgart, 1900. ]
P. 104. After first par. , insert : —
In comparison with the high flight of Platb, the personality and life-work of Aristotle appear throughout of cooler and soberer type. But if he lacks the impulse toward an active influence in public life, and also the poetic charm of diction and composition, he has, instead, all the more effective a substitute in the power of thought with which he surveys and masters his Held, in the clarity sum! purity of his scientific temper, in the certainty and power with which he disposes and moulds the results gathered from the intellectual labours of many contributors. Aristotle is an incarnation of the spirit of science such as the
world has never seen again, and in this direction his incomparable influence has lain. He will always remain the leading thinker In the realm of investigation which seeks to comprehend reality with keen look, unbiassed by any interest
derived from feeling.
P. 104. Line 10. After " knowledge," insert : —
*-
The recently discovered main fragment of bis rioXirria ri» 'AArnUwr is a valu able example of the completeness of this pan, also, of his literary work. In the main only his scientific, etc.
P. 104. (Especially valuable in the recent literature upon Aristotle are r H. Meier, Die Syllooittik de$ Arirtoteles. Vol. I. , 1896, Vol. II. in 2 pts. , 1900 ; G. Rodier, Arittote, Traiti de VAme, trad, et annotte. a vols. , Paris, 1900. Cf. also W. A. Hammond, A. 't Psychology: The De Anima and Parva Xat. ,tr. with int. and Nulet, Lond. and N. Y. 1901 ; H. Siebeck, A. , Stuttgart, 1899. ]
P. 112. As note to close of first par. , attached to words " in the middle": —
Cf. , however, on this, A. Ooedeke-Meyer, Die Naturphilotophie Spikur't in ikretn Verhdltniu xu Demokrit, Strassburg, 1897.
P. 119. Line 17. After "back," insert: —
according to the general laws of association and reproduction (Phaedo, 72 ff. ).
P. 123. Insert after the first par. under 6, the following par. : —
This completely new attempt on Plato's part was supported by the theological doctrines which he was able to take from the Mysteries of Dionysus. Here the individual soul was regarded as a " daimon " or spirit which had journeyed or been banished from another world into the body, and during its earthly life maintained mysterious emo tional relations to its original home. Such theological ideas were brought by the philosopher into his scientific system, not without serious difficulties.
P. 135. Note attached to the word "not" in line 11
foot) : —
685
For Aristotle means nothing else, even where, as is frequently the case In the Analytics, be expresses the relation by saying that the question is whether the one concept Is affirmed or predicated (»«rir>»ptr») of the other.
(from
686 Appendix.
P. 142. After the first sentence in the last par. , insert : —
" The subordination of the single thing under the general concept is for him too, not an arbitrary act of the intellect in its work of comparison; it is an act of knowledge which takes us into the nature of things and reproduces the actual relations which obtain there. "
P. 148. Line 3. After " world," insert : —
Every element has thus its " natural " motion in a certain direc tion and its " natural " place in the universe. Only by collision with others (/ftp) is it turned aside or crowded out.
P. 162. Before second par. , insert : —
" In the history of the Stoa we have to distinguish an older period which was predominantly ethical, a middle period which was eclectic, and a later period which was religious. "
P. 162. To references on Stoicism, add : — A. Schmekel, Die mittlere Stoa (Berlin, 1892).
P. 162. Line 6 from foot. To references on Lucretius, add : — R. Heinze's Com. on 3d Book (Leips. 1877).
P. 163. Line 20. Add : —
Cf. E. Pappenheim (Berlin, 1874 f. , Leips. 1877 and 1881).
P. 163. To references on Scepticism, add: —
V. Brochard, Let Sceptiques Orecs (Paris, 1887). [M. M. Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism (contains trans, of the " Pyrrhonic Sketches," Camb. and Lond. 1899). ]
P. 163. Line 35. After " principle," insert : —
Cicero stands nearest to the position of Probabilism as maintained by the Academy. See below, § 17, 7.
P. 163. To the material before § 14, add : —
A popular moral eclecticism was represented by certain preachers of morals who were more or less closely related to the principles of the Cynics. These scourged the social and moral conditions of the Hellenistic and later of the Roman world with harsh and outspoken criticism. Among them were Teles (cf. v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Philologische Untemuchungen, IV. , 292 ff. ; Frag ments, ed. by O. Hense, Freiburg, 1899), Bion of Borysthenes (cf. R. Heinze, de Horatio Bionis Imitalore, Bonn, 1889) of a later period, Demetrius, Oeno- maos, and Demonax. Cf. J. Bernays, Lukian ivid die Kyniker (Berlin, 1879). In this connection Dio Chrysostomos is also to be named. Cf. H. v. Arnim (Berlin, 1898).
P 174. Line 8. Add to this paragraph : —
In many cases, however, notably in the Imperial age of Rome, this maxim appears as the easily intelligible principle of the honour able man who finds himself repelled by the corruption and partisan self-seeking of political life, and can have nothing to do with it.
Appendix.
P. 181. Add to the second par. the following (in part new) : —
Nevertheless, inasmuch as they, like Heraclitus, treated the neces- :*s». ry course of events and providence as equivalent termii, the Stoic
formulation of the principle of sufficient reason (i. e. that everything which comes to be has a ground or reason) may also be expressed in
the form that not even the least thing in the world can be otherwise than in accord with the decree of Zeus.
P. 186. Line 8 from foot of text, after "Heraclitus" insert: —
•" and in part to the later philosophy of nature as influenced by nim. (Pseudo-Hippoc. vtpl SWrip ; cf. above p. 67, note 1. )
P. 189. Line 12 from foot, add the following: —
Finally this web of syncretistic theology received the metaphysi cal strand, to which the Older Academy with Pythagorean tenden cies (especially Xenocrates) had begun to attach the hierarchy of
mythical fonns (cf. § 11, 5). The combination of all these theo logical tendencies was completed in the middle, eclectic Stoa, espe cially through Posidonius.
P. 204. Note 4, add : —
Hence Epicurus did not regard it necessary to decide on theoretical grounds between different modes of explaining particular phenomena : the one mode waa no more valid (o4 paXXor) than the other, to use the sceptical phrase.
P. 210. Line 20. Add : —
trans, as H&rnack's Hittory of Doctrine, by N. Buchanan, Lond. 1894.
P. 210. Add to references : —
Fr. Susemihl, Qeiehichte der griechUcken Litteratur in der Alezandrinerteit (2 vols. , Leips. 1891).
P. 216. Line 26. To the lit, add : —
H. v. A num. Dion von Pruta (Leips. 1898), pp. 4-114.
P. 216.
