Hence, in regard to the affairs of Venus, they regard pleasure as an end in itself rather than as a means to
propagate
the species.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
.
Opportunity
? ? . Differences
? ? . Variable powers
? ? . Location
? ? . Predisposition
? ? . Diversity of predispositions
? ? . Condition
? ? . Reaction
? ? . Distinction
? ? . Blindness or ignorance
? ? . Diligence
? ? . Weapons
? ? . Vicissitudes
? ? . Eyes
? ? . Enticements
? ? . Sequences
? ? . Gates
On what can be bound in general
? . Types of things which can be bound. There are four things which rotate around God, or universal nature, or the universal good, or absolute beauty. They rotate in such a way that they cannot abandon that centre, otherwise they would be annihilated, and in such a way that they can be separated from that centre only by the distance of each of their circumferences from its proper centre. These four things, I say, move in a circle around their bonding agent in such a way that they maintain the same order forever. According to the Platonists, they are mind, soul, nature and matter. Mind, in itself, is stable; soul, in itself, is mobile; nature is partly stable and partly mobile; and matter, as a whole, is both mobile and stable.
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? ? . The condition of that which can be bound. Nothing is bound unless it is very suitably predisposed, for that brightness5 is not communicated to all things in the same way.
? . The form of that which can be bound. Everything which is bound has an awareness in some sense, and in the nature of that awareness, one finds a certain type of knowledge and of appetite, just as a magnet attracts or repels different kinds of things. Hence, he who wishes to bind ought to focus in some way on the awareness in that which can be bound. For, indeed, a bond accompanies the awareness of a thing just like a shadow follows a body.
? . The comparison of things which can be bound. Let us note that humans are more open to bonding than are animals, and ignorant and stupid men are very much less suited for heroic bonds than are those who have developed an illustrious soul. In regard to natural bonds, the common person is much more susceptible than is the philosopher; as the proverb says, the wise rule over the stars. In regard to the intermediate type of bonds, it happens that the greedy person might boast of being temperate, and the lustful person of being moderate.
? . The distinction of things which can be bound. From what has just been said, it must be noted that the strength of one bond makes another type of bond less forceful or more mild. Thus, a German is less agitated by Venus, an Italian by drunkenness; a Spaniard is more prone to love, a Frenchman to anger.
? . The seed or incitement of the capacity to be bound. A thing is bound in the strongest way when part of it is in the bonding agent, or when the bonding agent controls it by one of its parts. To show this with just one example, necromancers are confident that they exercise control over entire bodies by means of the fingernails or the hair of the living, and especially by means of footprints or parts of clothing. They also evoke the spirits of the dead by means of their bones or any part of their bodies. Hence, it is not accidental that special care is taken in burying the dead and in preparing funeral pyres, and that leaving a body unburied is counted among the most grievous crimes. Also orators create good will with their art when their listeners and judges find something of themselves in it.
? 5 For Bruno's use of this term, see Part Three, 'On Cupid's Bond and on Bonds in General', paragraph ? , 'The definition of a bond'.
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? ? . The timing of the capacity to be bound. In different seasons and ages, one and the same thing can be bonded in various ways, and different things are not related to one and the same bond in the same way. Nor are wholes always recomposed in the same way. From this we can point out that some- one who was easy going and showy as a young man becomes a more stable and prudent adult, while an old man is more suspicious and morose, and a very old man is full of blame and loathing.
? . The diffences of things that can be bound. Whoever wishes to bind must take note of the fact that some of the things that can be bound are affected more by nature, others more by judgement or prudence, and still others more by practice and habit. As a result, the skilful person obliges and binds the first type of things with bonds provided by natural things, the second type by reasons and proofs, by symbols and arguments, and the third type by what is at hand and is compelling.
? . Resistance to being bound. The more that a soul is bound to one object, the more it turns away from and rejects others. Therefore, he who wishes to limit what can be bonded to only one bond should make a special effort to make it insensitive to other activities and objects, and to turn it away from any concern for them. For, indeed, a more pleasant action excludes a less pleasant one; the soul that is intent on hearing neglects vision; he who observes more attentively becomes deaf; when we are either very happy or sad for some reason, we are little concerned with the other; when we are lazy we stop or slow down our work, that is, we become restrained, pulled away, held, bonded. As a result, when the orator breaks the bond of love by laughter or envy or other feelings, he binds by hate or contempt or indignation.
? ? . The number of things that can be bound. Thinking persons turn away from sensible things and are bound by divine things. Pleasure seekers descend through vision to the abundances of touching. Moralists are attracted by the amusement of conversation. The first are heroes, the second are nat- ural, and the third are rational. The first are higher, the second lower, the third in between. The first are said to be worthy of the heavens, the second of life, the third of feeling. The first ascend to God, the second cling to bodies, the third move away from one extreme and approach the other.
? ? . The motion of what can be bound. All composite and variable things, and generally all things which undergo changes in their nature and disposition,
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? such as the soul and the spirit, are subject to various changes in their bodies and in the motions of their bodies (for although each substance is quite stable and eternal because of its simplicity, still it acquires a desire from its privation, an impulse from its desire, a motion from its impulse, and a breaking of bonds from its motion). As a consequence, no bonds are eternal. Rather, things alternate between bondage and freedom, between being bonded and escaping from a bond, or they transfer from one type of bond to another. This is a natural occurrence, and it precedes, accompa- nies and follows the eternal condition of all things. Thus, nature binds with its variety and motion, and art, which emulates nature, multiplies, varies, diversifies, orders and arranges bonds in a successive series. But complete stability is opposed to the nature of things, just as we are sometimes more inclined to condemn it, and yet at other times we rather desire it, for it is quite natural to desire to break from bonds, while just a little while ago we were open to being tied to them by our own voluntary and spontaneous inclinations.
? ? . The indefiniteness of what can be bound. Insofar as that which can be bound is composed of more parts, to the same degree it is less limited to specific bonds. Thus, human pleasure is less limited to only one time or individual or sex than are the pleasures of animals. All horses would have an equal chance to mate with one mare, but this is often not true of all men and one woman. This separation and indeterminateness between humans and animals is also found between a true human and a brutal human, between a more sensitive, and also more feeling, person and a more dull person. And what we have said about one type of bond must also be applied to all other genera and species of bonds.
? ? . The foundation of the capacity to be bound. The primary reason why each thing is capable of being bound is partly because there is something in it which strives to preserve itself as it presently is, and partly because it strives to be completely developed in itself according to its circumstances. In gen- eral, this is self-love. Hence, if one could extinguish self-love in an object, it would be subject to any and every type of bonding and separation. On the other hand, when self-love flourishes, all things are easily attracted to the types of bonds natural to them.
? ? . The relation of things that can be bound. Consider the friendship and the enmity among animals, their sympathy and hostility, their similarity and
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? diversity, and the circumstances of such things. Then arrange in an order and in an analogy all the particularities and the separate individuals in the human species, then all of the individuals and all the species of the other animals, and finally the species of all other things. You now have collected before you in a convenient order the diversity of bonds.
? ? . The material diversity of things that can be bound. Although everything that can be bound is composite in some way, still one thing can be said to be simple and another many-sided or complex, and one thing can be more simple while another has more parts. Consequently, some things are bound purely and others impurely, and some bonds are pure while others are impure. Thus some pleasures and pains are pure, some are impure, and some are mixed. For example, Epicurus taught that the pleasures of Venus are impure, because they are accompanied by pain and by an insatiable desire (by which the whole body tries to transform itself into another whole body), and this results in a sorrowful exhaustion. If there are things whose principles never fail (perhaps the stars and the great living souls or gods of the world, in whom there is no fatigue and in whom the influx and outflux of substance is always exactly the same), then they would be bound by themselves to each other in the most happy way.
Therefore, he who desires to bind in a socially effective way must take into account the diverse composition or structure of things, and must con- sider, evaluate and decide differently when dealing with heroes, or with ordinary people, or with those who are more like brutes.
? ? . The degrees of things that can be bound. Children are less bound by their natural feelings, because their nature is absorbed in growth and is dis- turbed by great changes, and all their nutrition is given over to growth and the structuring of the individual. But they clearly begin to be open to being bound in the fourteenth year, for even though at that age they are still involved in growth, their rate of growth is not as fast and as great as when they were children. And in the stable period of adulthood, men have a greater strength in their semen and, as a result, seem to be more subject to being bound. Furthermore, adolescents and young men seem to be more sexually excited for the reason that they are on fire for a long time because of the novelty of this pleasure; because the passages through which the semen passes are narrower, the wetness gushes forth with a more delight- ful pleasure. And as a result of the sexual itch which arises from this pres- sure, they are more delighted and liberated. But bonds are more difficult
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? in older men, whose powers are half dead, whose organs and passages are spent, and whose semen is not abundant. Precisely the same thing is found proportionally in the other emotions which have an analogy or contrast or dependence on the passion of love.
? ? . The temperaments of things that can be bound. Because of their tempera- ment, those who are melancholy are more bound to indignation, sadness, pleasure and love, for since they are more impressionable, they also have a stronger sense of pleasure. They are also more prone to contemplation and to speculation, and in general are moved and agitated more often and more strongly by their emotions.
Hence, in regard to the affairs of Venus, they regard pleasure as an end in itself rather than as a means to propagate the species. Next to them are people who are choleric, in comparison to which the sanguine are less agitated. Those who are phlegmatic are less lustful than the others, but are more greedy. Nevertheless, the fact remains that everyone has his role in obeying nature. The melancholy are bound by a greater force of imagination; the sanguine by a greater ability to emit sperm and by their hot temper; the phlegmatic by their greater abundance of fluids; and the caloric by their being more strongly and more sharply agitated and stimulated by a hot spirit.
? ? . The signs of things that can be bound. Physiognomy also has its part to play in these considerations. There are people who have slender and sinewy tibias, and who are similar to goats and to satyrs in having a wide concave nose, deep breathing and a languid face. Such people love more intensely and pursue sexual license more strongly. At the same time, they are easily appeased and do not have any emotion for a long time.
? ? . The duration of things that can be bound. With respect to bonds, old men are more stable but less suitable; young men are more unstable but more suitable; but middle aged men are bound suitably, skilfully and in a stable manner.
? ? . The reaction of things that can be bound. Mutual agreeableness gives rise to mutual bonds. Thus, there are bonds in jokes, in wit and in theatrical performances. In these ways, even those who are ugly and deformed can bind those who have feelings for them. Let us add that we have often tried to think about what it would be like to have a huge and lustful body, since the following imaginary verses were composed to be cast as a spell upon a young boy or girl:
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? I confess that I lack a beautiful form;
Yet God prefers me as more excellent, As does a girl who is steady and not silly. 6
In a proportional way, there are bonds by which those who are ugly bind because of their reputation for courage, vigour, eloquence, ingenuity and other such things, for from one type of power they can cause bonds of another type. It is not a rare occurrence that the more ugly Amazons bind in the act of love because of their reputation for their strength or their use of eloquence.
? ? . The heterogeneity of things that can be bound. Furthermore, there are species which are bound to a different species through love, hate, admira- tion, piety, compassion and other such feelings. For example, there are some famous cases of such bonding, like Lesbia with her sparrow, Corinna with her small dog, Cyparissus with his doe, and Arion with his dolphin. In general, the seeds of all species are attracted to other species. I will remain silent about the sympathy between a man and a lion, and I will pass over what I know about the astonishing intimacy between a boy and a snake.
? ? . The changing of things that can be bound. It is not difficult to change that which can be bound from one type of bond to its contrary, since the bond- ing agent is also changeable. And it makes no difference whether this occurs actually or only in thought. Even though I was once bound in thought by a teaching, the bonds of contempt and indignation may come later when that opinion has been studied in a better light. And the bonds arising from the fires of youth and beauty are relaxed and soothed in time when they do not agree with the bonds derived from customs and skill.
? ? . The cause and effect of things which can be bound. What it is that bonds to love and hate or contempt is hidden to the functions of reason. Adrastia's explanation is useless: namely, that the explanation of love, which arises from seeing a beautiful object, is a recollection by the soul of divine beauty, which was first seen as a companion to the body. If this were true, what is
? 6 Bruno quotes these three lines, with minor variations, from the 'Priapea', a set of approximately eighty short Latin poems, mostly from the Roman era, which were collected by an unknown editor. The poems commemorate Priapus, the mythological Greek god of plant and animal fertility, who was depicted as having a grotesque body and an enormous phallus. The 'Priapea' can be found in Emil Baehrens, ed. , Poetae latini minores (Leipzig: Teubner, ? ? ? ? ) Vol. ? , ? ? -? ? . Bruno's quotation is from #? ? (? ? ).
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? it that suddenly changes the soul to reject an object which in no way has changed in its nature? Why are different souls captured more easily by different objects? Why does that which is beautiful to one person also turn out to be ugly to another, no less talented person? Thus, the condition of things that can be bound is unfathomable to casual and routine examination.
? ? . The definition of things that can be bound. Theocritus attributed love and the other emotions by which individuals are bound to luck or fate or some kind of an indeterminate cause. But he would have understood them more clearly if he had thought and said 'a hidden but determinate' cause instead of an 'indeterminate' one, because their origin is not apparent. The emo- tions, indeed, have a definite and rational structure which is either given by nature or which arises from practice and habit.
? ? . The meaning of things which can be bound. The fact that things are bound by love or hate or some other feeling was explained by the Achaeans as due to fate and not to reason or to any type of thought. As a result, they vener- ated both love and hate at the same altar. Some Platonists agreed with this opinion, saying that animals who cannot speak are never bound by love, because they lack reason and prudence. But they had too limited a view of the nature of thought and reason, which fills all things with the universal spirit and which shines forth in all things and proportionally in each object. But, for us, love, like all emotions, is a very practical form of knowledge. Indeed, it is a type of discourse and reasoning and argumentation by which humans are most powerfully bound, even though it is never listed among the primary types of knowledge. Therefore, he who wishes to bind believes that reason has neither a greater role nor a more important role than love in binding, although indeed the latter falls under the genus of knowledge.
? ? . The flight of that which can be bound. Sometimes that which ties itself by one type of bond flees in order to bind itself with another type of bond. As a result, he who wishes to bond should be careful to use means which effectively bind the object, that is, he should employ the bonds which already hold it. For example, a hunter, who was absorbed by his interest in and attention to wild animals, was sexually seduced with appropriate gifts by the nymph who used a horn whose sound made fleeing animals come to a standstill. Also a soldier may be bound by other feelings by enchanting him with the power of his weapons. Thus, people are bound to sex through hunting, fasting, drunkenness, gymnastic exercises and in general through
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? various types of concerns, leisure activity, abstinence, debauchery, etc. And what is true of this type of bond also applies to the others in their own way.
? ? . The substance of that which can be bound. There are two causes of the act of bonding, and they are the same as the two causes of the essence of that which, as such, can be bound: namely, knowledge of some kind and desire of some kind. If something has no desire at all, then it cannot be bound spiritually in any way at all. Furthermore, if something has no knowledge and desire, then it cannot bind anything either socially or through magic. I will not speak of the other types of bonds because I would not want to say anything unsuitable to those of limited vision, who are numerous.
? ? . The completeness of that which can be bound. Something is perfectly bound if it is bound in all its powers and components. Hence, he who binds should count these items carefully so that, in wishing to bind as completely as possible, he can tie up many or all of them. He should have no doubt or confusion about the different types and powers of nourishment and enticement which affect the soul and the spirit.
? ? . The connection of things that can be bound. It is not possible for a bond- ing agent to bind something to himself unless the former is also bound to the latter, for bonds adhere to, and are inserted into, that which is bound; the bonding agent, which may accidentally be bound to another object, must be truly bound to the object which it binds to itself. However, the bonding agent has an advantage over that which is bound, for he is master over the bonds, and because he is not affected and influenced in the same way. This notion is supported by the fact that a procurer binds but is not bound, but she who is loved is not bound by her lover unless he is bound by her in the same act of love. Furthermore, a spiritual and mysterious type of bond occasionally also occurs in which she who is loved is bound by her lover, but she neither knows nor loves him. This is the type and level of love in which Eros was brought to tears and unhappiness by Anteros. But at the social level, no one binds unless he is also bound by the same or a similar type of bond either to someone, or at least with someone, whom he desires to bind.
? ? . The truth of that which can be bound. For that which can be bound to be truly bound, a real bond is not required, that is, a bond which is found in things. An apparent bond is enough, for the imagination of what is not true can truly bind, and by means of such an imagination, that which can be
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? bound can be truly bound; even if there were no hell, the thought and imagination of hell without a basis in truth would still really produce a true hell, for fantasy has its own type of truth. It can truly act, and can truly and most powerfully entangle in it that which can be bound, and thus the torments of hell are as eternal as the eternity of thought and faith. As long as the soul, even when stripped of the body, retains these same character- istics, it maintains its unhappy state for ages, and perhaps even more so because of its pleasures and drinking and lack of self-control. The common philosophers did not understand this, and they most stupidly used this teaching to condemn the most ignorant of people. We will not make a big issue of this, except to say the following: when we were children and inex- perienced, we were flooded with the arguments of these philosophers, just as much as the old and the experienced, themselves, had been flooded with the same arguments. Nevertheless, we forgive these elders for these views, just as much as we think that we should be forgiven, since we were just children.
On cupid's bond and on bonds in general
We have claimed in our treatise De naturali magia7 that all bonds are either reduced to the bond of love, depend on the bond of love or are based on the bond of love. An examination of our thirty topics of discussion will easily show that love is the foundation of all feelings, for he who loves nothing has no reason to fear, to hope, to praise, to be proud, to dare, to condemn, to accuse, to excuse, to be humble, to be competitive, to be angered or to be affected in other ways of this sort. Hence, in this section, which we have entitled 'On Cupid's Bond', we have the opportunity to deal with a topic which is very familiar and with considerations and speculations which range very widely. This examination should not be considered to be far removed from public affairs just because it is more important and more wonderful than the field of public affairs.
? . The definition of a bond. According to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, the bond of beauty is said to be a brightness, a beam of light and a certain motion, or at least its shadow and image and trace. It has spread out first into the mind, which it adorns with the order of things; second into the soul, which it brings to completion with the sequence of things;
7 See On Magic, 'On the Analogy of Spirits', #? . ? ? ?
? A general account of bonding
? third into nature, which it diversifies and sustains with its seeds; and fourth into matter, which it supplies with forms. According to them this beam of light is clearest in the mind, clear in the soul, obscure in nature and most obscure in the material substrate of natural things. It is not a bodily mass, and it has no bulk. Nor can it rotate around a mass and through the whole of space, for not just large things, but also small ones, are seen to be beau- tiful. In the same species, large things are deformed and small things are beautiful, but the opposite also occurs, and it often happens that beauty is lost when something remains the same in quantity, and is preserved when that quantity is changed. The most beautiful baby or child is pleasing but does not bind until he is an adolescent of a certain age. Then he has some size, and this is true even if his form and figure and complexion have not changed at all. From this we conclude that social types of bonding require a degree of size on which the form and the power of the bond depends. It refers, I think, to gestures, words, clothing, habits, sense of humour, and the other signs of human feelings.
? . The origin of a bond. Some Platonists define a bond as arising from a cer- tain proportionality of parts accompanied by a certain pleasantness of colouring. But to those who consider the matter more fully, it is at least as clear that it is not just composite things and things consisting of parts that bind, but that colour alone and sound alone also bind. Furthermore, noth- ing slips away and ages faster than beauty, and nothing changes more slowly than the form and figure which shine forth from the composition of parts. Hence, it seems that the bond of beauty must be sought elsewhere than in the figure and in the proportionality of parts. Indeed, sometimes love passes away after the flowering of the object loved, but the same beauty and figure still remain. As a result, the nature of a bond consists chiefly in a cer- tain mutual orientation between a captor and a captive. Indeed, it some- times happens that even though we have no grounds to complain reason- ably about a girl's beauty, or in a social setting to criticize someone's conversation, speech, habits or actions in general, still they do not please us. On the other hand, something, or even many things, may displease us in someone, yet we still love that person. And, indeed, it would be rather stupid to identify colour as a bond without distinguishing between colour and the things associated with colour. For does colour in itself bind when a brighter colour is displeasing and rejected by an old man, while a duller colour binds and captures a young man? And also if, in a social setting, an
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? adolescent were to give a serious speech about grave matters of state, then no matter how brilliant the speaker's oratory, a man of more mature judge- ment would become indignant because of the speaker's arrogance. Likewise, if an old man were to give a speech full of charming, flattering and flowering words, this would invite contempt, would sometimes pro- voke laughter and would provide an occasion for mockery. Thus, in regard to the body, to words and to behaviour, one thing is fitting for a married woman, another for a virgin; one thing for a girl, another for a boy; one thing for a mature adult, another for an old man; one thing for a soldier, another for a Roman citizen.
? . The indeterminateness of a bond.
? ? . Differences
? ? . Variable powers
? ? . Location
? ? . Predisposition
? ? . Diversity of predispositions
? ? . Condition
? ? . Reaction
? ? . Distinction
? ? . Blindness or ignorance
? ? . Diligence
? ? . Weapons
? ? . Vicissitudes
? ? . Eyes
? ? . Enticements
? ? . Sequences
? ? . Gates
On what can be bound in general
? . Types of things which can be bound. There are four things which rotate around God, or universal nature, or the universal good, or absolute beauty. They rotate in such a way that they cannot abandon that centre, otherwise they would be annihilated, and in such a way that they can be separated from that centre only by the distance of each of their circumferences from its proper centre. These four things, I say, move in a circle around their bonding agent in such a way that they maintain the same order forever. According to the Platonists, they are mind, soul, nature and matter. Mind, in itself, is stable; soul, in itself, is mobile; nature is partly stable and partly mobile; and matter, as a whole, is both mobile and stable.
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? ? . The condition of that which can be bound. Nothing is bound unless it is very suitably predisposed, for that brightness5 is not communicated to all things in the same way.
? . The form of that which can be bound. Everything which is bound has an awareness in some sense, and in the nature of that awareness, one finds a certain type of knowledge and of appetite, just as a magnet attracts or repels different kinds of things. Hence, he who wishes to bind ought to focus in some way on the awareness in that which can be bound. For, indeed, a bond accompanies the awareness of a thing just like a shadow follows a body.
? . The comparison of things which can be bound. Let us note that humans are more open to bonding than are animals, and ignorant and stupid men are very much less suited for heroic bonds than are those who have developed an illustrious soul. In regard to natural bonds, the common person is much more susceptible than is the philosopher; as the proverb says, the wise rule over the stars. In regard to the intermediate type of bonds, it happens that the greedy person might boast of being temperate, and the lustful person of being moderate.
? . The distinction of things which can be bound. From what has just been said, it must be noted that the strength of one bond makes another type of bond less forceful or more mild. Thus, a German is less agitated by Venus, an Italian by drunkenness; a Spaniard is more prone to love, a Frenchman to anger.
? . The seed or incitement of the capacity to be bound. A thing is bound in the strongest way when part of it is in the bonding agent, or when the bonding agent controls it by one of its parts. To show this with just one example, necromancers are confident that they exercise control over entire bodies by means of the fingernails or the hair of the living, and especially by means of footprints or parts of clothing. They also evoke the spirits of the dead by means of their bones or any part of their bodies. Hence, it is not accidental that special care is taken in burying the dead and in preparing funeral pyres, and that leaving a body unburied is counted among the most grievous crimes. Also orators create good will with their art when their listeners and judges find something of themselves in it.
? 5 For Bruno's use of this term, see Part Three, 'On Cupid's Bond and on Bonds in General', paragraph ? , 'The definition of a bond'.
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? ? . The timing of the capacity to be bound. In different seasons and ages, one and the same thing can be bonded in various ways, and different things are not related to one and the same bond in the same way. Nor are wholes always recomposed in the same way. From this we can point out that some- one who was easy going and showy as a young man becomes a more stable and prudent adult, while an old man is more suspicious and morose, and a very old man is full of blame and loathing.
? . The diffences of things that can be bound. Whoever wishes to bind must take note of the fact that some of the things that can be bound are affected more by nature, others more by judgement or prudence, and still others more by practice and habit. As a result, the skilful person obliges and binds the first type of things with bonds provided by natural things, the second type by reasons and proofs, by symbols and arguments, and the third type by what is at hand and is compelling.
? . Resistance to being bound. The more that a soul is bound to one object, the more it turns away from and rejects others. Therefore, he who wishes to limit what can be bonded to only one bond should make a special effort to make it insensitive to other activities and objects, and to turn it away from any concern for them. For, indeed, a more pleasant action excludes a less pleasant one; the soul that is intent on hearing neglects vision; he who observes more attentively becomes deaf; when we are either very happy or sad for some reason, we are little concerned with the other; when we are lazy we stop or slow down our work, that is, we become restrained, pulled away, held, bonded. As a result, when the orator breaks the bond of love by laughter or envy or other feelings, he binds by hate or contempt or indignation.
? ? . The number of things that can be bound. Thinking persons turn away from sensible things and are bound by divine things. Pleasure seekers descend through vision to the abundances of touching. Moralists are attracted by the amusement of conversation. The first are heroes, the second are nat- ural, and the third are rational. The first are higher, the second lower, the third in between. The first are said to be worthy of the heavens, the second of life, the third of feeling. The first ascend to God, the second cling to bodies, the third move away from one extreme and approach the other.
? ? . The motion of what can be bound. All composite and variable things, and generally all things which undergo changes in their nature and disposition,
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? such as the soul and the spirit, are subject to various changes in their bodies and in the motions of their bodies (for although each substance is quite stable and eternal because of its simplicity, still it acquires a desire from its privation, an impulse from its desire, a motion from its impulse, and a breaking of bonds from its motion). As a consequence, no bonds are eternal. Rather, things alternate between bondage and freedom, between being bonded and escaping from a bond, or they transfer from one type of bond to another. This is a natural occurrence, and it precedes, accompa- nies and follows the eternal condition of all things. Thus, nature binds with its variety and motion, and art, which emulates nature, multiplies, varies, diversifies, orders and arranges bonds in a successive series. But complete stability is opposed to the nature of things, just as we are sometimes more inclined to condemn it, and yet at other times we rather desire it, for it is quite natural to desire to break from bonds, while just a little while ago we were open to being tied to them by our own voluntary and spontaneous inclinations.
? ? . The indefiniteness of what can be bound. Insofar as that which can be bound is composed of more parts, to the same degree it is less limited to specific bonds. Thus, human pleasure is less limited to only one time or individual or sex than are the pleasures of animals. All horses would have an equal chance to mate with one mare, but this is often not true of all men and one woman. This separation and indeterminateness between humans and animals is also found between a true human and a brutal human, between a more sensitive, and also more feeling, person and a more dull person. And what we have said about one type of bond must also be applied to all other genera and species of bonds.
? ? . The foundation of the capacity to be bound. The primary reason why each thing is capable of being bound is partly because there is something in it which strives to preserve itself as it presently is, and partly because it strives to be completely developed in itself according to its circumstances. In gen- eral, this is self-love. Hence, if one could extinguish self-love in an object, it would be subject to any and every type of bonding and separation. On the other hand, when self-love flourishes, all things are easily attracted to the types of bonds natural to them.
? ? . The relation of things that can be bound. Consider the friendship and the enmity among animals, their sympathy and hostility, their similarity and
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? diversity, and the circumstances of such things. Then arrange in an order and in an analogy all the particularities and the separate individuals in the human species, then all of the individuals and all the species of the other animals, and finally the species of all other things. You now have collected before you in a convenient order the diversity of bonds.
? ? . The material diversity of things that can be bound. Although everything that can be bound is composite in some way, still one thing can be said to be simple and another many-sided or complex, and one thing can be more simple while another has more parts. Consequently, some things are bound purely and others impurely, and some bonds are pure while others are impure. Thus some pleasures and pains are pure, some are impure, and some are mixed. For example, Epicurus taught that the pleasures of Venus are impure, because they are accompanied by pain and by an insatiable desire (by which the whole body tries to transform itself into another whole body), and this results in a sorrowful exhaustion. If there are things whose principles never fail (perhaps the stars and the great living souls or gods of the world, in whom there is no fatigue and in whom the influx and outflux of substance is always exactly the same), then they would be bound by themselves to each other in the most happy way.
Therefore, he who desires to bind in a socially effective way must take into account the diverse composition or structure of things, and must con- sider, evaluate and decide differently when dealing with heroes, or with ordinary people, or with those who are more like brutes.
? ? . The degrees of things that can be bound. Children are less bound by their natural feelings, because their nature is absorbed in growth and is dis- turbed by great changes, and all their nutrition is given over to growth and the structuring of the individual. But they clearly begin to be open to being bound in the fourteenth year, for even though at that age they are still involved in growth, their rate of growth is not as fast and as great as when they were children. And in the stable period of adulthood, men have a greater strength in their semen and, as a result, seem to be more subject to being bound. Furthermore, adolescents and young men seem to be more sexually excited for the reason that they are on fire for a long time because of the novelty of this pleasure; because the passages through which the semen passes are narrower, the wetness gushes forth with a more delight- ful pleasure. And as a result of the sexual itch which arises from this pres- sure, they are more delighted and liberated. But bonds are more difficult
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? in older men, whose powers are half dead, whose organs and passages are spent, and whose semen is not abundant. Precisely the same thing is found proportionally in the other emotions which have an analogy or contrast or dependence on the passion of love.
? ? . The temperaments of things that can be bound. Because of their tempera- ment, those who are melancholy are more bound to indignation, sadness, pleasure and love, for since they are more impressionable, they also have a stronger sense of pleasure. They are also more prone to contemplation and to speculation, and in general are moved and agitated more often and more strongly by their emotions.
Hence, in regard to the affairs of Venus, they regard pleasure as an end in itself rather than as a means to propagate the species. Next to them are people who are choleric, in comparison to which the sanguine are less agitated. Those who are phlegmatic are less lustful than the others, but are more greedy. Nevertheless, the fact remains that everyone has his role in obeying nature. The melancholy are bound by a greater force of imagination; the sanguine by a greater ability to emit sperm and by their hot temper; the phlegmatic by their greater abundance of fluids; and the caloric by their being more strongly and more sharply agitated and stimulated by a hot spirit.
? ? . The signs of things that can be bound. Physiognomy also has its part to play in these considerations. There are people who have slender and sinewy tibias, and who are similar to goats and to satyrs in having a wide concave nose, deep breathing and a languid face. Such people love more intensely and pursue sexual license more strongly. At the same time, they are easily appeased and do not have any emotion for a long time.
? ? . The duration of things that can be bound. With respect to bonds, old men are more stable but less suitable; young men are more unstable but more suitable; but middle aged men are bound suitably, skilfully and in a stable manner.
? ? . The reaction of things that can be bound. Mutual agreeableness gives rise to mutual bonds. Thus, there are bonds in jokes, in wit and in theatrical performances. In these ways, even those who are ugly and deformed can bind those who have feelings for them. Let us add that we have often tried to think about what it would be like to have a huge and lustful body, since the following imaginary verses were composed to be cast as a spell upon a young boy or girl:
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? I confess that I lack a beautiful form;
Yet God prefers me as more excellent, As does a girl who is steady and not silly. 6
In a proportional way, there are bonds by which those who are ugly bind because of their reputation for courage, vigour, eloquence, ingenuity and other such things, for from one type of power they can cause bonds of another type. It is not a rare occurrence that the more ugly Amazons bind in the act of love because of their reputation for their strength or their use of eloquence.
? ? . The heterogeneity of things that can be bound. Furthermore, there are species which are bound to a different species through love, hate, admira- tion, piety, compassion and other such feelings. For example, there are some famous cases of such bonding, like Lesbia with her sparrow, Corinna with her small dog, Cyparissus with his doe, and Arion with his dolphin. In general, the seeds of all species are attracted to other species. I will remain silent about the sympathy between a man and a lion, and I will pass over what I know about the astonishing intimacy between a boy and a snake.
? ? . The changing of things that can be bound. It is not difficult to change that which can be bound from one type of bond to its contrary, since the bond- ing agent is also changeable. And it makes no difference whether this occurs actually or only in thought. Even though I was once bound in thought by a teaching, the bonds of contempt and indignation may come later when that opinion has been studied in a better light. And the bonds arising from the fires of youth and beauty are relaxed and soothed in time when they do not agree with the bonds derived from customs and skill.
? ? . The cause and effect of things which can be bound. What it is that bonds to love and hate or contempt is hidden to the functions of reason. Adrastia's explanation is useless: namely, that the explanation of love, which arises from seeing a beautiful object, is a recollection by the soul of divine beauty, which was first seen as a companion to the body. If this were true, what is
? 6 Bruno quotes these three lines, with minor variations, from the 'Priapea', a set of approximately eighty short Latin poems, mostly from the Roman era, which were collected by an unknown editor. The poems commemorate Priapus, the mythological Greek god of plant and animal fertility, who was depicted as having a grotesque body and an enormous phallus. The 'Priapea' can be found in Emil Baehrens, ed. , Poetae latini minores (Leipzig: Teubner, ? ? ? ? ) Vol. ? , ? ? -? ? . Bruno's quotation is from #? ? (? ? ).
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? it that suddenly changes the soul to reject an object which in no way has changed in its nature? Why are different souls captured more easily by different objects? Why does that which is beautiful to one person also turn out to be ugly to another, no less talented person? Thus, the condition of things that can be bound is unfathomable to casual and routine examination.
? ? . The definition of things that can be bound. Theocritus attributed love and the other emotions by which individuals are bound to luck or fate or some kind of an indeterminate cause. But he would have understood them more clearly if he had thought and said 'a hidden but determinate' cause instead of an 'indeterminate' one, because their origin is not apparent. The emo- tions, indeed, have a definite and rational structure which is either given by nature or which arises from practice and habit.
? ? . The meaning of things which can be bound. The fact that things are bound by love or hate or some other feeling was explained by the Achaeans as due to fate and not to reason or to any type of thought. As a result, they vener- ated both love and hate at the same altar. Some Platonists agreed with this opinion, saying that animals who cannot speak are never bound by love, because they lack reason and prudence. But they had too limited a view of the nature of thought and reason, which fills all things with the universal spirit and which shines forth in all things and proportionally in each object. But, for us, love, like all emotions, is a very practical form of knowledge. Indeed, it is a type of discourse and reasoning and argumentation by which humans are most powerfully bound, even though it is never listed among the primary types of knowledge. Therefore, he who wishes to bind believes that reason has neither a greater role nor a more important role than love in binding, although indeed the latter falls under the genus of knowledge.
? ? . The flight of that which can be bound. Sometimes that which ties itself by one type of bond flees in order to bind itself with another type of bond. As a result, he who wishes to bond should be careful to use means which effectively bind the object, that is, he should employ the bonds which already hold it. For example, a hunter, who was absorbed by his interest in and attention to wild animals, was sexually seduced with appropriate gifts by the nymph who used a horn whose sound made fleeing animals come to a standstill. Also a soldier may be bound by other feelings by enchanting him with the power of his weapons. Thus, people are bound to sex through hunting, fasting, drunkenness, gymnastic exercises and in general through
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? various types of concerns, leisure activity, abstinence, debauchery, etc. And what is true of this type of bond also applies to the others in their own way.
? ? . The substance of that which can be bound. There are two causes of the act of bonding, and they are the same as the two causes of the essence of that which, as such, can be bound: namely, knowledge of some kind and desire of some kind. If something has no desire at all, then it cannot be bound spiritually in any way at all. Furthermore, if something has no knowledge and desire, then it cannot bind anything either socially or through magic. I will not speak of the other types of bonds because I would not want to say anything unsuitable to those of limited vision, who are numerous.
? ? . The completeness of that which can be bound. Something is perfectly bound if it is bound in all its powers and components. Hence, he who binds should count these items carefully so that, in wishing to bind as completely as possible, he can tie up many or all of them. He should have no doubt or confusion about the different types and powers of nourishment and enticement which affect the soul and the spirit.
? ? . The connection of things that can be bound. It is not possible for a bond- ing agent to bind something to himself unless the former is also bound to the latter, for bonds adhere to, and are inserted into, that which is bound; the bonding agent, which may accidentally be bound to another object, must be truly bound to the object which it binds to itself. However, the bonding agent has an advantage over that which is bound, for he is master over the bonds, and because he is not affected and influenced in the same way. This notion is supported by the fact that a procurer binds but is not bound, but she who is loved is not bound by her lover unless he is bound by her in the same act of love. Furthermore, a spiritual and mysterious type of bond occasionally also occurs in which she who is loved is bound by her lover, but she neither knows nor loves him. This is the type and level of love in which Eros was brought to tears and unhappiness by Anteros. But at the social level, no one binds unless he is also bound by the same or a similar type of bond either to someone, or at least with someone, whom he desires to bind.
? ? . The truth of that which can be bound. For that which can be bound to be truly bound, a real bond is not required, that is, a bond which is found in things. An apparent bond is enough, for the imagination of what is not true can truly bind, and by means of such an imagination, that which can be
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? bound can be truly bound; even if there were no hell, the thought and imagination of hell without a basis in truth would still really produce a true hell, for fantasy has its own type of truth. It can truly act, and can truly and most powerfully entangle in it that which can be bound, and thus the torments of hell are as eternal as the eternity of thought and faith. As long as the soul, even when stripped of the body, retains these same character- istics, it maintains its unhappy state for ages, and perhaps even more so because of its pleasures and drinking and lack of self-control. The common philosophers did not understand this, and they most stupidly used this teaching to condemn the most ignorant of people. We will not make a big issue of this, except to say the following: when we were children and inex- perienced, we were flooded with the arguments of these philosophers, just as much as the old and the experienced, themselves, had been flooded with the same arguments. Nevertheless, we forgive these elders for these views, just as much as we think that we should be forgiven, since we were just children.
On cupid's bond and on bonds in general
We have claimed in our treatise De naturali magia7 that all bonds are either reduced to the bond of love, depend on the bond of love or are based on the bond of love. An examination of our thirty topics of discussion will easily show that love is the foundation of all feelings, for he who loves nothing has no reason to fear, to hope, to praise, to be proud, to dare, to condemn, to accuse, to excuse, to be humble, to be competitive, to be angered or to be affected in other ways of this sort. Hence, in this section, which we have entitled 'On Cupid's Bond', we have the opportunity to deal with a topic which is very familiar and with considerations and speculations which range very widely. This examination should not be considered to be far removed from public affairs just because it is more important and more wonderful than the field of public affairs.
? . The definition of a bond. According to the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, the bond of beauty is said to be a brightness, a beam of light and a certain motion, or at least its shadow and image and trace. It has spread out first into the mind, which it adorns with the order of things; second into the soul, which it brings to completion with the sequence of things;
7 See On Magic, 'On the Analogy of Spirits', #? . ? ? ?
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? third into nature, which it diversifies and sustains with its seeds; and fourth into matter, which it supplies with forms. According to them this beam of light is clearest in the mind, clear in the soul, obscure in nature and most obscure in the material substrate of natural things. It is not a bodily mass, and it has no bulk. Nor can it rotate around a mass and through the whole of space, for not just large things, but also small ones, are seen to be beau- tiful. In the same species, large things are deformed and small things are beautiful, but the opposite also occurs, and it often happens that beauty is lost when something remains the same in quantity, and is preserved when that quantity is changed. The most beautiful baby or child is pleasing but does not bind until he is an adolescent of a certain age. Then he has some size, and this is true even if his form and figure and complexion have not changed at all. From this we conclude that social types of bonding require a degree of size on which the form and the power of the bond depends. It refers, I think, to gestures, words, clothing, habits, sense of humour, and the other signs of human feelings.
? . The origin of a bond. Some Platonists define a bond as arising from a cer- tain proportionality of parts accompanied by a certain pleasantness of colouring. But to those who consider the matter more fully, it is at least as clear that it is not just composite things and things consisting of parts that bind, but that colour alone and sound alone also bind. Furthermore, noth- ing slips away and ages faster than beauty, and nothing changes more slowly than the form and figure which shine forth from the composition of parts. Hence, it seems that the bond of beauty must be sought elsewhere than in the figure and in the proportionality of parts. Indeed, sometimes love passes away after the flowering of the object loved, but the same beauty and figure still remain. As a result, the nature of a bond consists chiefly in a cer- tain mutual orientation between a captor and a captive. Indeed, it some- times happens that even though we have no grounds to complain reason- ably about a girl's beauty, or in a social setting to criticize someone's conversation, speech, habits or actions in general, still they do not please us. On the other hand, something, or even many things, may displease us in someone, yet we still love that person. And, indeed, it would be rather stupid to identify colour as a bond without distinguishing between colour and the things associated with colour. For does colour in itself bind when a brighter colour is displeasing and rejected by an old man, while a duller colour binds and captures a young man? And also if, in a social setting, an
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? adolescent were to give a serious speech about grave matters of state, then no matter how brilliant the speaker's oratory, a man of more mature judge- ment would become indignant because of the speaker's arrogance. Likewise, if an old man were to give a speech full of charming, flattering and flowering words, this would invite contempt, would sometimes pro- voke laughter and would provide an occasion for mockery. Thus, in regard to the body, to words and to behaviour, one thing is fitting for a married woman, another for a virgin; one thing for a girl, another for a boy; one thing for a mature adult, another for an old man; one thing for a soldier, another for a Roman citizen.
? . The indeterminateness of a bond.
