“(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be
negotiated
between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body.
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
B.
Keith was that the Federal scheme was
not satisfactory. The units of which it was composed were too dis-
parate to be joined suitably together. On the British side, the
scheme was favoured in order to provide an element of pure conser-
vatism in order to combat any dangerous elements of democracy
contributed by British India. On the side of the rulers, their essen-
tial pre-occupation was with the effort to secure immunity from
pressure in regard to the improvement of internal administration
of their states. Particularly unsatisfactory was the effort made to
obtain a definition of paramountcy which would acknowledge the
right of the ruler to mis-govern his state as he was assured of British
support while putting down any resistance to his regime. The
federation was largely cooked by the desire to evade the issue of
extending responsible government to the Central Government of
British India. The withholding of Defence and External Affairs
from federal control rendered the alleged concession of responsibility
all but meaningless. Sir Shanmukham Chetty, at one time the
Speaker of the Central Assembiy under the Government of India
Act, 1919 and later on the Finance Minister in post-independence
India, made the following observation in this connection: "It is
indeed a far cry between the Government Act and the Dominion
Status. The principle of Dominion Status asserts that the Domi-
nion should have the right to the same measure of autonomy in
external affairs as in internal matters and that it is the duty of the
British Government to give effect to the doctrine accepted. But
India has neither control in the internal nor in the external affairs.
The internal administration shall be under the guidance of the
Governor-General and the Governors who are vested with tremen-
dous powers; the external affairs shall be under the guidance of
Parliament, the Crown and the Secretary of State. Indians shall
not be able to work out their own destiny. The safeguards, reser-
vations, special powers of the Governor-General and the Gover-
nors, the weakness of the Indian Legislatures, and the ministers in
the Federal and the Provincial Governments with no Central res-
ponsibility and weak provincial autonomy, the Communal Award,
the States' representation bought at the expense of British Indians,
the financial and other economic drawbacks, half measures of the
Indianisation of the Army with no control over the Defence-all
these things show that Indians shall not be having Dominion Status. "
## p. 659 (#699) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
659
The view of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was: “The new
Act has been thrust upon us. It has a somewhat democratic ap-
pearance outwardly, but it is absolutely hollow from inside. " C.
Rajagopalachariar described the new constitution as worse than
dyarchy. Mr. M. A. Jinnah described the scheme of 1935 as
"thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. ”
C. Y. Chintamani described the Government of India Act, 1935, as
the anti-India Act and the government as "against" India. Mr.
Fazl-ul-Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal, observed that under the
Government of India Act, 1935, there was to be neither Hindu Raj
nor Muslim Raj but British Raj.
The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the Government of India
Act, 1935 “provided for some kind of provincial autonomy and a
federal structure, but there were so many reservations and checks
that both political and economic powers continued to be concen-
trated in the hands of the British Government. Indeed, in some
ways it confirmed and enlarged the powers of an executive respon-
sible solely to that Government. The federal structure was so
envisaged as to make any real advance impossible and no loophole
was left for the representatives of the Indian people to interfere with
or modify the system of British-controlled administration. The Act
strengthened the alliance between the British Government and the
princes, landlords and other reactionary elements in India. .
The whole complicated structure of Government remained as it
was. ” (The Discovery of India, pp. 368-69).
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was opposed to the federal part of the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935. He was determined to fight the
Government of India Act "until we have that replaced by a Consti-
tution which, we think, is a right one. ” He expressed his attitude
in these words: "If I have to submit to it, I shall submit to it under
protest. I shall see what use I can make of it. The German na-
tion, when it was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, signed it.
If I have to deal with this Constitution as the Germans dealt with
the Versailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages
as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content
until that Constitution is replaced by a Constitution which is ac-
ceptable to us. ” Mr. M. A. Jinnah got the following Resolution
passed from the Muslim League: “The All-India Muslim League
enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution, as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people
of India, against their will and, in spite of the repeated disapproval
and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country.
The League considers that, having regard to the conditions prevail-
ing at present in the country, the Provincial scheme of the Consti-
## p. 660 (#700) ############################################
660 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
tution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objection-
able features contained therein, which render the real control and
responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire
field of Government and the Administration nugatory. The League
is clearly of the opinion that the All-India Federal Scheme of the
Central Government, embodied in the Government of India Act,
1935, is fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, in-
jurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis the
Indian States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely
the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible
Government and is totally unacceptable.
“The League considers that the British Parliament should still
take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh
regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the
League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace
and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to
disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entire unworkable
in the interests of India and her people. ”
"Whether at the Round Table Conference or in India, the
Indians had been quarrelling among themselves like the two cats
which, unable to arrive at a settlement, went to a monkey for jus-
tice with the result that the monkey took away the whole cheese.
It was true that despite any resolution of protest which might be
passed they would remain in a helpless condition. But surely one
could at least express one's opinion that the new Constitution was
a fraud being imposed upon them. One could express one's ‘resent-
ment against the fraud that is being perpetrated' and one could
ask others to do it. A question might be asked as to whether pro-
tests would be of any avail when the Constitution was coming into
cperation. The answer was “What did Germany do with the Treaty
of Versailles which was forced on her? ' Did she not sign the
Treaty? Here in India, there was no question of anybody having
to sign. The Constitution was forced upon the country, and it was
going to be the law of the land. Every one knew, and the British
Government knew, that the Constitution had been the grossest
breach of faith on the part of the British Government who had
stated that they would not announce any constitution which did
not receive an adequate amount of support. The question was
whether there had been any agreement at all. Nevertheless, it was
being pointed out that there was a large measure of agreement in
the Conservative Party and that was enough. "
Critics point out that the Government of India Act 1935 pro-
posed a conservative framework for an independent India. The
vital feature of that framework was princely participation. An
## p. 661 (#701) ############################################
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
661
independent India dominated by the princes might have been deco-
rative and peaceful but could not be effective or forward-looking.
It was something like stopping the clock just before the alarm for
the new age was due to go off. Moreover, the new Act failed to
prevent the partition of India. The Muslims felt that the Act was
devised mainly in the interests of the Hindus. It is true that the
federal principle which granted larger powers to the provinces could
help the Muslims to control provinces like Sind and the North-west
Frontier Province, but the representation in Bengal was such that
they had to form a coalition ministry with some other parties. The
same was the case with the Punjab. There also they were not given
absolute majority to control the destiny of their province. The
view of the Muslims was that regional federalism was not enough
to safeguard their interests. They had no faith in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty and rule by majority. The fear of domi-
nance by one community over another created the atmosphere
which made partition inevitable.
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
It has rightly been pointed out that for all its ifs and buts, its
complications and hesitations, the Government of India Act, 1935,
proved to be a land-mark in the development of India. It marked
a point of no-return in constitutional development. While the Re-
form of 1919 had left the ultimate goal hazy and uncertain, the
Act of 1935 definitely fixed the goal of Dominion status for India
which was to have a federal form of Government along with the
parliamentary institutions. There were to be no periodic enquiries
as under the Act of 1919. Provision was made for changing the
Constitution from within. In many ways, the new Act was a blue-
print for independence. What is remarkable about this Act is that
in the new Constitution of India which came into force in January
1950, many of its Articles have been copied from the Act of 1935.
Even the general shape of the new Constitution of India is on the
pattern set in the Government of India Act of 1935.
The Act of 1935 represented not only a consensus of British pub-
lic opinion but also a considered attempt to provide conservative
form for ultimate Indian independence. England was to enter into
a partnership with an independent India but in that India, conserva-
tive interests were to predominate and that fact was ensured by the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was for that
purpose that the princes were given a very privileged position in
the federal set up. It was with the same object that provision was
made for safeguarding the trade interests of Englishmen.
## p. 662 (#702) ############################################
662 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
The view of Prof. Percival Speare is that “Unlike the Montford
Reform of 1921 or anything that was done after World War II,
the Government of India Act of 1935 was enacted from strength.
It could be said that after both World Wars, Britain was too en-
feebled to take an uncompromising stand. But in the thirties, she
had recovered from World War I, was emerging from the Great
Depression and had just defeated the strongest frontal attack on
the Indian Government authority since the Mutiny. There was no
compelling force dictating concession or constitutional advance.
What was done was done through conviction and might be said
to represent a minimum rather than a maximum. That was wh
there was an air of solidity about the Act and why its major fea-
tures proved to be so fruitful in the future. It was generally real-
ized that there could be no going back on it. The Act was the
constructive half of the dual policy of suppression of Congress defi-
ance and advance towards self-Government. It was meticulously
drawn up and represented, in effect, a draft Constitution for an
Indian Dominion. It was made easy to fill in gaps later; old fea-
tures which were left such as the Office of the Secretary of State,
could be lopped off without difficulty, and provision was made for
a measure of change within the Constitution. The London con-
nection began to assume the appearance of legal umbilical cord
which could be snipped at the right moment. "
In spite of the best efforts on the part of Lord Linlithgow, the
federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935, could not be
brought into force. The Indian States put forward all kinds of
hurdles in the way. Moreover, the Muslim League was deadly
opposed to the introduction of federation at the Centre. The Con
gress also unwittingly opposed the federal part of the Constitution
even after the inauguration of provincial autonomy, little realising
that this action of theirs would strengthen the centrifugal tenden-
cies which could ultimately disrupt the unity of the country.
When World War II broke out in September 1939, India was
immediately declared a belligerent country by the British Govern-
ment without consulting the people of India. The Congress Work-
ing Committee lodged a strong protest and called upon the British
Government to declare their war aims in clear terms. The Con-
gress enquired from the Government whether those aims included
"the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be guid-
ed in accordance with the wishes of the people. ” The Congress
Working Committee declared in unequivocal terms that "the Com-
mittee cannot associate themselves or offer any cooperation in a
war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant
to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere. "
## p. 663 (#703) ############################################
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
663
The British Government refused to give the assurance demanded
by the Congress. It made vague promises to the effect that at the
end of the war the British Government would be willing to consult
the various interests in India to make such modifications in the
Government of India Act 1935 as might appear to be desirable.
The result was that the Congress decided to non-cooperate with
the British Government and called upon the Congress ministries in
8 provinces to resign. This was done in October 1939. This ac-
tion of the Congress has been criticised by V. P. Menon on the
ground that it was the resignation of the Congress ministries which
helped Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to become strong in
Indian politics. Moreover, if the Congress ministries had not re-
signed voluntarily, the British Government would not have got the
courage to dismiss them as they could not afford to lose the good-
will of the people in those critical days.
There was a lot of discontentment in the country and in order to
meet that Lord Linlithgow declared in January 1940 that “Domi-
nion status of the Westminster variety as soon as possible after the
war” was the goal of British policy in India. However, this did
not bring any response from the Congress side.
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
On the eve of the battle of Britain, a new declaration of British
policy known as the August Offer was made on 8 August 1940.
This offer was made by the Viceroy on behalf of the British Gov-
ernment. It was pointed out that though the differences which
prevented national unity remained unbridged in India, the expan-
sion of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the
establishment of an Advisory War Council should not be postponed
any longer. In view of the doubts as to whether the position of
the minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future consti-
tutional change or not, the British Government reaffirmed its desire
that full weight would be given to minority opinion. To quote the
words of the Viceroy, “It goes without saying that they could not
contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace
and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority
is directly denied by large and powerful elements of India's national
life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements
into submission to such a Government. ” Subject to the fulfilment
of their obligations—an allusion to such questions as defence, mino-
rity rights, the treaties with the states and the position of the Secre-
tary of State Services, the British Government concurred in the
Indian desire that the framing of the new constitution should be
## p. 664 (#704) ############################################
664 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
"primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves and should origi-
nate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political
structure of the Indian life. ” Constitutional issues could not be
decided at "a moment when the national life is engaged in a strug-
gle for existence,” but after the War, a representative Indian body
would be set up to formulate the new constitution. In the mean-
time, the British Government would welcome and assist any efforts
to reach agreement as to the form and operation of this constitu-
tion-making body and as to the principles of the constitution. In
the interval, the British Government hoped that all parties and
communities in India would cooperate in India's war effort and
by thus working together pave the way for India's attainment of
free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The August Offer undoubtedly registered an advance of first-
rate importance in the method of handling the constitutional prob-
lem. It was clearly stated that the Indians were to be primarily
responsible for making the new constitution of India. It followed
that if the Indians agreed to the kind of constitution they wanted
and if that constitution provided for the due discharge of British
obligations, it would be virtually impossible for the British Parlia-
ment to reject that constitution. Mr. Amery pointed out that
Dominion status was not inferior to that of nations that stood alone,
but was actually superior. “There is no higher status in the
world. ”
The August Offer was rejected by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,
the Congress President. Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the whole
conception of Dominion Status for India was “as dead as a door-
nail. ” The view of Mahatma Gandhi was that the August Offer
widened the gulf between India as represented by the Congress
and England.
The response of the Muslim League to the August Offer was
different. Its Working Committee welcomed that part of the Offer
which was condemned by the Congress. According to the Muslim
League, the August Offer met its demand "for a clear assurance
to the fact that no future constitution, interim or final, should be
adopted by the British Government without their approval and
consent. " The League declared that "the partition of India was
the only solution of the most difficult problem of India's future
constitution. ” In spite of this, the League neither accepted nor
rejected the August Offer.
The Liberals of India asked for a further clarification from the
British Government. They demanded that the enjoyment of Domi-
nion Status must be unqualified and a time limit for its attainment
must be fixed. That must not be delayed on account of the atti-
>
## p. 665 (#705) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
665
tude of any minority in India. The Indian members of the Execu-
tive Council of the Governor-General must be party leaders and
they should also be in a majority.
Nothing came out of the August Offer on account of the attitude
of the Congress. The comments of Mr. Amery were in these words:
"Inspired by an ardent national patriotism, the (Congress) have
striven to make that organization national and all-embracing. If
only they had succeeded, if Congress could in fact speak, as it pro-
fesses to speak, for all the main elements in India's national life,
then however advanced their demands, our problem might have
been very different and in many respects far easier than it is today. ”
CRIPPS PROPOSALS (1942)
The deadlock in Indian politics continued. While the British
Government refused to come to terms with the Congress, the latter
refused to cooperate with the former. During this period, the
second World War was going on. The international situation began
to deteriorate. In December 1940, Japan joined the War against
the United States and Great Britain. The Japanese armies ad-
vanced rapidly all over South-East Asia. The tide of their con-
quest rolled at a tremendous pace towards Burma and India. When
Singapore fell in February 1942, the security of India was threaten-
ed. Rangoon fell on March 7, 1942. Colombo was bombarded.
Some bombs fell on the eastern coast of India. Calcutta was
threatened and refugees began to leave that city. In spite of this
threatening situation, the attitude of the Indian leaders did not
change. The Congress was as hostile as ever. It was prepared to
help only if India was given independence. The Muslim League
was more concerned with the partition of India than its immediate
salvation from the Japanese conquest.
It was under these circumstances that Sir Stafford Cripps, the
Leader of the House of Commons, came to India in March 1942
with certain proposals on behalf of the British Government. The
sending of the Cripps Mission was due to many causes. The first
cause was the threat of Japan to India. By 7 March 1942, when
Rangoon fell, Japan had occupied the whole of South-East Asia.
Churchill made his famous announcement only 4 days after the fall
of Rangoon. Another cause was the pressure of President Roose-
velt and Marshall Chiang Kai-Shek. Mr. Hull, American Secre-
tary of State, tells us that “The President and I, both before and
after Pearl Harbour, were convinced that the Indians would co-
operate better with the British if they were assured of independence
at least after the War. ” White Roosevelt put pressure on Chur-
## p. 666 (#706) ############################################
666 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
chill
, Hull put pressure on Halifax. Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife
visited India in February 1942. Chiang Kai-Shek asked the British
Government to give India “as speedily as possible” “real political
power” in order to secure her moral and material support. In spite
of the refusal of Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek met Gandhiji at
Calcutta on 18 February, 1942. Another cause was the growing
frustration in India. The Indians felt happy over the reverses of
the British and seemed to take pleasure in the victories of the Axis
Powers. They listened to the broadcasts of Subhas Chandra Bose
from Berlin. Something had to be done to meet the menace. There
were men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who would like to bring about
a compromise between the Congress and the British Government
and the latter did respond to their efforts. They also influenced
the Congress to open its doors for negotiations. Public opinion in
England was also in favour of reconciling India. There was a de-
bate in the House of Commons on 24 and 25 February, 1942, on
war situation and 15 speakers made references to the Indian prob-
lem and impressed upon the Government the necessity of tackling
it. The Labour Party also stood for reconciling India. It was
under these circumstances that Cripps was sent to India.
The following is the text of the Draft Declaration of the British
Government:
“(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elect-
ed body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for
India.
“(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation
of Indian States in the constitution-making body.
"(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and imple-
ment forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
"(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepar-
ed to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional
position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.
“With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new consti-
tution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.
“(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This
treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete
transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's
Government, for the protection of the racial and religious minori-
## p. 667 (#707) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
667
ties, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian
Union to decide in future its relationship to other member-States of
the British Commonwealth.
"Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitu-
tion, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrange-
ments so far as this may be required in the new situation.
"(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as fol-
lows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communi-
ties agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:
“Immediately upon the result being known of provincial elections
which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire mem-
bership of the Lower Houses of Provincial Legislatures shall as a
single electoral college proceed to the election of the constitution-
making body by the system of proportional representation. This
new body shall be in number about 1/10th of the number of the
electoral college.
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the
same proportion to their total population as in the case of repre-
sentatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as
British Indian members.
“(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until
the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government
must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control
and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war
effort but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and
material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment of India with the co-operation of the people of India. His
Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effec-
tive participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the
Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth
and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their
active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is
vital and essential for the future freedom of India. "
Sir Stafford had a very busy time in India. He met the leaders
of the various parties and did his level best to persuade them to
accept the proposals. His mission was a very difficult one. The
Indian leaders were prepared to accept what was being promised
to them in the future, but they were not satisfied with what was
being offered to them at once. What they wanted was a say in
the matter of the participation of India in the war. This Sir
Stafford Cripps was not able to give them and no wonder his mis-
sion failed and he had to go back empty-handed.
It is true that the proposals of Cripps were an advance on the
August Offer in many respects. They conceded to the projected
## p. 668 (#708) ############################################
668 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Indian Union the liberty to secede from the British Commonwealth,
if so desired. The framing of the new constitution was to rest not
primarily but solely in Indian hands. However, its acceptance was
made subject to the fulfilment of British obligations. If the Indians
could not become free as a single unit, they could become free as
two or more units. Disagreement among the Indians was not to
give the British Government an excuse to perpetuate their rule in
India. The August Offer had invited the Indian leaders to start
discussing the principles of the new constitution and the method of
framing it. The Cripps Proposals contained a plan for a consti-
tution-making body to be adopted if no Indian plan was agreed
upon before the cessation of the hostilities. The Cripps Proposals
went farther than the August Offer as regards the character of the
interim system of the Government. The offer had provided for
the inclusion of a certain number of representative Indians in the
Executive Council. The Cripps Proposals invited the leaders of
the principal sections of the Indian people to participate in the
counsels of India, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
The great merit of Cripp's proposals was their frankness and
precision. There was no hesitancy and generalities as was the case
in the declarations of 1939 and 1940. It was declared in un-
ambiguous terms that the new Constitution of India would be
framed by the Indians themselves. The right of secession was re-
cognised. The device of a bilateral treaty for implementing the
new Constitution and discharging the British obligations was intro-
duced. The Muslims were also assured that they could have
Pakistan if they so pleased.
However, the Cripps Proposals were criticized by all the interested
parties in India. Each party criticized the proposals from its own
point of view. The objection of the Congress was not so much to
the long-term arrangement as to the interim arrangement. The
Congress acted on the principle that one bird in hand was better
than two in the bush. Cripps had given an understanding to the
Congress that with the exception of the Defence Department, other
Departments would be completely in the hands of Indians and the
Governor-General would act as a constitutional head. However,
at a later stage, he withdrew that offer. That made the Congress
suspicious regarding the honesty of the British Government. The
Congress wanted the Executive Council of the Governor General to
work as a cabinet but the British Government was not prepared to
make such a concession. The Congress also objected to the veto
power of the Viceroy. It was also opposed to the acceptance of
the novel principle of the non-accession of the provinces. It ap-
## p. 669 (#709) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
669
own.
peared to them that this provision brought in Pakistan by the back-
door.
The Hindu Mahasabha opposed the Cripps proposals on two
grounds. It was opposed to the freedom given to the provinces to
leave the Indian union and set up separate governments of their
It also objected to the elections on the basis of the Communal
Award which was anti-national and un-democratic. The Sikhs
also opposed the provisions relating to the non-accession of the pro-
vinces. They declared: “We shall resist by all possible means the
separation of the Punjab from All-India Union”. The depressed
classes denounced the proposals on the ground that the necessary
safeguards were not provided for their interests.
The response of the Muslim League was a mixed one.
Its mem-
bers were happy at the prospect of realising their ambition of
Pakistan. However, Mr. Jinnah was a politician and his diplo-
macy led him to contend that the Pakistan idea as embodied in the
Cripps' proposals was nebulous and very serious impediments were
placed in the way of its realisation. In his Presidential address
delivered on 4 April, 1942, at the Allahabad session of the All-India
Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah declared: “The alleged power of the
minority in the matter of secession suggested in the document is
illusory as the Hindu India will dominate the decision in favour of
one All-India Union in all the provinces and the Muslims in Bengal
and the Punjab will be at the mercy of the Hindu minority in those
provinces, who will exert themselves to the fullest extent and length
for keeping the Musalmans tied to the chariot-wheel of Hindustan”.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League passed the follow-
ing Resolution on the 11 April, 1942: “The Committee, while ex-
pressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recog-
nised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or
more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His
Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open
to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are
invited. ” The Resolution ended by declaring that the Muslim
League would not be satisfied with anything short of what was
contained in the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940.
Mahatma Gandhi was not at all impressed by the proposals
brought by Cripps. He is stated to have told him thus: “Why did
you come if this is what you have to offer? If this is your entire
proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home. ”
Sir Stafford's reply was: “I will consider that. ”
It is pointed out that there were snags in the proposals brought
by Cripps. One was the repetition of the August Offer of 1940
and the addition of the explanation that “the present declaration is
## p. 670 (#710) ############################################
670 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
intended not to supersede, but to clothe these general declarations
with precision and to convince the people of India of the War Cabi-
net's sincere resolve. " This created suspicion in the minds of the
people. It indicated a resolve on the part of the British Govern-
ment to safeguard its prestige. The second snag was that there was
no indication in the proposals that the British Government was pre-
pared to part with power. Another defect in the scheme was that
it had either to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. There
was no scope for any internal adjustment. Sir Stafford Cripps had
been placed in a very tight corner by Sir Winston Churchill and
his associates. The failure of his mission was a foregone conclusion.
After the failure of the Cripps Mission, there was a lot of dis-
contentment in the country. The Congress leaders were convinced
that they could not expect anything from the British Government
in the near future. Consequently, the All-India Congress Com-
mittee passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8th August,
1942. That Resolution emphasised the necessity of immediately
ending the British Rule in India and also announced “the starting
of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale. "
The Government of India acted with promptness and arrested all
the members of the Congress Working Committee and Mahatma
Gandhi. The people of India also hit back. In various parts of
India, the Government machinery was completely thrown out of
gear. The Government used ail possible means to crush the move-
ment. Thousands of people were either mercilessly killed or put
behind the bars. The political life of India was completely sus-
pended. At this time, the Communist Party of India helped the
Government of India in its war efforts. The deadlock continued
up to 1944 when Mahatma Gandhi was released.
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA (1944)
In March 1944, C. Rajagopalachariar put forward his formula
to solve the deadlock in the country. On 8 April, 1944, he wrote to
Mr. Jinnah a letter which embodied the terms which could form
the “basis for settlement. ” It was made clear in that letter that
the formula had the “full approval of Mahatma Gandhi. Those
terms were the following:-
“(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitu-
tion for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand
for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional Interim Government for the transitional
period.
“(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be
## p. 671 (#711) ############################################
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA
671
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west
and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the in-
habitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable
franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from
Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sove-
reign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border
to choose to join either state.
“(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of
view before the plebiscite is held.
“(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreement shall be
entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and com-
munications and for other essential purposes.
“(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely
voluntary basis.
“(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by
Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India. ”
Mr. Jinnah asked for certain clarifications from Mahatma
Gandhi. He enquired who was to frame the Constitution referred
to in the scheme. He also wanted to know the lines on which the
Interim Government was to be set up or constituted. He wanted
to know who was to appoint the Commission, whose duty was to
demarcate the contiguous areas where the Muslims had an absolute
majority. He also enquired whether the plebiscite was to be taken
districtwise or on some other basis, and whether the same was to
be based on adult franchise or some other franchise. He also
enquired who was to give effect to the verdict of the commission
and to whom the power was to be transferred and through what
machinery and when.
Mahatma Gandhi wrote back to Mr. Jinnah saying that the
Constitution was to be framed by the Provisional Government con-
templated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after
the British power was withdrawn. The Provisional Government
was to be set up on the basis of an agreement between the Congress
and the League. The Commission was to be appointed by the
Provisional Government. The form of plebiscite could be agreed
upon between the League and the Congress. The power was to
be transferred to the nation, by the British Government, in a peace-
ful manner. To quote Mahatma Gandhi: “We reach by joint
effort independence for India as it stands, India become free will
proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people con-
cerned vote for partition. ” Mahatma Gandhi also pointed out
that he found “no parallel in history for a body of converts and
## p. 672 (#712) ############################################
672 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent
stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must
remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of
her children. . . . . . You do not claim to be a nation by right of
conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two
nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam. . . .
The only real, though awful test, of one nationhood arises out of
our common political subjection. ” The reply of Mr. Jinnah was:
“We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major
nations by any definition and test of a nation. We are a nation
of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our
own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature,
art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and
proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, his-
tory and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short, we have our
own distinctive outlook on life and of life. ” The contention of Mr.
Jinnah was that the Muslims of India as a nation had the right
of self-determination and they alone were to be entitled to vote and
not the non-Muslims. He also pointed out that “there cannot be
defence and similar matters of common concern, when it is accept-
ed that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent
sovereign States. "
In his letter dated 24 September, 1944, Mahatma Gandhi sug-
gested that the areas should be demarcated by a Commission ap-
proved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g.
not satisfactory. The units of which it was composed were too dis-
parate to be joined suitably together. On the British side, the
scheme was favoured in order to provide an element of pure conser-
vatism in order to combat any dangerous elements of democracy
contributed by British India. On the side of the rulers, their essen-
tial pre-occupation was with the effort to secure immunity from
pressure in regard to the improvement of internal administration
of their states. Particularly unsatisfactory was the effort made to
obtain a definition of paramountcy which would acknowledge the
right of the ruler to mis-govern his state as he was assured of British
support while putting down any resistance to his regime. The
federation was largely cooked by the desire to evade the issue of
extending responsible government to the Central Government of
British India. The withholding of Defence and External Affairs
from federal control rendered the alleged concession of responsibility
all but meaningless. Sir Shanmukham Chetty, at one time the
Speaker of the Central Assembiy under the Government of India
Act, 1919 and later on the Finance Minister in post-independence
India, made the following observation in this connection: "It is
indeed a far cry between the Government Act and the Dominion
Status. The principle of Dominion Status asserts that the Domi-
nion should have the right to the same measure of autonomy in
external affairs as in internal matters and that it is the duty of the
British Government to give effect to the doctrine accepted. But
India has neither control in the internal nor in the external affairs.
The internal administration shall be under the guidance of the
Governor-General and the Governors who are vested with tremen-
dous powers; the external affairs shall be under the guidance of
Parliament, the Crown and the Secretary of State. Indians shall
not be able to work out their own destiny. The safeguards, reser-
vations, special powers of the Governor-General and the Gover-
nors, the weakness of the Indian Legislatures, and the ministers in
the Federal and the Provincial Governments with no Central res-
ponsibility and weak provincial autonomy, the Communal Award,
the States' representation bought at the expense of British Indians,
the financial and other economic drawbacks, half measures of the
Indianisation of the Army with no control over the Defence-all
these things show that Indians shall not be having Dominion Status. "
## p. 659 (#699) ############################################
DEFECTS IN THE ACT OF 1935
659
The view of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was: “The new
Act has been thrust upon us. It has a somewhat democratic ap-
pearance outwardly, but it is absolutely hollow from inside. " C.
Rajagopalachariar described the new constitution as worse than
dyarchy. Mr. M. A. Jinnah described the scheme of 1935 as
"thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable. ”
C. Y. Chintamani described the Government of India Act, 1935, as
the anti-India Act and the government as "against" India. Mr.
Fazl-ul-Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal, observed that under the
Government of India Act, 1935, there was to be neither Hindu Raj
nor Muslim Raj but British Raj.
The view of Jawaharlal Nehru was that the Government of India
Act, 1935 “provided for some kind of provincial autonomy and a
federal structure, but there were so many reservations and checks
that both political and economic powers continued to be concen-
trated in the hands of the British Government. Indeed, in some
ways it confirmed and enlarged the powers of an executive respon-
sible solely to that Government. The federal structure was so
envisaged as to make any real advance impossible and no loophole
was left for the representatives of the Indian people to interfere with
or modify the system of British-controlled administration. The Act
strengthened the alliance between the British Government and the
princes, landlords and other reactionary elements in India. .
The whole complicated structure of Government remained as it
was. ” (The Discovery of India, pp. 368-69).
Mr. M. A. Jinnah was opposed to the federal part of the Gov-
ernment of India Act, 1935. He was determined to fight the
Government of India Act "until we have that replaced by a Consti-
tution which, we think, is a right one. ” He expressed his attitude
in these words: "If I have to submit to it, I shall submit to it under
protest. I shall see what use I can make of it. The German na-
tion, when it was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, signed it.
If I have to deal with this Constitution as the Germans dealt with
the Versailles Treaty, I shall begin by tearing off as many pages
as the Government of India Act has, and we shall not rest content
until that Constitution is replaced by a Constitution which is ac-
ceptable to us. ” Mr. M. A. Jinnah got the following Resolution
passed from the Muslim League: “The All-India Muslim League
enters its emphatic protest against forcing the Constitution, as
embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935, upon the people
of India, against their will and, in spite of the repeated disapproval
and dissent expressed by various parties and bodies in the country.
The League considers that, having regard to the conditions prevail-
ing at present in the country, the Provincial scheme of the Consti-
## p. 660 (#700) ############################################
660 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
tution be utilised for what it is worth, in spite of the most objection-
able features contained therein, which render the real control and
responsibility of the Ministry and the Legislature over the entire
field of Government and the Administration nugatory. The League
is clearly of the opinion that the All-India Federal Scheme of the
Central Government, embodied in the Government of India Act,
1935, is fundamentally bad; it is most reactionary, retrograde, in-
jurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India vis-a-vis the
Indian States, and it is calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely
the realisation of India's most cherished goal of complete responsible
Government and is totally unacceptable.
“The League considers that the British Parliament should still
take the earliest opportunity to review the whole situation afresh
regarding the Central scheme before it is inaugurated; or else the
League feels convinced that the present scheme will not bring peace
and contentment to the people, but on the contrary it will lead to
disaster if forced upon and persisted in as it is entire unworkable
in the interests of India and her people. ”
"Whether at the Round Table Conference or in India, the
Indians had been quarrelling among themselves like the two cats
which, unable to arrive at a settlement, went to a monkey for jus-
tice with the result that the monkey took away the whole cheese.
It was true that despite any resolution of protest which might be
passed they would remain in a helpless condition. But surely one
could at least express one's opinion that the new Constitution was
a fraud being imposed upon them. One could express one's ‘resent-
ment against the fraud that is being perpetrated' and one could
ask others to do it. A question might be asked as to whether pro-
tests would be of any avail when the Constitution was coming into
cperation. The answer was “What did Germany do with the Treaty
of Versailles which was forced on her? ' Did she not sign the
Treaty? Here in India, there was no question of anybody having
to sign. The Constitution was forced upon the country, and it was
going to be the law of the land. Every one knew, and the British
Government knew, that the Constitution had been the grossest
breach of faith on the part of the British Government who had
stated that they would not announce any constitution which did
not receive an adequate amount of support. The question was
whether there had been any agreement at all. Nevertheless, it was
being pointed out that there was a large measure of agreement in
the Conservative Party and that was enough. "
Critics point out that the Government of India Act 1935 pro-
posed a conservative framework for an independent India. The
vital feature of that framework was princely participation. An
## p. 661 (#701) ############################################
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
661
independent India dominated by the princes might have been deco-
rative and peaceful but could not be effective or forward-looking.
It was something like stopping the clock just before the alarm for
the new age was due to go off. Moreover, the new Act failed to
prevent the partition of India. The Muslims felt that the Act was
devised mainly in the interests of the Hindus. It is true that the
federal principle which granted larger powers to the provinces could
help the Muslims to control provinces like Sind and the North-west
Frontier Province, but the representation in Bengal was such that
they had to form a coalition ministry with some other parties. The
same was the case with the Punjab. There also they were not given
absolute majority to control the destiny of their province. The
view of the Muslims was that regional federalism was not enough
to safeguard their interests. They had no faith in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty and rule by majority. The fear of domi-
nance by one community over another created the atmosphere
which made partition inevitable.
ESTIMATE OF ACT OF 1935
It has rightly been pointed out that for all its ifs and buts, its
complications and hesitations, the Government of India Act, 1935,
proved to be a land-mark in the development of India. It marked
a point of no-return in constitutional development. While the Re-
form of 1919 had left the ultimate goal hazy and uncertain, the
Act of 1935 definitely fixed the goal of Dominion status for India
which was to have a federal form of Government along with the
parliamentary institutions. There were to be no periodic enquiries
as under the Act of 1919. Provision was made for changing the
Constitution from within. In many ways, the new Act was a blue-
print for independence. What is remarkable about this Act is that
in the new Constitution of India which came into force in January
1950, many of its Articles have been copied from the Act of 1935.
Even the general shape of the new Constitution of India is on the
pattern set in the Government of India Act of 1935.
The Act of 1935 represented not only a consensus of British pub-
lic opinion but also a considered attempt to provide conservative
form for ultimate Indian independence. England was to enter into
a partnership with an independent India but in that India, conserva-
tive interests were to predominate and that fact was ensured by the
provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was for that
purpose that the princes were given a very privileged position in
the federal set up. It was with the same object that provision was
made for safeguarding the trade interests of Englishmen.
## p. 662 (#702) ############################################
662 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
The view of Prof. Percival Speare is that “Unlike the Montford
Reform of 1921 or anything that was done after World War II,
the Government of India Act of 1935 was enacted from strength.
It could be said that after both World Wars, Britain was too en-
feebled to take an uncompromising stand. But in the thirties, she
had recovered from World War I, was emerging from the Great
Depression and had just defeated the strongest frontal attack on
the Indian Government authority since the Mutiny. There was no
compelling force dictating concession or constitutional advance.
What was done was done through conviction and might be said
to represent a minimum rather than a maximum. That was wh
there was an air of solidity about the Act and why its major fea-
tures proved to be so fruitful in the future. It was generally real-
ized that there could be no going back on it. The Act was the
constructive half of the dual policy of suppression of Congress defi-
ance and advance towards self-Government. It was meticulously
drawn up and represented, in effect, a draft Constitution for an
Indian Dominion. It was made easy to fill in gaps later; old fea-
tures which were left such as the Office of the Secretary of State,
could be lopped off without difficulty, and provision was made for
a measure of change within the Constitution. The London con-
nection began to assume the appearance of legal umbilical cord
which could be snipped at the right moment. "
In spite of the best efforts on the part of Lord Linlithgow, the
federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935, could not be
brought into force. The Indian States put forward all kinds of
hurdles in the way. Moreover, the Muslim League was deadly
opposed to the introduction of federation at the Centre. The Con
gress also unwittingly opposed the federal part of the Constitution
even after the inauguration of provincial autonomy, little realising
that this action of theirs would strengthen the centrifugal tenden-
cies which could ultimately disrupt the unity of the country.
When World War II broke out in September 1939, India was
immediately declared a belligerent country by the British Govern-
ment without consulting the people of India. The Congress Work-
ing Committee lodged a strong protest and called upon the British
Government to declare their war aims in clear terms. The Con-
gress enquired from the Government whether those aims included
"the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy will be guid-
ed in accordance with the wishes of the people. ” The Congress
Working Committee declared in unequivocal terms that "the Com-
mittee cannot associate themselves or offer any cooperation in a
war which is conducted on imperialistic lines and which is meant
to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere. "
## p. 663 (#703) ############################################
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
663
The British Government refused to give the assurance demanded
by the Congress. It made vague promises to the effect that at the
end of the war the British Government would be willing to consult
the various interests in India to make such modifications in the
Government of India Act 1935 as might appear to be desirable.
The result was that the Congress decided to non-cooperate with
the British Government and called upon the Congress ministries in
8 provinces to resign. This was done in October 1939. This ac-
tion of the Congress has been criticised by V. P. Menon on the
ground that it was the resignation of the Congress ministries which
helped Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to become strong in
Indian politics. Moreover, if the Congress ministries had not re-
signed voluntarily, the British Government would not have got the
courage to dismiss them as they could not afford to lose the good-
will of the people in those critical days.
There was a lot of discontentment in the country and in order to
meet that Lord Linlithgow declared in January 1940 that “Domi-
nion status of the Westminster variety as soon as possible after the
war” was the goal of British policy in India. However, this did
not bring any response from the Congress side.
THE AUGUST OFFER (1940)
On the eve of the battle of Britain, a new declaration of British
policy known as the August Offer was made on 8 August 1940.
This offer was made by the Viceroy on behalf of the British Gov-
ernment. It was pointed out that though the differences which
prevented national unity remained unbridged in India, the expan-
sion of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the
establishment of an Advisory War Council should not be postponed
any longer. In view of the doubts as to whether the position of
the minorities would be sufficiently safeguarded in any future consti-
tutional change or not, the British Government reaffirmed its desire
that full weight would be given to minority opinion. To quote the
words of the Viceroy, “It goes without saying that they could not
contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace
and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority
is directly denied by large and powerful elements of India's national
life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements
into submission to such a Government. ” Subject to the fulfilment
of their obligations—an allusion to such questions as defence, mino-
rity rights, the treaties with the states and the position of the Secre-
tary of State Services, the British Government concurred in the
Indian desire that the framing of the new constitution should be
## p. 664 (#704) ############################################
664 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
"primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves and should origi-
nate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political
structure of the Indian life. ” Constitutional issues could not be
decided at "a moment when the national life is engaged in a strug-
gle for existence,” but after the War, a representative Indian body
would be set up to formulate the new constitution. In the mean-
time, the British Government would welcome and assist any efforts
to reach agreement as to the form and operation of this constitu-
tion-making body and as to the principles of the constitution. In
the interval, the British Government hoped that all parties and
communities in India would cooperate in India's war effort and
by thus working together pave the way for India's attainment of
free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The August Offer undoubtedly registered an advance of first-
rate importance in the method of handling the constitutional prob-
lem. It was clearly stated that the Indians were to be primarily
responsible for making the new constitution of India. It followed
that if the Indians agreed to the kind of constitution they wanted
and if that constitution provided for the due discharge of British
obligations, it would be virtually impossible for the British Parlia-
ment to reject that constitution. Mr. Amery pointed out that
Dominion status was not inferior to that of nations that stood alone,
but was actually superior. “There is no higher status in the
world. ”
The August Offer was rejected by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad,
the Congress President. Jawaharlal Nehru declared that the whole
conception of Dominion Status for India was “as dead as a door-
nail. ” The view of Mahatma Gandhi was that the August Offer
widened the gulf between India as represented by the Congress
and England.
The response of the Muslim League to the August Offer was
different. Its Working Committee welcomed that part of the Offer
which was condemned by the Congress. According to the Muslim
League, the August Offer met its demand "for a clear assurance
to the fact that no future constitution, interim or final, should be
adopted by the British Government without their approval and
consent. " The League declared that "the partition of India was
the only solution of the most difficult problem of India's future
constitution. ” In spite of this, the League neither accepted nor
rejected the August Offer.
The Liberals of India asked for a further clarification from the
British Government. They demanded that the enjoyment of Domi-
nion Status must be unqualified and a time limit for its attainment
must be fixed. That must not be delayed on account of the atti-
>
## p. 665 (#705) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
665
tude of any minority in India. The Indian members of the Execu-
tive Council of the Governor-General must be party leaders and
they should also be in a majority.
Nothing came out of the August Offer on account of the attitude
of the Congress. The comments of Mr. Amery were in these words:
"Inspired by an ardent national patriotism, the (Congress) have
striven to make that organization national and all-embracing. If
only they had succeeded, if Congress could in fact speak, as it pro-
fesses to speak, for all the main elements in India's national life,
then however advanced their demands, our problem might have
been very different and in many respects far easier than it is today. ”
CRIPPS PROPOSALS (1942)
The deadlock in Indian politics continued. While the British
Government refused to come to terms with the Congress, the latter
refused to cooperate with the former. During this period, the
second World War was going on. The international situation began
to deteriorate. In December 1940, Japan joined the War against
the United States and Great Britain. The Japanese armies ad-
vanced rapidly all over South-East Asia. The tide of their con-
quest rolled at a tremendous pace towards Burma and India. When
Singapore fell in February 1942, the security of India was threaten-
ed. Rangoon fell on March 7, 1942. Colombo was bombarded.
Some bombs fell on the eastern coast of India. Calcutta was
threatened and refugees began to leave that city. In spite of this
threatening situation, the attitude of the Indian leaders did not
change. The Congress was as hostile as ever. It was prepared to
help only if India was given independence. The Muslim League
was more concerned with the partition of India than its immediate
salvation from the Japanese conquest.
It was under these circumstances that Sir Stafford Cripps, the
Leader of the House of Commons, came to India in March 1942
with certain proposals on behalf of the British Government. The
sending of the Cripps Mission was due to many causes. The first
cause was the threat of Japan to India. By 7 March 1942, when
Rangoon fell, Japan had occupied the whole of South-East Asia.
Churchill made his famous announcement only 4 days after the fall
of Rangoon. Another cause was the pressure of President Roose-
velt and Marshall Chiang Kai-Shek. Mr. Hull, American Secre-
tary of State, tells us that “The President and I, both before and
after Pearl Harbour, were convinced that the Indians would co-
operate better with the British if they were assured of independence
at least after the War. ” White Roosevelt put pressure on Chur-
## p. 666 (#706) ############################################
666 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
chill
, Hull put pressure on Halifax. Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife
visited India in February 1942. Chiang Kai-Shek asked the British
Government to give India “as speedily as possible” “real political
power” in order to secure her moral and material support. In spite
of the refusal of Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek met Gandhiji at
Calcutta on 18 February, 1942. Another cause was the growing
frustration in India. The Indians felt happy over the reverses of
the British and seemed to take pleasure in the victories of the Axis
Powers. They listened to the broadcasts of Subhas Chandra Bose
from Berlin. Something had to be done to meet the menace. There
were men like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru who would like to bring about
a compromise between the Congress and the British Government
and the latter did respond to their efforts. They also influenced
the Congress to open its doors for negotiations. Public opinion in
England was also in favour of reconciling India. There was a de-
bate in the House of Commons on 24 and 25 February, 1942, on
war situation and 15 speakers made references to the Indian prob-
lem and impressed upon the Government the necessity of tackling
it. The Labour Party also stood for reconciling India. It was
under these circumstances that Cripps was sent to India.
The following is the text of the Draft Declaration of the British
Government:
“(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, steps shall be
taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elect-
ed body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for
India.
“(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation
of Indian States in the constitution-making body.
"(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and imple-
ment forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:
"(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepar-
ed to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional
position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.
“With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His
Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new consti-
tution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.
“(ii) The signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between
His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This
treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete
transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make
provision, in accordance with undertakings given by His Majesty's
Government, for the protection of the racial and religious minori-
## p. 667 (#707) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
667
ties, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian
Union to decide in future its relationship to other member-States of
the British Commonwealth.
"Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitu-
tion, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrange-
ments so far as this may be required in the new situation.
"(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as fol-
lows unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communi-
ties agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:
“Immediately upon the result being known of provincial elections
which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire mem-
bership of the Lower Houses of Provincial Legislatures shall as a
single electoral college proceed to the election of the constitution-
making body by the system of proportional representation. This
new body shall be in number about 1/10th of the number of the
electoral college.
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the
same proportion to their total population as in the case of repre-
sentatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as
British Indian members.
“(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until
the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's Government
must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control
and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war
effort but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and
material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment of India with the co-operation of the people of India. His
Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effec-
tive participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the
Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth
and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their
active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is
vital and essential for the future freedom of India. "
Sir Stafford had a very busy time in India. He met the leaders
of the various parties and did his level best to persuade them to
accept the proposals. His mission was a very difficult one. The
Indian leaders were prepared to accept what was being promised
to them in the future, but they were not satisfied with what was
being offered to them at once. What they wanted was a say in
the matter of the participation of India in the war. This Sir
Stafford Cripps was not able to give them and no wonder his mis-
sion failed and he had to go back empty-handed.
It is true that the proposals of Cripps were an advance on the
August Offer in many respects. They conceded to the projected
## p. 668 (#708) ############################################
668 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Indian Union the liberty to secede from the British Commonwealth,
if so desired. The framing of the new constitution was to rest not
primarily but solely in Indian hands. However, its acceptance was
made subject to the fulfilment of British obligations. If the Indians
could not become free as a single unit, they could become free as
two or more units. Disagreement among the Indians was not to
give the British Government an excuse to perpetuate their rule in
India. The August Offer had invited the Indian leaders to start
discussing the principles of the new constitution and the method of
framing it. The Cripps Proposals contained a plan for a consti-
tution-making body to be adopted if no Indian plan was agreed
upon before the cessation of the hostilities. The Cripps Proposals
went farther than the August Offer as regards the character of the
interim system of the Government. The offer had provided for
the inclusion of a certain number of representative Indians in the
Executive Council. The Cripps Proposals invited the leaders of
the principal sections of the Indian people to participate in the
counsels of India, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
The great merit of Cripp's proposals was their frankness and
precision. There was no hesitancy and generalities as was the case
in the declarations of 1939 and 1940. It was declared in un-
ambiguous terms that the new Constitution of India would be
framed by the Indians themselves. The right of secession was re-
cognised. The device of a bilateral treaty for implementing the
new Constitution and discharging the British obligations was intro-
duced. The Muslims were also assured that they could have
Pakistan if they so pleased.
However, the Cripps Proposals were criticized by all the interested
parties in India. Each party criticized the proposals from its own
point of view. The objection of the Congress was not so much to
the long-term arrangement as to the interim arrangement. The
Congress acted on the principle that one bird in hand was better
than two in the bush. Cripps had given an understanding to the
Congress that with the exception of the Defence Department, other
Departments would be completely in the hands of Indians and the
Governor-General would act as a constitutional head. However,
at a later stage, he withdrew that offer. That made the Congress
suspicious regarding the honesty of the British Government. The
Congress wanted the Executive Council of the Governor General to
work as a cabinet but the British Government was not prepared to
make such a concession. The Congress also objected to the veto
power of the Viceroy. It was also opposed to the acceptance of
the novel principle of the non-accession of the provinces. It ap-
## p. 669 (#709) ############################################
CRIPPS PROPOSALS
669
own.
peared to them that this provision brought in Pakistan by the back-
door.
The Hindu Mahasabha opposed the Cripps proposals on two
grounds. It was opposed to the freedom given to the provinces to
leave the Indian union and set up separate governments of their
It also objected to the elections on the basis of the Communal
Award which was anti-national and un-democratic. The Sikhs
also opposed the provisions relating to the non-accession of the pro-
vinces. They declared: “We shall resist by all possible means the
separation of the Punjab from All-India Union”. The depressed
classes denounced the proposals on the ground that the necessary
safeguards were not provided for their interests.
The response of the Muslim League was a mixed one.
Its mem-
bers were happy at the prospect of realising their ambition of
Pakistan. However, Mr. Jinnah was a politician and his diplo-
macy led him to contend that the Pakistan idea as embodied in the
Cripps' proposals was nebulous and very serious impediments were
placed in the way of its realisation. In his Presidential address
delivered on 4 April, 1942, at the Allahabad session of the All-India
Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah declared: “The alleged power of the
minority in the matter of secession suggested in the document is
illusory as the Hindu India will dominate the decision in favour of
one All-India Union in all the provinces and the Muslims in Bengal
and the Punjab will be at the mercy of the Hindu minority in those
provinces, who will exert themselves to the fullest extent and length
for keeping the Musalmans tied to the chariot-wheel of Hindustan”.
The Working Committee of the Muslim League passed the follow-
ing Resolution on the 11 April, 1942: “The Committee, while ex-
pressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recog-
nised by implication by providing for the establishment of two or
more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His
Majesty's Government, embodying the fundamentals, are not open
to any modification and, therefore, no alternative proposals are
invited. ” The Resolution ended by declaring that the Muslim
League would not be satisfied with anything short of what was
contained in the Lahore Resolution of March, 1940.
Mahatma Gandhi was not at all impressed by the proposals
brought by Cripps. He is stated to have told him thus: “Why did
you come if this is what you have to offer? If this is your entire
proposal to India, I would advise you to take the next plane home. ”
Sir Stafford's reply was: “I will consider that. ”
It is pointed out that there were snags in the proposals brought
by Cripps. One was the repetition of the August Offer of 1940
and the addition of the explanation that “the present declaration is
## p. 670 (#710) ############################################
670 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
intended not to supersede, but to clothe these general declarations
with precision and to convince the people of India of the War Cabi-
net's sincere resolve. " This created suspicion in the minds of the
people. It indicated a resolve on the part of the British Govern-
ment to safeguard its prestige. The second snag was that there was
no indication in the proposals that the British Government was pre-
pared to part with power. Another defect in the scheme was that
it had either to be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole. There
was no scope for any internal adjustment. Sir Stafford Cripps had
been placed in a very tight corner by Sir Winston Churchill and
his associates. The failure of his mission was a foregone conclusion.
After the failure of the Cripps Mission, there was a lot of dis-
contentment in the country. The Congress leaders were convinced
that they could not expect anything from the British Government
in the near future. Consequently, the All-India Congress Com-
mittee passed the famous Quit India Resolution on 8th August,
1942. That Resolution emphasised the necessity of immediately
ending the British Rule in India and also announced “the starting
of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale. "
The Government of India acted with promptness and arrested all
the members of the Congress Working Committee and Mahatma
Gandhi. The people of India also hit back. In various parts of
India, the Government machinery was completely thrown out of
gear. The Government used ail possible means to crush the move-
ment. Thousands of people were either mercilessly killed or put
behind the bars. The political life of India was completely sus-
pended. At this time, the Communist Party of India helped the
Government of India in its war efforts. The deadlock continued
up to 1944 when Mahatma Gandhi was released.
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA (1944)
In March 1944, C. Rajagopalachariar put forward his formula
to solve the deadlock in the country. On 8 April, 1944, he wrote to
Mr. Jinnah a letter which embodied the terms which could form
the “basis for settlement. ” It was made clear in that letter that
the formula had the “full approval of Mahatma Gandhi. Those
terms were the following:-
“(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitu-
tion for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand
for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional Interim Government for the transitional
period.
“(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be
## p. 671 (#711) ############################################
RAJAGOPALACHARIAR FORMULA
671
appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west
and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute
majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the in-
habitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable
franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from
Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sove-
reign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given
effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border
to choose to join either state.
“(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of
view before the plebiscite is held.
“(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreement shall be
entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and com-
munications and for other essential purposes.
“(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely
voluntary basis.
“(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by
Britain of full power and responsibility of the governance of India. ”
Mr. Jinnah asked for certain clarifications from Mahatma
Gandhi. He enquired who was to frame the Constitution referred
to in the scheme. He also wanted to know the lines on which the
Interim Government was to be set up or constituted. He wanted
to know who was to appoint the Commission, whose duty was to
demarcate the contiguous areas where the Muslims had an absolute
majority. He also enquired whether the plebiscite was to be taken
districtwise or on some other basis, and whether the same was to
be based on adult franchise or some other franchise. He also
enquired who was to give effect to the verdict of the commission
and to whom the power was to be transferred and through what
machinery and when.
Mahatma Gandhi wrote back to Mr. Jinnah saying that the
Constitution was to be framed by the Provisional Government con-
templated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after
the British power was withdrawn. The Provisional Government
was to be set up on the basis of an agreement between the Congress
and the League. The Commission was to be appointed by the
Provisional Government. The form of plebiscite could be agreed
upon between the League and the Congress. The power was to
be transferred to the nation, by the British Government, in a peace-
ful manner. To quote Mahatma Gandhi: “We reach by joint
effort independence for India as it stands, India become free will
proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people con-
cerned vote for partition. ” Mahatma Gandhi also pointed out
that he found “no parallel in history for a body of converts and
## p. 672 (#712) ############################################
672 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent
stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must
remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of
her children. . . . . . You do not claim to be a nation by right of
conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two
nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam. . . .
The only real, though awful test, of one nationhood arises out of
our common political subjection. ” The reply of Mr. Jinnah was:
“We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major
nations by any definition and test of a nation. We are a nation
of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our
own distinctive culture and civilisation, language and literature,
art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and
proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, his-
tory and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short, we have our
own distinctive outlook on life and of life. ” The contention of Mr.
Jinnah was that the Muslims of India as a nation had the right
of self-determination and they alone were to be entitled to vote and
not the non-Muslims. He also pointed out that “there cannot be
defence and similar matters of common concern, when it is accept-
ed that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent
sovereign States. "
In his letter dated 24 September, 1944, Mahatma Gandhi sug-
gested that the areas should be demarcated by a Commission ap-
proved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g.
