" Hence to suffer as a
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is
done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for
avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the
head of witnessing to the faith.
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is
done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for
avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the
head of witnessing to the faith.
Summa Theologica
i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of
injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress
the weaker. "
The Fourth argument is granted.
Reply to Objection 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain
particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to
fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most
beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace. "
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OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
(4) The pain of martyrdom;
(5) Its cause.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all
acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary,
as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and
of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age
of eternity through the glory of martyrdom. " Therefore martyrdom is not
an act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is
unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above ([3302]Q[64], A[5]), and yet
martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and
so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic
Church with most solemn veneration. " Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act
of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would
it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Mat. 5:10):
"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([3303]Q[123], AA[1],3), it belongs to
virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason
consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its
proper effect, as shown above ([3304]Q[109], AA[1],2;[3305] Q[123],
A[12]). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth
and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident
that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents
the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they
suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains
no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain
obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by
their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes
the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized
children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory
through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's
sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of
the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De
Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not
believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt
of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough
to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein
you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer. "
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority
thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. [3306] Q[64], A[1],
ad 2]. "
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
Now it has been stated ([3307]FS, Q[108], A[1], ad 4) that some of the
precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the
preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to
do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain
things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the
mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to
reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the
case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings
unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of
acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in
moderation.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For
the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto
Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the
Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
blood. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue
which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the
act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:
Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in
His martyrs. " Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of
martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath,
that a man lay down his life for his friends. " Moreover without charity
martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I should
deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me
nothing. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is
easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing
to imitate his faith and patience. " Now that which calls chiefly for
praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage? " Now a
person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3308]Q[123], A[1], seqq. ), it belongs
to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially
against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all
against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom
man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to
faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the
imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with
his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf.
ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and
Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls
unmoved, and strength divine. " Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom
is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office
of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].
Reply to Objection 1: Two things must be considered in the act of
fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and
this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby
a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving
that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the
safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous
fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which
is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus
martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened,
but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as
its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it,
whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause,
being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity
as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3309]Q[123], A[6]), the chief
act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act,
which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves
fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is
that martyrs are also praised for their patience.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of
precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary
for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for
salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With the heart we
believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation," and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that "we ought to lay down
our lives for the brethren. " Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to
perfection.
Objection 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a
man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give
God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices. "
Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better than
the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he
that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and
guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom
to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to
belong to perfection in the highest degree.
I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,
with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue
proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the
due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts,
because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in
so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue,
such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the
end is better.
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its
first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this
respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since,
as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the bond of
perfection. " Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof
of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved
to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its
sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its
sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the
present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates
death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the
pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain
from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36).
And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most
perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the
greatest charity, according to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. "
Reply to Objection 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter
of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.
xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary
to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for
salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation
to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal
for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of
their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as
referring to the preparation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
2:8) that He became "obedient unto death. " Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
absolutely.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to
the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all
other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all
virtues.
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Whether death is essential to martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For
Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et
Eustoch. ): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin
and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory says
(Hom. iii in Evang. ): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the
opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since
even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit. "
Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
Objection 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for
despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life
of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been
forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith,
as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of
martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the
flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to
forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou
causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a
twofold crown. "
Objection 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs
to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as
Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships
besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely
imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint
Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not
essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
Objection 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above
(A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential
to martyrdom.
On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying
for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
without faith. "
I answer that As stated above [3310](A[2]), a martyr is so called as
being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise
things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11.
Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the
faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order
to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the
life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things
relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred
and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose
life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and
all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i. e. for
the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom
requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may
meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh,
or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it
is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the
Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in
the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and
consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of
God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a
reward, as Lucy said.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3311]Q[123], AA[4],5),
fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers
consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for
suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except
in so far as these result in death.
Reply to Objection 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in
the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person
willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,
that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death
ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
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Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For
it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer,
or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as
a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this
name. " Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom
to those who suffer.
Objection 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is
borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,
otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a
truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems
ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
Objection 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most
account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the
nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of
martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die
for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with
Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who
die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): "Blessed are they that
suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom,
according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.
Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.
Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
I answer that, As stated above [3312](A[4]), martyrs are so called as
being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear
witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which
is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:
wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of
faith.
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also
outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one
confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he
has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my
faith. " Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They
profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him. " Thus all
virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions
of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of
us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of
martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of
Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny
the faith, but for reproving adultery.
Reply to Objection 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person
is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but
also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is
none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to
sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified
their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.
" Hence to suffer as a
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is
done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for
avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the
head of witnessing to the faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection
with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according
to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to
be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3313]Q[110], AA[3],4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever
truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a
lie is a sin against the Divine Law.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of one's country is paramount among
human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since
human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God,
it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may
be the cause of martyrdom.
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OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or
'timidity. ' The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account
of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a
better rendering. ]
We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
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Whether fear is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as
stated above ([3314]FS, Q[23], A[4]; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised
nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin
is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear
and trembling. " Therefore fear is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for
sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii).
Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear. " Therefore fear
is not a sin. .
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be
thou afraid of their words. "
I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being
inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as
stated above ([3315]Q[109], A[2];[3316] Q[114], A[1]). Now this due
order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason.
And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some
sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to
be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good
is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The
result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought
after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the
appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather
than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate
and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun
what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate
nor sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance
in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in
accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be
lacking in the service they owe their masters.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils
that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us
nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.
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Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above
([3317]Q[123], AA[4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they
that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to
suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods. " Again a gloss on Mat.
27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that
"evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of
contempt. " Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.
Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is
opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1];
[3318]FS, Q[40], A[4]). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to
fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; [3319]FS, Q[43], A[1]),
all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to
something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of
virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since
every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while
inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives
use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is
included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money,
the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest
fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we
find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear
is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason
timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude.
[*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general
for the individual term; e. g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so
timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote
inordinate fear of the danger of death. ]
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in
its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference
to the end, as stated above ([3320]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3321]FS, Q[18],
A[6]): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of
death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger
of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by
fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or
something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for
to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3322]FS, Q[45], A[2]), fear is
the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind
of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results
from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now
the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely
to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards
dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
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Whether fear is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated
above ([3323]FS, Q[23], A[1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which
is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([3324]FS, Q[74], A[4]). Therefore fear is
not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.
But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is
fearful," etc. , says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the
very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,
but that he can rally and take courage. " Therefore fear is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection
but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a
precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, "What man
is there that is fearful and fainthearted? " says: "We learn from this
that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches. "
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet
this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful
and unbelieving and the abominable," etc. , "shall have their portion in
the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death. "
Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3325](A[1]), fear is a sin through
being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be
shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear
is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the
rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a
venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the
rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns
something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of
fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man
through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so
disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by
the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the
sensuality.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to
the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes
his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may
happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one
cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from
accomplishing what he purposed doing.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man
aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a
precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a
mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for
instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
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Whether fear excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a
sin, as stated above [3326](A[1]). But sin does not excuse from sin,
rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would
this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,
because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to
be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because
instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of
temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor
sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness. "
Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap.
Constat. ): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by
heretics, has an ostensible excuse. "
I answer that, As stated above [3327](A[3]), fear is sinful in so far
as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain
evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to
shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to
be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the
loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if
through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber,
and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather
than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other
hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to
reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to
reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin,
because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul
are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body
more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur
evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body,
such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of
money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid
loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin
would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less
voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain
necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply
voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness,
but in the point of its involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet
the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object
of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held
temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that
temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise
to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these
temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the
opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be
feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that
which is good according to virtue.
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OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
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Whether fearlessness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is
reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in
praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall
be without dread. " Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc. ,
nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, "Who
art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man? " Therefore it
is not a sin to be fearless.
Objection 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above
([3328]Q[125], A[2]). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to
love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv),
"the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the
heavenly city. " Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing
earthly.
On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. 18:2) that "he
feared not God nor regarded man. "
I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge
alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby
one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal
goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own
life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure,
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as
things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to
the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving
them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this
love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the
Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh. " Wherefore
even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh,
which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that
a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the
reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary
goods. One would expect 'se' instead of 'ea. ' We should then read: For
the reason that he loves himself less than he ought. ] But that he fear
none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but
only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted
by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the
result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others,
according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: "He [Vulg. : 'who'] was made to
fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing. " [*"A
man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were
nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as
is said to be the case with the Celts. "] It is therefore evident that
fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of
soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin
if it be invincible.
Reply to Objection 1: The just man is praised for being without fear
that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for
it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
justified. "
Reply to Objection 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by
mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice:
but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
from evil. "
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us
from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
Lord shall tremble at nothing. " But temporal goods are not to be
despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
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Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both
brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of
due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of
due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and
folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress
the weaker. "
The Fourth argument is granted.
Reply to Objection 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain
particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to
fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most
beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points
of inquiry:
(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
(2) Of what virtue is it the act?
(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;
(4) The pain of martyrdom;
(5) Its cause.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all
acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary,
as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and
of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age
of eternity through the glory of martyrdom. " Therefore martyrdom is not
an act of virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is
unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above ([3302]Q[64], A[5]), and yet
martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and
so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic
Church with most solemn veneration. " Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act
of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would
it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act
of virtue.
On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Mat. 5:10):
"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs
is the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([3303]Q[123], AA[1],3), it belongs to
virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason
consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its
proper effect, as shown above ([3304]Q[109], AA[1],2;[3305] Q[123],
A[12]). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth
and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident
that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents
the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they
suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains
no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain
obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by
their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes
the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized
children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory
through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's
sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of
the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De
Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not
believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt
of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough
to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein
you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer. "
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority
thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. [3306] Q[64], A[1],
ad 2]. "
Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
Now it has been stated ([3307]FS, Q[108], A[1], ad 4) that some of the
precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the
preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to
do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain
things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the
mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to
reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the
case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings
unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of
acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in
moderation.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For
the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto
Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the
Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
blood. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue
which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the
act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:
Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in
His martyrs. " Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of
martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath,
that a man lay down his life for his friends. " Moreover without charity
martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I should
deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me
nothing. " Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of
fortitude.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is
easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing
to imitate his faith and patience. " Now that which calls chiefly for
praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how
shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage? " Now a
person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above ([3308]Q[123], A[1], seqq. ), it belongs
to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially
against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all
against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom
man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to
faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the
imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with
his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf.
ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and
Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls
unmoved, and strength divine. " Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom
is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office
of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].
Reply to Objection 1: Two things must be considered in the act of
fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and
this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby
a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving
that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the
safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous
fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which
is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus
martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened,
but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as
its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it,
whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause,
being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity
as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without
charity.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3309]Q[123], A[6]), the chief
act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act,
which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves
fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is
that martyrs are also praised for their patience.
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Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?
Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of
precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary
for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for
salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With the heart we
believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation," and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that "we ought to lay down
our lives for the brethren. " Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to
perfection.
Objection 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a
man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give
God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices. "
Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
Objection 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better than
the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i,
2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he
that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and
guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom
to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to
belong to perfection in the highest degree.
I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,
with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue
proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the
due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts,
because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in
so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue,
such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the
end is better.
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its
first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this
respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since,
as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the bond of
perfection. " Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof
of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved
to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its
sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its
sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the
present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates
death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the
pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain
from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36).
And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most
perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the
greatest charity, according to Jn. 15:13: "Greater love than this no
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. "
Reply to Objection 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter
of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.
xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary
to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for
salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation
to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal
for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of
their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as
referring to the preparation of the mind.
Reply to Objection 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
2:8) that He became "obedient unto death. " Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
absolutely.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to
the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all
other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all
virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether death is essential to martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For
Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et
Eustoch. ): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin
and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory says
(Hom. iii in Evang. ): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the
opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since
even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we
slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit. "
Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
Objection 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for
despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life
of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been
forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith,
as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of
martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the
flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to
forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou
causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a
twofold crown. "
Objection 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs
to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as
Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships
besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely
imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint
Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not
essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
Objection 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above
(A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential
to martyrdom.
On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying
for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living
without faith. "
I answer that As stated above [3310](A[2]), a martyr is so called as
being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise
things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11.
Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the
faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order
to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the
life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things
relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred
and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose
life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and
all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i. e. for
the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom
requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
Reply to Objection 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may
meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
Reply to Objection 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh,
or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it
is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the
Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in
the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and
consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of
God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a
reward, as Lucy said.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3311]Q[123], AA[4],5),
fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers
consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for
suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except
in so far as these result in death.
Reply to Objection 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in
the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person
willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,
that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death
ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
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Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?
Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For
it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer,
or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as
a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this
name. " Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith
of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom
to those who suffer.
Objection 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is
borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,
otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a
truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems
ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
Objection 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most
account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the
nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of
martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die
for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with
Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who
die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): "Blessed are they that
suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom,
according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.
Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.
Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
I answer that, As stated above [3312](A[4]), martyrs are so called as
being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear
witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which
is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:
wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of
faith.
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also
outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one
confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he
has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my
faith. " Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They
profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him. " Thus all
virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions
of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of
us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of
martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of
Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny
the faith, but for reproving adultery.
Reply to Objection 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person
is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but
also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ,
according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is
none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to
sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified
their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.
" Hence to suffer as a
Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is
done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for
avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the
head of witnessing to the faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection
with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according
to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to
be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above ([3313]Q[110], AA[3],4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever
truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a
lie is a sin against the Divine Law.
Reply to Objection 3: The good of one's country is paramount among
human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of
martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since
human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God,
it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may
be the cause of martyrdom.
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OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES) [*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or
'timidity. ' The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account
of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a
better rendering. ]
We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
Fearlessness; (3) Daring.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
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Whether fear is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as
stated above ([3314]FS, Q[23], A[4]; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised
nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin
is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear
and trembling. " Therefore fear is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for
sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii).
Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear. " Therefore fear
is not a sin. .
On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not, neither be
thou afraid of their words. "
I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being
inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as
stated above ([3315]Q[109], A[2];[3316] Q[114], A[1]). Now this due
order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason.
And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some
sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to
be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good
is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The
result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought
after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the
appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather
than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate
and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun
what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate
nor sinful.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance
in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in
accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be
lacking in the service they owe their masters.
Reply to Objection 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils
that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us
nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.
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Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above
([3317]Q[123], AA[4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all they
that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we dread to
suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods. " Again a gloss on Mat.
27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word," says that
"evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of
contempt. " Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.
Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is
opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1];
[3318]FS, Q[40], A[4]). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to
fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.
I answer that, As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; [3319]FS, Q[43], A[1]),
all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to
something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of
virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since
every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while
inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives
use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is
included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money,
the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest
fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we
find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear
is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason
timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude.
[*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general
for the individual term; e. g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so
timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote
inordinate fear of the danger of death. ]
Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in
its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference
to the end, as stated above ([3320]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3321]FS, Q[18],
A[6]): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of
death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger
of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by
fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or
something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for
to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3322]FS, Q[45], A[2]), fear is
the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind
of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results
from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now
the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely
to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards
dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated
above ([3323]FS, Q[23], A[1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which
is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the
sensuality, as stated above ([3324]FS, Q[74], A[4]). Therefore fear is
not a mortal sin.
Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.
But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is
fearful," etc. , says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the
very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,
but that he can rally and take courage. " Therefore fear is not a mortal
sin.
Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection
but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a
precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, "What man
is there that is fearful and fainthearted? " says: "We learn from this
that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches. "
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet
this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful
and unbelieving and the abominable," etc. , "shall have their portion in
the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death. "
Therefore fear is a mortal sin.
I answer that, As stated above [3325](A[1]), fear is a sin through
being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be
shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear
is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the
rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a
venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the
rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns
something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of
fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man
through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so
disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by
the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the
sensuality.
Reply to Objection 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to
the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes
his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may
happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one
cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from
accomplishing what he purposed doing.
Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man
aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a
precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a
mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for
instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a
sin, as stated above [3326](A[1]). But sin does not excuse from sin,
rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would
this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,
because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to
be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.
Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or
spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because
instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of
temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor
sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness. "
Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.
On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap.
Constat. ): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by
heretics, has an ostensible excuse. "
I answer that, As stated above [3327](A[3]), fear is sinful in so far
as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain
evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to
shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to
be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the
loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if
through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber,
and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather
than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other
hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to
reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to
reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin,
because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul
are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body
more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur
evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body,
such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of
money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid
loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin
would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less
voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain
necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply
voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness,
but in the point of its involuntariness.
Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet
the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object
of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held
temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that
temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise
to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these
temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the
opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be
feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that
which is good according to virtue.
__________________________________________________________________
OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fearlessness is a sin?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is
reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in
praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall
be without dread. " Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.
Objection 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body," etc. ,
nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, "Who
art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man? " Therefore it
is not a sin to be fearless.
Objection 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above
([3328]Q[125], A[2]). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to
love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv),
"the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the
heavenly city. " Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing
earthly.
On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. 18:2) that "he
feared not God nor regarded man. "
I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge
alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby
one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal
goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own
life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure,
that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as
things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to
the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving
them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this
love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the
Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh. " Wherefore
even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh,
which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that
a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the
reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary
goods. One would expect 'se' instead of 'ea. ' We should then read: For
the reason that he loves himself less than he ought. ] But that he fear
none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but
only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted
by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the
result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others,
according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: "He [Vulg. : 'who'] was made to
fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing. " [*"A
man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were
nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as
is said to be the case with the Celts. "] It is therefore evident that
fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of
soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin
if it be invincible.
Reply to Objection 1: The just man is praised for being without fear
that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for
it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
justified. "
Reply to Objection 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by
mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice:
but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
from evil. "
Reply to Objection 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us
from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
Lord shall tremble at nothing. " But temporal goods are not to be
despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both
brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of
due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of
due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and
folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.
