No More Learning

64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in
the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose carefully
whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the
Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the
Church. " Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug. ) See Opp.
August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in
a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
something deadly in the divine worship.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion. " Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ([3100]Q[81],
A[7]). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the
mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to
make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the
second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the
worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt
of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God
contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority,
and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1
ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: "He is
unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered
it. " For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition
is "the use of human observances under the name of religion. "

Reply to Objection 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship
Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that
contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Reply to Objection 2: Before the time of the Law the just were
instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and
others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward
precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Reply to Objection 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine
worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe
them, and to disregard them is unlawful.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship
of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as
ever you can, for He will yet far exceed. " Now the divine worship is
directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess
in it.

Objection 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward
worship, "whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith,
hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of
God.

Objection 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what
we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.
Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there will
be no excess in the divine worship.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that the
good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy
Writ. " But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be
superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with
regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in
the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God.
Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion,
through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine
worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind
and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God's glory,
and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate
curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship,
provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the
Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to
God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the
commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the
general custom---which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.
xxxvi], "has the force of law"---all this must be reckoned excessive
and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,
it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, "The kingdom of God
is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to wit, who pay
more attention to externals.

Reply to Objection 1: The glorification of God implies that what is
done is done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by
superstition.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God,
so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with
external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute
quantity.
__________________________________________________________________

OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?

(4) Of the cause of this sin.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a
species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are
idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above
([3101]Q[11], A[1]). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief
and not of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to
which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally
applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For
just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of
the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of
the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship
of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore
idolatry is not a species of superstition.

Objection 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of
any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and
further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in
sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything? " implying
an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs
properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it
cannot be a species of superstition.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor
to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just
as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are
reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the
creature rather than the Creator. " Therefore this species of
superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named
"worship of creatures. "

On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited
Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing
the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says:
"Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too
superstitious. " Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

I answer that, As stated above ([3102]Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to
superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done
chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given.
Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated
above ([3103]Q[81], A[1]) when we were treating of religion. Therefore
it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by
means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so
too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or
shape, which is called an "idol. " Yet divine worship was given to idols
in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed
images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons:
wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something
God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This
was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep],
as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine
worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby.
The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23, 25). For, as regards
the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God
into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and
of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he
says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator. "

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain
men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men:
for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the
whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but
by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God
to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and
reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but
of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given
to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all
such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as
Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly,
others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the
cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances
created by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of
their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels. " After
these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these
the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air,
and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to
be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason
of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as
Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in
the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said
to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on
the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion
relating to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was
celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented
by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship
to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious. "

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession
of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief
by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term
idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion.
Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of
superstition.

Reply to Objection 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In
one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God:
and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown,
because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included
in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to
true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is
univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king.
In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since
it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to
whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied
equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as
prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and
to that which is carnal.

Reply to Objection 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is
nothing in the world" means that those images which were called idols,
were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes
maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the
same sense we must understand the saying that "what is offered in
sacrifice to idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed
the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles
thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.

Reply to Objection 4: It was owing to the general custom among the
Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images
that the term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature,
even without the use of images.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether idolatry is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin
that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith
employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle
were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the
Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore
idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But
the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it
will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the
like.

Objection 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an
inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . .
in spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that
"God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity. " Now a man may happen to
worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith
inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly
without prejudice to the divine worship.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore them,"
i. e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i. e. inwardly, as a gloss explains
it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a
sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some
[*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other
things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others
aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor
should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But
this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet
the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due
to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is
the worship of latria.

Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible
sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most
high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely,
the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, as quoted
below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19),
"external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are
signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter
significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things
they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we
should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose
invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts. "

Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to
idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but
as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ.
Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in
such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom
rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says
that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the
same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the
schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their
gods, and the sovereign good. " This error was embraced also by certain
heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one
who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long
as he keeps the faith in his heart.

But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the
inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of
what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked
falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments
of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi,
10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more infamous
forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the
people believed him to act honestly. "

Reply to Objection 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old
Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of
latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in
order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be
impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the
image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as
we shall state in the [3104]TP, Q[25], A[3].

The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what
has been said above.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins.
The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior
worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than
external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which
are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which
is opposed to external worship.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous
it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by
blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to
another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of
the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with
greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin
against nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against
nature is a graver sin than idolatry.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do
we say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans,
but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many
gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things
that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship
things that exist not at all. " Therefore the vice of heretical
depravity is more grievous than idolatry.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you
again to the weak and needy elements? " says: "The observance of the
Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the
worship of idols, to which they had been given before their
conversion. " Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the
uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every
sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry.
"

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most
grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly
commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another
than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the
whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against
God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be
for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is
concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine
sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the
part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to
be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this
way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which
they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin
through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on
account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to
this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without
internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated
above [3105](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch
as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the
faith by deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be
against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be
more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to
himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in
this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of
idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting
punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man
abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he
may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean
heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is
more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in
opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies
about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their
belief in one God and worship Him alone.

Reply to Objection 5: The observance of the Law during the time of
grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but
almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the
part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or
guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's
nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is
one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to
inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in
man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil
fruit," according to Mat. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of
guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable
idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil. " Therefore
idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

Objection 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found
among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated
[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated
either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or
by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped.
Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus
was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael
was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a
great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the
part of man.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not
possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i. e. the
demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what
name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and
their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry.
Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men
they," i. e. idols, "came into the world. "

I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive
cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on
account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men
divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This
cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter
grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken
away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god. "
The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving either
their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg. :
'names']," i. e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood. " Secondly, because
man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher
observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human
images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave
them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): "If an
artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the
wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it
like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring
concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage. " Thirdly,
on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through
failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain
creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written
(Wis. 13:1,2): "All men . . . neither by attending to the works have
acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or
the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great
water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world. "

The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of
the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving
answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous.
Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are
devils. "

Reply to Objection 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the
part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his
intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this
pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning
and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does
not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin
by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a
beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the
worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth.
Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to
the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still
retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age
idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who
triumphed over the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of
idolatry.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether divination is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?

(3) Of the species of divination;

(4) Of divination by means of demons;

(5) Of divination by the stars;

(6) Of divination by dreams;

(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;

(8) Of divination by lots.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether divination is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is
derived from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain to
holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not
a sin.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to
say that learning is an evil? " and again: "I could nowise admit that
intelligence can be an evil. " But some arts are divinatory, as the
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that
divination is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because
nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek
to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
divination is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or
fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can.
Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a
penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of
penance. "

I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the
Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those
which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of
instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes,
because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these
effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they
be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in
themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates
running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves
before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the
future as though it were present, as stated in the [3106]FP, Q[14],
A[13]; [3107]FP, Q[57], A[3]; [3108]FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is
written (Is. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and
we shall know that ye are gods. " Therefore if anyone presume to
foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God.
It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they
were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and
by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men. "

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that
happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can
be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other
contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does
not divine, i. e. cause something divine, but rather receives something
divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself,
in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is
manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this
reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that
"divination is always taken in an evil sense. "

Reply to Objection 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly
ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation
thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of
future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not
pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the
knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the
devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

Reply to Objection 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future
by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.
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Whether divination is a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of
superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now
divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin.
Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is
superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to
undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Objection 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from
his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of
the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly,
under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of
shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of
the demons. " Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23),
"whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is
superstitious. " Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

I answer that, As stated above [3109](A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition
denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of
God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a
sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is
something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an
oath (Q[89], A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only
idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help
of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all
divination results from the demons' operation, either because the
demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or
because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the
future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this
kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to
vanities and lying follies. " Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the
future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be
foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of
superstition.

Reply to Objection 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to
the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind
of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Reply to Objection 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship
of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express
with the demons.

Reply to Objection 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from
solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no
institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters.
On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises,
there were consultations about the future in connection with religious
matters. Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): "And when they shall say
to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their
enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people
seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg. : 'seek
of their God, for the living of the dead? ']"

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several
species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there
are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of
sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact
with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not
several species of divination.

Objection 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as
stated above ([3110]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3111]FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all
divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the
future. Therefore all divinations are of one species.

Objection 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for
whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same
species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the
various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived.
Therefore there are not several species of divination.

On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination
(Etym. viii, 9).

I answer that, As stated above [3112](A[2]), all divinations seek to
acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and
help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help,
or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain
future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have
been explained in the [3113]FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly
invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes
they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in
order to foretell the future: and this species is called
"prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur].
Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called "divination by
dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead,
and this species is called "necromancy," for as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and {manteia} divination, because
after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem
to come to life, to divine and to answer questions. " Sometimes they
foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are
possessed: this is divination by "pythons," of whom Isidore says that
"pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the
inventor of divination. " Sometimes they foretell the future by means of
shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear
in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called
"geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in
fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the
altars of demons, "aruspicy. "

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who
are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on
which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds
or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of
limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the
chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from
watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be
observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If,
however, these observations have for their object men's words uttered
unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that
he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius
Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens
has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be
founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus
that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their
position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time:
'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here': and on
hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their
intention of advancing further. " If, however, the observation regards
the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies,
there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is
taken from observing the lines of the hand is called "chiromancy," i. e.
divination of the hand (because {cheir} is the Greek for hand): while
the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the
shoulder-blades of an animal is called "spatulamancy. "

To this second species of divination, which is without express
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing
certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult,
whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing
the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by
observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing
upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several
unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by
throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by
observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are
named "sortilege. "

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination.