Reply to
Objection
1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
Summa Theologica
Hence it is stated
(VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod orders that any man
who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life
and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the
episcopate. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on
account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases
through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if,
through the occurrence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal
power remain without the exercise of its act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to
abandon the flock committed to his care?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account
of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the
flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a
hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth
the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev. ) that "the
wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery
oppresses the faithful and the humble. " Therefore if, on account of the
persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from
the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling
and not a shepherd.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be
surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger,"
and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir up thy
friend. " Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): "To be
surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging
oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the
lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his
friend. " Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from
his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account
of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's
state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is
unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake
altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would
seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the
execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting
himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors
bishops are (Mat. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this city,
flee into another. "
I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is
the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the
pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.
Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal
presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person,
since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.
On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently
provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is
lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock,
either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of
some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad
Honorat. ): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to another, when
one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the
Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When,
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of
others must not be abandoned by those whom they need. " For "if it is
dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how
much more so when it is stormy," as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu.
i, can. Sciscitaris).
Reply to Objection 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal
advantage or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's
neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev. ): "A man cannot endanger
himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them
not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he
fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves. " But he
who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the
flock, does not flee as a hireling.
Reply to Objection 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to
fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another.
Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care
of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he
embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and
if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another
kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state.
Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting
himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity offer, and
necessity require it of him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have
property of his own. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go sell all [Vulg. : 'what] thou hast, and give to the poor . .
. and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary
poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of
perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess
anything as their own.
Objection 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the
Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the
apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, "Do
not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses"; wherefore
Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27): "Behold we
have left all things and have followed Thee. " Therefore it would seem
that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of
their own.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian. ): "The Greek
{kleros} denotes the Latin 'sors. ' Hence clerics are so called either
because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is
the estate, i. e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,
can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,
possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord
does not vouchsafe to be his portion also. " Therefore it would seem
that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their
own.
On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):
"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally. "
I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he
binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment. ): "Since you have taken the vow, you have
already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were
bound by the vow, you were free to submit. " Now it is evident that to
live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is
a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying
to the young man: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments," said afterwards by way of addition: "If thou wilt be
perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and give to the poor" (Mat.
19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their
ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does
the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary
for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are
not bound to live without possessions of their own.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3776]Q[184], A[3], ad 1) the
perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in
voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the
perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is
greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest
perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it
was said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have
been rich (Gn. 13:2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in
three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor
silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal
wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,
30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in
permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or
silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of
livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For
the workman is worthy of his meat. " And yet if anyone were to use his
own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of
supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12, 15).
Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.
xvi, 3], we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His
disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach
to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power,
seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of
their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their
successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of
their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he "received wages"
of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is
clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems
foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and
Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed
themselves bound to observe them.
Reply to Objection 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a
man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on
things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world.
Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their
own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the
worship of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the
ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute
not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For
Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp. , among the supposititious works
of St. Jerome] expounding Lk. 12:16, "The land of a certain . . . man
brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no man claim as his own
that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common
property in excess of his requirements"; and afterwards he adds: "It is
not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and
have plenty to refuse him who has not. " Now it is a mortal sin to take
another's property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they
give not to the poor that which they have in excess.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, "The spoil of the
poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the
poor. " Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which
belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.
Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or
friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they
are bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for
oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus
therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can.
Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul.
Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right
that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and
relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those
who have sufficient income from their parents and their own
possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and
incur the guilt of sacrilege. " Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim.
5:16): "If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them,
and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for
them that are widows indeed. " Much more therefore do bishops sin
mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their
ecclesiastical goods.
On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor,
but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue
of the Church.
I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which
bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real
dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the
case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either
keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless
they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them
either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in
accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to
restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.
On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or
trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif. ): "If we possess
privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to
the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim
ownership of them only by wicked theft. " Now dispensing requires good
faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the
dispensers that a man be found faithful. " Moreover ecclesiastical goods
are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the
divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII,
qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the offerings
of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two
parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the
ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining
part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective
merits. " Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the
bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the
poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the
bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the
poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine
worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally,
and is bound to restitution.
But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the
same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins
through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds
moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others
according to the demands of charity.
On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,
their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or
exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his
good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide
precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would
seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it
is written (Mat. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in his
heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's
judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a
sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which proceeds
from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth
not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the fellowship of good
men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites," namely in hell.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the
administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods
whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide
for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely
when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal
sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be
considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to
human prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to
be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other
purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that
they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality if you
overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so
as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor. "
Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to
the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are
to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In
such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain
himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a
patrimony of his own on which to support himself.
Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for
the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus
from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some
future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if
there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future
is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord
Who said (Mat. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious
observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a monk
from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the
holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop. " Now the regular observances
pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed
bishops are not bound to religious observances.
Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree:
thus it was stated above ([3777]Q[88], A[12], ad 1) that a religious is
not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is
appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated
above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound
to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who
are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their
order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to
poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (OBJ[1]) "when the
holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the
lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance. " Moreover they are
sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to
other regular observances.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside
their former purpose. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) the religious state
pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection,
it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor
it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read
and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if
there be among religious observances any that instead of being an
obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such
as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has
been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to
wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.
On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings
and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal
office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to
the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those
among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense
themselves in such matters.
Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as
stated above ([3778]Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are
compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the
particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.
Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops
are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit,
they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so
that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to
obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have
any.
As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according
to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the
sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his
death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
death.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
religious state.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?
(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?
(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?
(4) Whether continency is necessary?
(5) Whether obedience is necessary?
(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?
(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;
(8) Of their comparison one with another;
(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
statute of his rule?
(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion implies a state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one
almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it
takes its name from "our returning [religimus] to God Whom we had lost
by neglecting Him" [*Cf. [3779] Q[81], A[1]], according to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote
the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature. "
Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states,
as stated above ([3780]Q[40], A[2];[3781] Q[183], A[3]). Therefore it
would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the
state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also
some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does
not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it
is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy
synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal
dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
means rise again to the episcopate. " Now a place of repentance is
opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi)
places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
perfection.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot
Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we have to
undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation,
reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount
to the perfection of charity. " Now things pertaining to human acts are
specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore
religious belong to the state of perfection.
Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.
I answer that, As stated above ([3782]Q[141], A[2]) that which is
applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now
religion as stated above ([3783]Q[81] , A[2]; A[3], ad 2) is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "Some there are who
keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess. " Now
the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
above ([3784]Q[184], A[2]), and in this sense religion denotes the
state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is
necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's
possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3785]Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4],
ad 1,2;[3786] Q[85], A[3]) when we were treating of the virtue of
religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices
and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts
of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's
service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes
his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to
religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead,
those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3787]Q[184], AA[4],6) religion
denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it
does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already
perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on
Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc. , says (Tract. viii in
Matth. ) that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to
become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
begin to lead him to all the virtues. " Thus all are not perfect in
religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.
Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that
we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to
penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious
state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap.
Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a
monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do
public penance while remaining in the world.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to
observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes
the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ) that "he who
renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has
gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. " Now it
belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would seem
that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.
Objection 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of
perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil
some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life
fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such
are the counsels.
On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works
of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep
all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to
others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.
I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
essentially, and thus, as stated above ([3788]Q[184], A[3]) the perfect
observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly,
a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that
result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that
curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though
they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one
has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are sometimes
fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of
charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and
dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.
Now it has been stated [3789](A[1]) that the perfection of charity is
the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by
various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he
is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
charity.
For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result
from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to
fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.
In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession
to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even
as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom. " Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with
their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly. " Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.
Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be
omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or
do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion
themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular
better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up
with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be
bound to fulfil all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for
a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays
down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: "If the
will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,"
i. e. "you should keep back what you need," and afterwards he adds (2
Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should be eased, and you
burthened," i. e. "with poverty," according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered," says:
"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not
give up these temporal things altogether. " Therefore it seems that
voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he
who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger---not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name
of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have sinned"---but
also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As wisdom is a
defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's
self, since thereby man lives. " Therefore it would seem that voluntary
poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the
extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act
virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.
Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus.
31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches contribute instrumentally
to happiness. " Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.
Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above
([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.
Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and
as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr. ) "is a most effective
remedy in repentance. " Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it
would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of the
righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of
perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things
without. " Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to
religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very
height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all
outward things by voluntary poverty.
I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God:
"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he
loveth not for Thee. " Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no
cupidity. " Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to
the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras. )
that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them
than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad,
save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to
lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off
as a limb. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ) that "the
possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it
becomes stronger. "
Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21),
"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and
give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. "
Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this
(namely "not that you should be burthened," i. e. with poverty)," he did
not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation. " Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed
the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might
hold him back. "
Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's
sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary;
because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of
money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that
will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil. " This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves
to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not
weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary. "
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the
mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance,
or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right
reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the
contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have
done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.
(VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod orders that any man
who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life
and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the
episcopate. "
Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on
account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases
through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if,
through the occurrence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal
power remain without the exercise of its act.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to
abandon the flock committed to his care?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account
of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the
flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a
hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth
the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev. ) that "the
wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery
oppresses the faithful and the humble. " Therefore if, on account of the
persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from
the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling
and not a shepherd.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be
surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger,"
and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir up thy
friend. " Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): "To be
surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging
oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the
lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his
friend. " Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from
his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account
of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.
Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's
state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is
unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake
altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would
seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the
execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting
himself to works of perfection in a monastery.
On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors
bishops are (Mat. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this city,
flee into another. "
I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is
the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the
pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.
Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal
presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person,
since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.
On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently
provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is
lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock,
either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of
some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad
Honorat. ): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to another, when
one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the
Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When,
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of
others must not be abandoned by those whom they need. " For "if it is
dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how
much more so when it is stormy," as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu.
i, can. Sciscitaris).
Reply to Objection 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal
advantage or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's
neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev. ): "A man cannot endanger
himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them
not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he
fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves. " But he
who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the
flock, does not flee as a hireling.
Reply to Objection 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to
fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another.
Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care
of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.
Reply to Objection 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he
embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and
if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another
kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state.
Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting
himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity offer, and
necessity require it of him.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have
property of his own. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go sell all [Vulg. : 'what] thou hast, and give to the poor . .
. and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary
poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of
perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess
anything as their own.
Objection 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the
Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the
apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, "Do
not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses"; wherefore
Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27): "Behold we
have left all things and have followed Thee. " Therefore it would seem
that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of
their own.
Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian. ): "The Greek
{kleros} denotes the Latin 'sors. ' Hence clerics are so called either
because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is
the estate, i. e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,
can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,
possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord
does not vouchsafe to be his portion also. " Therefore it would seem
that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their
own.
On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):
"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally. "
I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he
binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment. ): "Since you have taken the vow, you have
already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were
bound by the vow, you were free to submit. " Now it is evident that to
live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is
a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying
to the young man: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the
commandments," said afterwards by way of addition: "If thou wilt be
perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and give to the poor" (Mat.
19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their
ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does
the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary
for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are
not bound to live without possessions of their own.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3776]Q[184], A[3], ad 1) the
perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in
voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the
perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is
greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest
perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it
was said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have
been rich (Gn. 13:2).
Reply to Objection 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in
three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor
silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal
wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.
Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,
30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in
permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or
silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of
livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For
the workman is worthy of his meat. " And yet if anyone were to use his
own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of
supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12, 15).
Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.
xvi, 3], we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His
disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach
to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power,
seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of
their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their
successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of
their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he "received wages"
of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is
clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems
foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and
Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed
themselves bound to observe them.
Reply to Objection 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a
man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on
things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world.
Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their
own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the
worship of God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the
ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?
Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute
not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For
Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp. , among the supposititious works
of St. Jerome] expounding Lk. 12:16, "The land of a certain . . . man
brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no man claim as his own
that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common
property in excess of his requirements"; and afterwards he adds: "It is
not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and
have plenty to refuse him who has not. " Now it is a mortal sin to take
another's property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they
give not to the poor that which they have in excess.
Objection 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, "The spoil of the
poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the
poor. " Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which
belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.
Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or
friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they
are bound to restitution.
Objection 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for
oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus
therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can.
Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul.
Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right
that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and
relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those
who have sufficient income from their parents and their own
possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and
incur the guilt of sacrilege. " Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim.
5:16): "If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them,
and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for
them that are widows indeed. " Much more therefore do bishops sin
mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their
ecclesiastical goods.
On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor,
but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue
of the Church.
I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which
bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real
dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the
case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either
keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless
they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them
either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in
accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to
restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.
On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or
trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif. ): "If we possess
privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to
the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim
ownership of them only by wicked theft. " Now dispensing requires good
faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the
dispensers that a man be found faithful. " Moreover ecclesiastical goods
are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the
divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII,
qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the offerings
of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two
parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the
ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining
part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective
merits. " Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the
bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the
poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the
bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the
poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine
worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally,
and is bound to restitution.
But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the
same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins
through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds
moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others
according to the demands of charity.
On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,
their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or
exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his
good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide
precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would
seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it
is written (Mat. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in his
heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's
judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a
sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which proceeds
from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth
not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the fellowship of good
men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites," namely in hell.
Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the
administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods
whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide
for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely
when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal
sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be
considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to
human prudence.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to
be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other
purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that
they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality if you
overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so
as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor. "
Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to
the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are
to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In
such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain
himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a
patrimony of his own on which to support himself.
Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for
the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus
from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some
future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if
there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future
is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord
Who said (Mat. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious
observances?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a monk
from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the
holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop. " Now the regular observances
pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed
bishops are not bound to religious observances.
Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree:
thus it was stated above ([3777]Q[88], A[12], ad 1) that a religious is
not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is
appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated
above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound
to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.
Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who
are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their
order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to
poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (OBJ[1]) "when the
holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the
lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance. " Moreover they are
sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to
other regular observances.
On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside
their former purpose. "
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) the religious state
pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection,
it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor
it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read
and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if
there be among religious observances any that instead of being an
obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such
as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has
been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to
wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.
On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings
and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal
office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to
the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those
among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense
themselves in such matters.
Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is
loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything,
but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.
Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as
stated above ([3778]Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are
compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the
particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.
Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops
are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit,
they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so
that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to
obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have
any.
As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according
to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.
Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the
sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his
death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
death.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
religious state.
Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?
(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?
(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?
(4) Whether continency is necessary?
(5) Whether obedience is necessary?
(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?
(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;
(8) Of their comparison one with another;
(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
statute of his rule?
(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religion implies a state of perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one
almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it
takes its name from "our returning [religimus] to God Whom we had lost
by neglecting Him" [*Cf. [3779] Q[81], A[1]], according to Augustine (De
Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote
the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature. "
Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states,
as stated above ([3780]Q[40], A[2];[3781] Q[183], A[3]). Therefore it
would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the
state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also
some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does
not denote the state of perfection.
Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it
is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy
synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal
dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no
means rise again to the episcopate. " Now a place of repentance is
opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi)
places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
perfection.
On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot
Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we have to
undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation,
reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount
to the perfection of charity. " Now things pertaining to human acts are
specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore
religious belong to the state of perfection.
Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.
I answer that, As stated above ([3782]Q[141], A[2]) that which is
applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now
religion as stated above ([3783]Q[81] , A[2]; A[3], ad 2) is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "Some there are who
keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess. " Now
the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
above ([3784]Q[184], A[2]), and in this sense religion denotes the
state of perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is
necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's
possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3785]Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4],
ad 1,2;[3786] Q[85], A[3]) when we were treating of the virtue of
religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices
and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts
of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's
service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes
his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to
religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead,
those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3787]Q[184], AA[4],6) religion
denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it
does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already
perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on
Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc. , says (Tract. viii in
Matth. ) that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to
become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
begin to lead him to all the virtues. " Thus all are not perfect in
religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.
Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that
we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to
penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious
state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap.
Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a
monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do
public penance while remaining in the world.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?
Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to
observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes
the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ) that "he who
renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has
gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness. " Now it
belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would seem
that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.
Objection 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of
perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil
some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life
fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such
are the counsels.
On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works
of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep
all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to
others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.
I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
essentially, and thus, as stated above ([3788]Q[184], A[3]) the perfect
observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly,
a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that
result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that
curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though
they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one
has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are sometimes
fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of
charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and
dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.
Now it has been stated [3789](A[1]) that the perfection of charity is
the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by
various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he
is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
charity.
For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result
from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to
fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.
In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.
Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession
to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even
as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom. " Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with
their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly. " Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.
Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be
omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or
do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion
themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular
better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up
with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be
bound to fulfil all of them.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?
Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for
a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays
down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: "If the
will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,"
i. e. "you should keep back what you need," and afterwards he adds (2
Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should be eased, and you
burthened," i. e. "with poverty," according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered," says:
"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not
give up these temporal things altogether. " Therefore it seems that
voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he
who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger---not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name
of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have sinned"---but
also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As wisdom is a
defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's
self, since thereby man lives. " Therefore it would seem that voluntary
poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.
Objection 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the
extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act
virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.
Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus.
31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches contribute instrumentally
to happiness. " Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.
Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above
([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.
Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and
as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr. ) "is a most effective
remedy in repentance. " Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it
would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of the
righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of
perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things
without. " Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to
religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very
height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all
outward things by voluntary poverty.
I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God:
"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he
loveth not for Thee. " Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no
cupidity. " Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to
the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras. )
that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them
than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad,
save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to
lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off
as a limb. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ) that "the
possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it
becomes stronger. "
Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21),
"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and
give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. "
Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this
(namely "not that you should be burthened," i. e. with poverty)," he did
not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation. " Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed
the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might
hold him back. "
Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's
sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary;
because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of
money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that
will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil. " This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves
to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not
weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary. "
Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the
mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance,
or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right
reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the
contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have
done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.
